Landmine Monitor 2022

Banning Antipersonnel Mines

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Use | Universalization | Production | Transfers | Stockpiles | Transparency

The year 2022 marks 25 years since the international treaty prohibiting antipersonnel landmines was adopted on 18 September 1997. The Mine Ban Treaty has succeeded in establishing a robust and inclusive international framework to eliminate these weapons. Although challenges remain, the treaty’s States Parties and its supporters are charting a clear course for achieving its ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.

During the reporting period, from mid-2021 to mid-October 2022, there was no evidence to indicate that any of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had violated its core obligations banning any use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines.

The greatest challenge to the emerging norm against these weapons can be seen in new use. Russia has used antipersonnel mines numerous times in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022. This has resulted in an unprecedented situation, in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

As in every year since it was first published in 1999, Landmine Monitor 2022 documents new, and now greatly expanded, use of antipersonnel landmines by government forces in Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. 

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least five countries during the reporting period, including in States Parties the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as in states not party India and Myanmar. This new use mostly involved improvised antipersonnel mines; in other words, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made from locally-available materials.[1]

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka completed the destruction of its last stockpiled antipersonnel mines in October 2021.[2]  Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of their stockpile destruction obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, having missed their respective deadlines. No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by either Greece or Ukraine during 2021.

Universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty remains stalled. The last accessions were five years ago.

The spirit of partnership and inclusion that characterized the negotiation of the treaty remains strong, as shown by its dedicated community of states, United Nations (UN) agencies, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by states not party Myanmar and Russia during the reporting period, while NSAGs in five countries also used antipersonnel mines.

Locations of antipersonnel mine use (mid-2021–October 2022)[3]

Use by states

Use by NSAGs








Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

New landmine use during the reporting period, confirmed by the Monitor, is detailed below. 

Landmine use by government forces


Russia has used antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion began on 24 February 2022.[4] There were also numerous allegations from Russian officials, and Russian-oriented media outlets, that Ukrainian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At least seven types of antipersonnel mines have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine since February 2022. There is also confirmed evidence that Russian forces have emplaced victim-activated booby-traps and IEDs in Ukraine since February 2022 at numerous locations prior to retreating and abandoning their positions.[5]

Antipersonnel mine types used by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022

































Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Additionally, PFM-type “scatterable mines” appear to have been used in several regions, many of which were under the control of Russian forces for an extended period of time.[6] Since there is no independent confirmation of these allegations as of yet, a final assessment and attribution of the use of PFM-series mines in Ukraine by either party is not possible at this time.

All antipersonnel mine types listed in the table above were manufactured in Russia or its predecessor state, the Soviet Union (or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR). Some landmines used in Ukraine in 2022 were manufactured as recently as 2021, including the POM-3 antipersonnel mine, delivered by the ISDM Zemledelie-I mine-laying rocket launcher from a range of 5–15km away.[7] The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Another antipersonnel mine used in Ukraine is the PMN-4 blast mine developed and produced by Russia in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved independence.

Other types of landmines used in Ukraine can be used in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, and older MON-series and OZM-72 mines. The POM-2 landmine is delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other remote means such as vehicles, while its variant the POM-2R is designed to be hand-emplaced.If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze or other means then such munitions are considered antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[8]

Belarus has provided various forms of military support to Russia related to its invasion of Ukraine, which has seen Russian forces use antipersonnel landmines.[9] This is an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party, with the possible assistance of a neighboring State Party.

The Monitor is not aware of Belarus providing such assistance, either directly or indirectly, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. However, Belarus should address these concerns with States Parties at a formal annual meeting or in its updated transparency report.

As a State Party to the treaty, Belarus must ensure that its joint military operations with Russia do not violate the prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing a state not party to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty. This means that it is prohibited for Belarus to:

  • Provide security, storage, transportation, or transit for antipersonnel mines;
  • Participate in planning for the use of antipersonnel mines;
  • Commit to rules of engagement that permit the use of antipersonnel mines;
  • Accept orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use antipersonnel mines; and
  • Knowingly derive military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines by others.

Since March 2022, Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine has been strongly condemned, including by the Mine Ban Treaty president of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Colombia, as well as Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the United States (US). This new use has also been condemned by the treaty’s special envoy for universalization, Prince Mired Ben Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, as well as by US congressional representatives including Senator Patrick Leahy.[10]

Use of PFM-series mines in Ukraine

There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in Ukraine in 2022. The claims began during the first days of the invasion and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made. After Ukrainian forces re-captured territory, particularly in eastern parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of Izium in September 2022, and former Russian-controlled territory became accessible to independent researchers, more information on the scale and method of PFM-series mine use has become available.

Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile PFM-series mines, which are delivered by a variety of dispersal systems including hand-carried ground launchers, vehicle-mounted launchers, jets and helicopters, and ground-fired 122mm and 220mm rockets.[11] The size of Russia’s stockpile of PFM-series mines is unknown.

Ukraine declared possessing 3.3 million PFM-series mines in 2020, which are all earmarked for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.[12] Ukraine has already destroyed more than three million PFM-series mines contained in cartridges used in the KMGU aerial dispenser and other types of “cassettes” carrying PFM-series mines used to load different types of delivery systems. The vast majority of Ukraine’s remaining antipersonnel landmine stocks consist of PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in 220mm 9M27K3 rockets fired by the Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers.[13]

Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series landmines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.[14] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.[15] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft scattered PFM mines in the Sumi region in mid-March 2022.[16] Similar reports surfaced in early April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.[17]

Russian officials have alleged that Ukrainian forces used PFM-series antipersonnel mines, while photographs and videos shared by Russians on social media showed PFM-series mines lying in place after attacks in areas that were under Russian control at the time.[18] Ukraine has denied the allegations and blamed Russian forces for PFM-series mine use.[19] The United Kingdom (UK) and the US have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.[20]

Initially, most claims of use made by Russian sources consisted of a close-up photograph of a mine posted to social media with no further context.[21] This trend culminated in July 2022, as Russian media sources in the city of Donetsk claimed that PFM-series mines had been scattered at several locations in the city center. These allegations were accompanied by images of mine clearance;[22] of individual PFM mines in isolation;[23] of civilians handling presumably live mines;[24] and claims of civilian casualties.[25] Russian diplomatic posts globally shared and quickly amplified the story.[26]

One of the more notable Russian claims of PFM-series mine use by Ukrainian forces originated from an attack in late May 2022 on Russian positions in Novovoskresenske, in the Kherson region. Evidence of the attack included photographs of mines in place, remnants of detonated mines, and remnants of the 220mm 9M27K3 Uragan mine-laying rocket, which opens in flight and scatters a payload of 312 PFM-type mines.[27] Ukrainian officials cited in a Ukrainian media report about this attack on 25 May 2022 counter-attributed responsibility to Russian forces.[28]

As of October 2022, there was significant visual evidence of PFM-type mine use and the remnants of the distinctive carrier equipment necessary to deploy these mines. For example, there have been sightings of the KPFM-1M cassette assembly used by 9M27K3 220mm Uragan mine-laying rockets.[29] Both elements were present in images accompanying the Russian claim that Ukrainian troops had mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar, in the Donetsk region, in early August 2022.[30] There have been no sightings of KSF-1 series canisters or the BKF-PFM cartridges necessary to deploy these mines from other launch modalities, such as trucks or helicopters.

