Landmine Monitor 2011

Ban Policy

LM Ban Header Fmt
© Ross Duncan, 4 April 2011
Shoe pile in Colombia representing the lives lost to landmines.

The Mine Ban Treaty is one of the great success stories in disarmament and in broader global humanitarian efforts, as demonstrated by its impressive implementation and by the widespread adherence to the norm it establishes against antipersonnel mines.

Opened for signature on 3 December 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force 12 years ago on 1 March 1999. The Pacific nation of Tuvalu acceded in September 2011, becoming the Mine Ban Treaty’s 157th State Party. While several major states remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty, such a high number of States Parties constitutes near-universal acceptance of the antipersonnel mine ban.

But major challenges remain. Full implementation and universalization of the treaty remain key objectives for the cooperative and enduring partnership of governments, international organizations, and the ICBL, that work on the Mine Ban Treaty’s behalf.

The Mine Ban Treaty continues to have a strong impact even on those that have not yet joined as the vast majority of states not party are adhering to its provisions. Yet in 2011, Israel and Libya laid new antipersonnel mines, joining Myanmar, the only other government to plant antipersonnel mines in recent years. Two long-standing treaty hold-outs—Finland and Poland—confirmed that measures are underway to join the Mine Ban Treaty next year, while a United States (US) policy review of the Mine Ban Treaty appeared to slow down in 2011.

This chapter has two parts. The first examines the implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty by its States Parties. The second section provides a global overview of mine ban policy, use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines by the 39 states not party to the treaty. The focus of the reporting is on the period from May 2010 to August 2011.

Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance

As a general matter, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have been respected and when ambiguities have arisen, they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. The treaty’s compliance provisions—contained in Article 8—have not been formally invoked to clarify any compliance question.

However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. Other States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including victim assistance, and ensure that the norm they established against antipersonnel mines continues to be respected and universalized.

As the ICBL warned in November 2010, there is a danger that the Mine Ban Treaty’s effectiveness will be eroded in the future if the challenges are not acknowledged, discussed, and addressed.[1]

Prohibition on use (Article 1)

There has never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. However, previous allegations of mine use by the armed forces of Turkey in 2009 and Cambodia in 2008 and 2009 remain unanswered, and warrant ongoing attention and resolution by those governments and other States Parties.[2]

In this reporting period, since May 2010 there have been allegations of new mine use in Sudan by government and rebel forces. Due to the security situation, the Monitor has not been able to investigate the allegations, but based on concerns expressed by UN personnel, the allegations are serious and merit careful investigation and finding of facts.[3]

Allegations of new mine use during the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire do not appear credible.[4]

Destruction of stockpiles (Article 4)

A total of 153 of the 157 States Parties do not have stockpiles, including 87 States Parties that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, 64 that have declared never possessing antipersonnel mine stocks (except in some cases for training purposes), and two that have not made an official declaration but are not thought to possess stocks (Equatorial Guinea and newest member Tuvalu).[5]

The most recent states to complete destruction were Iraq (declared in June 2011), Kuwait (declared in July 2009), and Ethiopia (April 2009). Iraq, which has a stockpile destruction deadline of 1 February 2012, reported in June 2011 that it destroyed 645 out of 690 antipersonnel mines that had been stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, retaining 45 mines for training purposes.[6]

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 45 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

The four States Parties that have not completed the destruction of their stockpiles are Belarus, Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Since 1 March 2008, Belarus, Greece, and Turkey have been in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty after failing to complete their stockpile destruction by that deadline. Ukraine joined this group after missing its 1 June 2010 stockpile destruction deadline.[7] This issue of non-compliance with the treaty has been of particular concern to States Parties since 2010, when States Parties adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, which calls on the States Parties that are in violation of the treaty to comply without delay and to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. While it is encouraging that some of these states have made progress in stockpile destruction by providing additional information about projected completion dates, requesting assistance, and destroying stocks, it is a threat to the integrity of the treaty that four States Parties have remained in violation of the treaty.

Belarus completed destruction of its non-PFM antipersonnel mines in 2006, but has not been able to destroy any of its stock of almost 3.4 million PFM mines since that time. In December 2010, Belarus made progress towards the destruction of these mines after signing a contract with a Spanish company to destroy its PFM mines within 28 months, which would mean that Belarus’s stockpile destruction should conclude in 2013. As of June 2011, Belarus was still finalizing the administrative arrangements of the contract, and the physical destruction had not yet commenced.[8]

