Summary: State Party Afghanistan ratified the convention on 8 September 2011. Draft legislation is being prepared to enforce its implementation of the convention. Afghanistan has participated in all of the convention’s meetings and voted in favor of a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. It has promoted universalization of the convention and condemned new use of cluster munitions.

In its initial transparency report for the convention provided in 2012, Afghanistan confirmed it has not used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions. The national armed forces do not stockpile cluster munitions, but Afghanistan regularly reports the discovery and destruction of abandoned weapons including cluster munitions.

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 8 September 2011, and became a State Party on 1 March 2012.

Afghanistan reported in April 2016 that the Ministry of Justice is preparing draft implementation legislation for the convention.[1] Previously, in April 2015, it reported that the Ministry of Justice was considering how to amend existing legislation to enforce the provisions of the convention.[2] A 2012 legislative review advised that existing law should be amended, while a technical committee has provided support to the process of preparing the draft.[3]

Afghanistan submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 August 2012 and has provided updated annual reports since, most recently on 25 April 2016.[4]

Afghanistan participated in most meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but despite actively supporting the ban objective it did not endorse the Wellington Declaration that would have committed it to participating fully in the formal negotiations of the convention. It also did not attend the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, not even as an observer.[5] Afghanistan attended the convention’s Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 as an observer, but unexpectedly signed the convention near the end of the conference after the representative announced that he had received instructions and authorization to do so.[6]

Afghanistan plays a positive and active role in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It participated in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015. In an address to the high-level segment of the meeting, Afghanistan described the convention as “one of the success stories in disarmament” and affirmed the need to “send out a strong message through this conference against cluster munitions and reaffirm our collective commitments for a world free of cluster munitions in the near future.”[7]

Afghanistan has attended all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties as well as intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011–2015.

On 7 December 2015, Afghanistan voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[8] Afghanistan has proposed that South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member states discuss cluster munitions.[9]

Afghanistan has condemned the use of cluster munitions and voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[10] At the First Review Conference, Afghanistan expressed strong support for draft outcome documents that condemned any cluster munition use by any actor and commented that “States Parties should join hands to end all suffering caused by these indiscriminate and inhumane weapons.”[11]

Afghanistan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has not ratified.

Interpretive issues

Afghanistan has not elaborated its views on several important issues relating to interpretation and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2011 have outlined US interpretation of the convention as it relates to Afghanistan (see section on Foreign stockpiling). In a December 2008 State Department cable, the US outlined its concern over how Afghanistan would interpret the convention’s prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling, as well as Article 21 on “interoperability” or joint military operations with states not party to the convention.[12]

Use, production, and transfer

In its initial Article 7 report, Afghanistan declared that it has no “production industry” for manufacturing cluster munitions.[13] In September 2011, Afghanistan stated that it “does not use, produce, or transfer Cluster Munitions in the country.”[14]

The Monitor is not aware of any use of cluster munitions in Afghanistan since 2002. US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions in 232 strikes on locations throughout the country between October 2001 and early 2002.[15] Soviet forces also used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989, while a non-state armed group used rocket-delivered cluster munitions during the civil war in the 1990s.[16]

Stockpiling and destruction

In September 2013, Afghanistan informed States Parties that it “destroyed all its cluster munitions stocks before” the convention entered into force and therefore complies with its obligations under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[17] In October 2013, it stated that concerning cluster munitions, “Afghanistan is pleased to have destroyed all weaponry of this kind within its military stockpile.”[18]

Afghanistan “has not officially announced” the completion of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but reports that “the Ministry of Defence verbally confirms that there is not any stockpile of cluster munitions left with Afghan National Forces.”[19] This would appear to indicate that there are not any stocks under the jurisdiction and control of national forces, but additional stocks abandoned in the past by the government may continue to be discovered.

Afghanistan’s Article 7 reports have contained information under stockpile destruction indicating significant destruction during 2005–2011 and further destruction in 2012–2015.[20] In April 2016, Afghanistan reported that HALO Trust weapons and ammunition destruction teams destroyed 165 “cluster munitions” during 2015 under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence.[21] Given the government’s statements that there are no longer any stocks, these destroyed items were likely cluster munitions abandoned by other combatants in the past (and recently discovered) and/or cluster munition remnants destroyed in mine action and clearance operations. These are all considered cluster munition remnants under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not stockpiled cluster munitions.

In 2008, Jane’s Information Group listed Afghanistan as possessing KMG-U dispensers and RBK-250-275 cluster bombs.[22] Standard international reference sources have listed Afghanistan as possessing Grad 122mm and Uragan 220mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these included versions with submunition payloads.[23]

Foreign stockpiling

According to a December 2008 State Department cable released by Wikileaks, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[24] In February 2011, an Afghan human rights group called on the US government and NATO to reveal if it they had stockpiled or used cluster munitions in Afghanistan since the 2002 conflict.[25]

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003.

Afghanistan has not adopted national implementation legislation.[1] A draft regulation prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of mines and cluster munitions was prepared in 2013. In August 2016, a representative of Ministry of Justice stated to an NGO forum that the legal process of the legislation for the convention was now included in the priorities of the ministry, which will attempt to finish the legal process by March 2017.[2]

Afghanistan submitted its 13^th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in April 2016, a report covering calendar year 2015.[3]

Over the past decade, Afghanistan has participated in every Meeting of States Parties, including the convention’s Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2015. Afghanistan participated in all intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, except in May 2016. It attended the Mine Ban Treaty’s First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004 and its Second Review Conference in Cartagena in 2009, however its delegation to the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 was denied a transit visa en-route. Afghanistan’s statements intended for the Maputo conference were uploaded to the treaty’s website.

Use

There have been no reports of antipersonnel mine use by coalition or Afghan national forces. However, use of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed groups continued in 2015 and 2016, resulting in further casualties.

Non-state armed groups

The use of victim-activated improvised mines continued in Afghanistan by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami that oppose the government. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that anti-government forces used victim-activated improvised mines in decreasing numbers during early 2016. Victim-activated (pressure plate) improvised mines were responsible for almost half of all casualties recorded from IEDs during the first half of 2016, down 17% from 2015.[4] UNAMA shares the view of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that victim-activated IEDs function as antipersonnel mines and are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, while command-detonated IEDs are not banned.[5]

In September 2015, Afghan officials were quoted as stating that the Taliban had emplaced landmines and booby-traps around Kunduz after seizing the city.[6] In December 2015, in Faryab province, official’s recovered the body of a soldier that they allege had been booby-trapped with an explosive device by the Taliban.[7] In July 2016, the administrative chief of Andar district of Ghazni province stated that Taliban forces had laid mines in public areas of the district, including near mosques and schools, in their armed conflict with the government.[8]

The Taliban have not made any statement regarding use of victim-activated IEDs since October 2012, when on the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website the Taliban denied the use of victim-activated explosive devices and said it uses only command-detonated explosive devices.[9] As in previous years, the Taliban have claimed responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using command-detonated IEDs.[10]

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and discoveries

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict, large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. In recent years, there were no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups.

