Landmine Monitor 2003

Banning Antipersonnel Mines

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty ever. Since 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later. For a state that ratifies or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that state deposited its instrument of ratification. That state is then required to make its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions. 


A total of 134 countries are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, as of 31 July 2003.[3] Another 13 countries have signed, but not ratified the treaty.[4] Thus, 147 countries have legally committed to the core obligations of the treaty, including no use of antipersonnel mines.[5]

Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2002, nine additional countries have become States Parties. Four countries acceded: Afghanistan (11 September 2002), Comoros (19 September 2002), Central African Republic (8 November 2002), and Timor-Leste (7 May 2003). Five countries ratified: Cameroon (19 September 2002), The Gambia (23 September 2002), Cyprus (17 January 2003), São Tomé e Príncipe (31 March 2003), and Lithuania (12 May 2003).

Two of these new States Parties are mine-affected (Afghanistan and Cyprus).

Since the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature in December 1997, over three-quarters of the world’s nations have joined the treaty. This indicates widespread international rejection of any use or possession of antipersonnel mines, and widespread commitment to mine clearance and assistance to mine survivors. 

Most of the major mine-affected countries are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. These include: Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Thailand in Asia; Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Mozambique in Africa; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia in Europe; Colombia and Nicaragua in the Americas. These countries—among the biggest users of antipersonnel mines in the past—have now foresworn the weapon. 

Every country in sub-Saharan Africa is a State Party or signatory, except Somalia, which does not have a functioning government; every country in the Americas region, except the US and Cuba; every member of the European Union, except Finland; every member of NATO, except the US and Turkey (which is about to accede). Major Asia-Pacific nations have joined, such as Australia, Indonesia, and Japan. 

In 2002 and 2003, there were many encouraging movements toward accession or ratification in countries not yet party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Belarus, with one of the largest antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the world, completed all the domestic measures necessary for its accession on 30 July 2003. The parliament of Serbia and Montenegro passed legislation to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty on 20 June 2003. The foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey affirmed that their countries would proceed to submit simultaneously their respective instruments of adherence, having completed all the domestic procedures to join the treaty. In April 2003, Guyana's National Assembly approved ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty. In Burundi, a draft law for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 2003 and by the Senate in June 2003. In Sudan, in May 2003, Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail announced that the Council of Ministers had officially and unanimously endorsed the Mine Ban Treaty and had transmitted it to Parliament for ratification. 

Estonia’s Prime Minister has stated that the government is seriously considering joining the Mine Ban Treaty and has started the process of internal deliberations for joining. In April 2003, the Latvian Ambassador to the UN in Geneva said the country would probably join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004. In October 2002, the Sri Lankan government announced its willingness to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty contingent upon reaching an agreement with the rebel LTTE on the non-use of landmines. An official from Papua New Guinea indicated in May 2003 that accession would be completed before the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2003. In the Cook Islands, ratification legislation is being considered by the Parliament. 

Sustained and systematic universalization efforts among States Parties, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and United Nations (UN) agencies continue. The Universalization Contact Group, coordinated by Canada, met several times in 2002 and 2003 to strategize and identify universalization targets. There were numerous important regional conferences and other meetings and missions aimed at universalization, including in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. (See ICBL chapter in this Landmine Monitor Report 2003). For most countries that have joined to the treaty since 2000, there seems to be a tangible relationship between the occurrence of either a States Parties or intersessional meeting and the ratification/accession of the treaty for those countries. Since February 2000, 24 of the 44 states ratified the treaty within two weeks before or after such a meeting.

Virtually all of the 47 non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines at some point in time, and many have already at least partially embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57/74 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted on 22 November 2002 by a vote of 143 in favor, none opposed, and 23 abstentions. The same eighteen states not party to the treaty voted for the resolution as did for the resolution last year: Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yugoslavia.[6] The 23 abstentions were four more than on a similar resolution last year. State Party Tajikistan described its abstention as a “mistake.”

Despite the large and growing number of States Parties, there is concern that the pace of new ratifications and accessions has slowed. There were three ratifications in December 1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference, then 55 ratifications/accessions in 1998, 32 in 1999, 19 in 2000, 13 in 2001, eight in 2002, and four from January to July 2003. 

Forty-seven countries (24 percent of the world’s total) have not yet joined the treaty. This includes three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States. Most of the Middle East, most of the former Soviet republics, and many Asian states are outside the treaty. Major antipersonnel mine producers and stockpilers, such as China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the US are not part of the treaty. Moreover, there has been little or no positive change in the ban policies of some states in the past year, including the US, Russia, and China. Universalization still remains the biggest challenge facing ban supporters. 

Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program 

During 2002-2003, the intersessional work program, established in 1999 to carry the work of the Mine Ban Treaty forward between the annual Meetings of States Parties, continued to help maintain international attention on the global antipersonnel mine problem, consolidate global mine action efforts, provide a global picture of priorities, and contribute to the full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The ICBL remained a full and active participant in the intersessional process, showing that the strong partnership with governments continues. 

The four Standing Committees—Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies; Stockpile Destruction; and General Status and Operation of the Convention—each met twice in 2002 and twice in 2003 at the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in Geneva. An Action Program issued by the President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties (Belgium) served as the basis for planning for the fourth year of intersessional work.  The Standing Committees focused more than ever before on the needs, gaps and resources available for the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, especially its mine action components, in the period leading up to the first Review Conference in November 2004.

The Coordinating Committee (CC) of the States Parties met monthly in 2002 and 2003, with the President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties as its chair. The CC consists of the co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the intersessional Standing Committees, the chairs of the ad hoc contact groups for Universalization (Canada), Articles 7 & 9 (Belgium), Resource Mobilization (Norway), and the Sponsorship Group (UK), and the presidents of past and forthcoming Meetings of States Parties. The meetings discussed practical coordination matters relating to the intersessional work program and preparations for the annual Meetings of States Parties. The ICBL and ICRC continued to participate in these meetings on a regular basis. 

Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) became operational in January 2002, it has more than proven its worth by ensuring better preparations for the intersessional meetings, providing valuable support to all interested States, serving as an information source, and contributing to strategic thinking on how to achieve the overall goals of the treaty. The ICBL works very closely with the ISU. The ISU together with the Sponsorship Group of interested States Parties helps to enable full participation in the intersessional program of mine-affected countries with limited resources. 

Participation in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in February and May 2003 reached record levels, with more than 500 persons in attendance, representing 126 countries (96 States Parties and 30 non-States Parties), dozens of members of the ICBL, Landmine Monitor researchers, the ICRC, international and regional organizations, UN agencies, and academic institutions. 