Since there is no independent confirmation of the allegations, a final assessment and attribution of use of PFM-type mines in Ukraine is not possible at this time.


Myanmar’s armed forces have extensively used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Monitor has previously documented new use by Myanmar every year since the publication of its first annual report in 1999. Yet 2021–2022 marked a significant increase in new use, including around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel mines were captured by NSAGs from the military every month during January–September 2022, from virtually every part of the country.[31] In August 2022, antipersonnel mines manufactured by the Myanmar Army and in the possession of Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were captured in the northwest and southwest of Myanmar, indicating extensive mine use by the military.[32]

Myanmar military officials have acknowledged ongoing mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces. Previously, in July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defence told the Monitor that landmines were still used by Myanmar’s armed forces in border areas and around infrastructure.[33] Earlier, in September 2016, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major General Myint Nwe, told the Myanmar parliament that the armed forces continued to use mines in internal armed conflicts.[34]

Specific reports and allegations of new antipersonnel landmine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period were recorded in Bago, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi regions, and in Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states. Examples of such reports and allegations are detailed below.

In September 2022, a local NSAG claimed that Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had laid antipersonnel mines around a church in Moybe, in Pekon township, Shan state.[35] While, in August 2022, a local militia group discovered MM6 antipersonnel mines laid around the perimeter of Letpadaung Copper Mine in Salingyi township, Sagaing region. The copper mine is a joint venture by the Myanmar military’s Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. and China’s state-owned Norinco Industries.[36]

In July 2022, there were multiple incidents of people being injured by landmines near the perimeter of Myanmar Armed Forces camps in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state.[37] Other incidents reported that month included:

  • Two villagers returning to Kawlin township, Sagaing region, after fleeing the previous day were injured by a mine allegedly emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces.[38]
  • Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers accompanied a villager to recover the body of his son, who had stepped on a mine in Zu Kaing village, in Ann township, Rakhine state. They removed two mines on the way which they said had been laid by a unit of the Myanmar Armed Forces.[39]
  • Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly closed a ferry service in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, and emplaced mines to prevent Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) from using it.[40]

In June 2022, a humanitarian group found three mines in a church compound in Daw Nye Ku, in Demoso township, Kayah state, that the Myanmar Armed Forces had left earlier that day, while a fourth mine injured a boy.[41] Still in Kayah state, landmine use attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces the previous month caused casualties among attacking anti-military militias.[42]

In May 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly laid mines at a Buddhist monastery that they had occupied in Puandge township, Bago region.[43]

A police officer who defected to the anti-military resistance stated in April 2022 that the Myanmar Army was laying directional and other antipersonnel mines at police posts.[44] That same month, two more incidents, which resulted in civilian casualties, were recorded. The first incident occurred in Mahlaing township, Mandalay region, where a landmine allegedly laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces at the base of a mobile phone tower injured a 15-year-old girl.[45] During the second, civilians were injured by landmines as they were returning to their village in Loikaw township, Kayah state after the departure of the Myanmar Armed Forces.[46]

In March 2022, villagers in Mhan Taw, in Khin U township, Sagaing region, reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces had left mines around bodies of people killed during a raid.[47] Also that month, locals alleged that Myanmar Armed Forces troops had emplaced mines at a checkpoint near the entrance to a bridge in Dawei township, Tanintharyi region.[48]

In February 2022, a civilian returning to Kinsanpya, in Kani township, Sagaing region, was killed by a mine which locals said was laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces during a raid.[49] While, a youth was injured by a mine laid by Myanmar Armed Forces Infantry Brigade 284 in Kyat Ka Chaung village tract, in Kyainseikgyi township, Kayin state.[50]

In January 2022, a man was injured after stepping on a landmine near Nang Khing village, in Demoso township, Kayah state. The Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF) said that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid mines in the area.[51]

Previously, in December 2021, two villagers were injured by a landmine after their village in Mingin township, Sagaing region, was occupied by the Myanmar Armed Forces.[52]

In November 2021, Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly laid antipersonnel mines near the base of mobile phone towers in 48 townships, causing casualties among engineers.[53] That same month, residents in Hsipaw township, Shan state, were warned of mines being laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces around a pumping station for an energy pipeline.[54]

During 2021 and 2022, civilians continued to be injured due to antipersonnel mines along the border with Bangladesh.[55] In October 2020, Myanmar rejected reports that it had emplaced mines on that border.[56] Bangladesh had expressed concern at ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar on its border, and said “unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.”[57] 

Landmine use by non-state armed groups

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in the CAR, Colombia, the DRC, India, and Myanmar. The Monitor also received reports of sporadic mine use by NSAGs in Egypt,[58] the Philippines,[59] Thailand,[60] Tunisia,[61] and Venezuela.[62] A lack of available information or means of independent verification meant that it was not possible to determine if the reported incidents were the result of new use of antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period, or due to legacy contamination from mines laid previously. 

The Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during the reporting period, any new use of antipersonnel mines in several countries which previously had significant use. No use was reported in Afghanistan for the first time since 2007. No use was reported in Pakistan for the first time since 1999, though the Pakistan Army recovered antipersonnel mines from an NSAG in 2022, and many groups which previously used them remain active.

No incidents of antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Nigeria were reported, for the first time since 2014, although groups previously involved in mine use remain active.

NSAGs in these countries may still use improvised mines, as in previous years, but limited access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control makes it difficult to confirm new use.