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007, eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007.[11] It reported the destruction of 525,504 stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 2003 and 2007.[12] It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program. It reported that it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines as of April 2007, and later reported that it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines in calendar year 2007.[13]

Afghan security forces regularly recover weapons, sometimes including landmines, in their operations. In May 2016, in Zabul Province, the Afghan National Army recovered 48 landmines of an unknown type among other weapons during an offensive.[14] In September 2015, in Helmand Province, authorities seized more than 2000 kilograms of explosives for making IEDs, along with antipersonnel mines and other weapons.[15]

In 2015, Afghanistan reported that a total of 329 antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2015 from stocks recovered during military operations, surrendered during disarmament programs, and discovered by civilians.[16] Since Afghanistan’s stockpile destruction deadline, it has discovered and destroyed 83,321 antipersonnel mines in previously unknown stockpiles.[17]

Mines retained for training and development

Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques. It has reported that “mine bodies used in these programmes have had their fuzes removed and destroyed and are no longer capable of being used.”[18] In June 2011, the chief of operations of the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) confirmed to the Monitor that Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training or other purposes.[19] All mines retained are fuzeless and are used to train mine detection dogs.[20]

Contaminated by: landmines (massive contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance.

 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline: 1 March 2023
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline: 1 March 2022
(Capable of meeting deadline)

Despite the progress of clearance operations, the amount of land known to be mine-contaminated has risen in each of the last three years as a result of new information on mine hazards collected in the course of continuing survey. As of the end of 2015, antipersonnel mines affected a total of 251km². The amount of land released from landmines in 2015 plunged to 37km², down from 77km² in 2014, reflecting a sharp downward trend in the amount of funding for mine action.

No release of the 6.86 km² contaminated by cluster munition remnants occurred in 2015, partly due to insecurity in affected areas and a downturn in funding.

Recommendations for action

• The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan should amend reporting forms to disaggregate clearance of cluster munition remnants from other unexploded ordnance (UXO) in line with the requirements of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
• The Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) should set revised timelines for clearance of cluster munition remnants and landmines reflecting reduced levels of donor funding. It should clarify the implications for fulfilling its extended Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline.
• Afghanistan should finalize and adopt a national mine action law.

Contamination

Landmines and ERW (see below for cluster munition remnants)

Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by mines, mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conflict, and the continuing conflicts between the government in Kabul and the Taliban and other armed groups. 

Despite the progress of clearance operations, the amount of land known to be mine-contaminated has risen in each of the last three years (see table below) as a result of new information on mine hazards collected in the course of continuing survey. In 2015, survey added 32km² of antipersonnel mined area and 39.5km² of antivehicle mined area in 23 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. As of the end of 2015, MACCA reported that antipersonnel mines affected a total of 251km² of territory, though Afghanistan’s Article 7 transparency report for 2015 put the figure at 239km².[1] MACCA estimated that by the end of March 2016, 917 hazardous areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines covering 75.37km² were located within one kilometer of a community center.[2]

Remaining contamination in 2013–2015[3]

Note: * Abandoned IEDs only; ** Not including International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) firing ranges.

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) estimated that mines and ERW block some 77km² of agricultural land, 361km² of grazing land, 29km² of residential areas, 89km² of roads, and 4km² of water sources.[4]

IEDs emplaced by anti-government groups posed the greatest explosive threat to Afghan civilians, including pressure-plate IEDs (PPIEDs) that are victim activated and qualify as weapons prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. The MAPA reported that 86% of ERW casualties reported in 2015 were caused by PPIEDs.[5] The extent of PPIED contamination is not known. (For information about ERW and IED casualties please see the Casualties and Victim Assistance country profile).

Cluster munition remnants

MACCA reported that by the end of 2015 it had 17 cluster munition-contaminated areas in four provinces covering a total area of 6.86km² (6,856.393m²), a level unchanged since April 2015. Nearly half of the contamination is in one district of northeastern Takhar province (see table below).[6] 

Cluster munition contamination at the end of 2015[7]

Cluster munitions were used by the United States (US), which dropped 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 submunitions between October 2001 and early 2002, as well as by Soviet forces during the decade-long war of resistance to the Soviet-backed government.[8]

The reported contamination arises from US use of cluster munitions. However, contamination appears to be more widespread than reported, as demining operators have, in the past, continued to find occasional submunitions resulting from Soviet use.[9] The extent of those finds is unclear as operators’ standard reporting forms only provide for recording clearance of UXO.

Cluster munition remnants are said to block access to grazing and agricultural land.[10]

Program Management

The MAPA is coordinated by MACCA with the support of a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) project office. In 2008, within the context of a transition of mine action from the UN to the government, a government interministerial board assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), renamed in 2015 the Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), which is a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and reports to the Office of the Second Vice President. In early 2016, DMAC had 15 headquarters staff in Kabul employed on government salaries, with plans for the number to increase.[11] It also had 51 quality management inspectors undertaking quality assurance of demining operations and the clearance of ISAF firing ranges, as well as two information management specialists, two communications officers, and two staff associates, employed under UN contracts. MACCA, responding to sharp falls in funding, had reduced its staff from 393 in 2012 to 145 by the start of 2016.[12] DMAC expected to absorb all MACCA personnel by June 2017.[13]

Strategic planning 

Afghanistan set out a landmine clearance plan for the 10 years to March 2023 in the Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2012 and revised in August of the same year. It planned to complete clearance of all known areas contaminated with antivehicle mines and other ERW as well as antipersonnel mines. It consolidated the 4,442 mine and ERW hazards then remaining into 308 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilization. Projects would be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.[14]

However, a sharp downturn in funding for mine clearance has resulted in lower levels of clearance than planned. At the level of funding received in 2015, MACCA estimated it would take a further 12 years to complete clearance.[15]

The MAPA adopted a five-year strategic plan for 1395−1399 (1 April 2016–31 March 2020) focused on “mainstreaming development in mine action” to mitigate the sharp downturn in donor funding experienced since 2011.[16] It set out four goals: facilitating development; engagement with other sectors; “the five pillars of mine action,” incorporating preventive action (survey, clearance, stockpile destruction, risk education, and advocacy) and responsive action (promoting needs of mine accident victims in government policies and budgets); and gender and diversity mainstreaming.

