Angola

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 5 July 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2003. Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2006, the coordinator of the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectoral de Desminagem e Assistancia Humanitaria, CNIDAH), told Landmine Monitor that draft legislation to implement the treaty domestically had been sent to the national parliament.^[1] No further progress has been reported, and the draft legislation is not mentioned in Angola’s latest Article 7 report.

As of July 2008, Angola had not submitted its annual updated Article 7 report, due 30 April 2008. Angola submitted its fourth Article 7 report on an unspecified date in 2007, covering the period from April 2006 to March 2007.^[2]

Angola did not vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 62/41 on 5 December 2007 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Angola attended the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008 in Geneva. It made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance at both meetings.

Angola has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, including joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training. It is particularly notable that Angola has not spoken on these issues, given its history of mine use and participation in joint military operations.^[3]

Angola is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but attended as an observer the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II in November 2007. Angola registered for the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008, but did not attend.

Production, Transfer, Use, Stockpile Destruction, and Retention

Angola states that it has never manufactured antipersonnel mines.^[4] It is not believed to have exported in the past. Landmine Monitor did not find any instances of use of antipersonnel mines in Angola in 2007 or the first half of 2008.

Angola completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 28 December 2006, just ahead of its 1 January 2007 treaty deadline. It destroyed 81,045 mines between October and December 2006, in addition to 7,072 antipersonnel mines of 12 types apparently destroyed between September and December 2003.^[5]

In its most recent Article 7 report, Angola reported retaining 2,512 antipersonnel mines under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.^[6] Angola has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in November–December 2004.

Landmine/ERW Problem

Angola is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including (cluster) submunitions. For more than four decades, the country saw extensive and continuous armed conflict, with different armed forces and groups making use of a wide array of weaponry. The conflict ended in 2002.^[7]

In 2007, demining operators reported finding more than 40 different types of mines from 15 countries.^[8] Estimates of the extent of the mine problem in 1993 spoke of millions of landmines littering one-third of the country’s land.^[9] It was not until June 2007, following completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), that a more measured and realistic description of mine contamination in the country and each of its 18 provinces (all of which are contaminated) was generally accepted.

The LIS identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 1,988 mine/ERW-impacted communities in 383 of Angola’s 557 comunas. These impacted communities represent 8% of the 23,504 communities in the country, affecting an estimated 2.4 million people. The survey found that 60% of impacted communities were affected by a single SHA, while the remainder had two or more. Three-quarters of all impacted communities and casualties were in just eight provinces: Benguela, Bié, Cuando Cubango, Cuanza Sul, Cunene, Malanje, Moxico, and Uíge, with Moxico the most heavily impacted province. Luanda, Namibe, and Cabinda provinces were found to have the least impact from mines.^[10]

During the LIS, a number of areas were not accessible because of poor roads, broken bridges, and the vast distances to travel. DanChurchAid (DCA) reported that the influx of persons to Moxico province since the LIS may warrant a new survey but expressed concern that Angola’s national mine action authority, the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) might not have the capacity to update the LIS.^[11] In August 2008, CNIDAH was preparing to identify survey teams to respond to reports of new SHAs and to provide database technical support. CNIDAH planned to deploy the teams in January 2009.^[12] During the LIS, 19 comunas were not accessible (14 in Lunda Norte and Malanje).^[13]

The LIS survey teams estimated the total area of all SHAs in Angola to be 1,239km2. However, in Benguela, Bié, Cuando Cubango, and Huambo, provinces, HALO Trust applied a more rigorous methodology for measuring suspected areas, which resulted in an average SHA size only one-ninth of those measured by the other LIS operators.^[14] The results from the Angola LIS show that HALO identified 35% of the total SHAs, but as a result of polygon mapping measured only 6.4% of the total suspect area, clearly indicating the benefits of polygon mapping (more precise delineation of the perimeters of suspected areas).^[15] Furthermore, in June 2008 HALO, based on data from its polygon mapped areas, and from its own past clearance records, indicated that on average only one-quarter of the suspected area requires physical clearance.^[16]

LIS data served as the basis for Angola’s 2006–2011 strategic mine action plan.^[17] CNIDAH, for planning purposes, took the results of HALO’s polygon mapping, and reduced the total estimated area from 1,239km2 to 242km2.^[18] It is expected that land release principles will reduce this estimate further.^[19]

At least two types of (cluster) submunitions have been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. As of 22 February 2008, according to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had reported clearing 13 submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Cuanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO had reported clearing 230 submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.^[20]

Landmines affect the daily lives of the people of Angola in many ways. Roads were heavily mined during the war and accidents were still occurring while traveling in 2007. The LIS identified blocked roads as a nationwide problem with a particularly high impact in Bié, Huambo, and Moxico provinces.^[21] Transportation and movement have been restricted and the legacy of blocked transit routes continues to interfere with the recovery and development of the country. The LIS identified a significant although smaller number of blockages related to drinking water, housing, and public services. Blocked drinking water is a problem nationwide but is particularly concentrated in Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Malanje, and Moxico provinces. Water and electricity distribution for much of the country is also affected, due to the widespread practice of mining high-voltage electricity pylons, reservoirs and dams during the years of conflict.^[22]

Landmines also have an environmental impact in Angola. Mine contamination in Cuando Cubango province was cited as one of the obstacles to creating the new Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (Kaza TFCA), the world’s largest game park on the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. National Geographic reported that “since the end of the war in 2002, elephants have begun to go back to the Luiana Partial Reserve in Angola’s sparsely populated Kuando Kubango province that borders southwest Zambia and Namibia. When the initial migration began a number of elephants had their trunks and legs blown off by mines, condemning the animals to agonizing deaths. But the elephants that followed have since avoided those areas.” According to Elephants Without Borders, “in order to re-establish and sustain wildlife communities in Luiana Partial Reserve, it is critical that the area be declared a national park and that the land mines are cleared.” More than 130,000 elephants are waiting to be allowed to move from Botswana through the park. This process has been held up until the park is free of the threat of landmines.^[23]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

There are two main national institutions for mine action in Angola. CNIDAH, created in 2001 by presidential decree 54/2001,^[24] is responsible for mine action policy-making, planning, and coordination in the implementation of Angola’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, and reports directly to the Council of Ministers. CNIDAH is also responsible for the accreditation of the commercial demining companies and, in principle, the companies send their clearance reports to CNIDAH.^[25]

CNIDAH has offices in all 18 provinces under the office of the vice-governor who is also the legal representative of CNIDAH at the provincial level. The offices have several functions, namely to:^[26]

• maintain communication with the vice-governor who is responsible for mine action in the province;
• conduct the administrative, logistics and human resources functions to operate the offices;
• collect information from mine action partners;
• conduct quality assurance and disseminate information;
• provide data for the national database in Luanda;
• coordinate planning and attend meetings as needed; and
• prepare the annual operational plan for the province.