Central African Republic

Since early 2021, there have been reports of new antipersonnel landmine use in the CAR. In April 2022, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) destroyed antipersonnel mines found in the country.[63] In 2021–2022, reports of the UN Panel of Experts on the CAR referred to incidents of antipersonnel mine use, documenting that in 2020 and 2021, “in several locations visited by the Panel including Grimari, Ippy, Boali and Nana-Bakassa, the Panel gathered testimonies from local communities regarding incidents where civilians were injured by small explosive devices often triggered by a trip wire in areas where the CPC [Coalition of Patriots for Change], FACA [Central African Armed Forces] soldiers and Russian instructors had been or were present.”[64]

Previously, several types of landmines, including NR442 antipersonnel landmines, were photographed by researchers from Human Rights Watch (HRW) and a journalist from France 24 in February 2014, among weapons seized from armed groups by French forces near Mpoko.[65]


Colombia reported that improvised antipersonnel mines were used by NSAGs in 2021, as well as by criminal enterprises involved in the manufacture of narcotics and illegal mineral extraction.[66] Colombia attributed responsibility for 216 antipersonnel mine events in January–December 2021 to residual or dissident forces of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), and for 77 events to the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).[67] Twenty events were attributed to other NSAGs, while for 54 events the group responsible was unknown. In total, 367 new events were reported in Colombia in 2021. From 1 January to 31 July 2022, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace registered 232 events (58 attributed to the ELN, 139 to residual FARC elements, 14 to other actors, and 21 unknown).[68] Landmine seizure incidents were reported in late 2021 and early 2022.[69]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

NSAGs are active in the DRC.[70] Sporadic use of antipersonnel landmines has been reported by the Monitor in the past.[71] In December 2021, a woman escaping an Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) camp was injured by an antipersonnel mine laid on the camp’s perimeter. Other incidents of mine use attributed to the ADF occurred from August to November 2021, when at least four farmers were killed in North Kivu province by mines. In July 2021, two children in Ituri province were killed by an explosive device allegedly laid by the ADF.[72] The Monitor had previously reported on mine use by the ADF in November 2005.[73]


An increasing number of incidents involving pressure-plate mines, attributed to recent use by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) or its People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) have been reported in the past few years. In February 2022, in Kalanhandi district, Odisha state, a journalist was killed by a pressure-plate mine placed under a banner that had just been raised by the CPI-M.[74] Five days later, a herder in the same area was killed by a pressure-plate mine and CPI-M banners were found nearby.[75] In June and December 2021, in Lohardaga district, Jharkhand state, villagers died after stepping on pressure-plate mines, which police said were laid by the CPI-M or PLGA. Further landmine casualties in this area were reported in 2022.[76]


NSAGs have used antipersonnel landmines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2021 and early 2022, there were allegations of new use by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the KNLA, and other groups.[77]

Since the military coup in February 2021, several local militia groups have been established, some of which identify as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Local media often report use of landmines by such groups. Most devices are actually command-detonated roadside bombs, though some are victim-activated mines.[78] PDF groups often declare allegiance to the National Unity Government (NUG). Pro-military militias, such as Pyusawhti, also operate in several areas of Myanmar.[79]

Between August and May 2022, mine-laying by PDFs resulted in several casualties among the Myanmar Armed Forces in Bago, Magway, and Sagaing regions, as well as Kachin state.[80]

Civilian casualties were also reported in 2021 and 2022. For example, in January 2022, a villager was killed by a landmine emplaced by the KNLA in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region.[81] While armed conflict between the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and members of the Northern Alliance including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in Kyaukme township, Shan state, reportedly resulted in mine-laying that caused civilian injuries in February and March 2022.[82] Also in March, mines laid by the KNLA caused casualties in Meh Klaw village tract, in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[83] In December 2021, locals blamed the Border Guard Force for a mine that caused civilian casualties near Kyaw Kayt Kee village, in Hpaan township, Kayin state.[84]

Allegations of landmine use by states

Landmines in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Azerbaijan accused Armenian forces of laying mines in 2020 and 2021 in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in adjoining areas.[85] It has not been possible to independently verify these claims.[86] At the Mine Ban Treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2021, Armenia denied using antipersonnel mines in the 2020 conflict and stated that during withdrawal, Armenian forces lacked the time possible to mine areas that subsequently came under Azerbaijan’s control.[87] 

Yet in May 2021, Armenia’s acting prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, told a government meeting that Armenian soldiers had emplaced mines along sections of the border to strengthen security, and had installed warning signs.[88] Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 12 June 2021 that 15 detained Armenians had been handed over to Armenia, in exchange for maps from Armenia showing the location of around 97,000 mines laid in the Aghdam region—one of seven territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan regained control over in 2020.[89] It is unclear if the maps show the location of newly laid minefields, mines emplaced before 2020, or both.

Landmines in Syria

The Monitor has not independently documented or confirmed any new use of antipersonnel landmines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria. The last concrete indication of possible new use was an undated photograph circulated on social media in May 2019, where a Syrian Army soldier is shown emplacing stake-mounted POMZ-2 fragmentation mines and tripwires on farmland near Kernaz, in northern Hama.[90] 

Universalizing the Landmine Ban

There are a total of 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; of which 132 signed and ratified it, while 32 acceded.[91]

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory. No states acceded to the treaty during the reporting period. The last to do so were Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in December 2017. Nonetheless, there are reasons to be hopeful when it comes to efforts to universalize the treaty.

President Joe Biden realigned US policy with most core provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty on 21 June 2022, and again set the goal of ultimately joining the treaty.[92] The new policy prohibits US development, production, and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines. It also commits the US to not use antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world except on the Korean Peninsula, and to destroy antipersonnel mine stockpiles that are “not required for the defense of the Korean Peninsula.”

Mongolia told the Monitor in December 2021 that it stockpiles antipersonnel mines, but “does not produce, sell or transfer” them and “does not utilize mines to defend its borders during peace and war.”[93] The statement shows how Mongolia has largely aligned its policies and practice with the Mine Ban Treaty, though it does not address the government’s position on accession to the treaty.

The lack of new accessions over the past five years demonstrates the intransigence of certain states who have ignored repeated calls to revisit and review their policy on not acceding to the treaty. During the reporting period, several states not party acknowledged the Mine Ban Treaty’s humanitarian rationale while reiterating their long-held positions on not joining it.

Cuba decried the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of antipersonnel landmines and said that it is “committed to the application of a strict policy to guarantee responsible use of antipersonnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for the security of the Cuban nation.”[94]

Egypt said that antipersonnel mines are a key means for securing its borders and repeated its criticism that the treaty does not, in its view, assign responsibility for mine clearance to those who laid the mines in the past.[95]

India expressed its commitment to the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines, but cautioned that its position on achieving that goal was contingent upon “the availability of militarily effective technologies that can perform cost effectively the legitimate defensive role of antipersonnel landmines.”[96]

Iran repeated its long list of objections to the Mine Ban Treaty, arguing that the treaty “does not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for their responsible and limited use of mines to defend their territory.”[97]

Pakistan repeated its long-held position that landmines “play a significant role in meeting military needs,” and stated that its “security concerns and the need to guard long borders” meant that “reliance on landmines is an integral part of Pakistan’s defence.”[98]

South Korea stated that the “unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula” prevents it from acceding.[99] It remains to be seen if South Korea will heed calls to revisit its position on joining now that the US has realigned its policy with most provisions of the treaty.

Annual UNGA resolution

Over the past 25 years, a key annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian approach and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.[100]

On 6 December 2021, a total of 169 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 76/26, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[101] No state voted against the resolution, while 19 abstained.