Convention on Conventional Weapons 

A total of 90 countries are States Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), as of 31 July 2003. In December 2001, States Parties to the CCW agreed to expand the scope of the CCW to apply to internal as well as international armed conflicts; by July 2003, 14 had ratified this amendment to Article 1 of the Convention.[7] The States Parties also agreed to form a Group of Governmental Experts to explore the problems posed by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM). 

In December 2002, the States Parties agreed to a mandate to negotiate an instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for ERW and to continue work on MOTAPM. The ICBL and other NGOs have challenged States Parties to conclude a strong, effective, legally binding instrument in 2003 on the wider problem of explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions. The ICBL and other NGOs have also urged the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to end the civilians casualties caused by antivehicle mines, and has encouraged all States to examine their national stocks to take steps to eliminate antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices that cause the mine to function like an antipersonnel mine, as these are already prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. 

The Group of Governmental Experts met for one week in March 2003 and two weeks in June 2003. They will meet again in November. Ambassador Chris Sanders of the Netherlands, the coordinator of the group’s work on ERW, put forward a draft framework paper in March, and a draft instrument in June. It is unclear if the negotiations will conclude in November; while most States Parties support a new protocol on ERW, the United States and a few others have raised objections to a legally-binding instrument.

A total of 69 countries are States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, as of 31 July 2003. Amended Protocol II regulates landmines, booby-traps and other devices; it took effect on 3 December 1998. Just ten of the 69 States Parties to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Estonia, Finland, India, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Pakistan, South Korea, and the US. Several of these have indicated they are likely to join the Mine Ban Treaty, including Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Thus, very few of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II continue to assert the right to use antipersonnel mines.

Two States Parties to Amended Protocol II are known to have used antipersonnel mines since December 1998: India and Pakistan. US forces in Afghanistan have incorporated Soviet-era minefields into their perimeter defense, deriving military advantage from these minefields. India, Pakistan, and the US are obligated to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II requirements to mark and monitor minefields to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. But none of these countries provided detailed information on measures taken in their annual national reports for Amended Protocol II submitted in December 2002. 

China and Pakistan deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex of Amended Protocol II, until 3 December 2007. Neither country has provided detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability requirement.

Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US, while India is developing such systems. Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the UK have destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines in order to comply with Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Amended Protocol II States Parties China, Pakistan, and Ukraine have deferred compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex. They have up to nine years to come into full compliance with the technical specifications. The deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, and 15 May 2008 for Ukraine. Ukraine, a signatory of the Mine Ban Treaty, is taking steps to destroy its stockpile of 5.9 million PFM-type remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. India and Pakistan have reported that new compliant remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines are being developed and tested.

Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines

The drop in global use of antipersonnel mines that began to take hold in the mid-1990s continued in this reporting period. In recent years, antipersonnel mines have been used by fewer countries and in lesser numbers than seen from the 1960s through the early 1990s, when the global landmine crisis was created. There have been notable aberrations from the general pattern of decreased use, but the overall trend has been positive, even with respect to non-States Parties, as the international norm against the antipersonnel mine has spread. 

In this reporting period, since May 2002, Landmine Monitor has confirmed that six governments used antipersonnel mines: India, Iraq, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Pakistan, and Russia. This compares to use by at least nine governments listed in Landmine Monitor Report 2002 and 13 governments in Landmine Monitor Report 2001.[8] There are credible allegations of mine use by three other governments, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to definitively confirm the allegations: Burundi, Georgia, and Sudan. All three governments strongly deny using antipersonnel mines. 

As of July 2003, it appears that only Myanmar and Russia are laying antipersonnel mines on a regular basis. India, Pakistan, and Nepal have all stopped their mine-laying operations, and the government of Iraq has ceased to exist. Since the cessation of mine-laying operations by India and Pakistan in mid-2002, there has not been a single government engaged in massive, sustained use of antipersonnel mines. 

During the reporting period, it is likely that the greatest number of mines were used by the government forces of Myanmar, Nepal, and Russia (in Chechnya). The most extensive use of antipersonnel mines by rebels was also likely in those three countries, as well as in Colombia.  

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties 

In this reporting period, Landmine Monitor has found no concrete evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by any State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. 

Mine Ban Treaty Signatories 

Landmine Monitor cannot definitively conclude that any signatory government used antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. However, Landmine Monitor has received ever-more compelling reports of use of antipersonnel mines inside Burundi by government forces, as well as rebels. The government strongly denies these allegations, stating that only rebels use mines. In Sudan, government and rebel forces exchanged accusations of mine use, while both deny responsibility.

States Parties Ecuador and Venezuela in their Article 7 transparency reports indicated that they used antipersonnel mines after signing the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997, but prior to entry into force. Angola, now a State Party, has also acknowledged use while still a signatory. The ICBL believes that use of antipersonnel mines by a signatory is a violation of international humanitarian law, in that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that treaty signatories must refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the instrument they have signed.  

Mine Ban Treaty Non-Signatories 

The governments of India, Pakistan, Nepal and Russia have all acknowledged using antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. It is clear that government forces in Myanmar continued to lay mines. Saddam Hussein’s forces used antipersonnel mines in the lead-up to and during the 2003 conflict in Iraq. There have been credible reports of use by Georgia, but the government denies it. 

Armed Non-State Actors

Opposition groups are reported to have used antipersonnel mines in at least eleven countries. Non-state actors have used mines in Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia (in Abkhazia), India, Nepal, Philippines, Russia (in Chechnya), Somalia, and Sudan. This compares to reports of use by non-state actors in at least fourteen countries in the previous reporting period. 

In addition, there have been a small number of reported incidents of use of antipersonnel mines, improvised explosive devices or booby-traps by non-state actors in countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Indonesia, and Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo). 

Key Developments Since Landmine Monitor Report 2002

Cessation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines

Use of antipersonnel mines by both government and rebel forces in three of the most mine-affected countries stopped during the previous Landmine Monitor reporting period. Use stopped in Afghanistan (aside from a few sporadic incidents) with the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, in Sri Lanka with the cease-fires in December 2001, and in Angola with the peace agreement in April 2002.

After increased use by both government and rebel forces in Nepal in 2002, there has been little or no use by either side since the January 2003 cease-fire. At some point in 2002, apparently in mid-year, India and Pakistan stopped their major mine-laying operations begun in December 2001. 

Initiation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines

Iraq is the only government to be added to the list of antipersonnel mine users in this reporting period. In March and April 2003, it laid significant numbers of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in numerous locations throughout the country. Coalition forces did not use antipersonnel mines. 

