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Country Reports
Norway

Norway

The Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo on 3 December 2008. Norway was one of four countries that both signed and ratified the convention that same day.

Norway initiated the Oslo Process in November 2006, held the first international diplomatic conference to launch the process in Oslo in February 2007, and hosted the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008. Norway’s leadership role, under the direction of Ambassador Steffen Kongstad, in stewarding and supporting the Oslo Process was fundamental to its success. Throughout the Oslo Process, Norway advocated for provisions in the draft convention that strengthened humanitarian protections. Norway also worked hard to ensure that civil society, and especially the CMC and cluster munition survivors, played a prominent and influential role in the process, including the development and negotiation of the convention text.

Norway is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 8 December 2005. Norway has participated in the work of the CCW on cluster munitions in recent years.

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Reflecting its leadership role in the creation and adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, and the treaty’s global implementation ever since then, Norway was an early supporter of action to deal with the harmful effects of cluster munitions, both domestically and internationally. In 2001, Norwegian parliamentarians began to call for a national moratorium on the use of cluster munitions, and on 14 June 2001, Parliament adopted a resolution urging the government to work actively toward the achievement of an international ban on cluster munitions.[1]

In early 2003, the Norwegian Parliament held discussions on a proposal to introduce a national ban on cluster munitions. The majority of the Norwegian Defense Committee argued that as the Norwegian military had on 7 February 2003 issued a decision not to use cluster munitions, specifically in connection with Norwegian military participation in Afghanistan, there was no need for further action. In February 2003, the Norwegian Parliament rejected the proposal for a ban, but supported continued restrictions on the use of cluster munitions.[2]

In November 2003, Norway reported that on the basis of the 2001 parliamentary resolution, “All air-delivered cluster bombs previously in Norwegian stock have been destroyed, because of their low level of precision and high dud-rate.” It also said that the Minister of Defense had issued instructions in October 2002 to the Norwegian Armed Forces prohibiting the use of all air-delivered cluster munitions in military operations in the future without prior consent of the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, the minister’s instructions prohibited the acquisition of all cluster munitions with “high dud rates/without self-destruct mechanisms.”[3] Norway did not say anything specific about its 155mm artillery projectiles with submunitions with self-destruct mechanisms.

In 2004, the Ministry of Finance decided to include cluster munitions in a category of inhumane weapons to be excluded from investment under the Norwegian Government Pension Fund’s ethical guidelines. In June 2005, eight foreign companies involved in the production of cluster munitions were excluded from the fund’s investments.[4] Additional companies were excluded in 2006 and 2008.[5]

In 2005 and 2006, Norwegian People’s Aid and the Norwegian Red Cross increased their campaigning activities and generated considerable media attention to the issue of cluster munitions, and secured the support of many parliamentarians and governmental officials.[6]

In early 2005, the Ministry of Defense stated, “In accordance with established Norwegian policy, only ground-launched [cluster] munitions with a reliability of at least 99% may be procured. This policy also states that no such ammunition may be procured unless equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.”[7]

At the CCW in 2005, Norway argued that the use of cluster munitions raised particular problems under international humanitarian law “due to their high number of submunitions, their wide dispersal, and, in many cases, their high dud rate.” Norway also noted particular problems associated with high-altitude aerial bombardment using cluster munitions.[8]

In March 2006, the media reported that Norway had facilitated testing in Norway by the United Kingdom of British M85 submunitions. The submunitions presented a failure rate of 2.3%, despite being the same type contained in Norwegian artillery projectiles that Norway maintained had a failure rate of less than 1%. The testing of Norwegian submunitions produced a failure rate of 2.04%.[9]

Shortly thereafter, in May 2006, the Ministry of Defense decided to institute a national moratorium on use of cluster munitions until further testing of its cluster munition failure rates had been undertaken, and said that it would work to ban cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian problems.[10] Norway officially announced a moratorium on the use of cluster munitions during the CCW session in June 2006.[11]

In September and October 2006, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense carried out a new round of testing to verify if Norway’s cluster munitions complied with its policy requiring a failure rate of less than 1%. The tests, carried out at the Hjerkinn firing range, were the most comprehensive ever conducted by Norway and revealed that the failure rates for its version of the M85 submunitions exceeded the 1% limit even in test conditions.[12]

Between 2001 and 2006, Norway had focused its international efforts on cluster munitions within the framework of the CCW. However, the CCW’s lack of action, combined with the developments at home as well as abroad—most notably Israel’s massive use of cluster munitions in south Lebanon in July-August 2006—convinced the government that another path was required.