Greece started its stockpile destruction of almost 1.6 million mines eight months after its deadline, and eventually halted stockpile destruction operations in early 2010 after an explosion at the destruction facility located in Bulgaria. In June 2011, Greece announced that it had established a new contract between the Ministry of Defense and the same company (Hellenic Defense Systems S.A., or EAS) that it had originally contracted.[9] However, the proposal for stockpile destruction with EAS was still under negotiation as of June 2011. Greece has stated that it plans to re-initiate the contract by the end of 2011, and complete its stockpile destruction within 22 months.[10] In a demonstration of transparency regarding stockpile destruction, Greece revealed that the 480 Greek mines that were missing from a shipment to Bulgaria were found in a Greek warehouse, prompting Greece to conduct a review of its stockpile.[11]

Turkey is the closest of the four States Parties in non-compliance with the treaty to completing its stockpile destruction obligation. By the end of October 2010, Turkey had destroyed all of its stockpiled mines in the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility, with the exception of 22,716 Area Denial Antipersonnel Mines (ADAM) type mines, which were transferred to Germany in February 2011 to be destroyed.[12] The destruction of these mines began on 23 March 2011, and was scheduled to conclude by 31 August 2011.[13] As of September 2011, the Monitor had not received an update about the status of this stockpile destruction process.

Ukraine previously destroyed all its non-PFM mines and over 100,000 PFM mines, but still had nearly six million PFM mines to destroy. In June 2011, Ukraine announced that it is conducting some destruction activities by ejecting mines into a “closed water reservoir,” enabling it to destroy 500,000 mines per year, and it expects to support its stockpile destruction efforts in part through an agreement with NATO’s Partnership for Peace Trust Fund.[14] Norway also provided assistance to Ukraine in 2011 in the form of equipment that will increase Ukraine’s stockpile destruction capacity and modernize its facilities, bringing them up to international environmental standards.[15] Taking this assistance into consideration, Ukraine reported in June 2011 that it projects that stockpile destruction will still take at least another four years to complete.[16]

States Parties have an obligation to provide international cooperation and assistance for stockpile destruction under Article 6, and have recommitted to providing support for stockpile destruction in Actions 37 and 42 of the Cartagena Action Plan.

Retained mines (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.… The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

Seventy-six States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 44 have each retained more than 1,000 mines and two (Bangladesh and Turkey) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Seventy-eight States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 25 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.

For three States Parties, the status of retained mines is not known. Equatorial Guinea has never submitted an initial transparency report, so its status is uncertain, but it is not thought to retain any mines. The newest State Party, Tuvalu, has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to retain any mines. Botswana has indicated its intention to retain some mines for training, but has never made a formal declaration.

Slightly less than 30% of the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an annual transparency update for calendar year 2010, which was due by 30 April 2011. Reporting is necessary to understand the intended purposes or actual uses of retained mines. Because of this lack of information, it is not possible to present a total figure of mines retained for 2010 that would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison with previous years.

Key updates from calendar year 2010 were:

  • Brazil destroyed 1,075 retained mines;
  • Cyprus destroyed almost half of its stock of retained mines following a re-evaluation of its requirements in accordance with the Cartagena Action Plan Action #56;
  • Latvia completed the destruction of its 118 retained mines—it no longer retains mines;
  • Thailand disclosed that an additional unreported 40 antipersonnel mines were found in the possession of the Thai National Police Department and will apparently retain them; and
  • Venezuela reported that it consumed 86 mines in 2010 in training activities—the first time it has consumed retained mines.

States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines 


Last known declaration
(for year)


consumed in 2010

Year of last
declared consumption

Reduced as
excess to


15,100 (2010)





12,500 (2009)


Not available

None ever


8,976 (2010)





7,150 (2010)





6,927 (2010)






6,158 (2010)





6,030 (2010)



None ever


5,970 (2010)






5,848 (2010)






4,910 (2010)





4,874 (2010)





4,491 (2006)


Not available

None ever

South Africa

4,355 (2010)





4,017 (2010)


Not available



3,760 (2009)


Not available



3,672 (2010)






3,466 (2010)






3,364 (2009)


Not available

None ever


3,346 (2009)


Not available




3,159 (2010)


Not available




3,100 (2010)





2,996 (2004)


Not available

None ever


2,991 (2008)






2,673 (2010)





2,618 (2009)


Not available



2,512 (2009)


Not available



2,500 (2010)





Czech Republic

2,473 (2010)





2,454 (2010)






2,201 (2010)




Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH)






2,120 (2010)






2,040 (2010)






2,021 (2010)





1,893 (2010)


Not available




1,943 (2009)


Not available



1,938 (2010)





1,921 (2010)





1,780 (2008)


Not available



1,764 (2009)


Not available



1,729 (2010)






1,634 (2009)


Not available



1,441 (2010)





1,372 (2010)






1,046 (2010)






1,020 (2007)


Not available


Partial total






States in italics did not submit a transparency report for calendar year 2010.Not available = It is not possible to determine the number from the information provided by the State Party.

