LANDMINE MONITOR 2021
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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor2@icblcmc.org.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental footprint of reports by publishing all our research reports online. This report is available online www.the-monitor.org.

Detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org/cp

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim.

Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to mine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering,
but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global mine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come, and the rights of survivors and persons with similar needs are protected.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities in which they were working in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks. News of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.
Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration and reiterated in the 2019 Oslo Action Plan.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

The ICBL’s efforts to ban landmines have led to a whole new approach called humanitarian disarmament, which is spearheaded by civil society campaigns and has led to four international treaties and, to date, two Nobel Peace Prizes.

In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW.

The ICBL created Landmine Monitor in June 1998, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information on all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting required of states under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.
The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and annual reports. A network of more than two-dozen researchers and an Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the ICBL-CMC campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT
This is the 23rd annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010.

*Landmine Monitor 2021* provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling; includes information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance; and documents international and national support for mine action. This report focuses on calendar year 2020, with information included up to October 2021 where possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for all their crucial assistance.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of six NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s members include: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), the Danish Refugee Council (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (Impact research team), Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer (ICBL-CMC government liaison and policy manager), Marion Loddo (Monitor editorial manager), and *ex officio* member Hector Guerra (ICBL-CMC director).
From January to October 2021, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2021. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban policy**: Mark Hiznay, Susan, Aboeid, Stephen Goose, Jacquelyn Kantack, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
- **Impact**: Loren Persi Vicentic, Ruth Bottomley, Éléa Boureux, and Audrey Torrecilla, with assistance from Mathilda Englund and Marianne Schulze; and
- **Support for mine action**: Marion Loddo.

Final editing was provided by Marion Loddo in October and November 2021 with assistance from Michael Hart (publications consultant).

Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Printrs printed the report in the Netherlands. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.

The front cover photograph was provided by Gwenn Dubourthoumieu/HI, and the back cover photographs were provided by Marijn van Broekhoven/NPA and Sean Sutton/MAG. Additional photographs found within Landmine Monitor 2021 were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors. In 2021, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 31 October 2021):

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- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of the United States of America*
- Holy See

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

*Specifically, for research on impact (contamination, casualties, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance) and support for mine action.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
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<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
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<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>confirmed hazardous area</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
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<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
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<td>DPO</td>
<td>disabled persons’ organization</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>EORE</td>
<td>explosive ordnance risk education</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
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<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Humanity &amp; Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>ICBL</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
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</table>
GLOSSARY

**Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance (BAC)** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cleared land** – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions." Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
**Confirmed hazardous area (CHA)** – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

**Diversity** – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person's social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

**Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)** – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

**Explosive remnants of war (ERW)** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Humanitarian mine action (HMA)** – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes: survey and assessment, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

**Improvised explosive device (IED)** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An IED may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

**Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine** – An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.

**International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)** – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**Intersectionality** – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to create layers of inequality.

**Land release** – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

**Non-state armed groups (NSAG)** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.
Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets;” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victims – Individuals killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), their family, and community.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
### Table Key

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<th>Category</th>
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<td>States Parties: Ratified or acceeded as of 1 November 2021</td>
<td>Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, North Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, United States, Russia, Uzbekistan.</td>
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<td>Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 November 2021</td>
<td>Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, North Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, United States, Russia, Uzbekistan.</td>
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<td>Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 November 2021</td>
<td>Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, North Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, United States, Russia, Uzbekistan.</td>
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- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Kenya
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Rwanda
- São Tomé & Príncipe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- South Africa
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Landmine Monitor 2021
MAG team explains to families in an IDP camp in Maiduguri, Nigeria, where the most dangerous areas are and what they should look out for to stay safe from unexploded munitions and improvised landmines.

© Sean Sutton/MAG, October 2020
MAJOR FINDINGS

STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY
There are 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory, the Marshall Islands, which has yet to ratify.

For the third consecutive year, 169 states, including 11 non-signatories, voted in favor of the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the treaty.

- No country voted against the resolution, while 17 states abstained, including States Parties Palau and Zimbabwe.

USE
From mid-2020 through October 2021, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- There are indications that new use of antipersonnel mines occurred during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2020, but it was not possible to either confirm new use or attribute responsibility to a specific combatant force.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during the reporting period: Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

- There were unverified reports of sporadic mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Egypt, Niger, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, and Venezuela.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED
States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 106,500 destroyed in 2020.

- Sri Lanka completed the destruction of its landmine stockpile in 2021, bringing the total number of countries to have declared completion of stockpile destruction to 94.

- Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of the treaty, as both have missed their deadlines to complete destruction of their stockpiles (2008 and 2010 respectively).
• Two States Parties possess approximately 3.6 million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (3.3 million) and Greece (343,413).

A total of 63 States Parties have reported that they retain a combined total of more than 135,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 30 retain more than 1,000 mines each.
• Chile destroyed its remaining retained mines during the reporting period.
• Seven States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo.

PRODUCTION
The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United States (US), and Vietnam. This represents no change from last year’s report.
• Russia and the US are both developing and testing new landmine systems. Though focused on antivehicle mines, these may include victim-activated elements.
• Russia also revealed a new type of antipersonnel mine that has been in development since at least 2015, the POM-3, which is seismically-activated.

CASUALTIES
2020 was the sixth year in a row with high numbers of recorded casualties due to mines, including improvised types, as well as cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The continuing high casualty total recorded is mostly the result of increased conflict and contamination observed since 2015.
• In 2020, at least 7,073 casualties of mines/ERW were recorded: 2,492 people were killed and 4,561 people were injured, while the survival status was unknown for 20 casualties.
• The 2020 total represents an increase from the 5,853 casualties recorded in 2019, and is more than double the lowest annual recorded total (3,456 in 2013).
• The vast majority of recorded mine/ERW casualties were civilians (80%) where their status was known.
• In 2020, children accounted for half of all civilian casualties where the age was known (1,872).
• As in previous years, in 2020, men and boys made up the majority of all casualties (85%) for which the sex was known.

Casualties in 2020 were identified in 54 states and other areas, of which 38 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
• Non-signatory Syria recorded the highest number of annual casualties (2,729) for the first time since the Monitor began its reporting in 1999.
• States Parties with over 100 recorded casualties in 2020 were: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

CONTAMINATION
At least 60 states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines, as of October 2021. This includes 33 States Parties that have declared clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as 22 states not party and five other areas.
• Three States Parties that previously declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines have since reported further contamination and submitted new clearance extension requests under Article 5: Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria.
In addition, four States Parties are suspected or known to have residual contamination (Algeria, Kuwait, Mozambique, and Nicaragua), while five States Parties need to provide information regarding suspected or known contamination by improvised mines (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Tunisia, and Venezuela).

Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the Monitor as more than 100km²) is reported to exist in nine States Parties: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.

- The extent of contamination in at least two of these countries—Ethiopia and Ukraine—is likely to be considerably less once survey is conducted.

CLEARANCE

States Parties reported clearance of at least 146km² of contaminated land and the destruction of more than 135,500 antipersonnel mines in 2020. In comparison, 156km² was reported cleared and some 122,000 mines were destroyed in 2019.

- Cambodia and Croatia reported the largest total clearance of mined areas in 2020, with each reporting clearance of more than 45km² and destroying a combined total of more than 15,000 antipersonnel mines.
- Chile and the United Kingdom (UK) declared completion of clearance of their mined areas in 2020. Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas but has not yet acknowledged completion.
- In 2020, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen all continued landmine clearance despite ongoing conflict or insecurity.
- Five States Parties reported no clearance in 2020: Cyprus, Ecuador, Mauritania, Peru, and Senegal.
- Chile and the United Kingdom (UK) declared completion of clearance of their mined areas in 2020. Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas but has not yet acknowledged completion.
- In 2020, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen all continued landmine clearance despite ongoing conflict or insecurity.
- Five States Parties reported no clearance in 2020: Cyprus, Ecuador, Mauritania, Peru, and Senegal.
- The COVID-19 pandemic presented challenges to demining operations in several States Parties, leading to the temporary suspension of clearance work in Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Serbia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

As of October 2021, 24 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations before or no later than 2025, while seven States Parties have deadlines after 2025.

- Seven countries requested extensions to their clearance deadlines in 2021 which will be considered at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in November: Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Turkey. Some of these requests lack costed and detailed multiyear workplans with annual projections for clearance and survey.
- Eritrea was expected to submit a clearance extension request but has yet to do so, and has been in violation of the treaty since its Article 5 deadline expired in December 2020.
- Only Croatia, Oman, Palestine, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe appear to be on target to meet their clearance deadlines. For the other 16 States Parties with clearance deadlines, land release projections are behind target or progress is unclear.

RISK EDUCATION

In 2020, 26 States Parties were known to have provided risk education to populations affected by antipersonnel mine contamination.

- Fifteen States Parties had mechanisms for the coordination of risk education, either through specific technical working group meetings or through inclusion in mine action coordination meetings of the United Nations (UN) Mine Action Sub-Cluster.
- None of the States Parties that submitted a request to extend their clearance deadlines in 2021 included costed and detailed multiyear plans for risk education.
Risk education has been greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, as physical distancing and other restrictions limited activities that are usually conducted to reach affected communities and to promote behavioral change, such as face-to-face sessions.

- States Parties and operators adapted to the changing circumstances by implementing and expanding online methods to deliver risk education, including through mass media, mobile phone apps, and social media platforms. Local networks of community volunteers also continued to provide safety messages when risk education teams were unable to do so.

**VICTIM ASSISTANCE**

The following findings relate to 34 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims.

- In 2020, healthcare and rehabilitation activities, previously the most supported sector of victim assistance, faced increasing and numerous challenges in many countries including in accessibility, coordination of services, and supply of materials.
- Only 14 of the 34 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance. At least 10 of the States Parties still need to complete the revision or adoption of a draft national disability strategy relevant to the implementation of victim assistance.
- At least 22 of the States Parties had ‘active’ coordination mechanisms, while survivors’ representatives participated in coordination processes in two-thirds of those States Parties. However, there was little evidence that their input was considered or acted upon.
- Significant gaps remain in access to economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities in many of the States Parties where livelihood opportunities were most needed.

The Oslo Action Plan includes a commitment on the protection of victims in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters. This action has become particularly important in the context of COVID-19, to continue implementing victim assistance while addressing additional constraints caused by pandemic-related restrictions.

**SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION**

Donors and affected states contributed US$643.5 million in combined international and national support for mine action in 2020.

- The level of international support for mine action provided by donors plateaued at $565.2 million in 2020, compared to $561.3 million in 2019.
- The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—the US, the European Union (EU), Germany, Japan, and Norway—contributing 75% of all international funding for 2020 ($426.1 million).
- The top five recipient states—Iraq, Lao PDR, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Croatia—received a combined total of $252.8 million, representing 45% of all international support.
- International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (68% of all funding), victim assistance (6%), capacity-building (4%), and advocacy (1%). The remaining 21% was either not disaggregated by donors or was unearmarked.
- In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic increased the impetus for greater flexibility and responsiveness from donors to ensure that operations could continue wherever possible.
The Monitor identified 14 affected states that reported providing a combined total of $78.3 million in national support for their own mine action programs in 2020: Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Niger, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey.
A landmine charge fashioned from a large pickle jar in Tal Afar, Iraq. Improvised landmines are detected and taped-off, then a senior technician disarms the device before a machine is used to tip out the explosive charge in case the item is booby-trapped. MAG has found that in some areas one in 50 devices were booby-trapped.

© Sean Sutton/MAG, April 2021
BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

As the international treaty prohibiting antipersonnel landmines enters its third decade of existence, it is hard to imagine a world without it. Adopted in September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty has established a strong international framework for comprehensively eradicating these weapons.

In the reporting period, from mid-2020 to 1 October 2021, there was no evidence to indicate that any of the treaty’s 164 States Parties have violated its core obligations banning any use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines. Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 100,000 during 2020. While Sri Lanka successfully fulfilled its obligation to destroy its stockpiles, Greece and Ukraine must redouble their efforts to complete destruction of their stocks after repeatedly missing deadlines set by the treaty.

The power of norm-setting can also be seen in adherence by the 33 countries that remain outside of the Mine Ban Treaty, with a few notable exceptions. As in recent years, Landmine Monitor 2021 documents new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in just one country, Myanmar, which has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

Additionally, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during the reporting period, including in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, and Nigeria; and states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan. This new use involved improvised antipersonnel landmines—victim-activated explosive devices made from locally-available materials.¹

Universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty has lost momentum, despite ongoing efforts of the treaty’s tightknit community of states, United Nations (UN) agencies, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The last states to accede to the treaty were Sri Lanka and the State of Palestine, both in December 2017.

¹ The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition, regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” to refer to victim-activated IEDs.
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to impact the Mine Ban Treaty, along with other humanitarian disarmament treaties such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, States Parties are adapting, while the broader family supporting the treaty remains strongly committed to achieving its ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.

**USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar during the reporting period, while NSAGs in six countries also used antipersonnel mines, as listed in the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations of antipersonnel mine use: mid-2020–October 2021²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use by state(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

New landmine use that is confirmed by the Monitor is detailed below.

There are indications that new use of antipersonnel mines occurred during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2020, but it was not possible for the Monitor to either confirm new use or attribute responsibility to a specific combatant force.

**LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES**

**Myanmar**

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has every year documented the use of antipersonnel mines in Myanmar by government forces—known as the Tatmadaw—and various NSAGs operating in the country.

Myanmar government officials have acknowledged ongoing landmine use by the Tatmadaw. In July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defence told the Monitor that landmines are still used by the Tatmadaw in border areas and around infrastructure.³ In September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defence, Major General Myint Nwe, told the Myanmar parliament that the armed forces continue to use landmines in internal armed conflicts.⁴


³ The official said, “In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.” Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defence, Ministry of Defence, Naypyidaw, 5 July 2019.

⁴ “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 September 2016, bit.ly/GNLMT13Sept2016. The deputy defence minister stated that the Tatmadaw used mines to protect state-owned factories, bridges, electricity towers, and its outposts in military operations. The deputy defence minister also stated that mines were removed when the military abandoned outposts; or warning signs were placed, to mark where mines were emplaced if soldiers were not present.
Claims of new mine use by government forces during the reporting period include:

- On 29 September 2021, one civilian was killed and two injured in Kayah state after they returned to a village following a raid by the Tatmadaw. A local militia said it had found 30 landmines left by the military.  

- On 25 September 2021, an employee of a military-owned telecommunications company was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine placed outside a cell phone tower near Nant Hwe village in Muse township. This occurred after allegations that the Tatmadaw was mining the bases of mobile phone towers in response to a string of attacks by local militia groups.  

- On 17 August 2021, a male farmer was injured by a landmine outside a Tatmadaw base in Usungtaung village in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state. According to locals, the area was commonly used by farmers and there were no landmine incidents in the area before.

- On 9 August 2021, villagers from Myi Tung Mare, in Kachin state’s Bhamo township, claimed that the Tatmadaw had planted a mine which killed a child tending cows near a Tatmadaw base.

- On 29 July 2021, two men were killed by a landmine emplaced where Tatmadaw soldiers had camped two days previously outside Thitmyinaung village in Pauk township, Magway region.

- On 8 June 2021, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar stated that he had received reports of mines laid by the Tatmadaw on public roads in Kayah state, in an apparent effort to blockade aid destined for displaced people.

- On 1 June 2021, Myanmar Border Guard Force Unit 1014, under the command of the Tatmadaw, reportedly laid mines in agricultural fields in Hpapun township, Kayin state, which killed one villager and left another wounded.

- Also in June 2021:
  - There was a civilian casualty after Tatmadaw Infantry Brigade 142 reportedly laid mines around its base near Dawt Hpong Yang in Momaung township, Kachin state.
  - A local militia in Mindat township, Chin state, alleged that Tatmadaw forces were responsible for mine use which led to the death of a local child near Shat village.

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9 “Two people were killed when a landmine exploded on Kyee Ngo Mountain,” Civil Disobedience Movement Myanmar, 30 July 2021, bit.ly/CDMM30July2021.

10 UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews (RapporteurUn), “Mass deaths from starvation, disease and exposure could occur in Kayah State after many of the 100,000 forced to flee into forests from junta bombs are now cut off from food, water and medicine by the junta. The international community must act. My full statement below:” 8 June 2021, 11:41 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TomAndrewsTweet8June2021. See, press release attached to tweet: “UN Special Rapporteur Calls for Immediate Action to Avoid Massive Loss of Life in Kayah State, Myanmar.”


In May 2021:
- A Tatmadaw informant said that soldiers had laid mines in three locations in Hakha, in Chin state.  
- Villagers in Kutkai township, Shan state, alleged that Tatmadaw forces had laid mines near Namparchi village.  
- The Tatmadaw reportedly laid MM6-type mines along the Kyaukkyi-Hsaw Hta road in the Eastern Bago region during resupply operations.  
- The Tatmadaw reportedly laid mines to prevent entry to farms near Mae Klaw village in Hpapun township, Kayin state.
- In April 2021, Tatmadaw Light Infantry Brigade 434 reportedly laid mines near Boh Hta village in Hpapun township, Kayin state.  
- Between February and May 2021, Tatmadaw soldiers reportedly laid mines on the road outside their base in Me Waing in Hpapun township, Kayin state, according to villagers.  
- Unreported previously, in May 2020, Tatmadaw Light Infantry Brigade 434 reportedly emplaced mines around its base on the Thai border in Hpapun township, Kayin state.

In October 2020, Myanmar rejected reports that it had laid mines on its border with Bangladesh.  Bangladesh expressed concern at the ongoing use of antipersonnel landmines by Myanmar forces on its border, and said “unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.”

16 Information provided to the Monitor on 24 June 2021. Battalions 706, 707, and 708, and Mobile Operations Command 4 moved supplies through the area and laid mines on 28 May 2021. Over the next two weeks, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) forces found and removed MM6-type mines.
17 Information provided confidentially to the Monitor on 11 May 2021. On 4 May, Mobile Operations Command 8 and Infantry Battalion 19 laid landmines around Bo Hta village in Mae Klaw village tract, which prohibited access to a path used by villagers to reach their paddy field.
19 KHRG, “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. The Tatmadaw planted mines in Me Waing, on a road used to reach farming and hill fields, resulting in a man losing his leg to a mine.
20 KHRG, “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. KHRG researchers were informed by a Thai villager hired by Light Infantry Battalion 434, who warned him about mines they had planted.
22 Statement of Bangladesh, General Debate, First Committee, 75th Session, UNGA, 14 October 2020.
LANDMINE USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan. The Monitor also received reports during the reporting period of sporadic mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Egypt, Niger, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, and Venezuela. A lack of available information or means of independent verification meant it was not possible to determine if these incidents were the result of new use of antipersonnel mines during the preceding 12-month period or due to legacy contamination from mines laid previously.

Afghanistan

In June 2021, Afghanistan stated that "improvised mines are still used by antigovernment elements as a weapon of choice" and that almost two-thirds of civilian casualties in the past 12 months were attributable to improvised mines. NSAG use of improvised mines in previous years has resulted in very high casualties. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) attributed use of pressure-plate antipersonnel mines in 2020 "almost exclusively" to the Taliban, stating that this use had led to an increase in the number of casualties attributed to the Taliban.


Sporadic use of improvised antipersonnel mines has occurred in the Philippines over past years. In December 2020, the Armed Forces of the Philippines displayed evidence of improvised antipersonnel landmines found in Barangay Itaw, in South Upi municipality, Maguindanao province, attributed to the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). The device was manufactured from recycled unexploded ordnance (UXO), Armed Forces of the Philippines, 57th Infantry Masikap Battalion Facebook page, 12 December 2020, bit.ly/MasikapBattalionFacebook. See also, Jeoffrey Maitem and Julie Alipala, "2 soldiers, 2 militias injured as landmine planted by local IS forces blasted in Maguindanao," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 October 2020, bit.ly/Inquirer24Oct2020.


of casualties after three years of decline. The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan has also been attributed to the Islamic State Khorasan Province.

Colombia

Colombia’s 2021 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report states that improvised antipersonnel landmines are still used by NSAGs, as well as criminal enterprises involved in the manufacture of narcotics and in illegal mineral extraction. The Colombian government Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, OACP) attributed responsibility for recent landmine use to residual or dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) forces for 218 mine incidents in 2020, and to National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) forces for 167 mine incidents in 2020. An additional 55 incidents were attributed to other armed groups, while 66 mine incidents occurred where the responsible group was unknown. In total, 506 new mine incidents were reported in Colombia in 2020. As of 1 September 2021, OACP had registered 177 incidents for the calendar year, with 23 attributed to ELN forces, 110 attributed to residual FARC forces, and 44 attributed to other actors. Local media outlets in Colombia reported numerous landmine seizure incidents in late 2020 and early 2021.

India

Maoist insurgents in India have made sporadic use of improvised mines. In early 2021, in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, villagers were killed or injured by improvised mines.


33 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 46–48. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT. The bodies of the improvised antipersonnel landmines are primarily non-metallic, using both commercial high explosives as well as improvised explosives from agricultural chemicals, and are activated by either electronic or chemical detonators. The Article 7 report notes that most are activated by pressure, but some by tension wires.

34 Updated information according to OACP, sourced from the Colombian Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights database of events by MAP/MUSE, bit.ly/ColombiaIncidentDatabase. Provided to the Monitor by the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM).

antipersonnel mines while gathering forest products. Police personnel were also killed or injured in mine incidents. The incidents were attributed to officials to pressure-plate activated mines laid by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) or its People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). In July 2021, in Jharkhand, a villager taken by the armed forces to guide them in the jungle died after stepping on a landmine attributed to CPI-M. In August 2020, two Adivasis (tribal people) were killed after they stepped on a mine laid by the PLGA in Visakhapatnam district, Andhra Pradesh. The CPI-M admitted responsibility for the incident to the family and by audio press note to the village where it occurred, claiming that they had laid the booby-trap for pursuing police forces. In December 2019, a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) officer was injured after stepping on a mine allegedly laid by the CPI-M near Lohardaga, in Jharkhand state. That same month, a girl was killed by a mine and five others were injured while visiting a waterfall in the same area. In August 2019, in Kanker, Chhattisgarh state, a villager herding cattle was killed after stepping on a mine allegedly laid by the CPI-M. In July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhattisgarh state told the state news agency that "Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable places, where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge."  

Myanmar

Many NSAGs have used antipersonnel landmines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2020 and early 2021, there were allegations of new mine use by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and other groups. Since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, several local militias—known as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs)—have formed. Local media have reported the use of landmines by these groups, but it is not possible to determine whether the devices are victim-activated or command-detected.  