Two more rebel groups (New Mon State Party and Hongsawatoi Restoration Party) were identified as mine users in Burma, bringing the total to 15 groups in that country. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines resumed its use of antipersonnel mines, despite having signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment prohibiting all use.

Ongoing and Increased Use of Antipersonnel Mines 

There was substantially increased use of mines and improvised explosive devices by both government and Maoist rebel forces in Nepal in 2002. The government for the first time openly acknowledged use, admitting to laying some 10,000 mines in all 75 districts of the country. As noted above, the January 2003 cease-fire has brought a virtual halt to mine use in Nepal. 

There was also expanded use by guerrilla forces in Colombia, particularly FARC-EP and UC-ELN, as well as AUC paramilitary forces; the government reported 638 incidents of mine use in 2002. 

Mine use was reportedly on the rise in Burundi, with both rebel and government forces blamed. The UN reported, “2002 saw an escalation of the conflict, and increases in mine use in provinces such as Gitega and Mwaro.” Some incidents in Burundi point to continued use of mines by both sides even after the December 2002 cease-fire agreement prohibiting mine use.

In Burma, government forces and 15 different rebel groups used antipersonnel mines; during this reporting period, it appears that mines were laid most extensively in Karen State. 

There was also ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by both Russian federal forces and rebels in Chechnya; the rebels are said to use mines on an almost daily basis. 

The government of Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996. However, there have been credible reports of use in both 2001 and 2002 in areas near Abkhazia. Abkhazian authorities have stated that that in mid-2002, troops from both Abkhazia and Georgia mined areas around the Marukh mountain pass. The government of Georgia denies any use of antipersonnel mines.

Mine-laying by India and Pakistan that began in December 2001 likely continued into this reporting period, but was apparently halted sometime in mid-2002. India may have laid millions of mines on the border. 

Also in India, non-state actors continued to use antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices in Jammu and Kashmir, Central India, and North East India. A number of rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo allegedly used mines, including RCD-Goma, UPC, RCD-ML, and MLC. There were reports of continued mine use by various factions in Somalia. In the Philippines, in addition to new use by the MILF, the New People’s Army and the Abu Sayyaf Group continued to use mines. 

Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines 

At least 36 nations have ceased production of antipersonnel mines. Thirty are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.[9] The other six are Finland, Greece, Israel, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. Taiwan has also stopped production. 

Landmine Monitor identifies fifteen countries that continue to produce antipersonnel landmines. This year, Landmine Monitor is adding Nepal to the list, reflecting the open admission by government officials that production has taken place. This marks the first time that the number of antipersonnel mine producers has increased since Landmine Monitor reporting started in 1999. 


Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Nepal, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States, Vietnam

Nine of the fifteen mine producers are in Asia (Burma, China, India, Nepal, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam), three in the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, and Iraq), two in the Americas (Cuba and United States), and one in Europe (Russia). 

India and Pakistan are actively engaged in new production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW. But, for most of the rest of these countries, it is not known if production lines were active in 2002 and 2003. 

In several cases, there appears to have been no production for a number of years. The US has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997. South Korea produced only Claymore mines in 1998-2000 and no mines since then. Egypt has unofficially stated that it ceased production in 1988. Russia has stated that it has not produced or supplied to its troops antipersonnel mines of the PFM-1, PMN, PMN-2, and PMN-4 types for the past eight years. 

In September 2002, Iran said it has not produced antipersonnel mines since the end of its war with Iraq in 1988. However, last year Landmine Monitor reported that hundreds of Iran-manufactured antipersonnel mines with production stamps of 1999 and 2000 were encountered by demining organizations in Afghanistan. 

Since the coalition occupation of Iraq, any industrial production of antipersonnel mines that may have been taking place has, presumably, ceased. Landmine Monitor will keep Iraq on the list of producers until a new government officially renounces antipersonnel mine production.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

In recent years, Landmine Monitor findings indicate that the trade in antipersonnel mines has dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged trade. The scope and nature of the global landmine trade, which now appears to be defunct, is reflected in the Mine Ban Treaty transparency reports. Between March 1999 and July 2003, 39 States Parties declared stockpiles of antipersonnel mines imported from at least 23 countries in their Article 7 transparency measures reports.[10] These numbers are likely to increase over the coming year as more countries submit initial transparency reports. States Parties have included significant supplementary information about the countries of origin and dates of acquisition of their antipersonnel mine stockpile. 

The de facto global antipersonnel mine transfer ban established during the 1992-1997 period has been reconfirmed and extended in 2002. Several countries outside the Mine Ban Treaty have extended their moratoria on exports and transfers of antipersonnel mines during this reporting period. Belarus extended its moratorium through the end of 2007. China reaffirmed its limited moratorium in December 2002. Israel extended its export moratorium until July 2005. Poland adopted a new law prohibiting all transfers. Russia continues observing its limited export moratorium while in the process of extending it. Singapore affirms that its indefinite moratorium is still in effect. South Korea announced the indefinite extension of its moratorium in December 2002. Turkey made its export moratorium permanent. The US extended its export moratorium through October 2008.

Questions remain about exports from Iran.  Landmine Monitor Report 2002 reported that new Iranian antipersonnel mines had been found in Afghanistan and also intercepted en-route to Palestine. An export moratorium was instituted by Iran in 1997, but it is not known if it is still formally in effect.

Following are some examples of possible continuing illicit trade. According to a media account, in May 2003, a Panamanian court sentenced four Panamanians and three Colombians to 20 and 60 months imprisonment for attempting to import into Colombia weapons acquired in Nicaragua, which included thirteen Russian antipersonnel mines. A former official from the Central African Republic said that landmines were brought into the CAR from Chad during the coup attempt in October 2002; there is no independent confirmation of this allegation. In July 2003, the head of the Transitional National Government in Somalia accused Ethiopia of supplying arms, including landmines, to Somali factions; Ethiopia dismissed the claim. A media report in November 2002 claimed that Turkish customs officials had detained a truck containing a large load of weapons, including antipersonnel mines, at the border with Georgia, allegedly coming from Kazakhstan.

Transfers for Purposes Permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty permits the transfer of antipersonnel mines for the purpose of their destruction or for training and research needs. During 2002, two companies in Germany received quantities of antipersonnel mines for destruction from foreign sources. Spreewerk Lubben destroyed 42,175 mines received from Taiwan. The company EBV destroyed 5,984 BLU-92 Gator antipersonnel mines transferred from the Netherlands. In 2001, Canada reported the transfer of 180 mines from the US and 110 from Yugoslavia, and Ecuador transferred 1,644 mines to the US, all for demining research purposes. 

Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines 

Landmine Monitor estimates that there are approximately 200-215 million antipersonnel mines currently stockpiled by 78 countries. This new estimate reflects the concrete progress of implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and the rejection of the weapon, even among states not party to the ban on antipersonnel mines.  Landmine Monitor Report 2002 cited an estimate of 230 million antipersonnel mines stockpiled globally. The rapid destruction of antipersonnel mine stockpiles accounts for the reduction, most notably Russia’s new claim that it destroyed nearly 17 million antipersonnel mines since 1996. 

Landmine Monitor estimates 22 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile between one million and two million antipersonnel mines, as of 31 July 2003. The sizable range in the estimate reflects that several new States Parties likely to have substantial stocks have not yet officially reported their numbers, including Afghanistan, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Eritrea.

Landmine Monitor estimates that the 13 signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile approximately 8.5 to 9 million antipersonnel mines. Ukraine has reported that it possesses a stockpile of 6.35 million. Poland and Greece recently declared stockpiles in excess of one million antipersonnel mines each. Indonesia in May 2002 revealed it has a stockpile of 16,000 antipersonnel mines. These voluntary declarations, as well as one by non-signatory Serbia and Montenegro, were indicators of their commitment to the objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty. Ethiopia and Sudan also likely hold stockpiles, though Sudan claims to have mines only for training. Brunei, Burundi, and Guyana also acknowledge possessing antipersonnel mines. Signatories Cook Islands, Haiti, Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu are unlikely to stockpile antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Monitor estimates that the greatest numbers of antipersonnel mines, between 190 million and to 205 million, are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The largest stockpiles likely belong to China (estimated 110 million) and Russia (estimated 50 million). Other states with large stockpiles include the US (10.4 million), Pakistan (estimated 6 million) India (estimated 4-5 million), Belarus (4.5 million), South Korea (2 million), and Serbia and Montenegro (1.3 million). Other states not party to the treaty believed to have large stockpiles are Burma, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Vietnam.

Russia has publicly claimed for the first time that it destroyed more than 16.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 1996 and 2002. This startling information is inconsistent with past statements and documents. Taking this new information into account, Landmine Monitor has reduced its estimate of Russia’s stockpile to 50 million antipersonnel mines.

In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, including groups in Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, DR Congo, Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda.

Stockpile Developments Since May 2002 

States Parties

  • Algeria declared a stockpile of 165,080 antipersonnel mines.
  • Bangladesh declared a stockpile of 204,227 antipersonnel mines.
  • Chile declared a stockpile of 213,076 antipersonnel mines.
  • Republic of Congo declared a stockpile of 5,090 antipersonnel mines. 
  • Cyprus voluntarily revealed that it has a stockpile of 48,615 antipersonnel mines.
  • Guinea-Bissau declared a stockpile of 4,997 antipersonnel mines.
  • Lithuania voluntarily revealed that it stockpiles 8,091 antipersonnel mines.
  • Mauritius declared a stockpile of 93 antipersonnel mines.
  • Tajikistan declared a stockpile of 3,339 antipersonnel mines under its control and 18,200 mines under the control of Russian forces. 
  • Tanzania declared a stockpile of 23,987 antipersonnel mines.
  • Togo declared a stockpile of 436 antipersonnel mines.
  • Venezuela declared a revised stockpile of 46,136 antipersonnel mines, up from 22,136.

Non-States Parties

  • Greece voluntarily declared a stockpile of 1,078,557 antipersonnel mines.
  • Latvia voluntarily declared a stockpile of 2,980 antipersonnel mines.
  • Poland voluntarily declared that it possesses 1,055,971 antipersonnel mines.
  • Serbia and Montenegro voluntarily declared that it stockpiles 1,320,621 antipersonnel mines.
  • The figure for the US stockpile of antipersonnel mines has been updated and reduced to 10.4 million, based on information provided to the US Congress in 2002.

Stockpile Destruction

Since 1992, a total of 69 countries have destroyed approximately 52 million antipersonnel mines. Sixty-three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed 30 million antipersonnel mines. Since May 2002, 18 States Parties completed the destruction of their stockpiles, eliminating a combined total of almost 10.8 million antipersonnel mines over the course of their destruction programs. About 3 million mines were destroyed in the past year by States Parties, and more than one million by non-States Parties (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Somaliland). 

An important milestone in the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was reached on 1 March 2003: the four-year deadline for destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines for all countries that were party to the treaty when it first entered into force on 1 March 1999. Fulfillment of this obligation by States Parties was not only an important test of the health and viability of the treaty, but a sign of the impact of the international norm against the antipersonnel mine. Positive movement by States Parties toward destruction of stockpiled mines has also motivated non-States Parties to destroy antipersonnel mines. 

It would appear that all States Parties with a 1 March 2003 deadline met their obligation, with the minor exception of Djibouti, which was two days late, and the major issue related to Turkmenistan, which reported completion of destruction, but also declared retention of 69,200 antipersonnel mines. The ICBL expressed its view that retention of such a number of mines in fact means that Turkmenistan did not fully destroy its stocks, and that it is not keeping “the minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the treaty, and is therefore in violation of a core treaty obligation.

A total of 99 States Parties have either completed destruction of antipersonnel mines stockpiles, or declared never having a stockpile. Fifty-one States Parties have completed destruction of their stockpiles.[11] Eighteen States Parties completed destruction since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2002:  Brazil, Chad, Croatia, Djibouti, El Salvador, Italy, Japan, Jordan, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Portugal, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Uganda.

Forty-eight States Parties have officially declared not stockpiling antipersonnel mines.[12] In the reporting period, Barbados, Comoros, Dominica, The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Maldives, Niger, Seychelles, and Trinidad and Tobago officially confirmed that they do not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. 

Twelve States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles. Six initiated the destruction process since the previous Landmine Monitor Report: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan, Tanzania, and Venezuela. Six others continued destruction programs: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Romania, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

Four States Parties (Algeria, Bangladesh, Republic of Congo, and Kenya) have not begun the destruction process, but each has developed a plan to destroy their stockpiles in advance of the treaty-mandated deadline.