In addition to those listed above, an additional 30 States Parties that retain less than 1,000 mines possessed a total of 12,247 retained mines. [17]

A major concern for the ICBL is the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines, but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remained each year, indicating none were consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, which is typically the case for most countries, and no other details were provided about how the mines were being used. A dozen States Partieshave never reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

Numerous States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but few have explained the reductions in their transparency reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2010 were Australia (20 fewer mines), Cambodia (144 fewer mines), Czech Republic (24 fewer mines), Denmark (57 fewer mines), Ecuador (90 fewer mines), Luxembourg (201 fewer mines), the Netherlands (193 fewer mines), Peru (20 fewer mines), Portugal (3 fewer mines), Slovakia (50 fewer mines), Spain (6 fewer mines), and the United Kingdom (UK) (160 fewer mines).

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties were unnecessarily reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, or otherwise rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine. Technically these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:

  • Afghanistan, BiH, and Cambodia, reported that all of their retained mines do not have fuzes;
  • Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless;
  • Australia retained only 100 serviceable detonators for over 6,900 retained mines; and
  • Belgium, Eritrea, Iraq, Portugal, and Sweden also reported that some of the mines they retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.

A total of 29 States Parties have used expanded Form D of annual transparency reports to voluntarily report additional information on retained mines (note that some States Parties on this list only used some voluntary elements of Form D).[18]

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

As of 1 October 2011, only 52% of States Parties submitted reports for calendar year 2010. This is the lowest annual compliance rate in the past decade, undercutting the previous low of 56% for calendar year 2009.

Of the 74 States Parties that had not submitted a report for 2010, most failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years. Among the States Parties that did not submit reports for 2010 are nine States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations (Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda).

However, five States Parties (Cook Islands, Ghana, Lesotho, Palau, and Zimbabwe) submitted an annual transparency report after not turning in a report for two or more years. Equatorial Guinea is the only State Party to have never submitted an initial transparency report; it was due on 28 August 1999. Tuvalu’s initial transparency report is due by 30 April 2012.

Three states submitted voluntary transparency reports for 2010. Treaty signatory Poland submitted its ninth voluntary transparency report, while state not party Morocco submitted its fifth report. State not party Lao PDR submitted a voluntary transparency report for the first time, after stating its intentions in 2009 and 2010 to submit a report in the future. In previous years, Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Mongolia (2007), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.

Tenth Meeting of States Parties

The Tenth Meeting of States Parties (10MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty was held in Geneva, Switzerland from 29 November–3 December 2010. Representatives from 99 States Parties attended, as well as observer delegations from 17 of the 39 states that had not joined the treaty. An ICBL delegation of more than 120 campaigners from 33 countries, including mine survivors, participated in the meeting.

The main outcome of the 10MSP was the Geneva Progress Report, a document reviewing progress made in the first year of the application of the Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference in November 2009. Mine clearance deadline extensions were granted to Chad, Colombia, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Zimbabwe.

The 10MSP assessed and confirmed the treaty’s 10-year-old implementation machinery, including its Implementation Support Unit and the Intersessional Work Programme. At the initiative of Zambia, the 10MSP agreed to establish a new standing committee on “resources, cooperation, and assistance” to encourage more state-to-state cooperation to meet treaty obligations.

There were some positive developments on protracted implementation issues, particularly for three of the States Parties that missed their four-year treaty-mandated deadline for destroying all their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines: Belarus, Turkey, and Ukraine.

The 10MSP agreed to hold the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties (11MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh, Cambodia from 28 November–2 December 2011. Cambodia is one of the most heavily mine-affected countries in world. Prak Sokhonn, Minister Attached to the Prime Minister and Vice-Chair of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority, was designated President of the 11MSP.

Global Overview: States not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states may no longer sign and ratify the treaty, but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 157 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 26 acceded.[19]

On 13 September 2011, the Pacific nation of Tuvalu acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, becoming the first accession since Palau joined in November 2007.[20] Thirty-nine countries remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty as states not party, including two signatories that have not yet ratified (Marshall Islands and Poland).[21]

States Parties, the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit, the ICBL, ICRC, and UN agencies cooperate and coordinate their efforts promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2011, focus was on universalization in the Asia-Pacific region in advance of the 11MSP. The treaty’s Special Envoy Prince Mired of Jordan visited the Pacific countries of Tuvalu (2–4 August) and Tonga (6–7 October) to discuss accession with government leaders. On 21–22 September 2011, five states not party from Asia (China, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Vietnam) attended a regional seminar convened by Cambodia in Phnom Penh to address the human cost of antipersonnel mines. Additionally, the President-Designate of the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties Cambodian Minister Prak Sokhonn visited Singapore and Vietnam in October 2011.

