Landmine Monitor 2005

Banning Antipersonnel Mines

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty ever. Since 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later. For a state that ratifies (having become a signatory prior to 1 March) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that state deposited its instrument of ratification. That state is then required to make its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.


Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 147 States Parties, a total of 80 states ratified or acceded to the treaty after its entry into force on 1 March 1999.[1] The numbers of states that ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for signature are as follows: 1997 (December only)—3; 1998—55; 1999—32 (23 after 1 March); 2000—19; 2001—13; 2002—8; 2003—11; 2004—3; 2005 (as of October) —3.

Four states joined the treaty since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2004. Ethiopia ratified in December 2004, Latvia acceded in July 2005, Bhutan acceded in August 2005, and Vanuatu ratified in September 2005. Ethiopia’s ratification leaves Somalia as the only sub-Saharan African country not party to the treaty. Ethiopia is mine-affected and deployed antipersonnel mines during its 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea, but has now foresworn the weapon. With Latvia’s accession, all three Baltic states have joined the treaty. Latvia has reported possession of a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Bhutan is the second country from the South Asian sub-continent to become a State Party, joining Bangladesh. Vanuatu provides a positive example for the six Pacific Island states that are not yet party to the treaty.

There are seven states that have signed, but not yet ratified the treaty: Brunei, Cook Islands, Haiti, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Poland and Ukraine. There are positive indications from most of these states that they will ratify the treaty in the near-term. The Parliament of Ukraine approved a national ratification law in May 2005; it has been signed by the President but not yet officially deposited with the United Nations. Poland changed its policy on joining the treaty in 2004 and announced at the First Review Conference in December 2004 that it has begun the national ratification process. In June 2005, an interdepartmental working group in Indonesia reached a consensus in favor of ratification and submitted to the President a recommendation to proceed with ratification.

Also in June 2005, a Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told the ICBL that ratification legislation passed by the national parliament would be printed in the government gazette very soon, one of the last steps required for Haiti to ratify; Haiti attended the June 2005 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, its first participation in a treaty-related meeting. There were indications that the ratification process in Brunei had reached its final stage in August 2004, but no further progress has been reported. No apparent progress has been made toward ratification by the Cook Islands and Marshall Islands.

There have been encouraging developments in many of the non-signatory nations around the world as well.

In Africa: The Prime Minister of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government attended the First Review Conference, where he confirmed the government’s intention to join the treaty.

In the Asia-Pacific region: The ICBL was informed that the executive branch of the Federated States of Micronesia completed a review of the Mine Ban Treaty and intended to send the agreement to the Congress for accession in September 2005. In July 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Laos expressed its intent to accede, but noted that it requires some time to prepare the necessary steps in meeting its obligations. Mongolia has agreed on a step-by-step approach aimed at accession in 2008. In October 2004, the then-President of Mongolia denounced the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of landmines during an official visit to Canada. India attended the First Review Conference and the June 2005 intersessional meetings, its first participation in treaty-related meetings. China expressed its desire to expand cooperation with Mine Ban Treaty States Parties and sent a high level observer delegation to the Review Conference.

In the Commonwealth of Independent States: Azerbaijan has expressed greater support for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Deputy Foreign Minister has indicated Azerbaijan will prepare a voluntary Article 7 report and will vote in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in 2005. In Georgia, a Deputy Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in May 2005 that the issue of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty has been under re-consideration, and the Deputy Minister of Defense said that Georgia intends to destroy all of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines. In May 2005, a Foreign Ministry official in Kyrgyzstan noted that the issue of joining the Mine Ban Treaty will receive in-depth study by the new government due to its changed circumstances.

In the Middle East-North Africa region: The transitional government of Iraq is studying accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, and has made a number of statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines. It voted in favor of the annual UNGA pro-ban resolution in December 2004 supporting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, and attended both the First Review Conference and the June 2005 intersessional meetings. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Bahrain for the first time indicated there were no major impediments to joining the treaty, and said internal processes to consider accession were underway. In June 2005, a Kuwaiti official reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense had both recommended acceding to the treaty. In September 2004, senior officials in the United Arab Emirates said there were no serious reservations against joining the treaty and indicated the UAE had initiated a study to examine it in all aspects. At the first landmine seminar in Libya in May 2005, the President of the Gaddafi Foundation for Charitable Associations, who is also the son of Libya’s President, called for the country to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. At the First Review Conference, Egypt for the first time officially announced a moratorium on the production of antipersonnel mines.

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly resolutions calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 59/84 was adopted on 3 December 2004 by a vote of 157 in favor, none opposed, and 22 abstentions.[2] This is the highest number of votes in favor of this annual resolution since 1997 when it was first introduced.[3] Twenty-three states not party to the treaty voted in favor. This included the four countries that subsequently became States Parties (Bhutan, Ethiopia, Latvia and Vanuatu), five signatory countries (Brunei, Haiti, Indonesia, Poland and Ukraine), and 14 non-signatories (Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Iraq, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu and the United Arab Emirates). Notable among this latter group are Iraq, Morocco, Somalia and Tuvalu, all of whom voted in favor of the annual resolution for the first time.

Despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines, there were also discouraging actions among some of the 40 states not party to the treaty. Most egregious, government forces in Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia have continued to use antipersonnel mines on a regular basis, and it appears Georgian forces used antipersonnel mines in 2004. In September 2004, Finland announced that it would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until 2012, six years later than its previously stated goal. The United States has been developing new landmine systems that are incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty, and is due to make a production decision on one type in December 2005.

Non-State Armed Groups

There is ever-increasing awareness of the need to involve non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the global efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. It is noteworthy that during the June 2005 intersessional meetings, 16 governments, the UN Mine Action Service and ICRC referred to non-state armed groups and their impact on the landmine ban in their presentations. NSAGs were discussed in some fashion in all four of the Standing Committees.

