Key developments since May 2005: Non-state armed groups, most notably
FARC, continued to use antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices
extensively. Colombia initiated mine clearance of the military bases.
Clearance of one base was completed, was ongoing in a second, and impact surveys
had been carried out on 17 bases. Despite inadequate data collection, Colombia
recorded a significant increase in casualties in 2005: 1,110, approximately
three casualties per day, compared with 882 in 2004, 734 in 2003 and 627 in
2002.
Mine Ban Policy
Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 6
September 2000 and became a State Party on 1 March 2001. National
implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July
2002.[1] The Antipersonnel Mines
Observatory of the Vice President’s Office remains the governmental agency
responsible for integrated mine action in the country as the technical
secretariat of the National Interministerial Commission on Mine Action.
Landmine Monitor obtained a copy of Colombia’s 2006 Article 7
transparency report, dated April 2006 and covering the period April 2005 to
March 2006, but it had not been posted to the UN website as of 1 July 2006.
Colombia has previously submitted five Article 7
reports.[2]
Colombia participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, where it made a statement
during the General Exchange of Views, as well as the sessions on mine clearance
and victim assistance. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee
meetings in June 2005 and May 2006. In the May meetings, it made presentations
on its mine clearance and victim assistance programs.
Colombia has made a few interventions on matters of interpretation and
implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. In June
2004, it made a strong and unequivocal statement that any mine that is
victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine, and is
banned.[3] In December 2005, the
government supported a proposal for more detailed Article 7 reporting on mines
retained for training.[4]
The government has called on other States Parties to exert pressure on
non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to accept the international norm prohibiting
antipersonnel mines, as set out in the Mine Ban
Treaty.[5] On 4 April 2006, at
celebrations to commemorate International Mine Awareness Day, Vice President
Francisco Santos Calderón called on non-state armed groups to halt the
use of antipersonnel mines, asserting that “the
FARC–especially–but also the ELN continue to sow death in our
country, in an indiscriminate manner, sowing mines in water sources, schools,
backyards of houses....”[6]
Colombia is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended
Protocol II, but did not attend the Seventh Annual Conference of States Parties
to the protocol on 23 November 2004 and has not submitted an Article 13 national
measures report for 2005.
Non-State Armed Groups
NSAGs continue to use antipersonnel mines and improvised explosives devices
(IEDs) on a daily basis. Principal among opposition armed groups are the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army
(Unión Camilista - Ejército de Liberación Nacional,
UC-ELN). Smaller groups include the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército
Popular de Liberación, EPL) and the People’s Revolutionary Army
(Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, ERP).
FARC, the largest NSAG and most prolific user of mines, has not made any new
statements on landmines since January 2005, when the Central Command issued a
statement defending the group’s use of antipersonnel mines on the grounds
that it was fighting an adversary with more
resources.[7]
The country’s second largest guerrilla group, ELN, continued
preliminary peace talks with the government, but landmines have not been
explicitly included as part of the talks and ELN has continued to use the
weapon.[8] In April 2006, ELN
representative Antonio García said ELN “complies with international
norms against ... indiscriminate use” of landmines, and noted that
“when we mine, we do not do it on roads, nor on populated areas. This is a
topic we have been discussing with [the Swiss-based NGO] Geneva Call and we are
reflecting on how ELN uses mines. We are not avoiding the topic; we are
exploring it with
specialists.”[9]
Other NSAGs include a large number of paramilitary forces, which operate with
the tolerance, and often support of, units within the Colombian
Army.[10] Some of the paramilitary
forces are part of the umbrella organization, United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). There are also smaller groups
such as the Self-Defense Peasant Forces of the Casanare (Autodefensas Campesinas
del Casanare, ACC) and Self-Defense Peasant Forces of Meta and Vechada
(Autodefensas Campesinas del Meta y Vichada, ACMV).
Most paramilitary forces have been engaged in a process of demobilization.
In mid-April 2006, the government announced that the three-year demobilization
of the AUC had been completed.[11] More than 30,000 paramilitary fighters from different blocs and regions
were demobilized, and approximately 16,000 weapons were turned
in.[12] There was only one report
regarding mines; in Cesar, the AUC turned in five antipersonnel mines in
February 2006.[13] However, 500
antipersonnel mines were seized from the AUC in the same month (see
below).[14]
In April 2006, the head of the Organization of American States (OAS) Mission
of Assistance to the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP) told media that some
demobilized paramilitary groups were rearming and resuming their
activities.[15] Landmine Monitor
knows of no landmine use by these new paramilitary groups.