Several states were preparing to join the Mine Ban Treaty within one to two years including Finland, Poland, and South Sudan. Significant developments during the reporting period regarding universalization of the treaty include:

  • Finland confirmed its intention to accede in 2012 and submitted the legislation for accession to the treaty to its parliament in August 2011.[22] In September 2011, the parliament approved the proposal and referred it for consideration to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  • Lao PDR voluntarily submitted a transparency report in June 2011 and noted in a statement at the June 2010 meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committee its “desire and intention” to accede in “coming years.”
  • In February 2010, Nepal’s Minister of Peace and Reconstruction initiated a ministerial-level committee to study the responsibilities of and opportunities for becoming a State Party.
  • Poland confirmed its commitment to complete ratification in 2012, but the procedure had not been initiated in parliament. On 11 August 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated the ratification proposal (motion) for informal interministerial consultation. The bill will be introduced to the new parliament in late 2011 or early 2012.
  • The Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority chair, Brigadier Jurkuch Barach, said in June 2011 that once the government of South Sudan is established “we fully intend to join [the Mine Ban Treaty] as soon as we are able and will endeavour to adhere to its principals and obligations.”[23]
  • US officials confirmed in June 2011 that the comprehensive review initiated in late 2009 of US mine policy and its position on joining the Mine Ban Treaty was continuing. During 2010, the US Department of State coordinated a series of consultations, but in 2011 the pace of the review appeared to slow. Since the Second Review Conference in November 2009, the US continued to participate as an observer in Mine Ban Treaty meetings.

Additionally, during meetings in 2010 and 2011, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty reiterated their positive views of the treaty as expressed in prior years, but noted little progress toward joining, including Lebanon, Mongolia, and Morocco. In June 2011, a representative from Vietnam disappointingly said it was unlikely that the country would join the Mine Ban Treaty at this time as they are still using mines on their borders “as a form of defense,” but clarified that Vietnam was not necessarily laying new mines.[24]

Annual UN General Assembly resolution

On 8 December 2010, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 65/48 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 165 states in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions.[25] This was the highest number to vote in support of the Mine Ban Treaty since the first UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 (the lowest was 138 in 2001), and equaled the lowest number of abstentions ever.[26]

The annual resolution provides an important opportunity for states outside the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its universalization. Nine states not party have voted in favor of every Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1997: Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ten states not party that used to consistently abstain or be absent now vote in favor: Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Somalia, and Tonga. Many countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 have done so after voting in support of consecutive UNGA resolutions.[27]

The number of states abstaining from supporting the resolution has ranged from a high of 23 in 2002 and 2003 to a low of 17 in 2006, 2005, and 2010. A group of states that could be described as most actively opposed to the Mine Ban Treaty are the 15 states not party that have abstained on consecutive resolutions since 1997 (unless noted in parentheses): Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Libya (since 1998), Myanmar, North Korea (since 2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan (since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).[28]

Non-state armed groups

A significant number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have indicated their willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines. At least 62 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years.[29] The exact number is difficult to determine, since NSAGs may split into factions with different policies, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. More than 40 NSAGs have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, most recently factions of Kurdish groups operating along the Iran-Iraq border in June 2009.[30]

Efforts have continued to engage NSAGs in the global ban on antipersonnel mines. Following outreach by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group, and the UN, the National Transitional Council (NTC), the opposition authority in Libya, issued a communiqué on 28 April 2011 formally pledging that “no forces under the command and control of the [NTC] will use antipersonnel or anti-vehicle landmines.”[31] The NTC committed to “destroy all landmines in their possession” and to “cooperate in the provision of mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.” The communiqué also stated that “any future Libyan government should relinquish landmines and join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.”[32] In late August, after seizing the capital of Tripoli, the NTC proclaimed an interim government.

Use of antipersonnel mines

Locations of New Use of Antipersonnel Mines, 2010–2011

Use by government forces

Use by NSAGs

Israel, Libya, Myanmar

Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan

Government forces


Units of Myanmar’s Army (Tatmadaw) have laid mines in numerous parts of the country every year since the Monitor began reporting in 1999.

In February 2010, Tatmadaw Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) 363 and 367 allegedly laid mines in Kheh Der village tract, Kyaukkyi township, Nyaunglebin district; militia forces accompanying returning villagers subsequently discovered 11 mines.[33] In March 2010, villagers in Htantabin township blamed Tatmadaw LIB 427 for laying mines that injured two villagers and an animal.[34] Also in March, a former Tatmadaw soldier from LIB 102 in Karenni state noted that he had been given a mine to use while in the military, and that before he deserted in March 2010 he witnessed other soldiers being ordered to lay mines near his unit’s camp in Khaw Daw Koh area, Tantabin township, Bago division.[35] In April 2010, villagers in the Ma No Roh area, Tenasserim division stated that Tatmadaw LIB 561 planted mines near their village.[36]