Fifteen States Parties have not officially declared the presence or absence of antipersonnel mine stockpiles because of their failure to submit transparency measures reports on time.[13] The deadline for stockpile destruction has passed for three of these countries (Equatorial Guinea, Guinea and Namibia).[14]

Four States Parties will announce their plans when they submit their initial transparency measures reports: Central African Republic, Cyprus, Timor-Leste, and São Tomé e Príncipe.[15] 

Stockpile Destruction Developments since May 2002

Completed Destruction

  • Brazil completed destruction of its stockpiled mines, destroying 27,397 antipersonnel mines between December 2001 and January 2003.
  • Chad completed destruction of its 4,490 stockpiled antipersonnel landmines in January 2003.
  • Croatia completed destruction of its 199,003 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in October 2002. 
  • Djibouti destroyed its stockpile of 1,118 antipersonnel mines on 2 March 2003.
  • El Salvador completed destruction of its 6,539 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 20 February 2003.
  • Gabon reported that its stockpile of 1,082 antipersonnel mines was destroyed when the treaty entered into force for Gabon. 
  • Italy completed the destruction of over 7.1 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines in November 2002. 
  • Japan completed destruction of its 1,000,089 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 8 February 2003. 
  • Jordan completed the destruction of its stockpile of 92,342 antipersonnel mines on 23 April 2003. 
  • FYR Macedonia completed destruction of its stockpile of 38,921 antipersonnel mine stockpile on 20 February 2003. 
  • Moldova completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile on 26 November 2002. 
  • Mozambique completed destruction of its stockpile of 37,318 antipersonnel mines on 28 February 2003. 
  • In the Netherlands, stockpile destruction was completed in December 2002, with the destruction of 5,984 Gator antipersonnel mines. 
  • Nicaragua completed destruction of its 133,435 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 28 August 2002. 
  • Portugal completed destruction of its 231,781 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in February 2003. 
  • Slovenia completed destruction of its stockpile of 168,898 antipersonnel mines on 25 March 2003.
  • Thailand completed destruction of its 337,725 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 24 April 2003. 
  • Turkmenistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction by 1 March 2003, destroying almost 700,000 mines in an eighteen-month period. 
  • Uganda completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in July 2003. 

Other Destruction Developments 

States Parties

  • In Afghanistan, ceremonial destructions of antipersonnel landmines were conducted on 12 May 2003 to emphasize the government’s commitment to implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
  • Argentina and the OAS signed an agreement in June 2003 for cooperation and technical assistance in the destruction of the country’s 90,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines.
  • Chile destroyed 185,446 antipersonnel mines from August 2002 to May 2003.
  • Colombia began its stockpile destruction program in June 2003.
  • In the DR Congo, the NGO Handicap International Belgium reported destroying 1,660 antipersonnel mines from rebel stockpiles in 2002 and 2003.
  • Guinea-Bissau destroyed 1,000 mines in September 2002.
  • Romania destroyed 486,000 antipersonnel mines from April 2002 to April 2003.
  • Tajikistan began destroying its stockpiled mines in August 2002. 
  • Tanzania destroyed its first 9,837 antipersonnel mines in March 2003.
  • Tunisia has destroyed another 13,684 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and plans to complete destruction in September 2003. 
  • Uruguay destroyed another 400 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in June and October 2002.
  • Venezuela began stockpile destruction in May 2003. 

Non-States Parties

  • As a signal of its support for the Mine Ban Treaty, non-signatory Belarus destroyed 22,963 PMN-2 antipersonnel mines in 2002. 
  • Russia reported for the first time that it destroyed more than 16.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 1996 and 2002, including 638,427 in 2002.
  • In Somaliland, 2,382 stockpiled antipersonnel landmines were destroyed in November 2002.
  • Ukraine, a Mine Ban Treaty signatory, completed the destruction of nearly 405,000 PMN-type mines between July 2002 and May 2003.

Mines Retained for Training and Research

Of the 134 States Parties, 62 retain over 280,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. This is an increase of 11 countries and at least 112,000 mines since the publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2002

Of these 62 states, five intend to keep more than 10,000 mines. These five countries account for nearly half of all the mines retained by States Parties. Turkmenistan alone accounts for 25 percent, with 69,200 mines retained. Others with very high levels are Brazil (16,545), Sweden (16,015), Algeria (15,030), and Bangladesh (15,000). 

Six more States Parties intend to keep more than 5,000 antipersonnel mines. Thirty-four intend to keep between 1,000 and 5,000 mines. Another 17 are retaining less than 1,000 mines. Colombia, Mozambique, and Rwanda have reversed earlier decisions and now have chosen to retain mines. 

A total of 55 States Parties have chosen not to retain any antipersonnel mines. Joining this category in this reporting period are Afghanistan, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, and Qatar. Of those not retaining, 13 states once stockpiled mines, but have destroyed them or are in the process of destroying them. The number of States Parties that have not yet declared whether they intend to retain any antipersonnel mines has decreased from 22 to 17.

The most distressing development in this area is Turkmenistan’s announcement that it plans to retain 69,200 mines for training. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2003, several States Parties expressed concern over Turkmenistan’s retention of such a large quantity of mines. The ICBL believes that 69,200 mines is an unacceptable, and likely illegal, number. It is obviously not the “minimum number absolutely necessary,” as required by the treaty. 

Another disturbing development is that some states are retaining their entire stockpile of antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes. Lithuania has stated its intention to retain its entire stockpile of 8,091 antipersonnel mines, the seventh largest amount of all States Parties, despite the fact that it conducts only small scale demining training in cooperation with other Baltic countries. Latvia appears poised to follow Lithuania’s lead, keeping all 2,980 mines, based on its voluntary Article 7 submission of 1 May 2003. Togo (436), Ireland (116 mines), Mauritius (93 mines), and Botswana (unknown number) are also among this group. Antipersonnel mines do not affect any of these countries. Zambia originally proposed retaining its entire stockpile of 6,691 antipersonnel mines under Article 3, but it has reconsidered its position and announced that this total will be reduced. 

One encouraging trend is the significant number of States Parties that have reduced the number of mines retained from the high levels originally proposed. Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Thailand have taken this step in previous years. During this reporting period: Chile reduced the number of mines retained from 28,647 to 6,245; Italy reduced from a ceiling of 8,000 mines retained to 811; Mauritania reduced from 5,728 to 843; the United Kingdom reduced from 4,949 to 1,783; and Uganda reportedly reduced from 2,400 to 1,764. 

Against the trend of reducing the numbers of mines retained, a handful of countries have actually increased their holdings. FYR Macedonia is now retaining 4,000 antipersonnel mines, a vastly greater amount than the 50 originally declared. Venezuela, in modifying the number of mines in its stockpile, also increased the number of mines retained from 2,214 to 4,614. Previously undeclared antipersonnel mines held by a private defense manufacturer in Sweden have necessitated an increase in mines retained from 13,948 to 16,015. Bosnia and Herzegovina is now holding 2,525 antipersonnel mines, 120 more than previously reported. 

The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training and calls on States Parties to continue to evaluate the necessity of this exception. Several States Parties also echoed this view in interventions made at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, including Afghanistan, Austria, New Zealand, and Norway.