Non-state armed groups have used unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, and signature to the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment to indicate their willingness to observe a landmine ban.[4] NSAGs in three States Parties (Philippines, Senegal and Sudan) have agreed to abide by a ban on antipersonnel mines.

Geneva Call has received signatures from 27 non-state armed groups, many of them in Somalia, since 2001. The signatories are in Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia and Sudan. The Juba Valley Alliance, a faction in Somalia, signed the deed in January 2005.

Four groups which had earlier indicated a willingness to abide by a landmine ban and signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment are now part of their state's governing authorities of their states. This includes the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, the Conseil National pour le Défense de la Démocratie ― Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) in Burundi, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Iraq; PUK leader Jalal Talibani now serves as President of Iraq.

First Review Conference

The landmark First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the “Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World,” was one of the most significant events in the life of the treaty since it became international law on 1 March 1999. Held in Kenya from 29 November to 3 December 2004, this was the biggest and highest level gathering on landmines of governments and NGOs since the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada on 3 December 1997. The final day of the Review Conference was timed to coincide with the seventh anniversary of the signing of the treaty.

From the ICBL perspective, the main purpose of the First Review Conference was to re-invigorate the international community with respect to efforts to eradicate antipersonnel mines―to increase governmental and public awareness, to get governments to re-commit on the issue and express their ongoing political and financial commitment, so that the job gets done.

An unprecedented number of participants, more than 1,300 people, attended the Nairobi Summit. Over 350 NGO representatives from 82 countries were present, including more than 50 landmine survivors and 40 youth from 24 countries. This was the largest gathering of NGOs related to landmines ever, and demonstrated the continued strength and vitality of the ICBL, and its long-term commitment to solving the landmine problem.

A total of 135 governments participated, including 110 States Parties. Many States Parties responded favorably to the call for high level delegations, with five heads of state, six deputy heads of state and 20 ministers participating. This was by far the highest level landmine meeting since 1997, though it fell short of the hopes and expectations of some in terms of high level participation.

A large number (27) of non-States Parties also participated, especially from Asia (Brunei, Bhutan, China, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu) and the Middle East (Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia). Five non-States Parties from Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States attended (Finland, Poland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine), as well as Cuba and Somalia. Ethiopia, which signed the treaty in 1997, announced its ratification on the opening day.

The ICBL was pleased to hear during the High Level Segment so many strong statements from senior officials emphasizing ongoing and long-term support for both universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty and implementation of its provisions, including mine clearance and victim assistance. There were disappointingly few concrete, multi-year pledges for mine action funding (in contrast to the signing ceremony in 1997), but many donor states indicated continued financial commitment.

The Nairobi Summit considered and adopted four key documents: a Five-Year Review Document, Five-Year Action Plan, the Nairobi Declaration, and a Programme of Meetings for 2005-2009. The 80+ page Review Document is thorough in an unprecedented way. It is noteworthy not just for the impressive amount of information on activities, accomplishments, and difficulties of the past five years, but also for setting out the main challenges for the years ahead. The ICBL views the Action Plan for the period 2005-2009 as easily the best Action Plan developed to date, providing a solid framework for ensuring ongoing progress in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and in tackling all aspects of the global mine problem. The Action Plan is the main concrete outcome of the Summit.

The Nairobi Declaration is a very strong document emphasizing the renewed commitment of States Parties to achieve “a world free of antipersonnel mines, in which there will be zero new victims.” It declares that states “have established a powerful international norm” against antipersonnel mines, and that they will “condemn any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor.” The Declaration recognizes the importance of the “unique spirit of cooperation between states, international organizations and civil society,” and pledges that “we shall persevere until this unique Convention has been universally applied and its aims fully achieved.”

Implementation and Intersessional Work Program

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty’s provisions. Structures created to monitor progress towards implementation, and to allow discussion between States Parties of issues arising, include annual Meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program, a coordinating committee, contact groups on universalization, on resource mobilization and on Articles 7 and 9, the sponsorship program, and an implementation support unit.

The Programme of Meetings 2005-2009 document agreed to in Nairobi calls for continued annual Meetings of States Parties, including in mine-affected countries when possible or appropriate, for one week-long intersessional meeting of the Standing Committees each year (instead of two, as in previous years), and for a Second Review Conference in 2009. The ICBL supported this schedule. It was also decided that the Sixth Meeting of States Parties will be held in Croatia from 28 November to 2 December 2005.

In Nairobi, States Parties also agreed that the new co-chairs and co-rapporteurs for the Standing Committees would be as follows: General Status and Operation: New Zealand and South Africa as co-chairs and Belgium and Guatemala as co-rapporteurs; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies: Algeria and Sweden as co-chairs and Jordan and Slovenia as co-rapporteurs; Stockpile Destruction: Bangladesh and Canada as co-chairs and Japan and Tanzania as co-rapporteurs; Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Nicaragua and Norway as co-chairs and Afghanistan and Switzerland as co-rapporteurs.

The Standing Committees met in Geneva from 13-17 June 2005. Details on Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various thematic areas.

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)[5]

A total of 85 countries were States Parties to Amended Protocol II of CCW, as of 1 October 2005. Amended Protocol II regulates landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices; it took effect on 3 December 1998. Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela joined Amended Protocol II since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2004. Only 10 of the 84 States Parties to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka and the United States.

China, Latvia, Pakistan, and most recently Russia deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex.[6] China and Pakistan are obligated to be compliant by 3 December 2007; neither has provided detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability requirement. Russia must come into compliance by 2014. Latvia’s deferral is now presumably irrelevant due to its accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, which prohibits the use of such mines and requires their destruction.