This marked the fourth consecutive year when 169 votes in favor were recorded. There was a slight rise in abstentions, up from 17 in 2020.[102] States Parties Serbia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe abstained from the vote, but did not explain their reason for doing so. Seven states not party made statements explaining their votes.[103]

A core of 14 states not party have consistently abstained from consecutive resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.[104]

Non-state armed groups

Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, reflecting the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of these weapons. However, there were no new declarations by NSAGs during late 2021 or 2022.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.[105] The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states have produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.[106] As many as 40 states have ceased production, including three states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.[107]

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel landmines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. The Monitor has again removed the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.[108]

Most of the countries listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing, but have yet to disavow ever doing so.[109] The most likely to be actively producing antipersonnel mines are India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia.

In December 2021, the first of 700,000 of a new design of antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military in India. The Nipun mine is designated as a replacement for the M-14 antipersonnel mine.[110] Three further types of mines are under development in India, but it is uncertain if any of these are antipersonnel mines. An August 2020 government procurement announcement called for the domestic manufacture of an antipersonnel fragmentation mine. Previously, the Ordnance Factory Board sent out a tender to local manufacturers for one million M-14 mines to be delivered at a rate of 200,000 per year.[111]

Production of antipersonnel mines appeared to have been ongoing in India from 2016–2022. India also produces the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, with warheads that can lay antipersonnel landmines. In September 2022, it was reported that Armenia had ordered the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher from private companies in India; it is not known if this included the antipersonnel mine laying variant of the system.[112]

Russia debuted new “smart” landmine systems during annual military exercises in 2021, including mines delivered by rockets and scattered from truck-mounted launchers.[113] It introduced the POM-3 or “Medallion” antipersonnel mine—a self-destructing bounding fragmentation mine equipped with inherent antihandling/anti-disturbance capability, which had been in development since at least 2015.[114] Russia has also deployed new MOB fragmentation mines in Ukraine with production markings indicating they were manufactured in 2019.[115]

On 17 September 2022, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense released a video and statement claiming to have found 100 Armenian-made PMN-E antipersonnel mines,[116] eight PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, and 10 antitank mines in territories and supply roads between the positions of Azerbaijani army units.[117] The claim that Armenia is producing antipersonnel mines is a recent development and has not been confirmed by non-Azerbaijani sources. Armenia denied these claims, and stated in a letter to the Security Council on 13 September 2022 that Azerbaijan was “disseminating false information…in preparation for launching armed aggression.”[118]

NSAGs have produced improvised mines in Colombia, Egypt, India, Myanmar, and Thailand.[119]

Antipersonnel landmines are prohibited regardless of whether they were assembled in a factory or improvised from locally-available materials.

Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing its annual report in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel landmines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements that declared they have stopped exporting mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.[120]

Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines

States not party

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.[121] In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the global collective total may be less than 50 million.[122]

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines


Mines stockpiled


26.5 million


6 million (estimated)


4–5 million (estimated)


“less than” 5 million


3 million


approximately 45 million

It is unclear if all 30 states not party thought to have stockpiled antipersonnel mines are current stockpilers. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines





Korea, North



Korea, South




Saudi Arabia



















States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Stockpile destruction by States Parties

At least 161 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 94 states which have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, and 67 states which declared that they never possessed antipersonnel landmines (except in some cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. States Parties possess a collective total of 3.6 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3.3 million) and Greece (343,413).

Sri Lanka announced in October 2021 that it had completed its obligation to destroy its stockpile.[123] Sri Lanka’s remaining stockpile of 11,841 antipersonnel landmines was destroyed in Kilinochchi district, Northern province, in advance of its 1 June 2022 deadline.[124]

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had a deadline for stockpile destruction of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010. Neither State Party has indicated when the obligation to destroy their remaining stockpiles will be completed.[125]

Greece did not destroy any stockpiled mines in 2020 or 2021. One of the reported barriers to the completion of its Article 4 obligations was a “legal dispute” with Hellenic Defence Systems (HDS), which halted the destruction process due to environmental compliance issues.[126] In a statement in June 2022, Greece shared that they have overcome these contractual and regulatory hurdles and that “the draft contract between HDS and their new subcontractor, has already been submitted to the Court of Auditors for a pre-contractual review and assessment.”[127]

The ICBL has repeatedly expressed concern over Greece’s failure to begin the destruction process early enough to meet its deadline. It has urged Greece to set a firm deadline, to devote the necessary resources for stockpile destruction, and to report progress to States Parties on a monthly basis.[128]

Ukraine remains unable to articulate a timeframe for stockpile destruction. A previous agreement reached by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Support and Procurement Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for destruction of stocks of PFM-series antipersonnel mines was terminated in 2020. The parties were in the process of tendering a new agreement.[129]

Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not possess stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[130]

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which armed group had produced the mines.[131]

Mines retained for training and research

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 69 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes; of which 28 each retain more than 1,000 mines, and three (Finland, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Belgium, Denmark, and Spain collectively used a total of 2,901 retained mines during 2021, decreasing their retained mines to under 1,000 respectively.[132]Another 94 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 41 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past. Chile joined this latter group of States Parties in 2020, decades after initially retaining over 28,000 antipersonnel mines when the treaty entered into force for the country.[133]

States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines


Last declared total (for year)

Initial declaration

Consumed during 2021

Year of last declared consumption

Total quantity reduced as excess to need


15,771 (2021)




Sri Lanka

14,489 (2021)





 12,050 (2016)





6,357 (2021)






5,948 (2021)





5,547 (2021)





4,874 (2011)





4,492 (2021)






4,341 (2021)





3,858 (2021)





3,760 (2020)





3,485 (2021)






3,364 (2011)



None ever


3,134 (2021)






2,996 (2004)




Czech Rep.

2,138 (2021)





2,050 (2020)






2,020 (2020)






2,000 (2020)



None ever


1,780 (2008)





1,771 (2021)





1,764 (2011)





1,634 (2009)





1,330 (2021)






1,491 (2021)





1,304 (2021)





1,213 (2021)





1,020 (2007)









Note: N/R=not reported.

In addition to those listed in the table, another 41 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines, and collectively possess a combined total of 14,888 retained mines.[134] Ten of these states used a combined total of 3,673 retained mines in 2021.[135] Another 13 did not report any use.[136] Seventeen States Parties that retain under 1,000 antipersonnel mines have not submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2021.[137]

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

Seven States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

  • Djibouti, Nigeria, and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
  • Burundi, Cabo Verde, Senegal, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

The Oslo Action Plan requires each State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes,” and to “destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number.”[138]

States Parties agreed to Action 49, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an “early warning mechanism.” The Action states that “If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned.”[139]

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.[140]

Transparency Reporting

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2022, 81 States Parties (49%) had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2021.[141] A total of 83 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2021, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.[142] The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2021 was slightly greater than that of 2020.

Morocco, a state not party, has submitted 12 voluntary transparency reports since 2006.[143] States not party Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR (2011), and Mongolia (2007) have also previously submitted voluntary reports. Palestine (2012–2013) and Sri Lanka (2005) provided voluntary reports prior to acceding to the treaty.

