Landmine Monitor 2008

Ban Policy

Key Developments

Only one state joined the Mine Ban Treaty since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2007: Palau in November 2007. Three States Parties–Belarus, Greece, and Turkey–all of whom have very large stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, putting them in serious violation of the treaty. Three other States Parties completed stockpile destruction: Burundi, Sudan, and Afghanistan, which was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction, but completed it in October 2007. No use, production, or transfer of antipersonnel mines was recorded by any State Party during the reporting period (May 2007 to May 2008). States not party Myanmar and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines, as did non-state armed groups in at least nine countries. In May 2008, 107 states adopted the new Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions.


The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. Since entry into force, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later.[1] Outreach by States Parties to the treaty has helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 156 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 25 acceded.[2]

Adherence by year to the Ban Treaty
Ban Graph

Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2007 only one country joined the Mine Ban Treaty. Palau acceded on 18 November 2007, and the treaty entered into force on 1 May 2008.

Two states have signed but not yet ratified the treaty: Poland and the Marshall Islands. Poland has backed away from plans to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future. The Marshall Islands gave a positive signal by, for the second year in a row, voting in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution (Resolution 62/41) calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The year 2007 marked the ten-year anniversary of the negotiation and signing of the Mine Ban Treaty and a series of events was held to commemorate the anniversary and to promote its full implementation and universalization. Events included those held in Vienna (February), Geneva (March), Phnom Penh (March), Port Vila, Vanuatu (May), Brussels (May), Oslo (September), and Ottawa (December).

UN General Assembly Resolution 62/41

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 62/41 was adopted on 5 December 2007 by a vote of 164 in favor, none opposed, and 18 abstentions.[3] This is the highest number of votes in favor of this annual resolution since 1997 when it was first introduced.[4] Nineteen states not party to the treaty voted in favor. This included the two signatory countries and 17 non-signatories.[5]

Regional Developments

Africa: Somalia voted in favor of the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time.

Asia and the Pacific: In November 2007, Mongolia reiterated its intention to accede to the treaty soon, but it has not indicated that it will meet its goal of joining in 2008. Lao PDR voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time. Vietnam participated in more mine-oriented international meetings than in the past, and made its first statement at a Mine Ban Treaty meeting in June 2008 in Geneva, when it told States Parties that Vietnam has "joined the world community to welcome the various bans, moratoria and other restrictions already declared by States on anti-personnel landmines." Indonesia hosted an Asia regional meeting to promote universalization of the treaty in February 2008; six states not party participated, including Myanmar. Malaysia hosted an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum Seminar on Antipersonnel Mines in April 2008, attended by five states not party. In addition to acceding to the treaty in November 2007, Palau hosted a Pacific regional workshop aimed at universalization in August 2008. The Marshall Islands attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings for the first time in June 2008.

Commonwealth of Independent States: Kazakhstan voted for the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time.

Middle East and North Africa: In November 2007, the United Arab Emirates told Landmine Monitor it would join the treaty in the near future. Also in November 2007, an Omani official told the ICBL that the decision about accession was at cabinet level. A seminar for states of the Gulf Cooperation Council on antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war was held in Kuwait City in June 2007.

Non-state armed groups

A significant number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. This has taken place through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, signature to the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call,[6] and most recently through the "Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines" developed by the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines.

This declaration of adherence unilaterally commits the signatory to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on landmines, and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW) (see below), as well as customary international humanitarian law rules regarding use of mines and explosive devices. As of July 2008, it had been signed by three rebel groups in the Philippines.[7]

In October 2007, the United Jihad Council, a coalition of 18 armed groups in Kashmir, unilaterally issued a Declaration of a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines in Kashmir. This followed a Declaration for a Mine Free Kashmir in which some Kashmiri political parties called on all combatant groups in Kashmir to halt the use of antipersonnel mines, and requested international assistance for mine survivors and for mine clearance.

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in December 2007.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon.

In this reporting period, since May 2007, the armed forces of Myanmar and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. There were also serious allegations of use by the armed forces of Sri Lanka, but Landmine Monitor could not verify them.

Myanmar's military forces used antipersonnel mines extensively, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Mine use was recorded in Karen state and Pegu division.

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields. In discussions with Landmine Monitor since 2006, Russian officials have not stated that use of antipersonnel mines has stopped. Landmine Monitor will continue to cite Russia as an ongoing and active user of antipersonnel mines until an official denial is made and confirmed by the facts on the ground.

There have been allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the fighting in August 2008, but each side denies it. At the time of writing, Landmine Monitor had not yet been able to investigate or confirm the allegations.

Knowledgeable sources in Sri Lanka who wish to remain anonymous, including those engaged in mine action activities in the field, have alleged that Sri Lankan security forces have used antipersonnel landmines in 2007 and 2008. Although Landmine Monitor is not able to confirm the allegations, it considers this the first serious charge of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Sri Lanka since the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army have strongly denied the allegations when asked by Landmine Monitor.

Landmine Monitor also received allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Armenia, Pakistan, and Yemen, but could find no evidence to substantiate the claims.

Use by non-state armed groups

Use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs has declined modestly in recent years. However, NSAG use of antipersonnel mines still takes place in more countries than use by government forces.

In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least nine countries. NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was reported in five States Parties–Afghanistan, Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq, and Peru–and in four states not party to the treaty–India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Compared to the previous Landmine Monitor report, Lebanon and Russia (Chechnya) have been dropped from the list, and Ecuador, Peru, and Sri Lanka have been added. Landmine Monitor cited NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries in its 2007 report, 10 countries in its 2006 report, and 13 countries in its 2005 report.

Some NSAG use of antipersonnel mines may have taken place during the reporting period in Niger, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen, but Landmine Monitor has been unable to confirm use from available information.

Insurgent and rebel groups have been using IEDs in increasing numbers. An IED that is victim-activated–that explodes from the contact, presence or proximity of a person–is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated–where the user decides when to explode it–is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices is often in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently reported by the media, militaries, and governments as "landmines." This has led to some confusion, and Landmine Monitor has consistently attempted to determine if an IED was victim-activated, or detonated by some other means.

In Afghanistan, new use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs by the Taliban has been reported. A spokesperson for the Taliban reportedly confirmed the planting of new mines against the Afghan army and international forces.

In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) continued to be the largest user of landmines in the country, and among the largest in the world, causing hundreds of casualties each year. The overwhelming majority of devices are improvised, rather than factory-made mines. The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) also used mines.

In Ecuador, in March 2008, many FARC rebels reportedly died while fleeing through one of their own minefields during a Colombian military attack on a FARC camp in Sucumbíos province of Ecuador. In April 2008, the Ecuadorian army seized and destroyed landmines found in another FARC camp inside their border.

In India, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) has used victim-activated explosive devices in Manipur.

In Iraq, insurgent forces used command-detonated IEDs extensively but, according to both UN and Landmine Monitor data, only rarely used antipersonnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, or booby-traps. However, there are many documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines by Coalition and Iraqi Forces.

In Myanmar, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karenni Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Shan State Army-South (SSA), the Monland Restoration Party, the United Wa State Army, and several other NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines in 2007 and 2008. The Southern Shan State Army (SSS) of Wa warlord Maha Ja, not previously identified as a user of antipersonnel mines, was alleged to have used mines in this reporting period.

In Pakistan, NSAGs sporadically used antipersonnel mines in Balochistan, some districts of the North-West Frontier Province, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in attacks on Pakistani security forces and civil administration, and in sectarian, inter-tribal and inter-family conflicts.

In Peru, since early 2007, remnants of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as "explosive traps," around illegal coca fields in the Alto Huallaga sector, Huánuco region, and in the San Martín region.

In Sri Lanka, the army has repeatedly accused the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of planting antipersonnel mines. The army has reported encountering newly laid mines, and capturing newly manufactured mines.

In the Philippines, there were no confirmed instances of use of improvised antipersonnel mines, but the Armed Forces of the Philippines alleged that the New People's Army (NPA) used victim-activated explosive devices in July 2008 in Maco, Compostela Valley, and that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) used antipersonnel mines in North Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces in August 2008. NPA and MILF publicly rejected the allegations.

The government of Turkey continues to accuse the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) of using antipersonnel mines.[8] In May 2008, Turkish officials showed an ICBL mission photos of VS-50 mines they said were seized from the PKK as recently as March 2008. According to media reports, the PKK is regularly using command-detonated IEDs in attacks on security personnel. These explosive attacks have frequently been reported as "landmines" in the Turkish media, but Landmine Monitor was only able to identify one media report in which an incident attributed to recent use by the PKK appeared to have been the result of a victim-activated antipersonnel mine or IED.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Algeria, the Temporary Security Zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Iran, Lebanon, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, and Yemen.

NSAGs reportedly used command-detonated IEDs in Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, El Salvador, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.[9] Thirty-eight states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines,[10] including four countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel, and Poland. Taiwan, which announced several years ago that it had stopped production, passed legislation banning production in June 2006.

Landmine Monitor identifies 13 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United States, and Vietnam. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period.[11]

China: In April 2008, several sources in Beijing told Landmine Monitor that facilities to produce antipersonnel mines are idle, have shut down, or have been converted for production of other products such as plastic materials. They said this reflected several factors: the existence of adequate stockpiles for China's own use; the government's policy not to export antipersonnel mines; and the lack of demand internationally for CCW-compliant antipersonnel mines. One official noted that production began to decrease in 1996, when China announced its moratorium on export, and continued to diminish until coming to a halt in recent years, although these companies retain some technicians and a limited production capacity.

India: The country is actively engaged in the production of detectable versions of M14 antipersonnel mines that are compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II. India has informed Landmine Monitor that it does not produce remotely-delivered mines.

Nepal: Officials have given conflicting information about production of antipersonnel mines, with some military and political officials acknowledging domestic production, but others–more recently–denying it. In 2007 and 2008, two different army officials insisted that there was no past or current production of antipersonnel mines. In 2007, a Nepal Army spokesperson denied any mine production, while acknowledging that soldiers frequently made command-detonated IEDs at barracks using obsolete weapons such as mortar shells, rockets, bombs, and antivehicle mines. In 2008, another army official told Landmine Monitor that Nepal did not produce or use any victim-activated mines or IEDs.

Pakistan: In November 2007, Pakistan reported that it planned incorporation of self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms in its future production of antipersonnel mines, in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II. The protocol requires that all remotely-delivered mines have self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms. Pakistan reported in 2002 that it was developing a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, but has provided no further details.

South Korea: In 2007 it was reported to Landmine Monitor that the Hanwha Corporation, a private company, produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, designated KM 74, which can be set to self-destruct 48 hours after deployment. In June 2008, South Korea told Landmine Monitor that a government-managed research project on alternatives to antipersonnel mines is scheduled for 2009-2012.

US: In May 2008, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army stated that the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition would be procured in a configuration that only allowed command detonation. Previously, the Spider system contained a feature that would permit it to function in a victim-activated mode, making it incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. This would have constituted the first production of antipersonnel mines by the US since 1997. However, research and development continues on the Intelligent Munitions System which contains a victim-activated capability. Legislation has been introduced in the Congress that would block production of the systems.

Vietnam: In May 2008, representatives of the army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a visiting Canadian governmental delegation that Vietnam has not produced mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official also emphasized that Vietnam reserves the right to use and produce landmines in the future.

Production by NSAGs

Compared to a decade ago, very few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel landmines. This is directly linked to the halt in trade and production, and the destruction of stocks, brought about by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs have access to the mine stocks of previous regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), but most armed groups today produce their own improvised mines.

The LTTE probably produce the most sophisticated antipersonnel mines among NSAGs. In March 2008, a Sri Lanka Army officer told Landmine Monitor the LTTE had started producing and using antipersonnel mines with an electronic antihandling feature. NSAGs in Colombia, India, Myanmar, and Peru are known to produce victim-activated improvised mines.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. In this reporting period, there were only a small number of reports of such trafficking in antipersonnel mines.

In July 2007, the UN Monitoring Group on the arms embargo on Somalia reported that at the Bakaraaha arms market, Mohamed Omar Habeeb "Dheere," the mayor of Mogadishu, purchased "a variety of anti-tank mines and antipersonnel mines" between November and December 2006. It also reported new information about two alleged shipments of antipersonnel mines in July 2006 from Eritrea (a State Party) to Somalia. The Monitoring Group's reports in July 2007 and April 2008 cited several other transactions of unspecified types of mines.

Antipersonnel mines were reportedly available on the clandestine market in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Ugandan authorities reportedly seized several caches of antipersonnel mines, which were being trafficked from Sudan to the DRC.

In December 2007, the US extended its comprehensive antipersonnel mine export moratorium until 2014. In July 2008, Israel extended its export moratorium for another three years. A significant number of other states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have formal export moratoria including China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, and South Korea. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, more than 130 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that 44 countries stockpile about 176 million antipersonnel mines.

States Parties

As of August 2008, 144 of the 156 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have stated that they do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. An additional four states have not yet formally declared the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines: Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Haiti, and Palau. Eighty-three States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles.[12] Sixty-one States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.[13]

States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 42 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 500,000 since the publication of the previous Landmine Monitor report.[14] The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are Burundi (March 2008), Sudan (March 2008), and Afghanistan, which was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction, but completed it in October 2007.

While compliance with this core obligation of the treaty has been excellent, this record has been tarnished recently by three States Parties–Belarus, Greece, and Turkey–that missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008. They each have very large stockpiles and both Belarus and Turkey have so far failed to indicate when they expect to comply with their obligations. Greece wrote to the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties that it would complete the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines no later than 28 May 2009.[15] While all three remain in serious violation of the treaty, the ICBL has been particularly critical of Greece, which as of August 2008 had not destroyed a single stockpiled mine.

About 14 million antipersonnel mines remain to be destroyed by six to eight States Parties, including Belarus (3.37 million), Greece (1.6 million), Indonesia (10,894), Kuwait (87,582), Turkey (2.5 million), and Ukraine (6.45 million).

It is not clear if Ethiopia and Iraq have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. In its initial Article 7 report, dated 31 July 2008, Iraq stated that while it had not yet identified any stockpiles, "this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report." Ethiopia has not made any statements on the subject, and its latest Article 7 report does not include a Form B (for reporting on stockpiled mines). However, it did report on destruction of some stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 2004 and 2007.

Stockpile destruction deadlines


1 March 2008


1 March 2008


1 March 2008


1 June 2009


1 June 2010


1 August 2011


1 January 2012


1 February 2012

States not party

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (estimated 24.5 million), and the US (10.4 million). Other states with very large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million) and India (estimated 4-5 million).

Poland, a signatory state, declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2007. In April 2008, it said that it would destroy 750,000 of the mines within three to four years.

China has reported that, from 1 October 2006 to 31 August 2007, the People's Liberation Army destroyed more than 50 tons (50,000kg) of old and obsolete stockpiled antipersonnel mines and other munitions that did not meet the technical requirements of CCW Amended Protocol II or were of too little value to modify.

In November 2007, a Russian official said that "during previous years" about 9 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed. It appears that in recent years Russia has been destroying about one million mines per year.

In May 2008, a Vietnamese army official informed a Canadian delegation that Vietnam's stockpile of antipersonnel mines will expire in a few years, and stated that Vietnam has gradually started to destroy the mines.

Non-state armed groups

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uganda. NSAGs were reported to possess stocks of victim-activated improvised mines in Colombia, Ecuador, India, and Peru. Most often, Landmine Monitor identifies whether an NSAG possesses stocks through reports of seizures by government forces.

Several NSAGs which have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment revealed information on or destroyed some stocks of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Polisario Front destroyed 2,000 antipersonnel mines in May 2008 in Western Sahara. In Somalia, in July 2008, the Puntland Mine Action Center destroyed 48 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. On 1 September 2008, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan destroyed 392 stockpiled antipersonnel mines at Koya in northern Iraq. In Myanmar, the Lahu Democratic Front informed Geneva Call that it had destroyed 34 mines from its stockpile.

Reporting on and destroying captured, seized, or newly discovered stockpiles

Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: "When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, [all States Parties will] report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information, and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority." States Parties took this a step further by agreeing to adopt a modified voluntary reporting format for Form B for reporting on these mines.

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive turned-in arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period, there have been official or media reports of discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Peru, Tajikistan, and Uganda. Afghanistan and Tajikistan provided information on this in their Article 7 reports, but the other states did not.

Afghanistan reported that 81,595 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 2007, including many that were discovered, seized, or received through turn-ins during the year. The mines were destroyed in 114 events at 22 different sites, all by open detonation. Some destruction events occurred in November and December after the announcement in October that the stockpile destruction program was completed. The type and number of mines destroyed in each location, and the dates of destruction, have been recorded in detail in Afghanistan's latest Article 7 report in Forms F and G.

In its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2007, Tajikistan included a great amount of information on antipersonnel mines discovered and destroyed after completion of its stockpile destruction deadline using the new optional form B2. Sometime in 2006, 49,152 PFM-1S remotely-delivered blast mines and 100 "blocks" of POM remotely-delivered fragmentation mines were transferred by Tajik border protection forces to Russian forces in Tajikistan for destruction. These stocks were destroyed in October 2006 by the order of the Russian Federation Federal Border Service. Tajikistan also reported two other cases where mines were "confiscated or detected" by Tajik armed forces.

In June 2007, Algerian Army intelligence agencies reportedly seized about 2,500 antipersonnel mines from a house in the city of Maghnia, Tlemcen province in western Algeria. The mines were alleged to have been brought in by networks of smugglers from the Moroccan border, and were destined for "the terrorist groups in the mountains of Tizi Ouzou" in central Algeria. This would constitute the largest seizure Landmine Monitor has ever seen reported. Algeria has not officially reported the matter.

Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)

Of the 156 States Parties, 71 retain a total of approximately 216,000 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.[16] There were three additions to this list as states submitted their initial Article 7 reports and declared that they would retain mines: Ethiopia (303), Indonesia (4,978), and Iraq (1,234).

The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.[17] Another 23 States Parties retain fewer than 1,000 mines.[18] At least 80 States Parties have chosen not to retain any antipersonnel mines. Suriname and Tajikistan joined this group by destroying all their antipersonnel mines previously retained for training. Other additions included Kuwait and São Tomé e Príncipe, which declared in their initial Article 7 reports that they will not retain mines.

Four States Parties account for nearly 30% of all retained mines: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Turkey. Of these, only Brazil consumed mines in 2007. A further six States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Australia, Belarus, Croatia, Greece, Serbia, and Sweden. Of these, only Australia, Croatia, and Sweden consumed mines in 2007. See table below for details.

In 2007, 35 States Parties reported consuming 14,758 mines for training and research purposes.[19] At least 38 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in 2007.[20] Fourteen countries have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since entry-into-force for that country: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Djibouti, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia.

States Parties with highest number of retained mines under Article 3

State Party

No. of

No. of mines
consumed in
training activities
in 2007
































In addition to mines consumed in training activities, a number of States Parties decided to reduce their number of retained mines as excessive to their need. Ecuador decided to cut its number of retained mines in half, destroying 1,001 mines and leaving 1,000. Thailand, in addition to consuming 63 mines in training activities, decided to destroy another 1,000 retained mines because they were no longer deemed necessary leaving a total of 3,650. Ukraine decided to reduce its number of retained mine significantly, destroying 847 PMN and 880 PMN-2 mines and leaving 223. Zambia destroyed 1,226 retained mines, leaving 2,232. Sudan, which completed its stockpile destruction in March 2008, decided to retain 4,979 mines instead of 10,000.

Five States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines. Four are not thought to have any antipersonnel mines, but have not yet submitted an Article 7 report formally declaring that fact: Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and Palau. In past years, the DRC has stated that reporting on mines retained for training purposes was "not applicable," but in 2008 instead stated that information on retained mines was not yet available.

Only 15 States Parties made use of the expanded voluntary Form D to report on the intended purposes and actual uses of mines retained: Afghanistan, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Peru, Rwanda, Tajikistan, and the United Kingdom.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an impressive 97%. This compares to 96% in 2006 and 2005, 91% in 2004, 88% in 2003, and 75% in 2002.

Seven States Parties have submitted initial reports in this reporting period: Cook Islands, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Montenegro, and São Tomé e Príncipe.

Only one State Party has a pending deadline for an initial report: Palau (28 October 2008). Four States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports: Cape Verde (deadline: 30 April 2002), Equatorial Guinea (28 August 1999), the Gambia (28 August 2003), and Haiti (28 January 2007).

As of late August 2008, only 85 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2007, four more than submitted reports for calendar year 2006. A total of 59 States Parties have not submitted updates.[21] This equates to a compliance rate of 59%.[22]

Several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports as a demonstration of their commitment to the goals of the Mine Ban Treaty.[23] Mongolia submitted its first voluntary report in September 2007. Poland, a signatory, has submitted voluntary reports each year since 2003, most recently in April 2008. Morocco submitted its second report in April 2008; like its first submission in August 2006, the report does not provide details on any stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka submitted a report in 2005. Other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and China.

National Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, "Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited" by the treaty.

Only 57 of 156 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.[24] This is an increase of four State Parties in this reporting period: Cook Islands, Jordan, Latvia, and Mauritania.

A total of 27 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway. Kuwait, Palau, and Vanuatu initiated the process in the past year.[25]

A total of 38 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.[26] Indonesia joined this category in the past year. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 34 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.[27]

Special Issues of Concern

For many years, the ICBL has identified special issues of concern regarding interpretation and implementation of aspects of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. These have included: what acts are permitted or not under the treaty's ban on assistance with prohibited acts, especially in the context of joint military operations with non-States Parties; foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines; the applicability of the treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices; and the acceptable number of mines retained for training purposes.

Ever since the treaty entered force in 1999, States Parties have regularly discussed these issues at the intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties, and many have tried to reach common understandings, as urged by the ICBL and the International Committee of the Red Cross.[28] States Parties agreed in the Nairobi Action Plan in 2004, and in the subsequent Progress Reports from the annual meetings of States Parties, that there should be ongoing discussion and exchange of views on these matters.[29]

However, too few states have expressed their views in recent years, especially with respect to Articles 1 and 2.

Ecuador stated in a July 2007 response to a Landmine Monitor questionnaire that it has never participated in a joint military operation with states not party to the treaty, it has never received a request for the transit of antipersonnel mines, it has not produced antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and it views 1,000 as the acceptable limit for the number of mines retained for training.

In July 2008, BiH responded to a Landmine Monitor inquiry on these matters. It stated that during joint military operations with its allies, it cannot be engaged in the process of planning and preparing military action where antipersonnel mines will be used. It also said that it will consider ways to ensure that mines such as TMRP-6 antivehicle mines with tilt rods cannot be victim activated and function as antipersonnel mines.[30]

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, no country spoke on Article 1, but five spoke on Article 2: Austria, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, and Zambia.[31]

Austria expressed its view that if a mine explodes from the presence, proximity or contact of a person, it is banned, regardless of any other purpose or design of the mine, and that States Parties should remove any such mines from their inventories and destroy them. It stated its willingness to have States Parties elaborate a formal understanding on the matter.

Canada stated that any mine that can be victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited. The Netherlands agreed that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices that can explode from the unintentional act of a person.

Norway also stressed that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine, that can explode from human contact, is banned. It stated, "It does not matter whether the main purpose of usage for that mine is directed toward vehicles. It does not matter whether it is called something else than anti-personnel mine." It called for the issue to be dealt with directly within the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Zambia stated that it joins others in calling for a common understanding that any mine that can be set off unintentionally by a person, thereby functioning as an antipersonnel mine, is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive anti-handling devices. It also stated its understanding that transit of antipersonnel mines is prohibited, and that participation in joint military operations must be in adherence with the treaty.

For detailed information on States Parties policies and practices on these matters of interpretation and implementation, which the ICBL considers essential to the integrity of the Mine Ban Treaty, see past editions of Landmine Monitor.

Eighth Meeting of States Parties

States Parties, observer states, and other participants met for the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty at the Dead Sea, Jordan, from 18-22 November 2007. In its assessment, the ICBL said, "The meeting has served to reinvigorate the mine ban community and reaffirm commitment to finish the task we began 10 years ago when the Mine Ban Treaty was signed."[32] It labeled the treaty a "success in progress," and stressed the unique ongoing cooperation between states, civil society, UN agencies, and the ICRC on the issue. It also expressed its appreciation that the meeting was held in and presided over by a mine-affected country.

On the opening day, Palau announced its accession to the treaty. The meeting generated considerable momentum in the Middle East region, with Kuwait and Iraq acceding in the run-up. Twenty countries not yet party to the treaty participated as observers, including seven from the Middle East, demonstrating the continuing spread of the international norm against antipersonnel mines.[33]

The meeting produced a strong Dead Sea Progress Report, which, in addition to reviewing progress in the past year, highlighted priority areas of work for the coming year. This built on Progress Reports from the previous two years, and the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009 adopted at the First Review Conference (Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World) in November-December 2004.

A template for requesting an extension of the mine clearance deadline was adopted, as was a proposal to amend the Article 7 reporting format to facilitate reporting on stockpiled mines discovered after destruction deadlines have passed.

New co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the Standing Committees were selected for the period until the next annual meeting, which was to be held in Geneva under the Presidency of Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland from 24-28 November 2008, as set out in the table below.

Standing Committee co-chairs and co-rapporteurs in 2007-2008

Standing Committee



General Status and Operation

Germany and Kenya

Chile and Japan

Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies

Canada and Peru

Argentina and Australia

Stockpile Destruction

Lithuania and Serbia

Italy and Zambia

Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration

Cambodia and New Zealand

Belgium and Thailand


Discussions focused on the two crucial aspects of implementation at this point in the life of the treaty–victim assistance and mine clearance–with particular emphasis on the upcoming clearance deadlines and the process for possible extensions. The clear sense of the meeting was that extension requests will be carefully studied and there will be no "rubber-stamped" approvals.

The ICBL identified several disappointing aspects of the meeting, most notably that, based on statements, more than half of the states with clearance deadlines in 2009 and 2010 were unlikely to meet them. In addition, there continued to be very little meaningful discussion on the inconsistent interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2, regarding acts permitted under the treaty's prohibition on "assistance" and mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes.

Participation in the meeting was high–nearly 800 people–with a total of 115 country delegations attending, including delegations from 95 States Parties.[34] The range of participants–diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners and landmine survivors–again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem.

More than 250 members of the ICBL attended. For the first time, a parallel session was held that was entirely facilitated by mine survivors. Also for the first time, youth from 30 countries participated in a parallel model review conference and adopted a Jordan Action Plan. The Jordanian government sponsored a field visit the day before the meeting began, and the week was packed with an array of side events.

Implementation and intersessional work program

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty's provisions. Structures created to monitor progress toward implementation and to allow discussion among States Parties include the annual meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program with its four Standing Committees, a coordinating committee, and contact groups on universalization of the treaty, Articles 7 and 9, resource utilization, and linking mine action and development.

The intersessional Standing Committees met for one week in June 2008. Details on Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various thematic sections. One session was devoted to preparations for the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008. Cambodia and Colombia each offered to host the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2010.

Among the many side events were briefings on CCW Protocol V and on the new Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted the week before in Dublin, Ireland, by 107 countries.

The Oslo Process and the Convention on Cluster Munitions

With the failure of the CCW Third Review Conference in November 2006 to adequately address cluster munitions (see below), Norway announced it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. It subsequently held the first meeting in the "Oslo Process" in February 2007, where 46 states committed themselves to conclude a new international treaty banning cluster munitions "that cause unacceptable harm to civilians" by 2008. A "Core Group" of nations took responsibility for the initiative, including Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Peru.

At the first follow-up meeting in Lima, Peru, in May 2007, a draft treaty text was distributed and discussed. Additional sessions to develop the treaty took place in Vienna, Austria, in December 2007 and Wellington, New Zealand, in February 2008. A total of about 140 countries participated in at least one of these Oslo Process preparatory meetings. Regional meetings to build support for the treaty were also held in Costa Rica in September 2007, Serbia in October 2007 (for affected states), Zambia in April 2008, and Thailand in April 2008 (sponsored by the ICRC).

Formal negotiations were held in Dublin, Ireland from 19-30 May 2008. At the conclusion, all 107 of the participating states adopted the new Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. An additional 20 states attended the negotiations as observers. The convention will be open for signature in Oslo on 3 December 2008.

The Cluster Munition Coalition and the ICBL praised the new treaty as one that will save thousands of lives for decades to come. Like the Mine Ban Treaty, it takes an integrated approach to the cluster munition problem, and requires clearance of contaminated areas as well as assistance to survivors and affected communities. The victim assistance provisions are especially laudable and much stronger than those included in the Mine Ban Treaty. Efforts to weaken the treaty with exceptions for certain cluster munitions, and to have a transition period allowing use of banned weapons for a number of years, were defeated. The most highly criticized aspect of the new convention is a provision that could be seen by some as a loophole allowing States Parties to assist in some way with the use of cluster munitions by states not party to the treaty in joint military operations.

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Amended Protocol II

CCW Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the 1996 protocol gave impetus to the "Ottawa Process" that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 91 states were party to Amended Protocol II as of August 2008. Just 10 of the 91 have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US.[35] Thus, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries.