CNIDAH provincial operations offices determine annual priorities based on NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.^[27]

As Angola allocated millions of dollars for rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and in support of the massive rebuilding of the country, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) was established in December 2005 to coordinate and manage mine clearance by the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD) and the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA); its main responsibility is to coordinate the mine clearance activities of INAD, the FAA, and the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN).^[28]

In 2008, the Council of Ministers was scheduled to vote on legislation that would clarify the roles of the CED, INAD, the FAA, and CNIDAH. Under the proposed legislation the CED and CNIDAH would remain separate entities. Under Angolan law, a commission has only a temporary life. The proposed legislation would change the status of CNIDAH from a commission to an agency, thereby granting CNIDAH a more permanent status. The change from “commission” to “agency” will probably involve a further name change.^[29] In May 2008, a news article reported that the cabinet had created the National Mine Action Agency (Agência Nacional de Ação Contra Minas, ANAM) and approved its statutes.^[30] However, this development was not well known in Angola, and could not be confirmed even within CNIDAH.^[31] There was no information on the status of the CED.

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) supports mine action through separate projects to build the capacity of CNIDAH and INAD. UNDP has supported CNIDAH through an 18-month project that was scheduled to end 31 December 2008, to train the internal management, planning, quality control, and data processing departments, as well as the staff for 18 provincial offices and the funding of national technical advisors. The project’s purpose has been to support CNIDAH to carry out the 2006–2011 strategic mine action plan.^[32]

In March 2008, UNDP expected that at the end of the project CNIDAH would no longer need UNDP support to train its employees or financial support from the European Commission (EC) to support technical assistance. It was anticipated that, once the project was over, the only remaining technical advisor would be the chief technical advisor (CTA).^[33] However, as of June 2008, the CTA position had been vacant for one year. Balbina Malheiros Dias da Silva, CNIDAH’s Coordinator, was not certain of funding for a CTA beyond 2008 and believed that filling the position should be contingent on long-term funding.^[34]

Through a three-year direct execution project with funding from Japan, UNDP also supported INAD with six technical advisors to enhance its role as the national mine clearance operator. The CTA for the project advises INAD on “institutional and individual capacity development.” In particular, the CTA was tasked with advising and assisting INAD in refining its management and operational structure, planning, integrating mine action and development, and ensuring efficient use of its mechanical assets.^[35] The three main outputs of the project were:

• increased management and technical capacity of INAD at the headquarters level;
• renovated premises and enhanced management systems at the Technical Demining Training School in Viana, and an updated training curriculum based on national and international mine action standards; and
• seven of the 15 INAD demining brigades trained and equipped.^[36]

The government of Angola’s contribution to the project has been equipment, which was said to have been purchased and delivered as planned.^[37]

National mine action legislation

To support the goal of sustainable national support for mine action, the National Mine Acton Strategic Plan 2006–2011 sets several time-specific objectives defining the roles, responsibilities and capacities of national mine action authorities and stakeholders, and calls for national legislation to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of CNIDAH, CED, INAD, FAA and government ministries, and to provide the framework for funding policies and regulations.^[38] As of March 2008, CNIDAH reported that legislation had been drafted and was awaiting approval by the Council of Ministers.^[39]

Status of strategic mine action planning

On 6 September 2006, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2006–2011 was approved by the Council of Ministers. The plan’s five goals are to:^[40]

• significantly reduce the risk to impacted communities and at-risk groups by 2011;
• provide landmine/ERW survivors with medical care (within the national health system for persons with disabilities) and give them access to assistance to reintegrate into community life;
• ensure that the Angolan mine action program supports national infrastructure investment and reconstruction;
• establish a national mine action capability that is sustainable by national resources after the end of major international assistance; and
• establish a world-class mine action program in Angola.

CNIDAH planned to review the strategic plan and revise it, as needed, by the end of 2008 or early in 2009.^[41]

Priority-setting

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated its priorities as: clearing agricultural and resettlement areas; demining and reconstruction of roads and bridges; demining along border areas with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Zambia; and demining of military facilities.^[42] As mentioned above, CNIDAH provincial offices provide a priority task list to demining NGOs. The NGOs select the tasks they will undertake based on a variety of factors, including their capacity, time, and resources, as well as the relative humanitarian and developmental impact. Some operators target SHAs rather than communities. Others focus on the needs of the community or only clear the part of the SHA that is obviously mined and impacting the community. As of early 2008, CNIDAH was said to be developing standardized criteria for area reduction, marking, and cancellation.^[43]

INAD takes directions from the government rather than CNIDAH. Araújo Kapapelo Nunda, the general assistant to the director of INAD’s Technical Department, declared in February: “Our priorities are defined by the central Government. At the moment, we are demining the railways, enlarging the roadsides and intervening on places where undertakings helping with the process of reconstruction and development of the country will be built or rehabilitated.”^[44]

Integration of mine action with relief, reconstruction and development

Angola’s Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2004–2006 emphasized the need to guarantee basic physical security through demining, disarmament and the upholding of law and order throughout the country. It identified mine action as one of its strategic goals. Moreover, mine action is reflected as a cross-cutting issue in the UN Development Assistance Framework 2005–2008 plan for Angola.^[45] However, in its 2007 annual report on Angola, UNDP cited the incorporation of mine action operations into the government’s development plans at both the national and provincial levels as one of its main challenges in 2008.^[46]

On the basis of various statements by government officials and a paper delivered at an international conference, a linkage between general development activities and mine action exists,^[47] in particular with respect to major Chinese investment in Angola. Chinese companies work in close collaboration with the GRN to assess the threat of mines/ERW in their area of interest and then, if necessary, hire commercial demining companies for clearance.^[48] The priorities are: roads; rehabilitation and enlargement of provincial and municipal hospitals; mineral exploration; and rehabilitation of irrigation systems, tourism sites, marine signaling, railways, and high-tension powerlines.^[49] The armed forces conduct mine clearance on the railway lines for Chinese investors while commercial companies clear roads for reconstruction.^[50]

Mine action evaluation

No evaluation has yet been conducted of Angola’s mine action program.