In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, which included information on contamination, clearance, casualties, and victim assistance in Western Sahara.[144]

[1] The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” IEDs or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition, regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” to refer to victim-activated IEDs.

[2] In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, June 2021, Section 3, Table 2. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database,

[3] NSAGs used landmines in at least six countries in 2018–mid 2021; eight countries in 2017–2018; nine countries in 2016–2017; 10 countries in 2015–2016 and 2014–2015; seven countries in 2013–2014; eight countries in 2012–2013; six countries in 2011–2012; four countries in 2010; six countries in 2009; seven countries in 2008; and nine countries in 2007. During the 2021–2022 reporting period, there were also reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, CAR, Chad, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Ukraine, and Yemen.

[4] See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 15 June 2022,

[5] HRW, “Ukraine: Russian Forces’ Trail of Death in Bucha,” 12 April 2022,

[6] Such types are also labeled “remotely-delivered” and Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) defines them as a “Remotely-delivered mine,” meaning a mine that is not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 meters away are not considered to be “remotely delivered,” provided that they are used in accordance with Article 5 and other relevant Articles of Amended Protocol II. See, ICRC, “Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 CCW Convention as amended on 3 May 1996),” undated,

[7] HRW, “Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines,” 29 March 2022,

[8] HRW, “Backgrounder on Antivehicle Landmines,” 8 April 2022,

[9] HRW, “Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 15 June 2022,

[10] Patrick Leahy, US Senator for Vermont, “Statement On Russian Landmines: Congressional Record,” 7 April 2022,

[11] Of the states of the former USSR, Belarus and Turkmenistan joined the Mine Ban Treaty and destroyed their significant stockpiles (3.4 million and 5.4 million respectively). North Macedonia found a residual stockpile of banned antipersonnel mines in May 2012, including a small number of PFM-series mines, after it completed the destruction of its stockpile.  

[12] The requirement to destroy almost six million PFM-series antipersonnel mines was a key obstacle that prevented Ukraine from rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty. For years, Ukraine repeated at nearly every formal and informal Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it would depend on international support for the destruction of its stockpile. Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

[13] Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 18 June 2014,; statement of Ukraine, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 26 June 2015,; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019, In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions. The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines were not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

[14] Facebook post by Irina Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 26 February 2022,

[15] “Ukraine attacked by Russia. Butterfly mines in the Kharkiv region,” Polish News, 26 February 2022,

[16] Daria Skuba, “In Sumy, during a night raid, the invaders scattered anti-personnel mines: what they look like,” Obozrevatel, 17 March 2022,

[17] Necro Mancer (666_mancer), “Russians fill residential areas of the city with mines-petals.” 4 April 2022, 17:36 UTC. Tweet, /

[18] See, Permanent Mission of Russia to the UN, “Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UNSC briefing on Ukraine,” 24 August 2022,; and statement of Russia, Security Council, 27 July 2022,

[19] Facebook post by Irina Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 26 February 2022,

[20]  “Russia highly likely deploying anti-personnel mines in Donbas, UK says,” Reuters, 8 August 2022,

[21] Alikantes, Marina (Marianna9110), “The Armed Forces of Ukraine “littered” the territory of the Orphanage in Makiivka, a satellite city of Donetsk, with prohibited anti-personnel mines PFM-1 “Lepestok”, as well as in other cities of the DPR. These mines are prohibited by international conventions.” 2 August 2022, 18:51 UTC. Tweet,

[22] Nikolai (Nikolai11449196), “A Russia tank drives through Donetsk setting off PFM-1 ‘petal’ anti-personnel mines. Ukraine firing these mines into a civilian area is a war crime.” 31 July 2022, 08:26 UTC. Tweet,; Bob in NZ (BobInNZ1), “A novel manner of demining the PFM-1 “Petal” anti-personnel mines spread by the UAF over Donetsk. These mines are small and disguised, and can easily kill a child or main an adult. Ukraine committed to destroying 10 million of these weapons in 1999, but failed to do so.” 31 July 2022, 11:18 UTC. Tweet,; Chronology (Chronology22), “Local residents of #Donetsk help the sappers in clearing Ukrainian anti-personnel mines PFM-1 #Lepestok (#Petal) with simple improvised methods, a tire and a rope. How many did you demine today?, correspondent asked. About 20, replied the local resident. #Ukrainewar #Ukraine.” 2 August 2022, 09:20 UTC. Tweet,

[23] Glosm Eusec (glosmeusec), “On use of mines inside civilian areas. #Ukraine - 20220813 - unknown place, #Donetsk Oblast - Reported around 17.00 pm, video showing box with PFM-1 anti-personnel mines being described as on Marshak Street, Kyivs'kyi district, Donetsk.” 13 August 2022, 16:46 UTC. Tweet,

[24] NEXTA (nexta_tv), “In occupied #Donetsk, a woman picked up a petal mine and put it in her bag to show her colleagues at work. Due to the small size of the mine, she thought it was a shell fragment.” 31 July 2022, 12:34 UTC. Tweet,

[25] Dubovikova, Maria (politblogme), “Ukrainian “petal” mines were found in the following streets, avenues and lanes of Donetsk: Mira, Universitetskay, Oreshkova, Vatutina, Chelyuskintsev, Lubavina, Shchorsa, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. These are residential areas. No military infrastructure.” 30 July 2022, 23:23 UTC. Tweet,

[26] See, for example, Russia in Canada (RussianEmbassyC), “The retreating Ukrainian troops mine heavily the territories in Donbass with anti-personnel landmines PFM-1 “Lepestok” prohibited by the #OttawaConvention.” 7 July 2022, 16:17 UTC. Tweet,

[27] Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “#Ukraine: UA forces reportedly hit RU-controlled Novovoskresenske, Kherson Oblast with 2 9M27K3 cluster MLRS rockets- each containing 312 infamous PFM-1S land mines. Whilst being very small they leave horrible injuries, though this time they should at least self-destruct in time.” 26 May 2022, 21:45 UTC. Tweet,

[28] “In the Kherson region, the Russian military shelled the villages of Novovoskresenske and Dudchany,” Suspilne Media, 26 May 2022,

[29] Chronology (Chronology22), “Ukrainian troops continue scattering mines PFM-1 #Lepestok (#Petal) in Donetsk using cluster munition of MLRS Uragan. The cluster shell is also sighted (photo no. 1). Civilians! Be careful! #Ukrainewar #Ukraine #Civilians #Donetsk #Cluster #HRW #AmnestyInternational.” 12 August 2022, 09:07 UTC. Tweet,

[30] Chronology (Chronology22), “Ukrainian troops have mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar with anti-personnel mines PFM-1 Lepestok (#Petal). For the mining they use cluster munition from Uragan MLRS. The clusters are also seen in the footage #Ukraine #Ukrainewar #Soledar #Bakhmut #Artyomovsk #Lepestok.” 1 August 2022, 16:56 UTC. Tweet,

[31] The Monitor found, between January and September 2022, in a non-exhaustive survey of media photographs, over 25 instances, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel landmines of types MM1, MM2, MM5, and MM6 in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states and in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions. The mines were captured by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or National Unity Government (NUG)-affiliated People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) in those areas after overrunning Myanmar Army outposts or after capturing or ambushing a military patrol.