The ICBL believes that it is important to have complete transparency on mines retained for training and strongly supports the recommendation of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention that States Parties should in their Article 7 reports “include information on the intended purpose and actual use” of retained mines. 

An increasing number of States Parties are declaring the number of antipersonnel mines actually consumed each year, and for what precise training and research purposes. Fifteen States Parties reported consumption of 3,806 antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes in 2002.[16] Most States Parties did not report any activities or consumption of their retained mines in 2002, and some of these countries have apparently not used or consumed any mines retained for training or research since 1999.

Transparency Reporting 

As of 31 July 2003, the UN has received initial Article 7 transparency measures reports from 113 States Parties. The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is a highly commendable 88 percent, up from 75 percent reported last year and 63 percent reported in 2001. A total of 21 State Parties have submitted initial reports since May 2002: Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Maldives, Niger, Seychelles, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

Efforts over the past year to promote full transparency have halved the number of late initial reports. Landmine Monitor Report 2002 noted that 30 States Parties were late in submitting their initial reports. As of 31 July 2003, a total of 15 States Parties are still late in submitting their initial transparency measures report: Angola, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and Suriname. 

For Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Namibia, and the Solomon Islands, the deadline for submission of their initial report was in 1999, which represents what can only be considered gross negligence in fulfilling the treaty’s transparency obligation.

As of 31 July 2003, the rate of compliance for annual reports due on 30 April 2003 for calendar year 2002 is 62 percent. A total of 76 reports were submitted to the UN by the 123 States Parties obligated to submit annual updates. Of the 47 States Parties not submitting an annual update in 2003, half of them also did not submit reports in 2002 for calendar year 2001.[17]

In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports, including Lithuania in 2002 when it was a signatory, and Latvia and Poland in 2003. At the May 2003 Standing Committee meeting, Ambassador Jean Lint of Belgium (President of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties) suggested that all non-States Parties that voted in favor the UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74, which calls for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, should be encouraged to submit voluntary transparency reports.

During this reporting period, the responsibility for maintaining the online database for Article 7 reports was shifted from UN offices in New York to Geneva.[18] This transition did not go as smoothly as anticipated, due to technical and capacity problems, as well as the fact that many States Parties do not submit their reports in electronic format. Solving these problems should be a high priority during the next intersessional period to ensure that reports are posted in a timely and comprehensive manner, especially near the 30 April annual deadline.

Belgium continues to coordinate a contact group aimed at promoting transparency reporting. In November 2002, Belgium hosted a seminar in Brussels for African countries on transparency reporting under Article 7. The NGO VERTIC, in cooperation with the ICBL and the ICRC, developed the “Guide to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention.”

National Implementation Measures

Only 36 of the 134 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty.[19] None have done so in this reporting period.

A total of 19 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway.[20] Those initiating the process in the past year include Bangladesh, Benin, Republic of Congo, Jamaica, and Togo. 

Thirty-one States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty, a significant increase from the 18 reported in the Landmine Monitor Report 2002. Croatia, the Netherlands, Thailand and Tunisia reported that legislation was in the process of being adopted in previous years, but now deem existing law sufficient. Other countries that have adopted this position, whose views were previously unknown to Landmine Monitor, include the Holy See, Maldives, Paraguay, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Tanzania. 

In many cases, governments believe no steps are necessary because they have never stockpiled antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected. The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, as required in Article 9, in 48 States Parties. 

Special Issues of Concern

Joint Military Operations and “Assist”

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to “never under any circumstances...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” To ensure uniform implementation of the treaty, States Parties must reach a common understanding of how this obligation applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist.” The ICBL believes that it is critical for States Parties to sort out the different understandings about what acts are permitted and which are prohibited. 

Events since entry into force concretely demonstrated the necessity of reaching a common understanding. Since 1 March 1999, States Parties have participated in joint combat operations with the forces of non-States Parties or armed non-state actors wherein antipersonnel mines were reportedly used by the non-State Party or non-state actor; States Parties have placed their forces under the operational command of a non-State Party; States Parties have participated in joint training and peacekeeping operations with non-State Parties; and, non-States Parties have transferred antipersonnel mines stockpiled in a State Party and transited them across the territory of other States Parties for possible use in combat.

While the majority of States Parties have yet to make their views known, at least 30 states have expressed some views and interpretations. A majority of the 30 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to antipersonnel mine use in joint operations or training.[21]

Some States Parties made new policy statements regarding joint military operations with states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or have offered their national interpretation of the term “assist.” Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here; see individual country reports for details.

  • Australia has placed limitations on its forces so as not to violate treaty commitments during joint operations.
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina states that its forces would not participate in joint military operations with any forces planning, exercising, or using antipersonnel mines. 
  • Bulgaria stated in February 2003 that while it participates in joint exercises with some neighboring countries not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, no prohibited activities involving antipersonnel mines are planned or executed during the exercises.
  • Croatia reports that its military would not assist in the use of antipersonnel mines within Croatia or in other countries, including those not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
  • Japan noted that under Article 9 of its Constitution, its armed forces cannot be deployed outside of its territory and cannot participate in any joint military operations.
  • Luxembourg states that its forces are not authorized to participate, actively or passively, in operations involving the use of antipersonnel mines.
  • New Zealand clarified its view on “assist” by stating it cannot “actively assist” with prohibited acts, noting that providing cover for the laying of mines would be active assistance, as would participating in planning or training for use of antipersonnel mines. It also said that “incidental benefit” from mine-laying by others would not constitute active assistance.
  • Portugal confirmed that it would not assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.
  • Switzerland associated itself with the statements of other countries that Article 1 clearly bans joint military operations that may involve use of antipersonnel mines. Switzerland appealed to all States Parties to respect “the words and spirit” of Article 1.
  • Tajikistan states that its Armed Forces would refuse orders by Russia to lay mines and said that Tajik forces are under separate command and control structures.
  • The United Kingdom in May 2003 extensively elaborated on the activities it finds unacceptable, including: planning with others for the use of antipersonnel mines; training others for the use antipersonnel mines; agreeing rules of engagement permitting the use of antipersonnel mines; agreeing operational plans permitting the use of antipersonnel mines in combined operations; requests to non-States Parties to use antipersonnel mines; and providing security or transport for antipersonnel mines. Furthermore, it is not acceptable for UK forces to accept orders that amount to assistance in the use of antipersonnel mines. UK forces are also instructed not to seek to derive direct military benefits from the deployment of antipersonnel mines in combined operations, recognizing that it is not always possible to say in advance that military benefit will not arise where this results from an act that is not deliberate or pre-planned. 

