Landmine Monitor 2023

Banning Antipersonnel Mines

Jump to a specific section of the chapter:

Use | Universalization | Production | Transfers | Stockpiles | Transparency


Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty seeks to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel landmines. The treaty’s 164 States Parties are currently half-way through the third decade of its implementation. While the prohibitions on antipersonnel mines enshrined in the Mine Ban Treaty remain fit for purpose, they are being tested from the inside and out.

The last accessions to the Mine Ban Treaty were more than five years ago, in 2017. There were few signs of progress toward more states joining the treaty in the reporting period, from mid-2022 through October 2023. However, universalization efforts received a high-level boost in July 2023, when United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres released “A New Agenda for Peace,” a policy brief urging UN member states to work to “achieve universality of treaties banning inhumane and indiscriminate weapons” including the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]

As the Philippines noted at the treaty’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2023, there is a need to pay attention to “universalizing the norms” established through the Mine Ban Treaty by promoting the stigma against any use of the weapon by any actor.

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since its all-out invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. This has resulted in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

The treaty’s strict prohibition on use of antipersonnel mines has been violated by a State Party only twice: by Yemen in 2011–2012 at Bani Jarmooz, north of Sanaa, during the uprising that led to the ousting of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh; and by Ukraine, with evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces used rocket-delivered PFM antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when it was occupied by Russian forces.

As in every year since it was first published in 1999, this annual Landmine Monitor report documents continued use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar also used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. Use by NSAGs was also recorded in State Party Colombia and state not party India. This new use mostly involved improvised antipersonnel mines, also known as victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The use of antipersonnel landmines in States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty highlights the importance of ensuring that appropriate national implementation measures, especially legislation, are in place to enforce the treaty’s provisions with penal sanctions and fines.

All except two States Parties have now completed their stockpile destruction obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, destroying a combined total of 55 million antipersonnel landmines. No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by Greece or Ukraine in the reporting period. Greece told the treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2023 that it was transferring its remaining stocks to Croatia, where they would be destroyed over the next 18 months. Ukraine meanwhile reported that storage sites where its 3.3 million PFM-series antipersonnel mines were once held had come “under air and missile attack” by Russia or are located in territories being liberated. Ukraine requested time to conduct audit and verification of the stocks.[2]

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continues its work to ensure the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, working in close partnership with its dedicated community of states, UN agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by State Party Ukraine and by states not party Myanmar and Russia during the reporting period, as detailed below.

NSAGs in at least five countries—Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Tunisia—also used antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period.[3] Additionally, new landmine use has been attributed to some groups in countries in or bordering the Sahel region of Africa.[4]

Use by government forces


Ukraine is severely contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from the armed conflict that began in 2014 and escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022.[5] Landmines have been documented in 11 of Ukraine’s 27 regions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.[6]

Russian forces have used at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine since February 2022.

Use by Ukrainian forces

There is credible information that Ukrainian government forces used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when the city was under Russian control.[7] In January 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that 9M27K3 Uragan rockets carrying PFM-series antipersonnel mines were fired into Russian-occupied areas near Russian military facilities in and around Izium during 2022, causing at least 11 civilian casualties.[8]

In a report to the Human Rights Council in March 2023, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said that it “has found instances where Ukrainian armed forces likely used cluster munitions and rocket-delivered antipersonnel landmines to carry out attacks in Izium city, Kharkiv region, from March to September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian armed forces.”[9] The commission reported that “Ukrainian armed forces were at that time stationed within striking distance of such rockets” and said that it “found it likely that Ukrainian armed forces have committed indiscriminate attacks, in violation of international humanitarian law.”

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Oleksandr Polishchuk responded in November 2022 to a request from HRW to confirm evidence that showed Ukraine’s use of PFM antipersonnel mines. He stated in a letter that Ukrainian authorities cannot comment on the types of weapons used during the armed conflict “before the end of the war and the restoration of our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”[10] The deputy defense minister also stated that “Ukraine is a reliable member of the international community, and it fully commits to all international obligations in the sphere of mine usage. This includes the non-use of anti-personnel mines in the war.”[11]

On 31 January 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the findings by HRW “will be duly studied by the competent authorities of Ukraine.”[12] At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2023, Ukraine promised to examine reports that its forces had used antipersonnel mines.[13] During the meeting, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) welcomed Ukraine’s commitment to launch an inquiry, provide regular updates, and engage with the Mine Ban Treaty president and members of its Committee on Cooperative Compliance.

In June 2023, HRW reported further evidence of Ukrainian use of PFM antipersonnel mines.[14] In May 2023, an individual working in eastern Ukraine—where the Ukrainian government had restored control after Russian forces left—posted photographs online showing multiple remnants of artillery rockets recovered during clearance operations. After close inspection of the markings on the remnants, HRW identified two 9N128K3 warhead sections of 9M27K3 Uragan 220mm rockets, which each contain 9N223 “blocks,” or stacks, of 9N212 PFM-1S antipersonnel blast mines in cassettes.[15] Analysis of handwriting on the side of one warhead section showed a first word in Ukrainian which translates as “from,” and a second word, written in Latin script, relating to an organization based in Kyiv.

A photograph posted on social media in August 2022 that bears the watermark of a Kyiv-based non-governmental organization (NGO)—posted by an individual thought to run the NGO, which had made a monetary donation to Ukraine’s war effort—showed the same warhead section of an Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket recovered from agricultural land. Markings specifying the batch, year, and factory, and the same handwriting and phrases, match those in the photographs assessed by HRW.[16] The post also showed the warhead sections of two other Uragan 9M27K3 rockets with phrases written on them. In total, at least 15 photographs have been posted online of the Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rockets.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian officials have alleged that Russia has used PFM antipersonnel mines.[17] Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series mines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.[18] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.[19] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft had scattered PFM mines in the Sumy region in March 2022.[20] Similar reports surfaced in April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.[21] The UK and the United States (US) have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.[22]

Use by Russian forces

Russia has used at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion of the country in February 2022. This is an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party, with the possible assistance of a neighboring State Party, Belarus.

In September–December 2022, HRW spoke with Ukrainian deminers in the Kharkiv region, including in Izium, and in parts of the Kherson region, after the retreat from those areas of Russian forces. The deminers identified numerous types of antipersonnel mines found in areas recently retaken by Ukraine, all of which are known to be in Russian stockpiles, including OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines and PMN-series blast mines (both PMN-2 and PMN-4).[23]

Some mine types used in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly-seen MOB and older MON-series and OZM-72 mines.[24] If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then such munitions are considered to be antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[25]

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps at positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Ukrainian deminers told HRW that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel mines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since 24 February 2022*









Multiple options

A modern hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mine, used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. This mine is only used by Russia.


USSR/ Russia


Tripwire/ command

MON-series hand-emplaced directional multipurpose antipersonnel mines can be used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner.[26] When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.


USSR/ Russia


Tripwire/ command


USSR/ Russia


Tripwire/ command


USSR/ Russia


Tripwire/ command


USSR/ Russia


Tripwire/ command

A multipurpose bounding munition emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.





Uniquely shaped and constructed, this plastic-cased mine can be scattered by mine-laying rockets and dispensers mounted on trucks or helicopters. It contains 37 grams of a liquid high explosive. Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile this mine type.


USSR/ Russia



A circular, plastic-cased mine. Ukraine destroyed its stockpile of this mine type in 2003.





A modern circular, plastic-cased mine produced by Russia. First publicly displayed by Russia in 1993, it has never been stockpiled by Ukraine.

POM-2/ POM-2R[30]

USSR/ Russia



A metal-case bounding mine delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other means. POM-2 and POM-2R mines are stockpiled by Russia. Ukraine destroyed its stocks of this mine type in 2018.





Used only by Russia, POM-3 mines were first publicly displayed during military exercises in 2021. The POM-3 is scattered by rockets fired from truck-mounted launchers. Ukraine does not possess this mine type or its delivery system. Markings on an expended delivery canister photographed with POM-3 mines that failed to deploy properly indicate it was produced in 2021.[31]

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*All of the mine types listed were manufactured in Russia or the Soviet Union.

Belarus, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, has provided various forms of military support to Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has seen Russian forces use antipersonnel landmines.[32] The Monitor is not aware of Belarus providing assistance with Russia’s mine use, either directly or indirectly. However, Belarus should address these concerns with States Parties at a formal annual meeting or in its updated Article 7 transparency report.

As a State Party, Belarus must ensure that its joint military operations with Russia do not violate the prohibitions of the Mine Ban Treaty on assisting, encouraging, or inducing a state not party to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty.[33]

International reaction

Ukraine is bound by the Mine Ban Treaty, which comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices regardless of the technical features and predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (either improvised or factory-made). Russia is bound by a lower standard regulating antipersonnel mines via the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

The final report of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Geneva in November 2022, “condemned the use of anti-personnel mines anywhere, at any time, and by any actor.” Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 42 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, in addition to the European Union (EU).

Landmine use in Ukraine has been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents and the treaty’s special envoy for universalization.[34] The ICBL has called on all parties to the conflict to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.[35]


Use by the Myanmar Armed Forces

The Myanmar Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines extensively during the reporting period. Previously, the Monitor has documented new use by Myanmar every year since the publication of the first annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999. There appears to have been a significant increase in new mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces since it seized power in a military coup on 1 February 2021. This has included the laying of mines including around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that significant numbers of antipersonnel mines were captured by NSAGs from the Myanmar Armed Forces each month from January 2022 to September 2023, in almost every part of the country.[36] In August 2023, antipersonnel landmines manufactured by the Myanmar Army and in the possession of Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were captured in the northwest and southwest of the country, indicating extensive mine use by the military.[37]

Specific reports and allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period were recorded in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the regions of Bago and Tanintharyi. Examples of specific reports and allegations of use since mid-2022 are detailed below. In some instances, the Myanmar Armed Forces acknowledge use; while in others, mine use was attributed by villagers due to the proximity of a military outpost.

On 25 July 2023, four children were killed by a mine near In Pin Thar village in Phyu township, Bago region. Villagers claimed the mine was emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces.[38]

After attacks from 5–10 April 2023 by the Myanmar Armed Forces on Si Maw village in Shwegu township, Kachin state, two children were injured when their oxcart ran over a mine. A local defense force subsequently found another landmine in the area.[39]

On 1 March 2023, near Cedipyin village in Rathedaung township, Rakhine state, a man was seriously injured after stepping on a mine in a mountainous area. A Myanmar Army contingent was stationed nearby.[40]

On 26 February 2023, three boys were wounded after stepping on a mine suspected to have been laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces between the villages of Numli Hka and Nwan Hka Zup in Waingmaw township, Kachin state.[41]

On 16 February 2023, during a change of units at the Yae Kin military camp, in Tima village in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state, two Myanmar Army soldiers stepped on mines that had been planted by the departing unit near the camp’s fence.[42]

On 14 February 2023, a man stepped on a mine allegedly planted by the Myanmar Armed Forces while searching for food near the Mungdung military camp, in Dawhpum Yang village in Momauk township, Kachin State.[43]

On 27 January 2023, a man was killed by a landmine outside a Myanmar Armed Forces base near Pharpyo village in Minbya township, Rakhine state.[44]

On 18 January 2023, a young man was seriously injured by a landmine near Panphetan village in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state, after walking past an area where a Myanmar Army battalion is stationed. The military had warned residents to stay away from the area.[45]

On 13 January 2023, a woman from Than Moe Taung village tract in Taungoo township, Bago region, stepped on a landmine emplaced by the roadside. The victim died before she could be reached by villagers, who heard the explosion but could not enter the area due to restrictions imposed by the Myanmar Armed Forces. Soldiers later informed villagers that they had planted the mine following clashes in the area with a local anti-military People’s Defense Force (PDF) in November 2022.[46] The military had previously notified villagers that landmines were laid on the Than Moe Taung road, and restricted access to it.[47]

On 16 December 2022, a villager was seriously injured by a landmine emplaced by Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers in Saw Muh Plaw village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[48]

On 21 November 2022, a man was injured by an MM6 mine emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces in Hkaw Poo village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[49] 

On 20 October 2022, a resident of Aung May K’Lar village in Kawkareik township, Kayin state, activated a tripwire landmine while making charcoal near a military camp. The mine was thought to have been planted by troops based at the nearby Aung May K’Lar military camp.[50]

On 13 October 2022, a Rohingya woman and her infant son were injured by a tripwire landmine placed along the exterior fence of a Myanmar Armed Forces camp in Pa Laung village in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state, near the border with Bangladesh.[51]

On 1 October 2022, a village guard was injured by a landmine planted by the Myanmar Army near a military camp in Htee Htaw Per village in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[52]

In October 2022, a villager stepped on a mine in the Htee Moh Pgha special area in Tanintharyi township, Tanintharyi region. The mine was believed to have been planted by Myanmar Armed Forces troops.[53]

Villagers in Hpapun township, in northern Kayin state, reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces planted around 100 landmines on the Lu Thaw road between September and November 2022.[54]

On 1 September 2022, a resident of Meh T’Raw Hta village tract in Dooplaya district, Kayin state, claimed that the Myanmar Armed Forces had planted a mine near his land.[55] On the same day,an eight-year-old boy was killed by a landmine laid by retreating Myanmar Armed Forces troops outside his temporary school in Krok Khu village in Demoso township, Kayah state.

In September 2022, livestock near Noh T’Kaw village tract in Kyainseikgyitownship, Kayin state, detonated landmines laid near a Myanmar Army camp. Villagers stated that the Myanmar Armed Forces had previously informed them of mines laid in the area. Later, in February 2023, the military repeated its warning to villagers that it had planted mines in the area.[56]

In September 2022, a local NSAG claimed that Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had emplaced antipersonnel mines around a church in Moybe village tract in Pekon township, Shan state.[57]

In 2022 and 2023, civilians continued to be injured due to antipersonnel landmines planted along Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh.[58] Previously, in October 2020, Myanmar rejected reports that it had emplaced mines on the border, after Bangladesh had expressed concern at ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar in the area. Bangladesh stated that “unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.”[59]

Use by non-state armed groups

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand and Tunisia, and by some groups in or bordering the Sahel region—in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.[60] The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. However, there were no new declarations by NSAGs from mid-2022 through October 2023.


In Colombia, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), dissident groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP or FARC), and other NSAGs continue to produce and use antipersonnel landmines.

In 2022, there were a total of 105 incidents of landmine use attributed to the ELN, 224 incidents attributed to FARC dissidents, and 26 incidents attributed to the GAO Clan del Golfo.[61] This represents a 30% annual increase on incidents of reported mine use in 2021.

In the first seven months of 2023, a total of 50 incidents of mine use were attributed to the ELN, while 241 were attributed to FARC dissidents and seven were attributed to the GAO Clan del Golfo.[62]

In February 2023, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace stated that the departments of Chocó, Bolívar, Nariño, and Putumayo and were seriously affected by antipersonnel mines, and called on all armed actors to halt use.[63] There were reports in 2022 and in the first half of 2023 of both military and civilian landmine casualties in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Cauca, Chocó, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca. These are all regions where armed conflict was ongoing between the National Army of Colombia and NSAGs. It is difficult to determine precisely when these mines were laid.[64]


In India, several incidents involving use of pressure-plate antipersonnel mines by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), or its People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), were reported in 2022 and 2023.

In May 2023, a man foraging in Luiya forest in Chaibasa district, Jharkhand state, was killed by a mine reportedly laid by Maoist rebels. Several other villagers in Chaibasa district were reportedly killed in similar incidents earlier in the year.[65] In January 2023, Maoist rebels had disseminated leaflets to villages in Kolhan division, Jharkhand state, warning that they had laid explosive devices in the area.[66] In December 2022, a man collecting wood in Goilkera forest in West Singhbhum district, Jharkhand state, died after stepping on a landmine.[67]

In September and November 2022, mines attributed to Maoist rebels were cleared by the military after livestock injuries in Kathagudem district, Telangana state.[68]


NSAGs have used antipersonnel landmines repeatedly in Myanmar since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. There were allegations of new use by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and other groups in early 2022.[69]

Local media in Myanmar has reported the use of landmines by local anti-military militia groups established after the February 2021 coup, including by PDFs. These devices appear primarily to be command-detonated roadside bombs, though some are victim-activated.[70] Pro-military militia groups, such as Pyusawhti, also operate in several areas of Myanmar.[71]

The Monitor has reviewed the following incidents attributed to NSAGs in Myanmar during the reporting period.

On 18 March 2023, two villagers were killed and two were injured by tripwire landmines set up by a PDF in Palaw township, Tanintharyi region. According to the PDF, the mines were emplaced to defend the area from the Myanmar Armed Forces.[72]

On 13 March 2023, three people were seriously injured by a mine in Tedim township, Chin state, and were taken across the border to India for treatment. PDF rebels acknowledged responsibility for laying the mine.[73]

On 27 February 2023, in Meh Way village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state, a child was killed and an adult was injured by a mine laid by the KNLA. The KNLA had previously warned villagers that it had planted mines in the area.[74]

On 16 February 2023, two residents of Pweh Pah village in Hpapun township, Kayin state, stepped on mines laid by the KNLA near a Myanmar Armed Forces camp.[75]

On 12 February 2023, two Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were injured after stepping on mines laid by an unknown group near the Paju crossroads in Kutkai township, Shan state.[76]

On 2 February 2023, members of the Shanni Nationalities Army were injured after stepping on a mine laid by an unknown group near Na Kata village in Indaw township, Sagaing region.[77] On the same day, a resident of Mone village tract in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, was injured by a landmine planted by the KNLA.[78]

On 14–15 January 2023, two villagers in Nyaunglebin township, Bago region, stepped on mines planted by the KNLA. The mines were reportedly emplaced by the KNLA after Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had left the area, to prevent them from returning. The KNLA had issued a verbal warning of the danger to villagers.[79]

On 12 January 2023, a woman was injured and her daughter killed by a landmine planted by the Ja Htu Zup People’s Militia Force near the Yuzana Factory, in Shar Du Zut village in Hpakant township, Kachin state.[80]

In December 2022, a PDF medic in Kale township, Sagaing region, laid mines around her house when she learned it would be raided by the military. Troops were later injured by the mines.[81]

On 12 October 2022, a PDF rebel was killed while maintaining a minefield in Khin-U township, Sagaing region.[82]

On 7 October 2022, a Rohingya civilian lost both legs to a landmine laid in his courtyard by the Arakan Army in Gudar Pyin village tract in Maungdaw township, Rakhine state.[83]

On 22 September 2022, a resident of Kone Nee village tract in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, was killed by a mine planted by an unknown group. Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers provided medical treatment but the man died from his wounds.[84]

On 9 September 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces troops stepped on two landmines in Yung Ngaw village in Kutkai township, Shan state, where KIA forces were positioned.[85]

In September 2022, villagers said that the Kamarmaung–Ka Taing Tee road in Hpapun township, Kayin state, had been mined by KNLA rebels, Border Guard Forces, and the Myanmar Army.[86]

On 29 August 2022, Myanmar Army soldiers were injured by mines that had been laid by a PDF in Taungjah village in Sagaing township, Sagaing region.[87]

On 13 July 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers stepped on two landmines at Nang Zaw Yang road junction in Waingmaw township, Kachin state, which were reportedly planted by the KIA.[88]


Pattani rebel groups in southern Thailand used improvised antipersonnel landmines sporadically in 2022 and 2023.[89]

In June 2023, a paramilitary officer was injured after stepping on a landmine while patrolling in Joh Ai Rong district, Narathiwat province.[90]

On 15 August 2022, a woman working at a rubber plantation in Sungai Padi district, Narathiwat province, was injured after stepping on a mine. A Royal Thai Army soldier was killed and six police officers were injured by a second mine that exploded near the site of the first incident.[91]


In Tunisia, the Monitor has reported the use of victim-activated IEDs by Islamist groups based in the mountains of Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate for more than a decade. In April 2023, a shepherd was injured after stepping on a mine in a mountainous area of Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate, near the border with Algeria. It is unclear exactly when the mine was laid.[92]

Improvised antipersonnel mine use in the Sahel

Islamist NSAGs have used improvised antipersonnel landmines in at least eight States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in the Sahel region of Africa since mid-2022: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was reported to be responsible for mine use in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Togo. The Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP), or Boko Haram, was responsible for use in Niger and Nigeria. Mine use in Algeria was attributed to Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Islamist groups were also responsible for incidents in Egypt’s Sinai region. Specific examples include:[93]

  • In Algeria, on 13 January 2023, an IED presumably planted by AQIM killed four hunters in Boudkhar, in the commune of Babar, Khenchela.
  • In Benin, on 23 December 2022, two young children were injured in an IED explosion in Kofounou. It is not known which group emplaced the device.
  • In Burkina Faso, on 2 March 2023, a child riding a bicycle was seriously wounded after hitting an IED likely planted by JNIM militants in Koalou, Kompienga.
  • In the DRC, on 2 December 2022, a man was killed by a landmine planted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Lumanza, Nord-Kivu province, as he was going to his field. The Monitor had previously reported on mine use by the ADF in 2021 and 2005.
  • In Mali, on 6 February 2023, two farmers were killed in an IED explosion between Niono and Tiemaba, in the Segou region. The device was likely planted by JNIM militants.
  • In Niger, on 16 October 2022, two pastoralist women were killed, and two others injured, by a roadside IED likely planted by ISWAP near Boula Gana, in the Diffa region.
  • In Nigeria, on 22 June 2022, an IED buried by Boko Haram rebels in Ngala, Borno state, exploded after it was stepped on by an internally displaced person (IDP). The victim, who was searching for firewood at the time of the blast, was killed instantly.
  • In Togo, on 4 December 2022, two children were killed when their cart hit an IED likely planted by JNIM militants in the village of Kpembonle, Savanes.
  • In Egypt, on 20 February 2022, an IED planted by the Islamic State in Sheikh Zuwayid, in the north Sinai, detonated, killing a young girl and injuring two other children.

Universalizing the Landmine Ban

There are a total of 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Of these, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.[94]

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory. No states acceded to the treaty during the reporting period. The last to do so were Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in December 2017.

The administration of President Joe Biden realigned US policy with most core provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty in June 2022, and again set the goal of ultimately joining the treaty. Yet little public information is available on how this policy is being implemented.[95]

For the first time, there was open discussion in two States Parties in 2022–2023 about potentially withdrawing from the Mine Ban Treaty. Under Article 20 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party engaged in armed conflict is not allowed to withdraw from the treaty before the end of the armed conflict. The treaty is also not subject to reservations.

On 22 June 2023, the UN confirmed receipt of a letter from Eritrea, informing the UN Secretary-General of the government’s decision to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty. However, in October 2023, Eritrea reportedly submitted a letter to the UN Secretary-General rescinding its previous letter of withdrawal.[96]

In late 2022, in Estonia, the Conservative People’s Party proposed that Estonia withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty and acquire and use antipersonnel mines, given the threat posed by Russia. The party’s parliamentary motion failed. Estonia’s Ministry of Defence argued that antipersonnel mines would not provide a military advantage in deterring a potential attack, and would make it more difficult to cooperate with military allies.[97]

Annual UNGA resolution

Over the past 25 years, a key annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an opportunity to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian approach and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.[98]

On 7 December 2022, a total of 167 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 77/63, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. No state voted against the resolution, while 17 abstained.[99]

Support for the annual UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty fell slightly compared to 2021, which was the fourth consecutive year when 169 states voted in favor.

Myanmar, for the first time since 1997, voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution in 2022. States Parties Central African Republic and Serbia abstained from the vote, but did not explain their reasoning. Previously, States Parties Serbia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe abstained voting on the 2021 resolution.

Several countries explained their vote, including South Korea, which reiterated that it “sincerely supports the objectives and purposes of the Ottawa Convention,” while repeating its long-held position that “due to the unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula we are currently not a party to the Convention.”[100]

A core of 13 states not party have consistently abstained from consecutive UNGA resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.[101]  

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states have produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.[102] As many as 40 states have ceased production, including three states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.[103]

The Monitor has added Armenia to its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines, bringing the list to a total of 12 countries: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

Most of the countries listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.[104] India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia appear most likely to be actively producing antipersonnel mines. The Monitor removed the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.[105]

In September 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense released a statement, along with a video, claiming to have found 100 Armenian-made PMN-E antipersonnel mines, eight PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, and 10 antivehicle landmines.[106] Later that month, as hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan reignited, Azerbaijan claimed that Armenian forces had “mined the territories and supply roads” of Azerbaijani army units.[107] These initial claims of Armenian production of antipersonnel mines were difficult to confirm via non-Azerbaijani sources.

In August 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense claimed to have cleared a total of 1,318 PMN-E antipersonnel mines in the Lachin region.[108]Armenia denied these claims and stated in a letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), dated 13 September 2022, that Azerbaijan was “disseminating false information…in preparation for launching armed aggression.”[109]

However, since these allegations emerged, reputable technical sources have now listed the PMN-E antipersonnel mine and attributed its production to Armenia.[110] While many questions remain about the origin and specific production details of the PMN-E mine, the Monitor considers that “production” could also include modifying the original manufacturer’s product for improved performance in combat and then re-loading, re-assembling, and re-packaging the items into a condition suitable for storage or use.

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.[111] Some of these new mine types were first seen publicly during annual military exercises in 2021, including POM-3 rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines, which had been in development since at least 2015.[112] Russia also tested newly-developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.[113] Markings on some of the mines used by Russia in Ukraine in 2022–2023 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including the POM-3 antipersonnel mine.[114] In October 2022, Ukrainian forces also displayed a new type of directional fragmentation Claymore-type mine, designated as MOB, which they claimed had been captured from Russian forces.[115]

Production of antipersonnel mines has occurred in India since 2016. In December 2021, the first of 700,000 “Nipun” antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military as a replacement for the M-14 antipersonnel mine.[116] At least two other mine types are reportedly under development, including “Ulka,” a bounding antipersonnel fragmentation landmine, and “Parth,” a directional antipersonnel landmine.[117] A procurement announcement by the Indian government in August 2020 called for the domestic manufacture of an antipersonnel fragmentation mine. Previously, in 2019, the Ordnance Factory Board sent out a tender to local manufacturers for one million M-14 mines, to be delivered at a rate of 200,000 per year.[118]

India also produces the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, with warheads that can lay antipersonnel landmines. In September 2022, it was reported that Armenia had ordered the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher from private companies in India, though it is not known if this order included the antipersonnel mine laying variant of the system.[119]

NSAGs have produced improvised mines in Colombia, Egypt, India, Myanmar, and Thailand.[120]

Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing the annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting antipersonnel mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.[121]

Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines

States not party

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.[122] In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the collective total in the stocks of states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty may be less than 50 million.[123]

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines


Mines stockpiled


26.5 million


6 million (estimated)


4–5 million (estimated)


“less than” 5 million


3 million


approximately 45 million

It is unclear whether all 30 states not party thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines are currently doing so. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines





Korea, North



Korea, South




Saudi Arabia



















States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as part of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Stockpile destruction by States Parties

Of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 161 do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 94 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, and 67 which confirmed that they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except for, in some cases, for training in detection and clearance techniques).

States Parties have collectively destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. Sri Lanka was the last State Party to complete its obligation to destroy its stocks in October 2021.[124]

Two States Parties possess a combined total of 3.7 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3,364,433) and Greece (343,413).

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had an initial deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine’s deadline was 1 June 2010. Neither State Party has indicated when the obligation to destroy their remaining stockpiles will be completed.[125]

Greece did not destroy any stockpiled mines in 2020–2022. In June 2023, Greece announced that its remaining stocks of antipersonnel landmines would be transferred to Croatia, where they will be destroyed over the next 18 months.[126]

Ukraine has destroyed 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date, constituting more than half of its total stocks.[127] In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report covering 2022, Ukraine declared a stockpile 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprised of 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.[128] 

Ukraine reported in April 2023 that its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines are stored in military warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and “will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” However, Ukraine also noted that, “if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and [after] carrying out relevant inspections.”[129] In June 2023, Ukraine told States Parties at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva that it needs time to audit and conduct verification of the stockpile.

Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.[130]

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which armed group had produced the mines.[131]

Mines retained for training and research

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 66 States Parties retain antipersonnel landmines for training and research purposes.  Twenty-five States Parties retain more than 1,000 mines each, including two (Bangladesh and Finland) that each retain more than 12,000 mines. Angola and Peru collectively used a total of 1,142 retained mines during 2022, decreasing their retained mines to under 1,000 respectively.[132]

Forty-one States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines. Another 97 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 44 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past.[133]  Nigeria, which initially declared 3,364 retained mines in 2011, reported having no retained mines in 2022.[134]Nicaragua and Portugal, which also previously reported 435 and 383 retained mines respectively, reported no retained mines in 2022 according to their Article 7 reports.

States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines


Last declared total (for year)

Initial declaration

Consumed during 2022

Year of last declared consumption

Total quantity reduced as excess to need


15,665 (2022)





 12,050 (2021)




Sri Lanka

9,825 (2022)





5,728 (2022)






5,527 (2022)





5,173 (2022)





4,874 (2011)





4,489 (2022)






4,320 (2022)





3,760 (2020)





3,747 (2022)





3,445 (2022)






3,134 (2022)






2,996 (2004)




Czech Rep.

2,102 (2022)





2,050 (2020)






2,000 (2020)



None ever


1,836 (2022)






1,780 (2008)





1,770 (2022)





1,660 (2022)





1,634 (2009)





1,475 (2022)





1,298 (2022)





1,020 (2007)









Note: N/R=not reported.

In addition to those listed in the table, the 41 States Parties each retaining fewer than 1,000 mines collectively possess a total of 15,264 mines.[135] The total increased by 1,091 on the previous year, with Angola and Peru added to this list in 2022. Thirteen of these states consumed a combined total of 2,259 retained antipersonnel mines in 2022.[136] Twenty States Parties that retain under 1,000 mines have not yet submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2022.[137]

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that retain mines but are apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these states, the number of retained mines has stayed the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

Five States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

  • Djibouti and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
  • Burundi, Cape Verde, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

The Oslo Action Plan requires each State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes,” and to “destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number.”[138]

States Parties agreed to Action 49, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an “early warning mechanism.” Action 49 states that “If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned.”[139]

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.[140]

Transparency Reporting

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2023, only 75 States Parties (46%) had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2022.[141] A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2022, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.[142] The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2022 was less than that of 2021.

Morocco, a state not party, has submitted 12 voluntary transparency reports since 2006.[143] States not party Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR (2011), and Mongolia (2007) have also previously submitted voluntary reports. Palestine (2012–2013) and Sri Lanka (2005) also submitted voluntary reports prior to acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, which included information on contamination, clearance, casualties, and victim assistance in Western Sahara.[144]

[1] UN, “Our Common Agenda: Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace,” July 2023,

[2] Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023,; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023,

[3] NSAGs used landmines in at least six countries from 2018 to mid-2022; eight countries in 2017–2018; nine countries in 2016–2017; 10 countries in 2015–2016 and 2014–2015; seven countries in 2013–2014; eight countries in 2012–2013; six countries in 2011–2012; four countries in 2010; six countries in 2009; seven countries in 2008; and nine countries in 2007. From mid-2022 through October 2023, the Monitor has also noted civilian casualties resulting from the use of antivehicle mines, mostly of an improvised nature, by NSAGs in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia.

[4] Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. The Monitor has chosen to group reported mine use in the Sahel region collectively due to a lack of reporting, the apparent sporadic and small-scale nature of the incidents, and access issues for independent verification.

[5] ERW are defined as unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) by Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Ukraine is also affected by mine and ERW contamination remaining from World War II. The scale of mine/ERW contamination in Ukraine has yet to be fully surveyed or quantified, but the conflict with Russia appears to represent the most widespread antipersonnel mine use globally in decades.

[6] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used at least 13 types of antivehicle mines (also called antitank mines). The hand- or mechanically-emplaced TM-62 series antivehicle blast mine, equipped with an MVCh-62 pressure-activated fuze, appears to be the most common type of antivehicle mine used. These mines are often buried but have also been sighted laid on top of the ground. See, Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 13 June 2023,

[7] The Russian military seized Izium and surrounding areas by 1 April 2022 and exercised full control there until early September 2022, when Ukrainian forces began a counter-offensive.

[8] HRW conducted research in Izium from 19 September to 9 October 2022, interviewing over 100 people including witnesses to landmine use, victims of mines, first responders, doctors, and Ukrainian deminers. Every interviewee said they had seen mines on the ground, knew someone who was injured by a mine, or had been warned about their presence during Russia’s occupation of the area. See, HRW, “Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians,” 31 January 2023,

[9]Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine,” A/HRC/52/62, 15 March 2023, pp. 6–7,

[10] Letter from Oleksandr Polishchuk, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, to HRW, 24 November 2023. Cited in HRW, “Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians,” 31 January 2023,

[11] Letter from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “Regarding the meeting on the use of antipersonnel landmines,” to HRW, January 2023,

[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Report of the Human Rights Watch,” 31 January 2023,

[13] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023. Notes by the Monitor.

[14] HRW, “Ukraine Promises Inquiry into Banned Landmine Use,” 30 June 2023,

[15] Each Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket is designed exclusively to carry and disperse 312 PFM-1S antipersonnel mines. The markings on all the photographs of rockets examined show that they were produced in 1986 (batch numbers 14 and 16) at the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) munitions factory designated #912. In addition, the GRAU Index numbers matched the warheads used to carry PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.

[16] HRW identified, through a search of publicly available information, a person who said that they run the NGO. The individual had also made public posts on social media indicating that they had donated funds to the Ukrainian military in 2022 through a Kyiv-based NGO supporting Ukraine’s war effort. Another Ukraine-based group posted photographs showing similar messaging written in Ukrainian on an Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket.

[17] There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in the conflict. The claims began during the first days of the invasion in late February 2022 and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made.

[18] Facebook post by Irina Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 26 February 2022,

[19] “Ukraine attacked by Russia. Butterfly mines in the Kharkiv region,” Polish News, 26 February 2022,

[20] Daria Skuba, “In Sumy, during a night raid, the invaders scattered anti-personnel mines: what they look like,” Obozrevatel, 17 March 2022,

[21] Necro Mancer (666_mancer), “Russians fill residential areas of the city with mines-petals.” 4 April 2022, 17:36 UTC. Tweet,  

[22] “Russia highly likely deploying anti-personnel mines in Donbas, UK says,” Reuters, 8 August 2022,

[23] HRW, “Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians,” 31 January 2023,

[24] Collective Awareness to UXO, “OZM-72 Landmine: Description,” undated,

[25] HRW, “Backgrounder on Antivehicle Landmines,” 8 April 2022,

[26] The numbers associated with each model of the MON family indicate the range, from 50 to 200 meters. Each model contains a specific number of pre-formed fragments that are projected horizontally. The MON-50 contains 540 ball bearings or 485 pieces of 5mm chopped steel rod, and the MON-100 contains 400 pieces of 10mm chopped steel rod. Colin King, Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2008–2009 (Croydon: Jane’s Information Group, 2008).

[27] Trevor Kirton (TJK_EOD), “Today the @OfficialSOLI EOD team was able to remote pull a live OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mine from a marsh located close to a farming community. This will be destroyed so it no longer presents a danger.” 21 April 2023, 14:08 UTC. Tweet,

[28] Maksim (kms_d4k), “In this footage, you can see why it is important not to touch any mines. These mines are set with a trap underneath. It is very dangerous to demine them, so the only way is to destroy them right away.” 6 February 2023, 13:32 UTC. Tweet,

[29] Mark Hiznay (MarkHiznay), “More PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being cleared. Since Ukraine never stockpiled this type, it doesn’t take much to figure out who did it. Now where? @minefreeworld.” 20 April 2023, 17:42 UTC. Tweet,

[30] Stu M (SM_EOD), “More anti-personnel mines out of a field today. We have also come across more evidence of POM-2 use which adds another level of complexity to our work. #onemineatatime #minefreeukraine #eod #demining #StandWithUkraine.” 21 April 2023, 09:58 UTC. Tweet,

[31] Armament Research Services has produced a detailed technical reference for POM-3 antipersonnel mines. See, Mick F. and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, “Russian POM-3 anti-personnel landmines documented in Ukraine (2022),” Armament Research Services, 15 April 2022,

[32] HRW, “Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 15 June 2022,

[33] This means that it is prohibited for Belarus to: provide security, storage, transportation, or transit for antipersonnel mines; participate in planning for the use of antipersonnel mines; commit to rules of engagement that permit the use of antipersonnel mines; accept orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use antipersonnel mines; and knowingly derive military benefit from the use of antipersonnel mines by others.

[34] Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), “President of the Convention that bans landmines calls for immediate cease of use of this insidious weapon in Ukraine,” 5 April 2022,

[35] ICBL, “Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Mines in Ukraine: ICBL-CMC Calls for International Condemnation and Immediate End to Use,” 30 March 2022,

[36] The Monitor found, from January 2022 to September 2023, in a non-exhaustive survey of media photographs, over 25 instances, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel mines of types MM1, MM2, MM5, and MM6 in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states and in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions. The mines were captured by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), or National Unity Government (NUG)-affiliated People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), in those areas after overrunning Myanmar Army outposts or capturing or ambushing a military patrol. The exiled opposition NUG is made up of elected parliamentarians unable to take up their roles after the military coup.

[37] On 1 September 2023, a PDF in Kyaukgyi village in Shwegu township, Kachin state, seized a large quantity of MM1, MM2, MM5, and MM6 antipersonnel mines after capturing a Myanmar Army outpost. Facebook post by Khit Thit Media, 1 September 2023,; on 25 August 2023, near Sipain village in Mabein township, Shan state, a joint PDF and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) force seized a large quantity of MM2 and MM6 antipersonnel mines after capturing a Myanmar Army outpost. Facebook post by People’s Spring, 26 August 2023,; on 19 February 2023, boxes of MM5 and MM6 mines were seized by a combined PDF a raid on a Myanmar Army outpost on the border of Salingyi and Yinmarbin townships, Sagaing region. Facebook post by New Ambassador, 20 February 2023, Previously, in July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defense told the Monitor that landmines were still used by the Myanmar Armed Forces in border areas and around infrastructure. The official said, “In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.” Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defense, Ministry of Defense, Naypyidaw, 5 July 2019.

[38] “Landmine kills 4 children in Myanmar’s Bago region,” Radio Free Asia, 27 July 2023,

[39] Free Burma Rangers, “Burma Army Offensive Levels 12 Kachin Villages, Displacing Thousands,” 27 July 2023,

[40] “Rathedaung Twsp man loses leg in landmine explosion,” Development Media Group, 1 March 2023,

[41] Free Burma Rangers, “Burma Army attacks and shifting power in Northern Burma, February 2023,” 11 May 2023,

[42] “Two soldiers killed after stepping on their own landmine in Kyauktaw Rakhine state,” Narinjara News, 22 February 2023,

[43] Free Burma Rangers, “Burma Army attacks and shifting power in Northern Burma, February 2023,” 11 May 2023,

[44] “Minbya Twsp man killed in landmine encounter,” Development Media Group, 27 January 2023,

[45] “Mrauk-U Twsp man severely injured in landmine blast,” Development Media Group, 18 January 2023,

[46] PDFs in Myanmar are local armed resistance groups opposed to the 2021 military coup. Most are affiliated with the exiled NUG. Some PDFs, however, may operate autonomously.

[47] Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Mine-Free Myanmar, “UPDATE: More landmine victims, Bangladesh-Myanmar/Burma border and in Maungdaw township from late 2022 new mine use on border,” updated on 6 April 2023,

[52] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] The Mobye PDF warned returning local people that they should avoid the grounds of the church as it had been mined. See, “Junta weapons seized from Catholic church in Shan State’s Mobye Township,” Mizzima, 15 September 2022,

[58] S. Bashu Das, “Bangladeshi injured in Myanmar landmine explosion,” Dhaka Tribune, 21 February 2023,; and “Bangladeshi injured in Myanmar landmine blast along Bandarban border,” The Daily Star, 8 November 2022,

[59] Statement of Myanmar, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 19 October 2020; and statement of Bangladesh, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 14 October 2020,

[60] Of these, 48 NSAGs have committed not to use mines through signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment; 20 by self-declaration; four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment); and two through a peace accord (in Colombia and Nepal).

[61] Office of the High Commissioner for Peace of Colombia, “Open data: Registration of information on MAP and UXO involvement and intervention​​​,” updated 31 August 2023,

[62] Ibid.

[63] “Warning of the effects of antipersonnel mines in Colombia,” La Prensa Latina, 23 February 2023,

[64] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Colombia: Impact,” updated 2023 (forthcoming). See,

[65] “Jharkhand: 1 Killed In Landmine Blast By Maoists,” Ommcom News, 25 May 2023,

[66] “Maoists ‘impose’ 12 hr curfew in Jharkhand’s Kolhan,” WebIndia123, 18 January 2023,

[67] Satyajeet Kumar, “Man killed after stepping on landmine placed by naxals in Jharkhand’s Goilkera,” India Today, 29 December 2022,

[68] “Pressure mine planted by Maoists explodes, injures a cow in Kothagudem,” Telangana Today, 15 November 2022,

[69] There were also allegations of use by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N), and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) in their operations against the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period.

[70] For example, in Monywa township, Sagaing region, three local militias stated that they had attacked Myanmar Armed Forces troops coming to clear mines. See, Aung Aung, “Revolutionaries attack junta forces with mines in Monywa,” Tha Din News and Radio, 23 August 2022, The Southern Pauk Guerilla Force in Pauk township, Magway region, killed several soldiers, and when reinforcements came to retrieve the bodies, more of its mines exploded, killing 17 more troops. See, “Armed resistance replaces anti-coup protests in Pauk township,” Frontier Myanmar, 31 August 2021, In Ye-U township, Sagaing region, a coalition of local militias stated that when Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers entered the area they detonated mines. See, Aung Aung, “Ten killed and many injured as junta troops mined in Ye-U,” Tha Din News and Radio, 14 August 2022,

[71] It is often difficult to attribute responsibility for each mine incident in Myanmar to a specific armed group. In northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw are engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance: the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the TNLA. Armed conflict among  NSAGs has also occurred in the area between the SSA-S, the TNLA, and the SSA-N. Casualties have occurred near to sites of conflict involving all of these groups, though locals were usure which group(s) had emplaced the mines.

[72] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

[73] “3 people seriously injured in Chin state land mine blast,” Radio Free Asia, 15 March 2023,

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Free Burma Rangers, “Burma Army attacks and shifting power in Northern Burma, February 2023,” 11 May 2023,

[77] Ibid.

[78] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Online database of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). See, ACLED website,

[81] “Scores of Myanmar Junta Troops Hit by Land Mines While Raiding Resistance Member’s Home,” The Irrawaddy, 8 December 2022,

[82] “Burma coup resistance notes October 13, 2022,” Burma Coup Resistance Notes, 13 October 2022,

[83] The victim had fled their village at the start of armed conflict, but returned once the Myanmar Armed Forces had pushed the Arakan Army out. Upon return to check on their home after conflict halted, they stepped on the landmine and were subsequently treated for their injury at a military field hospital in the northern part of the village tract. See, M. S. Zaman, “Landmine explosion in Rohingya village; Rohingya man receives serious injury,” Rohingya Khobor, 8 October 2022,

[84]  KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

[85] Free Burma Rangers, “Burma Army Attacks And Human Rights Abuses Spread Across Northern Burma, September 2022,” 5 January 2023,

[86] KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

[87] “Burma coup resistance notes August 29–31, 2022,” Burma Coup Resistance Notes, 31 August 2022,

[88] Free Burma Rangers, “No Relief As The Burma Army Rains Down Attacks Through Monsoon Season In Northern Burma,” 29 August 2022,

[89] Thailand has not provided information in its annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports on use, contamination, or clearance of improvised antipersonnel mines in the south. See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Thailand: Mine Ban Policy,” updated 28 September 2022,

[90] “One Ranger was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine in the area of Ai Rong, Narathiwat,” The Reporters, 10 June 2023,

[91] Mariyam Ahmad, “Insurgents suspected of landmine attack targeting rubber farmers in Deep South,” Benar News, 15 August 2022,

[92] “Tunisia: Landmine wounds shepherd in restive Kasserine governorate,” The North Africa Post, 11 April 2023,

[93] ACLED data for incidents in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, DRC, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo, for calendar year 2022 and first quarter of 2023. See, ACLED website,

[94] Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the treaty’s 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

[95] The new policy prohibits US development, production, and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines. It also commits the US to not use antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world except on the Korean Peninsula, and to destroy antipersonnel mine stockpiles that are “not required for the defense of the Korean Peninsula.” The White House press release, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” 21 June 2022,

[96] Letter from the State of Eritrea to the UN Secretary-General, June 2023; and conversation between Amb. Thomas Göbel, President of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and ICBL-CMC staff, 18 October 2023.

[97] “Defense ministry: Anti-personnel landmines would hinder NATO allies,” ERR, 15 November 2022,; and “Riigikogu rejects bill allowing rearmament of anti-personnel mines,” ERR, 12 January 2023,

[98] This includes Belarus, Bhutan, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Türkiye.

[99] “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” UNGA Resolution 77/63, 7 December 2022, The 17 states that abstained were: Central African Republic, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

[100] South Korea Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.40, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 1 November 2022, p. 33, In June 2022, an official told the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty that “the Republic of Korea, in light of the Korean Peninsula’s unique security situation, is unable to accede to the convention at this juncture,” but added, “we nevertheless, support the Ottawa Convention’s objectives and purposes of the convention.” See, statement of South Korea, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022,

[101] Of these states, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US are party to CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW Protocol II; and Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria remain outside of any treaty-based prohibition or regulation on antipersonnel mines.

[102] There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included within that list are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear whether Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.

[103] Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Uganda, UK, and Zimbabwe.

[104] For example, Singapore’s only known producer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” See, PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015,

[105] The US was previously removed from the list of producers in 2014, only to be added back on to the list in 2020 following a decision by the administration of President Donald Trump to roll-back the ban on US mine production.

[106] Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “Mines buried by provocateurs of the Armenian armed forces were detected,” 17 September 2022,; and Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “Liberated territories of Azerbaijan are being cleared of Armenian mines,” 8 September 2022,

[107] Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “Armenian armed forces committed large-scale provocations in Dashkasan, Kalbajar and Lachin directions,” 13 September 2022,

[108] Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “Uchdik-Girkhgiz-Saribaba high grounds are cleared of Armenian mines,” 22 August 2022,

[109] Letter from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN, addressed to the President of the UNSC, 13 September 2022,

[110] Fenix Insight, “PMN-E: Mine,” undated,

[111]In 2004, Russia said that it had spent or planned to spend RUB3.33 billion (US$115.62 million) on the research, development, and production of new engineer munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on the ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Average exchange rate for 2004: RUB1=US$0.03472. Oanda,

[112] Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” Izvestia, 6 September 2021, In 2015, the POM-3 mine’s design engineers claimed that the seismically-activated POM-3 would be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as it is activated by a sensor that detects the footfall of an individual, characterizes it against known signatures, and fires its warhead into the air. Directors Igor Smirnov and Mikhail Zhukov of the Scientific Research Institute of Engineering’s Department of Munitions, Mining, and Demining, interviewed on Zvezda TV, 20 November 2015, cited in “Russia Develops Landmine With ‘Electronic Brain’,” Defense World, 20 November 2015, See also, “Perspective Anti-Personnel Mine POM-3 ‘Medallion’,” Military Review, 30 November 2015,

[113] Landmine delivery systems Zemledeliye and UMZ-K Klesh-G, as well as antivehicle mine PTKM-1R. See, Rob Lee (RALee85), “UMZ-K Klesh-G and Zemledeliye minelayers at the Mulino training area.” 31 July 2021, 21:53 UTC. Tweet,; and Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” Izvestia, 6 September 2021,

[114] The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. See, Collective Awareness to UXO, “POM-3 Landmine: Description,” undated,; and HRW, “Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines,” 29 March 2022,

[115] Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “#Ukraine: A previously unseen Russian MOB AP directional mine was captured by the AFU. Apparently, this type is modular - up to 3 units can be connected to each other. They can also be fitted with additional preformed fragmentation blocks and various aiming and mounting devices.” 3 October 2022, 13:19 UTC. Tweet,

[116] Shankhyaneel Sarkar, “Nipun anti-personnel mines: Army gets weapons boost for Pakistan, China borders,” Hindustan Times, 21 December 2021,

[117] “New Family of Munitions (NFM),” Bharat Rakshak, 19 January 2020, Three new models of antivehicle mines are also under development in India.

[118] Manu Pubby, “Army wants 1 million mines from private sector,” The Economic Times, 3 October 2019,

[119] Joseph P. Chacko, “Israeli suicide drone HAROP to meet Indian Pinaka MRLS in Nagorno-Karabakh amid Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict,” Frontier India, 30 September 2022,; and “DRDO tests Pinaka Mark-II guided rocket system,” Frontier India, 5 November 2020,

[120] Previous lists of states with NSAG producers have included Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Low level production of victim-activated IEDs by Islamist groups in the Sahel, and in some other regions, is suspected.

[121] The Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that deminers in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to the Monitor by the HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining operators working in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

[122] Three states not party, all in the Asia-Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga.

[123] In 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile was “less than” five million, though there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated by the Monitor to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.

[124] In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), section 3, table 2. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database,

[125] The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to “present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner.” Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019,

[126] Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023,

[127] On 18 May 2010, Ukraine officially informed States Parties in a note verbale that “it will be unable to comply with its Article 4 obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines by 1 June 2010 deadline.” At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2010, after Ukraine missed its deadline, Ukraine’s representative noted that this is not “unexpected information to States Parties” and that “Ukraine remains open for the fruitful cooperation with States Parties and potential donors and hopes for the practical assistance to make Ukraine territory free from stockpiles of PFM-type as soon as possible.” See, statement of Amb. Oleksandr Nykonenko, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2010.

[128] This quantity is the same amount reported to be in Ukraine’s stockpile in 2020. Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 25 April 2023, Forms B and G. The OZM-4 mines were stored in Crimea.

[129] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 25 April 2023, Form B.

[130] Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.

[131] Colombian Armed Forces press release, “Joint Task Force ‘Omega’ located illegal warehouse with almost two thousand antipersonnel mines,” 10 May 2022,

[132] Angola retains 536 mines and Peru retains 956 mines. See, Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022); and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022).

[133] Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report so is not reflected in these figures.

[134] In May 2023, Nigeria reported that “Nigeria has destroyed all AP [antipersonnel] mines in the stockpile of the Nigerian Army. Nigeria currently has nil stock of AP mines and does not use AP mines.” See, Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022).

[135] States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Spain (976), Belgium (958), Peru (956), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Honduras (826), BiH (817), Mauritania (728), Japan (617), Slovakia (590), Italy (563), South Africa (545), Angola (536), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Cyprus (410), Guyana (360), Republic of the Congo (322), Sudan (298), Côte d’Ivoire (290), Germany (271), Slovenia (229), Netherlands (204), Suriname (150), Bhutan (146), Cape Verde (120), Tajikistan (113), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100), Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Ireland (49), Benin (30), Denmark (28), Guinea-Bissau (9), South Sudan (8), Burundi (4), and DRC (2).

[136] States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines and reported consumption of retained mines in 2022: Angola (768), Nicaragua (435), Portugal (383), Peru (375), Netherlands (66), Bhutan (65), Slovakia (60), Japan (46),  Tajikistan (25), BiH (17), Belgium (9), Germany (8), and Ireland (2). 

[137] States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines that did not submit an Article 7 report for 2022, as of 5 October 2023: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, and Togo.

[138] Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, Action 16,

[139] Ibid., Action 49.

[140] States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and UK.

[141] The 75 States Parties that submitted an Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2022 (as of 15 October 2023): Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, BiH, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palestine, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, UK, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[142] The 89 States Parties that have not submitted Article 7 reports for calendar year 2022 (as of 15 October 2023); those that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics:Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados,Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea,Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, North Macedonia, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia,Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu,Uruguay, Vanuatu,and Venezuela.

[143] Morocco submitted voluntary transparency reports in 2006, 2008–2011, 2013, and 2017–2022.

[144] The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario). Polisario’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU) but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the UN, which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.