[32] On 31 August, the Arakan Army displayed captured MM2 and MM5 antipersonnel landmines, among other weapons, from the remaining arsenal in a camp it overran at Border Post 40 in Maungdaw township, Rakhine state. “Arakan Army says it has captured Myanmar military camp near Bangladesh border,” Development Media Group (DMG), 31 August 2022, On 16 August, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and PDFs captured 11 MM6 antipersonnel mines from Myanmar Army soldiers in Pinlaebu township, in the Sagaing region. BBC Burmese Facebook post, 16 August 2022, On 15 August, the Arakan Army captured seven MM6 (M14) antipersonnel landmines among other weapons from captured Myanmar Army soldiers in Paletwa township, Chin state. Lu Nge Khit Facebook post, 15 August 2022, On 25 August, Kantbalu PDF captured five MM6 (M14) antipersonnel mines from Myanmar Army soldiers in Kantbalu township, Sagaing region. Lu Nge Khit Facebook post, 15 August 2022,

[33] The official said, “In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.” Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defence, Ministry of Defence, Naypyidaw, 5 July 2019.

[34] “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 September 2016, The deputy defense minister stated that the military used landmines to protect state-owned factories, bridges, electricity towers, and its outposts during military operations; adding that landmines were removed when outposts were abandoned by troops, or warning signs were placed to mark where mines were laid.

[35] The Mobye PDF warned returning local people that they should avoid the grounds of the church as it had been mined. “Junta weapons seized from Catholic church in Shan State’s Mobye Township,” Mizzima, 15 September 2022,

[36] The Irrawaddy (IrrawaddyNews), “North Yamar People’s Defense Force defused 78 [MM6 antipersonnel] landmines planted by the regime to protect the China-backed Letpadaung copper mines in Salingyi Township, Sagaing Region.” 19 August 2022, 09:09 UTC. Tweet,

[37] Aung Aung, “Mine exploded near junta’s station in Mrauk U, 4 children injured, 2 in critical condition,” Tha Din News and Radio, 18 July 2022,

[38] Aung Aung, “Villagers stepped on Junta’s planted landmines in Sagaing,” Tha Din News and Radio, 1 August 2022,

[39] The man’s 14-year-old son had been killed the day before and he wished to retrieve the body. After removing the two mines, which the soldiers said had been laid by the 66th Division of the Myanmar Armed Forces, they prevented the man from going further. See, “Six killed, 11 injured by landmines amid renewed tensions in Myanmar’s Rakhine state,” Radio Free Asia (RFA), 12 July 2022,

[40] On different dates, one child was killed and another person injured by these mines. See, “Locals worry about junta’s landmines in Kyaukgyi,” Than Lwin Times, 27 July 2022,

[41] Monitor interview with David Eubank, founder, Free Burma Rangers, 15 July 2022. According to Eubank, when Myanmar Armed Forces troops left an area after conflict with the Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF), the Free Burma Rangers discovered three mines in the church compound, another four mines and one that a 16-year-old boy stepped on. He noted that bags or baskets left by departing soldiers each had between one and six landmines in them, still in their factory packaging.

[42] David Boi, “Two KNDF comrades had their legs amputated because of the junta’s landmines,” Tha Din News and Radio, 23 May 2022,; Aung Aung, “A comrade from KNDF B-10 killed after stepping on a mine,” Tha Din News and Radio, 15 May 2022,; and Aung Aung, “One comrade stepped on mine during clearance operation, lost both legs,” Tha Din News and Radio, 24 April 2022,

[43] The Paungde PDF said that they had found the mines after the Myanmar Armed Forces departed. Aung Aung, “The junta soldiers stationed at the monastery planted mines after they retreated,” Tha Din News and Radio, 10 May 2022,

[44] The officer stated that the military council ordered the installation of landmines at police station entrances and exits to prevent PDFs from easily raiding them. “Claymore and anti-personal mines planted at police stations,” Than Lwin Times, 23 April 2022,

[45] The Myanmar Armed Forces were reported to be fencing and mining the base of mobile phone towers. Aung Aung, “15-year-old girl’s leg amputated due to a mine planted by Junta troops in Mahlaing,” Tha Din News and Radio, 3 May 2022,

[46] Karenni Human Rights Group (KHRG), “Quarterly Briefing: Vol. 1, Issue 2,” 13 July 2022, p. 3,

[47] Kyaw Thu, “The residents of Mhan Taw village, Khin Oo Township were killed by the junta and mines were planted near the bodies,” Tha Din News and Radio, 8 March 2022,

[48] David Boi, “The Junta’s forces planted landmines in front of Ka Myaw Kin Bridge in Dawei,” Tha Din News and Radio, 2 April 2022,

[49] David Boi, “A junta’s mine exploded in Kani Township, killing one civilian,” Tha Din News and Radio, 6 February 2022,

[50] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2022. The Myanmar Armed Forces had issued verbal warnings to villagers not to enter the area, yet the youth had just come to the area as his school elsewhere had been closed. It is uncertain when the minefield was first laid.

[51] “Near Nang Khing Village, citizen loses leg after stepping on a mine,” Kantarawaddy Times, 16 January 2022,

[52] “Myanmar Civilian Forces Claim Dozens of Junta Troops Killed in Mine Attacks, Ambushes,” The Irrawaddy, 15 December 2021,

[53] Mines were laid near mobile phone towers in Chin, Kayin, Mon, and Shan states, and in the Ayawaddy, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon regions. Some of these, such as Ayawaddy and Yangon, had never previously been reported to have antipersonnel mine contamination. See, “Telecoms tower sites mined by Myanmar military,” Myanmar Now, 5 November 2021,

[54] Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), “Villagers’ security threatened by Burma Army landmines along Chinese pipelines in Hsipaw, northern Shan State,” 18 January 2022,

[55] “Bangladeshi injured in mine blast along Myanmar border,” New Age, 16 September 2022,; and “BGF member injured in landmine encounter near Myanmar-Bangladesh border fence,” DMG, 20 December 2021,

[56] Statement of Myanmar, General Debate, First Committee, 75th Session, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 19 October 2020.

