Summary: State Party Iraq ratified the convention on 14 May 2013. Iraq has participated in every annual meeting of the convention, most recently in September 2016, and voted in favor of a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2016.

In its initial transparency report for the convention provided in June 2014, Iraq confirmed that it no longer uses, produces, transfers, or stockpiles cluster munitions and is not retaining any cluster munitions for research or training. There has been at least one reported incident of Islamic State forces using cluster munition rockets against Iraqi government forces near Mosul in February 2017, but the Monitor could not independently verify this evidence.

Policy

The Republic of Iraq signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 November 2009, ratified on 14 May 2013, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 November 2013.

Under its national implementation measures for the convention, Iraq has reported its 2012 ratification law and other relevant legislation.[1] It is not known if Iraq will enact specific implementation legislation to enforce its adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Iraq provided its initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention in June 2014 and has provided annual updated reports since then, most recently in the first half of 2017.[2]

Iraq participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but attended both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 as an observer.[3] At the Oslo Signing Conference, it pledged to sign the convention as soon as possible after completing national and constitutional processes.[4] Iraq subsequently signed the convention at the UN in New York in November 2009.

Iraq has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in September 2016. It attended the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015 and intersessional meetings in 2011–2015.

In December 2016, Iraq voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] It voted in favor of the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[6]

In a statement at the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2016, Iraq described cluster munitions as a barrier to social development and a cause of environmental destruction.[7]

The Iraqi Alliance for Disability and other civil society groups campaign in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Iraq is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production and transfer

In its initial Article 7 report provided in June 2014, Iraq declared that it does not produce cluster munitions.[8] Previously, in 2011, Iraq informed the Monitor that “There are no facilities that produce cluster munitions in Iraq.”[9]

Prior to 2003, Iraq produced two types of cluster bombs: the NAAMAN-250 and NAAMAN-500.[10] It was also involved in a joint project with Yugoslavia to develop the M87 Orkan cluster munition rocket (known in Iraq as Ababil).[11]

In the past, Iraq imported ASTROS cluster munition rockets from Brazil.[12] In 1996, Jane’s Information Group listed Iraq as possessing KMG-U dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and CB-470, RBK-250, RBK-250-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[13] The United States (US) military’s unexploded ordnance identification guide lists the Chinese 250kg Type-2 dispenser as present in Iraq.[14]

Use

There has been at least one report of Islamic State  forces using cluster munition rockets containing DPICM-like submunitions against Iraqi government forces near Mosul in February 2017, killing one soldier.[15] The Monitor could not independently verify this evidence and cannot confirm the use allegation.

Coalition forces used cluster munitions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The US, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions on Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the 1991 conflict.[16] During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US and UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1.8 million to 2 million submunitions.[17]

Iraq may have used cluster munitions in the past. According to one source, Iraq used air-dropped cluster bombs against Iranian troops in 1984.[18]

Stockpiling and destruction

In its Article 7 reports, Iraq has declared that it does not stockpile cluster munitions.[19]

Photographs published by the official media office in Kirkuk in 2015 showed IS forces unearthing at least 34 BKF cartridges containing AO-2.5RT submunitions that had been buried in the ground.[20] The exact date, location, and circumstances of this discovery was unclear, but burial has been used as a method for disposal of stocks in Iraq in the past. Iraq has not disclosed any discovery or seizure of stockpiled cluster munitions in its annual transparency reports.

Iraq states that it is not retaining any cluster munitions for research or training purposes. It previously said it would retain a small quantity of 25 inert submunitions with no explosive content.[21] However in June 2016, Iraq no longer reported the inert submunitions, but instead wrote “not applicable” in its Article 7 report.[22]

Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008.

Iraq has not enacted legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, but a government official said in 2012 that draft legislation was being prepared.[1] Iraq had not previously indicated if national implementation legislation to enforce the treaty’s prohibitions domestically was being pursued or if existing laws were considered adequate.[2]

The Iraqi Alliance for Disability Organizations (IADO) has continued to promote a landmine ban and organized an event together with the government of Iraq in April 2015 to celebrate the Mine Ban Treaty’s achievements and to consider implementation challenges as part of the International Day of Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action.[3]

Iraq submitted an annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report in April 2017.

Since the Second Review Conference in 2009, Iraq has attended almost every meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty.[4] It participated in the convention’s Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014, where it made statements on clearance and during the high-level segment.[5] Iraq attended the Mine Ban Treaty’s Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago in November–December 2016. At the intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2017, Iraq filed a request to extend its deadline for fulfilling Article 5 requirements by 10 years, which was not granted.[6]

Iraq is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Iraq ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons and all its protocols on 24 September 2014.

Production and transfer

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 conflict. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the coalition bombing campaign in 2003.[7] Iraq reported that it has no intention to reconstruct its production capacity.[8]

There have been no reports or allegations of landmine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s.

Use

For the sixth year in a row, there were not any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces or its international coalition partners, but the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS) fighting the government of Iraq have used improvised landmines, other types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and victim-activated booby-traps extensively since 2014.[9] The extent to which the IEDs are command-detonated or victim-activated is not clear.

IS continued its extensive use of improvised landmines into 2017. In Mosul, scores of civilians were killed by improvised mines while attempting to flee fighting between IS and Iraqi Federal Police units.[10] The group has also planted improvised mines around mass graves, in an effort to kill investigative journalists and aid workers.[11] IS continues to lose ground in Iraq, but consistently leaves improvised mines and booby-traps behind as it retreats, which some experts believe could take up to 30 years to clear.[12] Between September 2015 and January 2017, Mines Advisory Groups (MAG) successfully cleared 7,500 improvised mines and other improvised devices from Iraq and Syria.[13]