China, Pakistan, Ukraine, and most recently Belarus and Russia deferred compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex.[7] Their respective nine-year deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, 15 May 2008 for Ukraine, and 2014 for Russia. Ukraine, a signatory of the Mine Ban Treaty, is taking steps to destroy its stockpile of nearly six million PFM-type remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. Belarus is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM and KPOM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008.

In December 2003, CCW States Parties agreed to adopt Protocol V, a legally binding instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for explosive remnants of war (ERW). As of 1 October 2005, 13 states had ratified Protocol V.[8] In the CCW, work on mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM) and on measures to prevent specific weapons, including cluster munitions, from becoming explosive remnants of war continued in 2004 and 2005.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon, rather than the devastatingly common occurrence witnessed decade after decade from the mid-20th century onward.

In this reporting period, since May 2004, three governments are confirmed to have used antipersonnel mines: Myanmar (Burma), Nepal and Russia. There is also strong evidence that Georgian forces used antipersonnel mines in 2004, although there have been no allegations regarding Georgia in 2005. These were the same governments identified as using antipersonnel mines in the previous Landmine Monitor reporting period.

Myanmar’s military forces continued to use antipersonnel mines extensively. In its five-year review, Landmine Monitor Report 2004 identified Myanmar as one of only two governments, along with Russia, to have used antipersonnel mines consistently throughout the period. There is evidence that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, although in August 2005, Russian military officials told Landmine Monitor that Russian Ministry of Defense forces have not used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in 2004 or 2005. They could not comment on whether other Russian forces have used them in that time. Previously, the Russian government has said that it only uses mines in Chechnya in cases of “dire necessity.”

In Nepal, it appears that use of mines and improvised explosive devices by security forces—including the Royal Nepalese Army, the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force—expanded in 2004 and 2005 as the civil war intensified, particularly after King Gyanendra seized power in February 2005. Despite a formal moratorium on use of antipersonnel mines, it appears that Georgian forces used them in September 2004 when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) expressed concern about new mine-laying by both Georgian and South Ossetian forces.

There is no evidence—or even serious allegation—of use of antipersonnel mines by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties or signatories in this reporting period.[9] This is notable in that many current States Parties have either admitted using, or there are credible allegations of their using, antipersonnel mines in the recent past, before joining the treaty, some even as signatories.[10]

Use by Non-State Armed Groups

It is clear that use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups is now far more widespread than use by government forces. In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least 13 countries.

NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was reported in five States Parties (Burundi, Colombia, Philippines, Turkey and Uganda) and in eight non-States Parties (Burma/Myanmar, Georgia, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia and Russia, including in Chechnya, Dagestan and North Ossetia).

In addition, small-scale, isolated or sporadic use by NSAGs and/or individuals was reported in Afghanistan, Egypt, Sri Lanka and Yemen. In most cases, Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm these instances of use of antipersonnel mines.

Compared to last year’s Landmine Monitor report, use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs was no longer recorded in Bhutan, Bolivia, DR Congo or Perú. Landmine Monitor Report 2004 also noted allegations of mine use by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sudan and Yemen.[11] Noted this year is more extensive use by NSAGs in Pakistan.[12]

In Colombia, the FARC continued to be the biggest user of landmines in the country, and among the biggest in the world. Other groups, notably the ELN and the paramilitary AUC also used mines. In Burma/Myanmar, two armed groups not previously reported to be mine users were identified, making a total of 12 non-state armed groups using antipersonnel landmines in the ongoing civil war. The two newly identified groups, the Karenni People’s National Liberation Front and the Karenni National Solidarity Organization, fought in support of the military.

In India, a variety of non-state armed groups continued to use antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines and, most commonly, improvised explosive devices in the northwest border state of Jammu and Kashmir, in the center of the country (Communist insurgents), and in northeast India, where Burmese rebels have planted mines inside India and various independence movements have deployed IEDs. In Pakistan, several non-state armed groups used landmines and improvised explosive devices regularly, most notably in Baluchistan, Waziristan Agency and elsewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

In Nepal, mine/IED incidents attributed to the Maoists reportedly took place in 73 out of 75 districts in 2004. One of the localized civilian militias known as Village Defense Forces said it laid 1,500 mines in its area of operation. In the Philippines, the New People’s Army continued to use command-detonated mines and improvised explosive devices; it denied using victim-activated mines. There were also reports of continued antipersonnel mine use by the Abu Sayyaf Group. Following a resumption of fighting for the first time since 1996, the Moro National Liberation Front acknowledged using antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

In Burundi, the government continued to accuse the FNL rebels of using antipersonnel mines; the increased number of mine casualties, particularly in Bujumbura Rural province where fighting has been taking place, indicates ongoing use of antipersonnel mines. In Somalia, there has been ongoing use of antipersonnel landmines in various parts of the country by a number of factions. In Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army continued to use antipersonnel mines and there were reports of Army seizures of antipersonnel mines from the People’s Redemption Army.

In Georgia, the OSCE expressed concern in September 2004 about new mine-laying by South Ossetian as well as Georgian forces. In Russia, there appears to have been a considerable increase in rebel mine and IED attacks in Dagestan, especially in the first half of 2005. Chechen rebels continued to use IEDs and mines, including in the notorious incident in Beslan, North Ossetia in September 2004.

In Turkey, use of landmines by the PKK led to both civilian and military casualties; from March 2004 to March 2005, Turkey reported 148 military casualties due to landmines laid by the PKK and related groups. In Iraq, opposition forces have used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and, most frequently, IEDs—both command-detonated and victim-activated. In August 2005, a US official said IED attacks were up 100 percent from the previous year.