Foreign Stockpiling and Transit of Antipersonnel Mines

Only 21 of the 134 States Parties have explicitly stated that they prohibit transfers through (transit) or stockpiling of foreign antipersonnel mines on their national territory.[22] However, several developments during this reporting period are encouraging as more States Parties declare their policy and establish more examples of state practice. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here; see individual country reports for details.

  • Bosnia and Herzegovina announced in April 2003 that it will not allow the storage or transit of antipersonnel mines belonging to another country in or through its territory.
  • Cameroon stated in September 2002 that it will not facilitate the transit of antipersonnel mines through its territory.
  • Malaysia prohibits the transit of antipersonnel mines that might be carried in vessels through Malaysian territory.
  • Norway reports that US antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Norway were removed in November 2002. US stockpiles were removed from Italy and Spain in previous years.
  • Qatar stated in May 2003 that it would not support any citizen of Qatar to carry, transport, or store any antipersonnel mines with the US. It also stated that any US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines on their territory are not under Qatari jurisdiction or control.
  • Tajikistan is the first State Party to report details on antipersonnel mines stockpiled by a non-State Party on its territory. It reported in February 2003 approximately 18,200 antipersonnel mines of various types are held by Russian Ministry of Defense units deployed in Tajikistan. These stockpiles are not under the jurisdiction or control of Tajikistan. Intergovernmental talks were underway to clarify and complete data collection regarding these Russian mines.
  • The United Kingdom confirmed its position that transit of foreign antipersonnel mines through UK territory is contrary to the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty and in May 2003 equated transit to “assistance” under Article 1. The UK stated that US antipersonnel mines were not transited, stockpiled or maintained on the Diego Garcia bases in British Indian Ocean Territory, during operations in Afghanistan in 2002. It takes the view that the stockpiling or transit of US antipersonnel mines on UK territory, including Diego Garcia, would constitute a breach of the UK's obligations under Mine Ban Treaty. It added that any landmines on US naval ships or military aircraft at Diego Garcia are not under the jurisdiction or control of the UK. 

As reported in the past, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway believe that the Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the transit of antipersonnel mines, at least in certain circumstances.

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the United States stored antipersonnel mines on the territory of at least 14 countries, including seven States Parties.[23] US antipersonnel mines have been removed from States Parties Italy, Norway, and Spain, at the request of those countries. Germany, Japan, Qatar, and the UK state that US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines on their territory are not under their jurisdiction or control. 

It is not possible to confirm current locations or numbers of US antipersonnel mines in foreign countries following the significant movements of equipment and ammunition during the military build-up in the Persian Gulf region preceding the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. For example, on 5 September 2002, US Secretary of the Army Thomas White disclosed that in July 2002 one set of equipment and ammunition that was identified as containing artillery-delivered antipersonnel mines, was moved from Qatar to Kuwait. 

Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices and Sensitive Fuzes 

Applying the definitions in Article 2 to all mines that function as antipersonnel mines, including some designated as antivehicle mines, remains a highly contentious issue. The way that States Parties come to a common understanding on this issue may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and universalized. Perhaps the most discouraging development in the reporting period was the unwillingness of some States Parties to support an initiative by the ICRC to host experts’ work in 2004 on “best practices” regarding antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes within the context of the Mine Ban Treaty, with the aim of agreement on language on a common understanding at the 2004 Review Conference. Germany, Denmark, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom opposed the ICRC initiative, stating that CCW was the only appropriate venue to discuss antivehicle mines. The ICBL believes that Germany’s “open matrix” approach in the CCW Group of Governmental Experts group is a welcome and complementary development that should help resolve the issue in the context of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Some progress has been made on clarifying what specific types of sensitive fuzes on antivehicle mines pose unacceptable dangers to civilians. Germany and the United Kingdom have made statements in 2003 supporting the view that antivehicle mines equipped with sensitive fuzes like tilt rods, tripwires, and breakwires are inappropriate and cannot be designed in a way to prevent detonation by a person. Hungary has destroyed the last of its tilt rod fuzes. Croatia and Slovenia have stated their willingness to discuss the appropriateness of tilt rod fuzes within the context of the Mine Ban Treaty. Canada, France, Mali, and the United Kingdom have removed tilt rod fuzes from their inventories. Sweden has prohibited its forces from using tripwire fuzes with antivehicle mines if they are removed from storage for use. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have retired from service one type of antivehicle mine with a breakwire fuze. France is exploring alternative fuzing mechanisms for its antivehicle mines.

However, state practice in this area is not yet universal. The Czech Republic continues to market an antivehicle mine with a tripwire fuze, stating it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. 

Many States Parties, the ICRC, and the ICBL believe that an antivehicle mine, regardless of design intent or label, with a fuze or antihandling device (AHD) capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person meets the definition of an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited by the treaty. Among the States Parties that have publicly expressed this understanding of what was agreed upon during the treaty negotiations in Oslo in 1997 are Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, South Africa, and Switzerland.

Some States Parties disagree and do not believe that the Mine Ban Treaty applies to antivehicle mines at all, and that the CCW is the only appropriate forum to consider any restrictions or prohibitions on antivehicle mines. Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are the only States Parties that have publicly expressed this view.

Unfortunately only a small number of States Parties, 22 of the current 134, have expressed views or shared national practice on the applicability of the Mine Ban Treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or AHD.[24] Some States Parties made new policy statements or announced concrete steps taken nationally during the reporting period. Only brief summaries of these new developments are included here, see individual country reports for details.

  • Bulgaria stated in February 2003 that production of the TM-46, the only antivehicle mine in its stockpile capable of being fitted with an AHD, had been discontinued and existing stocks were decommissioned and in the process of being destroyed.
  • Croatia stated in May 2003 that it does not stockpile antivehicle mines with AHD that can be accidentally activated. It also declared that the pressure fuzes for its mines function at levels above 120 kilograms, typically 150 to 300 kilograms. Croatia also acknowledged that it possesses tilt rod fuzes that function at the level of 1.3 to 1.7 kilograms and is willing to discuss these within the context of Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty.
  • The Czech Republic has decided to withdraw from stockpiles “old-fashioned antivehicle mines” and replace them with “newer, less dangerous devices.” 
  • The German Parliament passed a resolution in June 2002 urging the government to work nationally and internationally toward a ban of all antivehicle mines equipped with sensitive fuzes. At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, the German delegation drew a distinction between antivehicle mines with AHD, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, stating the former are permitted, while the latter is prohibited. Germany asked States Parties to reach a common understanding on this.
  • Hungary destroyed its remaining 100,000 tilt rod fuze equipped UKA-63 antivehicle mines.
  • The Netherlands disposed of 10,000 DM-31 (the Swedish produced FFV-028) as surplus and declared that it will not use the remaining stockpile of this type of antivehicle mine unless it is assured that the mines cannot function in response to mine detection equipment. 
  • Portugal appears interested in applying the Mine Ban Treaty’s prohibitions to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes that function like antipersonnel mines.
  • Slovakia expects the results of its study regarding which of its antivehicle mines are prohibited or permissible by the Mine Ban Treaty later in 2003.
  • Slovenia acknowledges possessing 59,500 antivehicle mines, but none with AHD. Within this stockpile are 8,228 TMRP-6 that are equipped with both pressure and tilt rod fuzes. Slovenia has indicated it is willing to discuss the TMRP-6.  