In October 2015, Iraq called for further assistance to address its humanitarian problem with uncleared landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) including cluster munition remnants, which it said has been “further compounded by terrorist groups, notably ISIS planting landmines and explosive devices to prevent the return of Iraqi forces to the areas.”[14] Iraq has blamed terrorist armed groups and IS, fighting government forces since 2014, for “a dramatic increase the number of mines, UXOs [unexploded ordnance] and IEDs” in the country, as well as for the increasing number of displaced persons.[15] In May 2015, Reuters reported that IS fighters laid landmines in Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s western desert province of Anbar.[16] Research organization Conflict Armament Research said in April 2015 that IS forces are producing and deploying IEDs on an industrial scale.[17] In February 2017, the Iraqi government repeated its calls for help from the international community in clearing mines from areas freed from IS.[18]

Stockpiling and destruction

Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines was 1 February 2012.[19] In June 2011, Iraq stated that it destroyed 645 out of 690 antipersonnel mines stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, retaining 45 mines for training purposes.[20] In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2011, Iraq reported that an additional 50 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the Kurdistan region.[21]

The manner in which Iraq has reported on the number of mines it retains for training and research purposes has been inconsistent and confusing. It appears that at least 45 mines were retained in the Kurdistan region for training purposes since the end of the stockpile destruction programs. Adding to this confusion is a claim in its 2011 Article 7 report wherein Iraq states that 793 mines were retained for training after the mines were recovered during clearance operations.[22] The Monitor cannot sufficiently assess the manner by which Iraq implements Article 3 based solely on the information provided by Iraq in its annual transparency reports.

In previous Monitor reports, substantial but decreasing numbers of antipersonnel mines were recovered by foreign and Iraqi forces from caches. The Monitor has not found any information regarding seizures during the current reporting period. Iraq also reported that it destroyed 4,295 antipersonnel mines from mined areas in 2011.[23] The Iraqi government had not previously reported on recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports.

Contaminated by: landmines (massive contamination), cluster munition remnants (heavy contamination), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Article 5 deadline: 1 February 2018
(Ten-year extension requested)

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline: 1 November 2023
(Not on target to meet deadline)

Summary

In 2016, mine action operations continued to be overshadowed by conflict.

Landmines: The Republic of Iraq submitted its first extension request in March 2017, for a period of 10 years to 2028. It reported that a total 1,195km² of suspected and confirmed hazardous contaminated areas remained to be cleared, of which 963.56km² were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 232.01km² were suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[1]

Available data does not allow comprehensive reporting on all the mined area that was released by survey and clearance in Iraq in 2016. In the center and south, 0.06km² was canceled through non-technical survey and 2.13km² was reduced through technical survey. In the Kurdish region, 16.9km² was canceled by non-technical survey. Across Iraq, a total of 27.36km² was reported to be cleared: 18.86km² of legacy contamination in central and southern Iraq; 2.7km² of legacy contamination in the Kurdish region; and 5.8km² of improvised mines laid by Islamic State (IS) forces. However, discrepancies in the data and reporting of large areas with very little contamination mean that the actual clearance total is probably lower.

Cluster munition remnants (to end 2016): CHAs covered a total of 207km² at the end of 2016, all in central and southern Iraq, over half of which was in Muthanna governorate. A small amount of cluster munition contamination also remains in the northern Kurdish region. At least 9.53km² of CHA was identified through survey and 3.09km² was cleared. Between 1,682 and 2,084 submunitions were destroyed. There are discrepancies between the data provided by the mine action center and the operators.

Recommendations for action

• Iraq should strengthen the mandate, management, personnel, and resources of the Department of Mine Action (DMA).
• Iraq should draw up a strategic mine action plan, setting out operational priorities, clarifying institutional responsibilities, identifying and allocating available resources, and setting timelines for implementation.
• Iraq should introduce national standards for cluster munition remnants survey and clearance, and develop the capacity of national operators to meet them.
• The DMA should draw on international assistance to enable it to fulfil its Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions clearance obligations.

Mine Contamination

Iraq is probably the world’s most mine-contaminated country. The 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition account for most known contamination, including barrier minefields along its borders with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Occupation of large areas by non-state armed group (NSAG) IS after 2014 added extensive contamination with improvised munitions. These are mostly improvised mines (victim-activated pressure-plate devices that are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty).

Iraq’s request for an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline prepared by the DMA and the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) and submitted in March 2017 estimated the remaining threat as 3,554 hazards covering 1,195km^2, of which 963.56km² is CHA and 232.01km² is SHA. Three southern governorates account for almost two-thirds of Iraq’s total mine contamination. Iraq’s Kurdistan region accounted for a fifth.[2]

However, data provided separately by the DMA and IKMAA (see tables below), reported total confirmed and suspected mine contamination at the end of 2016 as covering 1,518km².[3]

None of these reports of mine contamination include areas contaminated by improvised mines in areas recaptured from IS, which have not been subjected to systematic or large-scale survey.[4]

Central and southern Iraq

The DMA reported that at the end of 2016, areas affected by antipersonnel mines or a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, including improvised mines, totaled 1,278 km², a level almost unchanged from the previous year. In contrast, the extension request submitted in March 2017 reported 972.40km² of hazardous area in the center and south at the end of 2016.[5]

Despite the presence of such large mined areas, Iraq stated that most mined areas are scattered and random, increasing the challenge of locating them. It cites this as a factor that impeded Iraq’s ability to comply with its original Article 5 deadline. It also said many mined areas had not been identified.[6]

Mine contamination in central and southern Iraq by device (end 2016)[7]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle areas.

Antipersonnel mine contamination only in central and southern Iraq by governorate (as of end 2016)[8]

The DMA reported that emergency non-technical survey in 2016 had identified 13.93km² of improvised explosive device (IED) contamination in areas recaptured from IS, of which Anbar governorate (including Fallujah and Ramadi) accounted for 10.52km², Babylon for 2.39km², and Salah ad-Din for 1.02km².[9]

Kurdistan region (northern Iraq)

Estimates of contamination at the end of 2016 by IKMAA were marginally higher, at 240.67km², than a year earlier as a result of continuing survey and cleaning up of data. More than half the Kurdistan region’s mined area is located in Slemani governorate.[10] In contrast, the extension request submitted in March 2017 reported 223.17km² of hazardous area in the Kurdistan region at the end of 2016.[11]

IKMAA reports that a number of areas on the borders with Turkey and Iran totaling about 25km² have not yet been accessible for survey due to insecurity.[12]

Contamination in the Kurdistan Region by device (end 2016)[13]

Antipersonnel mine contamination only in the Kurdistan Region by governorate (end 2016)[14]

Improvised mines

In Iraq’s fast changing security environment, operators have not had sufficient time or resources to conduct widespread systematic survey in areas recaptured from IS, but report high levels of contamination. Even after the recapture in July 2017 of Iraq’s second city, Mosul, large expanses of territory and some major towns remained to be liberated and would likely add large additional hazardous areas requiring clearance.

