Key developments since May 2005: On 26 May 2006, the government of
Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) agreed to a bilateral cease-fire
and a Code of Conduct that includes non-use of landmines. Prior to the
cease-fire, both sides continued to use landmines and/or improvised explosive
devices. The UK suspended training for the army’s explosive ordnance
disposal unit in February 2005, but resumed in August 2005 and delivered new
equipment. Casualties from all kinds of explosive devices appeared to be lower
in 2005 than 2004; efforts were made by NGOs to create a nationwide casualty
data collection system. The majority of casualties were children.
Mine/explosives risk education gathered pace, involving many local and
international organizations.
Background
Armed conflict in Nepal intensified after King Gyanendra dismissed the
government and assumed total executive authority on 1 February 2005, declaring a
nationwide state of emergency and suspending fundamental human rights. The
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)―CPN/M―which had been fighting a
civil war with government forces for a decade, entered into an alliance with a
coalition of legal political parties under the banner of the Seven Party
Alliance, calling for the restoration of democracy. They announced a unilateral
cease-fire for the last three months of 2005, but the ceasefire was not
reciprocated by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and lapsed in early 2006.
Sustained “people power” demonstrations were launched in early 2006
by the Seven Party Alliance throughout the capital and other cities, despite
martial law and subsequent shoot-to-kill curfew orders. Ultimately, the
demonstrations were successful and on 21 April, King Gyanendra stepped back from
absolute exercise of power and asked for the Seven Party Alliance to name a new
prime minister. After further demonstrations, parliament was reinstated on 28
April. Parliament subsequently stripped the monarch of his authority over the
army, and abolished his title as a descendant of a Hindu God.
The CPN/M and the government of Nepal entered into a bilateral cease-fire on
26 May 2006, and agreed to a 25-point Code of Conduct. Point 3 of the Code
states that there will be no laying of landmines.
Mine Ban Policy
Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. As of June 2006, the new
government had not articulated its policy on the Mine Ban Treaty. However, the
bilateral cease-fire of May 2006 and accompanying Code of Conduct commits both
sides to non-use of landmines.
In recent years, the government provided mixed signals about its support for
a mine ban, its reasons for not acceding, and its intention to join the treaty
at some point.[1] Prior to the recent
political changes and the cease-fire, Kashi Nath Sharma, Joint Secretary of the
Ministry of Defense, told Landmine Monitor on 27 March 2006, “We are
committed that landmines should be banned – from both
sides.”[2] However, in the same
meeting, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense cited a number of reasons
why Nepal could not accede to the Mine Ban Treaty immediately: the ongoing
insurgency, political instability, the lack of a parliament, the need to ratify
around 30 international legal instruments related to security matters and
terrorism, and inability to meet the high costs of clearance operations and
victim assistance.[3] Some of those
impediments have been removed by subsequent events.
Nepal voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80, calling for
universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, on 8 December
2005. It had voted for similar annual resolutions every year since 1997, except
for 2004 when it was absent. Nepal did not attend the treaty’s
intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2005 and May 2006, nor the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005.
Nepal is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its
Amended Protocol II on landmines.
Advocacy efforts by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) have focused
on revealing the problems faced by local people due to the use of antipersonnel
landmines and other victim-activated explosive devices, and promoting accession
to the Mine Ban Treaty. The NCBL carried out educational activities on the mine
ban with both government officials and imprisoned Maoists. From January 2006,
it organized a public education campaign, called Interaction Programs, during
which government officials, representatives of political parties, teachers,
students, women’s organizations, doctors, war victims, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international NGOs developed proposals for
coping with landmines, improvised explosive devices and the consequences of
conflict.[4]
Following the political changes, on 4 May 2006 the NCBL organized an
Interaction Program on human rights and landmines, during which it promoted the
inclusion of a mine ban in the Code of Conduct. On 13 June 2006, the NCBL
organized a national seminar for parliamentarians on the Mine Ban Treaty. On 25
June 2006, it co-hosted with the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call a national seminar
on the role of the CPN/M in a mine ban.
UNICEF and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
organized a one-day Workshop on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War under
International Law on 19 December 2005, attended by more than 20 organizations
including the RNA.[5]
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Nepal has confirmed that it produces antipersonnel
mines.[6] A former government
official told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that landmines are produced at the
weapons factory at Sunchari in Makwanpur district south of
Kathmandu.[7] The government has not
provided any information on the types of mines produced.
Nepal is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. According to the
army, Nepal imported mines from India, China and the former Soviet Union, mostly
in the 1980s. It imported blast, fragmentation and command-detonated mines,
including M14, POMZ-2 and Claymore-type antipersonnel
mines.[8] The media has also reported
that security forces use PMD-6 and Type 69 antipersonnel
mines.[9] In March 2006, Ministry
of Defense officials stated that Nepal would not disclose the size of stockpiles
while still engaged in conflict.[10]
Maoist rebels have produced significant quantities of homemade mines and
other improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Security forces have seized some
rebel facilities for manufacturing weapons, reportedly including
mines.[11] The RNA website lists
reports on confiscations and recoveries of IEDs from
rebels.[12]
The rebels have reportedly obtained explosives and components to make mines
and IEDs from commercial construction sites, from operations against the RNA,
and from outside sources. In March 2006, the government reportedly said that
the Maoists had recently been obtaining explosives through areas along
Nepal’s border with India, noting seizures of clandestine shipments of
explosives.[13] At 8 March 2006
press conference, Home Minister Kamal Thapa requested that the Indian government
keep tighter control on explosives to prevent such clandestine
shipments.[14]
Use
In Nepal, the term “landmine” is usually used interchangeably
with “improvised explosive device” by the government, the CPN/M, the
media and others. Government forces (the Royal Nepalese Army and other security
services) have used both factory-made antipersonnel mines and IEDs.