Use of antivehicle mines by non-state armed groups was reported in at least eight countries: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Eritrea, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and Turkey. Non-state armed groups continued to manufacture and use a wide variety of improvised explosive devices, both victim-activated (which are de facto antipersonnel mines) and command-detonated.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines since May 2004

Sub-Saharan Africa
Central Asia
Middle East/
North Africa
FNL rebels
LRA rebels
FARC and other rebels, AUC paramilitaries
Burma/Myanmar: government and 12 rebel groups
India: rebels
Pakistan: rebels
Nepal: government and Maoist rebels
New People's Army, MNLF, ASG rebels
Georgia: government and NSAGs
Russia: government and rebels (in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Dagestan)
PKK rebels

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.[13] Thirty-eight states have ceased the production of antipersonnel mines.[14] This includes five countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Iraq, Israel and Poland. Taiwan has also stopped production. A total of 24 treaty members, with the addition of Zimbabwe in this reporting period, have reported on the status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of antipersonnel mine production facilities.[15]

Landmine Monitor Report 2004 identified 13 countries that continued to produce, or retain the right to produce, antipersonnel landmines. During this reporting period, since May 2004, Landmine Monitor has received sufficient information from public and private statements by government officials and other sources to remove Egypt and Iraq from the producers’ list. This is the third time Landmine Monitor has adjusted its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines.[16]

Antipersonnel Landmine Producers

Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam

At the First Review Conference, Egypt’s Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister stated that “the Egyptian government has imposed a moratorium on all export and production activities related to anti-personnel mines.” This was the first time that Egypt publicly and officially announced a moratorium on production. Egyptian officials have unofficially said for a number of years that Egypt stopped producing antipersonnel mines in 1988.

An Iraqi diplomat told Landmine Monitor in 2004 that all mine production capacity had been destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign. Other sources have confirmed that information. Given the destruction of Iraq’s production facilities, and the government’s statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor has decided to remove Iraq from the list of countries producing antipersonnel mines, but still awaits an official statement regarding a prohibition on production of antipersonnel mines.

South Korea has stated it has not produced any mines since 2000. The Director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran does not produce landmines, echoing an assertion from the Ministry of Defense in 2002 that Iran has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988. However, mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have since 2002 found many hundreds of Iranian antipersonnel mines date stamped 1999 and 2000.

The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997. However, it has been conducting research and development on new landmines. A decision will be made in December 2005 whether the US will begin producing a new antipersonnel mine called Spider. Spider contains a “battlefield override” feature that allows for activation by the victim (target), thus making it illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty. The Pentagon requested a total of $1.77 billion for research on and production of new landmine systems over the next five years.

India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW, including in Pakistan’s case new remotely delivered mine systems. In August 2005, India told Landmine Monitor that it is not producing remotely delivered antipersonnel mines; it had stated in October 2000 that it had designed a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, with self-destructing and self-deactivating mines, for trial evaluation and prototype production.

Non-state armed groups in Burma and Colombia are known to produce victim-activated mines or IEDs. Command-detonated, and possibly victim-activated, IEDs were produced by NSAGs in Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Nepal, Philippines, Somalia and Chechnya. NSAGs in other countries also likely produced their own mines/IEDs, but specific documentation is lacking. The LTTE in Sri Lanka produced large quantities of landmines in the past. They have not renounced production and the current status of manufacturing capability is unknown.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer or export of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon, the unilateral actions of key countries, and the subsequent implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has not documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since then. It is believed that the trade in antipersonnel mines has dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged trade.

In this reporting period, a UN investigative panel reported that landmines were being shipped to Somalia from unknown sources in Ethiopia and Yemen, in violation of the UN embargo. Another UN panel reported that rebels in the DR Congo obtained mines from Ugandan forces, a claim strongly denied by the Ugandan government. A Burundi official alleged that rebels were acquiring mines from unnamed sources in the DR Congo. Pakistan claims that mines it seized from Baluchi rebels were smuggled by armed groups from Afghanistan.

As noted above, at the First Review Conference, Egypt stated publicly and officially for the first time that it has a moratorium on export of antipersonnel mines; it had previously said unofficially that it had not exported since 1985. In July 2005, Israel extended for another three years its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines which was first declared in 1994. A significant number of other states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted or extended export moratoria in recent years including China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States.

In July 2004, the United States announced its intent to pursue negotiations on an international ban on the sale or export of non self-destructing landmines in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). Canada noted that the 42 CD member states that are already part of the Mine Ban Treaty “will not be in a position to enter negotiations on a lesser ban, aimed at arresting trade in one category of antipersonnel mines alone but implying the acceptability of trade in other categories of these weapons.”[17] The CD has not been able to agree on its agenda since 1997.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, 131 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. These global totals have been dramatically reduced since that time. Landmine Monitor now estimates that 54 countries stockpile about 180 million antipersonnel mines.[18] The most notable development in this reporting period is that Russia for the first time disclosed its stockpile total of 26.5 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor previously estimated that Russia stockpiled 50 million antipersonnel mines.

Moreover, States Parties destroyed more than 400,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in this reporting period, and non-States Parties, including China, destroyed an unknown additional number.

States Parties

A total of 81 states party to the Mine Ban Treaty have declared possessing stockpiles of antipersonnel mines at some point. Of these, 69 States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles.[19] Those who have completed most recently include Bangladesh (February 2005), Mauritania (December 2004), Uruguay (December 2004), Colombia (October 2004), Zambia (October 2004), and Tanzania (July 2004).

States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 38.3 million antipersonnel mines.[20] Italy destroyed the most mines (7.1 million), followed by Turkmenistan (6.6 million). Albania, France, Germany, Japan, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom each destroyed more than one million antipersonnel mines.

The 12 States Parties that have declared still possessing stockpiles of antipersonnel mines include Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Burundi, Cyprus, DR Congo, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan and Turkey. All report that their antipersonnel mines are in the process of being destroyed.[21] Algeria is scheduled to complete the destruction of its remaining 8,589 stockpiled mines in November 2005. Guinea-Bissau planned to destroy its mines in October 2005. These states possess upwards of 11 million antipersonnel mines, including Belarus (4.5 million), Turkey (2.9 million), Greece (1.5 million), and Serbia and Montenegro (1.32 million).