Operators have encountered a wide variety of improvised devices left by IS and report that the vast majority are victim-activated and meet the Mine Ban Treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine. These mostly consist of devices activated by a pressure-plate or “crush necklace” wires sufficiently sensitive to be detonated by the weight of a child and connected to an explosive charge of ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder or paste. The size of the charge ranges from 3kg to 100kg, which is capable of destroying a vehicle.[15] Mines Advisory Group (MAG), working in the Kurdistan region and the adjacent Grey Zone[16] reported that 98% of improvised items it cleared were improvised mines and the other 2% were abandoned radio-controlled or command-wire devices or booby-traps. It has also encountered devices loaded with chemical agents.[17] Janus Global Operations, working in central Iraq, reported 95% of the devices it encountered were improvised pressure-plate mines and that very few contained military explosives.[18]

IS used mines in conventional lanes in open country and around the perimeter of villages and access to key buildings. As an example of the scale of the contamination, MAG identified three mine “panels” in the vicinity of Bashiqar stretching over distances of 12km, 18km, and 24km, with multiple rows of devices spaced at intervals of between one and several meters in straight lines or zigzag patterns.[19] IS also mined approaches to buildings and public infrastructure and extensively booby-trapped private houses and property, posing a lethal threat to civilians returning to their homes. Operators and international aid agencies reported heavy civilian casualties from explosive devices but lacked detailed information. They believe that many fatalities may have gone unrecorded.[20]

Contamination (cluster munition contamination)

The DMA estimated that confirmed cluster munition contamination in central and southern Iraq at the end of 2016 was 207km². This is nearly 7km² more than the 200km² reported in May 2016, reflecting identification of additional hazards in the course of survey in 2016. One district of Muthanna governorate, Al-Salman, accounted for 128.5km², more than half the total. A further 1.76km² is suspected to be contaminated.[21] A small amount of cluster munition contamination also remains in northern Iraq’s Kurdish region.

The highway between Kuwait and Basrah was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War,[22] and cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. There are unverified reports that IS, used cluster munition rockets near Mosul in February 2017. (See Iraq’s Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for further details.)

Cluster munition contamination in central and southern Iraq 2016[23]

The IKMAA reported in April 2017 that northern governorates had residual, scattered cluster munition contamination but no CHAs or SHAs. Previously it had estimated cluster munition-affected areas at 1.18km² in two governorates (Dohuk and Garmiyan) at the end of 2015 together with 0.6km² of SHAs.[24] According to MAG, a number of areas where there is evidence of cluster munition remnants still need to be surveyed to establish the extent of contamination.[25]

Program Management

The mine action program in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA), set up under the Ministry of Health and Environment, manages mine action for humanitarian purposes in the center and the south, implementing policies set by an inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action that reports to the Prime Minister. Commercial companies undertaking oilfield clearance operations report to the Ministry of Oil.[26]

The DMA has previously reported that it oversees four regional mine action centers (RMACs),[27] however its Article 5 extension request referred to just three:[28]

1. North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din;
2. Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit; and
3. South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC-South, which accounts for 71% of confirmed antipersonnel mine contamination (see second table above) as well as 95% of Iraq’s cluster munition remnants contamination, was active tasking and coordinating operations by humanitarian demining agencies but in 2016 focused on cluster munition remnants, not mines.[29] The extent to which other RMACs were active in 2016 was unclear.

Mine action in Iraq’s northern governorates under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA). It coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmiyan, and Sulimaniya. IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator.

IKMAA’s priorities for areas affected by legacy minefields include clearing agricultural land and infrastructure, and tackling CHAs close to populated areas and areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties.[30] Operators identified areas affected by improvised mines for clearance in consultation with district-level authorities, IKMAA and, for the Grey Zone, a joint operations room run by iMMAP liaising with the DMA. Areas to which communities were returning were the main priority. IKMAA issued task orders for specific sites. IKMAA teams conducted quality assurance (QA).

The DMA and IKMAA agreed in September 2015 to share operations in the so-called Grey Zone, an area of about 69,000km² controlled or contested by IS forces after 2014 and overlapping their respective operating areas. The line separating DMA and IKMAA areas of responsibility in the Grey Zone is determined by which forces have liberated areas from IS and taken control of the territory. A Joint Operations Centre in Erbil managed by iMMAP coordinates operations in the zone.[31]

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess the extent of the threat of explosive weapons, including IEDs, of which many are improvised mines, in areas retaken from IS, and to help the authorities develop and coordinate an emergency response, facilitating the return of displaced people. Under this program, UNMAS is training selected security service and mine action personnel in how to organize an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response, along with survey and clearance in retaken areas, and assisting governmental authorities to develop standards and procedures for IED clearance.

By mid-2016, UNMAS had offices in Erbil with 12 national staff, and in Baghdad with four national staff.[32]

Strategic planning

Iraq’s Article 5 deadline extension request sets out separate two-year and 10-year workplans for the DMA and for IKMAA, which detail projected expenditure but provide no information on operations or priorities. It says the two-year workplans are based on existing capacity but describes the 10-year plans as “aspirational” and dependent on attracting international donor funding.[33]

The DMA envisaged expenditure of $30 million in 2018–2019 and $238 million over the 10-year period to the end of 2027. IKMAA proposed expenditure of almost $25 million in 2018–2019 and $247 million over the same 10-year period. The projected expenditure targets clearance of legacy minefields only and not the cost of operations tackling improvised mines, cluster munition remnants, or other ERW.[34]

The extension request addresses only legacy minefields, not the post-2014 improvised mines left by IS, which is using most of the funding provided by international donors. The request identifies a range of other factors that have slowed the progress of mine action:[35]

• Insecurity due to the conflict with IS;
• Extensive additional contamination as a result of conflict;
• Lack of funding;
• Lack of information because the Ministry of Defense lost all minefield maps after the change of regime in 2003; and
• Lack of technical expertise and capacity.