In March 2006, an army representative acknowledged to Landmine Monitor that
the RNA lays improvised explosive devices assembled in Nepal, as well as
antipersonnel mines, primarily around permanent
installations.[15] Military
officials have stated that the RNA only uses mines for defensive purposes, and
that it deploys mines systematically, with careful marking, and only military
engineers are permitted to deploy
landmines.[16] In March 2006, a
representative of the Armed Police Force told Landmine Monitor that they only
use command-detonated IEDs assembled in Nepal, referring to them as Ordnance
Explosive Devices, or OEDs.[17]
The UN has noted that security forces have been “reported to be laying
mines as defensive perimeters around military installations and infrastructure
such as bridges, dams and pylons, as well as around potential vantage points
above military
installations.”[18]
A former parliamentarian told Landmine Monitor in February 2006 that security
forces were using school buildings as barracks, and had laid perimeter defenses
with mines or other explosive devices, usually in combination with fencing. He
cited the secondary school at Khalanga, in Rukum district, and the primary
school at Khadga Devi, in Salyan
district.[19] In September 2005, an
explosive device placed three meters from a school wall by the RNA was ignited
during a lightning storm, damaging the roof of the building and sending
fragments into a classroom during school hours. Some students received minor
injuries and many were reported as being
shell-shocked.[20]
Security forces have expropriated private dwellings as security posts and
laid mines or other explosive devices. Describing such an experience, a person
in Rukum district stated, “As soon as the night falls, the security
personnel climb the top of my house with guns. My house has been converted into
a security post and mines are planted very close to my house to fence off the
area. If the mine goes off my entire family and the house will be destroyed
completely.”[21]
In 2004, the Nepal government began encouraging and arming localized civilian
militias, known as Maoist Defense Groups or Village Defense Forces. In May
2005, a Village Defense Force in Paklihawa, Nawalparasi district, claimed it had
placed mines in the village tract under its area of operation against Maoist
incursion, although later visits by observers were unable to confirm this.
Landmine Monitor first reported indications of antipersonnel mine use by
government security forces in 1999, but neither the government nor army
officials openly acknowledged such use until 2002. In April 2004, a military
spokesperson stated that the RNA had deployed 9,500 mines in the
conflict.[22]
Use by Non-State Armed Groups
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) rebels acknowledge using
“landmines” (improvised explosive devices). In March 2006, a CPN/M
leader told Landmine Monitor, “We are using mines out of compulsion. We
use them for defensive
purposes.”[23] According to
the RNA, the CPN/M has not used factory-made antipersonnel
landmines.[24] They have used
Claymore-type mines, as shown by the RNA in public displays; it is likely that
these devices were captured from RNA
stocks.[25]
The CPN/M has primarily used command-detonated explosive devices. The UN
reported, “Very few devices used by the CPN/M appear to be victim
activated with the exception of explosive devices attached to banners or
effigies.... Socket bombs tend to be the key unexploded ordnance (UXO) post
engagement causing risk to civilian populations, in particular to children.
Socket bombs are improvised hand grenades made out of galvanised pipe sockets.
CPN/M also makes use of larger IEDs such as pipe bombs, pressure-cooker bombs
and bucket bombs to destroy buildings, pylons, telecom towers and other
structures, as well as in road-side ambushes of military and civilian vehicles,
including buses and ambulances. Other CPM/N IEDs include
‘Claymore’-type devices and devices such as packet bombs, which are
carried in plastic bags and which can be thrown over walls and detonate on
impact. Most of these devices appear to be detonated on command through use of
timers, radio signals or other
devices.”[26]
According to a survey of media reports by UNICEF, of 437 reports mentioning
explosions in 2005, 80 mentioned victim-activated explosions. A total of 82
percent of the casualties were victims of suspected or confirmed Maoist
explosive devices. The majority of victims were children (76 children; 61
percent), and of those, 70 percent were killed or injured while tampering or
playing with explosive devices. The survey identified new incidents of
victim-activated explosive devices in 27 out of 75
districts.[27]
In March 2006, a police official alleged that the CPN/M has used explosive
devices at the perimeter of mass meetings in villages, in order to ward off
security forces. He said that these devices were not cleared or defused once
the meetings are over, and that civilians have fallen victim to such
mines.[28]
The CPN/M, like the RNA, has been known to use or store explosive devices at
or near schools in Nepal. During 2005, 25 out of 251 explosive incidents
recorded by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines took place at or near
schools.[29]
There have been reports that child combatants forcibly recruited by the CPN/M
have been made to place explosives, and have been killed and injured while doing
so.[30]
The use of command-detonated devices has caused numerous civilian casualties
and extensive damage to property in Nepal. According to one report, from the
beginning of the conflict in February 1996 through 2005, a total of 326 buses,
trucks, tractors and other vehicles were damaged in explosions, and 170 people,
including 68 security personnel, 80 civilians and 22 transport workers, were
killed in those explosions.[31] Vehicles destroyed in such explosions included Red Cross vehicles and
ambulances.[32]
Mine and ERW Problem
From 1996, Nepal experienced a steadily escalating civil war between Maoist
insurgents and the royalist government which spread landmines, explosive
remnants of war and improvised explosive devices as the area of conflict
widened. From its origins in three rural districts of western Nepal, the
insurgency had spread by 2001 to 68 of Nepal’s 75
districts.[33] The intensity of the
conflict increased significantly after 2001, when the RNA took over the control
of the anti-insurgency effort from police. Nepal’s media reported
explosive incidents in 38 of its 71 districts in 2005 and the first three months
of 2006.[34] As a result, despite
its relatively small population (approximately 28 million people), Nepal ranks
globally among the 10 countries most-affected by civilian casualties from
unintentional explosions.[35]
In 2005, UNICEF recorded 197 new casualties in 29 districts, of which 142 (72
percent) were civilians. Children were 56 percent of the civilian casualties.
