Cluster Munition Monitor 2014

Contamination & Clearance

CMM14 Contamination Clearance
© Sean Sutton/MAG/ICBL-CMC, 2014
Educators work with children in the Domiz camp for Syrian refugees to help ensure their safety in Iraq and when they return home.


A total of 23 states and 3 other areas were believed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants as of 1 July 2014. Eleven of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions,[1] two have signed but not yet ratified,[2] while another 10 have neither signed nor acceded.[3] Six states—Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Vietnam—as well as one other area, Nagorno-Karabakh, are considered heavily affected by cluster munition remnants, each with estimated contamination covering 10km² or more of land. 

The Monitor has calculated that in 2013 more than 54,000 unexploded submunitions were destroyed during clearance of almost 31km² of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants in 12 states and three other areas. This data, however, is known to be incomplete due to the fact that reporting by states and demining operators on clearance of cluster munition remnants is partial and inconsistent in content, format, and quality, including among States Parties who are legally obligated to report on clearance activities.

Eight contaminated States Parties and signatories conducted clearance of unexploded submunitions in 2013: Afghanistan, BiH, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Norway. Cluster munition remnants were also cleared in non-signatories Cambodia, Serbia, Vietnam, and Yemen, as well as three other areas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.[4]

Global Contamination

Cluster munition remnants are defined in the convention as covering four types of hazards: unexploded submunitions, unexploded bomblets, failed cluster munitions, and abandoned cluster munitions.[5] Unexploded submunitions and bomblets pose the greatest threat to civilians, primarily as a result of their sensitive fuzing but also because of their appearance in terms of shape, color, and metal content, which often attracts tampering, playful attention, or collection. 

As detailed in the table below, a total of 23 states and 3 other areas are believed to have cluster munition remnants, including unexploded submunitions, on their territory as of 1 July 2014.[6] Eleven of the states contaminated by cluster munition remnants are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are legally obligated to complete clearance within 10 years, while another two have signed but not yet ratified.

At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Zambia in September 2013, Mauritania stated that it had completed clearance of cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control, and that it was taking the necessary administrative steps to make a formal declaration of completion.[7] At the April 2014 Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction in Geneva, Norway similarly stated that it had completed clearance of cluster munition remnants, noting that it would make a formal declaration of completion at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Costa Rica.

States and other areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants

Africa (Sub-Saharan)




Middle East & North Africa






Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)



Bosnia and Herzegovina












South Sudan









Western Sahara
















Six states

One state

Four states

Seven states and two areas

Five states and one area

Note: States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are indicated in bold; convention signatories are underlined; other areas are in italics.

Contamination is also still suspected, but not confirmed, in another 15 states, including: Angola, Colombia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia (South Ossetia), Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Palau, Russia (Chechnya), Saudi Arabia, and Tajikistan.[8] Both Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which may still contain areas with unexploded submunitions.

Extent of contamination

The extent of contamination across affected states varies significantly. Six states and one other area have the greatest contamination from cluster munition remnants (more than 10km²), particularly unexploded submunitions: BiH, Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Vietnam, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh.

States Parties

Eleven States Parties are contaminated by cluster munition remnants, with the heaviest contamination in Lao PDR and Lebanon:

  • Afghanistan is contaminated by cluster munition remnants primarily from Soviet use of air-dropped and rocket-delivered submunitions, and from United States (US) aircraft dispersing 1,228 cluster munitions containing an estimated 248,056 submunitions between October 2001 and early 2002. As of early 2014, the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan database identified 19 areas containing cluster munition remnants covering almost 7.3km2 and affecting 3,859 people.[9] Contamination appears to be more widespread but is unrecorded as operator reporting forms do not disaggregate unexploded submunitions from other unexploded ordnance (UXO).
  • BiH is contaminated with cluster munition remnants, primarily as a result of Yugoslav aircraft dropping BL-755 cluster bombs in the early stages of the 1992–95 conflict related to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO forces also used them in Republika Srpska. The first phase of a general survey completed by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2011 identified 140 areas hit by air strikes and artillery with an estimated total of 3,774 submunitions, and additional contamination around a former ammunition factory at Pretis that was hit by a NATO air strike. It identified 669 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) covering a total of 12.18km², of which 3.23km² was believed to be high risk. Some 5km² is contaminated by artillery-delivered submunitions: 3.9km² by BL-755 and 3.1km² by KB-1 submunition remnants. Release by NPA of more than 2km2 of SHAs and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 2013 is believed to have reduced remaining suspected and confirmed contamination to just over 10km2 as of end 2013. 
  • Chad is contaminated by cluster munition remnants resulting from conflicts in the 1980s in which France and Libya used cluster munitions. In December 2008, Chad stated it had “vast swathes of territory” contaminated with “mines and UXO (munitions and submunitions)” but since then no significant amounts of submunitions have been found. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) found unexploded Soviet PTAB-1.5 submunitions close to Faya Largeau during a 2010–11 re-survey of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. In September 2012, Chad stated that the extent to which its territory is contaminated by cluster munition remnants is not precisely known, but it was evident the weapons had been used in the Fada region and there is a strong likelihood that they were used in other parts of the north. Chad said that the Tibesti region in the northwest was being surveyed to determine the extent of the contamination.[10]
  • Chile has identified four areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants located within three military training bases in three regions. The almost 97km2 of SHA represents the total size of the training area where cluster munitions were used.[11] The precise extent of cluster munition-contaminated area will be determined during technical survey and clearance.
  • Croatia has areas contaminated mainly by KB-1 type cluster munition remnants left over from the conflict in the 1990s following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. By the end of 2013, these covered an area of almost 3.5km² across five counties, but most contamination (86%) is located in three counties: Zadar, Splitsko-dalmatinska, and Ličko-senjska.
  • Germany announced in June 2011 that it had identified areas suspected of containing cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. Non-technical survey confirmed that single Shoab-0.5 cluster munitions are suspected to contaminate an area of approximately 11 km². Technical survey of the area is scheduled to begin in 2015.[12]
  • Iraq’s cluster munition contamination is believed to be large but the extent is not known with any degree of accuracy. In Iraqi Kurdistan, MAG has found cluster munition remnants from strikes launched by coalition forces around Dohuk in 1991. Heavy contamination exists in central and southern Iraq as a result of extensive use of cluster munitions by allied troops during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of suspected cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys. Submunitions made up a significant portion of the items cleared by Basra-based Danish Demining Group (DDG) and by commercial companies working on clearance of southern oilfields.
  • Lao PDR is the world’s most heavily cluster munition-contaminated state as a result of the US dropping more than 270 million submunitions on the country between 1964 and 1973. There is no agreed estimate of the true extent of contamination from unexploded submunitions, but close to 70,000 cluster munition strikes have been identified. Lao PDR has continued to claim that cluster munitions contaminate approximately 8,470km². Such an estimate, however, is based on bomb targeting data that bears little relation to actual contamination on the ground. After two decades of UXO/mine action, Lao PDR has not yet conducted sufficient survey to produce a credible estimate of the total area contaminated in the country.
  • Lebanon is affected by cluster munition contamination that originates primarily from Israeli use during the July–August 2006 conflict, but parts of the country remain affected from cluster munitions used in the 1980s.  Of approximately 57.8km2 of contaminated area that has reportedly affected Lebanon, an estimated 17km2 remains to be released in Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and South Lebanon.[13]
  • Montenegro informed States Parties in April 2012 that it was contaminated by cluster munition remnants left over from conflict in the 1990s. A report by NPA in May 2013 in cooperation with the Regional Centre for Underwater Demining (RCUD) of Montenegro, based on non-technical survey conducted by NPA between December 2012 and April 2013, identified 87 SHAs and CHAs covering a total area of 1.7km² affecting five communities in three municipalities. The most affected area was Golubovci municipality, particularly around its airport, accounting for 1.38km² of the total, followed by Tuzi and Rožaje municipalities. Submunitions may also be present in two other areas of Plav municipality, Bogajice, and Murino, which could not be immediately investigated because of high levels of snow.
  • Mozambique stated in September 2013 that it believed any remaining threat from cluster munition remnants was limited.[14] NPA has identified cluster munition remnants in Chifunde and Cahora Bassa districts. It cleared one unexploded submunition in Chifunde. The estimated size of contamination in Cahora Bassa is some 0.26km² although non-technical survey is needed to determine the extent of contamination with greater precision.[15]


Two signatories are believed to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants: DRC and Somalia.