36 While collecting leaves in the forest, one woman was killed and four were injured after stepping on a mine said by officials to have been laid by the PLGA on the border of Lathedar and Gumla districts, in Jharkhand State. Injuries from pressure-plate mines had previously been reported in the area. "Woman Killed, 3 Injured in Landmine Blast by Maoists at Jharkhand Forest," News 18, 16 January 2021, bit.ly/News18Jharkhand16Jan2021. Later in the month, also in Jharkhand State, a young man was injured while tending cattle in the forest. Vishvendu Jaipuriar, "Chatra youth loses leg in landmine blast in Chatra," Telegraph India, 21 January 2021, bit.ly/TelegraphIndia21Jan2021. In March 2021, in Chhattisgarh, an officer of the special state armed forces was killed after stepping on a pressure-plate mine. "Chhattisgarh Armed Force Jawan Killed In Blast Triggered By Maoists," NDTV, 4 March 2021, bit.ly/NDTV4March2021.  

37 Mukesh Ranjan, "Villager guiding cops killed after IED planted by Maoists explodes in Jharkhand's Gumla," The New Indian Express, 14 July 2021, bit.ly/NewIndianExpress14July2021. It is not known if this was voluntary or forced labour. The article states that there were other similar casualties.  


42 There are also allegations of use by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N), and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) in their operations against the Tatmadaw during the reporting period.  

Recent allegations of new use were reported in Kachin, Kayin, Mon, and Shan states:

- In August 2021, a PDF in Pekon township, Shan state, claimed that its use of mines had caused several Tatmadaw casualties.44
- In July 2021:
  - A combined Katha PDF and KIA force claimed that its use of landmines had caused Tatmadaw casualties.45
  - A mine reportedly laid by KNLA Battalion 102 killed a local person in Hpapun township, Kayin state.46
- In June 2021, KNLA Battalion 102 removed landmines that they had laid along a road, to allow villagers to travel to market. KNLA forces left the mines at the side of the road.47
- In May 2021, Myanmar government officials alleged that KIA mine use had caused two casualties in Momauk township, Kachin state.48

It is often difficult to attribute responsibility for each mine incident in Myanmar to a specific armed group. In northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw are engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance: the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Conflict between NSAGs has also occurred in the area: between the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), the TNLA, and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N). Casualties have occurred near to sites of armed conflict involving all these groups, and locals are not sure which groups have laid mines. Examples of such incidents include:

- In July 2021:
  - A child was injured by a mine in Ponnagyun township, Rakhine state, in an area where the Tatmadaw and the AA had recently clashed.49
  - A man was killed by a mine in Kyaukme township, Shan state, where multiple armed groups operate. It was not possible to determine which NSAG laid the mine.50
- In June 2021, in Hpapun township, Kayin state, recently laid mines wounded two local people, but it was unclear which group laid the mines.51
- In May 2021, villagers fleeing armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA outside Meh Klaw saw mines laid along the side of the road to Kamarmaung, Kayin state, but it was not known who laid them.52

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46 KHRG, “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. KHRG researchers were told that no warning by the KNLA had been issued. Nearby, another mine caused minor injuries to two other people the same day.
47 KHRG, “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. KHRG researchers were told that on 19 June 2021, KNLA Battalion 102 removed some mines so that local villagers could visit Hpapun town to buy goods. They left some landmines beside the road, leaving villagers afraid to go back to their own villages.
51 KHRG, “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. KHRG researchers were told that it was an improvised mine. In the second incident, a “local armed group” had warned villagers not to go to the area. In the July incident, local authorities had given a warning which had been forgotten by the villager who was injured.
52 KHRG, “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2021. On 3 May 2021, villagers from Nah Koo Nah village, Meh Klaw village tract, fled due to skirmishes between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw occurring close to the village. In all, 70–80 villagers (12 households) fled to Kamarmaung town, during which they noticed landmines laid along the road leading to Kamarmaung.
Nigeria

In June 2021, Nigeria stated that with regard to new mine contamination, the “majority of incidents reported are due to improvised anti-personnel mines (Victim-Activated IED-pressure plate activated).” Boko Haram militants have used landmines, improvised landmines, and other types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks, primarily in northeastern Nigeria. In December 2020, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) documented past incidents and recoveries of improvised landmines attributed to Boko Haram. It recorded 697 incidents, which produced 1,052 casualties, from improvised landmines or ERW from January 2016 to August 2020 in Borno state and in some areas of Adamawa and Yobe states. Previously, in September 2018, MAG stated that there was evidence of significant new use of mines by Boko Haram and its splinter groups. MAG reported that locally-manufactured antipersonnel mines were used on roads, fields, and in villages, mostly in Borno state, but also in Adamawa and Yobe.

In April 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported the "extensive use of simple pressure plate activated IEDs on main supply routes, effectively as very large de facto landmines. There are reports of significant use of IEDs around Boko Haram held areas, with the use of multiple IEDs and anti-handling devices." In June 2017, UNMAS said contamination by improvised mines laid by Boko Haram factions also threatened communities in nearby areas of the Lake Chad Basin. In May 2020, the Nigeria Security Index reported that 99% of the attacks by Boko Haram over a 10-year period used landmines and other explosive devices, but did not differentiate by type.

Pakistan

NSAGs in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used improvised antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period. Use is attributed to militants often referred to as “miscreants” in local media reports, but is generally accepted to be by constituent groups of Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) and Balochi insurgent groups. In October 2020, a spokesperson for the Baloch Liberation Army admitted responsibility for mines laid in the Kohlu district of Balochistan province, which killed one person and left another injured. As in previous years, some civilians were killed or injured in antipersonnel mine incidents, but from available information it was difficult to attribute specific responsibility or the date of placement. Landmine Monitor has recorded numerous antipersonnel mine incidents in past reports in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, though in some cases the precise date of mine use could not be ascertained.

55 MAG, “Out of Sight: Landmines and the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria,” 30 September 2018, p. 4, bit.ly/MAGNigeria30Sept2018. MAG states that their research revealed that almost 90% of the victims of explosive incidents were from antipersonnel landmines, with a casualty rate of almost 19 per day during 2017 and early 2018.
ALLEGATIONS OF LANDMINE USE BY STATES

Landmines in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Azerbaijan accused Armenian forces of laying mines in 2020 and 2021 in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in adjoining areas. It has not been possible to independently verify this claim. At the Mine Ban Treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2021, Armenia denied using antipersonnel mines in the 2020 conflict and stated that during withdrawal, Armenian forces lacked the time possible to mine areas that subsequently came under Azerbaijan’s control.

However, in May 2021, Armenia’s acting prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, told a government meeting that Armenian soldiers had emplaced mines along sections of the border to strengthen security and had installed warning signs. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 12 June 2021 that 15 detained Armenians had been handed over to Armenia, in exchange for maps from Armenia showing the location of around 97,000 landmines laid in the Aghdam region, one of seven territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan regained control over in 2020. It is unclear if the maps show the location of newly laid minefields, mines planted before 2020, or both.

Other allegations of new landmine use by states

In November 2020, allegations of new use of antipersonnel landmines by North Korean forces surfaced. South Korean state media reported that in a closed-door session of the National Assembly, intelligence officials stated that North Korea had blocked its borders and emplaced landmines along parts of its border with China. These allegations have not been independently verified, though several casualties due to these mines were reported along the border in Ryanggang province.

The Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during the reporting period, any use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria. NSAGs in Syria likely continued to use improvised landmines, as in previous years, but limited access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control made it difficult to confirm new use.

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 164 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.
No states joined the Mine Ban Treaty during the reporting period. The last states to accede to the treaty were Sri Lanka and the State of Palestine, both in December 2017.

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory yet to ratify.

Libya’s representative told States Parties in November 2020, “We seize this opportunity to convey to you the declaration by the Chair of the Presidential Council of the National Accord government of Libya is willing to join the Mine Ban Treaty,” adding that “this treaty has extraordinary importance to Libya.”

Other states not party made statements during the reporting period, confirming their long-standing positions on joining the Mine Ban Treaty. These include:

- Armenia told the president of the Mine Ban Treaty in June 2021 that it values the treaty, but has not signed as the decision is linked to “the security environment in our region” and the “principle of reciprocity.”

- Azerbaijan provided a detailed statement to the Mine Ban Treaty president in June 2021, elaborating its views on joining and adhering to the treaty. According to the statement, “Azerbaijan endorses the purpose and objectives of the Convention and appreciates the humanitarian spirit reflected therein.” However, it states that Azerbaijan is not a State Party “for the obvious reasons arising from our assessment that the military posture of neighbouring Armenia does not allow us to become a full-fledged party to the Convention.”

- Russia told the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in November 2020 that it “is not advisable for it to adhere” to the treaty, and it has “serious doubts as to the reliability [of the treaty] as it does not have the necessary tools to ensure the compliance of those States that have violated it.” Russia said it “shares the goals of the treaty and supports a world free of mines” but views antipersonnel mines “as an effective way of ensuring the security of Russia's borders.”

- Syria told the Mine Ban Treaty's Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020 that it “stresses that achieving global agreement and freeing the world of landmines requires addressing existing concerns and challenges. First and foremost, translating political commitments into financial resources to support the achievement of these goals.”

The administration of President Joe Biden has yet to review the US landmine policy announced on 31 January 2020 under former president Donald Trump, that allows the US to develop, produce, and use landmines as long as they are “non-persistent,” that is, equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features. The policy abandons the previous...
constraint on using antipersonnel mines only on the Korean Peninsula, and instead permits
the US to use them anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{75}

\section*{ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTION}

Since 1997, an annual UNGA resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with
an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for the humanitarian rationale of the
treaty and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to
the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.\textsuperscript{76}

On 7 December 2020, UNGA Resolution 75/52, calling for the universalization and full
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, was adopted by a vote of 169 in favor, none against,
and 17 abstentions.\textsuperscript{77} This marked the second year that no state voted against the resolution,
and the third consecutive year with 169 votes in favor. It represented a slight decrease in the
number of abstentions, down from 18 in 2019. States not party Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US made statements explaining their votes.

A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions
since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South
Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan,\textsuperscript{78} and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{79}

\section*{NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS}

Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel landmines, which reflects
the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of these weapons.
However, there were no new declarations by NSAGs during 2020 or early 2021.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt using antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{80} The
exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of
existence, or become part of state structures.

\textsuperscript{75} Previous US president Barack Obama issued a new landmine policy in 2014 banning production and
acquisition of antipersonnel mines as well as halting their use by the US anywhere except the Korean
Peninsula. The Obama administration brought US policy further in line with the Mine Ban Treaty, but
did not take any measures towards US accession. Under the 2014 policy, the US committed not to use
antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and not to assist, encourage, or induce other
countries to use, stockpile, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines outside of the peninsula. It also
committed to no future US production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.

\textsuperscript{76} This includes Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,
Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

\textsuperscript{77} The 17 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan,
Palau, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{78} Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and did not vote on the
resolution in 2018 and 2020.

\textsuperscript{79} Of these states: India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US are party to the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to
CCW Protocol II; and Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols.
Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria remain outside of any treaty-based prohibition or regulation of
antipersonnel mines.

\textsuperscript{80} As of October 2021, 48 NSAGs have committed not to use mines through the Geneva Call Deed of
Commitment: 20 by self-declaration, four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel
Declaration and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment), and two through a peace accord (in Colombia and
PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states have produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past. As many as 40 states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including three that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.

The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. This represents no change from the previous reporting period.

Most of the countries listed as producing antipersonnel landmines are not believed to be actively producing, but have yet to disavow ever doing so. Those most likely to be actively producing mines are India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia.

Russia debuted new “smart” landmine systems during its annual military exercises in 2021, including mines delivered by rockets and scattered from truck-mounted launchers. It introduced the POM-3 or “Medalyon” antipersonnel mine, a self-destructing bounding fragmentation mine equipped with inherent antihandling/anti-disturbance capability, which had been in development since at least 2015.

The landmine policy announced by the US in January 2020 returned it to the list of countries that either actively produce antipersonnel landmines, or reserve the right to do so.

NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen. Antipersonnel mines are prohibited regardless of whether they were assembled in a factory or improvised from locally-available materials.

TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing its annual report in 1999.
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.\(^8\)

**STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

**STATES NOT PARTY**

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.\(^9\) In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global collective total may be less than 50 million.\(^9\)

It is unclear if all of these 30 states not party currently stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

**STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY STATES PARTIES**

At least 161 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 94 states which have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 67 states which have declared that they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. Two States Parties destroyed a combined total of 106,569 mines during 2020 (Sri Lanka

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\(^8\) Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

\(^9\) Three states not party, all in the Asia-Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga.

\(^9\) In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile was “less than” five million, but there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
destroyed 106,113, and Ukraine destroyed 456). States Parties possess a collective total of 3.6 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3.3 million) and Greece (343,413).

Sri Lanka announced in October 2021 that it had completed its obligation to destroy its stockpile during the late summer of 2021. Sri Lanka’s remaining stockpile of 11,841 antipersonnel mines was destroyed in Kilinochchi district, Northern province, in advance of its 1 June 2022 deadline.

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete destruction of their stockpiles by their respective four-year deadlines. Neither state has indicated when the obligation to destroy their remaining stockpiles will be completed.

Greece did not destroy any stockpiled mines in 2020. It announced in June 2021 that a new contract tender “will be issued in order to appoint a new subcontractor for the demilitarization of the remaining APLMs stockpile.”

Ukraine remains unable to articulate a timeframe for the completion of stockpile destruction. A previous agreement reached by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Support and Procurement Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines was terminated in 2020. The parties are currently in the process of tendering a new agreement. As the President of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties noted, “Ukraine further indicated that it is doing its best to intensify the interaction with relevant stakeholders on the matter” and added that “as soon as the tender procedure will be completed, Ukraine will inform on the activities carried out under Article 4.”

Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not possess stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 63 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 30 retain more than 1,000 mines, and three (Sri Lanka, Finland, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Another 100 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines.

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91 In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. See also, Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Section 3, Table 2. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.
93 Greece had a deadline for stockpile destruction of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
98 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.
mines, including 41 states that stockpiled or retained mines in the past. Chile joined this latter group of States Parties during the reporting period, decades after initially retaining over 28,000 antipersonnel mines when the treaty entered into force for the country.99

States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last declared total (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Consumed during 2020</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Total quantity reduced as excess to need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15,851 (2020)</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,050 (2016)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6,439 (2020)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>5,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,964 (2020)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,570 (2020)</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,875 (2011)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4,505 (2019)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,375 (2019)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3,858 (2020)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2020)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,485 (2020)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,364 (2011)</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,134 (2018)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,454 (2015)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2,155 (2020)</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,021 (2020)</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,020 (2020)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,000 (2020)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,841 (2020)</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,764 (2011)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,730 (2020)</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1,705 (2020)</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>7,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,540 (2020)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,304 (2020)</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,121 (2020)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123,033</td>
<td>221,300</td>
<td>6,906</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>35,470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/R=not reported.

99 Botswana, Brazil, and Uruguay all reported in 2020 that they destroyed their remaining retained mines (1,002, 364, and 260 respectively) during calendar year 2019. In 2018, Argentina, Cambodia, and Ethiopia destroyed the entirety of their stockpiles retained for training and research, and the UK announced that its stockpile was comprised of inert munitions that do not fall under the scope of the treaty. Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report, which was originally due in 2012.
In addition to those listed above, another 33 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines, and collectively possess a combined total of some 13,900 retained mines. 100 Seven of these states used a combined total of 1,143 retained mines in 2020. 102 Another seven did not report any use. 102 Fourteen States Parties that retain under 1,000 antipersonnel mines have not submitted an annual transparency report for calendar year 2020. 103

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

A total of seven States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Djibouti, Nigeria, and Oman (which each retain more than 1,000 mines); and Burundi, Cape Verde, Senegal, and Togo (which each retain less than 1,000 mines). This list remained unchanged from the previous reporting period.

The Oslo Action Plan calls for any State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to "annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes" and to "destroy all antipersonnel mines that exceed that number." 104

States Parties agreed to Action #49, wherein the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role to play in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an "early warning mechanism." The action point states that "If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned..." 105

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition. 106

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party "report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180

100 States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Cambodia (953), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Slovakia (874), BiH (834), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), Japan (719), South Africa (576), Italy (563), Sudan (528), Germany (465), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Cyprus (435), Nicaragua (435), Portugal (383), Republic of the Congo (322), Côte d’Ivoire (290), Netherlands (270), Slovenia (249), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), The Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).

101 States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines and reported use of retained mines in calendar year 2020: Netherlands (587), Sudan (201), Germany (118), Japan (84), Cyprus (65), Italy (54), and Slovenia (23).

102 States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines but did not report using any in calendar year 2020: BiH, Burundi, Ecuador, Jordan, Portugal, Senegal, and Zimbabwe.

103 States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines but did not submit an annual Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2020: Benin, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Mali, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia.


105 Ibid., Action #49.

106 States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, The Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and the UK.
days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 1 October 2021, 45% of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2020. A total of 91 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2020, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years. The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2020 is equal to that of 2019.


In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, which included information on contamination, clearance, casualties, and victim assistance in Western Sahara.

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107 The 73 States Parties that submitted a transparency report for calendar year 2020 (as of 1 October 2021): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, BIH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, UK, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

108 The 91 States Parties that have not submitted Article 7 reports for calendar year 2020 (as of 1 October 2021); those that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and Zambia.

109 The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario). Polisario’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU), but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the United Nations (UN), which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.
1997 MINE BAN TREATY: STATUS 2021

[Map showing states that have signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty as of 2021]
A woman poses in front of her stall at the Fada market in Chad. She is a beneficiary of PRODECO, a large-scale EU-funded development and demining project, implemented by HI in association with other organizations in the mine contaminated regions of Borku and Ennedi.

© Gwenn Dubourthoumieu/HI, November 2020
THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter highlights developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of antipersonnel mines. The first part of this overview covers contamination and casualties, while the second part focuses on addressing the impact through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. These make up three of the five core components or “pillars” of mine action.

This overview documents progress under the Oslo Action Plan—the five-year action plan of the Mine Ban Treaty, adopted in November 2019. The plan is consistent with the fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty, whereby States Parties declare that they are:

“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenseless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.”

As of October 2021, there were 33 States Parties that had declared obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty to clear contaminated land. In 2020, despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, most States Parties reported undertaking clearance in areas under their jurisdiction and control. A total of 146km² of contaminated land was cleared, while approximately 135,583 antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed. In 2020, Chile and the United Kingdom (UK) both declared completion of their Article 5 clearance obligations.

However, States Parties Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria were added back on to the list of States Parties with clearance obligations due to having either newly discovered or, in the case of Nigeria, new mine contamination. Progress towards the aspirational goal “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025,” as agreed by States
Parties at the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014 and reaffirmed at the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in 2019, has stalled, with few States Parties on target to meet their deadlines.

Exceptionally high numbers of casualties resulting from landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to be recorded during 2020, following a sharp rise in casualties caused by increased conflict and contamination since 2015. The total of 7,073 mine/ERW casualties in 2020 represents more than double the number of casualties in 2013, which saw the fewest annual casualties on record. Casualties were recorded in 51 countries and three other areas in 2020. For the first time, Syria recorded the highest number of annual causalities, followed by Afghanistan. The majority of casualties in 2020 were reported in countries experiencing armed conflict and which suffered contamination with mines of an improvised nature.

Mine/ERW risk education was conducted in at least 26 States Parties during 2020, albeit under unprecedented and challenging conditions. Delivery was adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic as physical distancing, movement restrictions, and school closures prevented many of the usual risk education activities from being conducted. However, in line with Action #31 of the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties and operators responded and adapted to these changing circumstances by devising new ways to deliver the life-saving messages through mass media, mobile phone apps, social media platforms, and local networks of community volunteers.

At least 34 States Parties have responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims—these states have “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.” The Oslo Action Plan includes commitments to enhance the core victim assistance components of emergency medical response, ongoing healthcare, rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and socio-economic inclusion. It also includes a commitment on protection of victims in situations of risk, including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters. This action has become particularly important in the context of states meeting victim assistance objectives during the COVID-19 pandemic, while at the same time addressing the changes and challenges brought about by pandemic-related restrictions.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

States Parties with Article 5 obligations
As of October 2021, a total of 33 States Parties had declared an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control, and therefore have obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

States Parties that have completed clearance
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty.

At the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020, Chile formally announced having completed clearance of all known mined areas within its territory on 27 February 2020.


The Impact

The United Kingdom (UK) also announced completion of its Article 5 obligations in November 2020, following the clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas ahead of its deadline of 1 March 2024. 3

Since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999, 33 States Parties have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory. State Party El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties that have declared Article 5 obligations as of October 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The United Kingdom (UK) also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory, and completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

The United Kingdom (UK) also announced completion of its Article 5 obligations in November 2020, following the clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas ahead of its deadline of 1 March 2024. 3

Since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999, 33 States Parties have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory. State Party El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force.

States Parties that have declared fulfilment of clearance obligations since 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Djibouti, Honduras, Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Eswatini (formerly Swaziland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>France, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Albania, Rwanda, Tunisia,***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Nicaragua*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Nigeria**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,** Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Bhutan, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Venezuela***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Algeria*, Mozambique*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Jordan, Mauritania**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Chile, UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Algeria, Nicaragua, and Mozambique have reported, or are suspected to have, residual contamination.

**Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria have reported finding new contamination.

***Tunisia and Venezuela are suspected to have improvised mine contamination.

Several States Parties that have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines later discovered previously unknown mine contamination, or were required to verify that areas had been cleared to humanitarian standards. 3 Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Jordan each declared the fulfilment of their Article 5 obligations several years after their initial declarations.

States Parties that have reported new contamination

If a State Party discovers a mined area under its jurisdiction or control after its original or extended Article 5 deadline has expired, it has an obligation to inform all States Parties of


4 Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination from civilians living close to the areas.
the discovery and to undertake to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines in the area as soon as possible, and before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference.⁵

Three States Parties that previously declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines have since reported further contamination, and submitted extension requests in 2020 and 2021.

Guinea-Bissau declared fulfilment of its clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 December 2012. Yet in June 2021, Guinea-Bissau reported residual contamination from mines/ERW and submitted an extension request until 31 December 2022.⁶

Mauritania, which declared itself free of mines in 2018, reported finding new contamination in 2019 and was granted a one-year extension in 2020 to conduct survey to gain a more accurate estimate of contamination.⁷ Following this initial one-year extension, Mauritania submitted a fourth request to extend its clearance deadline in June 2021.⁸

Nigeria announced that it had fulfilled its Article 5 obligations in 2011, but indicated newly-mined areas in 2019.⁹ Nigeria submitted an extension request in November 2020, and received an interim extension until 31 December 2021 “to present [a] detailed report on contamination, progress made and work plan for implementation.”¹⁰ Nigeria submitted a second request in May 2021, to be considered at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2021.¹¹

States Parties with residual contamination

Four States Parties were known or suspected to have residual contamination in 2020.