Landmine Monitor believes that three other States Parties also possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines: Ethiopia, Guyana, and Latvia. Cameroon may also fall into this category. These states have yet to submit Article 7 reports that officially declare the existence of stockpiled mines. Cameroon’s report was due August 2003, Guyana’s was due July 2004, Ethiopia’s is due November 2005, and Latvia’s is due June 2006.

Landmine Monitor has previously estimated a stockpile of 20,000 mines for Guyana. Latvia has declared a small stockpile inherited from the Soviet Union in its voluntary transparency reports. Ethiopia is known to have had a substantial stockpile of antipersonnel mines in the past, but the current status is not known. Cameroon has provided conflicting information regarding stockpiled mines, mines retained for training, and mines destroyed.[22]

Pending Stockpile Destruction Deadlines

1 Nov 2005
1 Apr 2006
DR Congo
1 Nov 2006
1 Jan 2007
1 Mar 2007
1 Mar 2007
1 July 2007
1 Feb 2008
1 Mar 2008
1 Mar 2008
Serbia & Montenegro
1 Mar 2008
1 Mar 2008
1 Apr 2008
1 Apr 2008
1 Jun 2009
1 Jan 2010

Four other states that Landmine Monitor does not believe have stockpiles (Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, and São Tomé e Principe) have nevertheless not officially declared the presence or absence of stockpiles, due to their failure to submit an initial Article 7 report. Equatorial Guinea has passed its deadline of 1 March 2003 for destroying any stockpiled antipersonnel mines and has not informed States Parties of compliance with this core obligation.

A number of States Parties, most notably Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia, have discovered and destroyed previously unknown stockpiles of antipersonnel mines after formally completing their destruction programs. Cambodia newly discovered and destroyed 15,446 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2004, a larger number than any year since the destruction program was completed in 1999. The Mine Ban Treaty does not explicitly deal with this phenomenon. However, Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: “When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.” The ICBL has stressed the importance of timely destruction of these newly found mines, no later than one year after discovery, and of complete transparency about numbers and types discovered and the destruction process; it has suggested this information should be transmitted immediately to the Implementation Support Unit and Stockpile Destruction Standing Committee co-chairs.

A total of 57 States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.[23] Since May 2004, Central African Republic, Estonia, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, have officially confirmed that they do not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.


Landmine Monitor estimates that four of the seven signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile approximately seven million antipersonnel mines. The majority of these mines are held by Ukraine (5.95 million) and Poland (996,860). Indonesia in May 2002 revealed that it has a stockpile of 16,000 antipersonnel mines. Brunei has acknowledged possessing antipersonnel mines, possibly Claymore-type only. It is unlikely that the other three signatories stockpile antipersonnel mines (Cook Islands, Haiti and Marshall Islands).

The European Commission decided in 2004 to fund the destruction of Ukraine’s 5.9 million PFM mines, and in June 2005, following the completion of ratification procedures by Ukraine’s Parliament and President, the EC announced that it had concluded the negotiation of the terms of reference of a €6 million (some US$7.5 million) project to destroy the mines. The Ministry of Defense of Poland said in July 2005 there were no obstacles to destruction of Poland’s stockpile and estimated that the destruction should not take more than two years.


Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (26.5 million) and the United States (10.4 million). Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million), India (estimated 4-5 million) and South Korea (2 million). Other states not party to the treaty believed to have large stockpiles are Burma, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Syria and Vietnam.

Russia for the first time disclosed the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpile is 26.5 million, of which 23.5 million are subject to destruction by 2015. Russia reported that it destroyed or disposed of approximately 19.5 million antipersonnel mines between 2000 and November 2004.

Non-State Armed Groups

During this reporting period, non-state armed groups were reported to possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen and Chechnya.

Most often, these stockpiles were reported as part of seizures by government forces. Landmines were seized from or turned in by NSAGs, or unidentified sources, in 12 States Parties. Only three of these States Parties reported such acquisitions in their Article 7 report: Burundi, Sudan and Turkey. The other States Parties to seize mines or have them turned in were Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Uganda and Yemen. These states have not reported on their acquisition or destruction of antipersonnel mines.

Hussein Mohamed Aideed, former warlord and now Deputy Prime Minister of the new Transitional National Government of Somalia, stated that his militia possessed 3,500 landmines, and he estimated that mines in the possession of other militias in the capital to total around 10,000. In June 2005, he informed States Parties of his decision to destroy the antipersonnel mines held by his militia.

Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)

Of the 147 States Parties, 74 retain over 248,000 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Burundi, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, and Turkey have joined this list since publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2004.[24]

At least 64 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines, with the recent additions of Central African Republic, Estonia, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, St. Vincent and Grenadines, and Turkmenistan.[25] Nine States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines.[26]

During the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and during Standing Committee discussions from 1999-2004, most States Parties have agreed that mines retained should number in the hundreds or thousands or less, but not tens of thousands.

Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines: Brazil (16,125), Turkey (16,000), Algeria (15,030), Bangladesh (14,999) and Sweden (14,798). Turkey is the recent addition to those retaining far more mines than is standard state practice.

A total of ten States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Australia (7,465), Greece (7,224), Japan (6,946), Croatia (6,400), Namibia (6,151), Belarus (6,030), Chile (5,895), and Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan and Tunisia (5,000 each). Serbia and Montenegro and Sudan are recent additions to this list. In June 2004, signatory Indonesia indicated its intent to retain 10,000 mines for training purposes after it becomes a State Party.