  • DRC reported in April 2014 at the Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction in Geneva that among more than 403 areas surveyed across the country, five were found to contain cluster munition remnants. The total area was 17,590m² (0.02km²), most of which is located in the province of Équateur in the northwest.
  • Somalia’s level of cluster munition remnants contamination is unknown. Dozens of dud PTAB-2.5M and some AO-1SCh explosive submunitions have been found within a 30km radius of the Somali border town of Dolow. Contamination is believed to have occurred during the 1977–78 Ogaden War.


Several of the 10 contaminated states that have not joined the convention have active clearance programs in place, including Cambodia, Libya, Serbia, South Sudan, and Vietnam.

  • Cambodia, particularly its eastern and northeastern areas bordering Lao PDR and Vietnam, is affected by several million cluster munition remnants as a result of US aircraft dropping approximately 26 million submunitions in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. In February 2011, Thailand’s use of cluster munitions in Cambodia’s northern province, Preah Vihear, resulted in additional submunition contamination over an area of approximately 1.5km². The Baseline Survey (BLS) of 24 districts identified 990 cluster munition-contaminated areas covering an area of 492km2, but the area of suspected contamination was certain to rise as the survey continued in other districts not included in the BLS.[16] NPA, pursuing a cluster munition remnants survey in northern Rattanakiri province in 2013, identified 53 new SHAs covering 45km2 but expected technical survey would shrink the area by up to 90%.[17]
  • Libya was added to the list of contaminated states following use of cluster munitions by government forces in April 2011. Operators identified three types of cluster munitions, including Russian and Spanish[18] devices, but no comprehensive survey has been possible and the precise extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants is not known.
  • Serbia’s cluster munition contamination results from NATO air strikes in 1999, which Serbia said struck 16 municipalities.[19] By the end of 2013 Serbia said cluster munitions affected the the city of Niš and the municipalities of Brus, Bujanovac, Crveni krst, Gadžin Han, Knić, Sjenica, Stara Pazova, and Užice. This included CHAs covering 592,824m2 (0.59km2) and SHAs totaling 5.64km2.[20]
  • In South Sudan, since 2006, 750 sites containing cluster munition remnants have been identified across all 10 states, including new contamination as a result of the ongoing conflict in the country since December 2013.[21] On 7 February 2014, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) UXO survey teams discovered new remnants from RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and unexploded AO-1SCh submunitions on the Juba-Bor road, south of Bor in Jonglei state.[22] As of May 2014, UNMAS reported that 95 known dangerous areas containing cluster munition remnants remained in all 10 states. Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria states are the most heavily contaminated.[23]
  • Sudan is believed to have at least nine areas contaminated with unexploded submunitions, while, based on latest available information, another 81 have been released. The Mine Action Center has not reported on cluster munition contamination since 2011. The government of Sudan has denied using cluster munitions.
  • Syria is contaminated with cluster munition remnants due to the ongoing armed conflict. The full extent of contamination is unknown, but a number of locations in Syria have been identified as areas where cluster munitions have been used in at least 10 of Syria’s 14 governorates (see Ban Policy chapter). Additional locations reportedly hit by government attacks in 2014 include the towns of Keferzita in Hama governorate[24] and Yabrud in rural Damascus.[25]
  • Vietnam is one of the most cluster munition-contaminated countries in the world as a result of an estimated 413,130 tons of submunitions used by the US in 1965–73. Cluster munitions were used in 55 provinces and cities, including Haiphong, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hue, and Vinh, but no accurate assessment exists of the extent of cluster munition contamination. Substantial amounts of cluster munitions were abandoned by the US military, notably at or around old US air bases.
  • In Yemen, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) has reported identifying 43 areas amounting to 22km2 contaminated by cluster munition remnants in Sada’a governorate in 2012 and 2013 and said it has cleared 3.7km2 of it. But it also believes there are cluster munition remnant-affected areas in northwestern Hajjah governorate, which it has so far been unable to survey due to insecurity.[26] YEMAC has confirmed the presence, but not the origin, of cluster munitions remnants in four districts on the border between Sada’a governorate and Saudi Arabia, consisting mainly of types BLU-97, dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM), and BLU-61. Amnesty International reported the presence of unexploded BLU-97 submunitions in June 2010, which it alleged originated from a US cruise missile attack on 17 December 2009 on the community of al-Ma’jalah in the Abyan area in south Yemen. The northern Sada’a governorate near the border with Saudi Arabia is also contaminated by cluster munitions used in late 2009 during conflict between the government of Yemen and armed Houthi rebels.