Algeria declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations in 2017, but continues to find and destroy antipersonnel mines on its southwestern borders. In 2020, Algeria reported that 8,813 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed, an increase from the 4,499 found in 2019.¹² Algeria reported that the mined areas are under its jurisdiction and control, and that the mines are immediately reported and destroyed, in accordance with the treaty.¹³

There have been several mine/ERW casualties reported in Kuwait since 1990. In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War.¹⁴ The mines are believed to be present mainly on its borders with Iraq.

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¹³ Email from Colonel Djelliel, Executive Secretary of the Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, 20 April 2021.

and Saudi Arabia; in areas used by shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

In Mozambique, four small suspected mined areas totaling 1,881m² were reported to be submerged underwater in Inhambane province. At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2018, Mozambique reiterated its commitment to address these areas once the water level had receded and access could be gained, and said the National Demining Institute conducted regular monitoring. Mozambique noted that it believed there was little probability that mines would be detected in the submerged areas. Mozambique has provided no further updates since 2018 on the status of these mined areas.

Nicaragua declared completion of clearance under Article 5 in April 2010, but has since found residual mine/ERW contamination. In 2018, Nicaragua reported that its contingency operations answered 13 reports made by the public, resulting in the clearance of 2,849m² and removal and destruction of 29 items of ERW. Nicaragua confirmed these operations would continue through 2019. In May 2020, two mines exploded in El Bayuncun, San Fernando, near the border with Honduras. The first mine injured one person and the second injured four people from a rescue party.

**Extent of contamination in States Parties**

States Parties Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen have all reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination (more than 100km²). However, the extent of contamination in at least two of these countries—Ethiopia and Ukraine—is likely to be considerably less once survey is conducted.

Large contamination by antipersonnel landmines (20–99km²) is reported in five States Parties: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

Medium contamination (5–19km²) is reported in seven States Parties: Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan.

Ten States Parties reported less than 5km² of contamination: Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, and Serbia.

Nigeria, which submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 extension request in 2021, reported that due to insecurity, the extent of contamination had not been determined. Nigeria is impacted by improvised mines, other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ERW, mainly in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in the northeast.

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15 Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/MozambiqueStatementJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 20 April 2017–1 April 2018), Form F. Mozambique erroneously reported that the total of the areas was “18,888 square meters” in its June statement to the intersessional meetings, and “1,118m²” in four tasks in its latest Article 7 transparency report.

16 Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/MozambiqueStatementJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Forms C and F. These areas were initially recorded as totaling 5,107m², which, following clearance of 3,226m² by Handicap International (HI) in 2015, left 1,881m² remaining to be addressed. In its April 2017 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, Mozambique reiterated that the “total areas suspended due to inaccessibility due to the high-level of water are 1,881m² with 4 tasks remaining,” and confirmed that the areas were “earmarked for future clearance once access is regained.” The report also erroneously lists the size of remaining contamination in the four areas as 3,226m².


18 La Segovias en Noticias, “One deceased and 4 injured in antipersonnel mines incident in the border with Honduras.”

### Estimated antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties\(^{20}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Massive (more than 100km(^2))</th>
<th>Large (20–99km(^2))</th>
<th>Medium (5–19km(^2))</th>
<th>Small (less than 5km(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Ecuador Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and South Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>Afghanistan Cambodia, Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</td>
<td>BiH, Croatia, Turkey, Ukraine*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tajikistan, Cyprus**,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Iraq, Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oman, Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Ethiopia*, Angola, Chad, Eritrea,</td>
<td>Mauritania, Somalia,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>South Sudan, Sudan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Both Ethiopia and Ukraine have reported massive contamination, although this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted. It is expected that the estimates will be significantly reduced after survey. In Ukraine the estimate includes all contamination, including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and other ERW.

**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

### Americas

In December 2020, Colombia reported a total of 260 municipalities suspected or known to be contaminated, including 138 municipalities that were inaccessible or only partly accessible.\(^{21}\) Contamination in accessible areas comprised 7.73km\(^2\), with 1.85km\(^2\) classified as confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and 5.88km\(^2\) as suspected hazardous areas (SHA).\(^{22}\) Colombia also reported in December 2020 that 253 municipalities were free of contamination.\(^{23}\)

Ecuador and Peru each have a very small amount of remaining contaminated area, of 0.04km\(^2\) and 0.37km\(^2\) respectively.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{20}\) Data reported by States Parties. Argentina is not included in the table. Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the islands and exercises control over them. The UK completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020, but Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

\(^{21}\) Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Section D, p. 18. In December 2019, Colombia had reported 322 municipalities suspected or known to be contaminated, including 156 municipalities where operators were working and 166 municipalities which were inaccessible due to insecurity. See, Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Clarifications to the Committee, 31 July 2020, pp. 9 and 58, bit.ly/ColombiaArt5ExtRequest2020.

\(^{22}\) Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 18.


East and South Asia and the Pacific

As of the end of December 2020, Cambodia reported contamination of 801.64 km², following the completion of a national baseline survey in 73 districts.\(^{25}\) Thailand has a total of 62.95 km² of contamination, of which 23.27 km² are CHA (183 areas) and 39.68 km² are SHA (43 areas). Much of the remaining contamination in Cambodia and Thailand is along their shared border, where access has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation.\(^{26}\)

Afghanistan reported contamination of 187.31 km² as of the end of 2020, of which 148.46 km² is classified as CHA, and 38.85 km² is classified as SHA.\(^{27}\) Prior to the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan in August 2021, new contamination resulting from fighting between the government and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) continued to add to the extent of contamination in the country.\(^{28}\)

Mine contamination in Sri Lanka is mainly in Northern province, the scene of intense fighting during the civil war; and to a lesser extent in Eastern and North Central provinces. As of March 2021, Sri Lanka reported a total of 12.79 km² contamination, with 304 CHA (11.44 km²) and nine SHA (1.35 km²).\(^{29}\)

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

BiH reported extensive contamination of 956.36 km² as of the end of 2020.\(^{30}\) The majority of hazardous areas in BiH are suspected rather than confirmed (95 km² CHA and 861.36 km² SHA), meaning actual contamination may be less than reported.

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\(^{25}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Chim Chan Sideth, Director, Regulations and Monitoring Department, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 28 February 2021; and email from Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA. Data provided by CMAA staff, 3 June 2021.

\(^{26}\) Improved relationships between Cambodia and Thailand have led to cooperation to survey and clear border areas. See, Khouth Sophak Chakrya, “CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border provinces,” *The Phnom Penh Post*, 24 September 2019, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost24Sept2019.

\(^{27}\) Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 8. In April 2020, it was reported that antipersonnel mine contamination in Afghanistan totaled 171 km² (120 km² CHA, 51 km² SHA), while contamination from improvised mines totaled 37 km² (16 km² CHA, 21 km² SHA). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 16 April 2020.

\(^{28}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.


\(^{30}\) BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C; and email from Ljiljana Ilić, Interpreter, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 30 September 2021. This was a reduction from the 966.68 km² reported in BiH Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 August 2020, p. 16, bit.ly/BiHArt5ExtRequestRevised2020; BHMAC, “Report on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2020,” undated, p. 11; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Željko Dogo, Officer for Analysis and Reporting, BHMAC, 2 April 2021.
As of March 2021, Croatia reported contamination of 279.55km² (196.89km² CHA, including 30.14km² under military control, and 82.66km² SHA) across eight of its 21 counties.31 The majority of contaminated land in Croatia is reported to be in forested areas.32 Newly discovered contamination was identified in four counties in 2020–2021.33

Turkey reported contamination of 145km² across 3,834 areas. The majority of contaminated areas are found along its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, while 920 areas are not in border regions.34 Turkey plans to conduct non-technical survey during 2021–2023 of all of the contaminated areas, to provide a more accurate picture of contamination.35

Ukraine reported 7,000km² of contamination (undifferentiated, including antipersonnel mines) in government-controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as of the end of 2020.36 Ukraine has provided the same estimate of contamination since 2018, and survey to provide a more accurate baseline has not yet been conducted.37 In addition, an estimated 14,000km² of undifferentiated contamination was reported in areas not controlled by the government.38

Cyprus, Serbia, and Tajikistan all have much smaller amounts of contamination.39

Cyprus is believed to have 1.24km² of antipersonnel and antivehicle landmine contamination. However, the contamination is reported to be only in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone, and not in territory under the effective control of Cyprus.39 Serbia reported 1.15km³ of contamination across five areas, in Bujanovac municipality.40 Tajikistan reported a total of 8.55km² of antipersonnel mine contamination (7.02km² CHA and 1.53km² SHA).41

Middle East and North Africa

Iraq is dealing with contamination by improvised landmines in areas liberated from the Islamic State. As of the end of 2020, Iraq reported 1,199.95km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, and an additional 596.27km² of IED contamination, including improvised mines. The majority of contamination was in Federal Iraq.42

Yemen does not currently have a clear understanding of the level of contamination, as ongoing armed conflict continues to add to the extent and complexity of contamination, which includes improvised mines.43 The scale of the conflict and its extensive impact has

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32 Response to Monitor questionnaire by CPD, 16 March 2021.
33 The newly identified contamination covers 310,931m² and is located in the counties of Lika-Senj, Požega-Slavonija, Šibenik-Knin, and Sisak-Moslavina. Response to Monitor questionnaire by CPD, 16 March 2021.
34 Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 9.
35 Ibid.
40 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D.
41 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 9 April 2021.
43 Yemen reported that trying to highlight the exact area of contamination would be misleading and possibly damaging to future reports. See, Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 12.
continued to prevent implementation of effective nationwide survey.\textsuperscript{44} The most recent estimate of contamination, from March 2017, was 323km\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{45}

Oman reported that all of its hazardous areas had been cleared before the signature of the Mine Ban Treaty, but were in the process of being "re-inspected" to deal with residual risk.\textsuperscript{46}

Palestine reported 0.18km\textsuperscript{2} of landmine contamination, of which 85,000m\textsuperscript{2} was antipersonnel mines and 99,000m\textsuperscript{2} was antivehicle mines.\textsuperscript{47}

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

Ethiopia reported in April 2020 that remaining contamination totaled 726.06km\textsuperscript{2}, across 152 areas in six provinces.\textsuperscript{48} Of this, 29 areas (3.52km\textsuperscript{2}) were CHA, while 123 areas (722.54km\textsuperscript{2}) were SHA.\textsuperscript{49} Most SHAs are located in the Somali region. It believed that the baseline figure is an overestimate and that only 2\% of these areas are actually likely to contain mines.\textsuperscript{50}

As of December 2020, Angola reported total landmine contamination of 85.42km\textsuperscript{2} across 17 provinces, of which 84.41km\textsuperscript{2} was antipersonnel mines and 1.01km\textsuperscript{2} was antivehicle mines. Of the antipersonnel mine contamination, 81.58km\textsuperscript{2} was classified as CHA and 2.83km\textsuperscript{2} as SHA.\textsuperscript{51}

Chad has identified 147 hazardous areas across three provinces,\textsuperscript{52} covering an estimated total of 80.33km\textsuperscript{2} of mixed contamination (57.59km\textsuperscript{2} CHA and 22.74km\textsuperscript{2} SHA).\textsuperscript{53} Over half of the mine contamination is located in Tibesti.\textsuperscript{54} Lake province is contaminated with improvised mines.\textsuperscript{55}

Eritrea has not reported on the extent of its contamination since 2014, when it was estimated at 33.5km\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{56}

As of 31 December 2020, remaining mine contamination in Zimbabwe was 34.12km\textsuperscript{2}. All of this contamination is classified as CHA, and is located in five provinces along the border with Mozambique and an inland minefield in Matabeleland North province.\textsuperscript{57}

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\textsuperscript{45} Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Form D, pp. 4 and 9.


\textsuperscript{47} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maj. Wala Jarrar, External and International Relations, Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC), 23 March 2021.


\textsuperscript{49} Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for April 2019 to April 2020), 13 May 2020, Form D, p. 6.


\textsuperscript{51} Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, pp. 3–4.

\textsuperscript{52} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), 18 June 2021.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{57} Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 3.
Mauritania declared clearance of all known contamination in 2018, but later identified further contamination. A survey conducted in February and March 2021 identified 19 mined areas, covering 16.18km². Local authorities have reported an additional mined area in Ouadane, in the Adrar region, the size of which is still to be determined.

Somalia reported 6.1km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, out of a total of 161.8km² of mixed contamination which includes antivehicle mines. Somalia also reported an increase in the use of improvised mines. Since 2017, the Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA) reported it was in the process of synchronizing and verifying data in the national database, which may lead to adjustments to the figures. This process was ongoing in 2021.

South Sudan reported 7.28km² of contamination as of 31 December 2020, with 63 areas classified as CHA (2.83km²) and 55 as SHA (4.45km²). The largest SHA, in Jonglei, totaled 1.98km², but it is thought its size would be reduced through survey.

As of the end of 2020, Sudan reported 13.09km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, with 56 CHA (up from 43 in 2019) and 41 SHA (down from 52 in 2019) across the states of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan. New contamination totaling 6.22km² was found in Blue Nile and South Kordofan in 2020, with 11 new hazardous areas registered.

Contamination in the DRC totals 0.13km², but is partly located in the provinces of Ituri and North-Kivu, which are difficult to access due to the presence of NSAGs and the Ebola epidemic.

In 2021, Guinea-Bissau reported that residual contamination covers 1.09km² and is classified as CHA, with antipersonnel mines accounting for 0.49km² and antivehicle mines accounting for 0.6km². In addition, 43 areas were suspected to contain both mines and ERW.

Niger and Senegal both have small amounts of contamination. Senegal reported that following non-technical survey in 2020, 37 hazardous areas had been identified, covering 0.49km². In 2020, Niger reported 0.18km² of CHA, adjacent to a military post in Madama, in the Agadez region.

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58 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019); and statement of Mauritania, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 2 July 2020.
59 Mauritania stated that this was a rough estimate of its remaining contamination, pending further technical survey of the mined areas.
63 Ibid., p. 3.
64 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 2–3.
67 Statement of DRC, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 2 July 2020; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 24 February 2021.
Improvised devices designed to detonate—or which due to their design, can be detonated—by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. Available information indicates that the fusing of most improvised landmines allows them to be activated by a person, but there may be exceptions.

Improvised mines are noted as a concern in the Oslo Action Plan, which says “the States Parties are also facing new challenges including increased use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature and rising number of victims.”

Action #21 of the Oslo Action Plan lays out the commitments of States Parties affected by improvised mines whereby all provisions and obligations of the treaty apply to such contamination. This includes the obligations to clear these devices in accordance with Article 5 and to provide regular information on the extent of contamination, disaggregated by type of mines, in their annual transparency reporting under Article 7.

Several States Parties suspected to be contaminated with improvised mines, which may be antipersonnel mines by their nature, have not declared clearance obligations under Article 5 or have not provided regular Article 7 transparency reports.

Improvised landmines causing casualties in Burkina Faso and Cameroon were believed to have primarily acted as de facto “antivehicle mines.” According to Monitor data for 2019, only vehicles were involved in mine incidents in both countries, and no casualties occurred while individuals were on foot. However, in 2020, a few incidents in Burkina Faso and Cameroon appear to have involved people walking.

In the following States Parties, casualties from improvised mines have been documented. These States Parties must clarify their status with regards to their Article 5 obligations and may need to request new clearance deadlines.

In Burkina Faso, IED use by NSAGs has been recorded since 2016. Pressure-plate improvised antivehicle mines have been increasingly used since 2018, due to the introduction of measures which block signals to command-detonated IEDs. In 2020, 107 casualties of improvised mines were recorded—although most incidents involved vehicles, including cars, carts, and bicycles. Yet in August 2020, eight children were killed by an improvised mine in Bembela. One report said the children were watching over

Remains of a car near Qbuq village, in Tal Afar, Iraq. The rocks painted red indicate this is an uncleared area. There are around 100 houses in the village, most are completely or mostly damaged by the conflict. MAG manual demining teams initially cleared roads and around houses. They found hundreds of improvised landmines and booby-traps. © Sean Sutton/MAG, April 2021

Suspected improvised antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties with reported improvised mine hazards and casualties

In Monitor reporting, improvised mines are synonymous with victim-activated IEDs. IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines or victim-operated IEDs, or are referred to by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs or crush wire IEDs.
animal herds when they stepped on an IED, while another said that the device exploded as some of the children were walking and some were on a cart. 72

Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, and its Article 5 deadline expired in 2013. However, since 2014, improvised mines have caused casualties, particularly in the north on the border with Nigeria, as Boko Haram’s activities have escalated. 73 The extent of contamination is unknown but is thought to be small. Most casualties in past years were traveling by vehicle; yet in 2020, of 12 recorded improvised mine casualties, two were incidents that were reported to have occurred while the casualty was walking.74

Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination, and since 2017 has experienced a significant increase in incidents caused by IEDs, including improvised mines, in the center of the country. 75 All casualties to date were traveling by vehicle. The Monitor recorded 242 improvised mine casualties in Mali in 2020. UNMAS reported to the Monitor that improvised mines in Mali are victim-activated by pressure tray or wire trap. 76

Tunisia declared completion of clearance in 2009, but there have been reports of both civilian and military casualties from mines—including improvised mines—in the last five years.77 The improvised mines causing casualties—particularly shepherds walking with their herds—often result in lower limb amputation, consistent with antipersonnel mine explosions.

Venezuela reported clearing all of its remaining mined areas under Article 5 in 2013. 78 Yet in August 2018, media reports said that Venezuelan military personnel suffered an antipersonnel mine incident in Catatumbo municipality, Zulia state, along the border with Colombia,79 where Colombian NSAGs were believed to be using improvised mines to protect strategic positions.80 In March 2021, the Venezuelan military engaged the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in Victoria, in Apure state,81 and a Venezuelan non-governmental organization (NGO) stated that mines "similar to those used in Colombia" were found

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74 Based on incident notes documented in the ACLED compilation of media coverage of conflict incidents for Cameroon in Calendar Year 2020.


76 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020.

77 In 2016, the Monitor reported the highest number of casualties of mines and victim-activated IEDs in Tunisia since monitoring began in 1999. There were 65 casualties in 2016, up from 20 in 2015, Since 2016, there have been between 17–20 casualties in Tunisia each year. ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Tunisia: Casualties,” updated 23 January 2018, bit.ly/TunisiaProfileCasualties2018.


79 “Un militar venezolano muerto por mina antipersona en frontera con Colombia” (“Venezuela military killed by anti-personnel mine at the border with Colombia”), France 24, 6 August 2018, bit.ly/France24-6Aug2018.


81 “Venezuela to request UN aid to clear mines from Colombia border,” France 24, 5 April 2021, bit.ly/France24-5April2021; and “Enfrentamiento entre Fuerzas Armadas venezolanas y disidentes de las FARC en Apure: denunciaron que en la zona del enfrentamiento se hallaron minas antipersona” (“Clash between Venezuelan Armed Forces and FARC dissidents in Apure: they denounced that antipersonnel mines were found in the conflict area”), NTN24.COM, 21 March 2021, bit.ly/NTN24-21March2021.
in the area.\textsuperscript{82} This indicates they were improvised antipersonnel mines. Contamination was later confirmed by a member of parliament and the Ministry of Defense.\textsuperscript{83} Venezuela requested UN support to clear mines from the border in April 2021, and announced that the military would be using a mine sweeper prototype to clear the area.\textsuperscript{84}

**ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS**

Twenty-two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas have, or are believed to have, land contaminated by antipersonnel mines on their territories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States not party and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: other areas are indicated in italics.

State not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999.

**States not party**

The extent of contamination is unknown in most states not party: Armenia, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Landmines are known or suspected to be located along the borders of several states not party, including Armenia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, North Korea, South Korea, and Uzbekistan.

Ongoing conflict, insecurity, and the impact of improvised mines affect states not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

The level of contamination is known to some extent in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, and Lebanon.

In Azerbaijan, contamination comprised 5km\(^2\) of antipersonnel mine contamination (1.5km\(^2\) CHA and 3.5km\(^2\) SHA) and 8.71km\(^2\) of antivehicle mine contamination (1.79km\(^2\) CHA and 6.92km\(^2\) SHA). Survey is needed to assess the extent of contamination, due to changes in control of parts of Nagorno-Karabakh after the conflict in 2020.\textsuperscript{85}

82 Ibid.


85 Since the end of the conflict in 2020, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported to the Monitor that there were “obvious minefields” and the entire region “will be surveyed to register the mine and ERW affected regions.” Due to changes in the affected territories, strategic and operational plans were also under review in 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021.
In Georgia, contamination totaled 2.79km² across four mined areas, including 0.05km² contaminated with antipersonnel mines, and 2.74km² contaminated with antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines. The size of two additional areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines, in the villages of Khojali and Osiauri, was unknown.86

Just over 90km² of contamination was reported in Israel in 2017, comprising 41.58km² CHA and 48.51km² SHA (including areas in the West Bank).87 This did not include mined areas “deemed essential to Israel’s security.” No updates on contamination have been provided since 2017, although Israel reported progress in re-surveying mine affected areas and the clearance of 0.18km² in 2020.88

At the end of 2020, Lebanon reported 18.23km² of landmine contamination, all CHA. There was also 0.41km² of IED contamination, which included improvised mines.89

Other areas

Five other areas unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status are known to have mine contamination: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

The extent of contamination in Abkhazia and Kosovo is small, at 0.01km² in Abkhazia and 1.2km² in Kosovo.90

Nagorno-Karabakh was reported to have 6.75km² of contaminated land including 5.62km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, 0.23km² of antivehicle mine contamination, and 0.9km² of mixed antipersonnel and antivehicle mine contamination.91 The total extent of contamination may be subject to adjustment, due to changes in territorial control during the 2020 conflict and the possibility that new mines may have been laid.

Somaliland was reported to have 3.86km² of contaminated land in total, including 0.52km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, 2km² of antivehicle mine contamination, 0.17km² of ERW contamination, and 1.17km² of mixed contamination.92

Western Sahara has minefields east of the Berm,93 covering an area of 215.96km² (90km² CHA and 125.96km² SHA).94 According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the minefields are contaminated with antivehicle mines, although small numbers of antipersonnel mines have been found in these areas.95

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86 Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Humanitarian Demining Control Division, Legal Entity of Public Law State Military Scientific-Technical Center “DELTA” (SMSTC “DELTA”), 10 September 2021.
87 Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMMA), 26 May 2018.
91 Email from Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 20 July 2021.
92 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Pantigoso, Somaliland Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 31 August 2021.
93 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm was built during the 1975–1991 conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco in the west, and the Polisario Front in the east.
94 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Western Sahara Programme Manager, UNMAS, 4 March 2021.
95 Ibid.
MINE/ERW CASUALTIES

Landmines of all types—including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and improvised mines—as well as cluster munition remnants and ERW remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm globally.