Nongovernmental Organizations Activities
By May 2006, the Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana
Contra Minas, CCCM) had expanded its network of local coordinators to 22
departments.[16] CCCM members
advise municipal governments on victim assistance and mine risk education
activities, visit areas where mine-related events occur to verify incidents,
carry out awareness workshops, and help survivors to claim medical support,
rehabilitation and compensation. In 2005 and 2006, CCCM continued to issue its
quarterly national mine action bulletin, Colombia sin minas (Colombia
without mines), as well as several press
releases.[17] On 22 November 2005,
CCCM and Handicap International Colombia supported the global launch of the
ICBL’s Landmine Monitor Report 2005 at a release event held in
Medellín, Antioquia to disseminate the major findings on landmine
casualties and victim assistance.[18] The Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia (CIREC) held a
mine action seminar from 28 February to 3 March 2006 in Bogotá that
developed CIREC’s mine action plan for 2006 through the Semillas de
Esperanza (Seeds of Hope) program.
In 2005 and 2006, CCCM continued to participate in NGO efforts to engage
Colombian non-state armed groups on the antipersonnel mine ban, working closely
with Geneva Call. The two organizations held events with civil society actors
and local authorities in Cali (Valle del Cauca) on 6 July 2005, in Santa Marta
(Magdalena) on 7 July 2005 and in Popoyan, Cauca in October 2005.
Geneva Call participated in discussions with the ELN’s Central Command
in Havana, Cuba in December 2005 and in February and April
2006.[19] In February 2006, CCCM
members met with ELN spokesperson, Francisco Galán, in Medellín.
The campaign urged ELN and the government to include landmines in their ongoing
negotiations and called on the ELN to commit itself to a unilateral limitation
on antipersonnel mine use. The arrangement of humanitarian agreements, even in
the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, is also the aim of the continued
discussions between Geneva Call and the
ELN.[20] CCCM also offered its
support to a survey of areas mined by ELN in Cesar, Cauca and Magdalena (Sierra
Nevada de Santa Marta).[21]
Production
Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased
production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998, and destroyed its
production equipment on 18 November
1999.[22] INDUMIL still fabricates
Claymore-type directional fragmentation
mines.[23] Colombia has stated that
these mines are used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine
Ban Treaty.[24] However, Colombia
has not reported on steps it has taken to ensure that these mines are used only
in command-detonated mode.
NSAGs continue to produce various homemade antipersonnel and antivehicle
mines and IEDs. The Colombian Army has classified the different kinds of
antipersonnel mines and explosive artifacts found during emergency and tactical
demining, and during seizure of stockpiles. These include mines made from beer
cans with syringes as activation mechanisms, PVC tubes, milk containers, wooden
boxes, and mines similar to Claymores, among
others.[25] The military states
that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling
devices.[26] In May 2006, media
reported the seizure of a FARC arsenal held by the Jacinto Matallana Front in
the hamlet of Santa Lucía, Pasto municipality, Nariño, that
included nearly four tons of Anfo, a mixture of ammonium nitrate and diesel
fuel, the explosive commonly used in mineral
mining.[27]
Transfer
The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel
mines. There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal
weapons shipments destined for non-state armed groups in Colombia, but Landmine
Monitor knows of none since 2003.
Stockpiling and Destruction
Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its 18,531 stockpiled
antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004. On that day, a final quantity of 6,814
antipersonnel mines was destroyed at the INDUMIL facilities at Ponedera military
base in Atlántico department.[28] Landmine Monitor and CCCM witnessed and documented that event, and all
seven prior public stockpile destruction events between June 2003 and August
2004.
In addition to the 18,531 mines destroyed, the government has reported three
other destructions of antipersonnel mines. A total of 2,542 stockpiled mines
were destroyed in July 1999, prior to Colombia becoming a State
Party.[29] Another 391 mines were
destroyed “inside of military units by expiration of their useful
life.”[30] Finally, 471 mines
were destroyed at the Military School, and the Battalions Muñoz,
Cartagena and Nutibara.[31]
Over the years, there have been many inconsistencies and discrepancies in
Colombia’s count of stockpiled mines and their destruction. The Ministry
of Defense sent a letter to Landmine Monitor in September 2005 to clarify many
of the problems.[32]
According to its April 2006 Article 7 report, Colombia has retained a total
of 886 MAP-1 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, the same number as
indicated in its 2005 report, but 100 fewer mines than reported in
2004.[33] The Ministry of Defense
said the number was reduced to 886 “because the General Command after
internal consultations considered that this number of mines is enough [to] cover
the training necessities of the
forces.”[34] The destruction
of the 100 mines has not been specifically reported by Colombia.
The mines are held by the Army (600 mines total; 100 mines each by Divisions
2 to 6 and another 100 by the Army Engineers), Navy (186 mines) and Air Force
(100 mines).[35] Colombia has not
yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its
retained mines—a step agreed by States Parties in the Nairobi Action Plan
that emerged from the First Review Conference in November-December 2004.