Nine of the districts had more than five reported
casualties.[36] Humanitarian
agencies fear that the cessation of fighting, opening the way to large-scale
movements of displaced people, could bring an upsurge in casualties as people
unfamiliar with the hazards come into contact with mines and other explosive
ordnance.[37]
Throughout Nepal, civilians face a hazard from landmines widely employed by
security forces as defensive barriers around their barracks or positions, which
may be located close to roads, government buildings and such major
infrastructure as hydroelectric stations and telecommunications towers. Some
airports are known to have landmines and IEDs nearby, including areas around the
runways.[38] The RNA states that it
uses only command-detonated mines and that mined areas are
mapped.[39] However, recent
incidents reveal that this is not always the case; in April 2006, soldiers
digging inside the perimeter of an army barracks in Tamghas, the capital of
Gulmi district, detonated a mine, killing seven soldiers and injuring 10
others.[40]
The exposure of schools to fighting and to mine and UXO contamination became
a source of particular concern to the civilian population and international
humanitarian agencies.[41] Researchers said there was evidence that Maoists also used schools at
night to produce explosive
devices.[42]
Security forces have also used IEDs, which may have been victim-activated or
command-detonated; UNICEF reported that the security forces use of such devices
was “not under control.” Moreover, increasing use of mines and IEDs
by mobile military units to protect temporary positions raised the risk that
these devices were not properly recorded or removed when the unit moved
on.[43] Many so-called “tora
bora” bombs (81mm mortar shells) dropped by the army from helicopters have
failed to detonate on impact, adding UXO contamination in some
areas.[44] There are also concerns
that mines placed around installations or positions on high ground may move as a
result of mudslides.[45]
The main cause of unintentional explosions and the biggest threat to
civilians are CPN/M socket bombs.[46] Areas where clashes have occurred between security forces and insurgents
are often contaminated by such devices, with reports of civilian casualties
occurring even in locations where security forces had undertaken some degree of
post-engagement battle area
clearance.[47] Civilians have also
suffered casualties trying to remove roadblocks set up by insurgents which
commonly include explosive devices with one or more means of detonation,
including tilt switches.[48]
Mine Action Program
Nepal does not have a formal program for dealing with mines and ERW. The
RNA’s 14th Brigade, based in Kathmandu, has an explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) unit using equipment and training provided by the UK. The Armed Police
Force also has one EOD team in
Kathmandu.[49] Media reported
operations by security forces to clear mines and other explosives in 21
districts during 2005.[50] Official
results of such operations were not available. The RNA’s EOD capacity
comprises a holding unit in the capital and six bomb disposal teams, usually of
six people each, deployed at each of the six regional divisional headquarters.
The EOD unit is supported with training by the British Army and UK-supplied
Wheelbarrow and Cyclops remote-controlled bomb disposal
vehicles.[51] The UK suspended
training after King Gyanendra assumed total executive authority on 1 February
2005, but it approved a resumption of training in August 2005 and made new
deliveries of EOD equipment to the RNA between September 2005 and March
2006.[52]
The army’s EOD squad has the capacity to deal with the full range of
explosive devices used by insurgents, but can be severely stretched by
post-engagement clearance requirements. It does not have sufficient resources
to undertake either survey or clearance operations addressing the needs of rural
communities. The RNA’s strategic priorities were to keep Nepal’s
roads and telecommunications infrastructure functioning, leaving little or no
spare capacity to address wider social needs for clearance while the conflict
continued.[53]
The suspension of hostilities between the government and CPN/M in April 2006,
followed by peace talks in May and initiatives to create an interim government
with Maoist participation in June, created openings for developing a program to
address the hazards posed by mine and ERW contamination. Representatives of
both the RNA and the Maoist People’s Army attended a GICHD workshop on
mine risk education organized by UNICEF in Kathmandu in June
2006.[54]
Other Risk Reduction Measures
The RNA has stated that mines emplaced around its barracks and other
installations are mapped, fenced and marked. However, recent research and
reports of mine incidents indicate that security forces do not apply common
rules or standards to marking and fencing. In some locations, security forces
have erected double or triple fencing around mined areas, or allowed a margin of
safety between emplaced mines and areas open to the public, and installed
warning signs. In other locations, researchers report only one fence or partial
fencing and an absence of warning signs. A senior police officer has stated it
was not necessary to inform or warn the
public.[55]
Effective marking of hazardous areas is also hampered by the absence of a
nationally-recognized sign or symbol for danger. At the GICHD workshop in June
2006, participants agreed on the design of a warning sign. Also in June, UNICEF
wrote to the Ministry of Defense and to police headquarters urging authorities,
among other recommendations, to clear public places and schools of mines and ERW
and to mark all mined areas.[56]
Mine Risk Education
There is no government body coordinating mine risk education (MRE) in Nepal.
UNICEF and partners continued convening the MRE working group established in
2004. It has a broad and growing membership of international and national
organizations, including members of the Save the Children Alliance, CARE,
Handicap International, World Education, World Vision, and 10 national
organizations, including the NCBL, Child Workers in Nepal, Porters’
Progress, Nepal Red Cross Society and Sahara. New national members in 2005-2006
were Equal Access Nepal, Federation of Nepalese Journalists, Informal Sector
Service Center, National Coalition for Children as Zones of Peace, and United
Mission to Nepal. The UN International Labour Organization (ILO) and Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have participated at
times.[57]
The working group aims to develop an integrated social mobilization campaign
disseminating MRE messages which accord with International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS); it has taken the view that MRE should not be a stand-alone activity.
Insufficient cooperation, absence of a civilian mine clearance organization and
low literacy levels have been identified as major challenges to an effective MRE
campaign. In the first quarter of 2006, the working group established a
subgroup on terminology and definition, to ensure uniformity and clarity in the
terms used in English and in Nepali.[58]
In June 2006, the GICHD facilitated a follow-up workshop for the working
group, having provided an introductory course in June 2004 and an advocacy
workshop in December 2005.[59]
In December 2005, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ran a four-day training
of trainers course as part of its Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War Safety
Project, with 30 participants from the UN, ICRC, donors, NGOs and the Nepal
government officials, and field
workers.[60] A Nepal-specific
safety training package was developed and translated into
Nepali.[61]
The development of a “mine risk education emergency kit” is seen
as a priority of the working group. UNICEF developed MRE tools in 2005-2006,
including a prototype emergency kit funded by the UK Department for
International Development (DfID); fieldtesting was carried out by partners in
April and May 2006. MRE materials and training packages were developed in
2004-2005 by Sahara, with the support of Save the Children Norway and the NCBL.