At a CCW meeting on 28 August 2006, Norway urged states to focus on “how to proceed toward substantive results” on cluster munitions and said, “We strongly believe there is an urgent need for an international instrument on cluster munitions and we remain willing to pursue the issue.”[13]

Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre announced in October 2006 that his country would “take the lead—along with other like-minded countries and international humanitarian actors—to put in place an international prohibition against cluster munitions.”[14] This was the first public indication that any government was considering going outside the CCW to work internationally on cluster munitions.

Just prior to a key CCW meeting, the Third Review Conference, on 3 November 2006 Norway extended its moratorium on cluster munitions until a legally-binding instrument on cluster munitions could be concluded. Norway stated that “the Norwegian moratorium is important in itself, but it is also important in terms of giving Norway the necessary international credibility now that the Government has decided to work for a ban on cluster munitions that cause great humanitarian suffering.”[15]

At the CCW Review Conference, Norway declined to formally support a proposal for a mandate to negotiate an instrument on cluster munitions in the CCW. After the proposal was rejected by most CCW States Parties, Norway and 24 other countries issued a joint declaration calling for an agreement that would prohibit the use of cluster munitions “within concentrations of civilians,” prohibit the use of cluster munitions that “pose serious humanitarian hazards because they are for example unreliable and/or inaccurate,” and require destruction of stockpiles of such cluster munitions.[16]

After the declaration was read out on the final day of the Review Conference, 17 November 2006, Norway announced that it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a cluster munition treaty and invited other governments to join, thus initiating what became known as the Oslo Process.[17] On the same day, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre made a statement announcing that Norway would organize an international conference to launch a process toward an international ban on cluster munitions that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences. Mr. Støre stated, “We must take advantage of the political will now evident in many countries to prohibit cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. The time is ripe to establish broad cooperation on a concerted effort to achieve a ban.”[18]

For the first international conference in Oslo on 22–23 February 2007, Norway invited countries willing to address the issue in a determined and effective manner and prepared to develop a new legally-binding international instrument on cluster munitions. A total of 49 countries participated in the Oslo conference along with several UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.[19] For its part, Norway stressed the need for an integrated approach to combating cluster munitions, by not only prohibiting use of the weapon, but also requiring stockpile destruction, clearance of contaminated areas, victim assistance, and donor support. The conference ended with 46 states endorsing the Oslo Declaration, committing states to conclude by 2008 a legally-binding international instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and providing a framework for assistance to affected populations.[20] Norway welcomed all committed states to join the process, and endorse the declaration, at any stage. [21]

Prior to the conference, the CMC and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) hosted a Civil Society Forum with representatives of more than 100 NGOs from more than 30 countries.

Norway provided important support for all of the subsequent meetings of the Oslo Process, including the three international conferences to develop the convention text in Lima (May 2007), Vienna (December 2007), and Wellington, (February 2008), the formal negotiations in Dublin (May 2008), and regional conferences in Phnom Penh (March 2007), San José, Costa Rica (September 2007), Belgrade (for affected states, October 2007), Brussels (October 2007), Livingstone (March/April 2008), Mexico City (April 2008), Sofia (September 2008), Kampala (September 2008), Xiengkhuang, Lao PDR (October 2008), Quito, (November 2008), and Beirut (November 2008).

At the Lima conference in May 2007, Norway emphasized that the definition of cluster munition, central to the scope of the future convention, must be approached foremost from humanitarian concerns. Norway argued that submunitions with self-destruct mechanisms should not be excluded from a prohibition as they were not reliable, and that the failure rate was not a good criterion, as experience had shown that there was little correlation between testing rates and actual performance.[22] Norway stressed the need for deadlines for stockpile destruction[23] and clearance of contaminated areas,[24] and strong provisions on international cooperation and assistance, and victim assistance in particular.[25] Norway spoke strongly about the need for comprehensive victim assistance as a fundamental part of a future instrument, and noted there was growing recognition that victim assistance was a human rights issue and should be approached from a rights-based perspective.[26]

At the Vienna conference in December 2007, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, NPA, and British explosive ordnance disposal expert Colin King released a groundbreaking report analyzing the failure rates of M85 submunitions in tests and as used by Israel in Lebanon in 2006.[27] This report effectively undermined arguments for an exemption from prohibition based on failure rates in tests, the simple presence of a self-destruct mechanism, or the safety of so-called non-dangerous duds.

In Vienna, Norway argued against proposals for the inclusion of new language to facilitate “interoperability” (joint military operations with states not party). Norway said that it had yet to see any insurmountable difficulties with interoperability in the context of other legal instruments, including the Mine Ban Treaty. As a NATO member, Norway stated that the issue merited discussion, but it was unfounded to automatically assume that a future treaty would be an obstacle to joint military action.[28] Norway continued to lobby for the strengthening of provisions on victim assistance, including a broad definition of cluster munition victim encompassing affected families and communities, and the inclusion of survivors in the development of national action plans and other activities.[29]

During the Wellington conference in February 2008, Norway spoke against a significant number of proposals from the so-called like-minded group that were sharply criticized by the CMC as weakening the draft convention text—particularly with respect to potential exceptions to the prohibition (the definition), a transition period before key obligations took effect, and interoperability.

While objecting to any exclusions based solely on the presence of a self-destruct mechanism or on failure rates, Norway said that there was a difference between “a total ban on every weapon containing more than one submunition, and a total ban on cluster munitions as defined in the new convention.” Norway argued that weapons “capable of detecting and engaging point targets” and equipped with “adequate fail safe mechanisms” should not be defined as cluster munitions because “they meet the humanitarian requirements we seek to achieve,” in keeping with the Oslo Declaration.[30] Norway emphasized, “We acknowledge that the burden of proof is on us to document that any…exempted weapons does not create the humanitarian problem we are here to address.”[31]

Norway was firmly against the inclusion of any transition period, stating, “We see a challenge in explaining a situation where a weapon is considered to be so bad it has to be banned but at the same time be allowed to be used in a transition period.”[32] Norway said that as a result of growing awareness of their political and humanitarian consequences, cluster munitions were not likely to be used in future international operations, and so “the actual interoperability issues are therefore both temporary and limited in scope.”[33] Norway noted that it had solved issues regarding criminal liability for its service personnel in its national legislation which contained “penal provisions regulating issues such as command responsibility, effective control and individual culpability, in relation to international operations.”[34]

Norway also opposed adding a provision permitting the retention of cluster munitions for training and research purposes.[35] Norway again supported strengthening provisions on victim assistance and called for the inclusion of a reference to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the preamble of the convention.[36]

At the Dublin Diplomatic Conference, Norway stated that the convention should contain a categorical ban on cluster munitions, emphasizing that the purpose of the negotiations was not to discuss exceptions, but to define what should be banned by looking at exclusions based on effects. Norway proposed a definition of cluster munition which it described as a comprehensive prohibition on all cluster munitions, but excluded certain weapons that have submunitions on the basis of a weight requirement; their ability to seek, detect, and engage point targets; and the presence of electronic self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms.[37]

Norway maintained its positions against any transition period and against the inclusion of provisions to facilitate interoperability.[38] Norway lobbied for language on victim assistance obligations to include a reference to gender and age sensitive assistance. It called for the inclusion of a reference to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security in the preamble of the convention.[39] Norway also supported obligations for past users of cluster munitions to provide assistance for clearance.[40] Norway served as the Friend of the President for Stockpile Destruction issues, and largely took responsibility for states reaching agreement on Article 3 (Storage and Stockpile Destruction) of the convention.

Norway joined the consensus adoption of the convention, calling it and the Oslo Process an example of “disarmament as humanitarian action.” It said key elements in the successful outcome were the partnerships between affected and non-affected states, and between governments and civil society.[41]

In November 2008, as the negotiations on cluster munitions in the CCW were scheduled to conclude, Norway and 25 other states issued a joint statement expressing their opposition to the weak draft text on a possible CCW protocol on cluster munitions, indicating it was an unacceptable step back from the standards set by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[42] Norway, together with Mexico and New Zealand, submitted a proposal for a ban on the transfer of cluster munitions in the CCW, which would apply to all cluster munitions as defined in the convention.[43]

On 20 November 2008, Norway adopted national legislation allowing Norway to sign and simultaneously deposit its instrument of ratification during the signing conference of the convention in Oslo on 3 December 2008.[44] Upon signing the convention, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg stated, “We are proud that Norway has played a special role in the Oslo Process. We are prouder still for being in a partnership with all of you. We could only have done this together and together we have truly made a difference.”[45]

Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre announced that Norway would provisionally apply Article 1 (the basic prohibitions) of the convention pending its entry into force.[46] He also stated, “We will allocate special funds and other resources to support the Convention in the crucial time ahead. This will ensure that we can reach the next milestones – the entry into force of the Convention, and the first Meeting of States Parties to the Convention.”[47]

A total of 94 countries signed the convention in Oslo, and four, including Norway, ratified at the same time. Forty-five foreign, defense, and other government ministers lined up to sign the convention at Oslo City Hall in a high-level two-day-long series of events overseen by senior Norwegian government leaders.[48] Afghanistan’s surprising last-minute decision to sign the convention added to the sense of history of the occasion and helped secure media coverage.

The CMC’s civil society delegation to the signing conference was comprised of 250 campaigners from 75 countries, in addition to approximately 100 Norwegians. Several events took place the day before the conference opened. A “Ban Bus” of activists completed their 60-day journey from Belgrade, after driving 12,000km and speaking to thousands of people, politicians, and the media about the cluster bomb ban. The Ban Bus arrived in time to address a parliamentary forum attended by 18 parliamentarians from 13 countries.[49] The CMC held a day-long workshop to discuss future campaigning for universalisation and implementation of the convention. Campaigners and delegates convened for a service at the Lutheran Church of the Holy Trinity in Oslo featuring greetings from representatives of Buddhist, Islamic, and Christian Orthodox faiths.

During the formal conference, CMC representatives—including deminers, survivors, and activists—made interventions with their perspectives on universalization and implementation of the convention. Mines Action Canada coordinated a witnessing system to enable campaigners to see government representatives sign the convention. Outside City Hall, a tent city housed displays. An innovative “Wish you were here” postcard action targeted four nations that had declined to be part of the Oslo Process: India, Israel, Russia, and United States. At night, delegates mingled with members of the public at an outdoor concert wearing woolen hats that read: “I was in Oslo when we banned cluster bombs.”

Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Norway has not used, produced, or exported cluster munitions. It has imported cluster munitions from the US and Germany. It obtained Rockeye cluster bombs from the US, but destroyed them sometime between 2001 and 2003.[50]

Norway obtained from Germany 155mm artillery projectiles with dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[51] In 2006, the Norwegian Armed Forces reported having a stockpile of 53,000 155mm DPICM artillery projectiles in service, including 36,000 DM-642 projectiles (each with 63 DM-1383 submunitions) and 17,000 DM-662 projectiles (each with 49 DM-1385 submunitions).[52] In November 2008, the Minister of Defense stated that Norway had 52,000 units.[53]

In October 2008, the Norwegian Minister of Defense said that Norway had begun the process of destroying its stockpile of cluster munitions, and that Norway’s goal is to have all cluster munitions destroyed sometime in 2009. The Norwegian Armed Forces had already done a preliminary security and environmental assessment and concluded that destroying cluster munitions could have more severe environmental effects compared to other types of munitions. The Armed Forces are not capable of destroying the stockpile itself and a private contractor has to be found.[54] In February 2008, Norway estimated that the cost of destruction of its 155mm cluster munitions would be €40 per shell.[55]


[1] CMC, “National Legislation Banning Cluster Munitions – Norway,” www.stopclustermunitions.org. Odd Roger Enoksen and Åslaug Haga (Center Party) were particularly active.

[2] “Forbyr ikke klasebomber” (“No prohibition on cluster bombs”), Forsvaret, 5 February 2003, www.mil.no; and “Stortinget vurderer klasebombe-forbud” (“Parliament considers ban on cluster bomb ban”), Forsvaret, 29 January 2003, www.mil.no.

[3] Norway, “National interpretation and implementation of International Humanitarian Law with regard to the risk of Explosive Remnants of War,” Sixth Session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva, CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/WP.3, 24 November 2003. The paper stated that “some countries may have self-imposed restrictions and policy that go further than the restrictions contained in the existing IHL. For the Norwegian Armed Forces, these restrictions i.a. imply that only air-delivered cluster bombs with a high reliability rate/self destruct mechanisms may be used in international military operations.”

[4] Ministry of Finance, “A Further Eight Companies Excluded from the Petroleum Fund,” Press release, 2 September 2005, www.regjeringen.no. The companies were Alliant Techsystems Inc., EADS Co (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), EADS Finance BV, General Dynamics Corporation, L3 Communications Holdings Inc., Lockheed Martin Corp., Raytheon Co., and Thales SA. The fund’s Council on Ethics, an independent council of five people, provides advice to the Ministry of Finance, which then makes the exclusion decision.

[5] The South Korean company Poongsan Corporation in December 2006 and Hanwha Corporation in January 2008. See Ministry of Finance, “South Korean producer of cluster munitions excluded from the Government Pension Fund – Global,” Press release, 6 December 2006, www.regjeringen.no; and Ministry of Finance, “One producer of cluster munitions and two producers of nuclear weapons excluded from the Government Pension Fund – Global,” Press release, 11 January 2008, www.regjeringen.no.

[6] See Margarita H. Petrova, “Small States as International Agenda-Setters and Law-Makers: Belgian and Norwegian Roles in Developing New Norms of Warfare,” Paper prepared for the 6th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Turin, 12–15 September 2007, pp. 26–27.

[7] Communication from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense to Pax Christi Netherlands, 6 February 2005.

[8] Response from Norway, “Responses to Document CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2, entitled IHL and ERW, Dated 8 March 2005,” Eleventh Session of the CCW GGE, Geneva, CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.5, 29 July 2005, pp. 4, 7.

[9] Colin King, Grethe Østern, and Ove Dullum, “M85: An analysis of reliability,” 2007, p. 59, www.npaid.org. The information was released under the UK Freedom of Information Act by the UK Ministry of Defence in a letter to Richard Moyes, Policy and Research Director, Landmine Action, 27 March 2006. Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) Secretariat, DLO Andover, “Response to Landmine Action question,” Reference 06-02-2006-145827-009, 27 March 2006.

[10] Human Rights Watch, “Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice,” February 2007, p. 43, www.hrw.org.

[11] Statement of Norway, Fourteenth Session of the CCW GGE, Geneva, 20 June 2006. Notes by CMC; and CMC, “National Legislation Banning Cluster Munitions – Norway,” www.stopclustermunitions.org.

[12] Colin King, Grethe Østern, and Ove Dullum, “M85: An analysis of reliability,” 2007, p. 59, www.npaid.org.

[13] Audio Recording of Intervention by Norway, General Exchange of Views, Fifteenth Session of the CCW GGE, 28 August 2006, www.onug.ch.

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Reply to Olav Akselsen’s (Labour Party) Question Regarding the War in Lebanon and the Use of Cluster Munitions,” No. 61 (2006–2007), 24 October 2006.

[15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway to take the lead in efforts to achieve an international ban on cluster munitions,” Press release, 3 November 2006, www.regjeringen.no; and “Klasebomber låses ned” (“Cluster Bombs Locked Down”), Aftenposten, 3 November 2006, www.aftenposten.no.

[16] Declaration on Cluster Munitions, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, CCW/CONF.III/WP.18, Geneva, 17 November 2006.

[17] Statement by Amb. Steffen Kongstad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 17 November 2006.

[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway takes the initiative for a ban on cluster munitions,” Press release, 17 November 2006, www.regjeringen.no.

[19] This group included countries which had expressed support for some sort of prohibition in the CCW sessions: Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Other countries were invited because they are affected by cluster munitions or because they expressed interest in participating and requested an invitation. These included Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Romania, South Africa, and the UK. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s Initiative for a Ban on Cluster Munitions: Questions and Answers,” undated, www.regjeringen.no.

[20] The three states choosing not to endorse the Declaration were Japan, Poland, and Romania. It was uncertain until the last moment if numerous other participants would endorse, including Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

[21] Statement by Raymond Johansen, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 23 February 2007.

[22] Statement of Norway, Session on Definitions and Scope, Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, 24 May 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[23] Statement of Norway, Session on Storage and Stockpile destruction, Lima Conference, 24 May 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[24] Statement of Norway, Session on Clearance, Lima Conference, 23 May 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[25] Statement of Norway, Session on International Cooperation and Assistance, Lima Conference, 24 May 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[26] Statement of Norway, Session on Victim Assistance, Lima Conference, 23 May 2007. Unofficial transcription by WILPF.

[27] Colin King, Grethe Østern, and Ove Dullum, “M85: An analysis of reliability,” 2007, www.npaid.org. The report concluded that the reliability of M85 submunitions with self-destruct mechanisms in combat is substantially worse than indicated by tests. Rather than a 1% standard, the experience in Lebanon showed failure rates in the 10–12% range.

[28] Statement of Norway, Session on General Obligations and Scope, Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 6 December 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[29] Statement of Norway, Session on Victim Assistance, Vienna Conference, 6 December 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[30] Statement of Norway, Session on Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 February 2008.

[31] Statement of Norway, Session on Victim Assistance, Wellington Conference, 20 February 2008.

[32] Statement of Norway, “Statement on general scope and obligations in relation to interoperability,” Wellington Conference, 18 February 2008.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Statement of Norway, Session on Storage and Stockpile Destruction, Wellington Conference, 21 February 2008. Norway said experience from other treaties, including the Mine Ban Treaty, had shown that such exceptions “may easily become a means to circumvent the treaty obligations.” Norway questioned whether the retention of live cluster munitions would contribute to research or training, adding that the six-year deadline for stockpile destruction would provide adequate time to conduct any necessary research or training.

[36] Statement of Norway, Session on Victim Assistance, Wellington Conference, 20 February 2008. It supported language on data collection and distribution; emergency and long-term medical care; physical rehabilitation and psychological support; social and economic inclusion, including inclusive education; the enactment and enforcement of adequate laws and public policies; and the inclusion of both survivors and their communities in decisions on the implementation of victim assistance provisions.

[37] Statement of Norway, Informal Discussions on Definitions, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 21 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[38] Statement of Norway, Informal Discussions on Interoperability, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 21 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[39] Statement of Norway, Committee of the Whole on Articles 4 and 5, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 20 May 2008; Statement of Norway, Informal Discussions on Victim Assistance, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 22 May 2008; and Statement of Norway, Committee of the Whole, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 26 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[40] Statement of Norway, Committee of the Whole on Articles 4 and 5, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 20 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[41] Statement by Amb. Steffen Kongstad, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 30 May 2008.

[42] Statement delivered by Costa Rica on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Uruguay, and Venezuela, Fifth 2008 Session of the CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 5 November 2008.

[43] Draft Protocol on a Prohibition on Transfer of Cluster Munitions, Submitted by Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway, Fifth 2008 Session of the CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, CCW/GGE/2008-V/CRP.17*, 7 November 2008.

[44] Email from Øystein Sassebo Bryhni, NPA, to the CMC, 21 November 2008.

[45] Statement by Jens Stoltenberg, Prime Minister, Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference, Oslo, 3 December 2008.

[46] Statement by Jonas Gahr Støre, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Official Opening, Signing Conference, Oslo, 3 December 2008, www.regjeringen.no.

[47] Statement by Jonas Gahr Støre, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Akershus Castle, 3 December 2008, www.regjeringen.no.

[48] Norwegian Minister for International Development Erik Solheim welcomed campaigners to Oslo at their CMC Campaign Workshop on 2 December, Norwegian Minister of Defense Anne-Grethe Strøm Erichsen hosted a welcome reception for all delegates on 2 December, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg spoke at the opening of the Signing Conference on 3 December, and Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre signed the convention on 3 December.

[49] CMC, “Oslo International Parliamentary Forum,” www.stopclustermunitions.org.

[50] In November 2003, Norway reported that on the basis of a 2001 parliamentary resolution, “All air-delivered cluster bombs previously in Norwegian stock have been destroyed, because of their low level of precision and high dud-rate.” Norway, “National interpretation and implementation of International Humanitarian Law with regard to the risk of Explosive Remnants of War,” Sixth Session of the CCW GGE on ERW, Geneva, CCW/GGE/VI/WG.1/WP.3, 24 November 2003. NPA reports that Norway had 745 Rockeye bombs, each with 247 bomblets. Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA, 23 April 2009.

[51] Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), pp. 674–676. This indicates a contract was awarded in late 2006.

[52] Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, “Cluster and Cargo Munitions,” 15 January 2009, www.mil.no. Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA, 23 April 2009.

[53] “Alle klasevåpen skal bort” (“All cluster munitions to be removed”), Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), 28 November 2008. www.nrk.no.

[54] Ministry of Defense “Forsvarets klasevåpen skal nå destrueres” (“Armed Forces cluster munitions should now be destroyed”), Press release, 29 October 2008, www.regjeringen.no.

[55] Statement of Norway, Session on Storage and Stockpile Destruction, Wellington Conference, 21 February 2008.