The plan also set out 33 objectives and 108 associated actions. These included having mine action incorporated into Afghanistan’s National Priority Programmes and Sustainable Development Goals; integrating mine action into the activities of line ministries, improving fundraising; completing survey; and keeping implementation of Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request on track. On the basis of a mid-2015 review, it concluded the MAPA needed $391.7 million to implement the plan, including $353.4 million for clearance, $24.8 million for “coordination” (quality assurance, planning and prioritization, information management, advocacy, and resource mobilization), $3.6 million for survey, and $5.6 million for risk education.[17]

The MAPA’s operational work plan for 1394 (1 April 2015–31 March 2016) aimed for clearance of 75.4km² of affected land but this was dependent on attracting funding of $65.9 million. MACCA reported it received only 62% of this amount and achieved 64% of targeted clearance. Despite this setback, the MAPA’s work plan for 1395 (2016−2017) targeted clearance of almost 91km² of contaminated land with the release of 941 hazards, leading to 233 communities and 27 districts being declared mine-free.[18] 

Afghanistan stated in 2014 that it planned to release 60% of its cluster munition hazards by the end of 2015. The remaining hazardous areas would be tackled “later” because they were located in areas of insecurity.[19] This target was not achieved. In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report for 2014, Afghanistan stated it would clear cluster munition-contaminated hazardous areas in Nangahar and Takhar provinces totaling 5km² (nearly three-quarters of the remaining contamination) in Afghan year 1395 (ending 20 March 2017). It planned to clear three hazardous areas totaling 0.8km² in 1397 (ending March 2018) and the last hazardous area covering 0.16km² in Afghan year 1400 (ending March 2022).[20] Note that this is less than the 6.86km² remaining to be cleared.

Legislation

An inter-ministerial committee and MACCA drafted a mine action law in 2005 but it was never enacted. The draft law, now annexed to a Disaster Management Law, has been approved by the Ministry of Justice and sent to the Prime Minister’s Office for review, but has still not been presented to parliament.[21] The lack of such a law, clarifying the structure of mine action and institutional responsibilities, has weakened representation of mine action within the government and its omission from the government’s National Priority Programme, contributing to a serious downturn in funding.[22]

Operators

Clearance of explosive contamination is conducted by five long-established national and three international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), and the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). The two most active international NGOs are Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust, while the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has a small operation near the border with Tajikistan.[23] 

A total of 24 commercial companies were accredited in 2015, but only 10 operated during the year and of these only Sterling Demining Afghanistan was active throughout the year, working on clearing ISAF firing ranges. None worked on antipersonnel mine clearance.[24]

As a result of funding cuts, implementing partner capacity had fallen by more than half over the course of three years to just under 5,400 personnel by the end of Afghan year 1393 (1 April 2014–31 March 2015).[25] By September 2015, the number of people employed in mine action for humanitarian purposes had dropped to about 4,000 and the number engaged by Sterling Demining Afghanistan on clearing ERW from ISAF/NATO firing ranges had risen to around 5,000.[26] 

Deminer safety

One deminer was killed and nine injured in demining incidents in 2015 but conflict and criminality took a much higher toll. Eight MAPA personnel were killed and a further 34 were injured in security incidents involving armed criminals as well as armed opposition groups. Another 63 personnel were abducted, although all were eventually released. Additionally, mine action organizations had taken from them a total of 11 vehicles and a range of other equipment, including radios, detectors, GPS devices, helmets, and body armor.[27]

Land Release (Mines)

The amount of land released in 2015 plunged, reflecting a sharp downward trend in the amount of funding for mine action. A total of 37km² was released in 2015, down from 77km² the previous year.

Survey in 2015 (Mines)

Afghanistan started a “Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey” (MEIFCS) in 2012, envisaging it would take two years to complete. The survey has found many more communities than in the official gazetteer, which provided the basis for planning, and at the same time has had to contend with less funding, less manpower, and more constraints on access as a result of heightened insecurity. 

In 2015, 14 teams conducted the survey, half the number in the previous year, of which HALO provided 12 teams that visited 2,516 communities in 13 provinces, covering most area in Balkh just north of Kabul and Logar province south of the capital. HALO reported it completed survey of seven districts.[28] FSD provided two teams, working in Badakhshan. In total, the survey covered a total of 4,398 communities, of which only 1,643 were in the gazetteer. Teams canceled 36 hazards covering 2.1km² but also identified 148 additional areas of contamination covering 30.7km².[29]

Mined areas identified in 2015[30]

Note: SHAs = suspected hazardous areas

Clearance in 2015 (Mines)

Operators cleared 35.4km² of mined area in 2015 (see table below), 43% less than the previous year, the third successive year of falling clearance and the lowest result recorded since 2007. The number of antipersonnel mines destroyed was little more than one-third of the previous year’s result, partly an effect of operators moving onto more remote and sparsely contaminated minefields, as well as reduced capacity resulting from funding constraints.[31]

HALO Trust and MDC accounted for more than three-quarters of the total area cleared in 2015. MDC, in addition to humanitarian clearance, continued to work on infrastructure tasks linked to the development of the Aynak copper mine. Four other national operators (ATC, DAFA, MCPA, and OMAR), which have borne the brunt of financial cuts in the past three years, together accounted for 20% of the area cleared in 2015. Only community-based demining in areas of fragile security expanded with the number of teams rising from 24 at the end of 2014 to 49 at the end of 2015.[32]

DDG stood down 13 clearance sections and 130 deminers in response to funding cuts, which resulted in mined area clearance falling by two-thirds from 2014, though it also cleared 1.4km² of battle area and undertook close to two-thirds of the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks called in on a MACCA hotline.[33]

HALO Trust also stood down 11 demining teams in 2015 as a result of a decrease in funding, but with some 2,300 staff it remained much the biggest humanitarian operator in Afghanistan. It cleared only marginally less (2%) area than the previous year as a result of higher productivity and by undertaking more clearance of areas affected by antivehicle mines.[34] 

Mined area clearance in 2015[35]

Note: * APMs = antipersonnel mines; AVM = antivehicle mines; UXO = unexploded ordnance.

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

No release of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants occurred in 2015, partly due to insecurity in affected areas and reflecting competing priorities at a time when the mine action program is dealing with a sharp downturn in funding.[37] HALO Trust reported destroying 10 submunitions in the course of mine clearance operations but it did not tackle any cluster munition-contaminated hazardous areas.[38] DDG was also not involved in any cluster munition clearance. National operators did not respond to requests for information about their activities.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2009), to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. It is not on track to meet the deadline.

Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request submitted in 2012 set out a detailed timeline for completing clearance of mined and battle area in 2022 (1401). Afghanistan will miss those targets as a result of a combination of factors, notably a sharp downturn in funding for the MAPA.

Mine clearance in 2010–2015

Other factors adding to uncertainty include continued new discoveries of mined areas, which meant the outstanding area requiring clearance was 11.5km² greater at the end of 2015 than two years earlier, despite clearance of close to 100km² in the interim. Escalating insecurity is also hampering survey and clearance in wider areas.[39] Afghanistan’s 2016−2020 strategic plan also flagged concern that use of PPIEDs, if continued at the same level as in the recent years, could contribute to delays in meeting Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline. It observed that the continuing conflict prevents clearance of operational items by the MAPA to avoid jeopardizing its status as a neutral actor and because of problems of access to the devices in areas of conflict.[40] 

Convention on Cluster Muntions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Afghanistan is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Afghanistan can meet this deadline.