Other areas

  • Kosovo is affected by remnants of cluster munitions used by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia armed forces in 1998−99 and by a NATO campaign in 1999, during which aircraft dropped 1,392 bombs containing 295,700 submunitions. Following demining operations between June 1999 and December 2001, the UN reported that problems associated with mines, cluster munitions, and other UXO in Kosovo had been “virtually eliminated.” Subsequent investigation, however, revealed that considerable contamination remained. HALO Trust and Kosovo Mine Action Center’s (KMAC) resurvey of Kosovo in 2013 confirmed 51 areas containing cluster munition remnants covering a total of 7.63km2, not including three CHAs that were undergoing clearance in 2013 until work was suspended at the end of the demining season.[27]
  • Nagorno-Karabakh has significant cluster munition contamination, particularly in the Askeran, Martuni, and Martakert regions, where more than 75% of the remaining cluster munition remnants are located. Large quantities of cluster munitions were dropped from the air during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1988–94. As of end 2013, HALO Trust estimated the remaining area in need of battle area clearance at 86km². 
  • Western Sahara was expected to be cleared of known cluster munition remnants outside the buffer zone with the Moroccan berm (sand wall) by the end of 2012. However, the discovery of previously unknown contaminated areas meant this target date was not met. As of July 2014 there were 33 known cluster munition strike zones east of the berm requiring clearance, three of which were discovered in June 2014. Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) conducted clearance of almost 1km2 in 2013, destroying 1,033 unexploded submunitions in the process. Given lack of funding, no new target date for clearance is available.[28]

Clearance of Cluster Munition Remnants

Reporting by states and operators on clearance of cluster munition remnants is incomplete and inconsistent in content, format, and quality, including among States Parties. Based on available reporting and information gathered directly from programs, in 2013 more than 54,000 unexploded submunitions were destroyed during clearance operations of almost 31km² of land contaminated with cluster munition remnants in 12 states and 3 other areas, as detailed in the table below. The bulk of the clearance in 2013 was reported in Lao PDR. To seek to represent actual clearance of cluster munition remnants in that country and not merely of UXO, an estimate has been made of land cleared that contained cluster munition remnants. 

Clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2013


Area cleared (km2)

Submunitions destroyed

















20.00 (est.)





















0.30 (est.)





Western Sahara






N/R = Not reported; * Only very partial data
Note: States Parties are indicated in bold; other areas are in italics.

Clearance obligations

Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention. If unable to complete clearance in time, a state may request an extension of the deadline for periods of up to five years. Clearance deadlines for contaminated States Parties are shown in Table 3 below.

Article 4 clearance deadlines for States Parties

State Party

Clearance deadline


1 March 2022


1 March 2021


1 September 2023


1 June 2021


1 August 2020


1 August 2020


1 November 2023


1 August 2020


1 May 2021


1 August 2020


1 September 2021

In seeking to fulfill their clearance and destruction obligations, affected States Parties are required to:

  • survey, assess, and record the threat, making every effort to identify all contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control;
  • assess and prioritize needs for marking, protection of civilians, clearance, and destruction;
  • take “all feasible steps” to perimeter-mark, monitor, and fence affected areas;
  • conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around areas contaminated by cluster munitions;
  • take steps to mobilize the necessary resources (at national and international levels); and
  • develop a national plan, building upon existing structures, experiences, and methodologies.

Norway, as President of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, submitted a paper entitled “Compliance with Article 4” to the Fourth Meeting of States Parties. The paper’s stated aim was to explain the key obligations that states must fulfill in order to be able to make a declaration of compliance. Ireland and Lao PDR, as Co-Coordinators of the Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction Education, submitted to the same meeting a paper entitled “Effective steps for the clearance of cluster munition remnants.” States Parties “warmly welcomed” both documents.[29]

Land release

A set of guiding principles for land release of cluster munition-contaminated areas published by the Cluster Munition Coalition  in June 2011, calls for affected states to put sufficient resources into properly identifying cluster munition-affected areas before carrying out clearance. It recommends states conduct a desk assessment (of ground conditions, weapons delivery systems, battlefield data, etc.) followed by non-technical survey to collect field evidence of contamination and, where required, technical survey to define a cluster strike footprint. It notes clearing cluster munitions should not be approached in the same way as clearing landmines and suggests states apply principles detailed in the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), Battle Area Clearance standards (09.11) for land contaminated exclusively with cluster munition remnants.