In October 2010, the Tatmadaw laid mines around four bridges between Thaton and Bilin townships. The mined area was marked with a “Caution Mines” sign at each bridge. The Tatmadaw stated that the mines were laid to prevent the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) from using the bridges.[37] In December 2010 in Bilin township of Thaton district, Border Guard Force Battalion 1016, led by Par Ke Re, and Tatmadaw IB 3, led by Major Zaw Lwin Moe, placed mines in Kyaw Blaw Khi Blo and Htee Nyar Khar Blo. These mines subsequently injured villagers and killed cattle.[38] Another Tatmadaw unit is alleged by the Free Burma Rangers (FBR) to have laid mines for the first time in many years in Chin state. The FBR claims that Battalion 232 laid new mines in the vicinity of Nygeletwa, Pomnyamwa, Aumthiwa, Mariwa, Setalumwa, and Putuwa villages in Paletwa township of Chin state.[39] On 25 December 2010, Tatmadaw soldiers placed mines on trails and village land, in Mone township. A rebel soldier was sent to remove the mines, and found four M-14 mines before being injured by a fifth mine.[40]


The first reports of pro-Gaddafi forces using antipersonnel and antivehicle mines began to emerge in late March 2011 in the east of the country, then in the Nafusa mountain range in the northwest, and finally around Tripoli and coastal towns in the west. HRW has confirmed the use of five types of mines in six separate locations. Additionally, three types of mines have been found abandoned at three other locations.

The Brazilian T-AB-1 antipersonnel mine appears to be the most frequently used mine by pro-Gaddafi forces. Its low metal content makes the mine particularly challenging for detection and clearance efforts.[41] Amnesty International documented the use T-AB-1 mines in the Tammina neighborhood of Misrata on 25 May 2011.[42] There have been multiple instances of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines laid together with Chinese Type-72SP antivehicle mines.[43] In July, rebel forces also reported witnessing pro-Gaddafi troops laying T-AB-1 and Type-72SP mines around western towns near the Tunisian border including Ghazaya, Ruwas, and Kiklah.[44] The same mines have been found in al-Qawalish, Zintan, Khusha, and the rest of the surrounding Nafusa mountain region.[45]

Remotely-delivered “parachute mines” were scattered by Grad ground rockets into the port area of the city of Misrata by pro-Gaddafi forces on 5 May 2011. These Chinese-produced Type-84 antivehicle mines bore markings indicating a 2009 manufacture date.

By 1 September 2011, the European Union and at least four Mine Ban Treaty States Parties (Australia, Canada, Germany, and Norway), in addition to the President of the 10MSP, the ICRC, and the ICBL had condemned or expressed grave concern about the Libyan government’s use of antipersonnel mines.[46]


In early August 2011, Bamachaneh, the journal of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), reported that IDF soldiers were planting antipersonnel mines in the Golan Heights along the border with Syria. The mines were laid openly and in daylight by Combat Engineering Corps officer cadets and placed beyond the border security fence, but within the “Alpha Line” that marks the border with Syria.[47]

The mines were laid after hundreds of civilians entered Israeli territory on 15 May 2011, during the annual Palestinian commemoration of “Nakba Day,” apparently crossing through minefields uninjured. According to IDF Major Ariel Ilouz, “Because of age, rain and other natural hazards the antipersonnel mines that were laid along the border were full of mud. … They were simply stuck. These mines are as old as 35–36 years and have not been touched.”[48]

The ICBL publicly condemned mine use by the IDF,[49] while the President of the 10th 10MSP expressed his deep concern.[50]

Non-state armed groups

In this reporting period, since May 2010, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least four countries: States Parties Afghanistan and Colombia and states not party Myanmar and Pakistan. This is two fewer countries than previously cited by the Monitor, with the removal of India and Yemen. It is the lowest number of countries with use by NSAGs ever reported by the Monitor. There were serious but as of yet unconfirmed allegations of NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in State Party Sudan and state not party South Sudan.

In Afghanistan, there has been a notable increase in the number of reports of use of antipersonnel mines, especially victim-activated IEDs, by armed groups opposing the government and international forces. In July 2011, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released a report that found that the majority (approximately two-thirds) of IEDs encountered in Afghanistan were pressure plate-detonated, victim-activated devices.[51] UNAMA has called on the Taliban to cease using pressure plate IEDs and to publicly reaffirm its 1998 decree banning mines.[52] On the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website, the Taliban denied the allegation and said their explosive devices are command-detonated and do not use pressure plates.[53]

In Colombia, theFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. In September 2010, the Colombian army recovered over 3,100 antipersonnel mines from a cache belonging to the National Liberation Army in Tolima.