Clearance of Afghanistan’s remaining cluster munition-contaminated hazardous areas by its Article 4 deadline is well within the MAPA’s capacity. Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request provided for clearance of all ERW, including submunitions, by 2020.[41] However, clearance of cluster munition remnants stalled in 2015 because they are located in areas that were too insecure for operators to access.[42]

In 2015, Afghanistan said that it intended to complete clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2022.[43] Whether it is achieved will depend mainly on factors outside the control of the mine action sector, notably the country’s long-running conflict. The extent of scattered cluster munition remnants suggests operators will continue to encounter residual contamination beyond the Article 4 clearance deadline, even if Afghanistan were to meet it.

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2015, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan received US$52.6 million from 17 donor governments, an increase of 7% compared to 2014.[1]

The United States (US) provided the largest contribution with $22.7 million, which represents some 43% of the total international mine action assistance in Afghanistan for 2015. Four other donors contributed more than $3.5 million each: the United Kingdom (UK) ($5.9 million), Germany ($3.8 million), the Netherlands ($3.7 million), and Canada ($3.5 million).

Of the total contribution, 86% ($45.2 million) went toward clearance and risk education activities, 6% ($2.9 million) was for victim assistance, and the remainder ($4.5 million) went to other mine action activities that were not disaggregated by sector.

Victim assistance is integrated within the broader coordination mechanisms of the disability sector.[2] Consequently, overall funding to victim assistance is under-reported. In 2015, victim assistance funding totaled $2.9 million and came from three donors: Germany ($1.3 million), France ($1.1 million), and Italy ($500,000).

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is largely funded through international assistance, although in the past the government of Afghanistan has reported contributing to some specific projects. For instance, in 2015 the government of Afghanistan contributed $1.5 million for clearance operations in Logar Province, while in 2013, Afghanistan contributed $2.6 million for clearance of the Aynak copper mine.[3] No information on any national contribution was available for 2014.

International contributions: 2015[4]

Since 2011, Afghanistan has received more than $350 million in international assistance for mine action. Between 2010–2014, a downward trend had been apparent with a continuous decline in international assistance that has dropped from $102 million in 2010 to less than $50 million in 2014.

In September 2015, MAPA noted that “While the APMBT [Mine Ban Treaty] work plan envisages a reduction in the funds required as the plan progresses, the funds received from donors in the past four years have decreased at a more rapid rate. If this trend continues, it is unlikely that Afghanistan will meet its 2023 deadline under the MBT [Mine Ban Treaty].”[5] In order to cope with the recent fall in international assistance, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) reported it has implemented new initiatives as part of its mobilization strategy, notably via the exchange of experience and the provision of trainings. In line with these efforts, the United Arab Emirates provided mine/explosive remnants of war training at its training center in Kabul, which benefited 8,622 Mullah Imams from 18 provinces between April 2014 and March 2015.[6]

Summary of contributions: 2011–2015[7]

Summary action points based on findings

• Develop, adopt, and implement a national disability plan that includes objectives that respond to the needs of survivors and recognizes its victim assistance obligations and commitments, together with a monitoring structure.
• Expand access to physical rehabilitation needs, particularly in provinces lacking services or where traveling to receive rehabilitation is difficult for survivors.
• Ensure that meaningful participation of survivors is increased at all levels.
• Prioritize physical accessibility, particularly for services and for government buildings.
• Provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer support in particular to new survivors as well as those who have been traumatized and live in isolation.

Victim assistance commitments

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Afghanistan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 18 September 2012.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

The Monitor identified 1,296 new casualties due to mines, victim-activated IEDs, and ERW in Afghanistan for 2014. The overall total included 470 civilian and 16 deminer casualties of mines/ERW recorded by the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA). Another 775 casualties from victim-activated IEDs recorded by UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) were included in the annual total.[1] Of the 1,242 civilian casualties reported for 2014, 664 were adults, including at least 57 women.

In 2014, children (561, including 80 girls) made up 45% of the total civilian casualties where the age group was known.[2] Similarly, in 2013 children (486, including 70 girls) made up almost half (47%) of the total civilian casualties where the age was known. This marked an increase from 2012 when children (432) accounted for a third (34%) of civilian casualties.

In 2014, there were 16 deminer casualties (two were killed and 14 injured), a significant decrease from 2013, when 22 deminer casualties (one killed and 21 injured) were reported. The total number of deminer casualties in 2014 was the same as in 2012, 16 (three killed and 13 injured).[3]

The 2014 casualty total of 1,296 represented an increase from 1,050 casualties in 2013,[4] and was closer to the 1,422 casualties[5] due to mines/ERW including victim-activated IEDs identified in Afghanistan for 2012.

In both 2014 and 2013, far fewer casualties among military and security forces were reported or identified than in previous years. This is unlikely to be representative of a trend, but rather due to changes in media reporting, other reporting sources, and the overall availability of data.

Data from Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), part of its global explosive weapon casualties monitoring project, included 33 casualties of victim-activated IEDs among Afghan security personnel (armed forces and police) and one International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military casualty in 2014. These casualties were included in the Monitor casualty total for Afghanistan. The number of national security force casualties was relatively low in proportion to the 505 armed actor casualties (including non-state armed group (NSAG) actors) of all types of IEDs recorded by AOAV for 2014.[6]

In addition, Afghan security force sources reported on 16 NSAG members (suspected Taliban) killed while making or planting IEDs. As casualties of their own explosive devices—IEDs that may have been constructed to be detonated remotely on command—these were not included in the casualty total for Afghanistan for 2014.[7]

An increase in the number of civilian casualties of victim-activated IEDs (specifically pressure-plate IEDs, PP IEDs) was recorded in in Afghanistan in 2014. During the reporting period, MACCA took the step of integrating PP IED casualty data collection into its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), in order to respond to the needs of survivors and victims in accordance with the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.[8] MACCA reported serious concerns about the increased use of the “indiscriminate illegal” PP IEDs by anti-government elements in 2014. UNAMA recorded a 39% annual increase, with 775 civilian PP IED casualties (417 killed and 358 injured) in 2014. PP IEDs accounted for 26% of civilian casualties from all types of IEDs. MACCA and UNAMA established a close coordination mechanism for exchange and verification of data on casualties of mines, ERW, and PP IEDs in 2014.[9]

The total number of victim-activated IED casualties reported with disaggregated data for the years 2014, 2013 (557), and 2012 (913) was far higher than those identified in previous years.[10] Although the number of annual victim-activated IED casualties in 2013 was significantly less than in 2012, by mid-2014 UNAMA reported that the number of victim-activated IED casualties was again increasing.[11]

There was also an increase in the number of annual ERW casualties reported by MACCA, with 426 recorded for 2014, 6% higher compared to 399. Children were overwhelmingly the group most affected by ERW, with 352 child casualties (103 killed and 249 injured) making up 83% of the total of ERW casualties in 2014.