World Education worked with the support of UNICEF to incorporate MRE into a
Schools as Zones of Peace package that was fieldtested for inclusion into the
national curriculum in the second quarter of 2006. With Canadian funding,
UNICEF inserted an MRE component into its “Meena comic book” on
accident prevention, also for use in the emergency kit. Some 58,000 copies of
the Meena booklet were printed, of which 21,000 were used by ICRC in its MRE
outreach work.[62]
A UNICEF-supported interactive radio program for young people, Chatting
With My Best Friend, developed radio spots and dramas, based on focus-group
discussions, for possible use in the emergency kit and
elsewhere.[63] This one-hour show
is broadcast by 18 radio stations every Saturday afternoon, reaching a young
audience throughout the country. The program has 900 listeners’ clubs and
receives almost 500 letters every
month.[64]
In 2006, three-day training courses began in Dang, Pokhara, Nepalgunj and
Chitwan, also funded by Canada, for members of the Federation of Nepalese
Journalists on reporting of issues affecting children, particularly armed
conflict. The courses include a major MRE
component.[65]
In June 2006, UNICEF, with DfID funding, began a baseline study of the level
of knowledge of explosive devices through its partner organization Equal Access;
it was planned to survey 5,400 people in 60
districts.[66]
During 2005, the Nepal Red Cross Society disseminated basic MRE in 10 of the
most affected areas, and in another 10 areas in the first half of
2006.[67] It conducted 130 MRE
sessions for 6,737 high school students and communities in 10 districts in
2005.[68] Emergency MRE was
conducted in Palpa, Tansen district, following a large attack by the CPN/M on 31
January 2006.[69] The ICRC
continued developing the capacity within the Nepal Red Cross Society to
implement MRE.
The NCBL continued to conduct advocacy and basic MRE activities. In May
2005, with support from the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid, NCBL
produced radio and television MRE spots to be broadcast nationwide for six
months.[70] A district-level MRE
emergency program was developed for schools in 25 districts, selected according
to the number of explosive accidents and accessibility; one NCBL delegate from
each district received a two-day training of trainers in Kathmandu from the
NCBL. During August-September MRE programs targeted two main groups,
institutions and students/teachers; 522 individuals participated including local
community leaders, officials from district and village development committees,
and national and international organizations; 151,482 students in 413 schools
were reached.[71] The activities
received nationwide coverage on radio, television and print
media.[72]
In 2005-2006, the NCBL also produced new MRE materials; 30,000 leaflets,
3,000 appeals, 4,000 posters, 5,000 stickers and 80,000 picture brochures
depicting stories of survivors were distributed. A new booklet was produced in
a comic-book style describing a mine incident and teaching basic safety
measures.[73]
Save the Children USA “has been infusing ‘UXO Risk
Education’ to its stakeholders in 13 districts of the Western, Mid-Western
and Far-Western Regions through 121 Child Protection Committees...”
according to the NCBL. Porters’ Progress, a national NGO supported by
ILO, conducted MRE in porters’ villages and distributed posters about
explosive devices in remote districts of Khotang and
Solukhumbu.[74]
On 1 June 2006, the Informal Sector Service Center began a surveillance
system for civilian casualties of explosive incidents in all 75 districts of
Nepal. This included training courses for the Center’s staff in mine
action and data collection, including basic
MRE.[75]
The 14th Brigade of the Royal Nepalese Army, which has responsibility for
training in mine-laying and EOD, also disseminates MRE-materials produced by the
NCBL and provides warnings over the army radio and the national
television.[76]
Funding and Assistance
Two countries reported contributing funding for mine action in Nepal in 2005.
Canada contributed C$76,552 (US$63,188) consisting of C$18,997 ($15,681) to the
NCBL for advocacy and C$57,555 ($47,507) to UNICEF for
MRE.[77] New Zealand contributed
NZ$35,000 ($24,672) to Geneva Call for advocacy in Nepal in
2005.[78]
Mines Action Canada provided C$8,255 ($6,814) to the NCBL in 2005 for a
resource center.[79]
Landmine/UXO/IED Casualties
There is no official mechanism in Nepal for collecting casualty data, and no
official information is publicly available on mine/ERW/IED casualties. However,
various sources provide an indication of the extent of the problem.
In 2005, UNICEF recorded 197 new casualties of victim-activated explosions
(142 civilians and 55 combatants). Among civilian casualties, 40 were killed
(21 children) and 102 were injured (59 children); children represented 56
percent of civilian casualties. Among combatants, 37 were killed and 18
injured. During the cease-fire and after December 2005, the monthly casualty
rate dropped from 13.4 per month to 4.5 per month. Tampering or playing with
explosive items accounted for 58 civilian casualties, and of those 53 (91
percent) were children. The most affected districts were Dang (13 civilian
casualties) and Dhanusa (12 civilian
casualties).[80]
In 2005, the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines reported 771 casualties of
explosions: 536 were civilians (including 99 children and 68 women). Activities
at the time of the incident were walking, farming, cattle grazing, playing and
fetching water.[81]
On 9 April 2005, two Russian tourists were injured when their vehicle hit a
landmine on the Chehere Road, about 75 kilometers from
Kathmandu.[82]
Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. In less than a month since
starting its data collection project on 1 June, the Informal Sector Service
Center recorded 10 new civilian casualties of victim-activated explosions; two
were killed (both boys) and eight injured (five children); and one soldier was
also killed.[83] The Center
also looked at “unintentional explosions resulting in civilian
casualties” for the first five months of 2006, cross-checking media
reports on its website with UNICEF media reports. Preliminary results showed
that there were 84 casualties (20 killed and 64 injured) in 48 incidents in 34
districts of Nepal; 90 percent of casualties were caused by IEDs, four percent
by antipersonnel mines, two percent by UXO and four percent were unknown.