Iraq does not have a national strategic plan for clearance of cluster munition remnants. Its vision for mine action is “Iraq free from the impact of mines and explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions.”[36]

Operators

In central and southern Iraq, operators need to be accredited by the DMA but first have to register with the NGO Directorate, an opaque process that can take years and has obstructed efforts to rapidly scale up capacity for an emergency response to the contamination left by IS. Operators working in the Kurdistan region require accreditation with IKMAA. Most mine clearance capacity is located in the Kurdistan region, but without DMA accreditation, operators based there are not permitted to operate beyond the Grey Zone in central and southern Iraq.[37]

International mine action NGOs active (as at end 2016)[38]

Central and Southern Iraq

National organizations undertaking mine clearance included the army engineers tasked by the Ministry of Defense Directorate, and Civil Defense, which has a team in every governorate tasked by the Ministry of Interior and the DMA.[39]

Two international humanitarian demining NGOs, Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), were active in central and southern Iraq in 2016, but up to mid-2017 neither had conducted any mine survey or clearance. DDG closed its operation in Basrah in December 2014, however resumed operations at the end of 2015 and in 2016 worked with two battle area clearance (BAC) and two QA/quality control (QC) teams as well as four community liaison teams. NPA has operated out of Basrah since 2014, and in 2016 had three survey and five EOD/BAC teams focused on clearance of cluster munition remnants.[40]

Two commercial companies, Janus Global Operations and Optima, started working on improvised mine and IED clearance in 2016. As they had not received accreditation to conduct clearance, they partnered and provided operational management to an accredited local organization, al-Fahad Company for Demining, working in insecure areas with their own security details. Janus worked with financing from the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) in Ramadi in 2016, and increased the number of teams in 2017 when it also worked in Mosul.[41] Optima worked with three BAC teams under a one-year, $12 million UNOPS contract managed by UNMAS.[42] UNMAS has not provided any data on the details of clearance achieved under this contract. BACTEC was contracted by South Oil Company to undertake clearance in southern Iraq starting in October 2015 and continuing until October 2016.[43] Other demining companies active in the oil sector included Arabian Gulf and Al-Khibra Alfanya Company. The DMA also reported activities conducted by Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), which had shut down operations in 2014 after the US withdrew funding, but resumed limited activities with DMA funding in 2016.[44]

Kurdistan region (northern Iraq)

IKMAA operated with 27 12-person mine action teams, 37 QA teams, seven mechanical demining teams, five survey teams, and three EOD teams as well as 10 risk education teams. IKMAA’s clearance teams focused on legacy minefields, tackling improvised devices or improvised mines only in response to emergency requests from authorities and when international operators were not available. As a result of financial pressures, IKMAA terminated contracts with Kurdistan region commercial companies in 2014.[45]

MAG, active in Iraq for nearly 25 years, is the biggest international demining actor in the country. It almost doubled its capacity in 2016 to finish the year with a total of 470 staff. MAG worked with 185 staff in the Kurdistan region, including nine mine action teams employing 108 deminers, as well as two mine detection dog (MDD) teams. In central and southern Iraq, MAG had 20 multi-task teams with 160 personnel, and five mechanical demining teams, as well as managing 25 community liaison teams, 12 of which were affiliated to national partner organizations. In 2016, it opened a Training, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, training staff in high-risk search for areas affected by improvised mines and in community liaison.[46]

NPA has worked in southern Iraq since 2014 and received accreditation to work in the Kurdistan region at the end of 2016 as well as accreditation to conduct clearance of improvised mines from 1 January 2017. It operated two EOD teams with eight personnel each, focused on clearing improvised mines.[47] DDG received accreditation to conduct risk education in November 2015 and for ERW clearance in early 2016. By the end of the year, alongside 28 risk education staff, it employed 14 deminers clearing ERW, excluding improvised devices.[48]

Two more recent additions included the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), which established a presence in the Kurdistan region in October 2015, received accreditation in December, and was operational from March 2016.[49] Handicap International became active in 2016 receiving accreditation for clearance of all ERW except improvised devices in November and for disposal of improvised devices in April 2017.[50]

Cluster munition clearance operators

The DMA said five organizations conducted survey and/or clearance of areas affected by cluster munitions in 2016, including Civil Defense, DDG, Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), NPA, and RMAC South.[51]

Only two organizations, Civil Defense and NPA, were involved in systematic cluster munition clearance in 2016. Civil Defense provided the main cluster munition clearance capacity, deploying teams with a total of 202 deminers/EOD technicians in 15 governorates.[52] NPA worked in in Basra and Missan governorates and its capacity included three three-strong survey teams and five EOD/BAC teams with 48 deminers/EOD technicians.[53]

IKMAA has reported that only MAG conducts cluster munition clearance in the KRG.[54]

Standards

With respect to the clearance of IEDs, including improvised mines, operators adapted mine clearance and BAC operating procedures to suit security conditions and the local environment in their areas of activity. Operators employed national staff to conduct technical survey and mark items for clearance and restricted improvised mines and IED disposal to team leaders and international staff. In areas close to active hostilities, operators applied their own minimum-security criteria. These included an absence of IS activity for a specified period of time and minimum distances from, and no line of sight to, an IS frontline position.[55]

Land Release (mines)

Available data does not allow comprehensive reporting on all the mined area that was released by survey and clearance in Iraq in 2016. IKMAA and international operators sustained clearance in the Kurdistan region at about the same level in 2016 as the previous year. Mine survey and clearance in central and southern Iraq increased significantly, a reflection of major mine clearance by BACTEC and, in relation to improvised mines, by MAG.