To promote more efficient release of land, amendments to IMAS were adopted in April 2013 to the General Assessment standards (formerly 08.10) and set out to simplify and clarify standards on Land Release (now 07.11), Non-Technical Survey (now 08.10), and Technical Survey (now 08.20). They seek to make clear distinctions between SHAs and CHAs and provide more guidance on use of evidence to avoid inflating estimates of contamination where evidence does not justify it. They also seek to clarify basic principles of technical survey, the distinctions between area reduction and clearance, and the requirement to apply “all reasonable effort” in use of evidence to plan and interpret the results of technical survey.

Meanwhile, in a bid to increase productivity, international operators have focused increasingly on evidence-based battle area clearance for tackling cluster munitions and on developing survey methodology better tailored to the particular challenges of this type of contamination. A cluster munition remnants survey approach developed by NPA in Lao PDR, and endorsed or adapted by a number of other operators, including in Vietnam, begins with desk assessment and non-technical survey in order to define start points for technical survey. Clearance only takes place once a CHA is established and reported to the national regulatory authority. Sub-surface clearance is conducted as necessary according to the evidence, and a mixture of surface and sub-surface clearance may be considered sufficient clearance for an entire area to be released. A “fadeout” principle determines the distance to which clearance continues after finding what is perceived as the last target item in a footprint.

[1] Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Montenegro, and Mozambique.

[2] Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia.

[3] Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Libya, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.

[4] As of 1 July 2014, States Parties Chad, Chile, Germany, and Montenegro had not reported any clearance of unexploded submunitions in 2013, nor had signatories DRC and Somalia.

[5] Unexploded submunitions are submunitions that have been dispersed and have landed but have failed to explode as intended. Unexploded bomblets are similar to unexploded submunitions but refer to “explosive bomblets” which have been dropped from an aircraft dispenser but have failed to explode as intended. Failed cluster munitions are cluster munitions that have been dropped or fired but the dispenser has failed to disperse the submunitions as intended. Abandoned cluster munitions are unused cluster munitions that have been left behind or dumped and are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. See Convention on Cluster Munitions, Art. 2(4), (5), (6), (7), and (15).

[6] Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Montenegro, Mozambique, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen; and other areas Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.

[7] Statement of Mauritania, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 12 September 2013,

[8] While cluster munition remnants have certainly been present in the past, no specific areas are currently known or suspected to contain such remnants. However, a lack of information on the extent of survey and clearance makes it premature to determine that these states have completed clearance of all cluster munition remnants.

[9] Email from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, Operations, Research and Development Manager, Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), 11 February 2014.

[10] Statement of Chad, Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 13 September 2012.

[11] Chile, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form G, September 2012,

[12] Email from Silke Bellmann, Desk Officer, Federal Foreign Office, 4 August 2014.

[13] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for the year 2013), Form F, 15 April 2014,; and statement of Lebanon, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 12 September 2013,

[14] Statement of Mozambique, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 12 September 2013,

[15] Email from Mário Nunes, Programme Manager, Humanitarian Disarmament – Mozambique, NPA, 7 August 2014.

[16] Revised BLS data presented in statement of Cambodia to the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 10 April 2014.

[17] Email from Jan Erik Stoa, Program Manager, NPA, 25 March 2014.

[18] The transfer of these weapons by Spain took place in 2006 before Spain instituted a moratorium on the export of cluster munitions and prior to its adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

[19] Statement of Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 21 June 2011; and interview with Petar Mihajlović and Slađana Košutić, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), Belgrade, 25 March 2011.

[20] Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 22 April 2014.

[21] Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS South Sudan, 12 May 2014.

[22] UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014. See also UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26,

[23] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 12 May 2014.

[24] “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” Human Rights Watch, 19 February 2014,

[25] “Government Forces Use Cluster Munitions in bombing Yabrud,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, 13 March 2014,

[26] Information provided to Cluster Munition Monitor by email from YEMAC, 19 March 2014.

[27] Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 20 February 2014.

[28] Email from Gordan Novak, Senior Technical Advisor, AOAV, 25 July 2014.

[29] Final Document, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, CCM/MSP/2013/6, 23 September 2014, p. 4.