Command-detonated IEDs appear to constitute the lesser part of IED explosions.
Boys were 37 percent of casualties, men 29 percent, women 17 percent, girls 15
percent, and two percent were
unknown.[84]
During a private visit to Nepal, two members of the Indian Border Security
Force were injured by an explosive device when they tried to remove an obstacle
on a road.[85]
One of the primary issues regarding accurate collection of casualty data in
Nepal is consistent identification of types of explosive device and mode of
activation. Most information on incidents comes from media, which uses
terminology inaccurately.[86]
The total number of landmine casualties in Nepal is not known; however,
progress was made in 2005-2006 on identifying the number of casualties from
victim-activated devices. In September 2005, Handicap International conducted a
feasibility study for surveillance of casualties and explosive incidents. In
2006, UNICEF built upon this, working with major Nepali news organizations to
gather all media reports on incidents involving explosions since 1 January
2002.[87] UNICEF examined 437 media
reports mentioning explosions in 2005; victim-activated explosions were
mentioned in 80 reports. The study covered all districts of Nepal; however, an
estimated 17 percent of casualties were not reported at all by the media for
various reasons. UNICEF found that in most reports sufficient information for
minimum analysis and verification of incidents existed. In most cases,
journalists did not provide correct information about device types owing to lack
of technical knowledge; other aspects of the incidents, which were not reported
in sufficient detail to allow analysis, included age of casualties, injury and
medical care received, and occupation at the time of
incident.[88] The issue of
technical knowledge was addressed through the explosives awareness component of
workshops conducted by a UNICEF consultant with the Federation of Nepalese
Journalists; the terminology issue was addressed through the subgroup set up by
the working group. On 4 May 2006, UNICEF funded a workshop for journalists from
16 of the districts most affected by explosive incidents; they generally had
accurate information on casualties, and noted incidents reported locally, but
not by media in Kathmandu. The journalists also commented on the Nepali
version of the draft UN Landmine Safety Project module, and discussed its
implementation.[89]
The local NGO Informal Sector Service Center, working closely with 50 other
organizations, initiated a surveillance system of civilian casualties of
IED/UXO/mine explosions in all 75 districts in Nepal on 1 June 2006. The
project aimed to improve MRE and survivor assistance through accurate reporting,
and to advise survivors and their families about services available. A
consultant ran a series of training of trainers courses for staff including
basic MRE.[90]
Survivor Assistance
The Nepalese government reportedly provides emergency evacuation after an
incident, free medical and prosthetic treatment, and financial, administrative,
and logistical support to hospitals. However, the assistance available is
inadequate to meet needs, and some hospitals are severely understaffed. For
example, the Seti Zonal Hospital has a quota of 17 doctors, but there were only
six in 2005. Casualties often have to go either to Kathmandu or India for
treatment.[91]
While the government asserts that it provides free medical services in its
hospitals for civilian patients, INSEC district representatives found that
patients were obliged to purchase medicines. The hospitals claimed their
medical stocks were depleted, and it is a government responsibility to provide
medicines to hospitals. Private hospitals are not free of charge. People
usually need to borrow money for immediate treatment. While local organizations
provide help, their resources are insufficient to meet needs. Generally,
prospects of timely treatment for new casualties are
low.[92] Other obstacles include a
lack of available beds in government hospitals, poor public transportation and
safety due to increased internal conflict in 2005-2006, and the difficulty in
obtaining the documents necessary for free treatment. The Nepal Red Cross
Society provides free ambulance service in many districts, mainly in the south
of the country where roads are more developed; other ambulance services may be
available elsewhere.[93] In 2005,
ICRC reimbursed the cost of transport or surgery for 235 people injured in the
conflict, including transportation for one caretaker, and provided medicines and
other supplies to medical facilities in Kathmandu and
Negalpani.[94]
Eight hospitals provide assistance to mine/UXO/IED
casualties.[95] In 2005, ICRC
donated medical supplies to seven hospitals providing trauma care, and supported
the Nepal Red Cross Society to train 500 volunteers from 41 districts in
emergency first-aid; the network provided initial care to over 2,000 cases.
Paramedics were also sponsored to participate in two related professional
conferences.[96]
Physical rehabilitation services are provided to people with disabilities,
including survivors, through a network of 12 centers. Most are located in the
main cities; many patients cannot gain access to available services, since the
majority of them cannot afford the costs of transport or
treatment.[97] Reportedly, there is
a lack of physiotherapy and orthopedic devices are of poor quality; there are
also few opportunities for social and economic
reintegration.[98]
The ICRC supports physical rehabilitation at the Green Pasture Hospital and
Rehabilitation Center in Pokhara in cooperation with the Nepal Red Cross
Society, by providing materials, components and equipment, and training for
prosthetic technicians. In 2005, the center provided rehabilitation services to
953 people, of whom 258 were amputees; 123 new patients were fitted with
prostheses and 13 with orthoses. One technician was sponsored to attend a
refresher course in lower-limb prosthetics at the ICRC training unit in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia. A one-month assessment mission was conducted to determine how
overall patient management (devices and physiotherapy) could be
improved.[99]
The Nepal Red Cross Society continued to receive ICRC assistance with patient
identification and registration, and as part of its outreach program in 2005
registered amputees in 41 districts; people injured in the conflict accounted
for 17 percent of those who were
registered.[100]
The Disabled Relief Fund provides prosthetic/orthotic devices and assistive
aids through the Nepal Orthopedic Appliance Center in Bhrikutimandap
(Kathmandu). The center, which was upgraded with the support of Handicap
International, assists about 278 people a year. In 2005, the center distributed
48 prostheses, 56 wheelchairs, 15 tricycles, 124 crutches and 86 other assistive
aids.[101]
Handicap International supports 20 local NGOs in 12 districts on
disability-related issues, such as rehabilitation, awareness-raising and
advocacy, through a community-based approach to disability in development, and
the provision of specialized services. In 2005, it launched a project to
provide access to physical rehabilitation services for people with disabilities
affected by the conflict. The project activities are implemented at four
rehabilitation centers, the Nepal Orthopedic Appliance Center managed by the
Disabled Relief Fund (DRF), the PRERANA center in Sarlahi, central Nepal,
Biratnagar Community-Based Rehabilitation Center in Morang, eastern Nepal, and
Nepalgunj Medical College in Banke, Mid Western Development Region.