Both MACCA and UNAMA have expressed strong concerns about the sharp rise in civilian casualties from ERW associated with the closure of ISAF bases and high explosive firing ranges. Many of the ranges were not sufficiently cleared of ERW prior to closure.[12] MACCA identified 49 casualties that occurred on or near military bases and firing ranges in 2014 (52 in 2013 and 47 in 2012); the vast majority of these casualties were children: 78% in 2014 (73% in 2013 and 81% in 2012). Of all the casualties from ERW on firing ranges recorded from 2010 through 2013, almost all occurred during livelihood activities including: tending animals; household work; collecting food, water, or wood; hunting; recreation; and travelling. Only two were due to tampering.[13]

In advance of the NATO Summit in September 2014, members of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development (ACBAR) distributed an updated briefing paper on the impact of ERW left by international armed forces to key stakeholders in Afghanistan.[14]

Mines/ERW severely affected internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan, however, in 2014, the number of casualties among IDPs dropped sharply, to 18.[15] In 2013, IDPs made up more than 20% of all civilian mine/ERW casualties recorded by MACCA.[16] There was an increasing trend in the number of IDP casualties during the period from 2010 to 2013 (97 in 2013, 94 in 2012, 45 in 2011, and 72 in 2010). There were estimated to be around 176,129 IDPs living near 434 known hazardous areas (in a radius of 5km²).[17]

MACCA data indicated that there had been 24,300 (4,802 people killed and 19,498 injured) between 1967 and 2014, not including victim-activated IED casualties.[18]

Cluster munition casualties

Since 1980, 752 casualties of cluster munition remnants were recorded. In addition, at least 26 casualties during cluster munitions strikes have been recorded.[19] One submunition casualty was recorded in 2014. Previously the last submunition casualties recorded by MACCA were in 2010.[20]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Afghanistan is unknown, but in 2006 the number was estimated to be 52,000–60,000.[21]

Victim assistance since 1999[22]

Access to victim assistance in Afghanistan was hampered by a severe lack of services, poor to non-existent infrastructure, ongoing conflict, and poverty. However, Afghanistan did make progress in victim assistance and disability issues, supported by significant international funds that were needed to improve services and conditions. A lack of coordination among donors funding services for persons with disabilities alongside other competing priorities for assistance was identified as a challenge. Over time, ministries demonstrated more national ownership of services for persons with disabilities, which were integrated into ministry policies and strategic planning with the assistance of MACCA technical advisors. National NGOs, disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), and survivors’ organizations became increasingly active and participated regularly in disability coordination. Inclusive education increased since 2008.

Psychosocial support services increased from almost non-existent, as did peer-to-peer support, though they were still hardly available and remained insufficient to meet demand and needs. A community-based rehabilitation (CBR) network grew and became better coordinated.

Economic reintegration projects were limited and conducted mostly by NGOs under the coordination of relevant ministries—ministries paid some disability pensions to war victims and ran some vocational training.

Victim assistance under the Vientiane Action Plan 2011–2015

Movement restrictions (due to conflict, lack of accessible roads, and the cost of transport) were persistent obstacles to victim assistance in some parts of the country that continued through the period.

Despite improvements, geographic coverage of healthcare remained insufficient, particularly in terms of physical rehabilitation. Physical rehabilitation services were almost entirely operated by international NGOs and the ICRC under the coordination of the government.

Access to services and support for national and local DPOs and NGOs increased during the period 2010–2012. The ICRC increased its support to medical care and physical rehabilitation consistently throughout the period, while international NGOs continued to provide the remainder of physical rehabilitation services.

Funding challenges continued to impede progress. In 2013, there was an overall decline in the number of projects being implemented and some organizations were unable to fulfill their planned projects and overall mandates due to a decrease in international financial support. Although resources were greatly reduced, there were still some donors who sustained their support for persons with disabilities in ways that included survivors. MACCA and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) increased financial support to victim assistance and disability-related projects by registering national and international NGOs, which could then receive specific project funding.

Victim assistance in 2014

Afghanistan reported that, while there was tangible progress on the ground, the scale of victim assistance services was inadequate compared to the need.[23] Funding decreased and many NGOs providing victim assistance and other services for persons with disabilities faced critical financial shortages. Due to the shortage of financial resources some provincial braches of NGOs ceased their victim assistance activities.[24]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No specific needs assessment surveys of survivors were conducted in 2014. The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MoLSAMD) regularly registered persons with disabilities with war-related impairments and the dependents of persons killed (martyrs) in Kabul and in the provinces, in order to provide a monthly financial allowance. MoLSAMD also registered persons with disabilities not caused by conflict in Kabul.[25]

However, the social security registration system required a significant overhaul. An independent Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment (VCA) focusing on the challenges to obtaining legally guaranteed financial benefits faced by persons with conflict-related disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, was published in 2015. It found serious problems with the system—including a “significant number of lengthy, convoluted, and at times seemingly arbitrary steps…nearly all of which constitute discretionary transactions conducive to bribery, influence, etc.”[26] The process was also found to place additional psychological and physical burdens on persons with disabilities “a group that many Afghans treat as outcasts, corruption contributes to their further marginalization from society.”[27]

MoLSAMD entered data on registered persons with disabilities and dependents of persons killed into an Excel spreadsheet software program, which effectively meant that it could be misused at any time. In 2015, the World Bank was implementing a project to establish a better electronic data system.[28]

In 2015, the office of the president of Afghanistan reported that a “lack of a standard mechanism for identifying the level of disability, and proper work system were described as the major problems at Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Disabled that has prevented the ministry to respond [sic] to the legitimate demands of the disabled and families.”[29] The independent VCA report recommended that new, detailed, and comprehensive criteria for determining eligibility for registration of persons with disabilities needed to be developed and made available publicly and to all applicants.[30]

MACCA supported the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in the development of disability and physical rehabilitation indicators for its Health Management Information System (HMIS). The HMIS directorate agreed to include these indicators in the revised HMIS, which was planned for 2015. The software for the National Disability Referral Guide was developed by MACCA in Access format, but not yet printed or publically available.[31]

A study by MoLSAMD and the Ministry of Education (MoE), carried out on eight components of victim assistance in Afghanistan, was used in 2014 to identify a list of projects to be prioritized by relevant ministries as well as economic reintegration and physical rehabilitation projects funded by MACCA in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Kunar provinces.[32]

In 2014, Handicap International (HI) Community-Based Mine Risk Education (CBMRE) teams collected data on civilian mine/ERW casualties (specifically including mines, ERW, abandoned IEDs, and PP IEDs) from affected communities in 10 districts of Kandahar and Helmand provinces while conducting risk education sessions. Subsequently, verification data was submitted to the MACCA regional office in Kandahar. In May 2014, HI extended these activities to another four districts in the southern region.[33] Disaggregated data on mine/ERW casualties was collected and survivors and other persons with disabilities in need were referred to the HI Physical Rehabilitation Center (PRC) in Kandahar for assistance.[34] HI restarted its CBMRE in Kandahar and Helmand provinces in 2013 after a one-year pause due to lack of funding (April 2012 to March 2013).[35]

Most service providers collected information on the needs of survivors for use in their own programs. As in the following examples, recent assessments were carried out at local or regional levels, focusing on specific issues such as physical rehabilitation or accessibility.