In Myanmar, at least 17 NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines since 1999 including the KNLA, the Karenni Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A). In October 2010 the KIO released a statement that warned the public of more mines in the area. The KIO stated that they had planted more mines as a result of increased tensions with the junta over the KIOs refusal to bring its troops under Burmese Army command. In some other specific instances, in September 2010, the KNLA informed local inhabitants that they had planted mines beside the road between Phapun township and Kamamaung sub-township in Karen state. In March 2010, villagers in Ma Lay Ler village tract, Dweh Loh township, Papun District allege that DKBA Battalion 333 laid mines to prevent attacks by the KNLA in the area, leading to the loss of several cattle. In January 2010, villagers from Meh Nyoo, Meh Gkoo, Meh Mweh, and Meh Gklaw village tracts in Bu Tho township, Karen state that soldiers from DKBA Battalion 666 placed mines in areas near the villages and gave verbal warnings of dangerous areas.

In Pakistan, NSAGs continued to use mines in Baluchistan province as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, while the government again stated that “terrorists all over the country” were using IEDs in attacks that caused large numbers of casualties.[54]

In Sudan, there were reports in 2011 of new mine use in South Kordofan state near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the northern branch of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).[55] The Monitor has not been able to confirm these reports. There is a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. The Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines.

While the Monitor has not been able to do an independent investigation, it appears that new mine-laying has also occurred in South Sudan. However, it is difficult to determine who was responsible for new mine-laying and the extent to which antipersonnel mines, as opposed to antivehicle mines, were being laid. A variety of actors in different locations have been accused of mine-laying, including in the states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile. There have also been reports of new mine use in South Kordofan state in Sudan, which is home to many communities from South Sudan.

Additionally, some use by NSAGs may have taken place in Algeria, Mali, Peru, and Thailand, which the Monitor has been unable to independently confirm from available information. There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, and Yemen.

Production of antipersonnel mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.[56] Thirty-nine of these states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including five countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel, Nepal, and Poland.[57] A majority of major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among those nations that have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. In most cases, these countries were not actively producing mines, but reserve the right to do so. Active production may be ongoing in as few as three countries: India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

In September 2011, a Foreign Ministry official confirmed to the Monitor that most of China’s mine production has been shut down, and only a small number of mines are produced for the purpose of research by the army.

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, and Myanmar) produce antipersonnel mines, mostly victim-activated IEDs. Prior to its defeat in 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka probably produced the most sophisticated antipersonnel mines among NSAGs.

Trade in antipersonnel mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has not conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

At least 10 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including seven mine producers, have enacted formal moratoria on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.[58]

Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

The Monitor estimates that of the 39 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as many as 35 stockpile a collective total of more than 160 million antipersonnel mines. Three states not party, all Pacific nations, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga. It is not known if the newly independent state of South Sudan has any stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

States not party that stockpile antipersonnel mines





Korea, North



Korea, South

Saudi Arabia









Sri Lanka



















It is not certain that all of these states not party stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

The vast majority of global stockpiles belong to China (estimated 110 million) and Russia (estimated 24.5 million). Based on 2002 data, the Monitor has cited a US stockpile of 10.4 million antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor was informed in 2010 that the US stockpile may be considerably smaller now. Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated six million) and India (estimated four to five million).

Prolific mine use during 2011 by forces of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the discovery of hundreds of thousands of stockpiled mines have shown how Libya’s previous denial of a mine stockpile was patently untrue. The NTC has pledged to destroy all stocks of mines under its control.

Destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely occurs as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

In June 2011, Mongolia reported that it had 206,417 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and that 110 had been destroyed to “define an appropriate mine destruction technique friendly to the environment.”[59]

Non-state armed groups

Few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due to the halt in trade and production, and destruction of stocks under the Mine Ban Treaty. A few NSAGs have access to mine stocks from old regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), while others produce their own improvised mines or acquire mines by removing them from minefields. In states not party NSAGs have also been known to capture antipersonnel mines or steal them from arsenals or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines or their own craft-produced mines in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia, Iraq, and Pakistan. The Monitor relies on reports of seizures by government forces to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of September 2011, a total of 97 states were party to Amended Protocol II including three Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that ratified the protocol since the publication of Landmine Monitor 2010: Gabon (on 22 September 2010), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (6 December 2010), and Serbia (14 February 2011).

Only 11 of the 97 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US.[60] Thus, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 11 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still 11 states that are party to the original but have not joined the amended protocol: Cuba, Djibouti, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.[61] In 2010, CCW States Parties began discussing mechanisms to terminate the original Protocol II at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference in November 2011.

A total of 19 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also producers of antipersonnel mines.

States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to CCW protocols[62]



















Korea, North

Saudi Arabia


Italics indicated states which also produce antipersonnel mines.