Following a sharp rise in casualties amid increased conflict and contamination since 2015, high numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2020, when at least 7,073 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW. Of that total, at least 2,492 were killed while 4,561 were injured. In the case of 20 casualties, it was not known if the person survived.

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 51 countries and three other areas in 2020. The annual total represents an increase from 5,853 casualties in 2019, and an upward turn from three years of declining casualties (2017–2019) since the annual total reached a peak of 9,440 in 2016, due to increased conflict and the resulting contamination.

States and areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>States and other areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and South Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</td>
<td>Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold. Other areas are indicated in italics.

The casualty total for 2020 represents more than twice the number of casualties in 2013 (3,456), the year with the fewest mine/ERW casualties on record. The significant rise in casualties since that time is primarily due to intensive armed conflicts involving the use of improvised mines.

96 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by cluster munitions, see, ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2021 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2021), bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2021.

97 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties, and this information was not included in the Monitor’s casualty database.

Between 1999 and 2019, Afghanistan and Colombia alternated in having the highest number of annual recorded casualties. In 2020, Syria, a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, recorded the most casualties (2,729), followed by State Party Afghanistan (1,474). This marked the first year that Syria had the highest recorded number of annual casualties since Monitor reporting began in 1999. Afghanistan had recorded the most annual casualties each year from 2008–2019, while casualty rates in Colombia spiked from 2005–2007.

The Monitor notes that since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, casualty totals for Syria have fluctuated, due to inconsistent availability of data and sources and a lack of access to affected areas. Annual totals of recorded mine/ERW casualties in Syria are thought to be a considerable undercount, while ambiguity in the way that casualties and explosive incidents are reported in the media often leaves it unclear if mines involved in incidents were of an improvised nature. Casualty data for Syria is routinely adjusted in light of new surveys and historical data.

It is certain that many casualties go unrecorded each year globally, meaning not all casualties are captured in the Monitor’s data. Some countries do not have functional casualty surveillance systems in place, while other forms of reporting are often inadequate. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic posed an additional challenge to data collection efforts in mine/ERW affected countries.

The number of casualties initially recorded for past years has since been adjusted with newly available data.
In Afghanistan, data collection was limited amid ongoing conflict. The existing system records only civilian casualties. Reporting on military casualties is rare, with no data available for 2019 or 2020. Since May 2017, the Afghan military has stopped releasing conflict casualty figures.

The number of casualties in Azerbaijan in 2020 has not yet been adequately determined, in part due to the complexity of data collection following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also due to changes in territorial control of affected areas. This risks duplication or under-reporting.100

Yemen reported that there was no nationwide casualty surveillance system, and that casualties were recorded in an ad hoc manner by local authorities, medical institutions, and the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC). The issue is compounded by the scale of the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen and the COVID-19 pandemic.101 The Monitor recorded 350 casualties for Yemen in 2020. In its Article 7 report for 2020, Yemen reported 532 victims surveyed in 2020.102 The UN Humanitarian Needs Overview for Yemen reported 1,300 civilians “affected in landmine or ERW related incidents” in 2020, with no reference to persons killed or injured.103

CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS104

Civilian status of casualties in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>4,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deminer</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1,504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civilians accounted for the vast majority of mine/ERW casualties in 2020 compared to military and security forces.105 In 2020, 80% of casualties were civilians, where their status was known, evidencing the long-recognized trend of civilian harm that motivated the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor identified 27 casualties among deminers in nine countries during 2020 while the remaining 20% of casualties were military or combatants. The country with the most military casualties was Syria (390), followed by Mali (165), Ukraine (120), and Nigeria (113).

There were at least 1,872 child casualties in 2020. Children made up half of civilian casualties where the age group was known (3,733), and accounted for 30% of all casualties perished.

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100 The Monitor recorded detailed data on 26 casualties in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh for 2020, with duplicated reporting by area or country removed. ANAMA reported 21 mine/ERW casualties in Azerbaijan due to the conflict (11 killed, 10 injured), among 569 civilian conflict victims (106 killed, 463 injured). ANAMA also reported two casualties in 2020 prior to the conflict. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021. The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AZCBL) counted 179 mine/ERW casualties in 2020 (nine civilians killed, 10 injured; 42 military killed, 118 injured). Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, Director, AZCBL, 8 October 2021.


102 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G. Previous data indicated that aggregate annual casualty figures reported by Yemen included casualties for all time surveyed during that year, rather than casualties which occurred in the calendar year itself.


104 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.

105 The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat, as well as members of NSAGs and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipation2009.
for whom the age group was known (6,272). Children were killed (645) or injured (1,218) by mines/ERW in 34 states and one other area in 2020.

In 2020, as in previous years, the vast majority of child casualties—where the sex was known—were boys (81%). ERW was the device type that caused most child casualties (870, or 46%), followed by improvised mines (454, or 23%).

In 2020, as in past years, men and boys made up the majority of casualties, accounting for 85% of all casualties where the sex was known (4,583 of 5,391). Women and girls made up 15% of all casualties where the sex was known (808).

CASUALTIES BY DEVICE TYPE

Countries with high and increasing numbers of casualties are mostly those with improvised mine casualties. In 2020, improvised mines accounted for the highest number of casualties (2,119) for the fifth year in a row. Although the number of casualties attributed to improvised mines declined from 2019, this is attributable to variants in casualty recording terminology. Most casualties attributed to unspecified mine types in 2020 were reported in countries with improvised mine casualties (1,550 of 1,632 unspecified mine casualties in 2020, or 95%).

Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2020

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; and ERW=explosive remnants of war.

106 Child mine/ERW casualties are recorded when the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as a media report) as being a child.

107 The survival outcome for nine children was not reported. In 2020, child casualties were recorded in 34 states and one other area (other areas are indicated in italics): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

108 There were 1,146 boys and 276 girls recorded as casualties in 2020, while the sex of 450 child casualties was not recorded.

109 These casualties were recorded in Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
In 2020, landmines caused at least 4,352 casualties, including those reported as factory-made antipersonnel mines, improvised mines, antivehicle mines, and unspecified mines.\textsuperscript{110}

Cluster munition remnants caused 218 casualties,\textsuperscript{111} while other ERW caused 1,760 casualties.\textsuperscript{112}

A total of 743 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were not disaggregated in data or reporting.\textsuperscript{113}

### CASUALTIES AND MINE BAN TREATY STATUS IN 2020

Mine/ERW casualties occurred in 38 States Parties in 2020.\textsuperscript{114} States Parties accounted for half (52\%, or 3,642) of annual casualties. Eight States Parties recorded more than 100 casualties in 2020: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

There is a clear trend of declining annual casualties in most States Parties since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence more than 20 years ago, with the exception of those experiencing conflict and substantial improvised mine use.

In 2020, the Monitor identified 3,394 mine/ERW casualties in 13 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.\textsuperscript{115} More than 80\% of those casualties were recorded in Syria (2,729).\textsuperscript{116} Myanmar accounted for the next highest total among countries yet to join the treaty, with 280 casualties.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
State Party & Casualties \\
\hline
Afghanistan & 1,474 \\
Mali & 368 \\
Yemen & 350 \\
Ukraine & 277 \\
Nigeria & 226 \\
Colombia & 167 \\
Iraq & 167 \\
Burkina Faso & 111 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{110} In 2020, antipersonnel mines caused casualties in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Croatia, India, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Improvised mines caused casualties in Afghanistan, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Antivehicle mines caused casualties in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine. Unspecified mine types caused casualties in Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Other areas are indicated in italics.


\textsuperscript{112} ERW caused casualties in Afghanistan, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{113} In 2020, unspecified mines/ERW caused casualties in: Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and one other area, Western Sahara.

\textsuperscript{114} Afghanistan (1,474), Algeria (15), Angola (22), Bangladesh (2), Burkina Faso (111), Cambodia (65), Cameroon (32), Central African Republic (3), Chad (34), Colombia (167), Croatia (1), DRC (13), Ethiopia (14), Iraq (167), Jordan (9), Kenya (5), Kuwait (1), Mali (368), Mauritania (2), Mozambique (7), Niger (64), Nigeria (226), Palestine (10), Philippines (3), Senegal (15), Solomon Islands (2), Somalia (36), South Sudan (57), Sri Lanka (2), Sudan (22), Tajikistan (5), Thailand (12), Tunisia (4), Turkey (24), Uganda (7), Ukraine (277), Yemen (350), and Zimbabwe (16).

\textsuperscript{115} Armenia (4), Azerbaijan (12), Egypt (46), India (72), Iran (50), Lao PDR (33), Lebanon (9), Libya (87), Morocco (1), Myanmar (280), Pakistan (68), Syria (2,729), and Vietnam (5).

\textsuperscript{116} Not including the occupied Golan Heights.
In three other areas—Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara—a combined total of 37 casualties were reported in 2020.\(^\text{117}\)

COORDINATION

The Oslo Action Plan, agreed in November 2019 at the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, highlights best practices that contribute to the effective implementation of mine action programs. These include high levels of national ownership; developing evidence-based, costed, and time-bound national strategies and workplans; and keeping national mine action standards up to date with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Summary of mine action management and coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Mine action strategy end date</th>
<th>Risk education coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Risk education strategy/standard</th>
<th>Victim assistance coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Victim assistance plan/strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2021 TWG</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be adopted/implemented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 2009)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 2017)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be revised/finalized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2025 None</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy No RE standards</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>2025 None</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 2014)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Needs to be revised/finalized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2025 TWG</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2024 Included in mine action meetings</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be adopted/implemented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2025 TWG</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2026 None</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy No RE standards</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Needs to be revised/finalized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{117}\) As noted previously in this report, greater clarity is needed on the number of mine/ERW casualties reported as occurring in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh and in state not party Azerbaijan in 2020. Recorded casualties in the three areas are as follows: Nagorno-Karabakh (14), Somaliland (8), and Western Sahara (15).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Mine action strategy end date</th>
<th>Risk education coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Risk education strategy/standard</th>
<th>Victim assistance coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Victim assistance plan/strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place (expired in 2019)</td>
<td>Included in UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster meetings</td>
<td>RE was included in mine action strategy (expired in 2019) RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms (ad hoc)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 1994)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>RE included in mine action workplan</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>TWG inactive since 2012</td>
<td>RE NMAS outdated</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>TWG</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms (ad-hoc)</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 2018)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None (included in mine action strategy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 2019)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be adopted/implemented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 2010)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party</td>
<td>Mine action strategy end date</td>
<td>Risk education coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Risk education strategy/standard</td>
<td>Victim assistance coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan/strategy</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms (ad hoc)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>Included in UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster meetings</td>
<td>RE NMAS in development</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms (ad hoc)</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Included in UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster meetings</td>
<td>RE strategy in development RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2024</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS outdated</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms (ad hoc)</td>
<td>Needs to be revised/finalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>RE NMAS in development</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Included in mine action meetings</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place (under revision)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be adopted/implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2021 TWG</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be adopted/implemented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2023 TWG</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>Included in mine action meetings</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategy RE NMAS in place (under revision)</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CLEARANCE COORDINATION

In 2020, clearance in most States Parties with contamination was managed and coordinated through national mine action centers. This was the case in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Guinea-Bissau’s National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI), formed in 2001, and under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense since 2009, had been inactive since 2012.118 Having submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request in 2021, CAAMI reported that a new director had been appointed and that it had resumed activities.119

Nigeria formed an Inter-Ministerial Committee in 2019 to develop a mine action strategy and a workplan for survey and clearance.120 In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Nigeria reported that it hoped to establish a national mine action center during the extension period.121

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Mine action strategy end date</th>
<th>Risk education coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Risk education strategy/standard</th>
<th>Victim assistance coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Victim assistance plan/strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>RE included in mine action strategic workplan</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>N/A (completed mine clearance in 2012)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Victim assistance plan or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>No mine action strategy in place</td>
<td>Included in UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster meetings</td>
<td>RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>TWG</td>
<td>RE NMAS in development</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Needs to be revised/finalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>Included in mine action meetings</td>
<td>RE NMAS in place</td>
<td>Active coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Needs to be developed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported; NMAS=national mine action standards; RE=risk education; TWG=technical working group.
States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs are indicated in **bold**.

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118 Interviews with Filomeno Graça, Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance Program Coordinator, CAAMI, Bissau, 29 April 2019; with Irene Laval, General Secretary, Ministry of Defense of Guinea-Bissau, Bissau, 29 April 2019; and with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 23 June 2010.
119 Email from Nautan Mancabu, National Director, CAAMI, 4 March 2021.
120 Membership of the Inter-Ministerial Committee included representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Social Development, the National Emergency Management Agency, the Northeast Development Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs. The membership of the committee was being expanded to include the Nigeria Police Force, the National Security and Civil Defense Corps, and the Ministry of Education. See, Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, p. 13, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequest2021.
In Ukraine, a new structure comprising a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) chaired by the Minister of Defense, and two mine action centers—one under the Ministry of Defense and one under the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU)—were approved in September 2020 via an amendment to the 2018 Mine Action law. The two mine action centers were established and undergoing accreditation and staffing as of August 2021.

NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGIES

National mine action strategies and workplans are crucial for strengthening national ownership of mine action programs, and to enable greater transparency and accountability via monitoring and reporting of progress on clearance under Article 5. Developing a national strategy and workplans can also help states align their mine action activities with broader humanitarian and development aims, and boost their ability to secure international funding.

In 2020, 23 States Parties reported having national mine action strategies and/or workplans in place. Afghanistan, Croatia, Iraq, Sudan, and Tajikistan were in the process of updating their national strategies in 2020, with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) supporting the process in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan.

Sri Lanka planned to update its national strategy in 2021, based on the results of ongoing re-survey in Northern, Eastern, and North Central provinces. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) planned to assist Yemen in updating its outdated national strategy in 2021, to better reflect mine action needs and priorities amid the ongoing conflict.

In 2020, States Parties Cyprus, the DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Serbia, and Ukraine did not have national mine action strategies in place. The DRC’s strategy expired in 2019, though it reported in August 2020 and again in February 2021 that it was in the process of developing a new strategy. The GICHD planned to work with Ukraine to develop a national mine action strategy, with a workshop due to be held in 2022.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

States Parties that did not use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in 2020 included BiH, Croatia, Eritrea, Niger, Oman, Serbia, and Thailand. Serbia was in contact with GICHD to discuss the possibility of installing IMSMA.


123 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Advisor on Mine Action, OSCE-PCU, 4 August 2021.

124 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021; by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 13 April 2021; by CPD, 16 March 2021; by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 9 April 2021; and by Mohamed Abd El Majid, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (NMAC), 22 February 2021. See also, Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 26. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.


As part of the UNDP Mine Action Governance and Management Project, which began in 2017 and is funded by the European Union (EU), the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) planned to create a new online database to increase the availability and transparency of its mine action data.\(^{130}\) Colombia also enhanced its reporting and monitoring via interactive digital dashboards on demining, risk education, and victim assistance. These dashboards and mine action datasets have been made publicly accessible through the Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, AICMA) online “geoportal.”\(^{131}\)

Ukraine had two functioning IMSMA databases in 2020, one managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defense. Consolidation of both databases into a central national IMSMA database is planned once the NMAA has been established.\(^{132}\)

### TRANSPARENCY REPORTING


Four of them have not submitted their report for many years: Niger since 2018, Eritrea since 2014, Nigeria since 2012, and Guinea-Bissau since 2011.\(^{133}\) In line with Action #49 of the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties that have provided no update on implementation of their clearance obligations under Article 5 for two consecutive years should be assisted by the president of the Mine Ban Treaty, in close cooperation with the Article 5 Committee.

### NATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS

Several States Parties reported updating national mine action standards in 2020:

- Afghanistan updated standards on improvised mines, planning and prioritization, and quality management;\(^{134}\)
- Angola updated standards on land release, accreditation, training, technical and non-technical survey, post-clearance documentation, and quality and information management;\(^{135}\)
- Cambodia updated standards on land release, accreditation, and quality and information management;\(^{136}\) and
- Colombia updated standards on land release and information management.\(^{137}\)

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132 Email from Miljenko Vahtavic, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE-PCU, 30 April 2018.

133 Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Somalia submitted Article 5 deadline extension requests in 2021, but also need to submit Article 7 transparency reports every year.

134 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.


136 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Chim Chan Sideth, Director of Regulations and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 28 February 2021.

In 2020, Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all reported that their national standards were in the process of being reviewed and updated. 138 A national standards workshop in Yemen, set to take place in April 2020, was postponed amid the COVID-19 pandemic, but work began in September 2020 to update survey standards. Yemen reported that the Arabic version was 95% complete as of the end of 2020. 139

Ukraine’s national mine action standards, first published in April 2019, were being revised in 2021 and will become binding after the establishment of the NMAA. 140

Some States Parties need to update their national standards, or are still waiting for standards to be approved. Mauritania is required to update its national mine action standards, which date to 2007, and is planning to review them during its fourth extension period. 141 Somalia completed revision of its national standards in 2019, and prepared them for approval by the Ministry of Internal Security in 2020 after receiving feedback from stakeholders. 142 As of September 2021, the National Technical Standards and Guidelines in Somalia were still pending approval. 143

In 2020, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) and the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in Iraq reported developing guidelines for the conduct of mine action operations in the context of COVID-19 prevention measures. 144

RISK EDUCATION COORDINATION

In 2020, 15 States Parties had mechanisms for coordinating risk education, either through specific risk education technical working group meetings, or through inclusion in meetings of the United Nations (UN) Mine Action Sub-Cluster. Seventeen States Parties reported no specific mechanisms for risk education coordination.

In Croatia, risk education is coordinated at the regional level, through five large area offices and 15 smaller branch offices of the National Education Center for Civil Protection. 145 The Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA) coordinates risk education in Somalia via consortiums of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in each state. 146

In Sri Lanka, there is no official coordination mechanism, but the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) works with the national mine action center to support risk education activities conducted in schools through the Ministry of Education, and at community level through local NGOs. 147


144 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021; and by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) South, 5 March 2021. See also, Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form A, p. 10.


146 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic limited risk education coordination meetings in some States Parties. In Cambodia, the Risk Education Technical Reference Group, which usually meets on a quarterly basis, met once in 2020. In Iraq, the risk education working group held only one face-to-face meeting. In South Sudan, risk education meetings were conducted online, but due to limited internet connection some agencies were unable to attend.

Risk education delivery amid COVID-19 restrictions was a key topic of meetings in 2020.

STRATEGIES AND NATIONAL STANDARDS

In 2020, risk education was included within the national mine action strategies of States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Thailand. In addition, Ethiopia and Turkey reported including risk education in their national mine action workplans.

Cambodia and Somalia updated their national standards on risk education in line with IMAS 12.10 on Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), revised in November 2020. Risk education standards in Somalia were still pending approval as of September 2021. Colombia updated Standard Operating Procedures for risk education to align with the updated IMAS.

Iraq and Thailand were also in the process of updating national risk education standards in line with the revised IMAS 12.10.

Several States Parties had no risk education standards, or had standards that required updating. Angola had no risk education standards, but Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) planned to support the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) to develop these as part of its capacity development support. Chad had reported that it would review its risk education standards at the end of 2020, but in 2021 said this would take place in 2022. In Yemen, national standards were reported to be in the early stages of development.

148 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations, CMAA, 24 February 2021; by Jason Miller, Community Liaison Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 2 March 2021; by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 4 March 2021; and by Portia Stratton, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 26 March 2021.
149 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021; by Noor Al-Jazairy, Associate Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021; and by Celine Cheng, Risk Education Specialist, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.
150 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angelo Lawrence, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 4 March 2021.
151 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations, CMAA, 24 February 2021; by Portia Stratton, Programme Manager, NPA, 26 March 2021; and by Craig McDiarmid, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 March 2021.
153 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; by Noor Al-Jazairy, Associate EORE Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021; by Ismaeel Ahmed, National Operations Manager, FSD, 28 February 2021; and by Flt-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, Director General, Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC), 17 May 2021.
154 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miroslav Pisarevic, Angola Country Director, NPA, 22 March 2021.
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to report on risk education and other risk reduction programs in their Article 7 reports, including on methodologies used, challenges faced, and the results achieved; with information disaggregated by gender, age, and disability.

As of 1 October 2021, 20 of the 26 mine-affected States Parties that had submitted their Article 7 reports for calendar year 2020 reported on risk education. However, the level of detail varied. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, and Thailand all provided risk education beneficiary data disaggregated by age and sex, and also provided details of their risk education programs, including on activities, methodologies, and challenges amid COVID-19.

Eleven States Parties provided a description of risk education activities but no beneficiary data: BiH, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. In some cases—such as Peru, Senegal, and Turkey—no activities were conducted, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

States parties Angola and Yemen provided only beneficiary data, although it was disaggregated by age and sex. States Parties Chad, Cyprus, Oman, Tajikistan, and Ukraine did not report on risk education activities in their Article 7 reports.


RISK EDUCATION IN ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE EXTENSION REQUESTS

Action #24 of the Oslo Action Plan states that extension requests under Article 5 should include detailed, costed, and multiyear plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities. This will help ensure that risk education programs are planned, budgeted, and integrated within the overall obligations of States Parties.

In 2020, BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Mauritania, and Senegal described risk education activities within their Article 5 extension requests, though did not provide costed and detailed multiyear plans. Only South Sudan provided a clear explanation of risk education plans and a budget in its extension request. Niger and Ukraine did not include risk education in their requests.

In 2021, the DRC, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Turkey all included some mention of risk education within their extension requests, though none provided costed and detailed multiyear plans. Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria did not include risk education in their requests.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE COORDINATION

STATES PARTIES WHICH HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY FOR VICTIMS

The Oslo Action Plan reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination.

At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Nairobi in 2004, States Parties “indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors,” and that states with victims had the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest need and expectations for assistance. The Monitor’s reporting on victim assistance focuses primarily on the States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims and needs for assistance.
A definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference, as “those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.” Landmine victim, according to this widely accepted understanding of the term, includes survivors, as well as affected families and communities.

States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS**

Participation of victims is an overarching principle in the Oslo Action Plan. In 2020, victims were reported to be represented in coordination in Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. Victim participation in coordination activities was lower than in past years, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions.