• In 2014, the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program (PRP, known also as the Orthopaedic Program) conducted a vulnerability assessment of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, through its social reintegration project. The homes of more than 3,000 persons were visited and their economic situations evaluated so that they could be provided with appropriate socioeconomic inclusion measures. A portion of beneficiaries were later re-assessed in order to evaluate the impact of the program on them. The results confirmed the high level of vulnerability of persons with disabilities.[36]

• During April 2015, HI, through its Victim Assistance (VA) project in Afghanistan, launched a baseline needs survey in three districts of Kandahar province,[37] identifying the health, social, and economic status of mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities and their families (as immediate caregivers).[38]

• The NGO Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation (AABRAR) used a standard format for needs assessment of target beneficiaries. Short surveys were conducted to identify the needs of beneficiaries with disabilities for economic inclusion support in Kabul, Parwan, and Balkh province.[39]

The last comprehensive disability survey was in 2005.

Victim assistance coordination[40]

Coordination

MoLSAMD is the government focal point for victim assistance and regulating the legislation of disability issues overall.[41] Other national and international stakeholders support the government in developing or amending legislation. The MoPH and the MoE are involved in disability services and advocacy activities. The MoPH also coordinates training programs for physiotherapists and healthcare providers.[42] The work of these three key ministries is supported by MACCA technical advisors, who are funded by UNMAS.

In January 2014, MoLSAMD held its first-ever donors meeting, which was attended by more than 25 donors including representatives of embassies in Kabul. There were some assurances from donors to support the work of the ministry in the area of disability.[43] Previously, it was noted that greater donor coordination on disabilities issues would be particularly useful for Afghanistan.[44]

The MoPH is responsible for medical treatment and physical rehabilitation. Its plan of action consists of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS); physiotherapy services are included in both, while prosthetic services were only included in the EPHS. Although it is in the framework and action plans, physical rehabilitation, including delivery of services and funding, was not yet managed by the MoPH.[45] The MoPH Strategic Framework 2011–2015 counted improving disability services among its priorities, and the ministry’s focal point for disability, the Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Department (DRD), had an implementation strategy for the framework. MoLSAMD was responsible for the social inclusion of persons with disabilities through benefits and the pension system, while the MoE worked toward ensuring access to education. MACCA assists with overall coordination in the areas of disability and victim assistance.[46]

A specific coordination committee for victim assistance was established by MACCA in September 2013 with the aim of enhancing the coordination of victim assistance within MACCA, government line ministries (MoPH, MoLSAMD, and MoE), Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) implementing partners, and other victim assistance stakeholders working in Afghanistan. The VA [Victim Assistance] Coordination Group held six bi-monthly meetings at MACCA, chaired by the victim assistance department, with the participation of all key monthly national and international victim assistance and disability organizations and representatives of the line ministries, including the MoPH, MoLSAMD, and the MoE.[47] The main goals on the agenda were to create and strengthen the coordination mechanism for disability stakeholders while highlighting the needs of, and support for, mine, cluster munition, and other ERW survivors within a broader disability context in order to reach most mine/ERW and war-impacted communities. The goals, which were aligned with relevant ministries’ priorities, also included mapping activities and avoiding duplication of resources. [48]

Several other coordination groups, including those noted above, regularly held meetings relevant to victim assistance and disability rights, both nationally (from Kabul) and at the regional level. MACCA and the participating ministries reported that these meetings resulted in improved coordination and cooperation between actors; strengthened support and cooperation between the responsible ministries and other stakeholders; and improved advocacy and awareness-raising. The various coordination group meetings included the following:

• DSCG, led by MoLSAMD and supported by MACCA technical advisors, held 13 meetings in 2014. Issues discussed included: the inclusive education policy, tax issues for DPOs and NGOs serving persons with disabilities, the establishment of national inclusive vocational training, and skill development guidelines and standards among many CRPD-related points.

• The Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Taskforce, coordinated by the MoPH, held ad hoc meetings in 2014. Activities focused on finalizing spinal cord injury management guidelines, enhancing professional training, strengthening coordination, fundraising for services, and long-term planning.

The Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Taskforce also launched a highly commended mapping report on the physical rehabilitation sector, which focused mainly on the accessibility of services to users and how service providers ensure accountability. The mapping report was officially endorsed by the Disability and Rehabilitation Department of Ministry of Public Health (MoPH-DRD) in June 2014, and subsequently launched in November.[49] During the November launching workshop of the Mapping Report on the Physical Rehabilitation Sector, MoPH-DRD officials declared their commitment to use the recommendations of the report for the future strategic planning of their department.[50]

• The Advocacy Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ACPD), under the secretariat of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) disability section, organized meetings on a quarterly basis and mostly focused on the advocacy issues of the rights of persons with disabilities. It also remained engaged throughout the year in other groups and meetings. Together with ACPD members, the MACCA/UNMAS Victim Assistance/Disability Advisor for MoLSAMD attended some 24 meetings, sessions, workshops, and advocacy and awareness events on various issues of the rights of persons with disabilities. The AIHRC also chaired ad hoc meetings of the ACPD to address the challenges faced by persons with disabilities and the low implementation of laws and policies, including international disability and victim assistance conventions as well awareness-raising and advocacy.

• The Afghan CBR Network conducted five workshops on five components of CBR with the financial support of the Community Center for Disabled People (CCD) for which World Health Organization (WHO) international CBR guidelines were translated into Pashtu and Dari languages, then printed and distributed by Afghan CBR Network members.

• The Inclusive Child Friendly Education-Coordination Working Group (ICFE-CWG), chaired by the MoE, held six meetings during 2014. More than 15 national and international organizations discussed activities, achievements, challenges, and the way ahead. The key outcome was development, translation, and printing of the first comprehensive policy on disability-inclusive education in Afghanistan.

• The Inter-ministerial Taskforce on Disability, chaired by the MoPH-DRD and hosted by MoLSAMD, was established for addressing specific objectives including the national disability policy development mechanism, the establishment of a national rehabilitation institute, holding a high-level CRPD workshop, establishing training curricula for social workers, and training of the psychosocial counselors. In 2014, follow-up on these issues was undertaken by both ministries. As a result, the national disability policy draft was widely circulated for consultation.

• MACCA established a “MAPA Gender Mainstreaming Strategy Focal Points” working group for implementation of its Gender Mainstreaming Strategy (including victim assistance). The focal points from implementing partners participated in several meetings led by MACCA through which the progress made by each organization was presented during the meetings. For example:[51]
  • Every partner organization developed an action plan for implementation of the MAPA Gender Mainstreaming Strategy;
  • Most implementing partners revised their job vacancy announcements in line with requirements of the gender strategy to facilitate opportunity for female applicants;
  • Some of the Implementing Partners reviewed/adapted their human resources policies, standard operating procedures, and codes of conduct in consideration of gender strategy and some organizations promised to do so according to their plans;
  • Most of the gender focus points conducted briefing sessions to their organization’s staff members, and others committed to do so according to their own action plans.