Claymore Mines

The Mine Ban Treaty permits Claymore-type mines (directional fragmentation munitions) used in command-detonated mode. However, the treaty prohibits Claymore-type mines used in a victim-activated mode because the weapon then meets the definition of an antipersonnel mine. 

Twenty-one States Parties retain stocks of Claymore-type antipersonnel mines.[25] South Africa and Zimbabwe reported that they stockpile Claymore-type mines, but without the types of fuzes necessary for victim-activation. Croatia, Hungary, New Zealand, and Slovenia also declared that measures have been taken to ensure that their Claymore-type mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode. These declarations bring the number of States Parties who have taken measures to 17, an increase of six countries in this reporting period.  Landmine Monitor Report 2002 incorrectly included Slovakia and Germany on a list of countries retaining Claymore-type mines.

The number of States Parties confirming that they do not possess Claymore-type antipersonnel mines has increased to 24 with the inclusion of Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Kenya.[26]Additionally, Bangladesh, Mozambique, and Tajikistan have signaled their intent by scheduling their stocks of Claymore-types mines for destruction, aside from those retained under Article 3 for training and research purposes. Another 41 States have declared that they do not possess antipersonnel mine stockpiles and are presumed not to possess Claymore-type mines. 

The ICBL urges the remaining 48 States Parties to declare whether they possess Claymore-type mines.[27] States Parties that possess Claymore mines should declare the measures that have been taken to ensure that they cannot be used in the victim-activated mode.


[3] For the purposes of this report, Landmine Monitor identifies as a State Party any country that has given its consent to be bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some of these countries have not completed the six-month waiting period for formal entry-into-force mandated by the treaty. Also, in this report the term ratification is used as shorthand for “consent to be bound.” The treaty allows governments to give consent to be bound in a variety of ways, including ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession – all of which give binding legal status beyond signature.
[4] Thirteen states have signed but not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31 July 2003: Brunei, Burundi, Cook Islands, Ethiopia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Poland, Sudan, Ukraine, and Vanuatu.
[5] Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, when a State has signed a treaty, it “is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of that treaty.
[6] Non-States Parties Afghanistan and Comoros also voted for the resolution in 2001, but have subsequently acceded. 
[7] The 14 are: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, France, Holy See, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, South Korea, Sweden, and the UK.
[8] The change from the 2002 report to the 2003 report reflects the addition of Iraq and the removal of Angola, Afghanistan, Georgia, and Sri Lanka.
[9] States Parties that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. Others have been cited as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela.
[10] Antipersonnel mines from the following countries have been declared in the stockpiles of States Parties as of 31 July 2003: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, former Czechoslovakia, France, Germany (including the former East Germany), Iran, Israel, Italy, Libya, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, former Soviet Union, Spain, South Africa, Syria, UK, US, former Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. This total does not include stockpiles resulting from domestic production or inherited stockpiles declared by successor states, which exclude consideration of States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.  
[11] The 51 States include: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. 
[12] The 48 States include: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Niger, Niue, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts & Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zambia.
[13] The 15 States include: Angola, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and Suriname. Of those 15, those believed to stockpile antipersonnel mines are Angola, Eritrea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and possibly Guinea.
[14] Equatorial Guinea has stated that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines. Namibia claims to only retain mines for training and research purposes. Guinea’s stockpile status is not currently known.
[15] Of these, only Cyprus is believed to stockpile antipersonnel mines.
[16] The 15 States include: Japan (1,610), Sweden (1,002), Netherlands (314), Belgium (293), Australia (213), Croatia (200), South Africa (55), Denmark (33), Germany (19), France (17), Slovakia (14), Canada (12), Luxembourg (10), Ireland (9), and Brazil (5).
[17] Those not submitting include: Andorra,* Antigua and Barbuda,* Bahamas, Belize,* Benin, Bolivia,* Botswana,* Cape Verde,* Chad, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,* Equatorial Guinea,* Eritrea,* Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,* Guatemala, Guinea,* Honduras, Kenya, Kiribati,* Liberia,* Madagascar,* Maldives, Mali,* Namibia,* Nauru,* Nigeria, Niue, Paraguay, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis,* Saint Lucia,* Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,* Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone,* Solomon Islands,* Spain, Swaziland,* Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan,* and Uruguay. (* indicates States Parties that also failed to submit an annual update in 2002 covering events in 2001).
[19] The one addition to the list since Landmine Monitor Report 2002 is Honduras, which Landmine Monitor recently learned enacted implementation legislation in June 2000. The 36 States Parties are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.
[20] The 19 States include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Benin, Republic of Congo, Croatia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Philippines, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, and Zambia.
[21] Twenty-one States Parties have explicitly rejected participation in joint operations with antipersonnel mine use: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Senegal, Sweden, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.
[22] Twenty-one States Parties explicitly prohibiting the storage or transit of foreign antipersonnel mines on or across their territory as of 31 July 2003: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, Malaysia, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
[23] Apart from the seven States Parties, the countries have included: Bahrain, Greece, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey.
[24] Previous editions of the Landmine Monitor Report contain statements or developments on the issue of antivehicle mines with AHD or sensitive fuzes from States Parties Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Portugal and Slovenia join this list in this edition of the Landmine Monitor Report.
[25] The 21 States Parties include: Australia,* Austria,* Canada,* Colombia, Croatia,* Denmark,* Ecuador, Honduras, Hungary,* Malaysia,* Moldova, Netherlands,* New Zealand,* Norway,* Slovenia,* South Africa,* Sweden,* Switzerland,* Thailand,* United Kingdom,* and Zimbabwe.* (* indicates States Parties that declared that measures have been taken to ensure that their Claymore-type mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode).
[26] The 24 States Parties include: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Yemen.
[27] The 48 States Parties that have not declared include: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Djibouti, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Liberia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, São Tomé e Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Spain, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia.