Toward a Mine-Free World

The Landmine Monitor initiative is coordinated by an Editorial Board of four organizations: Mines Action Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and Norwegian People’s Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency.

Landmine Monitor Report 2007


Landmine Monitor collects information and assesses the response by the international community to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem, especially with regard to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Since 1999, this initiative has successfully and consistently demonstrated for the first time that non-governmental organizations can work together in a sustained, coordinated and systematic way to monitor and report on the implementation of an international disarmament or humanitarian law treaty.


Cover photos © Camilo Solano, 5 December 2006. Fransiney Chaux Grisalez coordinates the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM) in the department of Caquetá. On 24 February 2002, Fransiney stepped on a mine planted on a road. Fransiney educates landmine survivors about their rights, helps them apply for government assistance, and conducts mine risk education workshops.
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions that explode from the presence, proximity or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions that explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) refer to unexploded and/or abandoned ordnance left behind after a conflict. ERW includes unexploded artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs and cluster submunitions. Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or the air, the containers open and disperse submunitions over a wide area.

Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate – whoever activates the mine, whether it is a child or a soldier – will be its next victim. Mines used in a conflict against enemy forces can kill or injure innocent civilians decades later.

Weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosives are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict and has been left behind and is no longer under control of the party that left it behind. It may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for use. ERW consist of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmer’s fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause physical damage to people injured or killed by them –
they are a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for governments to use in alleviating the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled mines within four years, and they must clear all antipersonnel landmines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

To date, the only international legislation explicitly covering ERW is Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Its provisions are considered insufficient by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but Protocol V does make efforts to address responsibility for ERW clearance, sharing information for clearance, risk education, warning civilian populations, and assistance.

In 2006, the Norwegian government started a process to create a legally binding agreement prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. Negotiations for this new treaty are expected to conclude in 2008. NGOs, working in partnership with governments and international organizations, are using the Mine Ban Treaty as a model for this new agreement, and hope to build on its strengths and to remedy its shortcomings.

These legal instruments provide a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations, and it is the task of NGOs to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ICBL’s ultimate goal is a landmine and ERW-free world, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, and where children can play without mistaking an unexploded cluster submunition for a toy.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a coalition of more than 1,000 organizations in 72 countries, working locally, nationally and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines, and to stop the use of cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six non-governmental organizations: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign a practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks, and word of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in 72 countries.

The ICBL's ultimate goal is a landmine and ERW-free world, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, and where children can play without mistaking an unexploded cluster submunition for a toy.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a coalition of more than 1,000 organizations in 72 countries, working locally, nationally and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines, and to stop the use of cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six non-governmental organizations: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign a practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks, and word of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in 72 countries.
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada, 10 years ago. It is in part due to sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty, and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use, and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to join the treaty. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to victim assistance.

Ten years after its opening for signature the ICBL considers the Mine Ban Treaty a success in progress, meaning that an enormous amount has been accomplished so far, but that continued vigilance is required to ensure the remaining work on universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty is done. ICBL member campaigns will continue their work until the goal of a mine-free world becomes a reality.

Landmine Monitor

Landmine Monitor Report 2007 is the ninth annual report. Eight previous annual reports have been released since 1999, each presented to the annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Landmine Monitor is the ICBL’s research and monitoring initiative and the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally, to assess the international community’s response to the humanitarian problem caused by landmines and ERW. The Landmine Monitor project represents the first time in history that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL formally agreed to create Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. A four-member Editorial Board coordinates the Landmine Monitor system: Mines Action Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and Norwegian People’s Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency. The Editorial Board assumes overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Landmine Monitor system.

Landmine Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines. This is done through extensive collection, analysis and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, Landmine Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Landmine Monitor is designed to complement the States Parties transparency reporting required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

Landmine Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-related issues, and to seek clarifications, to help reach the goal of a mine-free world. Landmine Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Landmine Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of 69 Landmine Monitor researchers from 57 countries, and a 23 person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this
On 4 February 2007, Landmine Monitor researcher John Head (center in photo) passed away peacefully in New Zealand after a long illness. John was a long-time campaigner and researcher, who tirelessly worked to universalize the Mine Ban Treaty and ensure its full implementation throughout the Pacific.

Landmine Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs and international organizations, mine action practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information.


We extend our gratitude to Landmine Monitor contributors. Landmine Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. It was only possible to carry out this work with the aid of grants from:

- Government of Australia
- Government of Austria
- Government of Belgium
- Government of Canada
- Government of Cyprus
- Government of the Czech Republic
- Government of Denmark
- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of Holy See
- Government of Ireland
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of New Zealand
- Government of Norway
- Government of Spain
- Government of Sweden
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of the United Kingdom
- European Commission
- UN Development Programme
- UNICEF

We also thank the donors who have contributed to the individual members of the Landmine Monitor Editorial Board and other participating organizations.

Press conference to release the Sudan Landmine Monitor in Khartoum.

On 4 February 2007, Landmine Monitor researcher John Head (center in photo) passed away peacefully in New Zealand after a long illness. John was a long-time campaigner and researcher, who tirelessly worked to universalize the Mine Ban Treaty and ensure its full implementation throughout the Pacific.

Press conference to release the Sudan Landmine Monitor in Khartoum.

Press conference to release the Sudan Landmine Monitor in Khartoum.

Press conference to release the Sudan Landmine Monitor in Khartoum.
Abandoned explosive ordnance — Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Antihandling device — According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device, “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine — According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine, “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine — According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation — Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not in fact contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction — Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspect hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance — The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty — The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Cluster munition — Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel or both.

Community based rehabilitation — Programs designed to supplement facility-based programs within affected communities to improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to services, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

Demining — The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war — Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal — The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Improvised explosive device — A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated by the soldier. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

IMAS — International mine action standards developed by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

Landmine impact survey — A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.
Mine action center — A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some MACs also implement mine action activities.

National mine action authority — A governmental body, normally inter-ministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

Non-state armed groups — For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Risk education — Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by raising awareness and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

Risk reduction — Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property or the environment. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by risk education.

Submunition — Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

Survey — A study of the assessment of the location and impact of mines and ERW at the local or national level. General survey focuses on the location of mined and battle areas and the type of contamination they contain. A landmine impact survey also assesses the impact of affected communities (see separate definition for a landmine impact survey). Technical survey aims to confirm and identify the outer perimeters of the hazardous area and to gather other necessary information for clearance.

Unexploded ordnance — UXO refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; they are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

Victim — The individual directly hit by a mine/ERW explosion, his or her family and community.

Victim assistance — Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, casualty data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families and communities in society.
## Contents

### Introduction
- Mine and ERW Casualties in 2006
- Global Contamination from Mines and ERW
- Deadlines for States Parties with Article 5 Obligations
  - 1997 Mine Ban Treaty

### Maps
- Mine Risk Education
  - MRE Programs in 2006-2007
  - Evaluations and Studies
  - Emergency MRE
  - Conclusions

### Banning Antipersonnel Mines
- Universalization
- Seventh Meeting of States Parties
- Implementation and Intersessional Work Program
- Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)
- Cluster Munitions, the CCW, and the Oslo Process
- Use of Antipersonnel Mines
- Production of Antipersonnel Mines
- Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines
- Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction (Article 4)
- Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)
- Transparency Reporting (Article 7)
- National Implementation Measures (Article 9)
- Special Issues of Concern

### Mine Action
- Mine Action in 2006
- Completion of Article 5 Obligations
- Mine Action by Non-State Armed Groups
- Demining in Other Areas
- National Ownership of Mine Action
- Deminer Security
- Data Gathering and Reporting Inadequate Challenges

### Mine Risk Education
- New Casualties in 2006
- Special Issue of Concern: Inadequate Data Collection and Management
- Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives 2005-2009
- Other Progress in Survivor Assistance
- The Survivor Assistance Toolbox
- National Ownership of Survivor Assistance
- Other International Developments
- Funding and Resources

### Mine Action Funding
- International Funding of Mine Action
- National Funding of Mine Action
- Donor Coordination and Integration of Mine Action Funding with Development Funding Channels
- Mine Action Donors
- Other Mine Action Donors
- Research and Development Projects
- Reported by Donors
- Major Mine Action Recipients

### Status of the Convention
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction ("Mine Ban Treaty") entered into force on 1 March 1999. Signed by 122 governments in Ottawa, Canada in December 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty had 155 States Parties as of 15 August 2007. A total of 40 states remain outside the treaty, including two that have signed but not yet ratified.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) considers the Mine Ban Treaty the only viable comprehensive framework for achieving a mine-free world. The treaty and the global effort to eradicate antipersonnel mines have yielded impressive results. A new international norm is emerging, as many governments not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are taking steps consistent with the treaty, and an increasing number of non-state armed groups are also embracing a ban.

Further progress towards elimination of antipersonnel mines was made in 2006-2007. Four more states (Iraq, Kuwait, Montenegro and Indonesia) have joined the treaty, and others have moved closer to joining. Over three-quarters of the world’s states are now members of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Extensive research for this ninth edition of the Landmine Monitor Report has also found that:

- New use of antipersonnel mines continues to decline ongoing use by only two states (Myanmar/Burma and Russia) was confirmed since May 2006.
- Six more States Parties completed destruction of their stockpiled antipersonnel mines only 10 other States Parties still have stocks to destroy.
- Over 450 square kilometers of contaminated land was cleared in 2006, and several mine action programs adopted new methods to increase future productivity.
- Mine risk education reached 7.3 million people to protect them from the danger of mines and explosive remnants of war.
- Recorded casualties continued to fall, to 5,751 last year 16 percent less than in 2005.

The ICBL generally uses the short title, Mine Ban Treaty; other short titles in use include: Ottawa Treaty, Ottawa Convention, Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, and Mine Ban Convention.
Funding for mine action increased to a record level in 2006 $475 million. However, in some important respects little progress has been made in the global effort to eradicate antipersonnel mines.

- Forty countries outside the Mine Ban Treaty possess together 160 million antipersonnel mines.
- Thirteen countries still produce or retain the right to produce antipersonnel mines.
- At least 13 countries are in urgent need of new or additional mine risk education programs.

Although casualties declined in 2006 the number of mine survivors in the world continued to grow, to at least 473,000, many needing lifelong care.

Major challenges still facing States Parties in implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty include:

- Ten States Parties have some 14 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed.
- Fourteen States Parties are not on track to meet their treaty deadlines for clearance of mined areas; therefore, the Nairobi Action Plan’s aim that “few, if any” would miss the deadline is likely to be met instead with many requests for extensions.²
- Few States Parties have solid survivor assistance plans with SMART objectives adjusted to the needs of survivors, families, communities and the country-context.³
- Basic data collection on clearance, casualties and survivors has shown little improvement overall, which is an obstacle for effective mine action planning, optimal use of resources and adequate provision for survivors.
- Funding remains mostly short-term instead of multi-year, limiting the sustainability and effectiveness of mine action programs; much of the very impressive increase in 2006 funding was in response to crisis situations in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The following pages document both the impressive progress made and the substantial challenges remaining to universalize the Mine Ban Treaty and to fully implement it by clearing mines from the ground, destroying stockpiled antipersonnel mines, educating people about the dangers of mines and assisting mine survivors. The ICBL believes the only real measure of the Mine Ban Treaty’s success will be the concrete impact that it has on the global antipersonnel mine problem. As with the eight previous annual reports, *Landmine Monitor Report 2007* provides a means of measuring that impact, with chapters giving detailed information on 118 countries and areas. *Landmine Monitor Report 2007* is also available online at www.icbl.org/lm/2007.

This Executive Summary provides a global overview of the current Landmine Monitor reporting period since May 2006. It contains sections on banning antipersonnel mines (universalization, use, production, trade and stockpiling), on mine action, including mine risk education, on landmine casualties and survivor assistance, and on mine action funding.

---


³ SMART = Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound. Twenty-four States Parties were identified at the Mine Ban Treaty Review Conference in 2004 as having the greatest need to provide medical care, rehabilitation and other services to mine survivors; they were given assistance in preparing survivor assistance objectives and plans.
Deadlines for States Parties with Article 5 Obligations

* Argentina has declared that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim of sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas.
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. Since entry into force, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later.1

Universalization
Sustained and extensive outreach efforts by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 155 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 24 acceded.2 The numbers of states that ratified or acceded to the treaty each year since it opened for signature are as follows: 1997 (December only): three; 1998: 32; 1999: 32 (23 after 1 March); 2000: 19; 2001: 13; 2002: eight; 2003: 11; 2004: three; 2005: four; 2006: four; and 2007 (as of 15 August): three.


There are two states remaining that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty: Poland and the Marshall Islands. Poland backed away from plans to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future and instead declared that the Ministry of National Defense had determined that Poland should not join before 2015, when it intends to have alternatives to antipersonnel mines in place. The Marshall Islands gave a positive signal by, for the second year in a row, voting in favor of the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

With near universalization in Africa, the Americas and Europe, there have been encouraging developments in states not yet party to the treaty in several other regions.

Middle East-North Africa
Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007 and Kuwait acceded on 30 July 2007. Support for accession appears to have intensified in Bahrain. The Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs told an ICBL mission in March 2007 that Bahrain supports the Mine Ban Treaty and that he intends to recommend accession; various legislators expressed similar sentiments.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty
December 1997–August 2007

1 For a state that ratifies (having become a signatory prior to 1 March 1999) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that state deposited its instrument of ratification. That state is then required to make its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

2 The 24 accessions include Montenegro, which technically “succeeded” to the treaty after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro. Of the 131 ratifications, 43 came on or before entry into force on 1 March 1999 and 88 came afterward.
In April 2007 an Omani military official told the ICBL that Oman already abides by the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty, and that “something will happen” soon regarding accession.

Morocco continued to stress its de facto compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty and for the first time submitted a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

Asia-Pacific

In September 2006 Mongolia reiterated its objective of joining the treaty by 2008. Mongolia amended its State Secrecy Law in December 2006 to allow it to make information on antipersonnel mines publicly available. Mongolia is preparing a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

On several occasions in 2006 and 2007 Laos stated its intention of joining the treaty in the near future.

The government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist agreed under the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to neither use nor transport mines. In March 2007 Nepal declared that it was moving toward joining the treaty, and in April Nepal told States Parties that it was holding consultations on joining.

In April 2007 Palau told States Parties that it intends to join in the near future and already views itself as bound by the treaty. Palau voted for the pro-ban UNGA resolution for the first time.

Tonga attended a Pacific-wide Mine Ban Treaty workshop in Port Vila, Vanuatu in May 2007; this was its first-ever participation in a Mine Ban Treaty-related meeting.

During an October 2006 advocacy trip to Vietnam, the ICBL met with government officials who reaffirmed that the country is already in accord with much of the treaty; it is not producing, exporting or using antipersonnel mines, and is providing support for mine action globally. The government expressed a willingness to be more involved in international efforts to eradicate antipersonnel mines.

In December 2006 China voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution for the second consecutive year; it continued to make statements supporting the Mine Ban Treaty’s purposes and objectives.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Georgia told States Parties in September 2006 and April 2007 that it is continuing to consider the possibility of acceding to the treaty, reiterating that it “fully shares the principles and objectives” of the treaty. Georgia and Armenia continued their practice of supporting the pro-ban UNGA resolution, and Azerbaijan for the second year in a row voted in favor.

In March 2007 the government of Kazakhstan in cooperation with others convened a regional workshop on mine action. The Deputy Minister of Defense revealed that some 3,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed three years ago, and that there was a plan for further destruction.

But, despite the growing list of states committed to banning antipersonnel mines, there were discouraging actions among some of the 40 states not party to the treaty. Government forces in Myanmar/Burma and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. There were serious allegations that Israeli and Georgian forces also used antipersonnel mines (both governments denied the charges). Pakistan threatened to mine its border with Afghanistan. Poland backed off its commitment to join the treaty soon. The United States is moving toward production of new landmine systems that appear to be incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. South Korea has initiated production of remotely-delivered mine systems. The conflict in Lebanon appears to have stalled progress toward joining the Mine Ban Treaty, as has conflict in Somalia.

UN General Assembly Resolution 61/84

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly resolutions calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 61/84 was adopted on 6 December 2006 by a vote of 161 in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions. This is the highest number of votes in favor of, and equal to the lowest number of abstentions on this annual resolution since 1997 when it was first introduced. Twenty states not party to the treaty voted

1 Seventeen states abstained from voting for UNGA Resolution 61/84 in December 2006: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, United States, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

in favor, including three countries that subsequently became States Parties (Indonesia, Kuwait, and Iraq), two signatory countries (Poland, Marshall Islands) and 15 non-signatories (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Palau—for the first time, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, United Arab Emirates).

Of the 40 states not party as of 15 August 2007, 17 abstained and 17 voted in favor of the resolution. The six other states not party to the treaty were absent from the vote, three of which have supported the resolution in the past (Nepal, Somalia, Tuvalu), and three of which have been absent from every previous vote (Laos, North Korea, Saudi Arabia).

Non-State Armed Groups
A significant number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. They have done this through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, and signature of the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call. 1 NSAGs in four States Parties (Burundi, Philippines, Senegal, Sudan) and one state not party to the treaty (Nepal) have agreed to abide by a ban on antipersonnel mines through bilateral agreements with governments.

In September 2006 the government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL signed a Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement which bans any mine-laying operations. In Nepal the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement committed the government and the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist to forego use of landmines.

Geneva Call has received signatures from NSAGs in Burma, Burundi, India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey and Western Sahara. The Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) and its armed wing, People’s Defense Forces (HPG), also known as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), 2 signed the Deed of Commitment in July 2006, as did the Chin National Front/Army of Burma. The Kuki National Organization and its armed wings in northeast India signed in August 2006, and the Lahu Democratic Front, the Palaung State Liberation Front, and the Pa-O People’s Liberation Organization, all from Burma, signed in April 2007.

Seventh Meeting of States Parties

Notable announcements at the meeting included: the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia completing its mine clearance obligations; Latvia completing its stockpile destruction obligations; and, Macedonia and Moldova destroying mines previously retained for training. The ICBL welcomed the focus of States Parties on Article 5 mine clearance deadlines and especially the agreement on three proposals related to the deadlines: a standardized method of officially reporting completion of mine clearance obligations; a process to ensure that there are as few extension requests as possible, and that extensions are given for the shortest possible period to those states that have made their best efforts to meet the deadline; and a template for requesting extensions that requires concrete details on past efforts to achieve the deadline and on future plans to complete clearance. Both mine-affected and non-affected states agreed that extensions should not be considered automatic.

Participation in the meeting was high—over 600 people—with a total of 123 country delegations attending, including 97 States Parties. 3 More than 180 representatives of non-governmental organizations from 63 countries attended. The range of participants—diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners and landmine survivors—again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem.

A total of 26 states not party to the treaty participated, including signatories Indonesia (which subsequently ratified) and Poland. This large number indicated the continuing spread of the international norm rejecting antipersonnel mines. Some of the more notable “holdouts” attended, including Azerbaijan, China, Egypt and India. Notably, nine states not party to the treaty from the Middle East-North Africa region took part, an encouraging development in a region with low adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty. These included Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq (which

---

1. Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action.

2. The PKK/Kongra Gel is listed as a terrorist organization by the EU, NATO, US, Canada, UK and Australia.

3. This number includes Brunei, which had ratified prior to the meeting, but the treaty had not yet entered into force.

---
ICBL mission participants discuss plans to join the Mine Ban Treaty with the speaker of Kuwait’s parliament.

subsequently acceded), Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates.  

One disappointing aspect of the meeting was that, as in previous years, there was very little meaningful discussion on the inconsistent interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2, regarding acts permitted under the treaty’s prohibition on “assistance” and mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes.

Implementation and Intersessional Work Program

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty’s provisions. Structures created to monitor progress toward implementation and to allow discussion among States Parties include the annual Meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program, a coordinating committee, contact groups on universalization, resource mobilization, and Articles 7 and 9, the Implementation Support Unit. A new contact group on linking mine action and development was initiated by Canada in May 2006, and had its first meeting in September at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties.

The new co-chairs and co-rapporteurs for the intersessional Standing Committees were selected at the Seventh Meeting in September 2006, for the period to the next annual meeting. The Standing Committees met for one week in April 2007. Details on Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various thematic sections.

8 Libya was registered to attend, but did not send a delegation.
9 General Status and Operation: Argentina and Italy as co-chairs and Germany and Kenya as co-rapporteurs; Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies: Chile and Norway as co-chairs and Canada and Peru as co-rapporteurs; Stockpile Destruction: Algeria and Estonia as co-chairs and Lithuania and Serbia as co-rapporteurs; Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Austria and Sudan as co-chairs and Cambodia and New Zealand as co-rapporteurs.

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Just 10 of the 87 States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Korea, Sri Lanka and the United States. Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices.

China, Latvia, Pakistan and Russia deferred compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex. China and Pakistan must be compliant by 3 December 2007; neither has provided detailed information on the steps taken thus far to meet the detectability requirement. In April 2007 Chinese officials told Landmine Monitor that China will meet its compliance deadline. Russia must come into compliance by 2014. Latvia’s deferral is now presumably irrelevant since it has already destroyed its stockpile as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has retained some mines for training purposes.

Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine deferred compliance with the self-destruction and self-deactivation requirements for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines provided in the Technical Annex. 10 Their respective nine-year deadlines for this action are 3 December 2007 for China and Pakistan, 15 May 2008 for Ukraine, and 2014 for Russia. In November 2006 Russia said that it plans to complete its work to meet the technical requirements of Amended Protocol II by the end of 2007. Belarus is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM and KPOM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Ukraine is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM-type remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010.

In December 2003, 91 CCW States Parties agreed to adopt Protocol V, a legally binding instrument on generic, post-conflict remedial measures for explosive remnants of war. On 12 May 2006, the 20th State Party ratified the protocol, triggering an entry into force date of 12 November 2006. As of 1 August 2007, 32 states had ratified Protocol V.

Cluster Munitions, the CCW, and the Oslo Process

In contrast to previous CCW meetings, the Third Review Conference held in Geneva from 7-17 November 2006 devoted a significant amount of time to addressing cluster munitions. Nearly 30 states supported a proposal for a mandate to begin negotiations in the CCW on a “legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian
concerns posed by cluster munitions.” The proposal was rejected by a number of states, including China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, in favor of a weak mandate to continue discussions on explosive remnants of war, with a focus on cluster munitions. The larger group of states in favor of a strong negotiating mandate issued a declaration calling for an agreement that would prohibit the use of cluster munitions “within concentrations of civilians,” prohibit the use of cluster munitions that “pose serious humanitarian hazards because they are for example unreliable and/or inaccurate,” and require destruction of stockpiles of such cluster munitions.