The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.[27] The notable addition to this group is Afghanistan, which had initially indicated that it would not retain any mines, but reversed its decision and reported retaining 1,076 antipersonnel mines for the training of mine detection dogs. Another 18 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines.[28]

A total of 24 States Parties reported consuming 6,761 mines for training and research purposes in 2004.[29] In 2003, 17 States Parties reported consuming 3,112 mines. In 2002, 16 States Parties reported consuming 2,540 mines.

At least 36 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in 2004: Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Mali, Moldova, Mozambique, Nigeria, Perú, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe. A total of 26 States Parties did not report consuming any mines in 2003; 29 did not consume any in 2002.

It is worth noting that the list of States Parties for 2004 includes at least 10 that retain over 1,000 mines and have not reported consuming any mines for research or training purposes for two or more consecutive years, including: Algeria, Djibouti, Hungary, Jordan, Mozambique, Perú, Portugal, Thailand, Tunisia and Yemen.

The ICBL believes that states that retain antipersonnel mines and apparently do not use any of these mines for permitted purposes abuse the exception permitted by Article 3.

The ICBL has long urged that all states should declare the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. States Parties agreed to this as part of the in the Nairobi Action Plan. Action #54 states that those retaining mines should “provide information on the plans requiring the retention of mines...and report on the actual use of retained mines and the result of such use.” Argentina and Chile made a joint proposal for expanded reporting forms for retained mines during the First Review Conference and the June 2005 intersessional meetings. The ICBL has supported the proposal.

Australia, Canada, Japan, South Africa and Sweden have in previous years provided consistently detailed information on the intended uses and disposition of their retained mines. Joining this list are Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Croatia, Namibia and the Netherlands who detailed their national practice during the intersessional meetings in June 2005.

One encouraging trend is the significant number of States Parties that have reduced the number of mines retained from the high levels originally proposed. Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Italy, Lithuania, Mauritania, Perú, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela and Zambia have taken this step between March 1999 and October 2004. Nine of these States Parties originally intended to retain 10,000 mines or more.[30]

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement aspects of the convention. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an impressive 96 percent. This compares favorably with rates in previous years: 91 percent in 2004, 88 percent in 2003, 75 percent in 2002 and 63 percent in 2001.

A total of 18 State Parties have submitted initial reports since May 2004: Belarus, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte D’Ivoire, Estonia, Greece, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Timor Leste and Turkey. For several of these States Parties, the deadline for submittal had been several years ago: Namibia (August 1999), Guinea (September 1999), St. Lucia (March 2000), Liberia (November 2000), Côte D’Ivoire (30 May 2001), and Nauru (July 2001).

Only four States Parties have a pending deadline: Ethiopia (28 November 2005), Latvia (30 June 2006), Bhutan (31 July 2006), and Vanuatu (28 August 2006). Latvia has submitted three voluntary reports, but will still need to submit its first formal report to the United Nations within the deadline specified.

A total of six States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports: Equatorial Guinea (due by 28 August 1999), Cape Verde (30 April 2002), Cameroon (27 August 2003), Gambia (27 August 2003), São Tomé e Principe (28 February 2004), and Guyana (31 July 2004).

States Parties did not improve on the rate of annual updates submitted for the previous calendar year, which were due by 30 April 2005. As of 1 September 2005, a total of 89 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2004; 48 States Parties had not submitted updates.[31] This equates to a compliance rate of 65 percent. The rate of compliance for annual reports for calendar year 2003 was 78 percent. The rate for calendar year 2002 was 62 percent.

In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Cameroon in 2001, Gambia in 2002, and Lithuania in 2002, when they were signatories. Then non-State Party Latvia and signatory Poland submitted voluntary reports in 2003, 2004 and 2005.

In June 2005, Sri Lanka submitted its first voluntary Article 7 report. It is quite detailed in many areas, but does not report on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. The other states which have submitted voluntary reports have included stockpile information. Several other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, including Azerbaijan, China and Mongolia.

National Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty.

Only 44 of 147 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.[32] This is an increase of four State Parties since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, El Salvador and Yemen. A total of 23 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway.[33] Chad, Chile and Malawi initiated the process in the past year. However, legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in Bangladesh, Benin, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Perú, Swaziland, and Uganda.

A total of 36 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.[34] Central African Republic, Estonia and Papua New Guinea joined this category in the past year. Guinea-Bissau is exploring the possibility of adopting new legislation even though it has deemed existing legislation sufficient. The Dominican Republic, Holy See, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Qatar believe that no steps are necessary because they have never produced, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected. The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 43 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.[35] Albania, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo were removed from the “in progress” category this year having reported no concrete progress in enacting legislation in over three previous years.

The ICRC has produced an Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. This kit is available from the ICRC in English, French, Russian and Spanish and is also available on the internet.[36]

Special Issues of Concern

Compliance with Article 5

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires the destruction of emplaced mines as soon as possible, but not more than 10 years after entry into force of the treaty for a particular State Party. Meeting the deadline is a matter of great importance, but there are also other issues of concern relating to implementation of and compliance with Article 5.

The ICBL has identified nine States Parties that it considers affected by mines and UXO, but which do not officially declare areas containing or suspected of containing antipersonnel mines in their Article 7 reports: Bangladesh, Belarus, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Moldova, Namibia, Philippines and Sierra Leone. States Parties should establish a specific process for clarifying situations such as these when a State Party declares no mined areas but there is some evidence to the contrary.

Djibouti initially declared mined areas, but after clearance operations stated it was “mine safe” and indicated it had fulfilled its Article 5 obligation. It is evident, however, that mined areas still exist in Djibouti. States Parties should establish a specific process for clarifying whether a State Party has met its obligation under Article 5 to clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas, when there may be some evidence to the contrary.

Joint Military Operations, Transit, and Foreign Stockpiling (Article 1)

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to “never under any circumstances...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” There has been a lack of clarity, however, regarding what types of acts are permitted or prohibited within the context of the prohibition on assistance. Many States Parties have recognized the need to address this issue and to share views on policy and practice.

An understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist” has begun to emerge. A total of 36 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines.[37] Tanzania is one State Party that has voluntarily included this information in its annual transparency measures report.

Some States Parties have declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited; each country’s understanding of what constitutes “active” or “direct” assistance varies.[38] Australia has formally declared that it is permissible to provide “indirect support such as the provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention engaging in such [prohibited] activities,” presumably including the laying of antipersonnel mines. It reiterated this view in the June 2005 intersessional meetings.

A total of 26 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing of foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory.[39] Germany, Japan, Qatar and the United Kingdom have stated that US antipersonnel mine stocks in their countries are not under their national jurisdiction or control. Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in a transparency measures report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by a non-State Party on its territory. Russian forces hold 18,200 antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan.

Mines with Sensitive Fuzes and Antihandling Devices (Article 2)

Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL has emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. However, applying the definition in Article 2 to all mines that function as antipersonnel mines, including those designated as antivehicle mines, remains a contentious issue. The way that States Parties agree—or disagree—on what practices are acceptable may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and universalized.

Many States Parties support the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited. Among the States Parties that have publicly expressed this understanding of what was agreed upon during the treaty negotiations in Oslo in 1997 are Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Kenya, Ireland, Mexico, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Perú, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland and Zambia.

At the June 2005 intersessional meetings, Argentina also appeared to endorse this interpretation when it stressed that any mine that explodes from the presence, proximity or contact of a person is banned.[40] The only other State Party to speak on the issue at that time was Australia, which emphasized that any antivehicle mine that acts as an antipersonnel mine is prohibited; it is the function of the munition that matters.[41]

Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom are the only States Parties that have publicly stated the view that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices. Sweden, while not directly ascribing to this position, has expressed the view that the CCW is the more appropriate forum to consider any restrictions on mines other than antipersonnel mines.

A situation is developing wherein some States Parties have chosen to keep for future use and export mines that other States Parties have determined are antipersonnel mines and destroyed. This is already the case for mines with tripwires, tilt rods, and overly sensitive antihandling devices.

There appears to be broad agreement that a mine that relies on a tripwire as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. However, the Czech Republic has stated it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty, and a Czech company has offered for sale mines with a tripwire fuze.

The low amount of lateral pressure necessary to activate a mine with a tilt rod fuze makes it very susceptible to be activated by a person. Canada, France, Hungary, Mali and the United Kingdom have removed tilt rod fuzes from their inventories. However, in 2004 and 2005 the Croatian company Agencija Alan continued to offer TMRP-6 mines with tilt rod fuzes for sale. Croatia has acknowledged that it stockpiles TMRP-6 mines with tilt rod fuzes that function at the level of 1.3 to 1.7 kilograms. Slovenia has also acknowledged possessing TMRP-6 mines that are equipped with both pressure and tilt rod fuzes. The Czech Republic has acknowledged possessing tilt rod fuzes, but has stated that the mines that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and will be retired with 15 years. Sweden acknowledges possessing antivehicle mines with tilt rods, but has not formally expressed a view on their legality under the Mine Ban Treaty.

States Parties have been reluctant to report on the measures taken to ensure that mines with antihandling devices are compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty. Some States Parties have simply indicated that their mines and antihandling devices are compliant with the treaty. Unfortunately, States Parties have not provided technical detail to support this determination. Bulgaria has decommissioned its existing stocks of TM-46 antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, and the destruction process is expected to be completed by the end of 2005. Slovakia has prohibited the use of the Ro-3 fuze as an antihandling device. Belarus has committed to destroying MUV-type fuzes used as antihandling devices and booby-traps.

Several States Parties have reported that they have removed from service and destroyed certain ordnance items that, when used with mines, can cause them to function as antipersonnel mines. Belgium has banned pressure and tension release firing devices (igniters) used as booby-traps. France has destroyed a number of unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes. Germany and Slovakia have retired and destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines.

Claymore and OZM-72 Command-Detonated Mines

Certain types of mines are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed to be capable of being both command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In many cases, options for both means of utilization are packaged with the mine.

The most common mines in this category are Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions.[42] In 2004 and 2005, several States Parties have extended this application to a type of bounding fragmentation mine, the OZM-72, which also possesses these inherent dual-use capabilities for command and target activation. Lithuania and Moldova have reported modifying OZM-72 mines so that they no longer consider them antipersonnel mines, and do not count them as mines to be destroyed or mines retained for training. Most recently, Belarus decided to convert over 200,000 OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines into command-detonated munitions.

A total of 26 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of Claymores and/or OZM-72 mines.[43] New to this list is Nicaragua which reported in 2005 that a total of 121 MON-50 and MON-200 (Claymore-type) mines previously reported as mines retained for training have been excluded from the list as these mines are “not included in the restrictions established by the Ottawa Convention.”[44] However, Nicaragua has not reported on what steps it has taken to ensure that the mines can only be used in command-detonated mode, so that they do in fact conform to the treaty.

Some States Parties have chosen to physically modify the mine to accept only electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate blasting cap. Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand and Sweden have reported on the measures taken to modify these mines in their Article 7 reports.

Another 27 States Parties have declared that they do not possess or have destroyed Claymore and/or OZM-72 mines.[45] The vast majority of States Parties, a total of 92, have not declared whether their forces possess these types of mines. While 45 of these States Parties have declared that they do not possess any antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases it cannot be presumed that this includes dual-use command-detonated mines.

In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations.


[1] Of the 80, 59 were signatories who ratified and 21 were non-signatories who acceded.

