Key developments
since May 2002:For the first time, government and military officials
have openly and officially acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines by security
forces. An Army official also acknowledged production of antipersonnel mines.
There was increased use of antipersonnel mines and Improvised Explosive Devices
by both security forces and rebels in 2002, including use in all 75 districts.
However, there has been little or no mine use by either side since the 29
January 2003 cease-fire. During a joint mission of the Nepal Campaign to Ban
Landmines and the ICBL, both government and Maoist leaders expressed support for
including a ban on landmines in the cease-fire code of conduct.
Mine Ban Policy
Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In
a statement to the United Nations in October 2002, Nepal’s Permanent
Representative said, “Opposed to anti-personnel landmines, Nepal has
actively participated in the evolution of the convention to control them, and
our moral commitment to it remains strong. When the time is ripe, we will be
happy to join the rank of those that have the privilege of becoming a party to
that very important global
treaty.”[1]
In an interview with Landmine Monitor, the Chief of the United Nations
Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “We have yet to reach
the conclusion of the study [of the Mine Ban Treaty]. The study is positively
moving forward. There were two meetings on the issue at the ministry this year.
We are unhurried to sign the treaty as the government is blamed for hasty
signature and its consequences on implementation. The government has no
objection to the treaty principally. The government is also well aware of
increasing aid following the signing of the treaty. We believe that the Nepal
government will soon reach the conclusion of the study. The time cannot be
specified.”[2]
In September 2002, the Royal Nepalese Ambassador to Switzerland Shambhu Ram
Simkhada, told Landmine Monitor, “The reason behind not signing the Mine
Ban Treaty by Nepal could be that it is not a matter of priority for the
government. The warring Maoists are using mines unceasingly and the Royal
Nepalese Army also requires
it.”[3] In a May 2003
meeting with Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams and Nepalese mine survivors,
Ambassador Gyan Chandra Acharya expressed his sympathy for the mine victims but
said, “Nepal is still not fully convinced that a total ban of landmines
could enhance the national
security.”[4]
Under the 2002 Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment)
Act, landmines are included under the definition of bombs, and the use and
possession of such items by civilians is considered a terrorist
act.[5]
Nepal voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly
Resolution 57/74 in November 2002, as it had in previous years. Nepal
participated as an observer in the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September
2002, but not in the intersessional meetings in February and May 2003.
In 2002 the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) organized a range of mine
ban campaign activities including a one-day national seminar on “Emergency
and Landmines,” a “Landmine Clearance” workshop, a
“Victim Assistance” workshop, a poem competition, a signature
collection and other public education meetings. Ministers, parliamentarians,
security forces and representatives from different organizations participated in
the initiatives, which also received extensive media coverage. NCBL published a
Landmine Monitor country report in Nepalese and English and distributed it
widely.
The government of Nepal andthe Communist Party of Nepal agreed to a
cease-fire on 29 January 2003. The cease-fire Code of Conduct, issued in March
2003, does not include a specific prohibition of mine use. NCBL has urged the
inclusion of an additional clause calling for a permanent halt to the use of
landmines.
The NCBL and the Non-State Actors Working Group of the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines (ICBL) conducted a joint mission in June 2003. They met with
government leaders, including the peace negotiator, and with Maoist leaders,
requesting that a ban on landmines be included in the Code of Conduct.
Brigadier General Kul Bahadur Khadka welcomed such a step, and Maoist leader
Khrisna Bahadur Mahara also indicated they would be amenable. The NCBL/ICBL
said it also secured support from two major political parties, the National
Human Rights Commission, and 25 human rights and peace groups to push for
Nepal’s accession to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[6]
Use
Both the Maoist rebels and government security
forces used antipersonnel mines in significantly increased numbers in 2002.
However, there has been little or no new use of mines by either side since the
January 2003 cease-fire. A small number of incidents have occurred causing new
casualties, but it is not clear if these are the result of new mine use or an
existing problem.
Use by Government
For the first time, government and military officials have openly and
officially acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines by security forces (the Royal
Nepalese Army, the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force). The past two
Landmine Monitor Reports noted serious indicators that government forces
were using antipersonnel mines, but no public admission had been made.