Additionally, a satellite unit was established in Surkhet District Hospital, in
the Mid Western Development Region, to offer decentralized services. All the
centers and the satellite unit have a physiotherapy department and a fully
equipped orthopedic appliance workshop, as well as qualified physiotherapists
and orthopedic staff.[102]
The Indian NGO Bhagwan Mahaveer Viklang Sahayata Samiti produces the Jaipur
Foot prosthesis and other prosthetic devices in
Kathmandu.[103] There are many
community-based organizations working for the rehabilitation of people with
disabilities in Nepal, such as the Nepal Disabled Association; a national
network facilitates coordination among the various organizations providing
community-based
rehabilitation.[104]
The NCBL supported the schooling costs of 57 young girls affected by the
conflict in 2005-2006; some are mine/IED/UXO survivors, others the children of
survivors. From 16 November 2005 to 11 February 2006, the NCBL also organized a
three-month basic computer course for 16 survivors, provided travel expenses,
food and accommodation during the training period, and paid the training cost.
[105]
Disability Policy and Practice
The 1982 Disabled Persons (Protection and Welfare) Act and the 1994 Disabled
Persons (Protection and Welfare) Rules protect the rights of people with
disabilities to transportation, employment, education and other state services.
However, reportedly the legislation is not fully implemented or enforced, and
people with disabilities are subject to discrimination.
The Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare is responsible for issues
relating to people with disabilities; however, most people with physical or
mental disabilities rely almost exclusively on family members for
assistance.[106] According to the
Ministry, more than 3,750 disabled people receive a living allowance of Rs.100
($1.35) per month through the Village Development
Committee.[107]
The National Coordination Committee has developed a national policy on
disability; however, it has not yet been approved by the
government.[108]
[1] Landmine Monitor Report
2004, pp. 1073-1075, and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 827-828,
detail Nepal’s many statements and actions in support of an antipersonnel
mine ban, even as security forces increased their use of the weapon. [2] Interview with Kashi Nath
Sharma, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defense, and Bhupendra Prasad Poudyal,
Spokesperson, Ministry of Defense, Kathmandu, 21 March 2006. [3] Ibid. [4] This included seminars on: the
Impact of Landmines/IEDs on the Educational Sector (6 January), Health Sector
(18 January), Transportation Sector (13 February), Social and Economic Sector
(23 February), Women (9 March), Environmental Sector (3 May), and Child
Education (12 May, 5 June, 8 June). [5] Email from Susan Aitkin, Chief,
Communication, Advocacy and Lifeskills Section, UNICEF Nepal, 16 December
2005. [6] RNA Brig. Gen. Kul Bahadur
Khadka first confirmed this in June 2003 in remarks made to a mission from the
ICBL Non-State Actors Working Group. ICBL Press Statement, Nepal Mission, 15
June 2003. Landmine Monitor had previously reported allegations of Nepalese
production, but the army denied it as recently as December 2002. [7] Landmine Monitor/MAC interview
with confidential source, 20 August 2005. Some sources have speculated that
production takes place at Swyambhu or Sundarijal, but Brig. Gen. Kul Bahadur
Khadka said that was not the case, indicating there is a factory near army
headquarters. Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from NCBL, 16 July 2003. [8] Interview with Col. Deepak
Gurung, RNA, 13 February 2004; Nepali Times Weekly, 21-27 November 2003,
quoting Col. Deepak Gurung. [9] Nepal National Weekly,
Vol. 4, No. 17, 11 April 2004; Nepali Times Weekly, 21-27 November 2003;
Himalayan Times, 3 February 2004. [10] Interview with Kashi Nath
Sharma, Ministry of Defense, and Bhupendra Prasad Poudyal, Ministry of Defense,
Kathmandu, 21 March 2006. [11] See for example,
“Maoist training center destroyed,” Kathmandu Post, 11 July
2005, www.kantipuronline.com. [12] Royal Nepalese Army, www.rna.mil.np/news.html. [13] “Maobadile Bisfotak
Padartha Bhitryauna Thale,” Annapurna Post, 9 March 2006;
“Bisfotak Padarthama Nigarani Garna Bharatko Dhyanakarshan,”
Kantipur Daily, 9 March 2006. [14] “Bisfotak Padarthama
Nigarani Garna Bharatko Dhyanakarshan,” Kantipur Daily, 9 March
2006. [15] Interview with Maj. Gen.
Kiran Shamsher Thapa, RNA Headquarters, Kathmandu, 22 March 2006. Also present
was Brig. Gen. Keshar Bahadur Bhandari from the 14th Brigade, responsible for
training in mine-laying, disposal and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). [16] Speech by Maj. Shashi
Rayamajhi, Ahidaman Battalion, at NCBL MRE program, Nawalparasi district, 8
September 2005; telephone interview with Brig. Gen. Deepak Gurung, Spokesperson,
RNA, Kathmandu, 28 March 2005; interview with Maj. Gen. Kiran Shamsher Thapa,
RNA, Kathmandu, 1 April 2004. [17] Interview with Kishor Lama,
Deputy Inspector General, and Krishna Kumar Tamang, Security and Coordination
Officer, Armed Police Force, Headquarters, Kathmandu, 22 March 2006. [18] UN, “Nepal CAP,”
(draft), 22 August 2005, p. 30. [19] Interview with Prakash
Jwala, former parliamentarian, House of Representatives, Salyan district, 5
February 2006. [20] The NCBL visited the
affected site just after the explosion. This incident is also documented in
UNICEF, “The Presence of Explosive Devices in Nepal,” November
2005. [21] Interview in Rukum district,
9 March 2006. [22] Interview with Maj. Gen.
Kiran Shamsher Thapa, RNA, Kathmandu, 1 April 2004. [23] Interview with Matrika
Yadav, politburo member, CPN/M, Nakkhu Jail, 3 March 2006. [24] Interview with Maj. Gen.