There were few indications that input from victims was acted upon in 2020. Reporting by states lacked detail on processes for including inputs from victims in decision-making. However, in February 2021, Colombia hosted a three-day meeting in Bogota, aimed at ensuring inclusion of victims from different backgrounds and regions.

**VICTIM ASSISTANCE STANDARDS**

The process to adopt a first specific IMAS on victim assistance began in 2018. Following a review of an initial draft that was made available in 2020, the new standard was fully

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159 A “survivor” is a person who was injured by a mine/ERW and lived.

160 This list includes States Parties that have indicated to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that they have significant numbers of victims for which they must provide care. It also includes Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of victims in their Article 5 deadline extension requests. See, Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2011, bit.ly/AlgeriaExtensionRequest2011; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2013, bit.ly/TurkeyExtRequest2013. In addition, the list includes Palestine and Ukraine, as both are indicated to have significant numbers of victims and needs, but have not yet comprehensively reported them.


adopted in October 2021.163 According to the IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance, national mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating the ongoing, multi-sectoral efforts to address the needs of survivors, and help in ensuring the inclusion of survivors and indirect victims, and their views in the development of relevant national legislation and policy decisions. The standard notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.164

Afghanistan and Cambodia reported on their participation in the development of the IMAS on victim assistance. In 2020, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) held meetings with DMA in Iraq, on preparing a national standard for victim assistance and developing a mechanism for the collection of standardized victim data.165

A RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO COORDINATE VICTIM ASSISTANCE166

Twenty-two States Parties were reported to have victim assistance coordination linked to disability coordination mechanisms that considered issues related to the needs of mine/ERW victims.

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, no victim assistance coordination meetings were held in BiH, Chad, or the DRC in 2020.

MULTI-SECTORAL EFFORTS IN LINE WITH THE CRPD167

Adopting, and implementing, a comprehensive plan of action that identifies gaps and aims to fulfill the rights and needs of victims—and, or among, persons with disabilities—is a key step toward ensuring a coordinated response to the needs of mine victims in each State Party.

The Oslo Action plan confirms that States Parties recognize the need to integrate assistance to victims and survivors into broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks relating to the rights of persons with disabilities, health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction.168

In Afghanistan, the National Disability Strategy 2030 had been deposited with the president in 2020 for adoption, and some 15 action plans for its implementation were developed. The draft strategy was last discussed at the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled Affairs in June 2021.169

CENTRALIZED DATABASE WITH NEEDS AND CHALLENGES170

The Oslo Action Plan calls for States Parties to use a centralized database including information on persons killed and injured, and the needs and challenges of mine survivors—disaggregated by gender, age, and disability to ensure a comprehensive response. Progress

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163 The February 2020 edition of IMAS 13.10, as reported on in Landmine Monitor 2020, was taken offline in a review process to address concerns raised by international stakeholders.


in the development of centralized databases since the adoption of the Oslo Action Plan in 2019 has been unsteady.

Afghanistan’s National Disability Database was under development in 2020, in which 370,000 martyrs and persons with disabilities will be registered through a biometric system. People with a disability acquired due to conflict are prioritized and will make up most beneficiaries. Initial registration took place in Kabul and four other provinces in 2019. In September 2021, concerns were raised that biometric data collected by the deposed Afghan government, and inherited by the Taliban, could be used to identify people linked to previous regimes or international forces, or members of persecuted groups who have received aid.

In Iraq, DMA worked with the Ministry of Health and Environment and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 2020, to develop a database for persons with disabilities and mine/ERW victims. Discussions were held between DMA, ICRC, and HI regarding the mechanism for collecting victim data.

Data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims in Cambodia, Colombia, and Thailand was ongoing in 2020.

Croatia’s development of a unified database on mine/ERW victim needs had stalled since 2017. However, in 2020, data on mine victims and their family members was collected for inclusion in a central mine/ERW victim database, as part of a mine action project funded by Switzerland.

Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen needed to significantly improve the collection of victim data and each establish a unified and coordinated system.

**NATIONAL REFERRAL MECHANISMS**

States Parties can improve accessibility for victims by ensuring that service providers have the capacity to make referrals to appropriate health and rehabilitation facilities. Some victims may need to be referred to specialized services, from one health facility to another, or for travel and treatment abroad. Referral mechanisms can involve national systems as well as local networks, including referral via community-based rehabilitation systems.

National mine action centers that reported referring survivors to access services included those in BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen.

National government ministries and bodies provided referrals as victim assistance focal points in Algeria, Angola, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Peru.

Many NGOs provided referrals at the national or local level in the States Parties with victims. These groups included survivor networks, disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs, also referred to as organizations of persons with disabilities, OPDs), national NGOs, and international NGOs such as HI, ICRC, and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements.

The list of States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs does not encompass all States Parties with responsibility for mine survivors. The actions contained in the Oslo

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171 Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J.
173 Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J.
175 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 44.
176 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 13 April 2021.
Action Plan are specifically aimed at States Parties with a significant number of victims, yet the victim assistance section also notes more broadly that "States Parties with victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control will endeavour to do their utmost to provide appropriate, affordable and accessible services to mine victims, on an equal basis with others."

States Parties where the number of survivors reported or estimated is more than 100 (including those recognized as having a significant number of victims) can be found in the table below.

**States Parties with more than 100 mine/ERW survivors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More than 20,000 survivors</th>
<th>Between 5,000 and 20,000 survivors</th>
<th>Between 1,000 and 4,999 survivors</th>
<th>Between 100 and 999 survivors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Albania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ADDRESSING THE IMPACT**

**ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CLEARANCE**

**MINE CLEARANCE IN 2020**

The Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel landmines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

Among States Parties, total reported clearance in 2020 was at least 146km². This represents a decrease from the reported 156km² cleared in 2019. At least 135,583 landmines were cleared and destroyed in 2020.

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179 This refers to land cleared, and does not include land released or cancelled through survey. The figures should be taken with caution due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent data. States Parties have sometimes provided conflicting data regarding clearance and have not always disaggregated clearance from the amount of land reduced through technical survey or canceled through non-technical survey. Not all States Parties have provided annual Article 7 transparency reports. Clearance by actors such as state armed forces, the police, and commercial operators may not be systematically reported. For further details on land release figures for 2020, see individual country profiles on the Monitor website: bit.ly/MonitorCountryProfiles.
Monitor data on mine clearance in States Parties is based on analysis of information provided by multiple sources, including reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 reports, and Article 5 extension requests. In cases where varying annual figures are reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website.

### Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2019–2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2019 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>2020 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>28.01</td>
<td>7,801</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>5,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1,943</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>20.93</td>
<td>15,425</td>
<td>46.42</td>
<td>10,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>12,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>39.16</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>49.66</td>
<td>4,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>46.56</td>
<td>12,378</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>4,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- * Argentina clearance figures are under UK.
- Figures are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2020) unless otherwise stated. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.
- Afghanistan clearance data includes 23.83 km² of antipersonnel mine-contaminated land and 0.41 km² of land cleared of improvised mines.
- 5,159 antipersonnel mines and 220 improvised mines were cleared. Angola reported clearance of 426 antipersonnel mines during clearance operations and 26 antipersonnel mines during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts. BiH reported 609 antipersonnel mines and 143 improvised mines destroyed in its response to the Monitor questionnaire on 2 April 2021. In its Article 7 report, which was submitted on 26 August 2021, BiH reported the clearance of 1,357 antipersonnel mines. Cambodia: data provided by Chin Chan Sideth, Director of Regulations and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 28 February 2021, gave a clearance figure of 54.13 km² cleared and 10,085 antipersonnel mines cleared. The figures in the Article 7 report are provided in the table as they were based on a March 2021 database update.
- Croatia’s clearance figure includes 49.24 km² cleared by humanitarian operators and 0.42 km² cleared by the military. DRC clearance data from response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 24 February 2021. DRC reported clearance of 19 antipersonnel mines and four improvised mines. Iraq’s clearance figures include 0.62 km² of antipersonnel mine-contaminated land and 7.04 km² of IED-contaminated land. 3,817 antipersonnel mines and 226 improvised mines were cleared.
- Mali: data on ordnance cleared provided in responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020 and 5 May 2021. The mines cleared were all improvised mines. For Niger clearance data, see Niger Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 24, bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequest2020. The data for land cleared and mines cleared and destroyed is for the period 30 December 2019–1 March 2020. Niger has reported no further clearance since March 2020. Oman reported “re-clearance” of 0.23 km² but no mines
Palestine clearance data provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Major Wala’ Jarrar, External and International Relations, PMAC, 23 March 2021. Somalia clearance data from responses to Monitor questionnaire and follow-up questions by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 27 August and 21 September 2021. The clearance was of mixed, undifferentiated contamination. South Sudan clearance data provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 8 March 2021. In its Article 7 report, South Sudan reported 231 antipersonnel mines cleared and destroyed, less than the 246 reported by the NMAA. Tajikistan clearance data provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 9 April 2021. There is a difference between the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed provided by TNMAC (5,106) and in Tajikistan’s Article 7 report (5,103). Ukraine did not report clearance data for 2020. Data on mines cleared in Ukraine provided in response to Monitor questionnaire by Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 22 March 2021, and by email on 17 August 2021. Data also provided in emails from Tobias Hewitt, Programme Development Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 13 August 2021; and Tony Connell, Country Director, and Olena Kryvova, Deputy Country Director, FSD Ukraine, 18 August 2021. The UK records the number of antipersonnel mines cleared and the amount of land released annually in its Article 7 reports, but it is not disaggregated into land cleared or released through survey. Clearance figures for the UK are from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); “Falklands Demining Programme Workplan Under Article 7; 30 April 2020, pp. 8–9, annexed to the UK’s Article 7 report (for calendar year 2019). Yemen clearance data for 2020 is from the UNDP dashboard, and via an email from Marie Dahan, Reporting and Coordination Analyst, UNDP Yemen, 4 July 2021. However, this represents clearance by YEMAC only. The US Department of State gives a clearance figure of 2.9km² for 2020. See, US Department of State, PM/WRA, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: January–December 2020,” April 2021, p. 43, bit.ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2021. Figures on ordnance cleared are from Yemen’s Article 7 report, and differ from those reported for 2020 by the UNDP dashboard (923 antipersonnel mines, 5,312 antivehicle mines, 511 IEDs, 54,106 ERW, 403 cluster munition remnants, 98 rockets, 2,483 fuzes, and one air-dropped bomb). The difference could be due to YEMAC including ordnance cleared under the Masam Project in its reporting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance (km²)</td>
<td>APM destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>5,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>25,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK*</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>1,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>39,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>156.15</td>
<td>122,270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/R=not reported; APM=antipersonnel mines.
*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.
**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
***Clearance of mixed, undifferentiated contamination that included antipersonnel mines.
Several States Parties reported that the COVID-19 pandemic presented challenges to demining operations in 2020. Angola, Chad, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe all suspended demining operations for a period to comply with national measures to counter the pandemic.\(^{181}\) Angola reported that movement restrictions impacted the supply chain, and Tajikistan reported that border closures delayed the delivery of demining equipment and supplies.\(^{182}\) In other states, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sudan, and Thailand, clearance operations continued, albeit with precautionary measures in place.\(^{183}\) However, in States Parties Ecuador, Ethiopia, Peru, and Senegal, demining operations were largely suspended during 2020.

Despite the restrictions and challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic, some States Parties maintained a steady clearance output in 2020. Based on reported data, Croatia cleared the most land during 2020 (49.66km\(^2\)), closely followed by Cambodia (46.42km\(^2\)). Cambodia cleared and destroyed 10,085 antipersonnel mines, compared to 4,953 in Croatia. Sri Lanka cleared and destroyed the most landmines in 2020, reporting 43,157 mines cleared from 4.59km\(^2\).

Afghanistan cleared 24.24km\(^2\), down from 28.01km\(^2\) cleared in 2019. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) in Afghanistan told the Monitor that while it had met its original baseline land release target—set in its 2013 extension request—annual land release targets had increased each year, due to both legacy and new contamination being added to the database. In 2020, Afghanistan reported that it had reached only about 34% of the annual target.\(^{184}\)

Mine action in Yemen continued to operate under emergency response conditions in 2020, with a fire brigade approach to clearance focused on small, high-threat areas, with significant impact for communities.\(^{185}\) In 2020, non-technical survey was being planned and is expected to start in 2021. It aims to establish a baseline to enable the planning of future clearance.\(^{186}\)

Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, and Yemen reported clearing improvised mines as well as antipersonnel mines in 2020. In its Article 7 transparency report, Iraq provided better disaggregated data for land cleared of improvised

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\(^{183}\) Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakihl, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021; by Chhim Chansideth, Director of Regulations and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 28 February 2021; by Mohamed Abd Elmajeed, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 22 February 2021; and by Flt-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, Director General, TMAC, 17 May 2021.

\(^{184}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakihl, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.


mines as opposed to all improvised explosive devices (IED), hence reducing the amount of land reported cleared in 2020 compared to 2019. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported the clearance of improvised mines in Mali.187

Chile and the United Kingdom (UK) met their Article 5 clearance obligations in 2020. Chile completed clearance on 27 February 2020 after releasing 2.69km² in the first two months of the year, of which 0.6km² was cleared. Chile reported that 12,526 antipersonnel mines and 10,170 antivehicle mines were cleared during this two-month period.188 The UK reported completing clearance of antipersonnel landmines in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in November 2020, having cleared four remaining contaminated areas in the Yorke Bay area, totaling 0.23km².189 The UK reported clearing and destroying 432 mines in 2020.190

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, the DRC, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey all cleared under 1km² in 2020.191 Five of these States Parties—the DRC, Niger, Oman, Palestine, and Serbia—have small amounts of contamination while four—Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan—have contamination classified as medium, and therefore should be able to complete clearance within the next few years if clearance and land release outputs are increased. Niger also reported no clearance since the beginning of March 2020. Oman reported "re-clearance" of 0.23km² in 2020 and 0.13km² in 2019, but no landmines were found and destroyed.192 Serbia cleared no antipersonnel mines during 2020, but reported clearing one antivehicle mine and 1,586 ERW.193

Ukraine did not report mine clearance in its Article 7 report for 2020. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) reported clearing 49.39km² and destroying 73,375 ERW, although it did not specify clearance of antipersonnel mines.194 International operators cleared just over 2km² of undifferentiated contaminated land in Ukraine, destroying five antipersonnel mines.195

Five States Parties reported no clearance during 2020: Cyprus, Ecuador, Mauritania, Peru, and Senegal. Cyprus did not undertake clearance, as no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remained under its control.196 Ecuador and Peru both reported that clearance operations were suspended amid the COVID-19 pandemic.197 Mauritania reported conducting survey to confirm newly identified contaminated areas.198 Senegal reported that an action plan for

187 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020 and 3 May 2021.
188 Chile Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, pp. 15–17.
191 This list does not include Chile and the UK, who also both cleared under 1km² in 2020, but in completion of their clearance obligations.
195 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, DRC, 22 March 2021; and emails from Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, DRC, 17 August 2021; from Tobias Hewitt, Programme Development Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 13 August 2021; and from Tony Connell, Country Director, and Olena Kryvova, Deputy Country Director, FSD Ukraine, 18 August 2021.
resource mobilization had been developed and that non-technical survey had begun, but no suspicious areas had been identified. Implementation in Senegal was suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{199} Senegal has not reported any clearance since 2017.

Ethiopia reported in its Article 7 report for 2020 that it had cleared 1.75km\textsuperscript{2} of land, and cleared and destroyed 128 mines.\textsuperscript{200} These were the same figures provided in its Article 7 report for 2019 which covered the period January 2019–April 2020.\textsuperscript{201} It is likely that Ethiopia did not conduct further clearance after April 2020.

\section*{ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS}

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel landmines contaminating its territory within 10 years after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty for the country, it is able to request an extension for a period of up to 10 years.

\subsection*{Progress to 2025}

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, in June 2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a commitment “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025.”

As of 30 September 2021, 24 States Parties had deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before and no later than 2025.

Seven States Parties have Article 5 deadlines later than 2025: BiH (2027), Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), Senegal (2026), South Sudan (2026), and Sri Lanka (2028).

Of the seven Article 5 extension requests submitted in 2021, five States Parties have requested extensions up to 2025, while two States Parties have requested extensions beyond 2025.

Despite the majority of States Parties having deadlines in 2025 or earlier, it appears that few of these States Parties will meet their deadlines.

In several States Parties, land release projections are behind target, which they reported was due to a lack of funding and demining capacity.

In 2019 and 2020, Angola failed to meet its projection for land release of 17km\textsuperscript{2} per year, and has not provided an updated workplan or adjusted milestones.\textsuperscript{202} Cambodia reported requiring additional financial support and demining capacity to meet its 2025 deadline.\textsuperscript{203} Tajikistan also reported that its current capacity would need to be increased to meet its extension deadline.\textsuperscript{204} Chad indicated to the Monitor that it is uncertain whether it will meet its deadline, due to funding uncertainties beyond September 2021.\textsuperscript{205} Serbia also reported a lack of funding for field operations, which prevented survey of suspected contaminated areas in 2020.\textsuperscript{206} Serbia’s annual clearance figure of 0.27km\textsuperscript{2} was just below its projected clearance target of 0.3km\textsuperscript{2}.

Several States Parties reported that the COVID-19 pandemic had compromised progress.

\textsuperscript{199} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Seck Ibrahima, Head of Operations and Information Management Division, CNAMS, 20 March 2021.
\textsuperscript{200} Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{201} Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{203} Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2019, pp. 7–9 and 55, bit.ly/CambodiaArt5ExtRequest2019. Cambodia is considering deploying Royal Cambodian Army soldiers to meet this need.
\textsuperscript{204} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 9 April 2021.
\textsuperscript{205} Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 15.
\textsuperscript{206} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sladaša Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, SMAC, 8 March 2021.
Demining operations in Ecuador were suspended in 2020. The pandemic was reported to have delayed planning and affected Ecuador’s ability to complete clearance by 2022.\(^{207}\) Ecuador has cleared 0.55km\(^2\) of antipersonnel mine contaminated land since demining operations began in 2000.\(^{208}\) Ethiopia reported that most field activities in 2020 were suspended amid the pandemic, affecting land release in the Somali region. Ethiopia did not meet its annual clearance target.\(^{209}\) Peru’s land release output had increased significantly in 2019. However, in 2020, the pandemic prevented clearance operations.\(^{210}\) Sudan reported that it was not on target to meet its deadline of April 2023, claiming that two years of progress were lost due to political instability and the pandemic.\(^{211}\)

Thailand—which was on target in terms of its survey and clearance plan—reported that it was uncertain whether its deadline would be met, as COVID-19 restrictions had prevented face-to-face meetings with Cambodia to negotiate border clearance. The Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) was concerned that the national mine clearance budget may also be reduced as a result of the pandemic.\(^{212}\) Zimbabwe, also on target to meet its deadline, noted that the pandemic and the national economic situation could impact its ability to meet its 2025 deadline.\(^{213}\)

Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Yemen are each unlikely to meet their deadlines before 2025 due to insecurity, conflict, and the extent of contamination.

Afghanistan reported that it will not meet its 2023 deadline due to decreased funding, the need for survey of legacy contamination, and new contamination by improvised mines. Afghanistan anticipated submitting an extension request for at least five additional years until 2028.\(^{214}\) The Taliban takeover in August 2021 has created uncertainty about the continued progress of mine clearance in Afghanistan.

In Ukraine, ongoing conflict means it is unlikely to meet its Article 5 deadline.\(^{215}\) In June 2020, Ukraine stated that it did not have control over territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, impeding its ability to clear contaminated areas in these territories, and that the hostilities were causing further contamination along the contact line.\(^{216}\) Yemen also faced challenges due to continued fighting in parts of the country, restricting access to locations near the frontline, including newly contaminated areas.\(^{217}\) The pandemic slowed deployment of international staff and created access restrictions, while the declining economic situation in Yemen resulted in rising fuel prices and exchange rates.\(^{218}\) Yemen will submit a further Article 5 extension request in March 2022.


\(^{212}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Flt.-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol Nimnuan, Director General, TMAC, 17 May 2021.


\(^{214}\) Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Operations Manager, DMAC, 16 April 2020; and by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.


\(^{218}\) Ibid.; and Monitor communication via Skype with Stephen Robinson, Senior Technical Advisor-Mine Action, UNDP Yemen, 7 June 2021.
Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests (as of October 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period (No. of request)</th>
<th>Current deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 8 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 6 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>See note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 2 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 6 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2027</td>
<td>Progress unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 6 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>14 months (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 6 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 January 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 22 months (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 7 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>3 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 July 2022</td>
<td>Requested 4-year extension until 1 July 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>26 months (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 6 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 18 months (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 July 2022</td>
<td>Requested 3.5-year extension until 31 December 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 months (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2022</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 11 months (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>In violation of the treaty by not requesting a new extension to its clearance deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2015</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5.5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>2 months (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 January 2012</td>
<td>Requested extension until 31 December 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 February 2028</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 1 year (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 January 2022</td>
<td>Requested 5-year extension until 31 December 2026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party</td>
<td>Original deadline</td>
<td>Extension period (No. of request)</td>
<td>Current deadline</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1 September 2009</td>
<td>2 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;1 year (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;4 years (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Progress unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>1 year (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2021</td>
<td>Requested 4-year extension until 31 December 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>On target (in Palestinian-controlled areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;7 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;4 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>Requested 5-year extension until 1 October 2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>9 July 2026</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2014</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;4 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 April 2023</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;6 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>9 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 October 2023</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>Requested 45-month extension until 31 December 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2016</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;2 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 December 2023</td>
<td>Progress unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;3 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;2 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;2 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;3 years (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;8 years (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable.
*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020, but Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.*
Extension requests in 2020 and 2021

In 2020, nine countries submitted extension requests: BiH (until March 2027); Colombia (until December 2025); the DRC (until July 2022); Mauritania (until January 2022); Niger (until 31 December 2024); Nigeria (until December 2021); Senegal (until March 2026); South Sudan (until July 2026); and Ukraine (until December 2023). These requests were approved at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.

As of 1 October 2021, seven countries had submitted requests during 2021 to extend their Article 5 deadlines: Cyprus, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Turkey. The decision on approval of these extension requests will take place at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2021.

Cyprus has been granted three extensions to its Article 5 deadline, each for a period of three years. Cyprus submitted a fourth request in 2021, for another three years, until 1 July 2025. Cyprus has cited antipersonnel mines remaining in territory occupied by Turkish forces, which it has been unable to clear, as the reason for its multiple extension requests.

In 2020, the DRC submitted a third extension request, which was approved, setting a new deadline of 1 July 2022. In 2021, the DRC requested a fourth extension, for a period of three years and six months, until 31 December 2025, to clear 33 remaining contaminated areas totaling 0.12km². The extension request indicates that little progress has been made.