[1] Statement by Steve Goose, HRW, Head of ICBL Delegation, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2010,

[2] In October 2008, two Thai soldiers stepped on antipersonnel mines while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. Thai authorities maintained that the area was previously clear of mines and that the mines had been newly placed by Cambodian forces. Cambodia denied the charges and stated that the Thai soldiers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts. In April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries. In June 2011, a Cambodian official informed the Monitor that Cambodia had not received cooperation from Thailand regarding investigation into the issue and has, therefore, not pursued it further. In April 2010, a Turkish newspaper published a document allegedly belonging to the 23rd Gendarmerie Division Command indicating that on 9 April 2009, members of the Turkish Armed Forces laid M2A4 antipersonnel mines in the southeastern province of Sirnak. In May 2009, the media reported that seven Turkish soldiers were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Cukurca in Hakkari province. In June 2010, the Turkish government informed other States Parties that a “legal investigation” into allegations of use was underway and said that once concluded the results would be shared “in full transparency.” It said that commenting further on an ongoing legal procedure would be inappropriate.

[3] In 2011, there were reports of new mine use in South Kordofan state near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the northern branch of SPLM/A. The Monitor has not been able to confirm these reports. There is a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. The Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There have been no confirmed instances of government forces using antipersonnel mines since Sudan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004.

[4] Côte d’Ivoire experienced six months of post-election armed conflict between forces loyal to former president Laurent Gbagbo and then-president-elect Alassane Ouattara. Media articles reported allegations of mine use by both Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s forces and each side accused the other of use of antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor has found no evidence of any use of antipersonnel mines during the conflict. In an interview with the Monitor, an officer from Côte d’Ivoire’s gendarmerie stated that the allegations of mine use were false, and that what media reports described as mines were actually plastic packaging caps from containers for P17 rockets. Interview with Patrick M’Bahia, Focal Point/Officer, Gendarmerie, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[5] Tuvalu stated in 2002 that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.

[6] Statement of Iraq, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[7] For details see ICBL-CMC, "Country Profiles"", For historical information see Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 196–197, 443–444, 746–748, 774–778.

[8] Statement of Belarus, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[9] Statement of Greece, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Specifically, this involved the transfer of 631 155mm projectiles, each containing 36 ADAM antipersonnel mines, for a total of 22,716 antipersonnel mines. See statements of Germany and Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[13] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[14] Statement of Ukraine, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011. Notes by the ICBL.

[15] Statement of Norway, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[16] Statement of Ukraine, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011. Notes by the ICBL.

[17] States retaining less than 1,000 mines under Article 3: Nicaragua (963), Ecuador (910), Jordan (850), Cambodia (845), Honduras (815), Mauritania (728), Portugal (694), the UK (673), Italy (669), Mali (600), Luxembourg (599), Colombia (586), Zimbabwe (550), Cyprus (500), Togo (436), Republic of the Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Uruguay (260), Eritrea (172), Ukraine (170), Cape Verde (120), Gambia (100), El Salvador (72), Rwanda (65), Ireland (64), Senegal (28), Benin (16), Guinea-Bissau (9), Burundi (4), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“some”). In 2010, the DRC indicated that there were some live antipersonnel mines retained for training at the Military Engineers’ School in Likasi, but the types and numbers had not yet been reported.

[18] Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, BiH, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UK.

[19] The 26 accessions include Montenegro, which technically “succeeded” to the treaty after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro. Of the 131 signatories, 43 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

[20] With Tuvalu’s accession, only three Pacific states have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: of Micronesia, Tonga, and the Marshall Islands, which has signed but not ratified.

[21] While Tuvalu acceded in the past year, the total number of states not party remains 39 as South Sudan became an independent state in 2011 and has not yet joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

[22] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja: Ottawa Mines Convention a great victory for civic engagement,” Press release #193/2011, 12 August 2011.

[23] Statement of South Sudan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 23 June 2011.

[24] CMC meeting with Phan Hai Anh, Assistant Director General, Department of International Organizations, Geneva, 27 June 2011.

[25] The US was the first country to introduce a resolution to ban mines in 1996, urging nations “to pursue vigorously” an international ban treaty “with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.” UNGA Resolution 51/45S was passed on 10 December 1996 by a vote of 156-0, with 10 abstentions. The resolution also called on governments to unilaterally implement “bans, moratoria or other restrictions” on production, stockpiling, export, and use of antipersonnel mines “at the earliest date possible.” Since 1997, it has abstained on every UNGA resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

[26] The first resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, UNGA 52/38A, secured a vote of 142 in favor, none against, and 18 abstained.

[27] This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.

[28] Uzbekistan actually voted in support of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.

[29] As of September 2011, 41 through the Deed of Commitment, 19 by self declaration, and four by Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). Prior to 2000 several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.

[30] The Deed of Commitment includes a ban on any use, production, trade, or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. In April and June 2009, three factions of the Komala party (the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, the Komala Party of Kurdistan, and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan) signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 945.

[31] HRW, “Libya: Rebels Pledge Not to Use Landmines,” Press release, 29 April 2011,

[32] ICBL, “Nobel Peace Laureate Campaign Welcomes Libyan Rebel Pledge Not to Use Landmines, Urging the Government for Similar Action,” 30 April 2011.