Survey in 2016 (Mines)

Central and southern Iraq

The DMA reported a mixture of non-technical and technical survey covering nearly 14km² in areas liberated from IS, three-quarters of it in Anbar governorate, including the towns of Ramadi and Fallujah, which were occupied by IS from 2014 until they were liberated in 2016. It also included survey of areas of Babylon and Salah al-Din. The DMA reported this led to cancelation of 0.6km² through non-technical survey and reduction of 2.13km² by technical survey.[56]

The DMA reported that Civil Defense teams conducted non-technical survey over 84.7km² but only confirmed 0.4km² as hazardous area.[57] It also reported that IMCO did not conduct non-technical survey but still canceled more than 10km².[58]

Kurdistan region (northern Iraq)

IKMAA reported that its teams canceled 16.9km² through non-technical survey in 2016.[59] Other operators did not conduct survey of legacy minefields that have already been subjected to what IKMAA refers to as “preliminary technical survey.”

Operators conducted assessments of sites for people displaced by conflict and started “high-risk survey” of improvised mines in areas recaptured from IS in both the Kurdistan region and the Grey Zone.[60] The approach to survey by MAG combined non-technical survey, drawing on hazardous area reports from Kurdish Peshmerga security forces, local authorities, and community liaison teams, and limited technical survey to define mine lines and polygons.[61] FSD similarly reports assessing tasks using information available from the Peshmerga, local authorities, and any other available local source, and conducting technical survey to define and mark hazard perimeters.[62]

Clearance in 2016 (mines)

In 2016, across Iraq, a total of 27.36km² was reported as cleared: 18.86km² of legacy contamination in central and southern Iraq; 2.7km² of legacy contamination in the Kurdistan region; and 5.8km² of improvised mines laid by IS forces. A total of 17,113 mines were destroyed. However, discrepancies in the data and reporting of large areas with very little contamination mean that the actual clearance total is probably considerably lower.

Central and southern Iraq

Reported mine clearance in central and southern Iraq in 2016 totaled 18.86km² according to the DMA, down from 23.18km² reported by the DMA as cleared in 2015.[63] The 2016 data, however, attributed clearance of 4.2km² to NPA and DDG, which did not conduct any mine clearance in 2016, and reported 6.35km² cleared by Civil Defense with the destruction of only 10 mines.[64]

The only substantial clearance of minefields in central and southern Iraq appears to have been conducted by BACTEC working under contract to oil company, South Oil, and clearing mined areas northeast of Basrah along the border with Iran required for oilfield development.[65] The DMA reported that BACTEC cleared 7.37km² and destroying close to 7,000 mines.[66] It also reported that Civil Defense teams “released” 6.35km², but cleared only a total of 10 mines.[67] It reported clearance by NPA and DDG, however, both operators said they did not conduct mine clearance.

Reported clearance of (legacy) mined areas in central and southern Iraq in 2016[68]

Note: AP = antipersonnel: AV = antivehicle; N/R = not reported.

In central and southern Iraq, the military and police conducted clearance of improvised mines and IEDs in the course of operations liberating areas from IS. Systematic, large-scale clearance was undertaken only by two international commercial operators: Janus, funded by the US Department of State; and Optima, working for UNMAS. The operators had not received DMA accreditation to conduct clearance in 2016 and so operated in partnership with local company Al-Farhad.

Kurdistan region

Despite competing demands arising from the humanitarian fall-out from Iraq’s campaigns to drive out IS and severe financial constraints, IKMAA was able to report clearance of 2.7km² of legacy mined areas in 2016, more than the level IKMAA reported in the previous year.[71]

IKMAA concentrated all its clearance teams on tackling legacy mined areas giving priority to removing blockages on agriculture and infrastructure and removing hazards close to populated areas.[72] MAG also continued to support clearance of legacy minefields working with a slightly reduced number of teams in Dohuk, Slemani, and Kirkuk governorates but, according to its own data, clearing as much land as in 2015.[73] After receiving IKMAA accreditation in October 2016, DDG deployed a clearance team later that month onto a “legacy” minefield in Choman. The task was suspended in late December due to heavy snow and DDG moved the team to an alternative task located in Shaqlawa.[74]

Clearance of (legacy) mined areas in the Kurdistan Region in 2016[75]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

The focus of international operators, with the exception of DDG in the Kurdistan region in 2016 and 2017 was the clearance of improvised mines from liberated areas. Peshmerga units conducted military breaching as they advanced against IS positions and provided field intelligence on hazardous areas to international operators but did not conduct systematic clearance.[76]

MAG had started clearing improvised mines in 2015 on an emergency basis and in 2016 shifted to standard operations with a toolbox of manual and mechanical assets, expanding the number of teams, opening a sub-base in the Sinjar area, and working in three new areas in Ninawa governorate and one in Diyala governorate. Teams later moved to Hamdaniya district east of Mosul and in November to Bashiqa district northeast of Mosul, where they continued operating in 2017.

In 2016, MAG cleared a total of 5.26km² of land contaminated by improvised mines, destroying 5,268, mostly in Ninawa governorate’s Tal Afar and Sinjar areas.[77] Productivity increased significantly with the deployment of mechanical assets for both technical survey and clearance.[78]

FSD, the other humanitarian organization principally involved in clearing improvised mines in 2016, worked mainly in Kirkuk governorate before moving a team late in the year to Erbil governorate.[79] NPA started working with two teams in the Hamdaniyah area of Nineveh province in 2017, and later added two more clearance and two non-technical survey teams. Janus started working with one team in the Kurdistan region in January 2017 focusing on key infrastructure. This included a pipeline supplying water to east Mosul city.[80]

Clearance of improvised mines in the Kurdistan Region in 2016[81]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Iraq’s war against IS and associated security and humanitarian challenges raised attention to the mine action sector in 2016, but lowered the priority of cluster munitions clearance. Dense contamination by improvised devices inflicting casualties and delaying the return of civilian populations to urban centers controlled by NSAGs was the top imperative, resulting in slower progress on cluster munition survey and clearance.[82]

Major discrepancies between the data available from mine action authorities and operators made it difficult to assess progress. Moreover, long delays between completing clearance of tasks and final quality control checks by mine action authorities has resulted in long delays before the formal release of land.[83]

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Survey of cluster munition-affected areas in central and southern Iraq in 2016 (see table below) reported by the DMA covered less than a quarter of the 42.17km² surveyed the previous year, according to DMA data.[84]

Survey of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2016

The DMA’s record of activities undertaken by international operators, as in the past, differed significantly from the operators’ own records. DDG reported that it in fact undertook no cluster munition survey in 2016, as although it prepared to set up survey teams it reported that it was instructed that survey was not a requirement.[85] NPA said it confirmed 76 cluster munition hazards covering 6.73km², mostly in Missan governorate, in addition to canceling 14 SHAs covering 5.74km², nearly 10-times more than recorded by DMA data.[86] Even including NPA’s technical survey results, the cluster munition-affected area surveyed in 2016 was almost two-thirds less than the previous year.

IKMAA did not record any cluster munition-related survey in 2016.[87]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

The DMA reported a sharp decline in the amount of cluster munition-affected land cleared in central and southern Iraq in 2016 to 2.9km², compared with 8.2km² the previous year, but official numbers appear to be distorted by delays in the government’s certification of clearance, among other factors, and the pace of clearance may in fact have accelerated.

DMA records showed that NPA, working in Basra and Missan governorates, cleared 1.16km² of cluster munition-affected areas in 2016 but cleared another 2.21km² of land that had some submunitions, clearing 129 items.[88] However this differed from data from NPA, which showed that it cleared 7.9km² in 2016, more than three-times the 2.3km² it reported it cleared in 2015, although by its own count the number of submunitions it cleared dropped from 1,157 in 2015 to 525. The acceleration in clearance accompanied stronger coordination with RMAC South, which saw NPA for the first time operating with a workplan for non-technical survey and clearance in Basrah, Missan, and Muthanna governorates in 2017–2018.[89]

Demolitions of cleared items, however, remained a major concern for all operators across the mine action sector. Only the army was authorized to conduct demolitions and the diversion of military personnel and resources to conflict areas reduced the attention to demolitions, leaving cleared items stored in insecure settings for long periods.[90]

In the KRG-controlled areas, MAG remained the only organization working on cluster munition strikes in 2016, however this made up only a small part of its activities in 2016 and it cleared less than half the 0.55km² tackled the previous year.[91]

Clearance of cluster munition remnant contamination in 2016

Deminer safety

Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces are believed to have sustained casualties in the course of clearing improvised mines and IEDs but details are not known. Other operators, commercial and humanitarian, have also suffered fatalities in tackling such devices, prompting calls for more systematic exchange of information detailing accidents to try to mitigate risks. An international staff member of FSD was killed trying to defuse a single-switch, pressure-plate device in Daquq district. Investigations did not determine exactly how the device was initiated.[95] A Janus international operator was killed in August 2016 by a device that had been assessed and photographed, the cause of initiation was also unknown.[96] A MAG national staff member was killed in April 2017 after the search head of his detector hit a pressure plate linked to a 23kg charge.[97]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

The scale of Iraq’s contamination had ensured it would need to extend its Article 5 deadline, and in March 2017 the DMA and IKMAA jointly submitted a request for a 10-year extension, but covering legacy mined areas only. The request was prepared at a point when Iraq’s military offensive to drive out IS dominated the national agenda, including mine action, adding huge areas of contamination and slowing the progress of mine clearance.

The extension request provided some clarity on the scope of Iraq’s legacy mine problem but no estimate of the extent of improvised mine contamination and little guidance on Iraq’s plans for tackling both threats in the coming decade. Iraq identified numerous challenges (see Strategic Planning section above) and emphasized the future pace of mine clearance would depend on the extent of international donor support.[98]

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Iraq is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2023.

On current estimates of contamination Iraq would need to release around 30km² of cluster munition-affected areas a year to meet its treaty deadline. That would pose a significant challenge even without the pressures it faces from conflict with IS and the many resulting security and humanitarian imperatives. Against that background, however, cluster munitions do not rank as a priority and progress in survey and clearance lags well behind the level that would be needed to meet its deadline.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2016, 16 donors contributed a total of US$79.7 million for mine action activities to the Republic of Iraq.[1]

The United States (US) and Germany provided the largest contributions with a combined total of $49.3 million, which represents more than 60% of the total international mine action assistance in Iraq for 2016. In addition, seven donors provided more than $1 million each: Japan, Denmark, Norway, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and the Netherlands.

Only Germany and Austria reported supporting victim assistance activities, with a combined total of $1.3 million (2% of total funding).

As in previous years, the government of Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency, the Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, and the General Directorate of Mine Action did not report making any financial contributions to Iraq’s mine action program in 2016.

In July 2016, Canada, Germany, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and the US co-hosted a pledging conference in support of Iraq; among the issues addressed during the conference were funding requirements for demining. Over $80 million in new support was pledged by Australia ($3.8 million), Canada ($3.1 million), Egypt (technical support), Finland ($5.5 million), Germany ($16.5 million), the Netherlands ($11.1 million), Spain (technical support), and the US ($45 million).[2]

International contributions: 2016[3]

Note: N/R = not reported.

Since 2012, international assistance toward mine action activities in Iraq totaled almost $235 million, and has more than doubled throughout the period from $34 million in 2012 to more than $79 million in 2016.

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[4]

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2016, at least 109 casualties from mines, unexploded submunitions, and other ERW were reported for the Republic of Iraq. Discrepancies between the available datasets prevented the identification of casualty trends between years. Moreover, it is certain that there are many more mine/ERW casualties in Iraq that have not been identified.

A lack of corresponding detail between the datasets and available casualty reports restricted the ability to adequately compare the reported incidents. Thus, not all the reported casualties have been included in the Monitor’s annual casualty total for 2016, as it is possible there may be duplication. Iraq was yet to develop an effective and sustainable mechanism to collect information on ongoing mine/ERW casualties in Iraq.