• National meetings of the UNCHR-led Afghanistan Protection Cluster (APC) in Kabul, (seven meetings were held in 2014) focused on lobbying activities on the protection of civilians and strengthening collaboration among protection actors. In APC meetings, HI endeavored to ensure greater inclusion of persons with disabilities and victim assistance approaches in other participants’ programs, protection strategies, and action plans and to ensure that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Country Humanitarian Action Plan for 2015 would be inclusive of survivors and persons with disabilities.

While a lot of work remained to be done to integrate disability rights issues into the work of UN agencies, disability was on the agendas of some UN agencies in 2014, including the UNICEF and the World Food Program (WFP).[52]

As part of the process of handing over NGO-run physiotherapy clinics to district hospitals, in December 2014 the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) and the MoPH jointly organized a national workshop on physical rehabilitation, in Kabul. Representatives from MoLSAMD and the ICRC, HI, AABRAR, DAO, CCD, and the Afghan Association for Physical Therapy (AAPT) also attended the workshop.The main objectives were to discuss the current status of the physical rehabilitation services, and handover of services to the frameworks of the governments Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS). The MoPH committed to supporting the takeover of SCA district- and provincial-level physiotherapy clinics by BPHS and EPHS implementers. However, compared to NGO salaries, the low salary grades for physiotherapists, set by national salary standards, were recognized as a major obstacle in handover process.[53]

Policies and plans

In 2014, the process of developing the Afghanistan National Policy for Persons with Disabilities continued with the draft shared once again with government agencies and stakeholders for further feedback. The Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan (ANDAP) 2008–2011 was not revised; revision of the plan remained on hold since the ANDAP expired in 2011, pending the completion of the disability policy.[54] However, a number of other policies in Afghanistan refer to services for persons with disabilities, although do not necessarily mention victim assistance. These include the Health and Nutrition Strategy of the MoPH and the Inclusive Education Policy of the MoE.[55]

Afghanistan provided information on progress in and challenges to victim assistance at the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings and Meeting of States Parties in 2014. Afghanistan was the co-coordinator for victim assistance for the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2013–2014. Afghanistan presented victim assistance developments at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in 2014.[56] Afghanistan made extensive use of all sections of its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for 2014. Afghanistan also included detailed reporting on victim assistance activities in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting for 2014.[57]

Survivor inclusion and participation

Mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations were included in the planning and provision of victim assistance.[58] Persons with disabilities and their representative organizations were included in decision-making and participated in the various coordination bodies. However, it was sometimes reported that their views were not fully taken into account.[59] In 2014, the inclusion of persons with disabilities, survivors, and their representative organizations remained insufficient and was not yet effectively included as an essential component of activities.[60]

Parents of children with disabilities were involved in MoE inclusive education training in Kabul, which resulted in increased enrollment of children with disabilities into mainstream schools.[61] Many NGOs had a significant proportion of employees who were persons with disabilities. Mine/ERW survivors were included in the implementation of peer support, rehabilitation, and other services. Persons with disabilities employed by MACCA supported the activities of the key ministries and were included in NGO activities that MACCA supported.[62]

The ICRC Afghan Physical Rehabilitation Program was managed by persons with disabilities. The rehabilitation program maintained a policy of “positive discrimination,” employing and training only persons with disabilities. Service provision was entirely managed by survivors and persons with disabilities, including technical and administrative positions. The ICRC continuously consulted with and involved survivors in the decision-making process as survivors were fully integrated into its operations. The positive discrimination policy also aimed to demonstrate that persons with disabilities are an asset to society, not a burden.[63]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[64]

Emergency and continuing medical care

Obtaining appropriate and timely medical treatment in conflict-affected areas remained difficult for much of the population. Attacks on medical personnel and facilities further impeded services.[65]

A lack of funding and attention to victim assistance issues combined with increasing levels of conflict in Afghanistan resulted in the need for an increase in medical care while there were fewer resources available. Medical care for persons with disabilities decreased in availability.[66] In rural areas, medical services were particularly reduced because of the lack of physical security.

ICRC-supported hospitals treated 1,827 weapon-wounded patients in 2014 (a similar number of beneficiaries compared to 2,023 in 2013); some 42% (861) were injured by mines/ERW (compared to 47%, 950 in 2014).[67] Some 1,560 weapon-wounded people reached the hospitals in southern Afghanistan in 2014 through an ICRC-funded transport system, which had a new referral procedure and improved monitoring (an increase from about 1,000 people in 2013).[68]

A report by Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) in early 2014 found that the cost of healthcare was exacerbating the poverty of already very poor people in Afghanistan. Most of the population had access to basic public healthcare. However, the quality was reported to be extremely low, resulting in many patients having to resort to seeking higher cost private services, paid for “out-of pocket” with borrowed money. This, in turn, resulted in a cycle of debt.[69]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

Physical rehabilitation was not available in all provinces.The number of the facilities providing prosthetic and orthopedic devices remained unchanged in 2014. Rehabilitation centers were concentrated in 12 of the 34 Afghan provinces and patients were often forced to travel long distances to access services. Physical rehabilitation services were available through a network of 17 centers, seven of which were managed by the ICRC; the others were managed by NGOs, with the exception of two that were managed by the MoPH. The MoPH-run rehabilitation centers in Kabul and Khost provinces were reported to have had made an insignificant impact on the needs of persons with disabilities and performance was questionable. The annual production of mobility devices in the country indicates that existing centers are insufficient to meet demand.[70] There was a significant shortage of rehabilitation services in many districts in Afghanistan, especially in rural areas and regions where insecurity and persisting violence is high.[71]

The obstacles to rehabilitation were reported to be numerous; the ICRC listed the following: “ignorance, lack of compassion, dedication, accountability and professionalism among medical personnel, prejudices against disability, poverty, distances and transport difficulties, violence, ethnicity and political divisions.”[72] Due to the challenges Afghanistan faces and the large number of persons with disabilities among the population, the ICRC reported that it would be unrealistic to consider the government capable of ensuring the needed services itself. Anticipating that it will take years before the national authorities have the capacity to fully manage the long-term functioning of services, the ICRC continued the process of providing training while transferring management responsibilities to Afghan employees for a progressive handover.[73]

In 2013, a mapping report on the physical rehabilitation sector, which was developed under the regional rehabilitation project (south Asia), was carried by HI with the involvement of all physical rehabilitation stakeholders of Afghanistan. The findings also demonstrated that there remained a shortfall in availability, geographical coverage, and quality of services.[74]

The geographic coverage of ICRC rehabilitation services remained the same in 2014, while the number of patients assisted through the program increased. Due to supervision and improved technology, the quality of some of the services improved. However, occasionally, during the time of high influx, quality did decline temporarily. The number of the new registered patients increased by 2.5% (from 8,902 in 2013 to 9,131 in 2014); the total number of persons with disabilities receiving services increased by more than 10% (94,868 in 2013 compared to 104,584 in 2014).[75] Delivery of prostheses in ICRC-supported centers totaled 4,149 (58% of which were for mine survivors), a slight decrease from 4,335 in 2013 (61% were for mine/ERW survivors) but still more than the 4,046 prostheses (62% were for mine survivors) delivered in 2012.[76]