[2] 22 States abstained from voting for UNGA Resolution 59/84 in December 2004: Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Palau, Russia, South Korea, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. This marked the first time Palau voted on the annual pro-mine ban resolution. The Marshall Islands continued to be the only signatory to abstain, as in previous years.

[3] Voting results by year on the annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38A)―142 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77N)―147 in favor, none against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54B)—139 in favor, one against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33V)―143 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24M)―138 in favor, none against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74)―143 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53)―153 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining.

[4] Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment, a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action.

[5] The full name is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.

[6] India has also indicated that it opted to defer compliance, although that is not recorded with the other deferrals on the UN depositary website.

[7] Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Amended Protocol II States Parties Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. India has explored development of such systems. The Mine Ban Treaty requires Belarus, Greece, and Turkey to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the United Kingdom have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.

[8] Sweden was the first to ratify Protocol V, in June 2004, followed by Lithuania and Sierra Leone in September 2004. Ten states ratified in 2005, in this order: Croatia, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Nicaragua, and most recently on 16 September, Liberia.

[9] In Burundi, there was one notable allegation of use of antipersonnel mines by the Army which Landmine Monitor was unable to confirm. In June 2005, the administrator of the commune of Mpanda (Bubanza province, about 10 kilometers from Bujumbura) said he thought the new Burundi Army (Forces de Défense Nationale, FDN) was responsible for laying an antipersonnel mine that killed two people near a military position.

[10] See past editions of Landmine Monitor Report for details. Angola, Ecuador, and Ethiopia have admitted using antipersonnel mines as a signatory. Landmine Monitor has cited credible allegations of use while a signatory by Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. Other current States Parties who used antipersonnel mines since the early 1990s, as non-signatories, include Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, Eritrea, Perú, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

[11] See also, Landmine Monitor Fact Sheet, “Non-State Armed Groups and the Mine Ban,” prepared by Mines Action Canada, June 2005, released at the intersessional meetings in Geneva.

[12] Use in Pakistan was recorded as small-scale and sporadic last year.

[13] There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture.

[14] Thirty-three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Perú, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.

[15] Nine States Parties have not officially declared the ultimate disposition of production capabilities in transparency reports despite admissions or evidence of prior production activities: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. For many of these states the production of antipersonnel mines ceased prior to entry into force of the treaty.

[16] Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor has removed Turkey and FR Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories.

[17] Statement by Amb. Paul Meyer, Canada, to the Conference on Disarmament, 29 July 2004.

[18] In its previous edition, Landmine Monitor estimated that 65 countries held 200 million antipersonnel mines.

[19] As of 1 October 2005, the following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Perú, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[20] This total is about 1 million mines higher than reported last year. More than 400,000 stockpiled mines were destroyed in the reporting period, and the remainder of the total reflects adjustments by Landmine Monitor for mines destroyed by current States Parties prior to their joining the treaty, most notably Belarus.

[21] In some cases, the actual physical destruction of mines had not begun as of 1 October 2005. Landmine Monitor considers states to be “in progress” if they have reported they are formulating destruction plans, seeking international financial assistance, conducting national inventories, or constructing destruction facilities.

[22] Cameroon declared 500 mines for training and research purposes in a voluntary transparency report submitted in March 2001. Landmine Monitor received a report by the Cameroon military, dated 5 May 2003, which states that a total of 9,183 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed on 17 April 2003.

[23] The following States Parties have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte D’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Trinidad and Tobago.

[24] The 74 total includes Botswana, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau, which have expressed their intention to retain mines, but have not declared a number.

[25] Of the 64 choosing not to retain antipersonnel mines,18 once possessed stockpiles.

[26] Bhutan, Cameroon, Cape Verde, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, São Tomé e Principe, and Vanuatu have not indicated whether they intend to retain antipersonnel mines; most have not yet submitted an Article 7 report. Of these nine, only DR Congo, Ethiopia and Guyana are thought to possess mines.

[27] 38 States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Perú, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

[28] Eighteen States Parties retain less than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Colombia, Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Moldova, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.

[29] The following 24 States Parties reported consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2004: Argentina (92), Australia (70), Bangladesh (1), Belgium (267), Brazil (875), Bulgaria (12), Canada (21), Chile (350), Colombia (100), Croatia (78), Czech Republic (20), Denmark (69), France (11), Germany (41), Ireland (31), Japan (1,413), Luxembourg (20), Netherlands (377), Nicaragua (810), Slovakia (54), Slovenia (5), South Africa (33), Spain (1,103), and Sweden (908).

[30] Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, Italy, Spain and Turkmenistan originally intended to retain 10,000 antipersonnel mines or more.

[31] The 48 States Parties not submitting updates were: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Honduras, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Swaziland, Timor Leste, Togo, Uganda, and Uruguay.

[32] A total of 44 States Parties have enacted implementation legislation: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[33] A total of 23 States Parties are in the process of enacting legislation: Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Chile, DR Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Perú, Philippines, Rwanda, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland and Uganda.

[34] A total of 36 States Parties have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider that new legislation is necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Jordan, Kiribati, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela.

[35] Those without progress toward national implementation measures include: Albania, Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, São Tomé e Principe, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay.

[37] 36 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines: Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[38] States Parties that have declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited: Australia, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[39] A total of 26 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizingofforeign antipersonnel mines on national territory: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and Zambia.

[40] Oral remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 17 June 2005. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW).

[41] Oral remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 17 June 2005. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (HRW).

[42] The most common types of Claymore-type mines are the M18A1 (produced originally by the US but also widely copied or license-produced), MON series (produced in the former USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries) and the MRUD (produced in the former Yugoslavia).

[43] States Parties that possess dual-use command-detonated mines: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Honduras, Hungary, Lithuania, Malaysia, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

[44] Article 7 Report, Form D, 19 May 2005.

[45] States Parties that do not possess dual-use command-detonated mines: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Perú, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Uruguay and Yemen.