[57] Statement of Bangladesh, General Debate, First Committee, 75th Session, UNGA, 14 October 2020,

[58] New use of improvised mines and victim-activated booby-traps by militants linked to the Islamic State has been reported in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in 2020–2022. These devices have caused civilian casualties during resettlement of evacuated villages in the conflict area. In early 2022, tribal militias working with the Egyptian Army recovered pressure-plate initiated IEDs in houses and caches. See, “Egyptians return to Sinai homes to find Islamic State booby traps,” Middle East Eye, 24 October 2020, For further examples, see ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Egypt: Mine Ban Policy,” updated 28 September 2022,

[59] Sporadic use of improvised antipersonnel mines has occurred in the Philippines. In January 2022, an army soldier and an auxiliary member were injured by an antipersonnel landmine in Pinabacdao, in Samar, while setting up a new detachment. The mine use was attributed to the New People’s Army. See, “Army soldier, CAFGU auxiliary member wounded in Samar explosion – military,” GMA News, 26 January 2022,

[60] Sporadic use of improvised antipersonnel landmines by Pattani rebel groups in southern Thailand continued in 2021–2022. Thailand has not provided information in its annual Article 7 reports on use, contamination, or clearance of improvised antipersonnel mines in the south. See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Thailand: Mine Ban Policy,” updated 28 September 2022,

[61] As in the past few years, new casualties caused by victim-activated improvised mines were reported in 2021 to mid-2022 in the Jebel Al-Cha’anby area. See, “Tunisia’s defense minister visits soldiers wounded in Mount Salloum clashes,” Arab News, 16 August 2022,; and “Tunisia: Woman Injured in Landmine Explosion Near Jebal Samema,” All Africa, 5 December 2021,

[62] In February 2022, Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López stated that at least eight civilians were injured by antipersonnel mines in Apure on the southern border with Colombia. See, Florantonia Singer, “Venezuela informa de ocho muertes por minas antipersona en la frontera con Colombia” (“Venezuela reports eight deaths from antipersonnel mines on the border with Colombia”), El País, 11 February 2022, See also, Eunice Janssen, “Venezuela’s landmines status,” Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, CCCM), 21 April 2021,

[63] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Central African Republic: The ever-growing threat of explosive devices,” 8 September 2022,

[64] UN, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020),” S/2021/569, 25 June 2021, Annex 3.16,; and UN, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2588 (2021),” S/2022/527, 29 June 2022, para. 29,

[65] Email from Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies Director, HRW, 20 February 2014.

[66] Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), pp. 66–68. The bodies of the improvised antipersonnel mines are primarily non-metallic, using both commercial high explosives and improvised explosives from agricultural chemicals, and are activated by either electronic or chemical detonators. The Article 7 report notes that most are activated by pressure, but some by tension wires.

[67] “Mine event” refers to instances of casualties and other events such as reported presence of mines.

[68] Updated information according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, sourced from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights database of events by MAP/MUSE. Provided to the Monitor by CCCM.

[69] In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which NSAG had produced the mines. Colombian Armed Forces, “Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta ‘Omega’ ubicó depósito ilegal con casi dos mil minas antipersonales” (“Joint Task Force ‘Omega’ located illegal deposit with almost two thousand antipersonnel mines”), 10 May 2022.

[70] These include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) and the March 23 Movement (M23) among other smaller armed groups.

[71] Previously, in August 2009, a military officer reportedly stated that 25 soldiers had been killed by antipersonnel landmines laid by the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, FDLR), Rwandan Hutu rebels, and noted, “We are not aware of other antipersonnel mines planted in the area.” See, “350 Rwandan Hutu militiamen killed during Operation Kimia II in South Kivu province,” Radio Okapi, 29 August 2009,

[72] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data for DRC for calendar year 2021. See, ACLED website,

[73] ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, July 2006), p. 329,

[74] “Landmine blast by Naxals claims life of journalist in Odisha's Kalahandi,” The New Indian Express, 5 February 2022,

[75] “Cowherd dies in landmine blast in Kandhamal forest, Maoist posters found at site,” Hindustan Times, 9 February 2022, In March, in Kandhamal district, Odisha state, another villager was injured by mines attributed to CPI-M/PLGA use. See, “Villager Injured In Landmine Blast In Kandhamal,” Ommcom News, 28 March 2022,

[76] “Villager dies in landmine blast in Lohardaga,” Daily Pioneer, 24 December 2021,; “2 CRPF jawans injured in landmine blast in Lohardaga,” Daily Pioneer, 12 February 2022,; and “Third CRPF jawan injured in landmine blast in Lohardaga,” Daily Pioneer, 13 February 2022,

[77] There were also allegations of use by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N), and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) in their operations against the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period.

[78] For example, in Monywa township, Sagaing region, three local militias stated that they attacked Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers coming to clear mines. Aung Aung, “Revolutionaries attack junta forces with mines in Monywa,” Tha Din News and Radio, 23 August 2022, The Southern Pauk Guerilla Force in Pauk township, Magway region, killed several soldiers; and when reinforcements came to retrieve the bodies, more of its mines exploded, killing 17 more troops. See, “Armed resistance replaces anti-coup protests in Pauk township,” Frontier Myanmar, 31 August 2021, In Ye-U township, Sagaing region, a coalition of local militas stated that when Myanmar Armed Forces troops entered the area they detonated the mines. See, Aung Aung, “Ten killed and many injured as junta troops mined in Ye-U,” Tha Din News and Radio, 14 August 2022,

[79] It is often difficult to attribute responsibility for each mine incident in Myanmar to a specific armed group. In northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw are engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance: the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the TNLA. Armed conflict among  NSAGs has also occurred in the area between the SSA-S, the TNLA, and the SSA-N. Casualties have occurred near to sites of conflict involving all of these groups, although locals were usure which group(s) had laid the mines.

[80] For further examples, see ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Myanmar: Mine Ban Policy,” updated 17 November 2022,

[81] Ibid. Villagers stated that the mine was laid by KNLA soldiers but did not indicate when.

[82] “Father Of Six Injured By Landmine In Northern Shan State,” Shan Herald Agency for News, 18 March 2022,

[83] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2022. It is uncertain when the mines were laid.

[84] David Boi, “Villager injured in landmine explosion in Hpa An Township,” Tha Din News and Radio, 11 December 2021,

[85] Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “No:121/21, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the 4th of April - International Mine Awareness Day,” 4 April 2021,

[86] It has also not been possible to distinguish between the actions of Armenian-supported separatist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armed Forces of Armenia, or whether this seemingly joint force used landmines.

[87] Statement of Armenia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 21 June 2021,

[88] “Armenian military carried out mining work with the installation of warning signs, the purpose of sabotage was not – Pashinyan,” Novosti NK, 27 May 2021,

[89] Joshua Kucera, “Armenia and Azerbaijan exchange detainees for mine maps,” Eurasianet, 12 June 2021,

[90] See, Waters, Gregory (GregoryPWaters), “Engineer in the 33rd Brigade (formerly 9th Div, now part of Hama-based 8th Div) planting POMZ anti-personnel mines in #Kernaz #Hama before his death earlier this year. Farmland in north Hama will be incredibly dangerous for years to come due to all the mines. (ID from @obretix).” 3 May 2019, 00:00 UTC. Tweet,

[91] Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the treaty’s 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

[92] The White House press release, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” 21 June 2022,

[93] “Policy and position on joining ‘Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines’ and its relevant information,” Letter from the Ministry of Defence of Mongolia to the Monitor. Received via email from Oyu Vasha, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Mongolia to Canada, 14 December 2021.