Demining

Demining operators active in 2007 included the FAA, INAD, six international NGOs (DCA, HALO, MAG, Menschen gegen Minen, NPA, and Santa Barbara Foundation), and an unknown number of commercial companies.^[51] Five that are known are Apacominas, Cogote, Rocand, Sedita,^[52] and TeleService.^[53] CNIDAH conducts quality assurance on commercial demining projects and determines when the cleared land should be handed over to the community for use.^[54] Since 2007, CNIDAH has had 13 quality assurance teams deployed around the country.^[55]

As of April 2008, the CED was coordinating 43 mine clearance brigades of which 18 were linked to the FAA, 10 to the GRN, and 15 to INAD, for a total of 2,967 deminers.^[56] INAD expanded its capacity in 2006 to include 2,000 operational staff throughout the country and in 2007 conducted some clearance for telecom towers and roads. INAD was, however, unable to provide statistics on its demining activities because their data management system was said to be not functioning properly.^[57] The consistency and reliability of official demining statistics is a major concern in Angola.

HALO remained the largest international NGO operating in Angola in 2007, with operations in Benguela, Bié, Cuando Cubango and Huambo provinces employing 370 deminers and 148 deminer medics in 74 manual demining teams. HALO also had three mechanical teams, four road threat reduction teams, and four combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education (RE) and marking teams.^[58]

DCA operated in Moxico province in 2007 with three teams from January to June (48 deminers), and four teams (64 deminers) from July 2008. DCA also has had one mechanical team in Moxico province from May 2008. A full-time EOD team was to be deployed from July 2008.^[59]

INTERSOS closed its mine action program in Angola at the end of 2006.

Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) carried out projects in Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, and Cunene provinces with funding from the EC and the Italian government. Projects included road clearance totaling 452.2km, benefiting more than 23,000 people by providing access to water and polling stations for the September 2008 parliamentary elections. As of March 2008, MgM was in discussions with donors on clearing mined areas in the proposed Kaza TFCA national park for elephants in Cuando Cubango.^[60]

Demining of the Kaza TFCA was launched in early 2007 by the UN Environment Programme, in collaboration with Roots of Peace and International Conservation.^[61] Roots of Peace has confirmed that an initial US$20,000 was released in December 2007 to begin demining along the Angola-Zambia border.^[62]

MAG reduced its demining capacity in 2007 due to funding constraints, and was operating out of a single operations base in Luena by the end of 2007 with the number of mine action teams reduced from six in 2006 to four; it operated in Lunda Sul and Moxico provinces in 2007.^[63]

NPA carried out demining tasks in six provinces in 2007 (Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Malanje, Uíge, and Zaire) with four manual teams (96 deminers) and Casspir mine-protected vehicles and Aardvark mechanical clearance capacity (four teams).^[64]

The commercial companies are accredited by CNIDAH and respond to public tenders to clear SHAs for infrastructure development projects. Private investors and the Ministry of Public Works also contract commercial demining companies.^[65]

Identifying hazardous areas

The LIS, for which the fieldwork was conducted from April 2004 through June 2007, identified 1,988 mine-impacted communities and 3,293 SHAs.^[66] Since the end of the LIS, the national database at CNIDAH is said to have been regularly updated based on reports provided by the demining operators of completed clearance tasks.^[67]

In 2008 to June, HALO had cancelled a further 42 SHAs from the LIS. HALO cancels a SHA if the land has been farmed for three years or more without any incidents; if the land is being used for other purposes (housing and infrastructure) and no incidents have been reported; or if the SHAs have been cleared by another operator which follows the same safety practices and clearance standards as HALO. The final task in cancellation is obtaining at least four signatures from both beneficiaries and the local authorities on a declaration that the area cancelled is not mined and it is safe to use.^[68]

Marking and fencing of affected areas

Although marking low-impacted communities is a major goal of the national mine action strategic plan, marking is not a priority task among mine clearance operators.

NPA does not mark the perimeter of a SHA. Instead, in accordance with CNIDAH’s “Guidelines for Community Marking,” NPA paints a line of stones placed along the immediate edge of the SHA to indicate the safe and dangerous areas.^[69]

MAG has been marking only mined areas in which they are conducting clearance,^[70] and HALO does not mark low-impacted communities, but they explain to the local authorities when they mark SHAs with red paint or stones as they survey to indicate that the area within the perimeter is an SHA.^[71] DCA does not mark SHAs.^[72]

A CNIDAH workshop on area reduction and marking, held in Benguela province in February 2008, decided that concrete pillars should be placed every 15m and linked with barbed wire. A starting date was not set and it was suggested that national institutions should buy and place the pillars.^[73]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

In 2007, CNIDAH reported clearance of 36km of railway line, 1,683km of roads and 453km of powerlines.^[74] The CED, however, was reported in the media as claiming slightly different results for 2007, asserting demining by the FAA and INAD of 20.18km2 of land, 1,983km of road, 227km of railway line, and 485km of the route along high-tension electricity pylons, totaling 2,695km of infrastructure cleared. While clearing the infrastructure, the FAA and INAD were said to have destroyed 25,782 antipersonnel mines, 2,933 antivehicle mines, 32,994 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and more than 220 tons (220,000 kg) of various ERW.^[75]

In November 2007, at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Angola announced the following results for the previous 10 months of the year:^[76]

• 2,563km of road cleared;
• 8.2km2 of mined area cleared;
• 5,319 antipersonnel mines removed and destroyed;
• 317 antivehicle mines removed and destroyed; and
• 66,402 items of UXO removed and destroyed.

In 2007, NGO operators reported 3.25km2 cleared and another 1.75km2 either cancelled or reduced.^[77]

Demining in 2007 by NGO operators (not including roads)

N/R= not reported

In 2007, CNIDAH declared 89 communities with a population of 206,925 as “mine free” and clearance in 125 communities reduced the level of impact from high to medium or to low.^[78] By the end of 2007, HALO had cleared or cancelled 204 SHAs identified by the LIS.^[79]

For unknown reasons, possibly linked to reporting, battle area clearance (BAC) seems very low in comparison to mine clearance. NPA alone reported BAC, almost 90,000m2, but without the destruction of any ordnance.