Of the total casualties recorded for 2016, 41 occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in northern Iraq and were reported by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).[1] These occurred in six governorates: Duhuk, Erbil, Garmyan, Halabja, Kirkuk, and Sleimaniyeh. Twenty-four of the casualties were men, 13 were boys, and four were girls. In Iraqi Kurdistan, antipersonnel mines resulted in 19 casualties, while five casualties were caused by improvised mines, and 17 by ERW.

For central and southern Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) reported 27 mine/ERW casualties in four governorates in 2016: Basra, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi Qar. All were civilians. Twenty-two were male (eight men and 14 boys), and three were female (one woman and two girls). Fifteen casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, three by unexploded submunitions, and nine by other ERW, including two by “fragments.” However, the data provided by the DMA differed slightly from that reported in the two Article 7 reports. The Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report covering 2016 declared 27 casualties resulting from “antipersonnel mines” in the governorates of Baghdad, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi Qar (including three of the same governorates reported in DMA casualty data for 2016).[2]

Iraq’s Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report covering 2016 reported four submunition casualties.[3]

Data on improvised mine (victim-activated improvised explosive device, IED) casualties remained scarce and did not appear to be explicitly distinguished as such  despite reports of significant use of these weapons in Iraq (see Mine Ban and Mine Action profiles). The Monitor identified 43 casualties of improvised mines. Five improvised mine casualties were reported in the Kurdistan region by IKMAA, The DMA recorded five casualties as a result of IEDs (among the 27 mine/ERW casualties reported in central and southern Iraq in 2016). However, it was not specified whether these were improvised mines (victim-activated IEDs) or other IED types that are command-detonated and therefore not included in Monitor casualty data.[4] The NGO Iraq Body Count recorded 39 casualties of booby-traps in houses: 31 civilians, five members of the police, and three deminers. Many of the civilians were displaced people returning home after fighting had ended. Of these, one casualty was also recorded by IKMAA.[5] The NGO iMMAP reported 11,840 IED casualties in 2016 (4,826 killed and 7,014 injured). However, improvised landmines were not disaggregated from other IED types in the data, therefore these figures could not be included in Monitor casualty data for 2016.[6]

The UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) collected data on casualties in Iraq due to conflict and weapons, but did not report disaggregated data on casualties of improvised mines, or other mines, or ERW. It was not clear if UNAMI collected such data.[7]

iMMAP is providing technical support to set up a new information management office and an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) server for Iraq through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between IKMAA and the DMA. The MoU for iMMAP to support both of the offices was signed in September 2015.[8] iMMAP recorded 25 casualties (six killed and 19 injured) caused by mines/ERW in Iraq in 2016 in its incident database; however, as no details were available it was not clear whether those casualties were also included among those reported by the DMA and IKMAA.

Of the 109 casualties identified by the Monitor where the sex was known, 74 were male and eight were female.[9] A total of seven demining casualties were identified by the Monitor. Of casualties where the age group was known, 46were adults and 37  (46%) were children.[10] There were 43 men, two women, 28 boys, six girls, and 30 casualties of unknown sex and age group. The majority (81%, or 88) were civilians, and 12% (13) were military. Seven were deminers.[11]

It is certain that there are many more mine/ERW casualties in Iraq that have not been identified. The DMA reported that there were casualties as a result of victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines) and booby traps in areas that had been liberated from ISIS. The DMA noted that the security situation in the contaminated areas posed a challenge for the collection of data, as did the reluctance of people to report incidents that had resulted from scrap metal collection due to their concerns about legal consequences.[12]

The total number of casualties in Iraq remains unknown, though it is known that there were many thousands. By the end of 2016, the DMA reported having recorded 17,938 casualties, of which 6,143 were clearly defined in the detail of the data as mine/ERW casualties.[13] The IKMAA reported 13,463 mine/ERW casualties for all time in Kurdistan.[14]

Cluster munition casualties

By the end of 2016, 3,023 casualties from cluster munitions had been recorded. Of these casualties, 388 occurred during strikes (128 killed; 260 injured).[15] Iraq’s survey of mine/ERW victims had identified 880 victims of cluster munitions (148 killed; 732 injured) in five provinces as of 31 March 2014.[16] Due to the level of contamination, it has been estimated that there have been between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties from cluster munitions since 1991 (including casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes), and that one quarter of the estimated total casualties were children.[17]

In 2016, four unexploded cluster submunition casualties were reported in Iraq’s Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report.[18] One male was killed in Missan province, two boys were injured in Basrah province, and one male was injured in Salaheddin.[19] The DMA data included all of these casualties except the one in Salaheddin. According to the DMA, the three casualties it reported were all boys. No unexploded submunition casualties were reported in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2016.

Action points based on findings

• Further develop a sustainable mechanism to collect information on ongoing mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties and their needs in southern and central regions of the Republic of Iraq. It is certain that there were many more casualties in Iraq than have been identified.
• Increase participation of survivors and their representative organizations in the planning and coordination of victim assistance and disability issues throughout all of Iraq.
• Ensure equal access to all services and benefits for both male and female mine/ERW survivors.

Victim assistance commitments

Iraq is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. Iraq has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Iraq acceded to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 20 March 2013.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Iraq is estimated to be at least 48,000–68,000.[1]

Victim assistance since 2015

Economic and political crises in Iraq hampered the delivery of medical and socio-economic services, complicating access for persons with disabilities and increasing their vulnerability, as well as that of the general population throughout the country. While Iraq suffered from a financial crisis, the focus of donors and international NGOs has been on the massive needs of internally displaced persons. This has diverted financial support away from victim assistance and minimized the scale of service provision to mine/ERW survivors across the country.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that “Iraq’s failing health system is struggling to meet the needs of its people while lack of sanitation, overcrowding in some areas, malnutrition and water contamination are contributing to the spread of disease.”[2]

There was a need to ensure that programs supporting persons with disabilities who acquired impairment as a result of armed conflict were fully in line with the CRPD. In 2015, a survivor’s representative from Iraq also expressed an interest in a visit by the Special Rapporteur. In 2016, key UN agencies recommended that the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to visit Iraq, taking into account the standing invitation that the government of Iraq issued to all.[3]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No national needs assessments were reported.