Norway then announced it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. It subsequently held the first meeting in the process in February 2007, where 46 states committed themselves to conclude a new international treaty banning cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians” by 2008. At the first follow-up meeting in Lima, Peru in May 2007, a draft treaty text was distributed and discussed. By this point, a total of 75 states were participating in the “Oslo Process.” Additional sessions to develop the treaty were scheduled for Vienna, Austria in December 2007 and Wellington, New Zealand in February 2008, with formal negotiations in Dublin, Ireland in May/June 2008.

CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) met for one week in June 2007 with the sole substantive topic being cluster munitions. However, the outcome was extremely weak, with a statement that the Group “without prejudice to the outcome, recommends to the 2007 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW to decide how best to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions as a matter of urgency, including the possibility of a new instrument. Striking the right balance between military and humanitarian considerations should be part of the decision.”

**Use of Antipersonnel Mines**

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon.

In this reporting period, since May 2006, two governments are confirmed to have used antipersonnel mines: Myanmar/Burma and Russia. Nepal, listed as a user last year, stopped laying mines with the cease-fire in May 2006.

Russian’s military forces continued to use antipersonnel mines extensively, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Mine use was recorded in Karen, Karenifi and Shan states and Tenasserim division. Russia has in recent years also used mines on a regular basis, primarily in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan and on the borders with Tajikistan and Georgia. In June 2006 Russian officials acknowledged to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields.

There were two serious and credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by other government forces, but which Landmine Monitor was not able to confirm. The UN Mine Action Coordination Center in South Lebanon believes Israel laid antipersonnel mines during the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon. An Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that Israel did not use mines during the conflict. Russian peacekeepers claimed that Georgian military forces laid new landmines in South Ossetia and in the Kodori Gorge in 2006 and 2007. Georgia denied these allegations and stated that it continues to uphold its 1996 moratorium on landmine use.

In December 2006 Pakistan stated its intention to mine parts of its border with Afghanistan, but did not do so after considerable international and domestic criticism.

The ICBL has expressed strong concern that statements made by Venezuela, a State Party, may indicate it is still making active use of emplaced antipersonnel mines. In April 2007 Venezuela stated that it has not removed antipersonnel mines laid around six naval posts because it did not yet have a replacement system for the mines. If Venezuela is using these mines to derive military benefit, this would be an apparent violation of the Article 1 prohibition on use.

The ICBL also noted that this is not a phenomenon limited to Venezuela. There appear to be several cases where States Parties are using antipersonnel mines that they laid in the past to serve an ongoing military purpose. In particular, this is the case with mines laid, and not yet cleared, around military installations and prisons, and in border areas.

**Use of Antipersonnel Mines since May 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Myanmar/Burma, Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSAGs in</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Myanmar/Burma, Colombia, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia/Chechnya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Use by Non-State Armed Groups**

Use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups has declined modestly, mainly because some armed conflicts have entered into a negotiated settlement phase (such as in Nepal, Uganda and Burundi). However, NSAG
use of antipersonnel mines still takes place in more countries than use by government forces. In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries. NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was reported in two States Parties—Afghanistan and Colombia—and in six states not party to the treaty—Myanmar/Burma, India, Iraq (which acceded in August 2007), Lebanon, Pakistan and Russia. Previously, Landmine Monitor cited NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least 10 countries in 2005-2006 and 13 countries in 2004-2005.

Additions to the list of countries with NSAG use in this reporting period are Afghanistan and Lebanon. Countries with use by NSAGs in last year’s Landmine Monitor, but not in this reporting period include Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal and Somalia. In the case of Somalia it may well be that some NSAG use has continued, but Landmine Monitor has been unable to identify any specific instances.

Landmine Monitor also received allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Georgia, Niger, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Thailand, Turkey and Yemen which it has not been able to confirm independently.

Insurgent and rebel groups have been using improvised explosive devices in increasing numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—that explodes from the contact, presence or proximity of a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices is often in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently reported by the media, militaries and governments as “landmines.” This has led to some confusion, and Landmine Monitor has consistently attempted to determine if an IED was victim-activated, or detonated by some other means.

In Afghanistan new use of antipersonnel mines by the Taliban and others has been reported. In March 2007 the Taliban commander for Helmand province stated that his forces had laid landmines in anticipation of a NATO offensive. In February 2007 residents of Musa Qala stated that Taliban units were “digging trenches and laying mines” prior to a NATO offensive. In September 2006 Canadian forces operating in Kandahar province reported that retreating Taliban forces left booby-traps and landmines.

In Burma the Karen National Liberation Army, Karenni Army, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Shan State Army-South, United Wa State Army and several other non-state armed groups continued to use antipersonnel mines. It is likely that the Karen National Liberation Army was the NSAG using mines most extensively in this reporting period. Two armed groups not previously identified as users of antipersonnel mines were alleged to have used mines in this reporting period: the National Democratic Alliance Army, and remnants of the Mong Tai Army.

In Colombia the FARC continued to be the largest user of landmines in the country, and among the largest in the world, causing hundreds of casualties each year. The ELN also used mines. The Colombian government claims that there is a close correlation between the location of mine-related events and the location of coca routes.29

In many parts of India, particularly Manipur, Assam, Tripura and Nagaland states, NSAGs have continued to make widespread use of command-detonated IEDs but only limited use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs.

In Iraq insurgent forces used command-detonated IEDs extensively but made only limited use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs, despite many documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines. However, in August 2007 the US military reported that the number of incidents involving “house bombs,” including those with tripwires and pressure plates, had risen dramatically in recent months, and attributed this to Al-Qaeda forces.

In Lebanon Fatah al-Islam is reported to have booby-trapped buildings throughout a Palestinian refugee camp, in addition to laying unspecified mines during fighting with the Lebanese army. UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) troops on at least two occasions in late 2006 encountered antipersonnel mines used in ambushes, apparently ordered by a local Hezbollah commander.

In Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan and in the Waziristan agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines, as well as antivehicle mines and IEDs, against Pakistani armed forces and state administration agencies, and in inter-tribal conflict.

In the Russian Federation, rebels in Chechnya continued to use command-detonated IEDs but there was only limited use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. There were also two reports of victim-activated explosive booby-traps recorded in North Ossetia and Ingushetia in July 2007.

In Georgia there were allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in South Ossetia.

In Niger there were allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Mouvement des Niégers pour la Justice rebels.

In the Philippines two incidents involving victim-activated improvised mines took place on the islands of Sulu

---

29 FARC = Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo); ELN = National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista - Ejército de Liberación Nacional).
and Tawi-Tawi, attributed to either Abu Sayyaf or rival clans. The Armed Forces of the Philippines identified one incident of use by the New People’s Army.

In Somalia most, if not all, reports of landmine use appear to refer to antivehicle mines, command-detonated antipersonnel mines or command-detonated improvised explosive devices. It is likely that some factions have continued sporadic use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor was not able to verify any specific instances.

In Sri Lanka the army in May 2006 accused the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of planting antipersonnel mines for the first time since the 2002 cease-fire, and it has continued to make occasional allegations since that time.

In Thailand there was one case of use by a non-state armed group in April 2007, when a deputy police chief stepped on an improvised mine and was severely injured while inspecting the scene of a bomb explosion in Narathiwat province.

The government of Turkey reported ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by the PKK—noting that 35 antipersonnel mines laid by the PKK were destroyed from January to July 2007—though most if not all incidents reported by the media and other sources appear to refer to command-detonated devices.

In Yemen there were reports of new use of antipersonnel mines when conflict broke out between government troops and rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in April 2007.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia, the Temporary Security Zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Lebanon, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal and Somalia. NSAGs reportedly used command-detonated IEDs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Russia/Chechnya, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Turkey.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.13 Thirty-eight states have ceased the production of antipersonnel mines. This includes four countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel and Poland.14 In addition, Taiwan, which announced several years ago that it had stopped production, passed legislation banning production in June 2006.

Landmine Monitor identifies 13 countries as producers of antipersonnel mines: Myanmar/Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines but reserves the right to do so. No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period, though consideration was given to removal of Vietnam and Nepal.15

Vietnamese officials from both the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry told an ICBL delegation in October 2006 that Vietnam no longer produces antipersonnel mines, echoing comments made to a Canadian government delegation in November 2005. However, until Vietnam makes an official public statement that it no longer produces antipersonnel mines and will not do so in the future, Landmine Monitor will keep Vietnam on its list of producers.

In April 2007 a Nepali Brigadier General denied previous reports that Nepal has produced antipersonnel mines, while acknowledging that soldiers have frequently made command-detonated IEDs. Landmine Monitor has not received any official declaration from the Nepalese government denying antipersonnel landmine production, or foreswearing future production, so continues to identify the country as a producer.

The director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran does not produce landmines and earlier, in 2002, the Ministry of Defense asserted that Iran had not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988. However, since 2002 mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have found many hundreds of Iranian antipersonnel mines date-stamped 1999 and 2000.

In the United States, the Pentagon requested US$1.66 billion for research on and production of two new landmine systems—Spider and Intelligent Munitions System—between fiscal years 2006 and 2013. Both of

13 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000; it is unclear if this represents the result of production, export or capture.

14 Thirty-four States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

15 Since it began reporting in 1999 Landmine Monitor removed Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and the FR Yugoslavia from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2009 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories.
Banning Antipersonnel Mines

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

For the past decade global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. In this reporting period there were only a small number of reports of such trafficking in antipersonnel mines. Most notably and disturbingly, a UN arms embargo monitoring group alleged transfers of antipersonnel mines to groups in Somalia by Eritrea and Ethiopia, both States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In November 2006 the UN monitoring group reported transfers of antipersonnel mines, as well as antivehicle mines, from Eritrea to Mogadishu on 28 July 2006. The report added that the government of Ethiopia provided antipersonnel mines to groups in Somalia by Eritrea and Ethiopia, both States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. In earlier reports released in October 2005 and May 2006 the UN monitoring group alleged that the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia delivered mines to factions in Somalia, although only the May 2006 report specifically listed transfer of antipersonnel mines, by Eritrea. In April 2007, during the Standing Committee meetings, the president of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia, expressed concern over the UN reports and said that she had written to the chair of the Monitoring Group to seek further information. The ICBL lamented the fact that States Parties have not vigorously pursued these serious and specific allegations as potential violations of the Mine Ban Treaty and strongly encouraged States Parties to seek further information and clarification on this matter from both the UN Monitoring Group and the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia.

In 2007 Pakistani authorities acknowledged that some landmines continue to arrive in Pakistan from sources in Afghanistan. Tribal elders in Baluchistan province of Pakistan

these systems appear incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. In June 2006 the US decided to begin low-rate initial production of Spider—the first production of antipersonnel mines by the US since 1997. Legislation has been introduced in Congress that would block production of the systems.

South Korea acknowledged for the first time that it has begun production of self-destructing antipersonnel mines. In 2006 the Hanwha Corporation, a private enterprise, produced about 8,900 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, designated KM 74. South Korea clarified that it only produces Claymore mines in command-detona- tion mode. Previously, South Korea reported that it had not produced any antipersonnel mines, including Claymore mines, from 2000 to 2004.

Landmine Monitor has learned that blast mines based on the US M-14 design are being manufactured by Myanmar Defense Products Industries at Nyaung Chay Dauk, in western Bago division.

India and Pakistan are actively engaged in the production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW.

In September 2006 the New Zealand Superannuation Fund divested from Singapore Technologies Engineering (STE) due to its involvement in the production of antipersonnel mines. In April 2007 the Netherlands’ biggest pension fund, ABP, announced that it had stopped investing in landmine producing companies, including STE.

Production by NSAGs

Compared to a decade ago, most non-state armed groups today have limited access to factory-made antipersonnel landmines. This is directly linked to the halt in trade and production, and the destruction of stocks, brought about by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs have access to the arsenals of previous regimes (Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia), but most armed groups today produce their own improvised mines. The sophistication of mines produced by armed groups varies greatly. Some manufacture mines that can last for years, with many types of fuzing mechanisms, utilizing explosives such as TNT, ANFO, Urea Nitrate and C4/RDX. Detonators are frequently purchased from commercial companies, although a few

groups have manufactured detonators. Non-state armed groups in Burma, Colombia, India and the Philippines are known to produce victim-activated improvised mines.

In Burma, the United Wa State Army is allegedly producing PMN-type antipersonnel mines at an arms factory formerly belonging to the Burma Communist Party. In December 2006 the Sri Lankan Army claimed to have destroyed landmine production facilities of the LTTE. In October 2006 Colombian authorities recovered 1.5 tons of explosives, as well as assembled antipersonnel mines, from an area under FARC control. In January 2007, in Andhra Pradesh, Indian authorities recovered landmine production materials, reportedly of the Communist Party of India/Maoist, at a clandestine storage site in Koyyuru.

Non-state armed groups in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have also acquired mines by lifting them from the ground, capturing them, stealing them from arsenals, and purchasing them from corrupt officials. In Burma state-made antipersonnel mines have both been lifted and captured. In Iraq and Somaliland mines have been lifted from former battlefields.
maintain that landmines are smuggled from clandestine sources in Afghanistan to some districts in Baluchistan.

A significant number of states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted or extended formal export moratoria in recent years including China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and the United States. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including Cuba, Egypt and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

In August 2006 Russia told the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that it wanted to pursue “a universal international agreement on banning the transfer of the most dangerous antipersonnel mines” within the CD framework.

**Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction (Article 4)**

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, more than 150 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that 46 countries stockpile about 176 million antipersonnel mines.

**States Parties**

As of 15 August 2007, 145 of the 155 States Parties do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Eighty States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles.16 Sixty States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.17 An additional five states have not yet formally declared the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines: Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Haiti, Kuwait and São Tomé e Príncipe.

States Parties collectively have destroyed about 41.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 2.3 million since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2006. The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are Cyprus, Serbia, Montenegro, Angola, Latvia and Cape Verde.

Serbia, Montenegro and Latvia completed stockpile destruction well in advance of their deadlines under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Cyprus and Angola completed right on their deadlines. Cape Verde missed its November 2005 deadline by some eight months, becoming one of the very few States Parties to do so. It was joined by Afghanistan which did not meet its 1 March 2007 deadline.

Cyprus destroyed about 48,000 mines, finishing on its 1 July 2007 deadline. Serbia destroyed its 1.2 million mines, as well as nearly 200,000 held in Montenegro, finishing on 16 May 2007, long before Serbia’s deadline of 1 March 2008 and Montenegro’s of 1 April 2011. Angola destroyed about 88,000 mines, finishing four days ahead of its 1 January 2007 deadline, despite the discovery of new stockpiles late in the process and other complicating factors. Latvia destroyed 2,490 stockpiled mines in August 2006, just eight months after entry into force of the treaty for it.

Cape Verde was not known to possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines as it has never submitted an Article 7 transparency report, and a government official had previously told Landmine Monitor there were no stocks. However, NATO announced that on 26 June 2006 it helped destroy the last of Cape Verde’s stockpile of 1,471 antipersonnel mines, thereby bringing Cape Verde into compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. Cape Verde’s treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction was 1 November 2005. Cape Verde did not officially inform States Parties about its stockpile destruction.

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 14 million antipersonnel mines remain to be destroyed by 10 States Parties that still have to complete their stockpile destruction programs. A total of eight States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Afghanistan, Belarus (3.37 million remaining), Burundi (610), Greece (1.6 million), Indonesia, Sudan, Turkey (2.87 million) and Ukraine (6.3 million).18 While they have not yet officially declared stockpiles in Article 7 reports, Ethiopia, Iraq and Iran are also thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines.

Afghanistan was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction. In April 2007 it told States Parties that while it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines (including 463,807 in 2006), two depots of antipersonnel mines still remained in Panjshir province. The provincial authorities apparently did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion. Afghanistan has indicated it expects to finish by November 2007.

Belarus destroyed its remaining stockpile of 294,775 antipersonnel mines, except for PFM mines, and also destroyed the victim-activated components of 5,536

---

16 As of 15 August 2007 the following states had completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Comoros, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

17 Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Burkin Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte D’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu. A number of these states have destroyed stockpiles in the past, but used or destroyed them prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty including Eritrea, Rwanda and Senegal.

18 In the cases of Burundi and Greece, the physical destruction of mines had not begun as of mid-2007. Landmine Monitor considers states to be in process if they have reported they are formulating destruction plans, seeking international financial assistance, conducting national inventories or constructing destruction facilities.
MON-type and 200,826 OZM-72 mines. However, a project funded by the European Commission (EC) to provide technical and financial resources to Belarus to destroy 3.37 million PFM antipersonnel mines was abruptly cancelled. The collapse of this program will most likely result in Belarus being unable to destroy all its stockpiled mines by its 1 March 2008 deadline.

A similar regrettable situation also occurred in Ukraine. In April 2007 the EC-funded project to destroy 5.95 million PFM mines was terminated by the contractor. Ukraine’s ability to destroy its stockpiles of all types of mines by its deadline of 1 June 2010 appears to be in serious jeopardy. Ukraine’s most recent Article 7 report indicated a stock of 6.3 million mines, not 6.66 million as previously cited.

Turkey initiated its destruction program, destroying 94,111 of its stockpiled (2.96 million) antipersonnel mines in 2006, and has stated that it is confident of meeting its 1 March 2008 deadline.

Sudan also started destruction, announcing that it destroyed 4,488 mines, nearly half of its stockpile, in 2006; it announced that the remaining mines will be destroyed prior to its 1 April 2008 deadline. Burundi declared a revised stockpile total of 610 antipersonnel mines in 2006, and has stated that it is confident of meeting its 1 March 2008 deadline.

Indonesia told States Parties it would conduct an inventory of its stockpiled mines in mid-2007. Kuwait is not thought to have a stockpile, but must formally notify other States Parties of its status. The size of Iraq’s mine stockpile is not known, and will likely be difficult for the government to determine, given the dispersal of weapons stores around the country.

**Stockpile Destruction Deadlines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1 April 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1 August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**States Not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty**

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (26.5 million) and the United States (10.4 million). Other states with very large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million) and India (estimated 4.5 million).

Poland, a signatory state, declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2006. In 2007 Poland stated that it plans to destroy most of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines within nine or ten years, while putting self-destruct or self-neutralization mechanisms in some mines. However, antipersonnel mines with such mechanisms are clearly prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Marshall Islands, also a signatory, is not thought to stockpile any antipersonnel mines.

South Korea has told Landmine Monitor that it has a stockpile of 407,800 antipersonnel mines. Other states not party to the treaty believed to have large stockpiles are Myanmar, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Syria. In 2007 Nepal reported that it has a stockpile of about 3,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, including POMZ-2 and PMD mines. The Vietnamese Ministry of Defense told the ICBL in October 2006 that Vietnam’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines consists solely of mines cleared from minefields, and indicated its willingness to provide information on the size of the stockpile.

States not party to the treaty have destroyed significant numbers of antipersonnel mines, more than 25 million, primarily because the mines had expired or to be complaint with CCW Amended Protocol II.

**Non-State Armed Groups**

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), Egypt, India, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Turkey. Possession is most often determined as a result of seizures by government forces.
Several NSAGs which have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment revealed information on or destroyed some stocks of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Polisario Front destroyed 3,181 antipersonnel mines and 140 antivehicle mines in a public event on 27 February 2007 in Western Sahara. Two recent signatories in Burma declared possessing between 300 and 450 antipersonnel mines.

### Reporting on and Destroying Captured or Newly Discovered Stockpiles

Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan declares that States Parties should, When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. Angola, Bangladesh, Cambodia, DR Congo, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan and Yemen have provided some official information on such discoveries. Other States Parties have not reported on discoveries that have been cited in the media or other sources: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, Peru, Philippines and Uganda.

Since mid-2006 there have been reports of discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan (by national and coalition forces), Algeria, Bangladesh, BiH (by EUFOR), Colombia, DR Congo and the Philippines.

It is a State Party’s responsibility to account for the disposition of captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel landmines. States Parties should reveal in Article 7 the details of newly found antipersonnel landmines, depending on whether they are maintained for a period as stockpiled mines (Form B), transferred for destruction or training purposes (Form D), actually destroyed (Form G) or retained for training purposes (Form D). This reporting should occur for discoveries and seizures made both before and after the completion of stockpile destruction programs.

This responsibility to report is reflected in both Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan and the Final Report of the September 2006 Seventh Meeting of States Parties. The Final Report suggested that Form G of the Article 7 reporting format could be amended to facilitate reporting, a suggestion that originated with the ICBL.

### Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)

Of the 155 States Parties, 69 retain almost 228,000 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. In addition, Indonesia has said it will retain mines. Botswana has also expressed its intention to retain mines, but has not provided any information.

At least 77 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines, with the recent additions of Brunei, Burkina Faso, the Cook Islands, Guyana, Montenegro and Vanuatu. Moldova destroyed all of its 249 antipersonnel mines previously retained for training in May/June 2006. In July 2006 FYR Macedonia destroyed all 4,000 mines previously retained. Ecuador told Landmine Monitor that it intends to destroy 1,001 of its 2,001 mines retained for training in August 2007.

Seven States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines.

Five States Parties account for nearly one-third of all retained mines: Turkey (15,150), Algeria (15,030), Brazil (13,550), Bangladesh (12,500) and Sweden (10,498). In two encouraging developments, Sweden destroyed nearly 4,000 of its retained mines and Brazil destroyed almost 1,500. Brazil told States Parties in September 2006 that the mines would be utilized in training until 2019. A further seven States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Sudan (10,000), Greece (7,224), Australia (7,133), Croatia (6,179), Belarus (6,030), Serbia (5,565) and Tunisia (5,000).

These 12 States Parties together possess some 75 percent (170,089) of the total of mines (228,000) retained by all States Parties.

The majority (37) of States Parties that retain mines are keeping between 1,000 and 5,000 mines. Another 20 States Parties retain less than 1,000 mines.

© Protection and Rescue Directorate Macedonia, 10 July 2006

**Destruction of the Macedonian army’s last stockpiled mines, Krivolak training camp, Macedonia.**
Antipersonnel Mines Retained by States Parties under Article 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>have chosen not to retain any mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>retain less than 1,000 mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>retain 1,000 to 5,000 mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>retain 5,000 to 10,000 mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>retain over 10,000 mines (nearly one-third of all retained mines)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At least 44 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in 2006. Eighteen countries have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since entry into force for that country. The ICBL told States Parties in April 2007 that it is increasingly convinced that there is widespread abuse of the exception in Article 3 allowing retention of antipersonnel mines for training and development. It appears that many States Parties are retaining more antipersonnel mines than ‘absolutely necessary’ and are not using mines retained under Article 3 for the permitted purposes. It is time for States Parties to think about this as a serious compliance issue, and not just a reporting or transparency issue. Unless a State Party is clearly retaining the minimum number of antipersonnel mines, is actively utilizing the mines for the permitted purposes, and is being fully transparent about the process, there may rightly be concerns that the mines are in essence still being stockpiled and could be used for war fighting purposes.

The ICBL has long urged that all states should declare the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3. States Parties agreed in the Nairobi Action Plan (Action #54) that emerged from the First Review Conference in November-December 2004 to report in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005, States Parties agreed to adopt a new voluntary expanded reporting format for Article 7 Form D, to encourage and facilitate reporting on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines. Only 11 States Parties made use of the new format for calendar year 2006, the same number as in 2005.

Nine States Parties made statements on their retained mines during the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that, Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party regarding steps taken to implement aspects of the Convention. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

In 2007 States Parties maintained an impressive 96 percent compliance rate in submitting initial transparency reports, as in 2006 and 2005. This compares with 91 percent in 2004, 88 percent in 2003, 75 percent in 2002 and 63 percent in 2001.

Six State Parties have submitted initial reports since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2006: 26 States Parties submitted initial transparency reports. Six State Parties have submitted initial reports since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Bhutan, Brunei, Cook Islands, Guyana, Ukraine and Vanuatu. Guyana submitted its first Article 7 report, which was due 29 July 2004, on 26 October 2006. Four States Parties have a pending deadline for initial reports: Montenegro (28 September 2007), Indonesia (28 January 2008), Kuwait (29 June 2008) and Iraq (30 July 2008).

A total of six States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports: Equatorial Guinea (due 28 August 1999), Cape Verde (30 April 2002), Gambia (28 August 2003), São Tomé e Príncipe (28 February 2004), Ethiopia (28 November 2005) and Haiti (28 January 2007).

23 Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jordan, Mali, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 2005, a total of 53 States Parties did not report consuming any mines; in 2004, 36 did not consume any mines; in 2003, 26 did not consume any mines; in 2002, 29 did not consume any.

24 Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Djibouti, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Rwanda, Serbia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yemen. In addition, at least seven States Parties that retain over 1,000 mines have not reported consuming any mines for research or training purposes for two or more consecutive years, including: Bulgaria, Ecuador, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Venezuela and Zambia. Some states have indicated that the purposes for which they utilize the mines do not require the consumption (destruction) of the mines.


26 Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Peru, Tajikistan and United Kingdom.
In contrast with the impressive compliance rate for initial Article 7 reports, there was a decrease for the third successive year in the number of annual updates submitted, which were due by 30 April 2007. As of 15 August 2007, a total of 81 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2006. Seventy States Parties had not submitted updates which is, disappointingly, 15 more than the previous year.\(^{27}\) The 2006 compliance rate of almost 54 percent is less than in previous years (2005: 62 percent, 2004: 65 percent, 2003: 78 percent, and 2002: 62 percent).

In a very encouraging development, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports.\(^{28}\) In August 2006 Morocco submitted its first voluntary Article 7 transparency report, for the period from September 2005 to September 2006. It did not report on stockpiled mines. Poland, a signatory, has submitted voluntary reports each year since 2003, most recently on 6 April 2007. At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006, Sri Lanka announced that it intended to submit a second Article 7 report; its June 2005 report did not include information on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Several other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, China and Mongolia.

**National Implementation Measures (Article 9)**

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty.

Only 53 of 155 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9. This is an increase of three State Parties since publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*: Chad, Peru and Tanzania. A total of 27 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway. Brunei, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Haiti, Jordan and Montenegro initiated the process in the past year. However, legislation has been reported to be in process for more than two years in Bangladesh, Benin, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand and Uganda.

\(^{27}\) Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Moldova, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherland, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, São Tomé e Príncipe, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uruguay and Vanuatu.


A total of 37 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty. Bhutan joined this category in the past year, declaring that the treaty is “self-enacting” under domestic law. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 38 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^{29}\)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has produced an information kit on the development of national implementing legislation, which is available in English, French, Russian and Spanish, and on the ICRC website.\(^{30}\)

**Special Issues of Concern**

For many years the ICBL has identified special issues of concern regarding interpretation and implementation of aspects of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. These have included: what acts are permitted or not under the treaty’s ban on assisting prohibited acts, especially in the context of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, the applicability of the treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the acceptable number of mines retained for training purposes.

Ever since the treaty entered force in 1999, States Parties have regularly discussed these issues at the Standing Committee meetings and annual Meetings of States Parties, and many have tried to reach common understandings, as urged by the ICBL and ICRC.\(^{31}\) States...
Parties agreed in the Nairobi Action Plan in 2004, the Zagreb Progress Report in 2005 and the Geneva Progress Report in 2006 that there should be ongoing discussion and exchange of views on these matters. However, few states have expressed their views in the past year, especially with respect to Articles 1 and 2.

In one exception, Ecuador stated in a July 2007 response to a Landmine Monitor questionnaire that it has never participated in a joint military operation with states not party to the treaty, has never received a request for the transit of antipersonnel mines, has not produced antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and that it views 1,000 as the acceptable limit for the number of mines retained for training.

The Nairobi Action Plan for 2005-2009 indicates that the States Parties will “exchange views and share their experiences in a cooperative and informal manner on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3, to continue to promote effective and consistent application of these provisions.”

The ICBL’s special issues of concern were noted more fully in Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 17-22.

There were several notable developments related to Claymore and OZM-72 mines, which are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed to be capable of being both command-detoned by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations.

In 2006 Belarus destroyed the victim-activated components of its 5,536 MON (Claymore-type) mines and 200,826 OZM-72 mines. At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that it had discovered more than 15,000 MRUD Claymore-type mines during inspections of weapon storage sites. It said that “since they are not adapted to ensure command-detonation, MRUD mines can be technically considered as anti-personnel mines.” BiH thus made a decision to destroy the mines. It said that “the mines should be destroyed for humanitarian reasons.”

For detailed information on States Parties’ policies and practices on these matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 which the ICBL considers essential to the integrity of the Mine Ban Treaty see past editions of Landmine Monitor Report.

---

32 The Nairobi Action Plan for 2005-2009 indicates that the States Parties will “exchange views and share their experiences in a cooperative and informal manner on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3, to continue to promote effective and consistent application of these provisions.”

33 The ICBL’s special issues of concern were noted more fully in Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 17-22.

In most affected countries landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) no longer cause a humanitarian crisis—thanks to the sustained mine action efforts of many organizations, countries and individuals, especially tens of thousands of deminers, over the last decade. Since the origin of modern demining at the end of the 1980s, it is estimated that globally over 1,000 square kilometers of mined land have been cleared and ten times as much released through area reduction and cancellation techniques.1

Mine Action in 2006

Based on available information, Landmine Monitor believes that mine action programs around the world cleared over 140 square kilometers of mined areas in 2006, as well as over 310 square kilometers of battle areas, although data is not complete and there are significant problems in reporting data (see section below on data gathering).2 Afghanistan and Cambodia accounted for more than 55 percent of mined area clearance. Afghanistan and Iraq claimed battle area clearance representing two thirds of the global total estimated from reports of mine action programs. Overall, demining operations resulted in the destruction of at least 217,000 antipersonnel mines and almost 18,000 antivehicle mines as well as more than 2.15 million ERW; this total included some 95,000 unexploded submunitions destroyed in Lebanon following the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in mid-2006.

The figures for mine clearance for calendar year 2006 are very similar to those achieved in 2005 but the total of battle area clearance represents an increase of more than 60 percent on the 190 square kilometers achieved the previous year. In addition, release of suspected hazardous land through survey or other forms of verification (excluding clearance) amounted to a further 860 square kilometers in 2006, triple the figure for 2005, although more than 60 percent of this total was realized in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia.

In 14 countries, major mine action programs cleared more than 110 square kilometers of mined land and over 275 square kilometers of battle areas in 2006.

Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mined area clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Battle area clearance (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>107.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>111.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>277.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Demining covers the range of activities which lead to the removal of the threat from landmines and ERW, notably survey, risk assessment, mapping, marking, clearance, and the handover of cleared or otherwise released land. Clearance is only one part of the demining process. ‘Demining’ and ‘humanitarian demining’ are considered synonyms under the international mine action standards (IMAS). Explosive remnants of war include unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).

2 Especially significant is the absence of data on Iran, which has a huge mine clearance program.

3 In 2005, only 260 square kilometers of land release was recorded.

4 This and other tables and charts in this section do not include the results of all mine action programs in the world in 2006. Major mine action programs for which reliable data was available were selected. For example, Iran has previously reported very large clearance figures but it has not been possible to reconcile different data sets. The Sudan program also assessed 7,010 kilometers of roads of which it demined 814 kilometers. Yemen does not distinguish between battle and mined area clearance in its statistics.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.3 square kilometers of land was manually cleared in 2006, only two-thirds of the amount planned and substantially less than in 2005 and 2004 (when planning targets were also missed). The BIH Mine Action Center attributed the shortfall to major delays in EC tender procedures and failure to implement projects submitted to the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance.

There were increases in battle area clearance in 2006 from 2005 in several key countries, especially Iraq. In the south of the country, Danish Demining Group (DDG) was reported to have achieved a sharp increase in productivity, conducting battle area clearance on almost 100 square kilometers in 2006, compared with 6.3 square kilometers in 2005. The Regional Mine Action Center and DDG selected the area to be cleared on the basis of data collected by its community liaison and survey teams. Field operations are conducted entirely by national staff, working with protection provided by a 100-person security unit.

Mines and ERW remain a major humanitarian threat in certain countries, particularly where recent or ongoing conflict has caused new contamination or interrupted clearance of older mine/ERW contamination. In Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar/Burma and the south of Somalia, for example, many lives continue to be claimed by mines and ERW (despite challenges in accurate data collection in all three countries). In Guinea-Bissau, new mine and ERW contamination occurred during a brief conflict in the north, where rebels from the Casamance region of Senegal planted mines to hold defensive positions and impede that country’s armed forces. Israel’s widespread and indiscriminate use of submunitions against Lebanon in August 2006 caused hundreds of casualties subsequently. In Afghanistan casualties remain stubbornly high despite one of the world’s most effective mine action programs.

In other countries, however, casualties have fallen significantly in recent years. In Cambodia, one of the world’s most affected nations, more effective targeting of clearance operations and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) on local priorities and heavily mined areas, including the massive K-5 mine belt, has contributed significantly to progress in mine clearance in 2006 compared to the previous year, however, was uneven, with major differences in performance between mine action programs.

In Afghanistan decreased mine action funding in 2006 caused job layoffs which impacted on demining activity (although late-year contributions resulted in an overall increase in funding). Demining operators released 133 square kilometers of land in 2006, only 6 square kilometers (4.3 percent) less than the previous year. Although the overall decrease was small, it was achieved by changes in demining activity: the 25.9 square kilometers of mined areas cleared was down by one-third from 2005, mainly as a result of human resource cuts among Afghan NGOs. In contrast, battle area clearance, undertaken mainly by international NGOs unaffected by human resource cuts, increased by eight percent to 107.7 square kilometers.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Brief summaries of mine action in several countries are given in this section. For more information and sources, see reports for each country in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

\(^6\) Not every conflict leads to mine contamination. For example, it had been feared that the combat in Côte d’Ivoire would generate a new mine problem, but this does not appear to be the case.

\(^7\) In this regard, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that the UN’s Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid Response was thoroughly reviewed and revised in 2004 and was put to the test twice in 2006, first in the emergency in Guinea-Bissau in March. The response required inter-agency planning and mobilization of financial, human and technical resources. The second and larger effort under the Framework in 2006 involved the significant surge in mine action capacity required to respond to the humanitarian crisis in South Lebanon. Support from donors enabled UNMAS to react to the situation in Lebanon in a timely manner while also mobilizing dedicated resources. See UNMAS, 2006 Annual Report, New York, P. 21.

\(^8\) One of the few positive outcomes of the suffering inflicted on Lebanon’s population has been lessons learned by the demining community on the successful and safe disposal of a variety of submunitions within an emergency clearance program. See, for example, the Technical Note for Mine Action “Clearance of Cluster Munitions (Based on Lebanon Experience),” under development in mid-2007 as part of the IMAS.
Clearance of Submunitions in Lebanon

The war between Israel and Hezbollah from 12 July to 14 August 2006 resulted in significant new contamination in Lebanon. The UN estimated that approximately four million submunitions had been fired on Lebanon, many in the last few days of the conflict, of which up to one million did not detonate. However, after 12 months of clearance activities the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre adjusted the estimate to about 500,000 unexploded submunitions remaining.

By the end of July 2007 the estimate of the area contaminated by cluster munitions had risen to 37.5 square kilometers. Yet, as of mid-August 2007, Israel had not provided detailed strike information on the type, quantity and location of cluster munitions used, despite numerous calls to do so by the UN Secretary-General and other senior UN officials.

By the end of 2006 some 3.4 square kilometers of affected areas had been cleared by international NGOs, the Lebanese Armed Forces and commercial operators, with the destruction of 94,544 submunitions. Eight clearance personnel were killed and 17 injured in clearance operations. In late August 2007 a Swedish clearance specialist was injured while clearing cluster munitions in Qaaqayat Al Jirr village in Nabatiyeh region.

By the end of 2007 the UN in Lebanon expected that 30 square kilometers will have been cleared, leaving up to 10 square kilometers to be cleared in 2008.

is now the case in countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Vietnam.9

Despite progress in demining made in recent years, many countries remain mine/ERW-affected. Landmine Monitor research indicates that 99 states and eight other areas are affected to some degree by mined and/or battle areas.10

Completion of Article 5 Obligations

There should be no confusion about the conditions required to fulfill Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Every State Party is required to identify and clear all mined areas under its jurisdiction or control within 10 years of

---

9 The K5 mine belt was created by the Vietnamese-backed government of Cambodia to deter resistance after the Khmer Rouge was ousted from government in 1978; the mine belt was later augmented by ‘nuisance mining’. It stretches 700 kilometers along the Thai border, and has been responsible for the large majority of recent mine casualties in Cambodia. There was a sharp fall in the number of mine and ERW casualties in Cambodia from 873 in 2005 to 450 in 2006, and 88 percent of mine casualties occurred in just four provinces on the border with Thailand; UXO casualties consistently account for more than half the total casualties in Cambodia. The sharp rate of decline continued in 2007.

10 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has developed principles and guidelines for linking mine action with development. In the June 2007 draft, four principles are outlined for a national mine action authority: 1, take the lead in ensuring the country fulfills its international legal obligations; 2, demonstrate ownership of mine/ERW contamination problem; 3, ensure the integration of mine action with national, sector or subnational development plans; and 4, ensure information sharing and collaboration across sectors and among key actors. See, “Linking Mine Action and Development: Guide- lines for Mine-Affected States,” www.gichd.org.

11 For example, although nationally in Ecuador the socioeconomic impact is small, mine/ERW contamination restricts and endangers subsistence livelihoods in the sparsely populated border areas; particularly affected are the indigenous Shuar and Achuar tribes which are prevented from accessing large tracts of their traditional farming and hunting land.

12 For example, demining in the provinces of El Oro, Loja and Morona Santiago in Ecuador, and in Amazonas department in Peru, in the affected border area between the two countries, were said to enable the construction of three major roads and an international bridge which are expected to directly benefit 500,000 inhabitants.
After investigating suspected mined areas and clearing all confirmed mined areas, thereby meeting the Article 5 obligation, previously unknown mine contamination may be discovered in the future. For such eventualities, a residual clearance and EOD should be retained; newly discovered mined areas should be cleared promptly and reported fully in Article 7 transparency reports.19

Progress in Fulfilling Article 5 Obligations

While mine action programs in several States Parties have made significant strides towards fulfillment of Article 5 obligations, in too many others progress has been unacceptable. In the Nairobi Action Plan agreed in 2004 at the Review Conference, States Parties undertook to ensure that “few, if any” States Parties would be required to seek an extension to their Article 5 deadlines.

Four States Parties with 2009 deadlines, France, Niger, the United Kingdom and Venezuela, have failed to initiate formal clearance operations, which may be considered a failure to respect the treaty’s requirement to clear mined areas “as soon as possible.” The mined area under the jurisdiction or control of France surrounds the La Doudah ammunition depot on French territory in Djibouti. In April 2007 France stated that all preparations were being made so that clearance could be achieved as soon as possible and, in any case, before France’s deadline of 1 March 2009. However, initiation of clearance operations has been significantly delayed, without any apparent justification. In the eight years that France has been a State Party, not one mine has been cleared from La Doudah.

Niger, with an Article 5 deadline of 1 September 2009, has made little progress since presenting a draft mine action plan for 2004-2006 during the February 2004 Standing Committee meetings.20 The UK, with a 1 March 2009 deadline, has mined areas on the Falkland Islands over which it exercises jurisdiction or control, which is disputed by Argentina. In June 2006 the UK stated that it was committed to fulfilling its treaty commitment. By mid-2007, however, the UK had still not initiated formal clearance operations, nor even developed a clear timetable and operational plan. Explaining the long delay since becoming a State Party in 1999, the UK stated that “this is a very complicated and intricate sovereignty dispute.” This is a very complicated and intricate process.” However, the UK was not obliged to follow a bilateral process; there is no technical reason why the UK could not have begun demining earlier.

Venezuela, with a 1 October 2009 deadline, has publicly acknowledged that it is maintaining existing minefields for defensive use (which could constitute violation of Article 1 of the treaty as well as likely non-compliance with

15 Jurisdiction covers all of a country’s “sovereign territory,” including non-metropolitan territories and other overseas dependencies, and control encompasses other land it occupies or otherwise exercises authority over, even if that occupation is contested or considered unlawful. Either jurisdiction or control engages legal responsibility; both are not required. Areas within a State Party’s jurisdiction, but not its effective control (such as areas occupied by NSAGs) are also included in this obligation, though international law makes allowance for a state’s inability to intervene in such circumstances.

16 The UN Development Programme (UNDP) Completion Initiative seeks to accelerate mine action in countries where a concerted effort and an investment of up to $10 million would solve the landmine problem within stipulated deadlines. Although the Completion Initiative aims to focus on the antipersonnel mine problem in an attempt to meet treaty obligations, it also strives to develop national clearance and survey capacities to undertake ERW clearance and national ownership of the mine action program. National capacity would be equipped and trained to address any residual mine problem that may occur after treaty deadlines have been met. Email from Melissa Sabatier, Mine Action and Small Arms Unit, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 22 August 2007.


18 Although in June 2004 clearance was said to be finalized in Honduras, the Organization of American States (OAS) noted in the same year that certain regions would remain at risk of future mine incidents, especially in border areas, because of the nature of the original mine-laying and environmental factors. Available information indicates that Honduras has complied with the requirements of Article 5, but it cannot claim to be “mine-free” and a residual demining capacity will continue to be required.

19 Thus, for example, although there may be residual mines in Djibouti (in addition to the mines laid by France around its ammunition depot at La Doudah), since the mine action program has cleared all known mined areas, the existence of any residual mines will not prevent a declaration of completion of the Article 5 obligation.

20 Niger did not attend the Standing Committee meetings in 2005, 2006 or 2007 to provide an update on its mine clearance efforts or request assistance from other States Parties.
its Article 5 clearance deadline). At the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings Venezuela stated it had not made progress because it did not yet have a replacement for the antipersonnel mines used to guard naval bases. In July 2007 Venezuela’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that an Article 5 extension request was being prepared.

The extent of residual contamination in Namibia and the Philippines is not known, therefore their obligations under Article 5 remain unclear. Bosn­ia and Herzegovina (deadline 1 March 2009) acknowledged at the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings that it “will not be in a position to completely fulfill obligations stated under Article 5” and had started preparing an extension request. Its 2005-2009 mine action strategy aims only to reduce the mine/UXO risk and its associated socioeconomic impact “to an acceptable level.”

In view of the extent of its mine contamination, Cambodia’s medium-term vision is to be mine-impact free by 2012.21 In April 2006 the Secretary General of the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority publicly affirmed that Cambodia will not meet the deadline and that “an extension will be required.” He said the government would make clear the duration of the extension required at the time of the request and would explain in detail the reasons for it.

Chad (deadline 1 November 2009) declared in April 2007 that although clearance of less than 10 square kilometers of the original estimate of 1,081 square kilometers “might appear derisory, it actually corresponded to area reduction of around 57 percent of the total,” namely 616.5 square kilometers of low, medium and high-impact areas. Nevertheless, limited survey information, slow progress in clearance and lack of funding indicate that Chad will not meet its Article 5 deadline.

Croatia warned in May 2006 that the chances of meeting its 1 March 2009 deadline were “very, very slim.” Since 1998 the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) has released some 613 square kilometers to local communities, as a result of mine clearance and general or technical survey. At the start of 2007 Croatia estimated that further general survey would lower the estimate of remaining contaminated land to about 1,000 square kilometers. In April 2007, Croatia informed States Parties that it had the capacity to clear about 40 square kilometers per year (although it has never achieved this amount).

Ecuador, despite an Article 5 deadline of 1 October 2009, has a mine action plan which schedules clearance to end in 2010. However, Ecuador has stated that it “would make all the necessary efforts to conclude operations in 2009...” It claimed that two elements were fundamental to its compliance with the Article 5 deadline: appropriate mechanical equipment and international financial assistance.

Demining in Croatia 2002-2006 (km²)

---

Mine Action in Yemen.

A local community to hand land over to during a ceremony land cleared of mines. Deminers walk over during a ceremony land cleared of mines. Deminer unearths an antivehicle mine. Deminer unearths an antivehicle mine.

As shown by the extent of surveyed minefields and classified as high and medium impact, and 27 percent of the most critical low-impacted areas (147 square kilometers) are cleared by the end of March 2009. In its most recent Article 7 report, Yemen said it plans to permanently mark 16 of the remaining minefields, a strategy that falls short of the full requirements of the treaty.

Zimbabwe (1 March 2009 deadline) has a five year strategic plan that envisages clearance of all mined areas by 2009, but the demining progress is far behind schedule, with only about 40 percent of mined areas cleared by April 2007. The Director of the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre stated that, "Zimbabwe will not make it to the 2009 deadline...as shown by the extent of surveyed minefields and those not yet surveyed. We are in the process of preparing a request for the extension of our deadline which we will forward before February 2008. Under current funding it may take not less than 20 years to complete."

In Jordan clearance of remaining minefields on its northern border with Syria, expected to take two years, had not started as of April 2007, thus casting doubt on its ability to meet the 1 May 2009 deadline. Previously, it was stated that, “Jordan not only seeks to become the first Arab country to be declared free of mines by 2009 but also aspires to become a regional hub for mine action in years to come.”

In Mozambique, with a 1 March 2009 deadline, the UNDP Chief Technical Advisor stated that, “Given all the scenarios surrounding the mine clearance progress so far and the task ahead, it is quite evident that the Government of Mozambique will request an extension on its deadline...possibly until end-2010.” In March 2007 Mozambique began making preparations for requesting an extension; if granted, this request was expected to be integrated into the 2007-2010 National Mine Action Plan.

In Nicaragua (1 May 2009 deadline) the Ministry of Defense has reaffirmed its desire to complete clearance operations. But Nicaragua sought US$5 million from international donors for demining in 2007 and 2008, without which it stated that demining would be extended into 2009 or 2010.

In Peru (1 March 2009 deadline) a 2006 monitoring mission for the EC-funded joint Ecuador-Peru demining project in the Condor mountains praised the good cooperation but noted management problems, especially in Peru, which had limited project implementation.

Senegal, despite protracted delays in setting up a demining program, stated in April 2007 its determination to “respect its undertakings set out in Article 5 of the Convention to and ensure the destruction of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control within the prescribed deadlines, i.e. March 2009, to the extent possible.” A June 2007 agreement with UNDP should help Senegal to eventually meet its obligations.

Thailand (1 May 2009 deadline) has a five year strategic plan that envisages clearance of all mined areas by 2009, but the demining progress is far behind schedule, with only about 40 percent of mined areas cleared by April 2007. The Director of the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) to be contaminated. At the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings Thailand stated that “despite our very best efforts, an extension request for mine clearance may be inevitable.” It added, “this extension request will by no means set back our commitment and efforts to clear mines within our territory as soon as is realistically possible.” TMAC has estimated it needs approximately $12 million for clearance operations over the next five years. It expects Thailand will submit a request for extension of its Article 5 deadline by March 2008.

Uganda, with a 1 August 2009 deadline, has been slow to initiate a mine action program. Clearance did not start until 2006 but momentum increased considerably during the year and in April 2007, “It is anticipated that by 2009 Uganda shall have adequate capacity to carry out technical surveys, explosive disposal ordnance and clearance capacity to enable the Uganda Mine Action Centre to destroy all anti-personnel mines in the identified mined areas under Uganda’s jurisdiction.” The center’s director added that the mine action plan is dependent on “the successful outcome of the peace negotiations and the eventual end of conflict. The prospective end-date of fulfilling obligations in Article 5 is dependent on this factor.”

Yemen (1 March 2009 deadline) has claimed that because some mines are located deep below shifting sand they cannot be removed with existing technology. Its mine action strategy is to ensure “all communities classified as high and medium impact, and 27 percent of the most critical low-impacted areas (147 square kilometers) are cleared by the end of March 2009.” In its most recent Article 7 report, Yemen said it plans to permanently mark 16 of the remaining minefields, a strategy that falls short of the full requirements of the treaty.

Zimbabwe (1 March 2009 deadline) has a five year strategic plan that envisages clearance of all mined areas by 2009, but the demining progress is far behind schedule, with only about 40 percent of mined areas cleared by April 2007. The Director of the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre stated that, "Zimbabwe will make it to the 2009 deadline...as shown by the extent of surveyed minefields and those not yet surveyed. We are in the process of preparing a request for the extension of our deadline which we will forward before February 2008. Under current funding it may take not less than 20 years to complete.”
Criteria for Reviewing Article 5 Extension Requests

A State Party’s performance in seeking to fulfill its Article 5 obligations should be among the criteria for judging extension requests. The ICBL fully supports the process established at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties and encourages States Parties to abide by these procedures, including use of the recommended template and submission of requests nine months ahead of the Meeting of States Parties where a decision will be taken. In general, no automatic or blanket extension requests should be granted to any State Party. Where there is a well-founded case for an extension, the minimum possible period should be granted and progress during the extension period should be subject to the active oversight of States Parties. Where there is evidence that the requesting party did not make a sufficient effort to meet its initial deadline, this fact should be clearly stated by the other States Parties when rendering their decision.

The ICBL believes that three principal factors should be taken into account when reviewing a request for an extension:

1. **There should be evidence of a commitment by the requesting State Party to implement Article 5 “as soon as possible.”** Such evidence could include the establishment of a national mine action program (including the necessary enabling legislation); creation or contracting and deployment of an appropriate demining capacity as soon as possible after becoming a State Party; increases in demining capacity and productivity over time; national funding for the mine action program, with commitments to increase this; reporting the amount of land released relative to the original amount suspected to contain antipersonnel mines; and efforts to draw up a comprehensive inventory of mined areas containing antipersonnel mines, as required by Article 5, paragraph 2.

2. **The requesting State Party should submit a strategic plan for demining operations that justifies the period of the requested extension.** Such a plan should be realistic and accurately costed. It should detail precise undertakings by the requesting State Party, including a plan for the mobilization of resources from national and international sources. It should reflect national and development priorities, clearing first where the need is greatest. Any State Party that does not provide such a plan should be required to develop one and submit it to the next Meeting of States Parties, at which time the extension request should be reconsidered.

3. **States Parties should take into account extenuating circumstances that have been impeding the full implementation of Article 5.** States that have an ongoing internal conflict, or climatic or environmental obstacles to demining, or especially large suspected mined areas should not be judged in the same light as countries that have not had such special challenges to overcome.

A decision should also take into account the availability of international cooperation and assistance.

The Demining Toolbox and Land Release

Demining programs continue to allocate scarce resources to conduct operations on land which is then discovered not to be contaminated. As a result, land release principles have come to the forefront of demining programs over the last five years. At the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007 three presentations addressed the topic. GICHD noted that, “General assessments and impact surveys have led to large areas of ‘suspect’ land, but in reality much less is actually mined.” As a rule of thumb, between 5 and 20 percent of the area originally suspected to be hazardous turns out to be actually affected. Enhanced impact survey procedures are, however, now minimizing this discrepancy.

In Angola the Landmine Impact Survey was completed by May 2007 for all 18 provinces. The draft final report identified mine/ERW contamination in 1,968 localities, and concluded that some 2.4 million people were impacted. The survey generated an upper estimate of 1,239 square kilometers with further reduction likely. Presentation by Miljenko Vahtan, Assistant Director, CROMAC, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 26 April 2007.

For example, GICHD, “A Study of Mechanical Application in Demining,” Geneva, May 2004, p. 57, table 5, which showed that of 290 square kilometers of land claimed to have been cleared only 2.09 percent was actually contaminated.

Presentations by CROMAC, GICHD and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA); see, www.apminbancollection.org.


The extent of reduction may, on occasion, be even more. In 1996 Croatia estimated that 13,000 square kilometers of its territory were mine-affected. As of end-2006 this was down to 1,044 square kilometers with further reduction likely. Presentation by Miljenko Vahtan, Assistant Director, CROMAC, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 26 April 2007. In Mauritania a Landmine Impact Survey in 2006-2007 successfully reduced the suspected affected area from an (admittedly highly unrealistic) estimate of one quarter of the national territory (310,000 square kilometers) to only 76 square kilometers, with ongoing technical survey as of 2007 reducing it further.

In Angola, for example, prior to the completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) estimates of the total size of contaminated areas reached as high as 400,000 square kilometers. As of May 2007 the LIS had provided an upper estimate of 1,239 square kilometers of contaminated area, with a lower estimate of 207 square kilometers based on a new visual inspection protocol adopted by the Survey Working Group and piloted by HALO.

© Els Coolen, 13 March 2007

© C. Egan, 19 March 2007

© Els Coolen, 13 March 2007

© C. Egan, 19 March 2007
kilometers of suspected hazard areas, with a lower estimate of 207 square kilometers (assuming that areas would be reduced based on more precise later assessments).

Surprisingly, there is not yet an International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) definition of land release or area cancellation, although a “Big Bang” project being conducted by the Marshall Legacy Institute in the US with support from the Survey Action Center is seeking to generate possible definitions. There are also no standards or guidelines for appropriate procedures. At the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings the ICBL, while strongly supporting the appropriate use of area cancellation and area reduction as techniques to release land, put forward basic principles to ensure that the needs of affected communities are at the forefront of any shifts in mine action strategy, as follows:

- suspect hazardous areas found to contain antipersonnel mines must be cleared to IMAS or national standards in accordance with a country’s legal obligations;
- area reduction or cancellation methodology must be based upon an objective assessment using fixed criteria rather than a subjective decision made by survey teams;
- area reduction or cancellation methodology should be understood and accepted by local government representatives, the intended beneficiaries and their representatives;
- information on which decisions are made to release land other than through clearance must be carefully crosschecked with a range of key informants to minimize bias and error;
- all activities leading to the decision to release a specific area of land must be carefully documented, with decisions made in a transparent manner;
- the process of land release must be inclusive and participatory; it must be approved by the owner/s of the land, community representatives, national authorities and the national mine action center based upon review of the documented methods; and the handover process should include an explanation of the method/s used to release the land and the potential residual risk;
- the demining process leading to land release must follow national standards and standing operational procedures;
- any subsequent discovery of a mine or ERW on land that has been released must lead to an investigation, reassessment and possible clearance of the area;
- States Parties are encouraged to include in each Article 7 report the extent of land release and methodologies employed.

An increasing number of countries are realizing the importance of efficient land release, with good results, as comparison of 2005 and 2006 data reveal.
Three countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Yemen, reported releasing more than 100 square kilometers of suspected hazardous areas in 2006 through area reduction and area cancellation. Afghanistan and Iraq achieved release of more than 100 square kilometers due largely to battle area clearance.

In Cambodia productivity accelerated sharply in the past two years with greater efficiency achieved by application of a toolbox approach applying different clearance assets and methodologies to deal with different tasks and types of terrain, as well as by official recognition of the need to reclassify land already in productive use.

The three demining NGOs in Cambodia increased the amount of land cleared by 63 percent to 30 square kilometers in 2005 and by a further 15 percent to 35 square kilometers in 2006. The amount of land identified in the Landmine Impact Survey as suspect and released after identification in further surveys as under cultivation or in productive use more than tripled in 2006 to 303 square kilometers. In the first half of 2007 the three NGOs area reduced a further 268 square kilometers.

In Azerbaijan the pace of demining has increased significantly, largely due to the introduction in 2006 of a new integrated area reduction methodology that combines manual deminers, mine detection dogs and extensive use of mechanical assets.

In Laos the national operator achieved big productivity increases after reviews of its operations and clearance methodologies; it cleared nearly 21 square kilometers in 2006, one-third more than the previous year. Productivity gains look set to continue as UXO Lao completes its conversion from the metal-free or demining methodology used over the past decade to battle area clearance consistent with an environment where the dominant threat is from UXO, and it adopts a more selective, evidence-based approach to tasking. In the first half of 2007 it cleared more than 16 square kilometers, more than in the whole of 2005. The National Regulatory Authority commissioned a risk management and mitigation model to lay the basis for “a new approach to addressing the Lao PDR contamination problem” that would set new standards for assessing risk and clearance priorities, tasking operators and releasing land to the community.

Thailand, with its impending treaty deadline, has also sought to accelerate clearance and release of land since 2005 by emphasizing area reduction and the need for technical survey. Mechanical demining assets have been used increasingly to improve demining productivity. At a minimum, ground preparation machines can significantly improve the productivity of manual deminers for a relatively small outlay. Following a GICHD study, the use of machines has increased, especially for technical survey and sometimes as the primary clearance tool, and especially in antipersonnel minefields.

Mine detection dogs remain a controversial issue. Operators such as Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and RONCO make widespread use of dogs and firmly believe in their effectiveness and efficiency. Since late 2005 NPA has helped the mine action program in Ethiopia to incorporate a canine component to increase the program’s performance. In contrast, HALO trialed mine detection dogs several years ago and decided not to use them.

There has been a potentially significant improvement in the effectiveness of the deminer’s basic tool, the mine detection dog. In May 2006 the Cambodian government adopted a risk reduction strategy of reclassifying land identified as suspect in the LIS but already reclaimed by the community. Such land is not considered cleared but viewed as “land where the threat has been reduced to a level at which, unless particular circumstances exist (such as for infrastructure), further mine clearance should not be considered.”

In South Sudan, for instance, NPA used a MineWolf machine and sometimes achieved over 10,000 square meters per day in 2006. In Somaliland the HALO Trust found that the introduction of mechanical assets to its program doubled its clearance output.

31 In May 2006 the Cambodian government adopted a risk reduction strategy of reclassifying land identified as suspect in the LIS but already reclaimed by the community. Such land is not considered cleared but viewed as “land where the threat has been reduced to a level at which, unless particular circumstances exist (such as for infrastructure), further mine clearance should not be considered.”

32 In South Sudan, for instance, NPA used a MineWolf machine and sometimes achieved over 10,000 square meters per day in 2006. In Somaliland the HALO Trust found that the introduction of mechanical assets to its program doubled its clearance output.

33 NPA’s average mine detection dog (MDD) production rates in Ethiopia have consistently remained at the high end of what NPA considers safe, approximately 800-1,000 square meters per dog per working day. Between the start of operations in December 2005 and the end of 2006, NPA dogs cleared more than one square kilometer of land. NPA runs a Global Training Center for MDD in Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide its programs with trained dogs.
Since early 2006 HALO has tested an enhanced detector that uses ground penetrating radar (GPR) to discriminate between mines and metal clutter. The Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) is a modified Minelab F1A4 detector with ground compensation and an integrated GPR system. It was developed for the US military and has seen service in Afghanistan and Iraq with the US Army. In tests in Cambodia between April and November 2006 HALO found that the detector rejected 85 percent of metal clutter and cleared on average 200 square meters a day, finding a total of 1,104 mines with only two Type 72A mines mis-detected. Although the HSTAMIDS detector required additional training, once deminers were competent in its use clearance rates were found to be 10 times those achieved by standard detectors.

Community liaison, part of the IMAS definition of both mine risk education and demining and pioneered by Mines Advisory Group in the 1990s, continues to demonstrate its ability to ensure the speedy and appropriate use of released land. Successful handover procedures are sometimes considered an optional extra by programs even though the failure to conduct them can mean that part or all of land, cleared at high cost, remains unused.

Mine Action by Non-State Armed Groups

NSAGs and linked organizations carried out limited mine clearance and, to a greater extent, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations during the reporting period. Examples include:

- in Lebanon Hezbollah claimed that some of its members undertook clearance of up to several thousand submunitions after the conflict in August 2006;
- in Sri Lanka in early to mid-2006 the LTTE-linked TRRO Humanitarian Demining Unit continued clearance activities, but its work halted in September 2006 due to a freeze on its financial resources by the Sri Lankan government and renewed armed conflict; and,
- in Western Sahara the Polisario Front assisted the UN mission in marking and disposing of mines, UXO and expired ammunition. Landmine Action conducted training of a national staff team of 12 demobilized Polisario army engineers in survey, battle area clearance, EOD and medical procedures.

Demining in Other Areas

- in Abkhazia demining continued to be carried out primarily by 250 local staff under HALO management, while the CIS peacekeeping force provides EOD and mine clearance on request;
- in Kosovo the Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps Coordinator is responsible for mine action and all matters related to EOD, under the direct authority of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General; during 2006 demining was conducted by the Kosovo Protection Corps, KFOR (international forces), Mines Awareness Trust and HALO;
- in Nagorno-Karabakh clearance is carried out primarily by HALO, while the Karabakhi Department of Emergency Situations conducts limited EOD;,
- in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Palestinian police EOD teams are reported to have engaged in limited clearance operations;
- in Somalia, Puntland’s regional authorities reported undertaking limited EOD;
- in Somaliland the police carried out spot EOD tasks while most demining and EOD was undertaken by...

Mine Action

Farmers seeds fields beside a mined area in Bagram, Afghanistan.

A warning sign in front of a collecting point for diffused UXO in South Lebanon.
HALO and DDG under the auspices of the Somaliland Mine Action Center; and,

- in Taiwan the army established its first group of military deminers in mid-2006 to undertake humanitarian demining, prompted by the Antipersonnel Landmines Regulations Act and in a bid to accelerate clearance. The demining unit, composed of 18 volunteer soldiers, completed a 10-week demining and EOD training course conducted by a commercial demining company and had cleared 31,000 square meters and disposed of 1,163 mines by November 2006.

**National Ownership of Mine Action**

Increasing importance is accorded to national ownership of mine action programs. While some national programs have worked for several years without outside technical assistance, others have been supported by international advisors for more than a decade but are still not nationally sustainable or fully owned.

A nationally owned program is not one that simply exists independent of foreign technical advisors. It also demands that the state exert effective political, financial and technical ownership of mine action, including:

- national mine action legislation;
- ability to mobilize resources to ensure the program’s sustainability, in particular from national sources;
- rational and realistic strategic mine action plans integrated with national development objectives; and,
- national standards and standing operating procedures optimizing both safety and efficiency.

Research suggests that civilian management of a mine action program is generally more effective than the military, although when a program has downsized to a residual capacity this may be best housed within the Ministry of Defense. IMAS recommends that a national mine action authority, normally an interministerial body, conduct oversight of mine action. This helps the government take charge of the program and ensures key stakeholders (such as the ministries of agriculture, education, health and interior) are actively engaged in setting the priorities.

**Deminer Security**


In Afghanistan security for deminers continued to deteriorate, particularly in the south and east, underlined by a Taliban attack in April 2007 on a RONCO team that was traveling with armed protection in western Farah province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian passers-by were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed. On 4 August three deminers from local operator MDC were abducted by Taliban forces in Paktia province; three deminers, three guards and a civilian were killed.

In Iraq insecurity not only severely curtailed the ability of demining organizations to deploy but also penetrated the Baghdad headquarters staff of the National Mine Action Authority, whose director was kidnapped in May 2007.

---

38 Capacity development initiatives supported by UNDP, such as the Middle and Senior Management courses, and delivered by Cranfield Mine Action (now the Resilience Centre, Cranfield University) and James Madison University, as well as the regional training centers in Benin and Kenya, constitute significant opportunities for mine action programs around the world.

39 Examples of nationally owned mine action programs are Azerbaijan, Croatia and Yemen. Mine action programs which continue to be reliant on international support include Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique.

40 A number of programs have been changing from military to civilian management of mine action. For example, in Mauritania on 20 November 2006 the Minister of Economic Affairs and Development signed a decree transferring the mine action program into his ministry’s responsibility from the Ministry of Defense. The new coordinating body, the National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development, will be responsible for planning, coordination and implementation of demining activities and for their integration with development efforts.

In Thailand, despite a military coup in late 2006, moves to transform the Thailand Mine Action Center from a military-led undertaking to a civilian agency under the Prime Minister’s Office continued in 2007.

41 “Killing of de-miners suggests change in Taliban tactics,” IRIN, 7 August 2007, www.alertnet.org. This occurred after the report on Afghanistan in this edition of Landmine Monitor was completed.
In Sri Lanka intensification of fighting from 11 August 2006 brought demining operations to a standstill for about six weeks, and had other adverse effects on operational capacity. Operators faced threats to the security of their deminers, who include a majority of Tamils; there were staff abductions; many deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory left to join “local security forces;” operators faced tight restrictions moving Tamil deminers to tasks in different districts; and access to explosives for destroying mines and ERW was denied. In August 2007 DDG suspended operations in Jaffna after one of its deminers was shot dead by unknown attackers on his way to work and another deminer was wounded.  

Fear of attack curtailed some clearance activities. In Sudan the Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda was reported to have ambushed a team from the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action near Juba, killing two deminers; as a result, a commercial demining firm suspended activities. Fear of attack or conflict in the south of Sudan and in Darfur led to some temporary suspensions of clearance operations. According to the UN, during late 2006 and early 2007 newly laid antivehicle mines injured two demining staff and others in the Temporary Security Zone separating Eritrea and Ethiopia.

ICBL members speak with local leaders in Colombia about the mine contamination in their community.

A safe play area in Azerbaijan.

Data Gathering and Reporting Inadequate

The quality of mine action planning is only as good as the data on which it is based and the quality of data analysis. Despite many years of technical assistance by a variety of actors, the gathering and reporting of demining data by national programs remains highly variable. Landmine Monitor believes there is a need to distinguish systematically between battle area clearance and mine clearance, between AXO and UXO, and between destruction of cleared and stockpiled mines. Too few programs are able to generate and provide this data.

There continues to be reporting of “cleared” areas where little or no actual clearance has taken place. For example, in Mozambique the National Demining Institute reported that one commercial operator had “cleared” in 2006 the massive total of over 3,1 square kilometers without destroying a single mine or item of UXO. Physical clearance and release by other means must be clearly distinguished if mine action programs are to provide an accurate account of their achievements.

Challenges

The tools and techniques for effective and efficient mine action are available, despite some setbacks in 2006. The challenge for the international community is to finish the job. Meeting the needs of affected populations means ensuring a balance of resources between humanitarian and developmental mine action operations, releasing land swiftly and safely, and reporting accurately on achievements and obstacles. This will require political will, focus and commitment from affected states, donors and operators through 2009 and beyond.

Mine Risk Education (MRE) aims to prevent death and injury from landmines and explosive remnants of war. In this Landmine Monitor reporting period (since May 2006) several evaluations of MRE attributed reductions in casualties in part to effective MRE, for example in Cambodia and Laos.

In addition to its role in reducing casualties, MRE assists in the planning and prioritization of mine action by mobilizing mine-affected communities to report on dangerous areas, and helps to identify mine survivors and their needs. MRE is also a good tool to advocate for a ban on landmines. MRE is, therefore, an integral component of mine action. In 2006-2007 the positive trend of recent years continued, with MRE increasingly integrated into other forms of mine action and broader disciplines in many countries.

However, in crisis situations where humanitarian clearance cannot be undertaken, MRE may be the only immediate response available. In these cases, as well as providing information on risk avoidance, MRE teams play a vital role in gathering information from local people to establish the extent and nature of contamination. Local journalists may receive MRE in order both to spread risk-avoidance messages and to improve the accuracy of their reporting on casualties and the type of explosive devices. In 2006-2007 MRE operators responded with “emergency MRE” to several crisis situations, notably in Lebanon after the July-August 2006 war and the additional threat caused by unexploded cluster submunitions.

Methods used in the provision of MRE include a variety of “activities that seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines/UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioral change; including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.”

Community-based approaches continued to be promoted worldwide in 2006. An April 2007 mine action guide noted that, “The most successful efforts to achieve mine-safe behaviour use a variety of interpersonal, mass media and traditional media channels. These include individuals who practice mine-safe behaviour, local influential people and community leaders, radio and television networks, community training programmes and – most important of all – those that encourage communities to participate in planning, implementing, monitoring and improving their own interventions.”

While accidental exposure to risk from mines and ERW may be reduced by the effective provision of information, intentional risk-taking behavior poses greater challenges as it is often driven by economic necessity. In some countries people collect mines and explosive remnants of war to sell as scrap metal. In many cases daily livelihood activities such as collecting firewood, farming and grazing animals, or trading with neighboring villages, lead people to knowingly enter dangerous areas. To address intentional risk-taking, a wider set of responses is needed, including poverty-reduction measures and working with local stakeholders to identify alternative income-generating activities. This may involve integration of MRE with other humanitarian and development activities.

MRE Programs in 2006–2007

Landmine Monitor recorded MRE activities in 63 countries in 2006 and the first half of 2007, three more than in 2005.4 Forty-four of the countries with MRE were States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty;1 Nineteen are not party to the treaty.1

The total number of direct MRE recipients increased to 7.3 million people in 2006, from 6.4 million in 2005.2 As in past years, the global total is only an estimate based on many sources providing information to Landmine Monitor. The total of 7.3 million does not include recipients of MRE delivered by mass media, but many could be individuals receiving MRE from multiple sources or on several occasions; there may also be multiple counting by some agencies. Five countries accounted for nearly four million MRE beneficiaries: Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Sudan.8

No mine risk education was recorded in 36 countries and one area affected by mines or ERW. In some cases, no initial assessment of the need for MRE was undertaken; in some, formal MRE may not be necessary. Of the 36 countries, 26 were States Parties.2 The Mine Ban Treaty requires that States Parties report on measures taken “to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” of mined areas. As of July 2007, 28 States Parties had reported on MRE in their Article 7 reports, five more than last year.4 A voluntary Article 7 report from Morocco (not a State Party) also included MRE. States Parties that either do have or would be expected to have MRE but did not report on MRE in their Article 7 reports included Algeria, Belarus, Cambodia, Namibia and Ukraine.

New MRE activities were recorded in 34 countries, a notable development from 2005 (28 countries). For the first time, MRE was recorded in Cyprus, Libya and Morocco; in other countries, there were new MRE providers, significantly expanded activities, and/or new geographic areas covered. Of the 34 countries, 25 were States Parties and nine states not party to the treaty.7 There were also new MRE activities in Somaliland, in Western Sahara and for the first time in Taiwan.

Adequacy of MRE

MRE operators stress that the quality and impact of MRE is as important as the number of beneficiaries. Landmine Monitor has attempted to estimate the adequacy of MRE activities in this reporting period, based on research for country reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor, whilst cautioning that such estimates are approximate

---

1 Six countries were dropped from this year’s list because no MRE activities were reported: Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Namibia, Poland, Russia (Chechnya is reported separately) and Tunisa; nine were added due to new activities: Cyprus, Estonia, Honduras, Kenya, Latvia, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Morocco and Serbia
2 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, DR Congo, Ecuador, Estonia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Myanmar/Burma, China, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria and Vietn.4
4 The areas are Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan and Western Sahara.
6 Six countries were dropped from this year’s list because no MRE activities were reported: Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Namibia, Poland, Russia (Chechnya is reported separately) and Tunisa; nine were added due to new activities: Cyprus, Estonia, Honduras, Kenya, Latvia, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Morocco and Serbia
7 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, DR Congo, Ecuador, Estonia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8 The areas are Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan and Western Sahara.
9 States Parties without MRE were: Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, France (Djibouti), Greece, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lithuania, Malawi, Moldova, Montenegro, Namibia, Niger, Panama, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tunisia, United Kingdom (Falkland Islands), Vanuatu and Venezuela. States not party to the treaty were: Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, North Korea, Mongolia, Oman, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan. In addition, no MRE activities were recorded in Abkhazia.
10 States Parties’ Articles 7 reports including MRE in 2006 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Estonia, Eritrea, Greece, Honduras, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. France reported on MRE but not regarding its mine-affected territory in Djibouti.
and provisional. Targeting specifically those communities at risk, providing context-specific information and searching jointly for realistic alternatives to risk-taking behavior seem obvious priorities for good MRE but are still not the norm in many programs. Often a lack of accurate and current data to fully understand the threat at the local level hampers MRE.

“Adequate” means that a program was in place capable of providing MRE appropriate in scale and nature to the actual mine/ERW threat in that locality. In countries or areas with a limited mine/ERW problem, a limited MRE program may be adequate as long as the number of casualties remains very low or zero. However, in most of these countries additional MRE capacity would be justified to achieve a more comprehensive provision of services.

Of the 99 countries and eight areas affected by mines and/or ERW, 28 countries and five areas had adequate MRE programs in place, five more countries than in 2005. “Inadequate” means that the MRE approach was too basic (for example, limited to lectures and without school-based MRE where this would be appropriate) or that the scale and geographical coverage of activities were too limited. Inadequate MRE was recorded in 34 countries in 2006-2007 (three less than in 2005) and in two areas (one less than in 2005).

### Countries with Adequate MRE in 2006-2007*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Guinea-Bissau</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>FYR Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States not Party</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In the case of Libya the available information was inadequate, and from one source only, to allow a reasonable judgment.

### Countries with Inadequate MRE in 2006-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>DR Congo</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States not Party</td>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Countries with Urgent Need for New or Additional MRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Colombia, Kuwait, Mozambique, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States not Party</td>
<td>Myanmar/Burma, Georgia, India, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the view of Landmine Monitor, new or additional MRE programs and activities are most needed in 13 countries, six are States Parties and seven states not party to the treaty. Programs urged for last year were due to begin in the second half of 2007 in Albania’s ERW-affected “hotspots,” in Algeria and in Egypt.

Whilst there may not be a simple causal relationship between MRE and incidence of casualties, comparison of casualty trends and MRE provision can identify countries for further analysis of the need for MRE. Where casualties are high, there is likely a need for more and better MRE (as well as other measures such as fencing, marking and clearance of mine/ERW-affected areas).

MRE Beneficiaries in 10 Countries with Most Casualties in 2005 and 2006

![Graph showing MRE Beneficiaries in 10 Countries with Most Casualties in 2005 and 2006]

Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and related organizations provided limited MRE in three of the 10 countries with the most casualties in 2006: Myanmar/Burma, Somalia and Sri Lanka.

In Burma in 2006 the Karen National Union Department of Health and Welfare and the Committee Serving Internally Displaced Karen People started an MRE program and surveys of dangerous areas and mine casualties in rebel-controlled and contested sections of Karen state.13

In Sri Lanka the LTTE-linked organization White Pigeon conducted MRE in 75 mine/ERW-affected communities in eight divisions of Jaffna.

UN agencies and international and local NGOs provided MRE to populations living in areas accessed or controlled by NSAGs in Senegal, Colombia, Myanmar/Burma, Afghanistan, Somalia, Lebanon, Chad and Sudan in 2006-2007.

Evaluations and Studies

Several evaluations and studies of MRE in this reporting period provided more detailed information on the relationship between MRE and the incidence of mine/ERW casualties.

Cambodia noted a dramatic drop to 450 casualties in 2006, from an annual average of 846 each year since 2000. A study aiming to understand the causes found notable MRE improvements in targeting more at-risk people (particularly scrap metal dealers) and involvement of stakeholders such as the police. In addition, other factors including improved living conditions and access to arable land as well as stricter regulation of the scrap metal trade, were major contributors to the reduction in casualties. The study recommended even greater focus on people working in scrap metal yards and other high-risk and marginalized groups.14

In Laos two village case studies showed that while community MRE teams had increased people’s awareness of the danger of UXO this had not translated adequately into behavioral change.15 Another assessment found that MRE in Laos had targeted unintentional risk-taking by the general public and had not sufficiently addressed the most at-risk groups and intentional risk-taking. It recommended engaging stakeholders and revising MRE messages and strategies to reach children and young people, scrap metal collectors, people who dismantle UXO and farmers.16

In Yemen a study found an unmet need for “greater involvement of women and girls in MRE and awareness campaigns by recruiting more women’s awareness teams and by extending the house-to-house approach.”17

In Colombia a survey of 378 people in three departments found low levels of understanding of mine/ERW threat and some dangerous practices, as well as some

---

benefits from the limited MRE conducted.

In Somaliland a survey of 240 people found that while the number of people who had actually seen mines and ERW had significantly increased since a similar survey in 2002, knowledge of mines and safe behavior was not high and in some cases had even decreased. Eleven percent (five percent in 2002) did not know whether they lived in a mine/ERW-affected area.17

In 2006-2007 MRE evaluations, surveys and other studies were conducted in Armenia, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, Tajikistan, Yemen and Somaliland.18

Emergency MRE

Emergency MRE refers to activities not only during or immediately after a conflict from which mine/ERW contamination results, but also to natural disasters such as flooding which may uncover and move mines, and to accidents such as the explosion of arms depots. In 2006 there were emergency MRE campaigns in several countries, notably in Lebanon, Mozambique and Nepal.19

In Lebanon immediately after the 14 August 2006 cease-fire ending the 34-day war with Israel an “urgent appeal” on the dangers of UXO to civilians was issued by UN agencies; warnings about approaching “suspicious objects” were also issued by the Lebanese army and Hezbollah. The Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon disseminated threat information, provided safety briefings and included community liaison as part of demining/EOD and data gathering. In October-November all affected areas in South Lebanon, some 150 villages, received MRE from four national NGOs; 135,000 children received MRE. The high level of MRE activities were maintained in the following months, including training new MRE volunteers. The focus as well as the scale of MRE changed to educate people about the new type of threat from submunitions scattered in habitable areas, in contrast to the previous threat (mostly from antipersonnel mines in known areas) with which people were familiar. Despite these efforts, and rapid clearance/EOD operations, there were over 200 mine/ERW casualties from August 2006 to May 2007—almost half of all casualties recorded in Lebanon since May 2000.

In Nepal, despite the April 2006 cease-fire, civilians continued to be killed and maimed by explosives abandoned or insecurely stored, and less often by antipersonnel mines.20 An emergency campaign using mass media and 120 newly trained MRE activists was launched; in locations where incidents occurred communities were immediately targeted for emergency MRE.

Mozambique experienced heavy flooding in February 2007 in mined areas of Zambezia and Sofala provinces; emergency MRE was provided to 49,100 people in these areas. In addition, explosions in an arms depot in the capital Maputo on 22 March 2007 scattered UXO in a 10 kilometer radius affecting 14 neighborhoods; 103 civilians and 27 military personnel were killed and some 515 people were injured in the immediate aftermath. Emergency MRE was provided, reaching most of the 300,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, some casualties from the incident continued; in June two children were killed and one seriously injured when they lit a fire on debris in which ERW from the depot explosion was buried; four soldiers were killed and 11 injured by UXO exploding as it was transported out of the area.

Conclusions

From its research for country reports in 2006-2007 Landmine Monitor concludes that both the amount of MRE has increased and its quality has improved overall. In many countries MRE is seen as an important contributor to lower casualty rates. However, campaign-style MRE that mainly focuses on children has proved to be insufficient. To achieve behavior change MRE should be community-based, with trained “focal points” and educators within affected communities receiving continued support. It has also become evident that MRE loses credibility if it is not accompanied by fencing and marking of dangerous areas and if it is not followed quickly by demining or explosive ordnance disposal to remove the actual threat. While some countries have made much progress in integrated MRE based on strong community links, with the support from the international mine action community, there remain mine/ERW-affected countries (including some States Parties) with high numbers of casualties but inadequate MRE programs.

---


18 See country reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor. For Armenia, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 83.

19 Emergency MRE and new MRE programs in response to new threats were also conducted in Chad, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Sri Lanka in this reporting period.

Although landmines and explosive remnants of war continue to pose a threat to current and future generations—and improvised explosive devices are an increasing problem—there was a marked decrease in casualties in 2006.

Although casualties decreased in 2006, the number of mine survivors—many needing life-long care—continued to increase.

New Casualties in 2006

In 2006 a total 5,751 casualties from mines, ERW and victim-activated IEDs were recorded in 68 countries and areas, including 1,367 people killed and 4,296 injured (88 were unknown). This is 16 percent less than in 2005 (6,873 casualties recorded in 78 countries/areas). The 2006 casualty total is also less than half the 11,700 new casualties reported in 2002, which can be attributed to positive effects of the Mine Ban Treaty and the efforts of mine action organizations. It is reasonable to assume that the long-standing estimate of 15,000-20,000 new mine/ERW casualties per year no longer holds.

However, the 2006 total of 5,751 refers only to known casualties—that is, casualties recorded in data management systems or identified by Landmine Monitor media analysis. The actual total number of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties is unknown but certainly higher than 5,751, as data collection is inadequate or non-existent in 64 of 68 countries with recorded casualties. Even in the States Parties selected as the so-called VA24 to receive special assistance in providing for survivors, 22 of the 24 have inadequate casualty data collection mechanisms, making underreporting certain. From the total 5,751 casualties, 5,279 occurred in countries where surveillance mechanisms are inadequate or non-existent. Ten years after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, efforts to improve data collection are needed urgently in order to provide a sound basis for the planning and provision of survivor assistance; see Special Issue of Concern later. Other factors affecting the reliability of casualty totals are noted in the following pages.

Although there were fewer recorded casualties in 2006, the number of mine/ERW survivors continued to increase. The global number of survivors is not known with precision, but Landmine Monitor identified at least 473,000 survivors as of August 2007. Although it is impossible to say how many of these survivors are still alive, this is likely an underestimate, as many survivors are not officially registered, especially if they live in remote areas, are from ethnic minorities or incidents occurred many years ago; survivor statistics for some countries with large veteran populations, such as the United States and the Russian Federation, are not available.

1 Landmine Monitor includes in its casualty totals individuals killed or injured in an incident involving devices unintentionally detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle (victim-activated devices) including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cluster submunitions, other unexploded ordnance (UXO) and all explosive remnants of war (ERW). Landmine Monitor endeavors to differentiate between casualties from victim-activated devices and casualties from other devices (targeted weapons including command-detonated landmines and IEDs); deminer and military casualties from victim-activated devices are included, but “combat casualties” are excluded. If, from the limited information available in many countries, it was not possible to determine that a device was victim-activated, the resulting casualties are not included in totals reported by Landmine Monitor.

2 In Landmine Monitor Report 2006, 7,328 new mine/ERW/IED casualties were reported. However, due to better capacities in differentiating victim-activated and remote-detoned IEDs and subsequent revision of 2005 data, casualties were revised in the Russian Federation and India. Landmine Monitor Report 2006 referred to 65 countries/areas with mine/ERW casualties and a further 13 countries/areas with ERW casualties recorded in 2005.

3 Ninety-five percent of casualties in the four countries with complete data collection occurred in just one country, Cambodia.
### Casualty Distribution by Age Group in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Casualty Demographics

As in previous years, in 2006 civilians accounted for three-quarters of recorded casualties and children were 34 percent of civilian casualties, nearly all boys. In some severely affected countries/areas children were the majority of casualties (Afghanistan: 59 percent, Nepal: 53, Somaliland: 66) and boys between five and 14 years were a particularly high-risk group. Males were 89 percent of all casualties where gender details were known; the gender and/or age of 1,454 people (25 percent of all casualties) were unknown.

Some 24 percent of casualties were military; this increase from 2005 (19 percent) is due to one country, Colombia, which accounts for 57 percent of all military casualties. Excluding Colombia, 12 percent of casualties would be military. Other factors leading to recording of a higher military casualty rate are increased conflict (Pakistan) and extensive media reporting focused on foreign troops (Afghanistan and Iraq) at the expense of national civilian casualties.

Deminers carrying out clearance activities remained the smallest casualty group with just over one percent of casualties (69), the same level as 2005, despite increased clearance efforts in 2006 and more difficult tasks such as new ERW contamination in Lebanon. A small number of countries, notably Iran and Cambodia, have persistently high clearance casualties. Although more clearance personnel were the target of violence in 2006, (for example, in Senegal and Afghanistan), these casualties have not been included in the Landmine Monitor total.

Most casualties appear to occur in rural areas while people are carrying out their daily livelihood and economic activities; this is especially the case in Laos, Vietnam and Yemen. This clearly demonstrates the negative impact of mines and ERW on the livelihoods of people, as fertile land, pasture, village environs and trade routes remain contaminated and dangerous.

### Country and Regional Trends

Casualties continued to occur in all parts of the world in 2006, with decreases in recorded casualties in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa:

- 1,205 casualties in 19 countries/areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, up from 1,122 casualties in 21 countries/areas in 2005;
- 2,510 casualties in 13 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, down from 3,031 in 16 countries/areas in 2005;
- 165 casualties in eight countries/areas in Europe, down from 335 in 10 countries/areas in 2005;
- 205 casualties in 11 countries/areas in the Commonwealth of Independent States, down from 228 in 11 countries/areas in 2005;
- 539 casualties in 13 countries/areas in the Middle East-North Africa, down from 990 in 12 countries/areas in 2005; and,
- 1,127 casualties in four countries in the Americas, down from 1,167 in eight countries in 2005.

Key features of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualty incidence in 2006 were:

- 14 countries/areas where casualties had occurred in 2005 had no casualties in 2006;
- four countries with no casualties in 2005 had new casualties recorded in 2006: Republic of Congo (one), Hungary (one), Indonesia (five) and Tunisia (one);
- 41 percent of all recorded casualties were in three VA24 countries, Colombia, Afghanistan and Cambodia;
- significant casualty decreases were recorded in Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Cambodia, although casualty data collection in Laos and Vietnam is very limited and under-reporting is certain. The most spectacular decrease of nearly 50 percent occurred in Cambodia (down to 450 from 875 in 2005), due to increased economic opportunities and community involvement in mine action; this trend appeared to continue into 2007;
- significant casualty decreases in some countries/areas (for example, Palestine, Iraq, Iran) were solely due to lack of data collection mechanisms and cessation of actors who had provided data in previous years, and cannot be considered representative;
- most countries with annual casualty rates of 50 or less showed little changes from 2005, indicating a relatively low-level but constant threat;

---

4 For casualty data collection purposes, military demining casualties are recorded under the category “military.” Civilian deminer casualties and military casualties in 2005 have been recalculated from Landmine Monitor Report 2006.

5 Albania (23 recorded casualties in 2005), Bangladesh (eight), Bolivia (four), China (one), Côte d’Ivoire (two), El Salvador (four), Guatemala (nine), Honduras (one), Kenya (16), FYR Macedonia (one), Mongolia (one), Serbia (two), Taiwan (three) and Zambia (three).
• several countries reported increased casualty rates, almost exclusively due to conflict: Burma, Chad, India, Pakistan and Somalia. Lebanon noted an approximately tenfold casualty increase;
• in a few cases (Ethiopia, Sudan) increases were due in part to improved data collection; and,
• Colombia remains the country with the most mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties, although there are concerns about the accuracy of this data.

Also, by August 2007 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties had been recorded in seven countries where no casualties had been recorded in 2006: Albania, Honduras, Israel, Mongolia, Niger, South Africa and Zambia; four of these had casualties in 2005.

Trends in Types of Devices Causing Casualties

While there is insufficient historical data differentiating among the various devices causing mine/ERW/IED casualties to determine long-term trends, recent data management developments in some countries (for example, Cambodia and Nepal) suggests a gradual decrease in mine casualties compared with ERW and victim-activated IED casualties. In 2006, of casualties where the device type was known, 46 percent were caused by mines (51 percent in 2005), seven percent by cluster submunitions (four percent in 2005), 42 percent by other ERW (43 percent in 2005) and five percent by victim-activated IEDs (two percent in 2005). The increase in victim-activated IED casualties was due mainly to the establishment of a data collection mechanism in Nepal that distinguished victim-activated incidents, and more generally due to improved media reporting and increased Landmine Monitor analytical capacity. In addition, NSAG use of victim-activated devices was reported in several countries, including Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Chechnya and the Russian Federation.

The large increase in cluster submunition casualties was due to the 2006 Lebanon conflict and due to increased differentiation in databases. Cluster submunition casualties were recorded in at least 12 countries in 2006.7

Most IED incidents involve remote-detoned devices or devices where the detonation mechanism is not specified; these cases are excluded from Landmine Monitor casualty reporting. Victim-activated IEDs are de facto anti-personnel mines and are included in the totals. However, identification of the type of IED is often difficult because of incorrect or ambiguous terminology and insufficient detail on the circumstances of the incident. The prevalence and nature of remote-detoned IED incidents, which often cause large numbers of military casualties, lead to underreporting of civilian casualties and of victim-activated IED incidents which generally cause fewer casualties. Remote-detoned IEDs were used extensively in Afghanistan, Chechnya and the northern Caucasus, Iraq, and Turkey during the reporting period. A notable exception was Algeria, where victim-activated IEDs caused the majority of casualties in 2006 (43 of 58) and 2005.

In 2006 Landmine Monitor was able to identify 89 percent of device types (in 2005, 75 percent). Injury patterns, the number of people involved and activities at the time of incidents differ between cluster submunition, IED, ERW and mine casualties. For example, cluster submunitions tend to cause more severe shrapnel injuries and fewer lower limb amputations than do mines. ERW and scrap metal collection and trade contribute significantly to casualty rates in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Laos and Vietnam, and is an increasing problem in Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

Special Issue of Concern: Inadequate Data Collection and Management

Obtaining comprehensive data on mine/ERW/IED casualties for mine action planning purposes remains challenging. Forty-eight of 68 countries/areas recording new casualties in 2006 used the Information Management Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey members discuss Mine Ban Treaty implementation issues with a local mine survivor in Nusaybin, Mardin province, Turkey.

Inadequate Data Collection

The remaining casualties were caused by unknown devices. Columbia has been excluded from this analysis, for both 2006 and 2005 data, due to reporting inaccuracies and insufficient differentiation between mines and victim-activated IEDs.