It now appears that there was a great expansion of use of antipersonnel mines
by security forces in 2002. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Home Affairs
told Landmine Monitor that security forces used mines in all 75 districts of the
country.[7] Army officials,
parliamentarians, political leaders from affected areas, and local populations
have all confirmed widespread use by security forces. A Royal Nepalese Army
official told the joint NCBL/ICBL mission that the Army had used approximately
10,000 antipersonnel mines, mostly to defend some 50 army posts around the
country from Maoist
attacks.[8]
Security forces planted mines around police stations, army barracks and
government offices in order to protect against attacks by the Maoist rebels. A
former Home Minister has been quoted saying that in addition to these defensive
uses, security forces have used mines to trap the Maoists: “The security
force has closely been following the Maoists, all the entry points are blocked,
and ambushes are
laid.”[9]
In a meeting organized by the NCBL in Rukum district, one of the Maoist
strongholds, local people said that security forces also planted mines in fields
owned by civilians that were close to government buildings. In some cases
owners received compensation, but others claimed not to have received
any.[10]
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs spokesperson, landmines were laid
following safety procedures and were adequately marked. He said, “In
order to minimize the risk of common people falling victim to mines laid by the
security forces, the concerned personnel are trained in laying mines. The area
is fenced with barbed wire. People are informed of it. Common people fall
victim only rarely, due to technical
error.”[11] An Army
Captain also declared, “We fence the area where we plant mines with barbed
wire with a view to preventing not only people, but also animals. Very rarely
the common people have fallen victim. The Human Rights Cell of the Royal
Nepalese Army upon suspicion of common people falling victim to mines makes an
onsite study.”[12]
Local representatives of 30 districts all reported mine use around army and
police posts in their
districts.[13] They also
confirmed that the minefields were fenced with barbed wire,but landmine
warning signs were posted only in two places: in Darakh of Sukhad Village
Development Committee (VDC) of Kailali
district[14] and in Manthali of
Ramechhap district. In Ramechhap the population was also informed by the Army in
every party meeting and through loudspeakers. In spite of the public
information efforts two goats died in a landmine
blast.[15]
In some cases even the police are not fully informed of mine-contaminated
locations. In one incident a civilian and two security personnel were seriously
injured when they walked into an ambush laid by the security forces around the
District police station and an Armed Police Force
camp.[16]
In some districts, mines are planted during the night and are cleared in the
morning.[17] An Army official
said to Landmine Monitor, “We clear all the mines when we shift from that
place.”[18] However,
incidents due to mines being left behind have been reported. In an area
declared cleared, a cow died in a mine explosion in Darakh of Sukhad Village
Development Committee of Kailali. The incident terrorized the entire
village.[19]
Officially the security forces do not reveal the type of devices laid.An Army officer said that they are homemade mines
(IEDs).[20] It is believed the
security forces use victim-activated mines (pressure and tripwire),
command-detonated mines (remote control), and explosive devices with
timers.[21]
Use by Rebels
The use of landmines and other explosives by the Maoists escalated in
November 2001, after their assault on the Army barracks in Dang district. The
Maoists used mines and other weapons during their attacks in Syangja, Salleri of
Solukhumbu, Sanphebagar and Mangalsen of Achham, Bhiman of Sindhuli, Sandikharka
of Arghakhanchi, and Jumla and Lahan of Siraha
districts.[22]
In 2002 there were reports of landmine incidents attributed to rebel mining
in 72 districts.[23] The use of
mines damaged industry, trade and agriculture, and disrupted transport lines
between villages. A delegation of the Social Justice Committee of the National
Assembly could not reach Rajapur village in Bardia district due to massive
mine-laying in the area.[24]
The Maoists laid a large number of mines around villages in some districts to
prevent security forces from entering into their areas. In other cases, the
mines were used to ambush security forces. An Army Colonel said, “The
Maoists have made use of ambush and mines more than the security forces. And it
has caused a considerable damage to the security
forces.”[25] A
spokesperson from the Ministry of Home Affairs also said, “The Maoists
heavily use ambush mines. They lay traps in paths and the use of electric and
other explosives has caused a great damage to people and property. The Maoists
have massively used mines in destroying physical infrastructures as
well.”[26]
Like security forces, it is believed the Maoists use victim-activated mines