As many as 14 deminers were reported to have been injured in 2007, a significant increase from the previous year (see below section on Casualties).

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Demining in 2003–2007

*This includes the reported clearance figure for INAD, but which is likely to contain a significant element of land release other than by clearance) (20.18 km2).
**N/A = not available

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013. It is difficult to measure the progress being made in Angola. The government, through the CED, the FAA and INAD, has substantially increased clearance assets since 2005 but data on their achievements is not available. In particular, INAD has not reported for two years even though they have more than 2,000 personnel employed, purchased new equipment, receive international technical support, and receive funding from the government.

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated that it has allocated human and financial resources to tackle the mine problem in the whole country but the target set was achievable only if technical and operational demining capacity was doubled by the government and NGOs. The statement did not mention the need to request an extension to the deadline.^[80]

In November 2007, in the UN’s 2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Angola’s entry states, “The strategic plan is a basis for fulfilling the Government’s commitment to the anti-personnel mine-ban treaty. If it is achieved on time, the Government will have one more year to remove all marked SHAs, thus meeting the mine clearance deadline of 1 January 2013.”^[81]

While the LIS has reduced the total SHA in Angola, the size of the overall mine problem remained large. In April 2008, Andrew Lyons, Vice-President of HALO Trust USA, said: “Angola is probably in the top three countries in the world in terms of mine problems, along with Afghanistan and Cambodia. It’s probably going to take another 10 years to clear.”^[82] Formalizing land release standards, increasing the capacity of the operators along with increased financial support from the government of Angola should lead to outputs at the same or better levels than achieved in 2007. More transparency from CNIDAH and the CED would significantly enhance the credibility of its reported achievements in clearance as well as helping to define better the work that remains.

Landmine/ERW Casualties^[83]

The number of casualties occurring in Angola in 2007 is unknown. CNIDAH recorded at least 48 new mine/ERW casualties, including 14 people killed and 34 injured. However, CED reported 127 casualties, including 47 killed (42 civilians and five military) and 80 injured.^[84] It was reported in the media that there were up to 180 mine/ERW casualties.^[85] One disability organization reported providing services to 72 survivors injured in 2007.^[86] In June 2008, Angola reported that between 2005 and 2007, 110 people were injured by mines and ERW.^[87] Landmine Monitor recorded at least 206 people injured between 2005 and 2007 based on CNIDAH information.^[88]

Of CNIDAH-recorded casualties, ten were female and 38 were male. The age was not recorded for more than half of the casualties (25). Casualties with known age were 10 men, seven boys, four girls, and two women. The civilian/military status was not recorded or was unknown for 26 casualties, 17 were civilians, and five were recorded as “other.” No military or demining casualties were recorded although the media reported that there had been at least 14 demining accidents in 2007.^[89] Previously, CNIDAH reported seven clearance casualties to July 2007.^[90] Clearance operators reported the following clearance accidents:

DCA had one accident in which a technical advisor was injured by an antipersonnel mine in November 2007.^[91]

HALO reported three casualties who were all injured. The three accidents were reported to CNIDAH but not recorded in the data received by Landmine Monitor from CNIDAH.^[92]

MAG reported two antipersonnel mine accidents in February and March 2007. These were not included in the CNIDAH casualty totals for 2007.^[93]

It is also said that casualties due to clearance accidents at Angolan commercial companies, which are reportedly higher than humanitarian clearance accident rates, are not reported.^[94]

Information about the device causing casualties, as recorded by CNIDAH, was unknown for 39 casualties. One casualty was caused by an antipersonnel mine, four by antivehicle mines, three by submunitions, and one by other ERW. The activity at the time of the incident was not recorded for 22 casualties. When recorded, 14 casualties were while playing/ during recreation (all with unknown devices); other activities were travel and livelihood activities. Most casualties occurred in Cuanza Norte province (15), followed by Moxico (10), Bengo (eight), Malanje (seven), and Huambo and Cunene (four each). There were at least two duplicate entries in the IMSMA database at CNIDAH, and for five more entries, insufficient information was available to determine whether they were duplicated.^[95]

The database contained six casualties identified by CNIDAH, 11 by INAD, two by DCA and three by MAG; national NGOs reported the others. However, DCA noted it had submitted four civilian incident reports to CNIDAH, and HALO submitted reports on three casualties.^[96] In addition, Landmine Monitor identified at least seven casualties which had not been recorded in the CNIDAH database.^[97] In December 2007, four children were killed and two women injured when UXO, which the children had found and taken home, exploded while they were hitting it.^[98] A Chinese employee of a telecommunications company was killed by a mine in Benguela province in October 2007.^[99]

The 2007 casualty rate, so far as it is reliable, is a sharp decrease from the 121 casualties recorded by CNIDAH in 2006 (19 killed and 102 injured). In 2006, there were at least seven duplications in the database (total entries 128) and for 12 more insufficient detail was available to determine whether they were duplicated.^[100] Reasons for the decrease in casualties are said to be improved mine/ERW RE and demining progress. However, it is likely that the lower casualty rate is also due to a lack of data collection capacity and information flow inconsistency. For example, the national NGO AMMIGA provided 82 casualty reports (68% of CNIDAH’s total records for 2006) in 2006 but reported no casualties in 2007.