Factors in the inadequacy of data collection and management include the following:

• data collection is not prioritized; this is reflected in its poor quality and incompleteness (for example, in Ethiopia);
• lack of capacity impedes proactive data collection (Colombia);
• geographic and demographic coverage is limited—not nationwide or excludes some groups (Laos);
• mine/ERW/IED casualties occurring during conflicts are generally under-reported (Myanmar/Burma);
• lack of differentiation between device types, recording of personal details, numbers of casualties involved per incident and injury types (Burundi);
• lack of standard methodology, terminology and types of information collected (Georgia);
• poor quality control and verification resulting in duplications or fields containing the wrong information (Bosnia and Herzegovina);
• data may be censored, embargoed or not used transparently for political or conflict reasons (Iraq);
• multiple actors collecting data leads to competing databases, overlapping and contradictory information (Lebanon);
• few data collection mechanisms provide socioeconomic or survivor assistance information, or it is collected inconsistently (nearly all countries);
• casualty data is insufficiently linked to contamination data (nearly all countries);
• data is not shared for planning purposes, contains insufficient information for planning, or data collectors have insufficient analytical capacity (DR Congo); and,
• casualty data is not linked to referral mechanisms, resulting in data collection for compilation purposes rather than assistance (Sudan).

In 2006-2007 progress in data collection and management was made in some cases: separate databases were consolidated in Jordan; standard methodology was applied in Nepal; increased device type differentiation was achieved in Tajikistan and Cambodia; a standard casualty data form was developed in Iraq; survivor assistance and socioeconomic indicators were included in the surveillance mechanism in Uganda; a Landmine Impact Survey was started in Sudan; and, the LIS results for Iraq were released after long delay.

### Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives 2005-2009

At the first Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, in Nairobi in 2004, 24 States Parties were identified as having significant numbers of survivors and needs for assistance but also the greatest responsibility to act: Albania, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen.

#### VA24 States Parties with Most Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006 Casualties</th>
<th>2005 Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The VA24 agreed to identify survivor assistance objectives, produce plans to achieve these objectives within a timeframe (by the next Review Conference in 2009), to ensure the objectives were SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-bound), and to report regularly on progress. Support was provided by the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU).

---

6 The ISU, hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), provides advisory and direct process support to the VA24. The ISU also provides one-on-one support to survivor assistance experts to increase their input in relevant forums, and makes country visits to VA24 countries requesting assistance.
In total, the VA24 submitted 408 objectives; Afghanistan submitted 67 of them. Two countries (Burundi and Chad) had not formally submitted any objectives as of August 2007. Incomplete objectives were submitted by three countries (Mozambique; Nicaragua; and Colombia which had the most casualties in both 2005 and 2006 but only submitted four not-SMART objectives and partially achieved one of them).

Forty-five percent of the VA24 objectives cannot be considered to be SMART as they lack timeframes. Other objectives are too unrealistic or generic; for example, the creation of service directories appears as an objective for several countries—something that should have been achieved long ago.

These countries were invited to refine their objectives, with support from the ISU, to make them SMART. Only seven countries had formally presented revised objectives as of April 2007. Significantly improved objectives were presented by some countries; in other cases revised objectives were less ambitious or postponed, or became workplans for day-to-day operations.

Of the 408 objectives, 106 (26 percent) had annual deadlines or were to be achieved before mid-2007. As of August 2007, only 13 of them (three percent) had been fully achieved, 60 have been partially achieved and on 33 objectives no progress was reported.

Plans to achieve their objectives were submitted only by four of the VA24 States Parties; seven others presented informal plans during the reporting period. The only country rigorously reporting on plans and progress was Albania.

By the halfway point reached in 2007, there was little evidence of substantial progress made by many of the VA24 countries. In overall terms, adequate advances were made in 46 percent of VA24 countries in 2006-2007, with most progress reported by Albania and Tajikistan.

Changes since the VA24 countries were identified in late 2004 call into question whether these remain the 24 countries with the most “significant numbers of survivors and needs for assistance but also the greatest responsibility to act.” Several VA24 countries have seen their casualty rates reduced to levels similar to other States Parties, with whom they share similar development and survivor levels. About half of the VA24 continue to report high annual casualty rates, large numbers of survivors, poor development indicators, paired with insufficient capacity.”

The ISU prioritized support to five of the 12 VA24 countries with significant problems (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Tajikistan) and to six others with lesser problems (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Yemen). This selection seems unrelated to the need for assistance. Some of the priority countries operate the oldest mine action programs in the world and have considerable national or international

**VA24 States Parties Making Adequate or Inadequate Progress**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequate progress</th>
<th>Inadequate progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Adequacy of Survivor Assistance in VA24 States Parties in 2006-2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency medical care 21% adequate</th>
<th>Continuing medical care 21% adequate</th>
<th>Physical rehabilitation 17% adequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-inadequate 58%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate 65%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-adequate 13%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate 21%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-inadequate 21%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate 13%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-adequate 8%</td>
<td>increased-adequate 0%</td>
<td>increased-adequate 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decreased-inadequate 0%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate 4%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological support and social reintegration 16% adequate</th>
<th>Economic reintegration 4% adequate</th>
<th>Laws and public policy 13% adequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-inadequate 71%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate 63%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-adequate 16%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate 0%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-inadequate 13%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate 25%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-adequate 0%</td>
<td>increased-adequate 4%</td>
<td>increased-adequate 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decreased-inadequate 0%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate 8%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

9 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Croatia, DR Congo, Serbia and Tajikistan.
10 Formal plans: Afghanistan, Albania, Tajikistan, Yemen; informal plans: Bosnia and Herzegovina, DR Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Peru and Serbia.
11 Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan and Uganda.
Survivor assistance expertise (for example, Afghanistan, Cambodia) while other non-priority countries (Eritrea, Ethiopia) have negligible expertise and resources. Some of the six with lesser problems selected for ISU support have significant resources and a limited problem.

The accession of Iraq to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007 also calls for reconsideration of the VA24, as Iraq is one of the most severely mine/ERW affected countries in the world, with a high annual casualty rate and significant numbers of survivors.

Other Progress in Survivor Assistance

The humanitarian impact of mines, ERW and IEDs is not restricted to States Parties. Several states not party to the treaty and non-state areas have to deal with issues of a comparable scale, notably Laos, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Lebanon.

States not Party to the Treaty with Most Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006 Casualties</th>
<th>2005 Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of these countries made significant progress in survivor assistance during the reporting period. In Laos a victim assistance unit and technical working group was established to coordinate all survivor assistance activities; this is the only country to set mine action standards for survivor assistance. Nepal acknowledged that its new mine action authority should work on survivor assistance. In Sri Lanka coordination meetings to implement the integrated and emergency survivor assistance plan continued despite conflict. In Vietnam the government-supported community-based rehabilitation program continued to expand and a national action plan for people with disabilities was approved. In Lebanon service provision was strained to its limits in the aftermath of the July-August 2006 war, but it did not collapse and the needs of the country’s newly disabled are prominently featured in the media and awareness-raising campaigns.

In other, lesser affected countries significant advances were made in reducing casualties, creating strategic frameworks, and improved coordination and capacity of survivor assistance. For example, Azerbaijan’s survivor assistance projects continued to operate on priorities and needs identified by survivors, their families and communities. Egypt signed a strategic framework that will include a substantial survivor assistance component.

However, service provision remains largely inadequate among 28 states not party to the treaty and other areas recording casualties in 2006-2007. The general development level of this group can be considered reasonably similar to that of the VA24. Remarkably enough they appear to score better than the VA24 countries, but with marked differences. Whereas VA24 countries saw very few decreases in services, there were decreases for every component of survivor assistance in this second group of countries/areas. This is mainly due to conflict, capacity and financial constraints and, in some cases, lack of continued international support. Hardly any improvements in already adequate services were noted and significantly fewer increases were also noted in inadequate services as compared to the VA24.

The Survivor Assistance Toolbox

Despite numerous programs for mine/ERW survivors and people with disabilities, far too few people are reached. The ICBL put forward basic principles to make sure that the needs of survivors, their families and affected communities are at the forefront of survivor assistance and that survivor assistance is integrated into poverty alleviation and development programs. In April 2007 the ICBL presented its Guiding Principles for Victim Assistance. Based on these principles, as well as its field and research experience, Landmine Monitor identified the following:

- assistance is the prime responsibility of the affected state, but consistent and long-term support by the international community is needed;
- assistance should not be limited to the directly affected individual, but should extend to the family and affected communities;

Adequacy of Survivor Assistance in States not Party to the Treaty of 2006-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency medical care</th>
<th>29% adequate</th>
<th>Continuing medical care</th>
<th>25% adequate</th>
<th>Physical rehabilitation</th>
<th>29% adequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-inadequate</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-adequate</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-inadequate</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-adequate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>increased-adequate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>increased-adequate</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decreased-inadequate</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological support and social reintegration</th>
<th>18% adequate</th>
<th>Economic reintegration</th>
<th>14% adequate</th>
<th>Laws and public policy</th>
<th>11% adequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-inadequate</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>unchanged-inadequate</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unchanged-adequate</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>unchanged-adequate</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-inadequate</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>increased-inadequate</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased-adequate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>increased-adequate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>increased-adequate</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decreased-inadequate</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>decreased-inadequate</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- assistance includes six equal and interlinked components: data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies;
- assistance is a basic human rights issue about equal access for those affected, implemented through national legislation as well as adherence to international conventions;
- assistance programming must be long-term and based on needs and rights identified by the survivors, families and communities themselves who should be able to provide direct input into policy-making and planning at local, national and international levels;
- assistance should build on national ownership and systematic coordination between stakeholders, in order to be sustainable and effective;
- assistance cannot be carried out in isolation, but should, as much as possible, be part of existing disability and mine action programs, as well as cross-cutting public health, development and poverty reduction initiatives; and,
- assistance and disability should be priority issues, linked to and not in competition with emergency issues such as HIV/AIDS, millennium development goals or ongoing conflict.

Practical requirements for survivor assistance programs to be inclusive and comprehensive include:
- assistance must be physically and economically accessible, and information about available services should be freely available;
- assistance must be varied and effective; this includes the reinforcement of referral mechanisms, culturally appropriate psychosocial support, inclusive and specialized education, and equal job opportunities that meet market demand;
- center-based services should be complemented by community-based programs to improve service delivery and referral for people who have limited access to services due to their cost, uneven distribution and staff shortages;
- national and local services should gradually replace international services; states should seek ways to improve infrastructure and human resource capacity through training and increased staff retention; states should also increase national funding and seek increasingly diversified funding; and,
- progress in assistance must be monitored through more systematic and qualitative reporting, in for example Form J of the Article 7 report, but also by including services provided and socioeconomic indicators in casualty and injury surveillance mechanisms, which should be used proactively for planning purposes.

National Ownership of Survivor Assistance

Most countries with mine survivors still depend on technical advice, funding and project implementation by international NGOs and organizations such as the ICRC.
Close cooperation and coordination between national and international agencies is necessary to make more effective use of limited resources, avoid duplications and decrease gaps in services.

However, increasing importance is being accorded to national ownership of survivor assistance. A growing number of organizations are being placed under national management, government bodies are increasingly involved and national financial support appears to be expanding slowly. National ownership is underpinned by the development and implementation of legislation on disability, equal employment, education and social matters, as well as strategies adapted to local realities. It is reinforced by increased funding from the national budget and increased ability to mobilize resources.

Landmine Monitor has noted that survivor assistance strategies and programs became more effective when there was an ongoing and active involvement of relevant ministries and national coordination bodies such as disability councils or war veterans unions. Coordination mechanisms such as interministerial committees or mixed government/non-government task forces help the government take ownership of survivor assistance and ensure participation of key stakeholders, more balanced priority-setting, better defined responsibilities and accountability—although, in 2006-2007, many strategies and day-to-day monitoring were still developed and conducted by mine action centers.

While interministerial coordination was a priority in 2006 and progress was achieved, disability issues remain part of large ministerial portfolios in many countries; there are very few disability ministers; line ministries frequently have overlapping or competing portfolios; NGO stakeholders are not invited to provide input; and survivors, their families and communities remain under-represented in policy-making.

Other International Developments

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol were adopted during the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly on 13 December 2006 and opened for signature on 30 March 2007. As of 20 August 2007, 102 countries and regional organizations had signed the Convention and 57 also signed the Optional Protocol; four of the countries had ratified the Convention. Thirteen of the VA24 countries signed the Convention, seven signed the Optional Protocol and one (Croatia) ratified on 15 August 2007. Of 15 states not party to the treaty identified as severely mine-affected, only India and Sri Lanka signed, and Lebanon signed both the Convention and Optional Protocol.

Adoption and implementation of the Convention require inclusion of disability rights into mainstream policy agendas, commitment of resources, awareness-raising, capacity-building, comprehensive data collection and services, as well as monitoring. These requirements are consistent with the survivor assistance actions established at the First Review Conference and the ICBL guiding principles to create a barrier-free environment for people with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.

The Optional Protocol allows for people or organizations from States Parties to the Convention to file “communications” to an independent committee when they are “victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention.” The claim will be investigated and a suitable solution will be examined with the State Party in question in order to improve the rights of people with disabilities.

On 3 December 2006 the International Day of People with a Disability focused on “e-accessibility” or accessibility to information technology and communications for people with disabilities.

Funding and Resources

Precise, comprehensive and comparable information on resources allocated to survivor assistance is difficult to determine. However, Landmine Monitor has noted that.

\[\text{Landmine Monitor report 2007: executive summary}\]
to obtain. Contributions made by mine-affected states themselves are key to the provision of sustainable assistance. Only a small percentage of these contributions are traceable and cannot be seen as representative of the situation. Mine-affected States Parties should be encouraged to report, in Form J of the Article 7 report, full details of national funding allocated to assist mine survivors.

Mine-affected states are often dependent on international donor funding to sustain survivor assistance. In 2006-2007 many funding shortages affecting survivor assistance were identified among some VA24 States Parties, including Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Tajikistan and Yemen. The overall level of funding for survivor assistance has failed to keep up with needs of the growing number of survivors. The UN reported a 25 percent decrease in survivor assistance funding through the 2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects (US$3.5 million)

10 Lessons from 10 Years of Survivor Assistance

1. **Prioritization of data collection** is needed to understand the humanitarian problem caused by mines and ERW, and better plan mine action and survivor assistance. In the last 10 years casualty data collection has not been a priority, is still inadequate in most cases, lacks relevant service and socioeconomic detail and is not fully shared; where detailed data is available, it is underused.

2. **Involvement of mine survivors**, their families and communities in policy-making is needed. Currently they are under-represented; assistance is still provided mainly as charity rather than on a rights basis; disability legislation remains largely unimplemented.

3. **Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound survivor assistance strategies** are needed. Currently there are very few countries with solid survivor assistance plans containing SMART objectives adjusted to the needs identified by those directly affected and to each country’s context; VA24 States Parties have done this little better than states not party to the treaty.

4. **National ownership and sustainability** must be ensured. While there has been some progress in the last 10 years, national staff are not sufficiently trained to develop long-term strategies which are still made mainly by international experts; coordination between governments and NGOs remains weak, resulting in gaps and overlapping services.

5. **Improved service provision** is needed. Only 25 percent of services are adequate at present; the various components of survivor assistance are seldom linked or given equal attention; services are not physically, economically and bureaucratically accessible, and still depend on extensive international support; referral systems are weak; information about services is inadequate.

6. **Equal services for civilian and military survivors.** Military survivors continue to receive better survivor assistance than civilians.

7. **Greater human resources and infrastructure capacity** are needed to provide more complex and comprehensive services to survivors. Insufficient training has been provided to national stakeholders to develop sufficient human resource capacity and expertise.

8. **Better reporting on survivor assistance.** Reporting survivor assistance efforts is voluntary under the Mine Ban Treaty; there has been too little transparency, non-standardized reporting and incomplete information on resource allocation.

9. **A twin-track approach** to survivor assistance is needed. Ten years after entry into force of the treaty, survivor assistance is seldom linked with poverty alleviation and national development programs, and vice versa.

10. **Behavioral change, institutionally and individually,** is needed, to ensure that survivors and other people with disabilities are seen as productive contributors to society. Despite 10 years of advocacy and treaty implementation, survivors are still too often seen as a burden.

---

**LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2007: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY / 47**

---

© Amnesty International, 18 January 2007
compared to $4.7 million in 2005). Survivor assistance programs received just one percent of total Portfolio funds ($240 million) in 2006 (2 percent in 2005). The ICBL and many States Parties favor a twin-track approach: allocation of funding to specific survivor assistance programs while incorporating survivor assistance into broader development programs and the health sector. The Geneva Progress Report emerging from the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006 noted that, “Very little [reporting] has been provided to indicate efforts that will ultimately benefit landmine survivors are being undertaken through integrated development cooperation.” A notable exception is Albania where national and international funding was directed to existing services by improving the capacity of state-run healthcare facilities and maintaining NGO-managed services.

Resource Mobilization Contact Group consultations in 2006 noted that “for high levels of funding to be maintained,” stakeholders will demand evidence of concrete progress, including “more effective victim assistance.” However, Landmine Monitor found that the effectiveness of survivor assistance programs was compromised by lack of substantial long-term funding, which impedes long-term planning, forces implementers to reduce activities and reduces accountability. Donor countries should recall the Nairobi Action Plan commitment to multi-year funding: survivor assistance “investments need to be measured in the life spans of the survivors.”

19 Ibid, p. 20 (Article 49 iii).
Reporting of national and international funding for mine action remains a challenge, as methods and completeness of reporting financial contributions vary greatly among donors and among recipient countries. In-kind donations are also absent from some donors' funding estimates, and where noted are often without valuations. The following overview is based on the best available information.

International Funding of Mine Action

For 2006 Landmine Monitor identified more than US$475 million of international funding for mine action donated by 26 countries and the European Commission. This is a substantial increase of approximately $100 million, or 27 percent, from 2005. Much, but not all, of the increase was due to emergency funding for coordination and clearance in Lebanon following the July-August 2006 conflict; in some cases donor states provided emergency funds to Lebanon from sources outside planned mine action budgets.1

The 2006 total of $475 million is the highest annual total of mine action recorded by Landmine Monitor, exceeding the previous highest annual total ($392 million in 2004) by approximately $83 million or more than 21 percent, and reversing the decrease registered in 2005. Excluding the increase in funding to Lebanon, total funding in 2006 was more than $37 million (roughly 10 percent) higher than in 2005 and roughly $21 million (about five percent) higher than in 2004. While funding overall was provided at record levels, not every mine-affected country received more funds in 2006 than in 2005. Notable increases occurred in some countries, for example, in Laos ($6.2 million increase) and Ethiopia ($5.3 million increase), while significant decreases were recorded in several countries including, for example, Sudan ($18 million decrease) and Sri Lanka ($9.1 million decrease); see later section on major mine action recipients.

In 2006 as in previous years, funding was less than needed for many mine action programs.

The biggest contributors to global mine action in 2006 were the United States ($94.5 million), the European Commission ($87.3 million), Norway ($34.9 million), Canada ($28.9 million), Netherlands ($26.9 million), Japan ($25.3 million), United Arab Emirates ($19.9 million), United Kingdom ($19.3 million), Germany ($18.6 million) and Australia ($16.5 million). The largest contribution came from the EC combined with national funding by European Union member states, a total of $240.3 million (€191.2 million), as reported below.

Several donors provided more mine action funding than they had in any previous year. The EC, Canada, Netherlands, Denmark, Australia, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Slovakia and Sweden each exceeded the amount of their previous highest annual contributions.2 United Arab Emirates may also have contributed more in 2006 than any other year (a breakdown of annual funding by the UAE 2002-2004 is not available).

Global Annual Mine Action Funding 1996-2006 (US$ millions)


---

1 Mine action funding for Lebanon accounted for some 64 percent of the overall increase in global funding in 2006.

2 Sweden has allocated greater amounts in the past. 2006 marks the greatest reported disbursement of funds.
Some donor states increased their funding of mine action in 2006 as a result of revised or new national mine action assistance strategies. Of the 20 largest donors, 16 provided more funding in 2006 than 2005, and four provided less. The United Arab Emirates contributed $19.9 million to Lebanon in 2006 ($310,000 in 2005—the largest annual percentage increase). Other increases in terms of national/EC currency were: Spain (34.7 percent), Ireland (118 percent), Australia (88 percent), EC (81 percent), Netherlands (58 percent), Canada (32 percent), Denmark (27 percent), Sweden (26 percent), Italy (21 percent), Switzerland (17 percent), United States (15 percent), Belgium (eight percent), Finland (six percent) and New Zealand (two percent).

At least 12 of the 20 major donors increased their contributions by at least $1 million: the EC ($39.5 million), UAE ($19.6 million), United States ($12.6 million), Canada ($8.4 million), Australia ($7.6 million), Netherlands ($7.6 million), Slovakia ($6.8 million), Spain ($6.7 million), Sweden ($3.2 million), Denmark ($3.1 million), Ireland ($2.6 million) and Switzerland ($2 million). Greece also contributed $2.4 million in 2006, with no donations reported for 2005.

Countries with the greatest decreases in terms of national currency were: Japan (32 percent), France (15 percent), Germany (13 percent), United Kingdom (11 percent) and Norway (five percent). Decreases of at least $1 million were recorded by: Japan ($13.9 million), Germany ($2.5 million), United Kingdom ($2.1 million) and Norway ($1.6 million). Over one-tenth percent of gross national income (GNI) was donated for mine action in 2006 by: Slovakia (0.026 percent), the UAE (0.019 percent) and Norway (0.011 percent). The next largest donors in terms of GNI were Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Finland and Ireland.