[33] Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “Attacks and displacement in Nyaunglebin District,” 9 April 2010,

[34] KHRG, “Villagers injured by landmines, assisted by neighbours in southern Toungoo,” 22 October 2010,

[35] Unpublished information provided to the Monitor by the KHRG, 12 April 2011.

[36] KHRG, “Militarization, Development and Displacement: Conditions for villagers in southern Tenasserim Division,” March 2011,

[37] Source requested anonymity, Yangon, 2 March 2011.

[38] Source requested anonymity, Bangkok, 15 March 2011.

[39] FBR, “18-year-old Arakan Woman Raped by Burma Army Captain Chin State, Burma,” 3 May 2010.

[40] FBR, “Landmines, Victims and Flooding from Burma Army Dam Project Displaces Multiple Communities Nyaunglebin District, Karen State, Burma,” 17 January 2011,

[41] Brazil has confirmed that production and exports of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines ceased in 1989, even before Brazil joined the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. There is no export record of the shipments, because arms export records are not held for longer than 10 years. An internal investigation has been opened into the origins and transfer of the T-AB-1 mines to Libya. HRW meeting with Brazilian delegation to intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 27 June 2011. In June 2011, the ICBL asked Brazil to publicly condemn the use of antipersonnel mines in Libya and provide detailed information on the transfer of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines to Libya, including the date of manufacture and transfer, as well as the number of mines exported. The ICBL had not yet received a reply as of 23 September 2011. ICBL letter to Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 13 June 2011.

[42] Amnesty International, “Libya: Civilians at risk amid new mine threat,” Press release, 25 May 2011,

[43] HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011.

[44] “Land mines slow Libyan rebels’ march toward Tripoli,” The Washington Post, 26 July 2011,

[45] HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011.

[46] ICBL, “Landmine Use in Libya in 2011: Frequently Asked Questions,”

[47] Gil Ronen, “Antipersonnel Mines Laid Along Syria Border ‘for September,’” Arutz Sheva (Israel News), 11 August 2011,

[48] Or Butbul and Reut Farkash, “Operation Mine,” IDF,

[49] ICBL, “Nobel Peace Prize-winning global campaign strongly condemns Israel’s new use of landmines,” 16 August 2011,

[50] Implementation Support Unit, “President of Convention banning anti-personnel mines expresses concern about new use of mines by Israel,” 6 September 2011,

[51] The majority of pressure plate IEDs are set to detonate from approximately 10kg of pressure and contain approximately 20kg of explosives, more than twice that of a standard antivehicle mine. As a result of this design and configuration, “each pressure plate IED serves as a massive anti-personnel mine with the capability of destroying a tank. Civilians who step or drive on these IEDS have no defense against them and little chance of survival.” UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Mid Year Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, July 2011, p. 2.

[52] UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Mid Year Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, July 2011, p.8. See statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines, 6 October 1998, in Landmine Monitor Report 1999,pp. 433–434.

[53] “UNAMA accuses Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate of having caused casualties to the common people by planting land mines. However, all the country men know that Mujahideen use landmines which are controlled remotely, i.e. they are not detonated by heavy pressure. So Mujahideen’s mines aim only at a specific targets.” Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Statement of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Repeatedly Baseless Accusations of UNAMA,” 19 July 2011,

[54] Article 13 Report, CCW Amended Protocol II, 20 October 2010.

[55] The northern branch of the SPLM/A became an independent party in Sudan after the south’s secession. See Salma El Wardany, “Sudan Army, Opposition Fighters Clash in Southern Kordofan,” Bloomberg, 24 September 2011,; and UN Mission in Sudan, “Report on the human rights situation during the violence in Southern Kordofan, Sudan,” June 2011, para. 38,

[56] There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced.

[57] Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 34 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.

[58] Iranian antipersonnel mines have been seized in Afghanistan in 2008, Tajikistan in 2007, and Somalia in 2006. See “Landmine deport smuggled from Iran discovered,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 25 January 2008. See also “Iranian Land Mines Found in Taliban Commander’s House,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 January 2008; Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B2, 3 February 2008; and UN, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006),” S/2006/913, 22 November 2006, p. 62.

[59] Statement of Mongolia, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 20 June 2011. In its August 2007 voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Mongolia reported a stockpile of 206,417 antipersonnel mines, inherited from the Soviet Union. In November 2010, it stated that it had a stockpile of 206,317 antipersonnel mines and would destroy another 380 mines in 2011 to demonstrate “our step-by-step approach to join the Convention.”

[60] Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland is party to CCW Amended Protocol II. Though it has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, as a signatory it is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, so is already bound by a higher standard than Amended Protocol II.

[61] Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Togo, and Uganda are party to the Mine Ban Treaty and are thus bound to the higher standard.

[62] None of the countries listed in the table are party to the Mine Ban Treaty either.