Furthermore, notable changes occurred in the casualty demographic, device type, and incident location, possibly highlighting the incompleteness of 2007 data. While 45 military casualties and five (the sixth was a duplicate) demining casualties were recorded in 2006, no casualties were reported in either category in 2007. While Huíla was the province with the second highest number of casualties in 2006 (38), no casualties were recorded in 2007. Only 10 casualties were recorded in Moxico in 2007, whereas 45 were recorded in 2006 (by MAG and AMMIGA). Data collection on the device type deteriorated in 2007 and the device causing the incident was unknown in 82% of cases, compared to 30% in 2006. It was believed that an increasing number of casualties were due to ERW, but this cannot be corroborated by available data.^[101]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2008. As of July, CNIDAH reported figures almost as high as those recorded for 2007: 47 (10 killed and 37 injured). There were at least 15 duplicate entries (so 62 entries in total) and for four other entries insufficient detail was available to determine whether they were duplicated. Ten of the casualties reportedly happened in May.^[102] Seven casualties were female and 39 were male; the gender of one was unknown. At least 17 casualties were children (15 boys, two girls), 13 were men and one was a woman; the age of the remaining 16 is unknown (34%). Four casualties were military (including one international peacekeeper), and one was a deminer. NPA reported one clearance staff injured by an antipersonnel mine in 2008; the accident was not yet in the CNIDAH database as of May.^[103]

Unknown devices caused 29 casualties in 2008 (62%), antivehicle mines nine, antipersonnel mines and submunitions one each, and other ERW seven. The activity at the time of the incident was unknown for 19 casualties; when recorded playing/recreation (12) and travel (eight) were most common. CNIDAH identified four of the casualties and the other sources varied significantly from previous years, with INAD reporting 26 of the casualties.

Data collection

Data collection in Angola remains incomplete and inconsistent. It is believed that casualties remain under-reported and that “a substantial number” of casualties which occurred prior to 2004 remain to be included in the data collection mechanism.^[104] The level of under-reporting is unclear, but CNIDAH stated that casualties reported in the media are often not registered.^[105] The UN was reported as saying that there are some 300 to 400 mine/ERW casualties per year in Angola.^[106]

CNIDAH is responsible for storing casualty data in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In 2006, IMSMA was also installed in provincial CNIDAH offices. There are contradicting statements as to whether casualty data is entered into IMSMA. UNDP reported that “all victim data that has been reported to [the] CNIDAH database has been entered in the IMSMA system.”^[107] However during a Landmine Monitor field visit in March 2008, CNIDAH staff confirmed that not all casualty data were entered into IMSMA.^[108]

CNIDAH mainly receives casualty reports from RE and victim assistance (VA) providers; in 2007, six national RE organizations (of more than 10) and two international RE organizations (of seven) provided 31 casualty records. These organizations are said to collect information in standard forms from hospitals and incident sites and transfer it to the regional CNIDAH office.^[109] During a March 2008 Landmine Monitor field visit it was noted that sources traditionally aware of incidents, such as the police and village chiefs, do not report incidents to CNIDAH.^[110] INAD also records casualty data and appears to share it with CNIDAH, although not systematically. It was reported that the “accurate gathering of statistics” is one of the major gaps in INAD management.^[111]

Some 3,000 casualties recorded prior to 2004 had not been integrated into IMSMA as of July 2008, but these records only contained limited information.^[112] Analysis of the data provided to Landmine Monitor shows unsystematic information provision by data collectors as well as a lack of personal, device type and activity information. The fields dedicated to civilian-military status, activity and occupation of the casualties were often not filled, or were completed unsystematically and are contradictory. The database also contained duplicate entries.^[113]

The LIS data is considered to be the most reliable source of casualty information; it identified 341 recent casualties (168 killed, 159 injured and 14 unknown) in 173 communities. The percentage of survivors is lower than in most mine-affected countries, where 60–70% of casualties survive.^[114] The number of non-recent casualties is unknown. Most casualties were male (232 or 68%) which is also below the international average of about 80%. Some 75% of casualties were between 15 and 44 years old; 11% were between five and 14. Of total casualties, 15% were military.^[115]

The most common activity at the time of the incident was traveling (30%) followed by collecting wood/water (17%) and farming (11%). The latter two tasks are usually carried out by women and could explain the high percentage of female casualties. More than 50% of female casualties occurred while collecting wood/water or farming. Unofficial demining caused 4% of casualties; playing and tampering caused 2% and 1% of casualties respectively. In contrast to the LIS findings, CNIDAH information for 2006–2008 indicated that playing/recreation was the most common activity at the time of the incident. Only 10% of surveyed communities reported recent casualties.^[116]

One-third of casualties occurred in Moxico province (111), followed by Bié (58); no recent casualties were recorded in Luanda, Cabinda, Zaire, and Namibe provinces. However, CNIDAH identified one casualty in Cabinda in 2006 (the province was surveyed in 2007). One community in Lunda Norte province recorded 17 recent casualties, which are “extraordinary high numbers for one community.”^[117] Most of those killed or injured while traveling were not from the communities where the incidents occurred, which resulted in a lack of detail about these casualties.^[118]

The cumulative number of mine/ERW casualties is not known. Angola has stated several times that there are an estimated 80,000 survivors.^[119] However, in 2006 the Ministry of Social Action and Reintegration said that 70% of 89,170 registered persons with disabilities were mine/ERW survivors.^[120] This would amount to approximately 62,500 people. The media reported in 2008 that the UN estimates there are some 23,000 mine survivors.^[121] Handicap International (HI) estimated that 10% of the population is disabled.^[122] This corresponds to the worldwide average, and might be low for Angola.

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

During 2007–2008, major adjustments were made to mine/ERW RE in Angola. The classic program evolved into a more integrated risk reduction (RR) program, including clearance and community development, in which RE was seen as the purely educational component. While community liaison (CL) until 2007 was mostly limited to RE activities, it was increasingly referred to within the broader framework of RR. The RR approach in Angola is based on the LIS results.^[123] However, all operators expressed concern that the LIS data needed to be updated as certain communities had been inaccessible at the time of the LIS and because of refugee returns to impacted areas.^[124]

The total number of people reached by RE, or broader RR in 2007, is unknown. CNIDAH reported that at least 91,283 people received RE in Angola; almost all were children (88,649).^[125] This information does not correspond with the information provided by operators and RE statistics need to be considered incomplete because the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) does not keep beneficiary statistics (see below). The figures for 2007 are a substantial decrease compared to 2006 when CNIDAH reported 170,332 people receiving RE.^[126] However, CNIDAH information provided to Landmine Monitor in July 2008 only reports 121,564 beneficiaries for 2006.^[127]

Strategic framework and capacity

A sub-commission of CNIDAH coordinates and monitors RE in Angola; it is responsible for coordinating, authorizing and assuring quality control of RE activities.^[128] All RE providers are accredited by CNIDAH and work to national standards based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).^[129] There are also provincial RE working groups.^[130] Activities are based on the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011, which aimed to “refocus [RE] on impacted communities and at-risk groups as identified in the LIS and accident data.”^[131] Under the plan, communities would be primarily responsible for RE and marking, provincial resources should finance activities, and regular progress reports would be sent to CNIDAH.^[132] This approach was suggested by the ICRC.^[133]