Kiran Shamsher Thapa, RNA Headquarters, Kathmandu, 22 March 2006. [25] Photographic evidence
obtained from the Nepal Red Cross Society in Palpa district in March 2006 and a
documentary broadcast on Nepal Television News in 2004 of weapons confiscated by
the government from the CPN/M. [26] UN, “Nepal CAP,”
(draft), 22 August 2005, p. 30. [27] UNICEF, “New
Victim-Activated Explosions, Nepal 2005, Surveillance System Based on Media
Reports,” undated, pp. 1, 10, 11. [28] Paper by Puja Singh, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, at the Interaction Program on Impact of Landmine/IEDs
on Women, organized by NCBL, 9 March 2006. [29] NCBL newsbase covering
January to December 2005. [30] NCBL newsbase covering
January to December 2004; HRW interview with Senior Maoist Commander, Bardia
district, March 2005. [31] Paper by Bidur Kardki,
Secretary, Nepal Trade Union Federation, at the Interaction Program on Impact of
Landmine/IEDs on Transportation, organized by NCBL, 13 February 2006. [32] “Maoist Bomb
Ambulance,” Kathmandu Post, 23 February 2006. [33] Dr. Chitra K. Tiwari,
“Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Internal Dimensions,” Paper No. 187,
South Asia Analysis Group, 20 January 2001, www.saag.org. [34] UNICEF, “Mine action
narrative,” in email from Susan Aitkin, UNICEF Nepal, 28 June 2006. [35] Hugues Laurenge, “The
Presence of Explosive Devices in Nepal, Districts of Ramecchap, Dolakha, Banke,
Dang, Solukhumbu, Sindhuli, Dhanusha Myagdi, Threat and Risk Management, Field
Report,” UNICEF Nepal, November 2005, p. 28. [36] UNICEF, “New
Victim-Activated Explosions, Nepal 2005,” (Update), 8 March 2006. UNICEF
relies on media reports as its primary source of information in Nepal. See
Landmine/UXO/IED Casualties section in this report. [37] UNICEF Consolidated Appeal
for Nepal Mid-Year Review, 14 June 2006; email from Susan Aitkin, UNICEF Nepal,
28 June 2006. [38] John Flanagan,
“Mission Report,” UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) field mission (4-9
December 2005), 7 April 2006. [39] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 831. [40] “7 soldiers killed in
Nepal mine blast,” India eNews.com, indiaenews.com, 29 April
2006. [41] “Schools caught in the
conflict-NGOs,” IRIN, 3 April 2006, www.irinnews.org. [42] Hugues Laurenge, “The
Presence of Explosive Devices in Nepal,” UNICEF Nepal, November 2005, p.
22. [43] Ibid, p. 24. [44] HRW, “Nepal’s
Civil War: The Conflict Resumes,” (Briefing Paper), March 2006; NCBL,
“The Growing Threat of Landmines in Nepal Part (V),” database,
January to December 2004. [45] UN, “Country Profile:
Nepal,” www.mineaction.org. [46] The UNICEF survey of eight
districts learned of 20 new casualties in 2005, of which four were reportedly
injured by landmines placed by security forces and 16 by Maoist IEDs. See
Hugues Laurenge, “The Presence of Explosive Devices in Nepal,”
UNICEF Nepal, November 2005, p. 18; telephone interview with Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, 24 June 2006. [47] Hugues Laurenge, “The
Presence of Explosive Devices in Nepal,” UNICEF Nepal, November 2005, p.
21. [48] John Flanagan,
“Mission Report,” 7 April 2006. [49] Interview with Kishor Lama
and Krishna Kumar Tamang, Armed Police Force, Kathmandu, 22 March 2006. [50] NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal part VI,” database, January to December
2005. [51] Telephone interview with
Maj. Dave Ferguson, Defence Attache, British Embassy, Kathmandu, 22 June
2006. [52] Interview with Keith
Bloomfield, Ambassador, British Embassy, Kathmandu, 1 April 2005; email from
Maj. Dave Ferguson, British Embassy, Kathmandu, 26 June 2006. [53] John Flanagan,
“Mission Report,” 7 April 2006; telephone interview with Maj. Dave
Ferguson, British Embassy, Kathmandu, 22 June 2006. [54] Telephone interview with
Susan Aitkin, UNICEF Nepal, 24 June 2006. [55] Hugues Laurenge, “The
Presence of Explosive Devices in Nepal,” UNICEF Nepal, November 2005, pp.