[94] Explanation of Vote by Cuba on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.

[95] Explanation of Vote by Egypt on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.

[96] Explanation of Vote by India on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021; and statement of India, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 15–19 November 2021.

[97] Explanation of Vote by Iran on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.

[98] Explanation of Vote by Pakistan on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.

[99] Explanation of Vote by South Korea on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021; and statement of South Korea, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022,

[100] This includes Belarus, Bhutan, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Türkiye.

[101] “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” UNGA Resolution 76/26, 6 December 2021,

[102] The 17 states that abstained on the 2020 resolution were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, US, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. In 2021, all but Palau abstained. Other states abstaining were: Serbia, Uzbekistan, and Zambia.

[103] Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Korea.

[104] Of these states, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US are party to CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW Protocol II; and Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria remain outside of any treaty-based prohibition or regulation on antipersonnel mines.

[105] Of these, as of October 2022, 48 NSAGs have committed not to use mines through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment: 20 by self-declaration, four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment), and two through a peace accord (in Colombia and Nepal).

[106] There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included within that list are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear whether Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.

[107] Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Uganda, UK, and Zimbabwe.

[108] The US was previously removed from the list of producers in 2014, only to be added back on to the list in 2020 following a decision by the administration of President Donald Trump to roll-back the ban on US mine production.

[109] For example, Singapore’s only known producer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” See, PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015,

[110] “Nipun anti-personnel mines: Army gets weapons boost for Pakistan, China borders,” Hindustan Times, 21 December 2021,

[111] Manu Pubby, “Army wants 1 million mines from private sector,” The Economic Times, 3 October 2019,

[112] Joseph P. Chacko, “Israeli suicide drone HAROP to meet Indian Pinaka MRLS in Nagorno-Karabakh amid Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict,” Frontier India, 30 September 2022,; and “DRDO tests Pinaka Mark-II guided rocket system,” Frontier India, 5 November 2020,

[113] Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” Izvestia, 6 September 2021,

[114] In 2015, the POM-3 mine’s design engineers claimed the seismically-activated POM-3 mine would be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as it is activated by a sensor that detects the footfall of an individual, characterizes it against known signatures, and fires its warhead into the air. See, Igor Smirnov and Mikhail Zhukov, Directors of the Scientific Research Institute of the Engineering Department of Munitions, Mining, and Demining, interviewed on Zvezda TV, 20 November 2015, cited in “Russia Develops Landmine With ‘Electronic Brain’,” Defense World, 20 November 2015,; and “Perspective Anti-Personnel Mine POM-3 ‘Medallion’,” Military Review, 30 November 2015,

[115] Gibson, Neil (blueboy1969), “The new Russian modular munition (fragmentation mine), the MOB (МОБ), was seen by Fenix Insight in mid-September 2022, but could not be passed on due to various reasons.” 3 October 2022, 12:13 UTC. Tweet,

[116] The mine name “PMN-E” is a non-standard nomenclature used by Azerbaijan to refer to PMN-1 blast mines they claim are produced by Armenia. Further investigation is warranted to establish the provenance of these mines.

[117] Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense, “Mines buried by provocateurs of the Armenian armed forces were detected,” 17 September 2022,; and Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense, “Liberated territories of Azerbaijan are being cleared of Armenian mines,” 8 September 2022,

[118] Letter on behalf of Ararat Mirzoyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN, to the President of the Security Council, 13 September 2022,

[119] Previous lists of states with NSAG producers have included Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Low level production of victim-activated explosive devices in some other countries is suspected.

[120] The Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to the Monitor and the ICBL by the HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

[121] Three states not party, all in the Asia-Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga.

[122] In 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile was “less than” five million, but there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual landmines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.

[123] In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Section 3, Table 2. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database,

[124] Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Implementation Support Unit (ISU) press release, “Nearly 12,000 landmines destroyed by Sri Lanka under the Mine Ban Convention,” 1 October 2021,

[125] The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to “present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner.” Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019,

[126] Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 19 November 2020.

[127]Statement of Greece on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022,

[128] Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011,; statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2010,; and statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 2 December 2009.

[129] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 22 June 2021.

[130] Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.

[131] Colombian Armed Forces press release, “Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta 'Omega' ubicó depósito ilegal con casi dos mil minas antipersonales” (“Joint Task Force ‘Omega’ located illegal warehouse with almost two thousand antipersonnel mines”), 10 May 2022,

[132] According to their Article 7 transparency reports for 2021, Spain retains 976 mines, Belgium retains 967 mines, and Denmark retains 28 mines.

[133] Botswana, Brazil, and Uruguay all reported in 2020 that they destroyed their remaining retained mines (1,002; 364; and 260 respectively) during 2019. In 2018, Argentina and Ethiopia destroyed the entirety of their stockpiled mines retained for training and research, and the UK announced that its stockpile was comprised of inert munitions that do not fall under the scope of the treaty. Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report, which was originally due in 2012.

[134] States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Spain (976), Belgium (967), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), BiH (834), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), Japan (663), Slovakia (650), Italy (563), South Africa (545),  Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Cyprus (410), Portugal (383), Guyana (360), Republic of the Congo (322), Sudan (298), Côte d’Ivoire (290), Germany (279), Netherlands (270), Slovenia (229), Bhutan (211), Suriname (150), Tajikistan (138), Cabo Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100), The Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Rwanda (65), Ireland (51), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Denmark (28), Guinea-Bissau (9), South Sudan (8), Burundi (4), and DRC (2).

[135] States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines and reported use of retained mines in 2021: Denmark (1,702), Belgium (1,054), Sudan (230), Slovakia (224), Germany (186), Spain (145), Japan (56), South Africa (31), Cyprus (25), and Slovenia (20).

[136] States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines but did not report using any in 2021: Bhutan, Burundi, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Mozambique, Netherlands, Senegal, Tajikistan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[137] States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines that did not submit an Article 7 report for 2021: Benin, BiH, Cabo Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Mali, Mauritania, Portugal, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Suriname, and Togo.

[138] Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, Action 16,

[139] Ibid., Action 49.

[140] States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, The Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and UK.

[141] The 81 States Parties that submitted an Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2021 (as of 15 October 2022): Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Peru, Poland, Qatar, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain,  Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, UK, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[142] The 83 States Parties that have not submitted Article 7 reports for calendar year 2021 (as of 15 October 2022); those that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics:Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda,Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, BiH, Bulgaria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, CAR, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea,Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia,Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda,Ukraine, Vanuatu,and Venezuela.

[143] Morocco submitted voluntary transparency reports in 2006, 2008–2011, 2013, and 2017–2022.

[144] The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario). Polisario’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU) but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the UN, which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.