Colombia did not use the new expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines
agreed at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in December 2005.
Seizures of NSAG Stockpiles
Between May 2005 and January 2006, CCCM regional coordinators registered more
than 20 seizures of NSAG stockpiles ranging in quantity from one to 100
mines.[36] Media regularly report
seizures of NSAG stockpiled mines. In October 2005, the Army recovered 128
antipersonnel mines belonging to the FARC in Guaimaral, Arauquita municipality
(Arauca).[37] Later that month, it
seized 60 antipersonnel mines belonging to the FARC in Paez-Belalcazar
municipality, Cauca.[38] In
February 2006, the Army’s Fourth Division reported the seizure of a
stockpile of 500 antipersonnel mines in La Sabana, in San Martín
municipality, Meta, belonging to the Centauros Bloc of the
AUC.[39]
The government has not included in its Article 7 reports any information
about the acquisition or destruction of antipersonnel mines from such
seizures.
Use
In June 2005, CCCM received information from the community in Caruru
municipality, in the jungle of Vaupes, regarding the possible use of mines by
the Armed Forces fighting NSAGs in the area. A commission of CCCM and the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) visited the zone.
Their investigation did not reveal any evidence linking the Army to use of
antipersonnel mines.[40]
Use by Non-State Armed Groups
Use of mines by NSAGs is reported on a frequent basis in Colombia. FARC
remains the country’s principal user of antipersonnel mines, and ELN is
also regularly cited as being responsible for mine incidents. There have been
no specific reports of use of antipersonnel mines by AUC in this reporting
period (since May 2005), though mines have been seized from and turned in by AUC
members. Local media reporting remains a key source of information on mine
incidents in the country, however, it is often difficult to determine the types
of explosive artifacts reported by media. NSAG mines sometimes feature
mechanisms so that they can be command-detonated or victim-activated.
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia: FARC is responsible for
most of the antipersonnel mines being laid in Colombia. Since its last report,
Landmine Monitor registered new use of antipersonnel mines by FARC forces in
several municipalities that had not reported mine incidents previously. In
August 2005, a marine was killed and another seriously injured after they
entered a minefield reportedly laid by Front 37 of the FARC in El Aceituno, El
Salado municipality, Montes de María region
(Sucre).[41] That same month, FARC
guerrilla Fronts 41 and 59 allegedly set off mines between Valledupar and La
Mina municipality as 15 police officers supervising coca eradication operations
in the area passed by.[42]
Following are some examples of ongoing use of antipersonnel and antivehicle
mines by FARC:
In July 2005, one soldier was killed and two others injured after an
antipersonnel mine allegedly laid by FARC Front 47 exploded in San Franciso,
Antioquia.[43]
In August 2005, FARC Front 9 warned inhabitants of Cocorná
municipality in Antioquia not to use the roads in Retiro or Los Limones because
they had been mined; a truck driver that did not heed their caution was killed
after detonating a mine.[44]
In August 2005, four people including two priests were killed after walking
into a minefield allegedly laid by FARC in the northeastern region of Norte de
Santander department.[45]
In September 2005, the Army’s Contraguerrilla Battalion No. 13 found a
minefield containing 10 antipersonnel mines allegedly laid by FARC Front 21 in
El Arrocito, Cubarral municipality,
Meta.[46]
In September 2005, a rural truck driver and his companion were killed after
driving through a minefield reportedly laid by FARC in San Juan de Arama
municipality, Meta.[47]
On 22 September 2005, nine police officers on patrol were killed when their
vehicle detonated a FARC-laid landmine in La Cruz, Nariño
department.[48]
In October 2005, the Army’s Caribe Command I destroyed 60
antipersonnel mines laid in Santo Domingo, Fundación municipality in the
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, near Kogui indigenous territory, after fighting
between the Army and FARC.[49]
In November 2005, three soldiers were reported killed, and four more
injured, after entering a FARC minefield in Ituango municipality,
Antioquia.[50]
In December 2005, the Army and intelligence services (DAS) deactivated 92
antipersonnel mines allegedly laid by FARC, including 34 antipersonnel mines
located near a rural school in Samaná municipality,
Caldas.[51]
In January 2006, the Army’s Fourth Brigade located and destroyed a
minefield allegedly laid by FARC in Alto Letras, Abejorral municipality,
Antioquia.[52] In total, the Fourth
Brigade deactivated 110 FARC minefields that
month.[53]
In January 2006, four people were killed, including a child, when a
FARC-landmine exploded near a coca eradication project outside
Vistahermosa.[54]
In February 2006, a FARC mine laid on a road linking the municipalities of
San Carlos and San Rafael in La Esperanza, Antioquia, killed one soldier and