(pressure and tripwire), command-detonated mines (remote control), and explosive
devices with timers.[27] In
June 2002, the Royal Nepalese Army displayed weapons confiscated from the
Maoists, including mines. Thousands of people viewed the weapons, including NCBL
representatives.[28]
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Last year, Landmine Monitor cited an unconfirmed
report that indicated that the government had two small factories that produced
antipersonnel mines, as well as grenades and ammunition. In December 2002, an
Army spokesperson denied this: “Explosives are produced in the factory at
Swyambhu, but they are not landmines. The material used in landmines is also
used in the explosives that we produce. It is produced in Swyambhu
only.”[29]
However, during the NCBL/ICBL mission in June 2003, an Army official stated
that Nepal possessed both locally produced and imported antipersonnel mines.Brigadier General Kul Bahadur Khadka gave assurances that the Army will not
acquire any new stocks of victim-activated antipersonnel
mines.[30]
It is believed that the Army has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, and that
it in turn provides mines to the police
forces.[31] While the original
suppliers of the mines are not known, one official told Landmine Monitor that
according to an Army Major, they are factory-produced (not improvised) mines,
and are designed to explode with the pressure of 5 to 9
kilograms.[32]
The Maoist rebels produce significant quantities of victim-activated homemade
mines (also known as Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs). According to the
spokesperson of the Royal Nepalese Army, most of the explosives used by the
Maoists are looted from the government, in particular from the Department of
Roads. He also alleges that the rebels might have obtained explosives from
sources outside the country.[33]
There have been allegations that the Maoists have received training and weaponry
from two Indian-based rebel groups, the Maoist Communist Center and the
People’s War Group.[34]
However, there are no specific allegations on landmines.
Landmine Problem
In 2002, landmine and IED incidents were reported
in 72 out of 75 districts – all except Manang, Mustang and
Parsa.[35] Increased use of
mines by government and rebel forces has had a corresponding socio-economic
impact. The danger of mines has hindered movement within the country, but has
also contributed to the increase in the number of internally displaced people
and refugees. It has also disrupted farming and other economic activity. This
is particularly true for the mid-western regions of the
country.[36] There have been no
surveys or assessments of the mine situation in Nepal.
Mine Clearance and Mine Risk Education
The Royal Nepalese Army endeavors to defuse or
destroy mines whenever it encounters them. Records of mines defused or
destroyed are not available. An Army officer said, “The mine disposal team
of the Army disposes any mines wherever they are planted. The quantity of the
disposed mines cannot be specified. It is difficult to say the exact number
because they are defused on
sight.”[37] According to
media reports from January to December 2002, the security forces defused mines
in thirty-six districts.
The Army official claimed, “The disposal team has enough knowledge for
defusing mines. They are well trained. Sometimes the people involved in disposal
also meet with an accident, but not because of lack of training. However, there
is a challenge of making the disposal team more efficient and
skilled.”[38] He also
added, “As new types of mines are being used, we need more training and
more sophisticated
equipment.”[39] Clearance
operations are difficult in a mountainous country like Nepal. An Army Captain
reported a disposal team might walk up to eight days to reach the mine-affected
area.[40]
There are no formal mine risk education programs in Nepal, either
governmental or non-governmental. The NCBL has helped to raise awareness of the
dangers of mines in a variety of ways, including publishing a pictorial book
entitled “Beware of Dangerous Things.” NCBL has also broadcast
awareness messages on the radio and has conducted regular educational
meetings.
Landmine Casualties
There are no official records on landmine
casualties in Nepal due to the disruption of communication lines and the fact
that records on landmine and war casualties are a “sensitive
issue.”[41] According to
one police officer, “The Maoists have targeted not only security forces,
but the general public has also been massively
injured.”[42]
According to information collected by the NCBL, in 2002 there were 720
casualties caused by landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other
explosive devices, including 202 people killed and 518 injured. A total of 313
of the casualties were civilians, including 49 women and 46
children.[43] The Bheri Zonal
Hospital reports that about 13 percent of the casualties of the conflict treated
at the hospital in 2002 were mine
casualties.[44] A review of the
NCBL database on casualties leads Landmine Monitor to estimate that there were
177 civilian casualties to landmines and IEDs in 2002.