Iraq reported that it lacked resources to expand the geographical scope of its ongoing mine victim survey.

The UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recommended that Iraq establish a system of data collection and analysis for persons with disabilities, disaggregated by age and sex, and respectful of privacy and confidentiality standards. They also suggested that Iraq include the Washington Group on Disability Statistics Short Set of Questions.[4] Handicap International (HI, now Humanity and Inclusion as of January 2018) assessed the needs of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, as part of its victim assistance activities. HI’s survey also identified the impact on members of the beneficiaries’ families.[5]

Victim assistance coordination

In 2016 ad hoc victim assistance coordination meetings were held for central and southern Iraq, often connected with other events and celebrations of the rights of persons with disabilities. There were no regular victim assistance coordination meetings in the Kurdistan region. The situation of persons with disabilities is raised in the Health and Protection clusters and working groups. HI regularly gather actors involved in services for persons with disabilities.[6]

In October 2016, UNMAS held a three-week Risk Education and Victim Assistance Management training course for 15 senior staff from the IKMAA. The course, supported by Japan, included planning, implementing, and monitoring a victim assistance program in line with international standards.[7]

Iraq provided updates on victim assistance at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2017, the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2017, and the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago, Chile in 2016. Iraq reported casualty data and information about victim assistance services provided in central and southern Iraq and in Kurdistan, through form J of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report and form H of its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report for 2016.[8]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Mine survivors participated in the two victim assistance meetings held in central and southern Iraq through the Iraqi Alliance for Disability (IADO). A mine survivor—who is a disability rights leader and head of IADO—also participated in other public events and informal coordination meetings.[9]

There was a need to include persons with disabilities in decision making processes, “with a view to creating a conducive environment for their meaningful participation in society as dynamic, creative and effective agents of change.”[10]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities

Emergency and continuing medical care

Although some healthcare services for persons with disabilities were available in Iraq, such services appeared to have decreased over time. Service providers were mostly located in larger urban centers, with beneficiaries having to travel long distances and pay for transportation.[11]

The ICRC continued to strengthen the emergency response capacity of hospitals in violence-prone areas. Doctors received training in emergency-room trauma care and war surgery. Heavily conflict-affected areas received specific additional support, including in Ninewa Governorate, support from an ICRC surgical team and new operating rooms.[12]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

More than 37,000 persons with disabilities received physiotherapy and other services at nine state-run and one ICRC-managed physical rehabilitation centers in 2016.[13] The state-run centers received ICRC support and supplies. Authorities were encouraged to develop long-term strategies to ensure the welfare of persons with disabilities. In 2016, centers provided 2,955 prostheses in total, including 552 for mine/ERW survivors, marking a decrease compared to 2015, with 744 for mine/ERW survivors of 3,197 prostheses in total,[14] which was a slight decrease from 2014, when 880 prostheses were provided for mine/ERW survivors from a total of 3,098.[15] The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare of Iraq provided 254 prostheses for mine survivors in 2016, in addition it provided as upper limbs and distributed assistance devices.[16]

The economic crisis had a direct impact on the budgeting of all rehabilitation service providers, who as a result lacked material and supplies. In response, HI increased the capacity building of physiotherapists and provided assistive devices and prosthetics materials to four centers.[17]

With HI support, IADO began distributing assistive devices and providing physiotherapy for internally displaced persons in camps in Baghdad.[18] Disability Information Points, managed by local DPOs in each of the three governorates of the Kurdistan region, continued to provide information about available services, with the support of HI.

Economic and social inclusion and psychological support

Economic inclusion activities continued to be carried out on a limited basis in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan region as well as Kirkuk seriously lacked vocational training opportunities for persons with disabilities, including survivors. Additional vocational training was needed to help fill the gap faced by persons with disabilities who often have had only limited access to education. Furthermore, during the conflict, some institutions providing economic inclusion ceased to operate or exist and had not been reopened.[19]

The DMA referred mine/ERW victims (both survivors and family members of people killed by mines/ERW), along with other victims of armed conflict, for the provision of untaxed livelihood loans, free land, and adapted cars, and financed group marriages for mine/ERW victims (identified through the mine/ERW survey).[20] Also, as part of its program to support income-generating activities, thousands of female heads-of-households whose spouses were victims of conflict (including victims of landmines/ERW) continued to receive assistance from the ICRC to overcome government obstacles preventing women from registering for benefits and support for income-generating activities.[21]

Some patients from ICRC-supported rehabilitation centers received livelihood support and sports events were organized with local partners.[22]

While some hospitals had some capacity to provide psychological support to mine/ERW survivors immediately following a traumatic incident, Iraq lacked sufficiently-trained professionals to provide appropriate psychological support to mine survivors. The availability of psychological support and follow-up trauma care in Iraq, including for internally displaced persons, has been inadequate to meet needs.[23] A review of the situation for persons with disabilities in 2016 recommended that the state expand and improve specialized healthcare and psychosocial support.[24]

HI provided mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) services. Provision of MHPSS was one of the main overall concerns due to the massive shortage of qualified staff and lack of support to the entire sector.[25]

Laws and policies

As noted above, increased conflict in Iraq severely effects the lives of persons with disabilities, including survivors.

A review in 2016 recommended that Law 38 (2013) on the Care of Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs should be revised to ensure full compliance with the CRPD. It also noted that the widespread charity-based perception of disability in Iraq needed to change to a rights-based approach to disability, in line with the obligations of the CRPD.[26]

Iraq’s Council of Ministers approved a 3% public sector employment quota for persons with disabilities in 2013.[27] Simplification of the procedures required to claim disability benefits was needed, together with widespread dissemination of the accessible procedures.[28]

An independent mechanism to oversee and monitor implementation of the CRPD, including mine survivors’ representative organization, AIDO, was established in 2015. In May 2015, representatives of DPOs from throughout Iraq received training on conducting a parallel (shadow) CRPD report. IADO was facilitating the process with HI support to finalize the report in 2017.[29]