The nine-year deadline for states that chose to defer compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines and the requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines, as provided in the Technical Annex, was 3 December 2007. China, Latvia, Pakistan, and Russia deferred on detectability, while Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine deferred on self-destruction and self-deactivation.[36]

In its September 2007 Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, China stated that it had met its December deadline to comply with the protocol's technical specifications. In November 2007, China stated that it had made technical modification to or destroyed stockpiled antipersonnel mines which failed to meet the requirements of the protocol. It has provided few additional details.

Pakistan stated in November 2007 that it had made all the necessary technical changes to be compliant with the protocol, but it provided no details.

A Russian official said in November 2007, "By the end of this year a set of measures to implement requirements of the Protocol...will be nearing its completion. In particular, a national system of technical requirements to land mines, including anti-personnel ones, will be finalized and adopted for practical application, a planned disposal of obsolete types of mines is being carried out..."[37] Russia has not subsequently announced completion of the work, and over the years has provided few details about how it is complying with the technical requirements of the protocol.

Latvia's deferral is presumably irrelevant since it already destroyed its stockpile as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has retained some mines for training purposes. Belarus was obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008, but has not yet complied. Ukraine is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010.

Protocol V

Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War is intended to address the post-conflict dangers posed by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance. It was adopted in December 2003 and entered into force on 12 November 2006. As of August 2008, 46 states had ratified the protocol.[38] The first annual meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva in November 2007, and an intersessional meeting was held in July 2008.

Cluster munitions

At the Third CCW Review Conference held in Geneva from 7-17 November 2006, States Parties rejected a proposal to begin negotiations within the CCW on a "legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions" and instead agreed to a weak mandate to continue discussions on ERW, with a focus on cluster munitions, in 2007.

CCW's Group of Governmental Experts met for one week in June 2007 with the sole substantive topic being cluster munitions. However, the outcome was again weak, with a statement that the Group "without prejudice to the outcome, recommends to the [November 2007 Meeting of States Parties] to decide how best to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions as a matter of urgency, including the possibility of a new instrument. Striking the right balance between military and humanitarian considerations should be part of the decision."[39]

During the week-long November 2007 meeting, a proposal from the European Union to negotiate in 2008 a legally binding instrument that prohibits cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians was rejected. States considered several ever-weaker proposals to begin negotiations on cluster munitions in 2008, and settled for an agreement to "negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations." The mandate did not specify that negotiations should lead to a new legally binding protocol, or include any kind of prohibition, and had no timeline.

Meetings were held in accordance with the mandate on 14-18 January, 7-11 April, 7-25 July, and 1-5 September 2008. By the end of the September session, the chairperson had developed a draft protocol text, but there were still wildly divergent views on the need for a protocol and what it should contain. The outcome of the year-long negotiations, to be decided at the annual meeting of States Parties in November 2008, remained unclear.


[1] For a state that ratifies (having become a signatory prior to 1 March 1999) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for that state on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which it deposited its instrument of ratification with the Depositary. That state (now a party) is then required to make its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and destroy antipersonnel mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

[2] The 25 accessions include Montenegro, which technically "succeeded" to the treaty after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro. Of the 131 ratifications, 43 came on or before entry into force of the treaty on 1 March 1999 and 88 came afterward.

[3] Eighteen states abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 62/41 in December 2007: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

[4] Voting results by year on the annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38A)—142 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77N)—147 in favor, none against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54B)" 139 in favor, one against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33V)—143 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24M)—138 in favor, none against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74)—143 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53)—153 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2004 (Resolution 59/84)" 157 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2005 (Resolution 60/80)" 158 in favor, none against, 17 abstaining; 2006 (Resolution 61/84) 161 in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstaining.

[5]Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tonga, and the United Arab Emirates. Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, and Somalia voted in favor for the first time. Nepal and North Korea abstained from voting for the first time. Nepal had voted in favor of the resolution in previous years, except for 2004 and 2006 when it was absent. North Korea had been absent from every previous vote. For the December 2007 vote, ten States Parties were absent (Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kiribati, Seychelles, Timor-Leste, Uganda, and Vanuatu). Two states not party were absent (Saudi Arabia and Tuvalu). Tuvalu has supported the resolution in the past, while Saudi Arabia has always been absent.

[6] Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action. Geneva Call has received signatures from NSAGs in Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara.

[7] In February 2008, the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao/Revolutionary People's Army (RPMM/RPA) was the first group to sign the declaration, followed by the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary People's Army (RPMP/RPA) (Nilo de la Cruz faction) in May 2008, and the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas (MLPP) and its Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (RHB) military wing in July 2008.

[8] The PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel is listed as a terrorist organization by Australia, Canada, the EU, NATO, US, and the UK.

[9] There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture.

[10] Thirty-four States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.

[11] Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor has removed Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories.

[12] As of 15 August 2008, the following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Republic of Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the UK, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[13] New to this list is São Tomé e Príncipe. The following States Parties have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu. A number of these apparently had stockpiles in the past, but used or destroyed them prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty including Eritrea, Rwanda, and Senegal.