A tasking tool was developed, according to which some 461 communities were classified as high priority for RE (mainly in Moxico province), 918 as medium priority (mainly in Bié) and 609 as low priority (mostly in Bié and Cuanza Sul).^[134] CNIDAH also developed guidelines for solution-based RE in 2006, which were distributed and adopted as RE strategy in 2007.^[135] An evaluation of the progress under the guidelines is scheduled for 2009.^[136]

While CNIDAH assesses the coordination of RE to be good despite financial and accessibility limitations,^[137] some operators do not think that RE is coordinated adequately at the national level. Coordination meetings at CNIDAH are not regular and there is little discussion or exchange of information. CNIDAH was also unable to mobilize funds.^[138] At the regional level there are more regular coordination meetings, but CNIDAH lacked the capacity to follow-up and monitor activities.^[139]

INAD is also responsible for conducting RE assessments and monitoring RE projects within the “areas under its control”^[140] in linkage with development projects. The level of coordination between CNIDAH and INAD remains unclear.

In 2007, UNICEF continued providing technical support to RE. By the end of 2008, it aimed to shift its focus away from RE due to the decreasing number of child mine/ERW casualties and increased capacity at CNIDAH. Together with the Ministry of Education it worked on mainstreaming RE into the school curriculum, as this was believed to be a more appropriate way of making RE sustainable and less emergency-focused. In preparation for its decreasing role in RE, UNICEF organized a workshop for NGOs on funding diversification.^[141] In February 2007, a UNDP review found that most national RE providers were unable to obtain funding because they were unable to formulate sound funding proposals.^[142]

While most international organizations/NGOs work together with national partners, the national RE implementers appear to lack institutional capacity to be sustainable without international support. The most frequent problems were a lack of planning and fundraising capacity, staff working on a volunteer basis, and a lack of transportation means. International NGOs started to increase capacity-building efforts in 2008.^[143] It was also noted that while more than 10 local NGOs were registered as operators with CNIDAH, many were not operational due to a lack of funding.^[144]

Coverage and response

The LIS reported that RE activities had taken place in 62% of high-impacted (25 of 40), 48% of medium-impacted, and 33% of low-impacted communities, but that some provinces were under-served.^[145] RE coverage is strongly linked to accessibility, and it was noted that some areas close to main roads and larger cities were possibly over-served with RE, for example Luena in Moxico province.^[146] Operators believed there was still a need for RE. The challenge of effective RE was to combine it with alternative livelihood opportunities and community development programs.^[147]

Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan) and its national partner, the Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities (Centro de Apoio à Promoção e Desenvolvimento de Comunidades, CAPDC), continued RE activities in Lunda Sul province. In 2007, AAR Japan and CAPDC reached 1,978 people (614 men, 352 women, 569 boys, and 443 girls). RE teams received 112 clearance requests; 93 were responded to and resulted in the clearance of 55 mines and 38 ERW. In October 2007, AAR Japan closed its office in Angola but continued to provide distance support to CAPDC. CAPDC has funding to continue its RE program until September 2008, but faced decreasing donor interest.^[148]

The Red Cross Society of Angola (Cruz Vermelha de Angola, CVA) focused on community marking in Benguela, Bié, Cuando Cubango, Cuanza Norte, Moxico, and Zaire provinces. The CVA, which is supported by the ICRC, does not count the number of RE recipients but monitors behavioral changes every two months through interviews, focus groups, and observation.^[149]

In 2007, DCA RE activities reached 28,785 people in Moxico and 1,232 in Lunda Sul (8,531 women, 7,964 men, 6,813 boys and 6,709 girls). DCA used LIS data for planning but stated that high-impact areas do not necessarily correspond to the level of current impact of contamination In 2008, less direct RE will be provided due to decreasing demand and inclusion of RE in the school curriculum for which DCA started discussions with the Moxico authorities.^[150]

HALO continued to provide RE through its “combined teams” responsible for survey, RE, marking, and EOD response. It reached 13,310 people in 2007 and through to April 2008 (4,110 men, 4,642 women and 4,558 children). HALO used the LIS results but resurveyed RE needs in certain areas.^[151]

In 2007 HI started a pilot project in 39 high-impact areas in Huambo province to help communities identify the problems caused by mines and possible solutions to overcome these problems. The new project aimed to promote community participation and empowerment. In 2008, the program was extended to Bié and Benguela provinces, but funding was scheduled to end in September 2008 and HI was seeking funding to continue until 2011. Beneficiary statistics for 2007 were not made available.^[152]

MAG’s combined teams continued to conduct RE in Moxico, but the number of teams was reduced from six to four for funding reasons. MAG worked with two national NGOs (Kalufolufo and Zango Liamwono), developing their capacity for gradual handover. In 2007, MAG reached 20,112 people in communities and schools (4,659 women, 5,378 men, 4,872 girls and 5,203 boys).^[153]

UNICEF continued to provide support to national NGOs and the Ministry of Education.^[154] NPA distributed standard RE materials during its clearance operations.^[155] INTERSOS did not report RE activities in 2007.^[156] CARE International did not respond to Landmine Monitor requests. The Santa Barbara Foundation stated that, in 2007–2008, it did not include any RE in its demining project as donor funding for this component was cut.^[157] MgM did not conduct RE.^[158]

Victim Assistance

CNIDAH stated that the situation of mine/ERW survivors in Angola needs to be considered “grave due to their number and the services available.”^[159] The LIS did not provide information on the number of survivors receiving assistance or the type of assistance received. It identified survivors who had received assistance in only 167 of 1,988 mine-impacted communities (8%); 22 of these were in high-impact communities.^[160]

Few Angolans have access to healthcare and services are hampered by a lack of resources, qualified staff, medication, and equipment. Private facilities and insurance schemes exist but are unaffordable for the poor, including mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities.^[161] However, in 2007, it was reported that surgical capacity, coordination, referral and training in dealing with traumatic injury existed and that survivors usually had access to at least physical rehabilitation (but see below) services.^[162]