**Additional Mine Action-Related Funding in 2006**

The $475 million total for donor countries does not include contributions to research and development (R&D) into demining technologies. In 2006 R&D funding totaled at least $26.7 million. The global total also excludes some victim assistance funding and in-kind contributions, UN peacekeeping funds, and funding by mine-affected countries of their own mine action programs. To avoid double reporting of funds, Landmine Monitor also does not include mine action contributions by NGOs and the private sector; among such funding identified in 2006 were: $4 million raised by Adopt-A-Minefield for mine action in 11 countries; $2.8 million contributed by The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund; and $3.2 million received by Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) in private grants and individual donations.¹

UNMAS reported more than $42 million allocated for mine action through UN peacekeeping funding in 2006 ($24.3 million in 2005). These funds covered the costs of mine action conducted in conjunction with peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council in the DR Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Lebanon and Sudan. Expenditures from peacekeeping assessed budgets were reported as approximately $27 million in 2006.⁴

**National Funding of Mine Action**

Contributions to mine action by mine-affected countries themselves are not included in the $475 million donor total. In addition, Landmine Monitor identified at least 24 mine-affected states making monetary or in-kind contributions to their own mine action in 2006, with contributions totaling at least $84.3 million. This compares with roughly $50 million in 2005—however, reporting of national funding is incomplete and may not allow valid year-on-year comparisons. Many mine-affected countries do not make information available on their mine action expenditures. Contributions by mine-affected countries/areas reported in this year’s Landmine Monitor country reports include the following:

- **Albania** provided $233,000, in addition to funding of rehabilitation projects and unvalued in-kind contributions;
- **Angola** allocated $2.5 million for mine clearance in 2006, compared to $3 million in 2005;
- **Azerbaijan** provided $1.2 million in 2006, compared to roughly $750,000 in 2005 and $250,000 in 2004;
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina** contributed BAM20,070,706 ($12.5 million) from central and local authorities, an increase from BAM17,753,131 ($11.3 million) in 2005 (about 45 percent of the mine action budget in both years);
- **Cambodia** provided $1.2 million for mine action administration and programming;
- **Chad** contributed CFA165 million (some $300,000) to complement funding by UNDP;
- **Chile** provided $1.4 million, compared to approximately $1 million in government and armed forces contributions in 2005;
- **Colombia** provided COP2.562 billion ($1.1 million) for July 2006-June 2007, a large increase from $213,000 in July 2005-June 2006;
- **Croatia** provided HRK246,757,250 ($42.3 million) or 82 percent of mine action funding from state budgets and state and local bodies, compared with HRK192,769,625 ($32.4 million) or 57 percent in 2005;
- **Guatemala** allocated 1 million Quetzals (approximately $138,000) in 2006, and an additional $60,000 for residual clearance capacity, compared to total funding of $120,000 in 2005;
- **Jordan** provided JOD3,043,000 ($4.3 million) in 2006, including JOD373,000 ($52,809) in-kind;
- **Kosovo** contributed $106,000 through the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects to mine action in Kosovo;

---

¹ Email from Zach Hudson, Program Director, Adopt-A-Minefield; email from Andrew Cooper, Programme and Policy Officer, The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, 28 August 2007; email from Laura Kelch, Development Assistant, LSN, 28 August 2007. Some funds raised by Adopt-A-Minefield in 2006 were disbursed in early 2007.

Donor Coordination and Integration of Mine Action Funding with Development

Norway continued to chair the Mine Ban Treaty’s Resource Mobilization Contact Group (RMCG) in 2006. Among the issues addressed by the contact group during the year were assistance required by mine-affected States Parties to meet Article 5 mine clearance deadlines, data needed to improve allocation of mine action funding, and relevance of data to decision-makers. The United States assumed the chair of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) in 2006, which it will retain until the end of 2007. There remained 27 donor states as members of the MASG in 2006.

In May 2006 the Mine Ban Treaty’s Contact Group on Linking Mine Action and Development was initiated by Canada to address the integration of mine action into the development sector, complementary to the work of the RMCG. The Contact Group first met at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006. It intends to support States Parties in achieving the objectives of the Nairobi Action Plan and the OECD Peace and Development Cooperation Network in setting guidelines for donors addressing armed violence issues including mine action through development programming. In 2006 the Contact Group reported on the absence in some cases of an integrated approach by donors to security and development concerns in mine-affected countries, even where mine action had been integrated into poverty reduction and development plans, and the difficulty within development agencies of establishing mine action assistance through development funds in the face of competing priorities.

Several donor countries addressed the issue of integrating mine action funding with development programming in 2006. Australia’s A$75 million pledged funding for mine action 2005-2009 has been integrated into broader AusAID development programs. Canada continued to work towards integration of its mine action budget into development and other funding channels. In the fiscal year 2006-2007 over C$23 million of mine action funding (from a total C$34 million including R&D funds) came from sources outside of the dedicated Canadian Landmine Fund. At the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007, Canada stated that the Fund had been “virtually phased out.”

The end of 2006 marked the transition in EC mine action funding from a dedicated budget line for mine action to the integration of funds within new instruments regulating external assistance, the so-called Stability, Pre-accession, Neighbourhood and Development instruments. Administering and reporting mine action budget priorities will shift from centralized administration to EC delegations concerned with mine-affected states. At the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings the ICBL expressed its concern that the loss of a focal point for mine action in Brussels may lead to reduced funding for mine action; in some mine-affected countries national governments and EC delegations are reluctant to include mine action among development priorities. The EC responded that it shared the ICBL’s concerns and that successful mainstreaming would rely on the proper implementation of new responsibilities within the EC.

Funding Channels

In 2006 trust funds reported receiving at least $109.3 million in mine action funding, equivalent to 23 percent of total donor-reported contributions. The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), operated by UNMAS, received contributions of about $51 million in 2006 including core and multi-year funding. Funds were received for mine action in eight countries in 2006: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Lebanon and Sudan.

A total of $21.5 million, or 14.4 percent of its funds, was directed by the UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery to mine action in 23 countries.

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
9 Email from Melissa Sabatier, Mine Action and Small Arms Unit, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 27 August 2007.
The UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund received $2.4 million in mine action funding from Greece in 2006.

The UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) contributed $3.6 million to mine action in Sudan and Lebanon. UNTFHS is a single donor trust fund, receiving contributions exclusively from Japan.  

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), based in Slovenia, received $30.8 million from 15 countries, the EC, UNDP, local authorities, government agencies and private donors in 2006. Funding was directed to mine action programs in Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia (including Kosovo).  

### Mine Action Donors

Unless otherwise noted, figures are in US dollars. Totals do not include R&D funds, which are identified separately where known.

#### Donor Mine Action Funding by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-2007</td>
<td>$3.4 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$475 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$375 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$392 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$339 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$324 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$237 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$243 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$219 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$187 million (incl. an estimated $9 m.)</td>
<td>The total of $37.1 million for other countries includes Luxembourg ($7.2 million), China ($6.2 million), South Korea ($5.2 million), Slovenia ($4.6 million), Czech Republic ($3.3 million), Poland ($3.3 million), Saudi Arabia ($3 million), Iceland ($2.8 million) and some $1.5 million from Brazil, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Portugal, South Africa and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-97</td>
<td>$529 million (incl. an estimated $110 m.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

10 Email from Conventional Arms Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2007.
12 Figures for the years prior to 2006 are taken from Landmine Monitor Report 2006, with any corrections received for earlier years. In most cases figures for earlier years are calculated at the exchange rates for those years.
13 The 1992-2006 total includes contributions by some states for which amounts for specific years are not known, including $50 million from the UAE to Lebanon during 2002-2004.
14 Revised from $376 million reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2006, based on revision of EC and Belgium 2005 funding totals. See EC and Belgium funding sections below for details.
15 Revised from $359 million reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2006, based on revision of EC 2004 funding totals. See EC funding section below for details.
Donor Mine Action Funding for 2006: $475 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USD</th>
<th>EUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$94.5m</td>
<td>€75m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>$87.3m</td>
<td>€69.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>$34.9m</td>
<td>€27.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$28.9m</td>
<td>€23m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$26.9m</td>
<td>€21.4m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$25.3m</td>
<td>€20.1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>$19.9m</td>
<td>€15.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$19.3m</td>
<td>€15.4m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$18.6m</td>
<td>€14.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$16.5m</td>
<td>€13.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>$14.9m</td>
<td>€11.9m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$14.5m</td>
<td>€11.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>$14.1m</td>
<td>€11.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>$14m</td>
<td>€11.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>$8.6m</td>
<td>€6.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$7.1m</td>
<td>€5.6m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>$6.3m</td>
<td>€5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$5.4m</td>
<td>€4.3m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>$4.8m</td>
<td>€3.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$3.3m</td>
<td>€2.6m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>$2.4m</td>
<td>€1.9m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>$2.2m</td>
<td>€1.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>$1.3m</td>
<td>€1.1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>$1.3m</td>
<td>€1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>$1.2m</td>
<td>€1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>$0.9m</td>
<td>€0.7m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>$0.8m</td>
<td>€0.6m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EC funding together with national funding by European Union member states totaled $240.3 million (€191.2 million) in 2006, as reported below. This combined total was the largest source of mine action funding in 2006, as in 2005. It was also a large increase from the 2005 combined total of $187 million identified by Landmine Monitor.

Mine Action Funding in 2006 as a percentage of Gross National Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of GNI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.02635%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.01922%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.01130%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.00516%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.00385%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.00379%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.00369%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.00330%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.00297%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.00248%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.00245%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.00224%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.00207%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.00175%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.00098%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.00092%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.00080%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.00076%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.00072%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.00070%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.00068%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.00062%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.00052%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.00043%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.00029%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.00014%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Average exchange rates for 2006, used throughout this report: A$1 = US$0.7535, C$1 = US$0.8818, CZK1 = US$0.0445, DKK1 = US$0.1683, €1 = US$1.2563, ¥1 = US$0.0086, NZ$1 = US$0.6492, NOK1 = US$0.1560, SEK1 = US$0.1357, SIT1 = US$0.0052, CHF1 = US$0.7980, £1 = US$1.8434. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007. SKK1 = US$0.0337 (SKK-EU exchange: European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse, Exchange rates, Bilateral, Annual). In lists of national funding following, amounts are given also in national currency except in cases where the donor reported in US$.

17 The total of EC and EU member states’ funding in 2006 has been calculated by adding Landmine Monitor’s estimate of EC funding in 2006 (€68,417,090) to EU member states’ mine action funding provided bilaterally or otherwise than via the EC. 

18 World Bank, “Total GNI 2006, Atlas method,” World Development Indicators Database, 1 July 2007, www.worldbank.org, accessed 11 July 2007. For EU member states, the calculation of mine action funding as a percentage of GNI is based solely on their reported contributions bilaterally or otherwise than via the EC; individual EU member states’ contributions to mine action via the EC has not been reported.
Mine Action Funding

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA — $802.8 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$94.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$81.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$66.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$80.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$73.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$69.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$82.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$63.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$44.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>$115.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Figures do not include mine victim assistance funding; funding for war victims programs totaled an additional $14.75 million in fiscal year 2006.


The United States provided $94,450,000 to mine action in 28 countries and other areas in 2006, compared to $81.9 million to 23 recipients in 2005. Emergency funding to Lebanon accounted for roughly $9.6 million of total funding.\(^{22}\)

The European Commission allocated €69,460,162 ($87,262,802) to mine action in 2006. This was an increase of 81.2 percent from €38,337,001 ($47,725,733) in 2005.\(^ {23} \) Direct comparison is misleading, however, because the 2006 total includes multi-year commitments, funds allocated but not disbursed during the year, and funds incorporating some disbursements in previous years (as, for example, in the case of Angola), from which it has not been possible to fully identify and separate actual disbursements during 2006. The EC provided mine action funding to 25 countries and other areas in 2006, compared to 17 countries in 2005. Countries and

EUROPEAN COMMISSION — $498.8 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$87.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$89.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$64.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$38.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$23.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$14.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$15.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$21.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1997</td>
<td>$126.8 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• In 2006 the EC and EU member states together provided €240.3 million ($315.641) of mine action funding.

• With the mainstreaming of mine action funding within EC geographic and thematic budget lines, and the decentralization of budgeting and accounting from Brussels to EC delegations, Landmine Monitor can no longer obtain EC funding data from a single central source. EC data for 2006 has been collated from several sources, including EuropeAid, EC 2006 Annual Work Plan for Budget Line 19 02 04, and EC delegations to mine-affected countries. The necessity of working in this way increases the possibility of funding items being missed or, conversely, being double-counted, although every care has been taken.

• No R&D funding was reported by the EC in 2006. In 2005 EC R&D funding totaled €1,090,000 ($1,356,941), and from 1992-2006 €51 million.

The European Commission allocated €69,460,162 ($87,262,802) to mine action in 2006. This was an increase of 81.2 percent from €38,337,001 ($47,725,733) in 2005.\(^ {23} \) Direct comparison is misleading, however, because the 2006 total includes multi-year commitments, funds allocated but not disbursed during the year, and funds incorporating some disbursements in previous years (as, for example, in the case of Angola), from which it has not been possible to fully identify and separate actual disbursements during 2006. The EC provided mine action funding to 25 countries and other areas in 2006, compared to 17 countries in 2005. Countries and


\(^{23}\) The 2005 EC funding total has been reduced by €3 million (from the previous Landmine Monitor estimate based on information provided by Security Policy Unit, Conventional Disarmament, EC, June-July 2006). EC funding of €3 million for stockpile destruction in Belarus was terminated in November 2006. Letter to Landmine Monitor from Hélène Chraye, Head of Operations, EC Delegation to Ukraine and Belarus, 12 July 2007.

\(^{24}\) The 2003 EC funding total has been reduced by €3.91 million (from the previous Landmine Monitor estimate based on information provided by RELEX Unit 34 Security Policy, EC, 12 July 2007). EC funding of €3.91 million for stockpile destruction in Ukraine was terminated in April 2007. Letter to Landmine Monitor from Hélène Chraye, EC Delegation to Ukraine and Belarus, 12 July 2007.

\(^{25}\) The European Commission reported a 2005 funding total of €54.15 million (EC, “The European Union Mine Actions in the World 2006,” Luxembourg, p. 88). Landmine Monitor has not adopted this total because it includes funding allocated prior to 2005, funding allocated but not disbursed, and R&D funding which is calculated separately by Landmine Monitor.

\(^{26}\) Total US funding and recipients based on official US data; some variation in actual expenditure occurred. For fuller details on the summary information in this Introduction, see reports on individual countries in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
other areas receiving EC funding in 2006 but not 2005 included Abkhazia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chechnya, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nepal, Somalia, Somaliland, Thailand, Ukraine and Yemen. Those receiving EC funding in 2005 but not 2006 included Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Jordan and Uganda. Contributing to the increase in EC funding were significant contributions to Afghanistan (€26 million/$32.7 million), Angola (€12.4 million/$15.5 million), Lebanon (€7.5 million/$9.4 million), and Ethiopia (€3.9 million/$4.9 million).


In 2006 Japan contributed ¥2,944 million ($25.3 million), 32 percent less than in 2005 (¥4,323 million or $39.3 million). Much of the reduction was due to decreased funding for Sudan (¥624 million/$5.4 million in 2006; ¥2.1 billion/$19 million in 2005). Japan gave funds in 2006 to 14 countries including to Burundi, Jordan, Lebanon, Nicaragua and Senegal, none of which received funds from Japan in 2005. Colombia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Tajikistan and Yemen received funds from Japan in 2005 but not 2006.


In 2006 Japan contributed ¥2,944 million ($25.3 million), 32 percent less than in 2005 (¥4,323 million or $39.3 million). Much of the reduction was due to decreased funding for Sudan (¥624 million/$5.4 million in 2006; ¥2.1 billion/$19 million in 2005). Japan gave funds in 2006 to 14 countries including to Burundi, Jordan, Lebanon, Nicaragua and Senegal, none of which received funds from Japan in 2005. Colombia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Tajikistan and Yemen received funds from Japan in 2005 but not 2006.

Japan’s mine action funding in 2006–2007 was ¥2,944 million ($25.3 million), 32 percent less than in 2005 (¥4,323 million or $39.3 million). Much of the reduction was due to decreased funding for Sudan (¥624 million/$5.4 million in 2006; ¥2.1 billion/$19 million in 2005). Japan gave funds in 2006 to 14 countries including to Burundi, Jordan, Lebanon, Nicaragua and Senegal, none of which received funds from Japan in 2005. Colombia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Tajikistan and Yemen received funds from Japan in 2005 but not 2006.

UK funding of £10,491,251 ($19,339,572) in fiscal year 2006-2007 represented a decrease of 11 percent from 2005-2006. In 2006-2007 the UK Department for International Development (DfID) reported mine action funding for 14 states and other areas. Abkhazia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Laos and Lebanon received funds in 2006 but not in 2005. Ethiopia and Tajikistan received funds from the UK in 2005 but not in 2006. Funding to Lebanon totaled £2.3 million ($4.3 million) in 2006.

Email from Yngvild Berggrav, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 August 2007. Norway’s 2007 Article 7 report quoted $37,042,000 in mine action funding for 2006, however, a breakdown of funding items was not provided in the report.

Email from Conventional Arms Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2007.

Email from Andy Willson, Program Officer, Department for International Development (DfID), 23 February 2007.

Includes amounts from 1993 to 1996, reported on the basis of calendar year, and for fiscal year 1997-98.
**CANADA — $177 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (S$)</th>
<th>Amount (C$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$28.9 million</td>
<td>C$32.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$20.5 million</td>
<td>C$24.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$22.6 million</td>
<td>C$29.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$22.5 million</td>
<td>C$30.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$15.1 million</td>
<td>C$22.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$15.5 million</td>
<td>C$24 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$11.9 million</td>
<td>C$17.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$15.2 million</td>
<td>C$23.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$9.5 million</td>
<td>C$13.7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canada provided C$1,225,858 ($1,080,962) for R&D in 2006. Additionally, R&D funding totaled C$3.4 million ($2.8 million) in 2005, C$3.1 million ($2.4 million) in 2004, and $17.4 million from 1998-2006.

Canada’s mine action funding of C$32,770,866 ($28,897,350) in fiscal year 2006-2007 was an increase of 32 percent from 2005-2006 and the highest total reported for Canada to date. It provided funding to 28 countries and areas as well as regional bodies, UN agencies, NGOs, ICRC and GICHD. Funding to Lebanon totaled C$3.1 million ($2.8 million) in 2006, at least part of which was covered by emergency relief.

**GERMANY — $162.6 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
<th>Amount (DM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>€14.8 million</td>
<td>DM21.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>€17 million</td>
<td>DM20.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>€15.5 million</td>
<td>DM19.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>€19.5 million</td>
<td>DM22.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>€20.4 million</td>
<td>DM21.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>€13.7 million</td>
<td>DM26.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>€15.5 million</td>
<td>DM27.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>€15.5 million</td>
<td>DM32 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>€10.1 million</td>
<td>DM32.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>€14.4 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany’s funding of €14,838,320 ($18,641,381) in 2006 was a decrease of 13 percent from 2005, and included 20 countries and regions (21 in 2005). Countries and areas receiving funding in 2006 but not in 2005 included Chile, Mauritania, Tajikistan and Western Sahara. Countries receiving funding from Germany in 2005 but not in 2006 included Colombia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Somalia.

In May 2006 Germany stated that it no longer funds R&D, focusing in preference on mine clearance. No R&D funding was identified in 2005 and 2000-2003; 2004: €102,989 ($128,098); 1993-1999: €5.1 million.

**THE NETHERLANDS — $160.7 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
<th>Amount (Dfl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>€21.4 million</td>
<td>Dfl35.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>€15.5 million</td>
<td>Dfl32 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>€15.5 million</td>
<td>Dfl35.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>€12.1 million</td>
<td>Dfl32 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>€16 million</td>
<td>Dfl23 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>€13.9 million</td>
<td>Dfl32 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>€14.2 million</td>
<td>Dfl35.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>€8.9 million</td>
<td>Dfl35.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>€9.3 million</td>
<td>Dfl32 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>€20.9 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Netherlands increased funding in 2006 by 38 percent, to €21,433,318 ($26,926,677); this was its highest total reported to date. It provided funding to 15 countries and other areas. Lebanon received significant funds in 2006 (€4,150,000/$5,213,645).

**SWEDEN — $141.5 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (SEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>SEK110.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>SEK83.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>SEK102.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>SEK71 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>SEK100.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>SEK107.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>SEK83.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>SEK129.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1997</td>
<td>SEK35.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2006 Sweden provided SEK110,063,937 ($14,935,677), a 26 percent increase in mine action funding, for nine countries/areas: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Angola, Chechnya, Iraq, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Countries receiving funds from Sweden in 2005 but not 2006 were DR Congo, Philippines and Senegal.
DENMARK — $124.3 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (Million DKK)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (Million DKK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$14.5 million</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$11.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$13.7 million</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$13.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$11.9 million</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$11.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$10.6 million</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$10.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$14.4 million</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$14.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$13.4 million</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$13.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$7 million</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$6.2 million</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$6.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Figures for 1992-1995 do not include bilateral contributions.
• Denmark did not report R&D funding in 2006. It has funded R&D programs in the past, but the value is not known.

Denmark contributed DKK86,092,534 (≈$14,489,373) in 2006, the largest amount to date and a 27 percent increase compared to 2005. Funds included a contribution to Lebanon, which Denmark did not fund in 2005.

SWITZERLAND — $94 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (Million CHF)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (Million CHF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>CHF 17.6 million</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CHF 15.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>CHF 14.8 million</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>CHF 14.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>CHF 8.8 million</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>CHF 8.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>CHF 3.3 million</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>CHF 3.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>CHF 9.8 million</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>CHF 9.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>CHF 7.4 million</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>CHF 7.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>CHF 5.7 million</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>CHF 5.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Switzerland’s 2006 mine action funding of CHF17,635,800 (≈$14,489,373) was a 17 percent increase from 2005, and its highest funding to date. The 2006 total included CHF8,020,000 (≈$6,399,960) for the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and CHF9,613,800 (≈$7,671,812) for other mine action (non-GICHD funding in 2005 was CHF7,094,000/≈$5.7 million). Switzerland funded 13 countries and areas in 2006, and 13 in 2005. Chechnya and Jordan received funds from Switzerland in 2006 but not in 2005; the DR Congo and Vietnam received funds in 2005 but not in 2006. Sudan received a substantial increase in 2006 (CHF1,750,000/≈$1,396,500) compared to 2005 (CHF300,000/≈$240,790). The 2006 total includes an estimate of CHF2 million (≈$1,596,000) for in-kind contributions of personnel and material to various organizations by the Swiss Ministry of Defense.

The totals since 2000 include significant funds for GICHD, most of which could be counted as R&D funding. Swiss funding for GICHD totaled $6.4 million in 2006, $6 million in 2005, $6.1 million in 2004, $5.23 million in 2003, $4.35 million in 2002, $3.3 million in 2001 and $2.3 million in 2000, totaling some $33.7 million from 2000-2006.

Switzerland’s mine action strategy 2004-2007 forecast annual funding of roughly CHF16 million; funding in 2005 fell short of this target, while 2006 funding exceeded it. The strategy was under review in mid-2007.