7, 16, 24. [56] Email from John Flanagan,
Deputy Director, UNMAS, 27 June 2006. [57] Interviews with Hugues
Laurenge, Mine Action Focal Point, UNICEF Nepal, 16-29 March 2006; interview
with Susan Aitkin, UNICEF Nepal, Lalitpur, 26 March 2006, and email, 6 April
2006. [58] Ibid. [59] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 833. [60] UNMAS, “Note to File,
Training of Trainer Workshop Improvised Explosive Devices & Landmine Safety,
Lalitpur, Nepal, December 2005,” 14 December 2005; interviews with Hugues
Laurenge, UNICEF Nepal, 16-29 March 2006; email from Susan Aitkin, UNICEF Nepal,
6 April 2006. [61] Minutes of MRE Working
Group, 6 June 2006. [62] Ibid; interviews with Hugues
Laurenge, UNICEF Nepal, 16-29 March 2006; interview with Susan Aitkin, UNICEF
Nepal, Lalitpur, 26 March 2006, and email, 6 April 2006. [63] Email from Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, 6 April 2006. Digital Broadcast Initiative/Equal Access Nepal are
involved in this radio initiative. Minutes of MRE Working Group, 28 February
2006. [64] Minutes of MRE Working
Group, 28 February 2006. [65] Interview with R.B. Khatry,
Executive Director, Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ), and Kathryn Bice,
UNICEF Consultant and FNJ, Lalitpur, 19 March 2006. The courses are in
partnership with UNICEF and the International Federation of Journalists. FNJ
has over 5,200 active members. [66] Minutes from MRE Working
Group, 6 June 2006. [67] Interviews with Valerie
Dourdin-Fernandez, Cooperation Delegate, ICRC Nepal, and Sudha Upreti,
Cooperation Field Officer, ICRC Nepal, Lalitpur, 20 March 2006. The additional
districts are Kanchanpur, Kailali, Dailekh, Surkhet, Arghakhanchi, Parsa, Bara,
Sarlahi, Siraha and Terhathum. [68] Minutes from MRE Working
Group, 19 January 2006; interview with Krishna Hari Koirala, Mine Action Focal
Point, Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS), Kathmandu, 20 March 2006. [69] Email from Boris Cerina,
Regional Mine Action Advisor, ICRC, New Delhi, 28 February 2006; interview with
Babu Ram Karki, Executive Officer, NRCS, District Chapter Palpa, Tansen, 24
March 2006. [70] In Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, it was incorrectly stated that the support came from the Swiss
Foundation for Mine Action, FSD. [71] Interviews with Purna Shova
Chitrakar, Coordinator, NCBL, Kathmandu, 17-29 March 2006. [72] NCBL, “Media Report on
MRE Program,” 2005. [73] Interviews with Purna Shova
Chitrakar, NCBL, Kathmandu, 17-29 March 2006. [74] Minutes from MRE Working
Group, 28 February 2006. [75] Minutes from MRE Working
Group, 6 June 2006. [76] Telephone interview with
Col. Dhani Das Karki, RNA, Kathmandu, 5 May 2005. [77] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [78] Email from Helen Fawthorpe,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006; email from Megan McCoy, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: NZ$1 = US$0.7049.
US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January
2006. [79] Email from Nancy Ingram,
Manager of Program and Organizational Development, Mines Action Canada, 25 May
2006. [80] UNICEF, “New
Victim-Activated Explosions Nepal–2005: Surveillance System Based on Media
Reports,” (update), 23 February 2006, pp. 4-11. [81] NCBL, “Victims by
Conflict in Nepal 2005,” data collection, January-December 2005. NCBL
collects data from interviews with different government, army, and community
members. The totals include casualties caused by bombs, grenades,
command-detonated devices, and other weapons not prohibited by the Mine Ban
Treaty. See www.nepal.icbl.org. [82] “Nepal landmine blasts
kill 6, injured 28, including 2 Russians,” PTI (Kathmandu), 10
April 2005. [83] Interview with Prasannata
Wasti, Coordinator, Data Collection Project, Informal Sector Service Center
(INSEC), 27 June 2006. [84] INSEC, “Report on
civilian casualties of unintentional explosions – Surveillance system
based on INSEC Online and Media Reports,” (draft), Nepal, 11 July 2006, p.
9. [85] Dharapma Bharatia
Surachhyakarmi Sahit Char Ghaite, “Four injured in Dharan including Indian
security,” Kantipur Daily, 27 February 2006. [86] Hugues Laurenge, “The
Presence of Explosive Devices in Nepal,” UNICEF Nepal, November 2005, p.
19. [87] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 835. [88] UNICEF, “New
Victim-Activated Explosions Nepal-2005,” 23 February 2006, pp. 1-2. [89] Email from Susan Aitkin,
UNICEF Nepal, 28 June 2006; email from Kathryn Bice, Consultant to UNICEF and
FNJ, Kathmandu, 28 June 2006. [90] Minutes from MRE Working
Group, 6 June 2006. [91] Interview with Dipak Prasad
Devkota, former Deputy Mayor, Kailali district, 28 February 2006. [92] Interview with Prasannata
Wasti, INSEC, 20 June 2006; speech by Dr. Khem Karki, Tribhuvan University
Teaching Hospital, at Interaction Program on Impact of Landmines/IEDs on Health,
8 January 2006. [93] INSEC, “Assistance to
civilian casualties of accidental explosions, Reference Booklet,” (draft),
Kathmandu, p. 5. [94] INSEC, “Reference
Booklet,” (draft), Kathmandu, p. 5; ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program,
“Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, draft received 19 May 2006, p. 24. [95] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 835. [96] ICRC, “Annual Report
2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 176; ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program,
“Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, draft received 19 May 2006, p. 24. [97] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation
Program, “Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, draft received 19 May 2006,
p. 24. [98] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 835. [99] ICRC, “Annual Report
2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 174; ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program,
“Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, draft received 19 May 2006, p. 24;
ICRC, “Special Report-Mine Action 2005,” Geneva, May 2006, p.
23. [100] Ibid, p. 176; Ibid, p.
24. [101] Information provided by
Yuban Malla, Coordinator, Rehabilitation Project, Handicap International (HI),
Kathmandu, 24 June 2006. [102] Email from Yuban Malla,
HI, 24 June 2006. [103] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 836. [104] Asia-Pacific Development
Center on Disability (APCD), “Country Profile-Nepal-Current Situation of
Persons with Disabilities,” www.apcdproject.org, accessed 12 June
2006. [105] NCBL, “Child
Education Scholarship,” and “Computer Training Program,” www.nepal.icbl.org, accessed 20 June
2006. [106] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Nepal,” Washington
DC, 8 March 2006. [107] APCD, “Country
Profile-Nepal-Current Situation of Persons with Disabilities.” [108] APCD, “Government
Policy and National Plan towards Persons with Disabilities,” www.apcdproject.org, accessed 16 June
2006.
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