The LIS showed that amputation was the most common type of injury among survivors (93 or approximately 60%).^[163] In 2006, it was estimated that 25% of people in need of physical rehabilitation services could access them, and provisions continued to decline in 2007–2008. The Ministry of Health is responsible for the disability sector through the National Program for the Rehabilitation of People with Physical and Sensorial Disability, but has failed to nationalize the program: as of July 2008, none of the physical rehabilitation centers were operational and, as of August 2008, none would be supported by international organizations, which have been decreasing their support since 2005 due to a lack of government involvement.^[164] Access is further hampered by the location of the centers and transportation costs.^[165] It was also reported that patients do not actively seek to obtain prosthetic devices as no follow-up services or comprehensive assistance was provided.^[166] Reportedly, military disabled are not allowed by the army to use civilian rehabilitation services.^[167] Nevertheless, the government maintained that “almost always survivors have access to services.”^[168]

Psychosocial support remained limited, due to the non-existence of formal counseling infrastructure and a lack of trained staff. Most support is provided within the family or by NGOs.^[169] In November 2007, Angola reported that it had consolidated the community-based rehabilitation (CBR) network in all provinces to provide psychosocial support; concrete activities were not mentioned.^[170]

Survivors rarely had access to vocational training and employment schemes because they were not aware these services existed; the government rarely provided incentives to promote economic opportunities for persons with disabilities; and services were not accessible and limited in rural areas. The government reported raising awareness among employers on the legal obligation to reserve 2% of jobs for persons with disabilities.^[171]

Angola has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but it is largely unimplemented. There is a lack of monitoring, no central disability body and poor knowledge of the laws.^[172] Of the more than 10 laws and decrees dealing with disability, none supports an integrated protection approach, and for several laws no implementation measures were created. The different laws provide protection to certain persons with disabilities depending on the cause of disability but exclude others. For example, certain laws only assist those disabled during the independence war, and a law providing subsidies for persons with disabilities excludes mine/ERW survivors.^[173] The Protection Law for Disabled Persons created in 2000 and awaiting parliamentary approval since 2004 had not been approved as of July 2008.^[174] In November 2007, Angola reported starting compiling existing legislation for review and to define disability policies.^[175] As of 31 July 2008, Angola had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but it reiterated its commitment to further adherence in June 2008.^[176]

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Angola is one of 25 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[177] Angola presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. The objectives were subsequently revised in 2006 and 2007 to make them more SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound).

The latest revision, which was to be used as the national VA plan (National Plan for Integrated Action on Victim Assistance 2007–2011) was presented at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007. The objectives as received by Landmine Monitor were not all included in the Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties.^[178] Under the latest revision, most of the deadlines have been set for 2011, which does not correspond to the 2005–2009 timeframe Angola committed to under the Nairobi Action Plan. Many of the objectives focused on capacity-building and institutional strengthening, awareness-raising, information gathering, and monitoring, rather than service provision.

In addition to revised objectives, the plan contains a status of the situation in 2007, plans to achieve the objectives, responsible actors and funding sources. Overall, the aim is to improve service provision for all components of VA for 80% of mine/ERW survivors and/or affected communities. Given that there could be up to 80,000 mine/ERW survivors, this is a challenging target. Objectives which had 2007 deadlines before revision were not achieved in 2007:^[179]

• multipurpose center for survivors: not established;
• network of landmine survivors: network not formed;
• development of social integration projects and progress monitoring at the provincial level: provincial authorities were supported to better identify the needs but no projects were reported;
• creation of 18 cooperatives: no progress reported;
• increase access to micro-credit schemes through awareness-raising: an increase reported but no further information provided; and
• approve disability law: pending as of July 2008.

A VA expert was included in the Angolan delegation at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties but not at the Standing Committee meetings in 2008. Angola reported on progress during both meetings, focusing mostly on coordination and beneficiary statistics.

Victim assistance strategic framework

CNIDAH is responsible for the planning, coordination, and monitoring of all VA activities through its Sub-Commission for Assistance and Reintegration.^[180] The sub-commission is made up of relevant ministries, UN, ICRC, and NGOs. However, not all NGOs are invited systematically.^[181]

The strategic goal for VA under the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011 was that “Landmine/ERW survivors receive medical care within the national health system for persons with disabilities and have access to assistance to reintegrate into community life.” CNIDAH established several thematic working groups in 2007 to facilitate implementation of the plan.^[182]

Both the mine action plan and the VA plan stipulate that the Ministry of Health is responsible for medical care for survivors (including physical rehabilitation) while the Ministry of Social Action and Reintegration is responsible for reintegration services. Other implementers are the ministries of education, defense and war veterans, as well as NGOs and international organizations. CNIDAH was responsible for producing an annual VA progress report to monitor assistance provided to survivors, by 2007.^[183] No reports were produced as of July 2008. Full implementation of the comprehensive VA plan appears to be scheduled to start in 2009.^[184] Several operators noted that CNIDAH lacks the capacity to effectively coordinate VA activities.^[185]

Due to the increased decentralization, the VA plan needs to filter down to provincial authorities, who are responsible for implementation and monitoring with technical support from the national level. At the community level, there will be support to the provincial authorities in identifying the needs and requirements to further improve VA.^[186]

The Ministry of Social Action and Reintegration is responsible for disability issues and its services include food aid, housing, wheelchairs, and socio-economic reintegration. The Ministry of Labor’s National Institute for Education and Professional Training and the National Institute for Support of Disabled People work with NGOs on vocational training and micro-credit programs.^[187]

One of the main programs coordinating assistance to survivors and persons with disabilities is the Ministry of Health’s National Program for the Rehabilitation of People with Physical and Sensorial Disability (PNR), which aimed to completely nationalize and strengthen physical rehabilitation services. As of 2008, the rehabilitation centers under the PNR did not function adequately and their situation was exacerbated by decentralized government funding mechanisms, under which provincial health authorities decide how to allocate funding received from the national level. Assistance to survivors is considered to be a low priority for the provincial authorities and survivors do not have the political support and capacity to lobby for their rights.^[188]

Many organizations provide some services to mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities; only those providing updated information to Landmine Monitor have been included.

Activities

In November 2007, CNIDAH reported that some 7,000 persons with disabilities had received physical rehabilitation, some 5,000 survivors had received technical assistance, 14,171 persons with disabilities had received educational support, and more than 10,000 survivors received socio-economic support.^[189] It is unknown if these services were provided in 2007, or by whom, but the statistics probably include those reported by the operators listed below. CNIDAH was unable to respond to Landmine Monitor information requests, and noted “not applicable” in its questionnaire response on service provision.^[190]

The rehabilitation centers under the PNR provided 1,434 prostheses, 344 orthoses, and 877 repairs between January and September 2007. In December 2007, 11 technicians graduated from the University Don Bosco Prosthetic School in El Salvador. Due to the situation of the PNR, it is unknown how many technicians enrolled in training programs and distance courses were able to continue their training in 2008.^[191]

Although the initial timeframe was 2001–2005; the PNR program has been amended and extended into 2007. An evaluation by the EC in July–August 2007 proposed another extension of the program but without additional funds being mobilized. The Ministry of Health failed to submit an extension request by the specified deadline.^[192] Since its inception the PNR has been supported by international technical advisors and rehabilitation operators in Angola, but due to a lack of capacity and political will from the Ministry of Health, the PNR still had not been nationalized completely as of May 2008. The main problems remained the preparation of annual budgets, management, accessibility, staff training and retention, and quality of services.^[193]

The Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities provided capacity-building for NGOs working with persons with disabilities and disabled people’s organizations in 2007, particularly in the area of psychosocial support; this included the Sports for Life program through which 65 disabled athletes participated in sports events in 2007 (including 46 survivors).^[194]

The Angolan Association of Disabled Persons (Associação dos Deficientes de Angola) identified new survivors and provided multiple services to 240 survivors in nine provinces. Of these, services were provided to 72 survivors injured in 2007. About 1,000 other persons with disabilities were also assisted.^[195]

In July 2008, the ICRC announced that it ended its support to the physical rehabilitation sector in Angola.^[196] Since 1979, the ICRC had facilitated the production of nearly 32,000 prostheses, 724 orthoses, 900 wheelchairs, and 38,500 crutches with a budget of CHF42 million ($35 million) per year.^[197] Throughout 2007, the ICRC donated materials and components, and covered transport costs for patients to three rehabilitation centers in Huambo, Kuito, and Luanda. The ICRC noted that “without more financial support from the Angolan authorities, the centers will not be able to function properly.”^[198] In 2007, ICRC-assisted centers produced 708 prostheses (492 for survivors) and 158 orthoses (one for a survivor).^[199]

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), present in Angola since 1995, will end its support to two rehabilitation centers in August 2008 and hand them over to the government. It will also end support to the CBR project it operated with the local NGO League for the Reintegration of Disabled Persons (Liga de Apoio à Integração dos Deficientes, LARDEF). In 2007, GTZ and LARDEF assisted 2,150 persons with disabilities including 1,076 survivors. Patients received psychosocial support, 1,800 received rehabilitation services (726 survivors), 195 benefited from income-generating opportunities and vocational training (158 survivors), and 71 received educational support (12 survivors). GTZ ended its technical support to the PNR in 2007.^[200]

Disability and Development Partners (DDP) operated income-generating and capacity-building projects for persons with disabilities in cooperation with LARDEF. In 2007, 525 persons with disabilities, mostly survivors, received skills training, micro-credits and follow-up support. Twenty-four survivors were trained in RE to provide awareness in highly impacted communities where no RE has taken place in Moxico and Huambo provinces. In one project, 467 persons with disabilities (198 men, 177 women and 92 children) and 78 parents of disabled children received disability training and formed a campaign to advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities; about 50% of campaigners focused on the rights of disabled women.^[201]

HI continued its CBR project in areas where it conducts RE and referred people to the rehabilitation centers in its areas of operations, but did not support any of the centers. In 2008, it started providing capacity-building support to disabled person’s organizations.^[202]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Angola. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011 includes among its five primary goals the establishment of a national mine action capacity “sustainable by national resources” after the end of major international assistance.^[203] The plan projects an overall decline in international mine action funding from 2006 to 2011 and provides a general case supporting sustained international funding for mine action in Angola during this period.^[204]

Within its overall responsibility for mine action planning, policy-making and coordination, CNIDAH distributes and manages some funds allocated by national and international donors; advises the Angolan government on national funding issues; and liaises with government and donors on the impact on mine action of national development projects, and inclusion of mine action costs in relevant project budgets.^[205] CNIDAH coordinates with the Council of Ministers on national development priorities, and acts as a strategic partner of the Ministry of Finance in coordinating the national budget for mine action.^[206]

Within the annual mine action planning process, budgets are set each year from June to July, including the CNIDAH budget, the CED budget, and ministerial budget lines for their respective mine action responsibilities. From October to November, the planning process calls for completion of annual mine action plans for mine-affected provinces, including assessment of funds available for projects. Projects lacking funds are included in provincial and national mine action portfolios. ^[207]

National support for mine action

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated that the national government had allocated “both human and financial resources” to fulfill its Article 5 obligations, but did not specify national funding amounts for 2007.^[208] The national strategic plan commits the Angolan government to providing substantial funds “from 2006 onwards” to resource, equip and train manual and mechanical demining brigades.^[209] Angola allocated $2.5 million to support the mine clearance program in 2006.^[210]

CED receives partial funding through the GRN, the government body established in 2005 to approve projects that fall under the Chinese financial and technical assistance program.^[211]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, 11 countries reported providing $19,794,794 (€14,437,163) to mine action in Angola. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was 59% less than reported in 2006. Funds reported for 2006 included multiyear commitments by the EC totaling €12,373,663 ($15,545,033). The EC did not commit funds in 2007. (However, the EC and CNIDAH signed a funding agreement in July 2007 by which the EC will provide support, including technical and administrative assistance, to fulfillment of Angola’s national strategic plan.)^[212] Among donor states decreasing funding by more than 20% or discontinuing lines of funding to Angola, Australia cited changes in Africa program priorities; Norway cited the completion of the Angola impact survey project and stated that as a result of increased development in Angola, support was no longer in line with Norwegian development priorities; and Sweden reported phasing out development assistance to Angola in general. Switzerland, which increased funds to Angola by more than 20%, cited additional funding required by a new phase in HALO mine clearance programs.^[213]

As of mid-2007 UNDP reported sufficient funding for mine action programs in general, but cited a “failure to equitably distribute funds” and a lack of funding for some VA projects, creating difficulty in implementing mine action programs in 2007.^[214]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Angola: Monetary^[215]