Guinea-Bissau completed clearance of all known mined areas in December 2012. However, at the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, in November 2019, it reported residual mine/ERW contamination and submitted an extension request until 31 December 2022.

Mauritania declared fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations in 2018, but in June 2020 submitted an extension request—which was approved—to extend its clearance deadline by one year, in order to survey previously unknown mined areas. Following this initial one-

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year extension, Mauritania submitted a fourth request in June 2021 to extend its deadline to 31 December 2026.227

Nigeria reported having improvised mine contamination at the Fourth Review Conference, in November 2019, and submitted a request in November 2020 for an interim extension until 31 December 2021, to enable it to present a detailed report on contamination, progress made, and a workplan for implementation.228 In 2021, Nigeria submitted a request for four years, until 31 December 2025, but did not include a plan for survey or clearance for this extension period.229

Somalia submitted an extension request in April 2021 for five years, until 1 October 2027. A revised request was submitted in September 2021, which included a workplan.230 However, the plan fails to provide detailed annual projections for survey and clearance, which will make any progress towards the achievement of Somalia’s Article 5 obligations difficult to assess.

Turkey submitted an extension request in March 2021, for three years and nine months, until 31 December 2025. Turkey noted that the extension period would allow for the collection of relevant information, with a view to submitting a second request.231 The request did not include planning or resources for the clearance of mines in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus.

In addition, Eritrea was expected to submit an extension request in 2021, but as of 1 October, had yet to do so. Eritrea, which in 2019 was granted a new Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2020, has failed to report on progress or submit another extension request, and has been in a state of non-compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty since its deadline expired.232

**RISK EDUCATION**

The Mine Ban Treaty requires States Parties to “provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” in all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

The Oslo Action Plan further recognizes the importance of risk education in helping to prevent mine incidents and save lives, providing five actions for States Parties related to risk education. These are to integrate risk education within wider humanitarian, development, protection, and education efforts, and with other mine action activities; provide context-specific risk education to all affected populations and at-risk groups; prioritize people most at risk through analysis of available casualty and contamination data, and through an understanding of people’s behavior and movements; build national capacity to deliver risk education, which can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and report on risk education in annual Article 7 transparency reports.233

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PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION IN 2020

Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide context-specific mine risk education to all affected populations and at-risk groups. In 2020, 26 States Parties were known to have provided risk education to populations at risk due to antipersonnel mine contamination: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Risk education activities were disrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. For example, the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) reached 7,722 people through risk education in 2020, marking a massive decrease from 36,295 reached in 2019.阿富汗, Croatia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, among other States Parties, also saw a reduction in risk education beneficiaries in 2020. Beneficiary data collected by the Monitor in 2019 and 2020 indicates that in many states, the number of risk education recipients dropped, particularly where the majority of beneficiaries were reached through interpersonal delivery methods.

In Ecuador and Peru, no mine risk education beneficiaries were reached in 2020, as the Seventh Binational Mine Risk Education Campaign—carried out jointly by both states in contaminated border areas—was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Risk education activities in Turkey were suspended, and in Sri Lanka cancelled, due to the pandemic in 2020.

Chad, Cyprus, Tajikistan, and Ukraine did not report on risk education in their Article 7 reports, though it is known that risk education took place in these states. In Chad, risk education was undertaken by Humanity & Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND). In Cyprus, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provided online risk education to United Nations (UN) peacekeepers during the pandemic. In Tajikistan, risk education was carried out by the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) and the...
national Red Crescent Society. In Ukraine, risk education was carried out by international organizations, Ukrainian security and emergency sector actors, and the Ukrainian Red Cross.

As of 1 October 2021, the DRC, Eritrea, Niger, and Nigeria had not submitted Article 7 reports for 2020, though risk education was conducted in each of these states. In the DRC, risk education was carried out by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community volunteers, while in Eritrea the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) provided risk education to 30,000 children. The European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) in the Sahel conducted risk education sessions in Niger in 2020. Niger has not provided any updates on risk education since 2012. In Nigeria, risk education was conducted by a national NGO, the Youth Awakens Foundation, as well as by international and UN operators.

Argentina, Chile, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and the United Kingdom (UK) are not known to have conducted any risk education in 2020.

RISK EDUCATION PRIORITIZATION

Action #30 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to prioritize people most at risk by linking the provision of risk education to available casualty and contamination data. In 2020, as in 2019, it was reported that national level Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) victim data was used to inform the prioritization and planning of risk education in all States Parties where IMSMA data was available.

Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Sudan, and Turkey reported that a prioritization mechanism was in place for targeting people most at risk.

Afghanistan maintained a priority scoring matrix to prioritize affected populations by their proximity to hazards, recent casualties, and incidences of armed conflict. In Cambodia, the Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS)—operated by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)—was used by operators to plan and target activities. Croatia reported prioritizing risk education according to casualty and contamination data, with the system reported to be age-sensitive and tailored according to population movements, jobs, coping mechanisms, and risk behaviors. Sudan ranked contaminated communities as either high, medium, or low impact areas to prioritize risk education, while Turkey reported risk education prioritization was based on analysis of impacted villages in its database.
In 2020, studies in Cambodia, Colombia, and Ukraine aimed to enhance understanding of at-risk populations, and of prioritization and monitoring processes. In Cambodia, a review of risk education for the period 2013–2019 was conducted by CMAA. Its recommendations included developing a theory of change to inform the design and monitoring of risk education.\textsuperscript{249} In Colombia, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD) published a study that analyzed risk education and victim assistance IMSMA data from 2012–2019. It concluded that while data was being used to prioritize risk education, the development of a baseline and standardized indicators would help identify trends and changes in community vulnerability.\textsuperscript{250} In eastern Ukraine, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted a Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) survey of risk education in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, to provide a project baseline.\textsuperscript{251}

In several States Parties, there was a need to improve the availability of data and the processes for targeting risk education. In BiH and Iraq, victim databases were incomplete or not publicly available.\textsuperscript{252} In Ukraine, there was no standardized approach to data collection and analysis to inform risk education, and operators used different datasets, including open-source data, media reports, and reports by the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO) to inform targeting and prioritization.\textsuperscript{253} In Yemen, the lack of a functioning IMSMA database made it difficult to identify risk groups, highly contaminated areas, and risk taking behaviors.\textsuperscript{254}

**TARGET AREAS AND RISK GROUPS**

Action #29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide context-specific risk education, tailored to the threat encountered by the population. It must be sensitive to gender, age, and disability, and take the diverse needs and experiences of people living in affected communities into account. Consideration of target areas, high-risk groups, and the activities and behaviors that put people at risk, is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

**Target areas**

In 2020, many of the target areas for risk education remained the same as in 2019. States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine conducted risk education in both rural and urban areas. In States Parties Cambodia, Chad, Senegal, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, risk education was conducted only in rural areas.


\textsuperscript{252} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, Movement Cooperator Coordinator, ICRC, 29 April 2020; by India McGrath, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 15 March 2021; and by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021.


\textsuperscript{254} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Emma Simons, EORE Technical Coordinator, HI Yemen, 22 May 2020.
In Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and along the Thailand-Myanmar border, risk education was conducted in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In Afghanistan, returnees and IDPs were targeted for risk education via a collaboration between United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) zero points, transit centers, and encashment centers, using a blend of video and direct presentation approaches.255

In 2020, risk education in Iraq was prioritized in areas liberated from Islamic State, to ensure that returnees had an awareness of the risk and knowledge of how to stay safe.256 As a result of this prioritization, central and southern Iraq saw fewer risk education activities.257

Risk education targeted at border areas was conducted in Thailand and Zimbabwe in 2020. In Thailand, the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) provided risk education in areas bordering Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.258 HI delivered risk education for refugees and IDPs from Myanmar in nine refugee camps in Thailand.259 In Zimbabwe, risk education was conducted on the border with Mozambique.260

In Colombia, risk education was provided in indigenous reserves in mountainous areas in 2020. Indigenous communities were affected by ongoing conflict and extreme poverty, and were often hard to reach due to frequent displacement from their communities.261

In Yemen, UNDP reported that risk education will need to focus on hard-to-reach areas and locations near frontlines when they become accessible.262

Risk groups

Children, often growing up in contaminated areas but lacking knowledge of the risks, continued to be seen as a key risk group in many States Parties in 2020. Children are also prone to picking up and playing with explosive remnants of war (ERW). Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe reported children as a key target group for risk education. However, Angola, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine all reported that children were more affected by ERW than landmines, while boys and adolescent males were considered to be particularly prone to picking up and playing with items.

Adult men were also cited by the majority of States Parties and operators to be a primary risk group in relation to antipersonnel mines. Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe all targeted men for risk education. Men were often seen to be at high risk due to their work in rural areas, including cultivation, collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending animals. Men were also reported to be more likely than other groups to take intentional risks due to economic necessity.

Poverty and a lack of viable livelihood alternatives continued to be cited as the primary reasons for intentional risk-taking by populations in both rural and urban areas.

255 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.
256 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMB, DMA, 13 April 2021.
Fewer reported mine incidents involved women and girls in 2020, and risk education operators noted that they were less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors, or to travel as far from home as men. However, in the DRC, women were reported to travel to contaminated areas for food and household materials. Women and girls remain an important group to target in risk education as they can help promote safer behavior among men, and among children and peers. In Sri Lanka, women and schoolgirls worked with national risk education organizations to reach out to families and act as peer group influencers. In states such as Somalia, where female social and economic roles are limited, women and girls are often harder to reach for risk education.

In 2020, risk education in some states was conducted for specific at-risk groups.

In Afghanistan, drivers were targeted for risk education at bus stations, to sensitize them to the dangers of overtaking and using shortcut roads.

In Cambodia, risk education was provided to laborers and construction workers at their place of work, and to agricultural workers in the fields. In Iraq, municipality workers and street cleaners were targeted in cities such as Mosul. Casu for-work employees hired by UNDP and the IOM were also provided risk education. In Ukraine, railway workers, power company staff, and other employees received risk education if their work took them to contaminated areas.

In Somalia, pastoralists and nomadic groups were considered at risk due to frequently moving to new pastures and areas. They were also reported to be a challenging group to reach for risk education operators because of this mobility.

In Sri Lanka, risk education was provided to forest officers in Northern province, who were at risk while working in forested and potentially mined areas. Sri Lanka reported that several new hazardous areas were identified during risk education sessions with forest officers in 2020.

In response to accidents in border areas of Thailand, TMAC revised its risk education approach to better reach those most at risk, including labor migrants crossing Thailand's borders.

In Zimbabwe, risk education was provided to men and women working in tea and timber estates along the border with Mozambique, who traversed hazardous areas to get to work. Border traders were also targeted for risk education due to their use of unofficial border crossing points to evade the payment of taxes.

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264 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 2 June 2020; and by Aurelie Fabry, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS in the DRC, 11 May 2020.
266 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Somalia, 4 May 2020.
267 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programs, DMAC, 21 February 2021.
268 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 4 March 2021.
269 Response to Monitor questionnaire by India McGrath, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 15 March 2021.
270 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Almedina Music, Head of Programmes, DRC, 22 March 2021.
276 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Delia Sandra Maphosa, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG, 10 May 2020; and by Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 17 March 2021.
In Ukraine, elderly people were targeted for risk education as insufficient pensions forced them to cultivate plots of land, pick mushrooms, and collect firewood in contaminated areas. 277 Many people had to regularly cross the line of contact to collect pensions or access other public goods and services. 278

Refugees and IDPs remained an important target group for risk education during 2020 in States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. The Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reported that 7,474 IDPs were reached in 2020. 279

No new projects to reach persons with disabilities were reported in 2020, though HI continued to integrate victim assistance and risk education across their programs. For example, a program run by HI in Colombia combined physical rehabilitation and exercise with the promotion of safe behaviors. 280 A number of international mine action organizations provided training to community focal points and risk education teams in inclusion awareness training and referral.

In Colombia, risk education was delivered to indigenous populations living in remote areas. In 2020, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, OACP) reported that 40 different types of risk education materials had been developed in six different indigenous languages, following a project implemented by HI. 281

### RISK EDUCATION DELIVERY METHODS

Action #28 of the Oslo Action Plan recommends integrating risk education activities with wider humanitarian, development, and protection efforts; and as part of survey, clearance, and victim assistance activities within the mine action sector. Action #31 refers to a need to build national capacity to deliver risk education, in order to respond to changing needs and contexts.

#### Adapting interpersonal risk education

The vast majority of risk education reported in States Parties is delivered through face-to-face sessions, often with specialized risk education and community liaison staff and the distribution of printed materials, such as leaflets and posters. Many risk education operators reported using mixed gender teams to ensure that all age and gender groups in the population were adequately reached. Often risk education is carried out as an integrated part of survey and clearance, such as in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

However, in 2020, risk education activities, particularly interpersonal means of delivery, were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both national and international operators responded by adapting their approaches and developing new and innovative delivery methods.

Several States Parties developed specific guidelines to safely implement risk education during the pandemic. In Cambodia, protocols ensured that small numbers of people attended sessions and respected physical distancing. 282 In Iraq, the guidelines in Federal Iraq and in

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282 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations, CMAA, 24 February 2021.
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq were different, with the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) allowing restricted face-to-face sessions, while the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) allowed only the use of digital media.\textsuperscript{283} In line with DMA protocols, operators adopted remote delivery methods including the use of radio, video, loudspeakers, phone calls, mobile apps, and social media.\textsuperscript{284}

Colombia implemented a public information campaign via community radio, social media, and video and audio messages, to reach populations despite movement restrictions.\textsuperscript{285}

Amid COVID-19 movement restrictions in Somalia, UNMAS distributed 1,000 solar-powered Risk Education Talking Devices, with pre-recorded risk education and COVID-19 hygiene messages in Somali languages. UNMAS estimated that a total of 5,000 households—with an estimated 40,000 beneficiaries—were reached via the devices. UNMAS planned to distribute an additional 4,000 units across Somalia by April 2021.\textsuperscript{286}

In 2020, the Sudan National Mine Action Center (NMAC) created a Facebook page for risk education and mine awareness-raising, and reported distributing materials containing a hotline number for the public to report suspected contamination.\textsuperscript{287}

In Zimbabwe, operators conducted door-to-door risk education sessions instead of community sessions, and distributed fliers with risk education and COVID-19 prevention messages.\textsuperscript{288}

Reaching IDPs and returnees was also complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In Iraq, MAG developed a short script that could be delivered by phone to families in Sinjar district, Ninewa governate, in response to a significant increase in returnee movement from May–September 2020, which coincided with COVID-19 restrictions and, a lack of humanitarian actors on the ground.\textsuperscript{289}

Risk education in schools

Delivery of risk education to children in school settings is an important part of risk education programs in many States Parties. In 2020, five States Parties had risk education integrated into the school curriculum: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan; while it was reported that risk education was also being incorporated into the primary school curriculum in Nigeria and Iraq.\textsuperscript{290} Risk education was also provided in schools, outside of the curriculum, in many States Parties.

However, risk education in schools was disrupted in 2020 due to school closures or inadequate COVID-19 protection measures within schools. In BiH, the Red Cross Society conducted risk education in schools in previous years through annual competitions, under the “Think Mines” project.\textsuperscript{291} Unable to organize these competitions in 2020 due to school

\textsuperscript{283} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021.

\textsuperscript{284} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; by India McGrath, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 15 March 2021; by Goran Knezevic, Risk Education Coordinator, HI Iraq, 2 March 2021; by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021; and by Noor Al-Jazairy, Associate EORE Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021. See also, Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G, p. 31. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.


\textsuperscript{286} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudip Thapa, Operations Officer, UNMAS, 19 March 2021.

\textsuperscript{287} Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form I, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{288} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Nokutenda Masiyanise, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 27 February 2021; by Delia Maphosa, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG Zimbabwe, 10 March 2021; and by Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 17 March 2021.

\textsuperscript{289} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG, 14 March 2021.

\textsuperscript{290} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentina Crini, EORE Specialist, UNMAS Nigeria, 8 March 2021; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{291} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, Movement Cooperator Coordinator, ICRC, 29 April 2020.
closures, the Red Cross Society set up a risk education project online through “Viber,” an instant messaging app, which enabled risk messages to continue to reach primary school children during the pandemic. 292

Ukraine closed all schools and education facilities on both sides of the line of contact to contain the spread of COVID-19 from mid-March 2020, and schools were only gradually opened again from September. 293 UNICEF reached over 100,000 children in both government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas via its online education course, “Super Team against Mines,” and worked with the HALO Trust to provide online and offline sessions in remote schools and small education facilities. 294

**Risk education through focal points and police**

In some States Parties, community focal points were able to continue to deliver risk education messages in their communities when risk education teams were unable to visit.

In Colombia, in response to restricted access to remote communities amid the pandemic, OACP sub-contracted six indigenous peoples’ organizations, four afro-descendent organizations, and six survivors’ organizations to implement community risk education. 295 HI also implemented a training of trainers program for 110 beneficiaries in rural and indigenous communities, and supported community educators to acquire risk education certification from the OACP. 296

In Thailand, TMAC has long supported local risk education networks to disseminate messages in their communities, and to inform local authorities if mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) are found. In 2020, TMAC utilized social media platforms such as local group chats on “Line,” an instant messaging app, to coordinate with local networks and officials to continue delivering risk education, and to enable local level reporting on mines/ERW found in the area. 297

Some States Parties worked with local police or security services to deliver risk education and enable the reporting of mines/ERW in 2020. The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) worked with commune police posts to implement risk education sessions in line with the village and commune safety policy. 298 In Sri Lanka, following a number of accidents

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resulting from the illegal harvesting of explosives for sand mining, the Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) cooperated with the police and security forces to regulate the activity as a complement to risk education programs. In Somalia, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) provided risk education training to the Puntland State Police in stations situated close to contaminated land.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty through which States Parties have committed to provide assistance to people harmed by a specific type of weapon. The preamble recognizes the desire of States Parties “to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims.”

Article 6 of the treaty requires that each State Party “in a position to do so” should provide such assistance. It also affirms the right of States Parties to seek and receive assistance to the extent required for victims. Since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, this has been understood to imply a responsibility of the international community to support victim assistance in mine-affected countries with limited resources.

At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo in 2014, States Parties recognized their “enduring obligations to mine victims” even after completion of mine clearance, which was then seen to be “within reach.” Victim assistance is an ongoing responsibility in all states with victims, including countries that are mine-affected and those that have been declared mine-free.

In 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference, in Oslo, States Parties also recognized that victim assistance should be integrated into broader national policies, plans, and legal frameworks on the rights of persons with disabilities, and support the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development intends to address the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, with an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, rule of law, and inclusion. Therefore, the SDGs are complementary to the aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and offer opportunities to bridge relevant frameworks.

The CRPD is legally binding, providing an overarching mechanism for amending national laws and policies related to persons with disabilities. It also pertains to the victims of indiscriminate weapons. Although not all injuries result in the victim suffering long-term physical impairment, survivors of landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) often become persons with disabilities, and therefore are protected by the CRPD.

Over time, it has become more widely recognized that just as efforts to respond to the needs of mine/ERW victims should benefit all persons with similar needs—including other persons with disabilities, without discrimination—the rights of mine/ERW victims should be considered by disability rights actors more broadly. Interconnectivity allows for solution-oriented approaches to implementing the international legal commitments and obligations that arise from the CRPD, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

300 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Craig McDiarmid, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 March 2021.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION PLAN

Actions to address the impact of mines and ERW through to victim assistance in the Oslo Action Plan include the implementation of:

- Effective and efficient emergency medical response, and ongoing medical care;303
- Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation, and psychological and psychosocial support services;304
- Social and economic inclusion;305 and
- Protection in situations of risk, including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters.306

Emergency medical response and ongoing medical care307

A timely initial medical response to mine/ERW casualties should include first-aid, field trauma response, emergency evacuation, transport, and immediate medical care. The provision of such services, involving assessment and the communication of critical information ahead of transfer of a patient to hospital, can considerably affect survival outcomes and the speed of recovery of victims, as well as mitigate consequences of injuries and reduce the severity of impairments.

In Afghanistan, several health facilities were forced to close in 2020 due to insecurity. In early 2021, services at six health centers in Arghandab, Kandahar, were suspended due to improvised explosive device (IED) contamination blocking access routes for staff and patients.308 Overall, healthcare in Afghanistan is supported through two tiers of services, with the support of donors through the Sehatmandi project, while the Ministry of Public Health contracts international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to deliver health services.309 The Sehatmandi project supports primary health centers where services are utilized by marginalized populations in rural areas, with high poverty rates. From August 2021, a pause in funding to the Sehatmandi project left 90% (more than 2,000) of the supported health facilities at risk of closure.310

In Ethiopia, humanitarian and rehabilitation needs increased as access to essential services was limited amid the crisis in the Tigray region. As of December 2020, 90% of hospital staff in the regional capital, Mekelle, had returned to work, but most healthcare centers outside of Mekelle were closed due to damage or the effects of the conflict.311

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) lacks healthcare infrastructure and basic social services.312 In South Sudan, mine/ERW incidents often occurred in remote areas far from health facilities. However, in eastern Ukraine, primary healthcare centers and satellite services along the line of contact received equipment and medicines in 2020, while Doctors

304 Ibid., Action #58.
305 Ibid., Action #39.
306 Ibid., Action #40.
307 CRPD Article 25: Health; CRPD Article 20: Personal Mobility; and CRPD Article 26: Habilitation and Rehabilitation, bit.ly/CRPDArticles.
309 The Sehatmandi project is supported by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), managed by the World Bank (on behalf of 34 donors), and the International Development Association (IDA), supported by the Global Financing Facility. See, World Bank, “Ensuring Accessible Health Care for Rural Afghans,” 9 April 2020, bit.ly/WorldBankRuralAfghansApril2020.
Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) transferred patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. As of the end of 2019, all patients were provided with care through the public health system.  

International NGOs continued to provide much-needed assistance in conflict-affected areas in 2020. In Iraq, healthcare services for all persons with disabilities have decreased over time, in part due to the recent security situation. In Yemen, many medical facilities were damaged, and ongoing conflict has further undermined its weak health system. In 2021, Yemen’s health system was reported to have “collapsed” amid the impacts of armed conflict and the added challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Healthcare, rehabilitation, and psychological and psychosocial support services

Rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, aims to help victims regain or improve mobility, and to engage in everyday activities. Rehabilitation requires a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach, involving doctors, physiotherapists, prosthetists, social workers, and other specialists as needed. Such comprehensive services remain scarce in countries with mine/ERW survivors. Psychosocial support, an integral aspect of rehabilitation, can be standalone or combined with other activities, for example through peer-to-peer support carried out by survivors’ networks.