AUSTRALIA — $91.6 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (Million AUD)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (Million AUD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>$16.5 million</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>$8.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>$8.9 million</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>$5.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>$5.7 million</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>$5.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>$5.5 million</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>$7.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>$7.8 million</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>$6.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>$6.6 million</td>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>$7.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>$18.6 million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia’s funding of A$21,928,363 (≈$16,523,022) in fiscal year July 2006-June 2007 was an 88 percent increase, and its largest contribution to date, for mine action in 11 countries (seven in 2005). Funding in 2006 included A$1.5 million (≈$1,130,250) to Lebanon. The 2006-2007 level of funding, although much greater than the previous year, was reported to be in line with the overall A$75 million in funding committed by Australia for 2005-2010.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES — $69.9 million

In 2006 the United Arab Emirates contributed $19,881,982 to Lebanon via the Operation Emirates Solidarity II program. The UAE previously reported that it provided $50 million to mine action in Lebanon from 2002-2004 (annual breakdown not available). The UAE contributed $3,132,751 for Lebanon through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund in 2002-2005, including $310,000 for follow-up activities to Operation Emirates Solidarity in 2005.
### Italy — $61.9 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD)</th>
<th>Amount (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$54.0 million</td>
<td>€4.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$4.5 million</td>
<td>€3.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$3.2 million</td>
<td>€2.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$5.8 million</td>
<td>€5.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$8.7 million</td>
<td>€9.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$5.1 million</td>
<td>€11.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$1.6 million</td>
<td>€4.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$5.1 million</td>
<td>€13.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$12 million</td>
<td>L20 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>$10.5 million</td>
<td>L18 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Italy’s mine action funding of €4,322,741 ($5,430,660) in 2006 was a 21 percent increase from 2005, for 11 countries (six in 2005). Countries receiving funding from Italy in 2006 but not in 2005 were Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Lebanon, Nicaragua and Peru. Emergency funding to Lebanon totaled $2.512,900, from funds outside the planned mine action budget.

### Belgium — $41.1 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD)</th>
<th>Amount (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$7.1 million</td>
<td>€5.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$6.5 million</td>
<td>€5.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$5.7 million</td>
<td>€4.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$6.2 million</td>
<td>€5.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$3.6 million</td>
<td>€3.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$2.1 million</td>
<td>€2.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$2.5 million</td>
<td>BEF111 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$2.3 million</td>
<td>BEF93 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>$5.1 million</td>
<td>BEF111 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belgium’s mine action funding of €5,822,230 ($7,063,208) in 2006 was an increase of 8 percent from 2005, and the highest level of funding it has reported to date. Belgium provided mine action funding and assistance to 10 countries in 2006 (11 countries/areas in 2005).

### Finland — $58.4 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD)</th>
<th>Amount (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$6.3 million</td>
<td>€5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$5.9 million</td>
<td>€4.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$6 million</td>
<td>€4.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$6.3 million</td>
<td>€5.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$4.5 million</td>
<td>€4.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$4.5 million</td>
<td>€5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$4.8 million</td>
<td>€5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$5.7 million</td>
<td>€5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$6.6 million</td>
<td>€5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1997</td>
<td>$7.8 million</td>
<td>€5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finland contributed €5,046,691 ($6,340,158), an increase of six percent from 2005 (€4,746,000/US$5,908,295). The increase is in part accounted for by €1,000,000 in funding to Lebanon, which did not receive funds from Finland in 2005. Funding was allocated to nine countries and three organizations in 2006. See the Finland report for more details.

### France — $31.9 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD)</th>
<th>Amount (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$3.3 million</td>
<td>€2.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$3.8 million</td>
<td>€3.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1.9 million</td>
<td>€1.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$2.5 million</td>
<td>€2.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$3.6 million</td>
<td>€3.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$2.7 million</td>
<td>€3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$1.2 million</td>
<td>€3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$0.9 million</td>
<td>€1.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>$12 million</td>
<td>€2.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

France’s mine action funding of €2,601,263 (€3,267,967) in 2005 included in-kind contributions and training, for 25 recipient countries and areas (six countries in 2005). France reported in 2007 that it contributes between 17 and 25 percent of EC funding to mine action projects through various channels.

---

43 Email from Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 August 2007.
44 Email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 February 2007.
46 The 2005 Belgium funding total has been increased by €2 million from previous Landmine Monitor estimates. Belgium provided €2 million to ICRC in 2005, not previously reported by Landmine Monitor. Email from Michel Peetermans, Head of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2007.
47 Differentiated amounts for 1994-1997 are not available.
48 Email from Anne Villeneuve, Advocacy Officer, Handicap International, Lyon, 12 July 2007; with information from Béatrice Ravanel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Henry Zipper de Fabiani, Commission Nationale pour l’Elimination des Mines Anti-personnel (CNEMA).
49 Differentiated amounts for 1995-1997 are not available.
**SLOVAKIA — $24.9 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (SKK)</th>
<th>Value (Million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$14 million</td>
<td>SKK415.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$7.2 million</td>
<td>SKK218.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$3.5 million</td>
<td>SKK101.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2002</td>
<td>$230,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Slovakia reported contributing SKK415,660,309 ($14,007,752) as the value of in-kind contributions of the Slovak Armed Forces to demining operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2006, the highest contribution to date.

**IRELAND — $21.1 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
<th>Value (Million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$4.8 million</td>
<td>€3.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$2.2 million</td>
<td>€1.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$3 million</td>
<td>€2.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$2.3 million</td>
<td>€2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$1.6 million</td>
<td>€1.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
<td>€2.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$1.1 million</td>
<td>€1.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$1.5 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>$2.6 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ireland’s mine action funding of €3,790,000 ($4,761,377) in 2006 was a 118 percent increase from 2005, and its largest annual contribution reported, contributed to six countries and Somaliland. Cambodia, Iraq, Laos and Lebanon received funding from Ireland in 2006 but not 2005.

**AUSTRIA — $18.4 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
<th>Value (Million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$2.2 million</td>
<td>€1.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$2.2 million</td>
<td>€1.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$3 million</td>
<td>€2.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$0.9 million</td>
<td>€0.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
<td>€2.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$0.9 million</td>
<td>ATS13.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
<td>ATS30 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$1 million</td>
<td>ATS15 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>$4.2 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Austria provided €1,763,506 ($2,215,493) in 2006, roughly the same amount as in 2005 (€1,766,752 or $2,199,430), for four countries (seven in 2005). Lebanon and Sudan received funding from Austria in 2006 but not in 2005. Austria reported that it also provides approximately 2.2 percent of overall EC development aid expenditures which include mine action contributions.

**NEW ZEALAND — $13.3 million**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (NZ$)</th>
<th>Value (Million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>$0.9 million</td>
<td>NZ$1.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>$0.9 million</td>
<td>NZ$1.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>$2.5 million</td>
<td>NZ$3.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>$1.1 million</td>
<td>NZ$1.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>$0.8 million</td>
<td>NZ$1.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>$0.7 million</td>
<td>NZ$1.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>$1.1 million</td>
<td>NZ$2.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>$0.8 million</td>
<td>NZ$1.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>$0.5 million</td>
<td>NZ$0.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1998</td>
<td>$4 million</td>
<td>NZ$6.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• New Zealand has funded R&D programs previously, but annual totals are not available.


---

51 Differentiated amounts for 1996-97 are not available.
52 Email from Michael Keaveney, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 2007.
53 Differentiated amounts for 1994-97 are not available.
54 Austria Article 7 Report, Form J, undated but 2007.
55 Differentiated amounts for 1994-97 are not available.
56 Email from Alexander Kmentt, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2006.
57 Email from Aaron Davy, Multilateral Development Programme Administrator, NZAID, 11 July 2007.
Other Mine Action Donors

Spain provided €6,847,734 ($8,602,808) in 2006, including in-kind contributions through training at its International Demining Center. Spain reported that it had “increased significantly” its contributions to mine action in 2006 and “would maintain this profile as a donor state” in 2007. Spain contributed €1,533,648 ($1,909,238) in 2005. Estimated total mine action funding to date was $18.7 million. 

Greece contributed €1.9 million ($2.4 million) in February 2006 for mine action in Iraq; the funds were pledged in July 2005. Mine action funding by Greece totaled $12 million for 2001-2006.

Luxembourg provided €1,032,375 ($1,296,973) for mine action in five countries in 2006, similar to 2005 ($1,081,931/1,346,896). No R&D funding was reported in 2006 or 2005. Total mine action funding to date was $7.2 million.

Slovenia reported contributing €1,099,998 ($780,520) in 2006. It provided $184,498 in 2005. Total mine action funding to date was $4.6 million.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by the Republic of Korea or Iceland in 2006. The Republic of Korea contributed $1,050,000 to mine action 2005. Total mine action funding is $5.2 million. Iceland provided $1,500,000 for victim assistance in 2005. Total mine action funding was $2.8 million 1997-2006.

The Czech Republic contributed CZK6,955,311 ($1,194,120) for mine action in 2006, a decrease of 18 percent from 2005 (CZK5,866,000/$1,370,794), for Afghanistan, Croatia and Lebanon. Estimated total mine action funding to date was $3.3 million.

Poland contributed $1,332,815 to mine action in 2006. Its 2007 voluntary Article 7 report did not include a value for additional in-kind contributions in 2006. A €50,000 contribution to Bosnia and Herzegovina was reported. Landmine Monitor identified in-kind assistance to Lebanon of $1,270,000. In 2005 the reported value of Poland’s in-kind assistance to mine action was €1.6 million ($1.99 million). Total mine action funding for 2005-2006 was $3.3 million.

Research and Development Projects Reported by Donors

In 2006 five countries reported spending about $25.3 million on R&D related to mine action, a decrease of some 16 percent from 2005 ($30 million contributed by nine countries). The biggest expenditures were by the United States ($13.81 million), Japan ($9.1 million) and Canada ($1.1 million). Contributions were also made by Belgium and the United Kingdom.

Belgium contributed €727,650 ($914,147) for four R&D projects, including €31,500 ($46,699) for software development for mine clearance, €253,350 ($318,284) for detection technologies and methodologies, €122,800 ($154,274) for the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP), and €300,000 ($376,890) to APPO for the use of rats in humanitarian mine clearance operations.

Canada contributed C$1,225,858 ($1,080,962) to R&D including C$1 million ($881,800) to the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technology, C$100,858 ($88,937) to APPO for the use of rats in clearance operations, and C$125,000 ($110,225) for a technology expert to GICHD.

Japan reported ¥1,058,000,000 ($9,080,800) in R&D funding, including ¥547,000,000 ($4,704,200) through the Japan Science and Technology Agency for research programs in explosives sensor technology, ¥95,000,000 ($1.1 million). Contributions were also made by Belgium and the United Kingdom.

The UK provided R&D funding of £213,656 ($393,853) in fiscal year 2006-2007, consisting of £28,870 ($53,219) to DISARMO and £184,786 ($340,633) to ERA. The US Department of Defense spent $13.81 million on humanitarian demining R&D projects in fiscal year 2006. Of that total, $13.81 million was included in the Department of Defense budget.
In past years Landmine Monitor has reported funding to GICHD (except for funds specified for sponsorship and treaty implementation support) as R&D. However, in this edition of Landmine Monitor funds are counted as R&D only if specified for these purposes. Switzerland continued to provide GICHD with funding in 2006. Although some of this may be for R&D, Landmine Monitor has included the whole amount of GICHD funding within Switzerland’s general mine action funding because R&D amounts are not consistently differentiated.

Major Mine Action Recipients

Landmine Monitor has identified at least eight mine action funding recipients that have received more than $100 million in funding to date: Afghanistan ($602.5 million since 1993), Iraq ($288.3 million since 1993), Cambodia ($285.6 million since 1993), Angola ($225.1 million since 1993), Mozambique ($220.2 million since 1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina ($181.8 million since 1995), Lebanon (estimated $154.8 million since 2000) and Sudan ($108.9 million since 2001). Also, Kosovo ($95 million since 1999) and Laos ($82.4 million since 1994) have each received close to $100 million to date.

The top recipients of mine action funding in 2006 were Afghanistan ($87.5 million), Lebanon ($68.8 million), Angola ($48.1 million), Iraq ($35.3 million), Cambodia ($29.6 million) and Sudan ($28.9 million).

Notable increases—at least $5 million—in 2006 were seen in Lebanon (up $62.5 million or 992 percent), Afghanistan ($20.7 million, 31 percent), Angola ($12.3 million, 34 percent), Iraq ($7.5 million, 27 percent), Laos ($6.2 million, 85 percent), Ethiopia ($5.3 million, 202 percent), and Jordan ($5 million, 342 percent).

Significant reductions in mine action funding—at least $2 million—occurred in Sudan (down $18 million, 38 percent), Sri Lanka ($9.9 million, 48 percent), Mozambique ($3.8 million, 38 percent), Croatia ($2.9 million, 31 percent) and Albania ($3 million, 57 percent).

Mine Action Recipients in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>$87.5 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>$68.8 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$48.1 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$35.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>$29.6 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>$28.9 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>$18.8 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>$13.4 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>$9.9 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>$8.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>$7.9 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>$6.5 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>$6.5 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>$6.2 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>$5.7 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>$5.1 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>$4.8 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>$4.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>$4.1 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
<td>$3.1 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>$3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>$2.9 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>$2.4 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>$2.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>$2.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>$2 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>$1.7 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>$1.7 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>$1.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>$1.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>$1.1 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thirty-one countries and areas received at least $1 million in mine action funding in 2006 (31 in 2005). In addition, $1.9 million (€1.5 million) in donations were reported jointly to Montenegro and Serbia in 2006, without values differentiated for each. Jordan ($6.5 million), Chile ($2.3 million), Somalia ($1.7 million), and Tajikistan ($1.1 million) each received at least $1 million in 2006, but less than $1 million in 2005. Nagorno-Karabakh received more than $1 million in 2005 but not in 2006.

---

70 Total annual funding to Afghanistan prior to 2006 is based on reporting from UNMACA/MAPA. The 2006 total is based on funding identified by Landmine Monitor.

71 Late-year allocations by the EC, pending disbursement in 2007, account for much of the reported increase to Afghanistan and did not offset funding shortages during 2006; see recipient details for Afghanistan following.

72 The ITF reported allocating $176,182 to Montenegro and $2.6 million to Serbia in 2006, from various donors.
Major Mine Action Recipients

Abkhazia: $3,100,477 (approximately €2.5 million) for mine action in 2006 were reported by four countries and the EC, a decrease of roughly five percent from 2005 ($3,253,162 reported by two countries).

Afghanistan: $87,534,418 (€69.7 million) for mine action in 2006 was donated by 18 countries and the EC, an increase of 31 percent from 2005 ($66.8 million from 16 countries and the EC) and roughly equal to funding levels in 2004 ($91.8 million from 16 countries and the EC); a substantial portion of 2006 funds came from end-year allocations by the EC totaling €20 million ($32.7 million). UNMAS reported that “disruptions in funding” severely affected operations in 2006.

Albania: $2,298,716 (€1.8 million) was donated in 2006 by three countries, a decrease of 57 percent from 2005 ($5,316,712 from three countries and the EC).

Angola: $48,108,122 (€38.3 million) was donated in 2006 by 16 countries and the EC, an increase of 34 percent from 2005 ($35,771,510 from 17 countries and the EC).

Azerbaijan: $4,781,700 (€3.8 million) was donated in 2006 by two countries and the EC, an increase of approximately 17 percent from 2005 ($4,100,776 from three countries).

Bosnia and Herzegovina: $18,764,851 (€14.9 million) was donated in 2006 by 14 countries and the EC in 2006, an increase of 23 percent from 2005 ($15.3 million from 15 countries). Burundi: $2,987,894 (€2.4 million) was donated in 2006 by three countries and the EC, an increase of 32 percent from 2005 ($2,270,595 from three countries and the EC).

Cambodia: $29,583,031 (€23.5 million) was donated in 2006 by 13 countries and the EC, an increase of 24 percent from 2005 ($23.9 million from 14 countries).

Chad: $2,384,274 (€1.9 million) was donated in 2006 by two countries, roughly a 103 percent increase from 2005 ($1,169,000 from the United States).

Chechnya: $1,334,902 (€1.1 million) was donated in 2006 by six countries and the EC, an increase of 36 percent from 2005 ($982,124 from three countries).

Chile: $2,333,923 (€1.9 million) was donated in 2006 by five countries and the EC, an increase of 137 percent from 2005 ($985,849 from three countries).

Colombia: $4,336,602 (€3.5 million) was donated in 2006 by six countries and the EC, an increase of 86 percent from 2005 ($2,332,300 from seven countries and the EC).

Croatia: $6,543,964 (€5.2 million) was donated by nine countries in 2006, a decrease of 31 percent from 2005 ($9,491,287 from eight countries and the EC).

Cyprus: $1,256,300 (€1 million) was contributed by the EC in 2006; the EC previously donated €5 million in multiyear funding from 2004 to 2006.

DR Congo: $5,109,463 (€4.1 million) was donated in 2006 by seven countries and the EC, an increase of five percent from 2005 ($4,864,770 from eight countries and the EC).

Ethiopia: $7,859,540 (€6.3 million) was donated in 2006 by five countries and the EC, an increase of some 200 percent from 2005 ($2,604,980 from eight countries and the EC).

Iraq: $35,288,325 (€28.1 million) was donated by 14 countries in 2006, an increase of some 27 percent from 2005 ($27.8 million from 14 countries).

Jordan: $6,475,440 (€5.2 million) was donated in 2006 by 10 countries, an increase of 342 percent from 2005 ($1,464,826 from three countries and the EC).

Kosovo: $2,298,716 (€1.1 million) was donated by six countries and the EC, an increase of 17 percent from 2005 ($1,895,252 from six countries).

Lebanon: $68,845,935 (€54.8 million) was donated in 2006 for emergency and other mine action in Lebanon in 2006 by 20 countries and the EC, compared to $6.3 million provided by six countries and other funding channels in 2005.

2006 International Funding to Mine Action in Lebanon Reported by Donors (US$)*

*Note: Slovenia donated SIT17,100,000 ($88,920); the Czech Republic donated CZK2 million ($88,600).
Mozambique: $6,219,923 (€5 million) was donated in 2006 by nine countries and the EC, a decrease of 38 percent from 2005 (some $10 million from 12 countries).

Nicaragua: $5,722,481 (€4.6 million) was donated in 2006 by six countries, an increase of 64 percent from 2005 ($3,499,295 from six countries).

Somalia: $1,738,143 (€1.4 million) was donated in 2006 by two countries and the EC, compared to $110,000 donated by one country in 2005.

Somaliland: $2,931,329 (€2.3 million) was donated in 2006 by seven countries and the EC, a decrease of 21 percent from 2005 ($3,729,030 from six countries).

Sri Lanka: $9,932,574 (€7.9 million) was donated in 2006 by eight countries and the EC, a decrease of 48 percent from 2005 ($19,045,929 from 10 countries and the EC).

Sudan: $28,934,082 (€23 million) was donated in 2006 by 12 countries and the EC, a 38 percent decrease from 2005 ($46,914,250 from 14 countries and the EC), largely accounted for by the drop in Japan’s funding in 2006 after a significant contribution in 2005.

Tajikistan: $1,064,785 (€847,556) was donated in 2006 by four countries, an increase of 15 percent from 2005 ($924,168 from three countries and the EC).

Uganda: $1,666,251 (€1.3 million) was donated in 2006 by four countries in 2006, a small decrease from 2005 ($1,763,449 from five countries).

Vietnam: $8,256,167 (€6.6 million) was donated in 2006 by six countries, an increase of 44 percent from 2005 ($5,736,918 from six countries).

Yemen: $4,072,155 (€3.2 million) was donated in 2006 by four countries and the EC, a 66 percent increase from 2005 ($2,438,864 from six countries).

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 7 September 2007 there are 155 States Parties.

States Parties
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)  
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00  
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01  
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98  
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 98  
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99  
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99  
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99  
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98  
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98  
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00  
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99  
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)  
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98  
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98  
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98  
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)  
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98  
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00  
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99  
Brunei Darussalem 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06  
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98  
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98  
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03  
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99  
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02  
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01  
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)  
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99  
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01  
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00  
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)  
Congo (Brazzaville) 4 May 01 (a)  
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)  
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 06  
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99  
Cote d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98  
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03  
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99  
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98  
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98  
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99  
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99  
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99  
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)  
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)  
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)  
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04  
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98  
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00  
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02  
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03  
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98

© Iurie Pintea, 12 April 2006

Status of the Convention

Moldovan deminers working in Iraq.
Status of the Convention

Signatories
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97
Poland 4 Dec 97

States not Party
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Burma
China
Cuba
Egypt
Finland
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya
Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tonga
Tuvalu
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
Indonesia (20 Feb 07)
Iraq (15 Aug 07) (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
Kuwait (30 Jul 07) (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
Montenegro (23 Oct 06) (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
Sao Tome e Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
Preamble

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

**Article 2**

**Definitions**

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

**Article 3**

**Exceptions**

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

**Article 4**

**Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines**

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

**Article 5**

**Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas**

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension
period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

**Article 6**

**International cooperation and assistance**

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   
   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   
   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   
   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   
   e) Assistance to mine victims;
   
   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

**Article 7**

**Transparency measures**

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   
   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   
   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   
   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   
   e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   
   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   
   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along
with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-
personnel mine in the case of destruction in accor-
dance with Article 4;

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-
personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and
those currently owned or possessed by a State Party,
giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of
information as may facilitate identification and clear-
ance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this
information shall include the dimensions, fusing,
explosive content, metallic content, colour photo-
graphs and other information which may facilitate
mine clearance; and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and
effective warning to the population in relation to all
areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this
Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually,
covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April
each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate
with each other regarding the implementation of the
provisions of this Convention, and to work together in
a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States
Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek
to resolve questions relating to compliance with the
provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it
may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to
that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied
by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall
refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care
being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a
Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the
requesting State Party all information which would assist
in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within
that time period, or deems the response to the Request for
Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the
next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General
of the United Nations shall transmit the submission,
accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to
the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such
information shall be presented to the requested State Party
which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States
Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exer-
cise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification
requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening
of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the
matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
thereupon communicate this proposal and all informa-
tion submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all
States Parties with a request that they indicate whether
they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for
the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that
within 14 days from the date of such communication, at
least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special
Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties
within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall
consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special
Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall
first determine whether to consider the matter further,
taking into account all information submitted by the
States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall
make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If
despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been
reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States
Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting
of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States
Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter,
including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in
accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the
States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties
shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its
mandate by a majority of States Parties present and
voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission
shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the
States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties
to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of
up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional infor-
mation on the spot or in other places directly related to
the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or
control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities
and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by
States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties.
Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as des-
ignated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party
declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of
non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-
finding missions on the territory or any other place under
the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if
the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appoint-
ment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

Article 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
a) The operation and status of this Convention;
b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and

d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13
Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14
Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15
Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997.
and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

**Article 16**

**Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession**

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

**Article 17**

**Entry into force**

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

**Article 18**

**Provisional application**

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

**Article 19**

**Reservations**

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

**Article 20**

**Duration and withdrawal**

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

**Article 21**

**Depositary**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

**Article 22**

**Authentic texts**

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.