Physiotherapists in Afghanistan are mostly employed by NGOs and international organizations, with only a few working in governmental hospitals and private clinics. The goal for long-term sustainability of rehabilitation is to gradually shift services into government institutions, as the medical sector is improved and is able to take over the provision of rehabilitation services.[77]

The SCA planned to hand over its physiotherapy clinics, currently operating within district hospital compounds, to begin operating under the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) by end of 2015. It worked to restructure its remaining ongoing physiotherapy activities towards community-based physiotherapy.[78]

The HI Physical Rehabilitation Center in Kandahar Province saw the needs for physical rehabilitation services continue to rise as the conflict intensified in 2014. The number of beneficiaries increased by 11% compared to 2013. HI found that 12% of the 6,668 beneficiaries at its Kandahar Province center were mine/ERW survivors in 2014. In Kabul and Parwan provinces, the number of beneficiaries in 2013 and 2014 was maintained even though in 2014 activities lasted only five months compared to nine months of implementation in 2013. Physiotherapy services in Herat Province were phased-out during 2014; the number of people who received services decreased from 2013 by 53% accordingly.[79] HI had to stop delivering physiotherapy services in health facilities below the district hospital level from November 2014, in part due to lack of funds, but also due to the MoPH policy requirement that physiotherapy services should be provided only as part of the BPHS through district hospitals and health clinics. However, due to a lack of professional physical rehabilitation staff, many of them do offer physiotherapy.[80]

HI continued to work with the two community-based organizations, Serving Emergency Rehabilitation and Vocational Enterprises (SERVE) and Women Affairs Council (WAC), to deliver community-based physical rehabilitation services in Kabul province.[81] During the last quarter of 2014, HI’s PRC in Kandahar province carried out an external evaluation focused on improving cost efficiency and sustainability for remodeling the center. As a result, among other changes, the repair of mobility aids was stopped from the beginning of 2015, as there existed cheap private repair workshops.[82]

Due to a lack of funding, services at the physical rehabilitation center in Kunar Province remained on hold in early 2015 and it was anticipated that it would be forced to close down entirely if donor funding was not secured.[83]

Social and economic inclusion and psychological support

In 2014, the ICRC offered more than 3,000 persons with disabilities social inclusion opportunities.[84] The ICRC also continued to promote a wide range of sports activities. In most ICRC rehabilitation centers, sport became a consolidated activity to effectively address physical rehabilitation and social reintegration. The ICRC made concerted efforts to increase the sports activities and to improve the perception of inclusive sport for persons with disabilities. Still, room for improvement was needed overall and there were very limited opportunities for sports for persons with disabilities throughout the country.[85] In Jalalabad sports activities stopped because no transportation and equipment were available due to a lack of funding.[86]

The ICRC provided micro-credits for persons with disabilities and their families to become more self-sufficient, provided vocational training, distributed stationery kits to students, and supported home tuition for children.[87] In 2014, HI expanded socioeconomic inclusion opportunities for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, with project training and preparation throughout December.[88]

ALSO transferred education and training services from two of its regional mainstreaming centers to local existing institutions that could provide similar services. It continued to operate offices in both regions.[89]

A lack of psychosocial support, particularly peer support, has remained one of the largest gaps in the government-coordinated victim assistance and disability programs, although some national and international NGOs provided these services.[90] HI found that psychosocial support services were still almost non-existent.[91] The MoPH trained 200 psychological support counselors who began working in district hospitals. ALSO peer support activities and projects funded by MACCA/UNMAS operated in Kabul, Herat, Bamyan, and Balkh to provide support and counseling sessions, which were completed in early 2014.[92] Peer support was provided to 810 new landmine survivors and persons with disabilities living in isolated situations. Almost half (47%) were female. In Herat, ALSO provided training for income-generation for women with disabilities.[93]

Gender

Women were often marginalized and were not adequately targeted for the provision of services by international donor organizations.[94] The Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2014–2016 stated, “Existing discrimination and bias sometimes mean that women can be hard to reach when implementing surveys and as a result, this means that their priorities–frequently the priorities of their children and of basic community survival–can be excluded. In areas such as victim assistance…gender determines the access to and impact of activities and services, where females often face more restrictions compared to males.”[95] Many NGOs, both national and international, provided assistance to women with disabilities in major provinces. However, women with disabilities in remote provinces and districts required more support.[96]

In 2014,MACCA shared the Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2014–2016 with its implementing partners to ensure that the gender aspects of mine action, including victim assistance, were addressed.[97]

Laws and policies

There were no significant changes in legal frameworks relevant to victim assistance in 2014. The Law on the Rights and Benefits of Person with Disabilities and the Law on Rights and Benefits for Relatives of Martyrs and Disappeared Persons remained the key legislative provisions.[98]

The Law on the Rights and Benefits of Persons with Disabilities was amended[99] in March 2013. However, the law contained discriminatory provisions and was not in conformity with the principles of the CRPD. MoLSAMD accorded special treatment to families of those killed and injured in war, which was the only group to receive financial support for persons with disabilities.[100] It was also reported that greater benefits were paid to those members of the current and past Afghan armed forces who had become persons with disabilities.[101] NGOs reportedly did not discriminate between persons with disabilities based on the reason or type of their disability.[102]

Following amendments to the National Law on the Rights and Privileges Persons with Disabilities, welfare payments for people with disabilities caused by war were raised and ranged from AFS1,500 to AFS5,000 (approximately US$30 to $90) per month; the quota of governmental scholarships reserved for persons with disabilities was increased from 5% to 7%; the quota of housing set aside for persons with disabilities was also increased to 7%. Land was to be provided free of cost for persons with disabilities (rather than with a 50% discount as was provided previously) and housing with a 30% discount (instead of a 20% discount).[103] The Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority developed a procedure for discounting about 20% off airfares of national airline companies for persons with disabilities in national and international flights.[104]

According to the law, persons with disabilities should comprise 3% of state employees. However, 94% of those places were not filled as the state employed only 637 of the 11,280 persons with disabilities required by the quota. The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee reported that many persons interviewed noted that numerous violations of the Law on the Rights and Privileges of Persons employment quota occurred due to bribery and nepotism that resulted in job opportunities being taken away from persons with disabilities.[105]

The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination against citizens and requires the state to assist persons who have disabilities and to protect their rights, which include healthcare and financial protection. Overall, persons with disabilities faced challenges, such as limited access to educational opportunities, a lack of physical access to government buildings—including ministries, health clinics, and hospitals, a lack of economic opportunities, and social exclusion.[106]

There was reportedly almost no attention to the implementation of CRPD in Afghanistan and, overall, there was a decrease in consideration of the conventions’ requirements.[107] It was reported that although Afghanistan had joined the relevant treaties and conventions, the provisions were not implemented.[108]

National NGOs ALSO, CCD, and ROAWV collectively implemented the Disability Rights Watch Afghanistan (DRWA) project in all 34 provinces of the country. The project’s main objective is to prepare an initial parallel (shadow) civil society report on Afghanistan’s implementation of CRPD.[109]