States Parties can make rehabilitation services more sustainable by allocating a specific budget for the physical and functional rehabilitation needs of persons with disabilities, including mine and ERW victims. Once the most operative and supported sector of victim assistance, health and rehabilitation services faced increasing and numerous challenges in many countries in 2020, including over coordination, supply of materials, and access issues.

A World Health Assembly resolution, on the highest attainable standard of health for persons with disabilities, has called for their equitable treatment and access to health services, including rehabilitation, without discrimination. The resolution followed the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Disability Action Plan 2014–2021. The plan was developed and revised with broad input, including a joint contribution from ICBL-CMC members and survivors’ networks. It reflected many concerns raised by survivors, such as ensuring access to rehabilitation in rural and remote areas, as well as participation and inclusion. Its outcomes had not been reported as of the end of September 2021.

Access to rehabilitation centers remained extremely limited in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda in 2020.

In Afghanistan, authorities acknowledged that the government was not capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services. New physical rehabilitation centers were established in three provinces, yet at least seven more are needed. Afghanistan reported that 90% of its population lives more than 100km from such centers, while 20 of its 34 provinces have no prostheses provider.

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318 Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar Year 2019), Form J.
After the Afghan government was deposed by the Taliban in 2021, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) began steadily resuming activities in four provinces: Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Nimroz. An orthopedic program run by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to operate seven centers. The largest, in Kabul, remained open but operated at reduced capacity, with fewer patients admitted and reduced staffing. Around 25% of patients in the center in 2020 were amputees, with most being survivors of mines/ERW.

In Burundi, mine/ERW survivors are eligible for free healthcare via social programs targeting vulnerable groups, yet knowledge of this scheme and access to its benefits was limited. The three physical rehabilitation centers in Burundi were nearly nonfunctional and users had to pay for services, while just one center received government support in 2020.

In El Salvador, persons with disabilities—including mine/ERW survivors—protested delays in the procurement of materials to manufacture prostheses, which affected the quality of services for 20,000 beneficiaries, including ex-combatants and civilians. This was reported to be due to a lag in decision-making as new management staff lacked experience in disability services.

Nicaragua reported that in 2020, the “Everyone with a Voice” program assisted survivors and other persons with disabilities, providing medical care, food packages, and mobility devices.

Survivors in northern Uganda have to travel long distances to access prosthetic services at the only functioning rehabilitation center, in Gulu. In 2020, a study found that it was not feasible for the Ministry of Health to open more centers. It was reported that the Ministry of Health had to take over responsibility for managing the only functioning center in the mine-affected region due to “the warnings development partners are giving their clients to keep their limbs well if funding stops.”

Senegal has not provided support for victim assistance since 2015. Since then, Senegalese mine survivors have obtained prosthetic devices and repairs from an ICRC-supported rehabilitation center in Guinea-Bissau. Survivors’ networks reported that the ICRC’s support to the center was scheduled to end in December 2022.

324 Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J.
Rehabilitation services are not widely available at community and primary healthcare levels. Services that do exist lack qualified personnel, while procedures for obtaining assistive technology are often lengthy and complicated.\textsuperscript{327} A project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), called Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems (SRSHS), was launched in 2019 in Tajikistan and Ukraine. It aimed to improve rehabilitation services, and increase access in the two countries.\textsuperscript{328} A new international project, Rehabilitation Health Systems Integration Coordinator for Learning, Acting and Building for Rehabilitation Systems (ReLAB-HS) was launched in Ukraine in September 2021 with support from USAID.\textsuperscript{329}

In 2020, ICRC and the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) held discussions on opportunities to collaborate, including on the provision of medical equipment and training.\textsuperscript{330} The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour was unable to oversee a social development fund previously administered by the World Bank, which had provided limited basic services and supported more than 60 NGOs assisting persons with disabilities in Yemen.\textsuperscript{331}

Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based support groups, survivor networks, associations of persons with disabilities, and sports and recreational activities.

In Afghanistan, peer-to-peer support activities lacked funding in 2020. The Afghan Landmine Survivors’ Organization (ALSO) provided psychosocial support through a limited peer-to-peer support program, which reached 20–30 people.\textsuperscript{332}

In the DRC, psychological support for mine/ERW victims was lacking. Psychological support and socio-economic inclusion activities were only available in North-Kivu province.\textsuperscript{333}

In El Salvador, a mental health program included psychological support and empowerment in all aspects of life, including support in maintaining family and social roles.\textsuperscript{334}

In Iraq, a psychological support unit is reported to exist in every rehabilitation center, to support people with psychological trauma as a result of their injuries. A mental health advisor also sits at the Ministry of Health headquarters.\textsuperscript{335}

Sri Lanka reported that mental health services, provided by a consultant psychiatrist, a mental health officer, and a community support officer, were available across Northern province.\textsuperscript{336} A National Mental Health Strategy, which drew on the experiences of mine survivors, was in the process of being finalized by the Ministry of Health in 2020.\textsuperscript{337}

Sudan’s National Mine Action Center (NMAC) reported an increase in the provision of social and psychological support to mine/ERW survivors and their families in 2020, including peer-to-peer support, both within and outside of hospitals. However, NMAC also recognized that provision of such support to victims in remote and unsafe areas was scarce, and highlighted a need to train staff to provide appropriate psychological support to victims in those areas.\textsuperscript{338}
Social and economic inclusion

Ensuring the socio-economic inclusion of mine/ERW victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit schemes, income-generation activities, and employment programs, was a reported priority need in all affected states.

There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities, and to develop appropriate education, training, and livelihood support. Little reporting on programs that specifically involved mine survivors was available in 2020. Several states reported on employment quota systems or social security benefits, without indicating if these reached mine/ERW survivors.

In Cambodia, some patients undergoing rehabilitation received gender training, small business management training, job placements, and small grants to establish businesses.339

A project led by HI in Chad trained persons with disabilities and supported mine/ERW victims to restart income-generating activities and to undertake technical and vocational training.340

In the DRC, the Polus Center and its partners established a private-public partnership providing vocational training for mine/ERW survivors within the coffee industry, while also supporting rehabilitation and a local mine survivors’ association. In 2020, a coffee tasting lab and training center was under construction in partnership with the University of Buffalo in the US.341

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, planned accessible sports events and recreational activities were cancelled or postponed in many countries during 2020.

Protection of mine victims and persons with disabilities in situations of risk342

During times of armed conflict or occupation, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters, mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities can face extreme challenges and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing services. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to providing assistance to victims, families of those killed or injured, and affected communities in accordance with relevant human rights laws.

A Victim Assistance Experts Meeting, organized by the Committee on Victim Assistance and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit in November 2020, focused on Action #40 of the Oslo Action Plan on the protection of mine victims in situations of risk and emergencies.

In the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties with a significant number of victims commit to ensuring that “relevant national humanitarian response and preparedness plans provide for the safety and protection of mine survivors in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters, in line with relevant international humanitarian and human rights law and international guidelines.”343

The Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016. In November 2019, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) released guidelines on the inclusion of persons with disabilities in humanitarian action, consistent with the charter. They indicate how humanitarian actors can identify and respond to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities, and were pilot

340 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Marie-Cécile Tournier, Country Director, HI, 11 June 2021; and by Brahim Djibril Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.
tested with national organizations of persons with disabilities, including mine survivors’ networks.\textsuperscript{344}

The Reference Group on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action—co-chaired by the International Disability Alliance (IDA), CBM Global, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)—is a cooperation platform between the United Nations (UN), international agencies, NGOs, and organizations of persons with disabilities. It aims to support the implementation of key guidance materials, including the IASC guidelines.\textsuperscript{345}

UN Security Council Resolution 2475, adopted in June 2019, on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict, marked the first resolution on such protections.\textsuperscript{346} The resolution recognized the important contributions of persons with disabilities to conflict prevention, and called for their meaningful participation and representation in peacebuilding.

However, further efforts are required to increase the participation of survivors and persons with disabilities in peace processes, conflict resolution, and armed violence reduction programs.

A survey, released in April 2021, indicated that persons with disabilities had little presence in the peace process in Afghanistan and stressed the need for their active role in peace talks.\textsuperscript{347}

In Iraq, a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) found that persons with disabilities were disproportionately impacted by armed conflict, and that little consultation with persons with disabilities or their representative groups had been undertaken by the government, or by humanitarian and development agencies.\textsuperscript{348}

A disability rights group in Yemen informed the UN Security Council in 2020 that the majority of people who had acquired impairments due to conflict were injured by airstrikes, landmines, and ERW. The speaker stated that “Any peace negotiations must include participation of people with disabilities…but none of us have been engaged in any of those processes.”\textsuperscript{349}

In 2020, numerous States Parties with new mine/ERW casualties and victims were in situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.\textsuperscript{350}

The displacement crisis due to the conflict in Syria has also impacted services in refugee host countries, including in Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, HI, along with other NGOs, provided hygiene kits and information on physical distancing to beneficiaries of victim assistance programs.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), many activities related to healthcare, physical rehabilitation, and economic inclusion were suspended in early 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Most local communities were not sufficiently prepared to provide an adequate


response for persons with disabilities. In 2020, the pandemic impacted the provision of physical rehabilitation in Cambodia. The rehabilitation center in Siem Reap was relocated to enable health services to prepare for COVID-19, and only provided minor repairs to assistive devices. The rehabilitation center in Kratie also halted services, as extra hospital space was needed. People were referred to bicycle repair shops for minor repairs. Rehabilitation centers provided advice by phone, and staff coached parents and others to give physical therapy.

In Chad, digital rehabilitation was introduced to maintain a link between patients and rehabilitation centers amid the pandemic.

In Colombia, operators reported that the COVID-19 pandemic limited direct victim assistance activities, and that efforts were partly redirected toward capacity-building and advocacy using digital platforms. ICRC supported mine/ERW survivors in Colombia during the pandemic, in some cases providing cash to cover expenses for rent, food, medicine, and utilities.

Crisis response measures often result in the consideration of cash and voucher approaches. This may indicate a change from the long-standing distinction between rights-based support and social forms of disability support, shifting away from medical and charity models of assistance.

In Thailand, volunteers of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security collected data from persons with disabilities affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Registered persons with disabilities each received a cash transfer as initial financial assistance, while the state Fund for Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities offered a one-year debt moratorium for persons with disabilities or caregivers, in light of the impact of COVID-19 restrictions.

In the DRC, the five ICRC-supported physical rehabilitation centers suspended services due to COVID-19 response measures.

In Ukraine, limited access to trauma care and emergency health services was exacerbated amid the COVID-19 pandemic due to lockdowns, movement restrictions, and the closure of crossing points.

States Parties to the CRPD also have an obligation, under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies, aligning with Action #40 of the Oslo Action Plan.


352 Email from Denise Coghlan, Director, Jesuit Refugee Service Cambodia, 22 June 2021.

353 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Marie-Cécile Tournier, Country Director, HI, 11 June 2021; and by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.


357 Ibid.


LANDMINE, EXPLOSIVE REMNANT OF WAR (ERW), AND CLUSTER SUBMUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2020

Number of recorded casualties in 2020

- 1-9
- 10-49
- 50-199
- 200-499
- 500 or more

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold; OTHER AREAS are UPPER CASE ITALICS.
NPA deminer searches a contaminated agricultural field in Ha Trung Village, Vietnam.

© Hien Ngo/NPA-Project RENEW, April 2020
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

INTRODUCTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations.

Thirty-three donors and 14 affected states reported contributing a total of US$643.5 million in international and national support for mine action in 2020. This is approximately the same as in 2019, when global support totaled $650.7 million.1

The level of international support for mine action provided by donors plateaued at $565.2 million in 2020, compared to $561.3 million in 2019.

Overall, funding from international donors was in line with trends observed in previous years, with the major donors and recipients remaining mostly the same. The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Germany, Japan, and Norway—contributing a total of $426.1 million, or 75% of all international funding for 2020. On the beneficiary side, Iraq received more funding than any other country for the sixth consecutive year. The top five recipient states— Iraq, Lao PDR, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Croatia—received a combined total of $252.8 million, representing 45% of all international contributions.

As has been the case since the Monitor began reporting international support by sector in 2007, the majority of the funding provided by donors in 2020 went to clearance and risk education activities (68% of all funding), with more than $387 million provided. International support for victim assistance declined by $9.8 million, a 23% decrease from the 2019 level. The $33.3 million total for 2020 (6% of all funding) included only direct contributions to

1 All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current US dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather than the calendar year. In 2020, 16 of the 26 States Parties documented in this chapter reported disaggregated information on international funding for mine action in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.
victim assistance activities, while some donors supported such activities via funding for other programs or disability activities. However, it is still indicative of the general trend of support for this sector. The remaining 26% of overall funding ($144.8 million) was either not disaggregated by the donors, unearmarked, or used for capacity-building and advocacy purposes.

The Monitor identified 14 affected states that provided $78.3 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, representing 12% of global funding. This marks a decrease of $11.1 million from 2019, when 10 affected countries reported contributing $89.4 million.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and measures to curb its spread greatly affected the mine action community by disrupting planning, coordination, and implementation of activities. The pandemic has increased impetus for greater flexibility and responsiveness from donors, as well as for simplification of funding arrangements in order to best adapt to the new circumstances and ensure that operations can continue.

This chapter focuses on the financial response provided in 2020 by affected countries and international donors to support mine action efforts. While focused on financial contributions, it remains clear that cooperation and assistance is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience and know-how, best-practice sharing, and South-to-South or other forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.²

**INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2020**

In 2020, 33 donors contributed a total of $565.2 million in international support for mine action across 40 affected states, four other areas, and to global activities—$3.9 million more than the $561.3 million reported in 2019.³

After having increased by more than $100 million each year in 2016 and 2017, international support declined in 2018 (8%) and 2019 (13%). In 2020, international support for mine action from states, the EU, and other institutions essentially flatlined. On the one hand, the United Kingdom (UK) started reducing its contributions by half (55%) and Australia reduced its support by more than a third (40%). On the other hand, the US increased its support by $27.4 million (15%), while Germany and the EU each increased their contributions by more than $10 million. Overall, 15 of the 33 donors increased their funding in 2020.

In 2020, the 15 largest donors continued to provide almost all international mine action funding, with a combined total of $545.7 million (97% of all support).⁴

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³ Data on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, the ITF Enhancing Human Security and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) annual reports, media reporting, and answers from donors to Monitor questionnaires. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁴ The 15 largest donors in 2020 were: the US, the EU, Germany, Japan, Norway, the UK, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Italy. In 2018–2019, the same states contributed combined totals of $617 million in 2018 and $538.8 million in 2019.
IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

The pandemic has reinforced the need for better and more flexible grants and project implementation arrangements. Globally, there were very few reported instances of major diversion of mine action funding to address COVID-19 related issues. The following section provides details on the impact of the pandemic on mine action support for some of the major donors.

In May 2021, Australia said that it had to reduce its mine action funding because of the impact of the pandemic, though it was reported that funding levels for the second half of 2021 and the first half of 2022 were “nearing pre-COVID levels.” Australia has also adapted activities and agreements to take into account the impacts of the pandemic.5

Denmark reassigned a United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) contribution for activities in Iraq to cover part of the suspension costs for two mine clearance implementing partners, allowing them to have a stand-by capacity to resume clearance activities as soon as the conditions permitted. The total cost was approximately $200,000. In addition, planned disbursement for Tetra Tech and UNMAS projects in Iraq were delayed to the fourth quarter of 2020.7

In February and May 2021, Finland confirmed that its mine action budget for 2021–2025 has been secured to the €15 million level ($18.2 million)8 previously announced and has not been impacted by the pandemic.9 Finland also offered to its partner organizations to reallocate some mine action contributions to address COVID-19 related issues when needed.10

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6 Australia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J.
7 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kristine Dyregaaard Nielsen, Head of Section, Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, 15 October 2021.
10 Email from Anni Mäkeläinen, Desk Officer, Unit for Arms Control, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 13 July 2020.
In May 2021, Germany reported to the Monitor that funding for mine action remained stable in 2020 and 2021 despite the pandemic. Only one project was said to be postponed due to "major impediments," but with no impact on the overall disbursement of funds.11

Ireland reported having reallocated some funding from Colombia, where COVID-19 related restrictions prevented activities, to projects in Afghanistan and Somalia. Program targets were amended accordingly.12 No major disruptions were reported to Ireland-supported programmes in Southeast Asia.13 Irish funding to clearance activities run by the HALO Trust in five countries was disbursed incrementally based on quarterly progress reports, rather than as a "one-off" payment.14 This was aimed at addressing uncertainties in the delivery of planned activities amid limitations related to the pandemic.

Some projects supported by Japan combined mine action efforts with COVID-19 response activities in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Palestine, South Sudan, Sudan, and Syria.15 As of May 2021, the disbursement of Japan’s mine action support had not been affected by the pandemic, but the implementation of some projects had been delayed.16

In May 2021, the Netherlands reported that its level of funding for 2020 had not been impacted by the pandemic, while its new humanitarian mine action policy for 2020–2024 was said to be "COVID-19 sensitive."17

Sweden reported that some of its mine action resources had also addressed the pandemic response efforts, such as the delivery of COVID-19 awareness and prevention messages during risk education activities. In cases where implementing partners had not been able to use all funds received in 2020, unspent funds would remain available for mine action work in 2021.18

In 2020, as a response to disruptions to mine action operations on the ground, Switzerland reported that its partners were allowed to deploy resources to national COVID-19 response efforts or could extend the duration of projects.19

In April 2020, as a result of the deteriorating situation amid the outbreak of COVID-19, it was decided that EU funds initially allocated to mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) for 2018–2019 would be diverted to address COVID-19 and migration issues. As of September 2021, this was the only instance of a major diversion of EU mine action funding. The duration of several projects was also extended to address delays caused by the pandemic.20

In line with the "proportionality principle," the UK provided some broad guidelines to its implementing partners, such as ensuring staff safety, adjusting decisions to the local measures to address the pandemic, and maintaining planned activities wherever possible and appropriate. Salaries of demining staff would be guaranteed for up to three months.

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11 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sandrina Köbinger, Desk Officer, Conventional Arms Division, German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), 27 May 2021.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. The five countries were: Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
15 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ishida Tatsuya, Officer, Conventional Arms Division/Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2021.
16 Ibid.
17 MASG meeting, held virtually, Minutes, 28 May 2021, bit.ly/MASGMtgMay2021; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucas Daalhuisen, Policy Officer, Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 June 2021.
18 Email from Erik Pettersson, Senior Programme Manager, Peace and Human Security Unit, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 28 September 2021.
including under forced lockdown. However, in November 2020, the UK government announced that it would cut its foreign aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of its national income due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK parliament endorsed this reduction in July 2021. As a result, the allocation to mine action would be cut by half, with the mine action budget amounting to £17 million ($24 million) in 2021–2022. In October 2021, media reports estimated that UK funding for mine clearance in 2022–2024 could be reduced by at least 75%—from approximately £100 million ($137 million) over three years to £25 million ($34 million) over the same period. Six countries could no longer receive support as a result of the cuts: Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, South Sudan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. These cuts were to be reviewed by the newly appointed UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss.

No funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was diverted to address COVID-19, with the exception that a few programs were working with the Department of Health to support the development of accessible communications, while remaining within the scope of the initial activity of the contributions. The US also reported that in some instances mine action funds were used to assist COVID-19 related activities, such as the simultaneous provision of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and pandemic prevention messaging, or the delivery of medical supplies to hospitals through unused demining vehicles. In May 2020, a US representative said that “where host governments are requesting the use of HMA [humanitarian mine action]-funded assets, and it can be done in a reasonable and minimally disruptive manner, we will consider it.”

27 Email from Kirsten Lentz, Senior Technical Advisor, Rehabilitation, Technical Support Contract, USAID, Empowerment & Inclusion Division, 16 June 2020.
## DONORS

In 2020, 26 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, two states not party, the EU, and four other institutions contributed a total of $565.2 million to mine action.

### Contributions by donors: 2016–2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>204.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors*</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>565.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.


30 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. This information is drawn from Support for Mine Action country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as responses to Monitor questionnaires and other sources. In 2020, the total contributions of Denmark and the UK might have been slightly higher. Denmark support to Danish Refugee Council (DRC) operations in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia, and South Sudan was part of a multisectoral humanitarian and resilience assistance programme, for which the specific amount going toward demining was not available, and as such could not be included in the Monitor support database. In the case of the UK, some contributions reported in its 2021 transparency report (for calendar year 2020)—to Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen—were also included in its previous transparency report, which provided the total amounts for the financial year (April 2019 to March 2020) and were included in the Monitor support database for 2019. To avoid double reporting, those contributions were not included in the UK 2020 total by the Monitor.
As in past years, a small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action support. The five largest donors—the US, the EU, Germany, Japan, and Norway—accounted for three-quarters (75%) of all international support with a combined total of $426.1 million. The US remained the largest mine action donor with $204.8 million and it alone provided more than a third (36%) of all international mine action support. The EU ranked second with $89.8 million, or 16% of all contributions, followed by Germany with a total contribution of $54.3 million, representing 10% of all support. The next two donors—Japan and Norway—provided more than $35 million each.

Despite variations in the level of support provided, the proportion of total assistance from the top five donors has remained constant in recent years. From 2016–2020, the combined annual contributions from the five major donors accounted for 70–78% of all international support.

Support from States Parties in 2020 accounted for nearly half of all donor funding (47%), with 26 countries providing $268 million. This represents an 11% decrease from the $301.4 million contributed in 2019.

Overall, 15 donors contributed more in 2020 than they did in 2019, including a $27.4 million increase from the US (15%), while Germany and the EU increased their contributions by more than $10 million each. Ten donors increased their assistance by less than $1 million each. Three donors provided new funding in 2020: the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), and the Syrian Humanitarian Fund.

In contrast, 15 donors decreased their funding, with the UK representing the largest fall (down $39.4 million, a 55% decrease). The second largest decrease was seen for Australia (down $4.3 million, a 40% decrease) and was the result of a budget shortfall caused by the pandemic.

**Summary of changes in 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Combined Total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, and Slovakia</td>
<td>$19.3 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, EU, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, and US</td>
<td>$45.8 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Australia, Denmark, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, UK, and UNCERF</td>
<td>$50.3 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Andorra, Canada, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway</td>
<td>$9.6 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New donors in 2020</td>
<td>Syrian Humanitarian Fund, UNICEF, and UNTFHS</td>
<td>$1.8 million provided in 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors from 2019 that did not report new funding in 2020</td>
<td>Russia, Turkey, Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, UNA-Sweden, and UN Foundation</td>
<td>$3.1 million provided in 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


31 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.
32 MASG meeting, held virtually, Minutes, 28 May 2021, bit.ly/MASGMtgMay2021.
Additionally, five donors from 2019 did not report any new contribution to mine action in 2020.