In 2001, the NCBL recorded 214 people killed and 210 injured in 148 landmine
and IED incidents.[45]
Casualties continued at a greatly reduced rate in 2003. The media have reported
13 casualties, including four killed and nine injured, from 29 January through
May 2003.[46]
Survivor Assistance
Nepal has taken special measures to aid casualties
of the conflict, but no special provisions are designed for mine
survivors.[47] The government
provides financial assistance to security personnel and to civilians injured or
killed in Maoist attacks. Eight hospitals provide assistance to mine/IED
casualties including Bheri Zonal Hospital, Bir Hospital, Tribhuvan Teaching
Hospital, Dipendra Police Hospital, Birendra Police Hospital, Pokhara Zonal
Hospital, B.P. Memorial Hospital, and Patan
Hospital.[48] However,
financial constraints create difficulties in providing treatment to the
injured.
Hospitals and health posts in the affected areas are poorly equipped, and
often lack medicines and adequately trained
staff.[49] In Bheri Zonal
Hospital a Mass Casualty Management Team has been established. However, due to
a financial crisis, the zonal and district units did not receive funding and as
a result, the existing facilities have been cut and survivors are sometimes
forced to return home without completing their
treatment.[50] The Bir Hospital
has experienced similar financial problems and reports that some patients have
not been able to receive adequate
treatment.[51] Tribhuvan
Teaching Hospital reports that while there are delays in receiving funds from
the government the casualties of the conflict are properly cared
for.[52]
In 2002, the ICRC provided first-aid posts and surgical facilities with
medicines and other supplies to treat the wounded. It assisted the Nepal Red
Cross to set up first aid services in the districts of Aindhuli, Salyhan and
Phyuthan. The ICRC also conducted a war-surgery seminar for around 100
specialists and trainees from health care facilities in Kathmandu and
Nepalganj.[53]
There are no known programs offering physiotherapy, prosthetics, or
psychological support to mine survivors in the affected areas. Prosthetic
facilities are available in Kathmandu but many mine survivors cannot afford the
cost of transport, accommodation and food during the seven days required for
fitting.
In October 2002, the NCBL raised funds for six child mine survivors to
support the costs of schooling, medical treatment, prosthetics and crutches.
The government has acknowledged the problems caused by the lack of funding to
assist casualties of the
conflict.[54] It appears that
no funds have been allocated for mine survivor assistance from the Prime
Minister’s Relief Fund, the three-year program of the Army, or the
financial assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and China.
[1] Statement by H.E. Murari Raj Sharma,
Permanent Representative of Nepal to the UN, at the General Debate of the First
Committee of the 57th Session of the General Assembly, New York, 4 October 2002.
It is unclear if this is a reference to the Mine Ban Treaty or to Amended
Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional
Weapons. [2] Interview with Pushkar Man
Singh Rajbhandary, Chief of UN Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu,
27 December 2002. [3] Meeting with
Sambhu Ram Simkhada, Nepalese Ambassador to Switzerland, Geneva, 17 September
2002. [4] Meeting with Gyan Chandra
Acharya, Nepalese Ambassador to Switzerland, Geneva, 15 May
2003. [5] “Nepal Ain
Sangraha,” [Collection of Acts], Terrorist and Destructive Activities
(Control and Punishment) Act, 2058
(2002). [6] ICBL Non-State Actors
Working Group Press Statement, Nepal Mission, Latipur, Nepal, 15 June 2003.