[14] In addition, Iraq reported in July 2008 that it had destroyed 200,125 stockpiled antipersonnel mines since 2003, but did not indicate how many in the past year.

[15] "Achieving the Aims of the Nairobi Action Plan: the Geneva Progress Report 2007-2008," Draft, Geneva, 18 August 2008, para. 22.

[16] At least 4 States Parties reported acquiring or discovering previously unknown antipersonnel mines for training and research in 2007, including Serbia (increase of 5,507), BiH (212), Canada (increase of 22), and Bulgaria (12).

[17] Thirty-eight States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bhutan, BiH, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

[18] Twenty-three States Parties retain less than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Benin, Burundi, Colombia, Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, the UK, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.

[19] The following 35 States Parties reported consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2007: Afghanistan (626), Argentina (91), Australia (135), Belgium (282), Brazil (1,169), Burundi (1,668), Chile (331), Croatia (76), Ecuador (1,001), France (18), Germany (90), Ireland (5), Italy (29), Japan (565), Jordan (50), Latvia (3), Luxembourg (45), Netherlands (219), Peru (12), Portugal (335), Rwanda (36), Slovakia (5), Slovenia (1), Spain (40), Suriname (146), Sweden (2,967), Tajikistan (105), Tanzania (322), Thailand (1,063), Ukraine (1,727), the UK (4), Uruguay (240), Yemen (240), Zambia (1,226), and Zimbabwe (100).

[20] The following 38 States Parties did not report consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2007: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and Venezuela. In 2006, a total of 44 States Parties did not report consuming any mines; in 2005, 51 did not consume any mines; in 2004, 36 did not consume any mines; in 2003, 26 did not consume any mines; and in 2002, 29 did not consume any mines.

[21] The 59 States Parties not submitting updates were: Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, the Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, and Uganda.

[22] The rate of compliance for annual reports for calendar year 2006 was 54%, for calendar year 2005 was 62%, for calendar year 2004 was 65%, for calendar year 2003 was 78%, and for calendar year 2002 was 62%.

[23] While still signatories, a number of current States Parties submitted voluntary reports, including Cameroon in 2001, the Gambia in 2002 and Lithuania in 2002. When not a State Party, Latvia submitted voluntary reports in 2003, 2004, and 2005.

[24] A total of 57 States Parties have enacted implementation legislation: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, BiH, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Peru, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[25] Legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in the following states: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Chile, DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, and Uganda. Others reported to be in progress more recently include: Brunei, Ecuador, Haiti, Kuwait, Palau, and Vanuatu.

[26] A total of 38 States Parties have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider that new legislation is necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belarus, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Venezuela.

[27] The 34 states without progress toward national implementation measures include: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, the Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Iraq, Liberia, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, São Tomé e Principe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uruguay.

[28] The Final Report and President's Action Program agreed upon at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok in September 2003 states that "the meeting called upon States Parties to continue to share information and views, particularly with respect to articles 1, 2, and 3, with a view to developing understandings on various matters by the First Review Conference." The co-chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention (Mexico and the Netherlands) at the February and June 2004 intersessional meetings undertook significant consultations on reaching understandings or conclusions on these issues, but a number of States Parties remained opposed, and no formal understanding was reached at the First Review Conference.

[29] The Nairobi Action Plan for 2005-2009 indicates that the States Parties will "exchange views and share their experiences in a cooperative and informal manner on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3, to continue to promote effective and consistent application of these provisions."

[30] Specifically, it said that the BiH Ministry of Defense "does not mean that TMRP-6 antivehicle mine is not considered under definition of antipersonnel mines. This mine is intended for incapacitating and demolition of enemy armored and other combat and transport vehicles....this mine could be activated by human touch, but this way is one of way activated. Further, the BiH Ministry of Defence will consider correct legal mechanism how to reduce use of this mine in order to remove possibility for the mine to be activated by the human being [sic]."

[31] Norway provided written remarks available at Other remarks are taken from Landmine Monitor (HRW) notes. All were made to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 6 June 2008.

[32] ICBL, "Eighth Meeting of States Parties Reinvigorates Mine Ban Treaty," 22 November 2007,

[33] Some of the more notable "holdouts" attended, including China, Egypt, India, Laos, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Others included Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates.

[34] The 95 total includes Iraq, Kuwait, and Palau, for which the treaty had not yet entered into force at the time.

[35] Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland is party to Amended Protocol II. Though it has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, as a signatory, it cannot do anything contrary to the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, so is already bound by a higher standard than Amended Protocol II.

[36] Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Amended Protocol II States Parties Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US. The Mine Ban Treaty required Belarus, Greece and Turkey to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the UK have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.

[37] Statement of the Russian Federation, Ninth Annual Meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2007.

[38] Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2007, 14 additional states ratified Protocol V: Austria, BiH, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Madagascar, Moldova, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[39] Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, "Procedural Report, Annex III: Recommendation," CCW/GGE/2007/3, 9 August 2007, p. 6.