The following table summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 donors, expressed in their respective national currencies and in US$ terms, and shows the impact of exchange rates on the US dollar value of international contributions.

In national currency terms, mine action international support increased in five countries—France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the US—in addition to the EU. After conversion into US dollars, funding increases were slightly more pronounced and were recorded in the same countries.

Consequently, whereas a total of nine states reported decreases in their mine action assistance in national currency terms in 2020, when converted into US dollars these reductions were greater in percentage terms for four countries. For Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands, the decreases were lower after conversion, while for the UK the exchange rate had zero impact. In the case of Switzerland, an increase was recorded after conversion into US dollars.

Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>In national currency terms</th>
<th></th>
<th>In US$ terms</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount of decrease/increase (in million)</td>
<td>% change from 2019</td>
<td>Amount of decrease/increase (in million)</td>
<td>% change from 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-£31.0</td>
<td>-55%</td>
<td>-39.4</td>
<td>-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-A$6.1</td>
<td>-39%</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-DKK27.0</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-€2.2</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-€0.4</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-NZ$1.3</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-NOK26.0</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-€0.3</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-CHF0.3</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>+4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+SEK0.7</td>
<td>+1%</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
<td>+4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>+¥238.5</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
<td>+8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>+US$27.4</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+27.4</td>
<td>+15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>+€10.8</td>
<td>+16%</td>
<td>+13.8</td>
<td>+18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>+€13.1</td>
<td>+38%</td>
<td>+15.7</td>
<td>+41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>+€2.7</td>
<td>+56%</td>
<td>+3.2</td>
<td>+60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by

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UNMAS and ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known as the International Trust Fund).

In 2020, contributions through UNMAS totaled at least $58.2 million from 23 donors. Several small donors—with a total financial assistance under $1 million each—used the VTF to contribute to mine action: Andorra, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain. At least four donors allocated a combined total of $3 million in 2020 through ITF Enhancing Human Security for mine action programs.34

While donor funding is frequently used for national activities, implementation is often carried out by an array of partnering institutions, non-government organizations (NGOs), trust funds, and UN agencies. Overall, non-profit organizations received at least $210.1 million or more than a third of all funding (37%) in 2020. Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2020 included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies ($45.7 million), the HALO Trust ($42.5 million), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) ($35.9 million), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) ($24.3 million), Humanity & Inclusion (HI) ($17.7 million), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($13.8 million).

RECIPIENTS

A total of 40 states and four other areas received $520.5 million from 31 donors in 2020. A further $44.7 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. Two donors—Andorra and Liechtenstein—only reported contributions to “global” activities.

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding.35 The top five recipient states—Iraq, Lao PDR, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Croatia—received $252.8 million, or 45% of the total.

Since 2015, Iraq has been the largest recipient of mine action assistance. In 2020, the country received 18% of all international support from the largest number of donors (18). Thirteen states and three other areas, or 36% of all recipients, had only one donor.36

In 2020, 21 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2019, including 11 recipients that received less support and 10 recipients that received more support. In addition, two previous recipients received no new support: Benin and Mauritania. These fluctuations may reflect shifts in donor priorities and changes in local situations.

Turkey and Somalia were the recipients with the largest increases, receiving respectively $21 million and $5.6 million more funding than in 2019. These were the results of changes in donors’ contributions. The EU disbursed a $21.2 million multi-year contribution for mine clearance activities carried out by the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) along the Turkish borders with Armenia and Iran.37 In the case of Somalia, the increase in support was primarily due to higher contributions from Japan (from $0.2 million in 2019 to $5 million in 2020) and Norway (from $2.4 million in 2019 to $3.4 million in 2020), in addition to new support from the EU ($1 million provided in 2020).38

34 The four donors were: the Czech Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, and the US.
35 Of the 10 countries that received the most mine action funding in 2020, seven were in the top 10 in 2019.
36 Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Armenia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Croatia, Montenegro, Nepal, Pakistan, Palau, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, and other areas Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
37 Email from Carole Ory, Senior Expert, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, EEAS, 29 June 2021.
38 Ibid.; email from Camilla Dannevig, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 September 2021; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ishida Tatsuya, Officer, Conventional Arms Division/Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2021.
### List of international support recipients in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>104.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. African Rep.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>520.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>565.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*. *Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.*

It is the third consecutive year that mine action funding channeled to Syria decreased. In 2020, support to mine action activities in Syria fell more steeply (by $16.4 million, a decrease of 39%) than in 2019 (by $24.2 million, a fall of 36%). The reduction in contributions observed since 2018 is the result of sharp decreases in funding from Germany and the US, following their exceptional contributions in 2017 which saw a combined increase of more than $67 million in support. The US has not reported providing new mine action funding to Syria since then, while funding from Germany fell from $13.9 million in 2017 to $2.6 million in 2020. Afghanistan was the recipient with the second largest decrease in 2020, receiving $16.3 million less than in 2019 (28% decrease). Both countries remained among the 10 largest recipients of mine action funding in 2020.
Summary of changes in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Combined Total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Angola, BiH, Central African Republic, Kosovo, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, Turkey, Yemen, and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$49.6 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>Georgia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Palau, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and “global activities”</td>
<td>$23.7 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Afghanistan, DRC, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Montenegro, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Western Sahara</td>
<td>$63.5 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Jordan, and South Sudan</td>
<td>$8 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients from 2019 that did not receive new support in 2020</td>
<td>Benin and Mauritania</td>
<td>$0.4 million received in 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recipients in 2020</td>
<td>Armenia, Cameroon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nepal, and Pakistan</td>
<td>$2.5 million received in 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR**

In 2020, 68% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while support to victim assistance represented 6%, and advocacy and capacity-building represented 5%. “Various” funding represented 21% of all international mine action support. This includes contributions not disaggregated by donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any sectors.

Contributions by thematic sector in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of total contribution</th>
<th>No. of donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance and risk education</td>
<td>387.1</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>119.1</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>565.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable.

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39 In 2019, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education ($312.3 million, or 56% of total international support), victim assistance ($43.1 million, or 8%), capacity-building ($7.4 million, or 1%), advocacy ($6.5 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($0.002 million, or <1%), and various activities ($192 million, or 34%). It was the first time since 2015 that a donor reported new dedicated stockpile destruction funding.
CLEARANCE AND RISK EDUCATION

In 2020, $387.1 million, or more than three-fifths (68%) of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents an increase of $74.8 million from 2019 (24%).

Five donors—the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, and Germany—provided the majority (82%) of all support to clearance and risk education ($315.6 million).

Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Nineteen donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of $145.6 million in 28 affected countries and three other areas.40

More than two-fifths of international support (47%, or $263.6 million) went to nine States Parties with massive landmine contamination.41 Most of this funding, $179.9 million, went to clearance and risk education projects. As illustrated in the following graph, States Parties with smaller contamination have tended to receive less financial support to implement their clearance obligations. Some mine-affected States Parties have not received external support for years: Ecuador (since 2012), Eritrea (since 2011), Ethiopia (since 2013), Niger (since 2012), Peru (since 2018), and Senegal (since 2018).

Clearance and risk education dedicated support by extent of mine contamination in States Parties: 2019–202042

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Contamination</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massive contamination (more than 100km²)</td>
<td>170.6</td>
<td>179.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large contamination (20–99km²)</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium contamination (5–19km²)</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small contamination (less than 5km²)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in the top section of each bar indicate the combined total amount of clearance and risk education support.

40 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Montenegro, Palau, Palestine, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received international assistance for clearance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Kosovo,Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

41 Massive mine contamination is defined by the Monitor as more than 100km².

42 Recipients of international support with massive contamination (more than 100km²) included: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. Recipients of international support with large contamination (between 20–99km²) included: Angola, Chad, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Recipients with medium contamination (between 5–19km²) included: Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan. Recipients with small contamination (less than 5km²) included: DRC, Palestine, and Serbia.
Recipients of risk education dedicated support: 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

*Lao PDR is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Thirteen donors reported contributions totaling $9.3 million specifically for risk education projects in 15 countries. Myanmar and Syria received the most risk education-specific funding with a combined total of $4.5 million, about half of all risk education dedicated support.

Clearance and risk education dedicated international support: 2016–2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Clearance and Risk Education Funding (US$ million)</th>
<th>Proportion of Total International Support (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>347.9 (72%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>404.4 (58%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>396.9 (62%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>312.3 (56%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>387.1 (68%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated clearance and risk education funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

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43 This table includes recipients of specific risk education funding only. In addition to the recipients listed in the table, 16 states and other areas received support for risk education combined with other mine action activities, such as clearance or victim assistance (the specific amount going to each sector could not be disaggregated): Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, DRC, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mali, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Palestine, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

44 Donors of international assistance for risk education were: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and UNICEF.
Between 2016 and 2020, approximately two-thirds of international support went to clearance and risk education activities (62%, or $1.8 billion). Risk education-specific funding represented just 3% of all dedicated support, totaling $46.4 million. In comparison, a total of $30.6 million was recorded as risk education funding during the previous five-year period from 2011–2015. This 52% increase reflects better disaggregation of funding data and demonstrates renewed focus on this life-saving pillar of mine action since 2019.

**VICTIM ASSISTANCE**

Based on data available as of October 2021, direct international support for victim assistance activities in 2020 totaled $33.3 million, a 23% decline from the 2019 level ($43.1 million). Twelve donors\(^{45}\) reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 10 States Parties and six states not party.\(^{46}\)

**Victim assistance dedicated international support: 2016–2020**

![Graph showing victim assistance dedicated international support: 2016–2020](image)

**Note:** Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

In 2020, most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. As observed in 2018 and 2019, a large proportion of the contributions from donors to victim assistance activities in 2020 were the result of support within the context of emergency operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In 2020, more than half of all victim assistance support (60%) went to just four countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—receiving a combined total of $20 million.

Approximately $5.9 million, representing 18% of all victim assistance funding, was provided to global activities (without a designated recipient state or area).

The remaining 22% ($7.4 million) went to victim assistance activities in 12 other countries, including seven affected States Parties.

As in previous years, a large number of States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims received no, or very little, victim assistance support; whereas needs remained great and available resources were lacking.\(^{47}\) In 2020, 23 States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs included Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, and Sudan.

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\(^{45}\) Victim assistance donors included: Austria, Belgium, EU, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, and US.

\(^{46}\) States Parties recipients of international funding for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that received international funding for victim assistance were: Armenia, Georgia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, and Syria.

\(^{47}\) See Impact chapter for the list of States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs.
significant numbers of survivors did not receive any direct victim assistance funding, while four States Parties with landmine survivors each received less than $500,000—BiH, Jordan, Palestine, and Ukraine.

Funding for victim assistance remains especially difficult to track, as many donors report that they support victims via more general programs for development and the rights of persons with disabilities, and are not able to detail specific victim assistance funding. However, this annual estimate still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation.

**ADVOCACY AND CAPACITY-BUILDING**

In 2020, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities ($6.1 million). Of the 33 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 14 reported supporting advocacy activities.

Fifteen donors collectively provided $19.6 million—representing 4% of all international support—for capacity-building activities in 14 countries and one other area. This is more than double the level of funding for capacity-building in 2019, when donors allocated $7.4 million to capacity-building. It is the highest annual total support allocated to this sector ever recorded by the Monitor. This finding could reflect a growing interest from donors in strengthening local capacities to create conditions for effective and sustainable mine action efforts.

**Advocacy and capacity-building dedicated international support: 2016–2020**

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated advocacy and capacity-building funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

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48 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Uganda.

49 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to: contributions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty implementation support units, the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP), GICHD, Geneva Call, the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, and other operators and NGOs.

50 Advocacy donors in 2020 included: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

51 Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building activities were: Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, Western Sahara, and Yemen.

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2020

Overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports.

In 2020, the Monitor identified that at least 14 affected states provided a combined total of $78.3 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets.53 This is four more states than in 2019, but represents a decrease of more than $11 million from the $89.4 million reported for that year.

Chile has been one of the few affected states that completely funds its own mine action program; and has not received international support since 2007. Chile completed clearance of its mined areas in 2020, and provided more than $75 million in total toward completion of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations.54 Chile still has clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and estimated that $10.5 million would be needed to complete clearance of all areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants.55 In 2020–2021, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted Chile’s ability to allocate financial resources to mine action. However, as of August 2021, the country remained committed to cover the full cost of technical survey activities—estimated at some $30,700—which would be provided from the state budget.56

In 2020, due to conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, Yemen was not in a position to maintain its annual commitment of $3 million to its mine action program. Limited national support was provided to staff of the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) and for healthcare, but the amount was not reported.57 Yemen also reported that while the majority of international support is directed toward the implementation of activities, there was still a need to support coordination mechanisms.58

A dozen affected states have indicated contributing to their national mine action programs, but details on their level of contribution in 2020 were either unavailable or only partially available: Chad, Chile, the DRC, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In about half of these states, national contributions were limited to covering the running costs of their respective mine action authorities.59

### National support: 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**. *Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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53 Data on national support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, ITF Enhancing Human Security's annual report, and media reporting. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.


55 The total amount is subject to change, based on technical survey to be carried out in 2021-2022. Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 23 June 2021, bit.ly/ChileCCMExtRequestJune2021.

56 Chile, “Work plan to complete the technical surveys in the 4 military ranges which is suspected there may be cluster munition remnants [sic],” 26 August 2021, bit.ly/ChileWorkplanCCM2021.


58 Ibid.

59 Chad, DRC, Mauritania, South Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
OSLO ACTION PLAN AND SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

At the Oslo Review Conference in November 2019, States Parties committed to complete their respective time-bound obligations by 2025 and to ensure sustainable and integrated support for victims. The Oslo Action Plan contains six action points, along with a series of specific indicators, aimed at tracking progress toward enhancing international cooperation and assistance. These indicators include, among others: the level of national funding; the provision of assistance by States Parties; regular reporting on challenges and needs for assistance; the existence of coordinating mechanisms; and the facilitation of dialogue and information exchange among affected states, the donor community, and relevant stakeholders. A number of these points have been tracked by the Monitor in the past.

As regards the provision of assistance by and to States Parties, in the last decade, a total of 32 States Parties reported contributing some $1.9 billion in mine action support to 58 affected States Parties. In 2020 alone, 23 States Parties provided $176.6 million in mine action support to 25 States Parties. This is a significant decrease (15%) from the level of funding provided by and to States Parties in 2019 ($207.7 million), and the first time since 2017 that such funding has fallen below $200 million. While this must not be interpreted as a disengagement from the shared commitment and collaborative partnership within the Mine Ban Treaty community, it is an important reminder of the need to secure adequate resources for the effective and timely implementation of the treaty’s obligations.

Cumulative numbers remain just one aspect of the story, and the distribution of support among affected states and territories, as well as the sustainability of the assistance, are also key factors.

A decade of support from and to States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate contributions from States Parties to affected States Parties in US$ million, with the percentage in brackets as a proportion of total international support.

Tracking national financial commitments by affected States Parties has proven more difficult as a result of under-reporting. Since 2010, the Monitor has recorded a total of $1.5 billion provided by affected states to their own mine action efforts.61

60 This included $118.2 million to clearance and risk education activities (67% of the total) and $21.6 million to victim assistance (12%). The remaining 21% ($36.8 million) went to advocacy and capacity-building activities or was not disaggregated by sector.

61 This figure includes support provided by affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and/or to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
in 2020, 12 out of the 33 States Parties that have declared an identified threat of antipersonnel landmine contamination (36%) reported on their financial contributions.\textsuperscript{62} National support has remained below $100 million annually for five consecutive years. Affected states do not all provide the same level of information regarding national resources allocated to mine action activities, and some have never done so.

FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION 2016–2020

Over the past five years (2016–2020), total support to mine action amounted to $3.4 billion, an average of more than $670 million per year. This is $180.6 million more than the total support provided in the previous five-year period from 2011–2015, constituting a 6% increase.\textsuperscript{63}

Although data on national support for mine action remains incomplete, such support accounted for around 12% of total mine action funding from 2016–2020, and amounted to approximately $408 million. International support totaled $3 billion, an average of just under $590 million per year, and represented 88% of all support.

Summary of contributions: 2016–2020

Three donors—the US ($1 billion), the EU ($418 million), and Germany ($257 million)—contributed $1.7 billion, or 56% of total international support. Three other donors—the UK, Japan, and Norway—contributed more than $185 million each; while Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland ranked among the top 10 mine action donors for the five-year period.

Support from States Parties accounted for half (49%) of all international funding provided in 2016–2020, with a combined contribution of $1.4 billion.\textsuperscript{64} In percentage terms, this is similar to States Parties support in 2011–2015, when $1 billion was provided, representing 44% of all international funding during the period. This shows that historically, States Parties have been a stable and consistent contributor to mine action, despite variations in budget

\textsuperscript{62} In addition, two states not party, Lao PDR and Lebanon, reported contributing to their own mine action programs in 2020.

\textsuperscript{63} According to Monitor data, from 2011–2015, total support for mine action totaled $3.2 billion ($2.3 billion from international donors and $900 million provided by affected states to their own mine action activities).

\textsuperscript{64} Thirty-one States Parties reported mine action contributions in 2016–2020: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and UK.
allocations and changes in situations or contexts observed in the past decade. The major challenge to improve efficiency in international support remains greater coordination among donors for a better geographical distribution of financial resources, in order to address both legacy and new contamination, as well as all sectors of mine action, from clearance to risk education and victim assistance.

The overall increase in total support provided in 2016–2020 compared to the previous five-year period was mostly driven by the unusually large 2017 contributions from Germany and the US to support clearance efforts in Iraq and Syria, which represented a combined total increase of $204 million. There was also an apparent impact from the series of pledging conferences held in 2016 to secure funding for mine action in some heavily affected countries, as well as one-off extraordinary pledges announced around that time.65 This contributed to significant increases in support for activities in Colombia (up $128 million), Iraq (up $412.3 million), and Lao PDR (up $36 million), as shown in the table below.

This increase was partially offset by a 55% reduction in national support, which fell from a combined total of $904.8 million reported in 2011–2015 to $407.9 million in 2016–2020.

Summary of changes: top 10 recipients of mine action support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>2016–2020 contributions (US$ million)</th>
<th>2011–2015 contributions (US$ million)</th>
<th>% change from the previous five-year period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>601.8</td>
<td>189.5</td>
<td>+218%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>273.0</td>
<td>353.7</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>246.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>+1,319%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>208.4</td>
<td>172.4</td>
<td>+21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>196.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>+188%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>168.7</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>+210%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>109.9</td>
<td>143.7</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>72.8</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>+104%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>+12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,062.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,179.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>+75%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.
* Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In 2016–2020, the 10 largest recipients of mine action support received the majority of available funding, totaling more than $2 billion; this represents, on average, more than two-thirds (70%) of total international contributions. Of these 10 recipients, four came from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, four from the Asia-Pacific, one from the Americas, and one from Europe. No country from the Sub-Saharan Africa region was among the largest 10 recipients.66


66 Two affected states from the Sub-Saharan Africa region were among the 15 largest recipients of mine action assistance in 2016–2020: Somalia ranked thirteenth ($57 million received) and South Sudan fifteenth ($43.1 million). Both of them were among the top 10 recipients in 2011–2015.
During the five-year period, the composition of this group of recipients remained relatively similar from one year to another, while there were some variations in the contributions received by each of them from one year to the next.\textsuperscript{67} This illustrates changes in circumstances globally and/or nationally, as well as shifting in funding approaches, priorities, and focus.

\textsuperscript{67} In 2011–2015, the top 10 largest country recipients were: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, South Sudan, Angola, Somalia, Libya, Colombia, and Lebanon.
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION: 2020

National contributions

- (amount in parenthesis)

Recipients

- More than $15 million
- $1-$15 million
- Less than $1 million

International donors

- More than $15 million
- $1-$15 million
- Less than $1 million

Notes:
The European Union as an entity provided $80.8 million in international support for mine action in 2020.
Other donors in 2020 included: Syrian Humanitarian Fund ($1.3 million), United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UNCERF) ($0.4 million), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) ($0.2 million), and United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) ($0.4 million).
International donors provided $44.7 million without designating a recipient state or area.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold. Signatory is italics. OTHER AREAS are UPPER CASE ITALICS.
Addressing the Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, ICBL campaigner emphasizes the crucial importance of sustained international cooperation and assistance to fulfill the promise of the treaty. More than 400 delegates participated in the meeting, which took place in a virtual format due to COVID-19 restrictions.

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STATUS OF THE
CONVENTION

1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE,
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
(1997 MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into
force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second
date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign;
rather, they may become bound without signature through a one-step procedure known as
accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has
not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 31 October 2021 there were 164 States Parties.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
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**Status of the Convention**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00</td>
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<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
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**SIGNATORY**

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

**NON-SIGNATORIES**

- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Bahrain
- China
- Cuba
- Egypt
- Georgia
- India
- Iran
- Israel
- Kazakhstan
- Korea, North
- Korea, South
- Kyrgyzstan
- Lao PDR
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Micronesia, Federated States of
- Mongolia
- Morocco
- Myanmar
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Russia
- Saudi Arabia
- Singapore
- Syria
- Tonga
- United Arab Emirates
- United States
- Uzbekistan
- Vietnam
MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3

Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
ARTICLE 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   e) Assistance to mine victims;
   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.
ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
   h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
   i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties,
provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

ARTICLE 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Landmine Monitor 2021 provides a global overview of efforts to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, ensure clearance of mine contaminated areas, deliver risk education to affected communities, and assist victims of these weapons. More generally, the report assesses the international community’s response to the global landmine situation, focusing on calendar year 2020 with information included up to October 2021. It covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling globally; contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance; and documents global trends in support for mine action.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Cover: A 33-year old landmine survivor tries on a new prosthesis at the fitting and rehabilitation centre in Kabalaye, Chad. She stepped on a mine in Fada in 2002 and has been receiving care as part of PRODECO, a four-year EU-funded project led by HI in consortium with FSD, MAG, and SCADEV. © Gwenn Dubouchaud/HI, November 2020

Top left: Children passing by a billboard warning local communities against the presence of mines, including of an improvised nature, in Qbuq village, Tel Afar, Iraq. © Sean Sutton/MAC, April 2021

Top right: In Iraq, an NPA deminer marks out a zone with a wooden stick to delimit and characterize the contamination. © Marijn van Broekhoven/NPA, June 2021

The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is coordinated by the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC.

Research team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations comprise the committee: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, DanChurchAid, Danish Refugee Council, Human Rights Watch, Humanity & Inclusion, and Mines Action Canada.

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