[7] Interview with Gopendra Bahadur
Pandey, Spokesman, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singhdarbar, Kathmandu, 31 December
2002. [8] ICBL Non-State Actors Working
Group Press Statement, Nepal Mission, Latipur, Nepal, 15 June
2003. [9] Rajdhani Daily, 11 September
2002, citing former Home Minister Khum Bahadur
Khadka. [10] Statements made at meeting
organized by NCBL, Rukum district, 23 September 2002; interview with Amar
Bahadur Thapa, local political leader, Dailekh, 5 November
2002. [11] Interview with Gopendra
Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 December
2002. [12] Capt. Anup Adhikari, Royal
Nepalese Army, Statement at the Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4
August 2002. [13] NCBL interviews in
November and December 2002 with local leaders and local
organizations. [14] Interview with
Jeevan Kumar Rai, local political leader, Kailali, 24 September
2002. [15] Interview with Dev Shankkar
Paudel, former Member of Parliament, Ramechhap, 22 May
2002. [16] Kantipur (daily newspaper),
13 September 2002. A highly placed security official said the incident occurred
because security personnel who knew about the mine ambush had died and the new
personnel were unaware. [17] Interview
with Amar Bahadur Thapa, local political leader, 5 November
2002. [18] Capt. Anup Adhikari,
Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August
2002. [19] Interview with Jeevan Kumar
Rai, local political leader, 24 September
2002. [20] Capt. Anup Adhikari,
Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August
2002. [21]
Ibid. [22] NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal, Part V” (Collection of Newspaper Articles
from January to December 2002). [23]
Ibid. [24] Interview with Bijul
Biswokarma, Social Justice Committee, Upper House, Kathmandu, 13 January
2003. [25] Interview with Col. Deepak
Gurung, Spokesperson, Royal Nepalese Army, Army Headquarters, Bhadrakali,
Kathmandu, 26 December 2002. [26]
Interview with Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 December
2002. [27] Capt. Anup Adhikari,
Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August
2002. [28] NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal, Part V.”
[29] Interview with Col. Deepak Gurung,
Royal Nepalese Army, 26 December 2002. For an earlier denial, see Landmine
Monitor Report 2002, p. 720. [30] ICBL
NSA WG Press Statement, Nepal Mission, 15 June 2003. Asked if the production
took place at Swyambhu or Sundarijal, he answered no, indicating there was a
factory in the area near Army headquarters. Email from NCBL to Landmine Monitor
(HRW), 16 July 2003. [31] Landmine
Monitor Report 2002, p. 720; Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p.
563. [32] Interview with Khem Man
Khadka, Chairperson, District Development Committee, Kathmandu, 11 March 2002.
[33] Interview with Col. Deepak Gurung,
Royal Nepalese Army, 26 December
2002. [34] Kantipur (daily newspaper), 3
May 2002. [35] NCBL, “The Growing
Threat of Landmines in Nepal, Part V.”
[36] Raja Ram Gautam, “War Area
after the Emergency,” Nepal Monthly, 15 September to 1 October 2002;
interviews with mine victim Govinda Bahadur K.C., and other local
residents. [37] Interview with Maj. B.N.
Kumar Sharma, Coordinator, Human Rights Cell, Royal Nepalese Army, Army
Headquarters, Kathmandu, 26 December
2002. [38]
Ibid. [39]
Ibid. [40] Captain Anup Adhikari,
Statement to Interaction Program on Clearance of Landmines, 4 August
2002. [41] Interview with Biswo Shahi,
Police Superintendent, Terrorist Control Division, Police Headquarters,
Kathmandu, 2 January 2003; interview with Gopendra Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of
Home Affairs, 31 December 2002; interview with Dr. Manohar Shrestha, Director,
Bir Hospital, Kathmandu, 23 December
2002. [42] Interview with Biswo Shahi,
Police Superintendent, 2 January
2003. [43] NCBL collects data from
interviews with Members of Parliament, government officials, Army and Police
personnel, local political leaders, human rights activists, journalists, media,
and other organizations. [44] Interview
with Dr. Durga Prashad Pradhan, Director, Bheri Zonal Hospital, Nepaljung, 18
March 2003. [45] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, p. 721. [46] Email from
NCBL to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 16 July
2003. [47] Interview with Gopendra
Bahadur Pandey, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 December 2002; see also Landmine
Monitor Report 2002, p. 721. [48]
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 721-722; email from NCBL to Landmine Monitor
(HRW), 16 July 2003. [49] The NCBL
visited various hospitals and health posts in the affected areas during
2002. [50] Kantipur, 15 July
2002. [51] Interview with Dr. Manohar
Shrestha, Bir Hospital, 23 December
2002. [52] Interview with Dr. Mahendra
Nepal, Director, Tribhuvan Teaching Hospital, Kathmandu, 27 December
2002. [53] ICRC, “Annual Report
2002,” Geneva, June 2003, p.
163. [54] Interview with Madhu Raman
Acharya, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu, 27 December
2002.