injured two others. An ambulance taking a pregnant woman to a hospital in Rio
Negro, Antioquia, was severely damaged by the explosion as well, but the
vehicle’s occupants were not
injured.[55]
In February 2006, the Army’s Fourth Brigade found and destroyed 110
antipersonnel mines allegedly laid by FARC Front 47 in La Linda and Quebrada
Manizales, Sonsón municipality, Antioquia. Also in February 2006, the
Army destroyed five “Chinese Hat” type FARC mines in Puerto
Asís, Putumayo.[56]
In May 2006, four soldiers were killed and eight others wounded when they
entered a FARC minefield in Antioquia
department.[57]
Unión Camilista–Ejército de Liberación Nacional
Reports of landmine use by ELN continued during the reporting period:
In August 2005, an Army soldier was injured by an ELN-laid antipersonnel
mine in El Tambo municipality, Cauca.[58] It is not known if the mine was newly-laid, but the Army’s Mountain
Battalion No. 3 Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo destroyed 10 newly-laid ELN
antipersonnel mines in the municipality that
month.[59]
In December 2005, six families sought refuge in Los Andes Sotomayor,
Nariño department, after a landmine killed a 72-year-old peasant in their
community of Palacios. Residents and local authorities in the communities of La
Esmeralda, El Huilque, El Paraíso and El Palacio denounced ELN
mine-laying on roads in the
area.[60]
In January 2006, three members of the First Marine Brigade were injured
after they entered a minefield laid by the ELN Jaime Bateman Cayón Front
and ERP guerrillas in San Jacinto municipality,
Bolívar.[61]
In March 2006, the national police reported a new method for disguising
mines after they deactivated two mines allegedly laid by members of the ELN
Camilo Torres Restrepo Front, near El Limón hamlet, La Gloria
municipality, Cesar, that were covered with a layer of concrete to create the
“appearance of
rocks.”[62]
In April 2006, the Army’s Second Division destroyed 96 antipersonnel
mines laid by the Guillermo Ariza Bloc of ELN, in La Quebrada La Honda, Santa
Rosa municipality, Bolívar; they also destroyed 75 kilograms of R-1
explosives and five electronic
fuzes.[63]
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
Landmine Monitor has not received any reports of new use of antipersonnel
mines specifically attributed to paramilitary forces of the AUC, or other
paramilitary blocs, in this reporting period. But, as noted above, a large
stockpile of weapons including 500 antipersonnel mines was discovered at an AUC
camp in Meta in February 2006.[64]
Landmine and ERW Problem
Colombia is considered to be the country most affected by landmines and
explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the Americas, as a result of 40 years of
internal conflict.[65] The number
of affected departments and municipalities has increased regularly since
Landmine Monitor started reporting. In 1999, 125 municipalities in 21
departments were affected; as of 30 May 2006, 646 municipalities in 31
departments were identified as affected, representing approximately 59 percent
of the 1,092 municipalities of the
country.[66] Of Colombia’s 32
departments, only one― the Caribbean Archipelago Department of San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina―is not affected.
Both antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines have been laid by NSAGs along
routes used by government forces and around their camps. They also have been
used around schools, civilian routes, water sources, bridges, housing areas and
around illicit drug cultivations.[67] Colombia’s Article 7 of April 2006 stated that 668 people were
injured as a result of landmines compared to 14 as a result of ERW in
2005;[68] however, the Survey Action
Center (SAC) survey found that 78 percent of casualties were caused by mines and
22 percent by UXO. (See Landmine/UXO Casualties section in this
report).
From 1990 to 1 June 2006, the Observatory recorded 8,439 landmine and
ERW-related incidents, including 1,236 people killed and 3,916
injured.[69] The most affected
department, as of June 2006, was Antioquia, accounting for 22.6 percent of
incidents registered since 1990, followed by Meta and
Santander.[70]
Colombia’s landmine and ERW problem is overwhelmingly rural; as of June
2006, 96 percent of mine/ERW incidents took place in rural
areas.[71]
In October 2005, SAC conducted a preliminary opinion collection survey. It
identified 208 of the 330 surveyed municipalities (63 percent) as affected by
landmines and UXO. In addition, it recorded 34 mine-affected municipalities
that were not registered by the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory. When the
results are incorporated into the Observatory’s database (as of October
2005), of the 664 municipalities where information on landmines was available,
582 (or 88 percent), were considered to be affected by landmines and
ERW.[72]
In addition to mines laid by NSAGs, government forces also laid mines around
military installations and infrastructure. Colombia’s Article 7 reports
state that there are 34 minefields; 21 minefields contain 3,111 mines and the
other 13 sites need verification.[73]
In its Article 7 report of April 2006, Colombia stated that landmines affect
the mobility of people, as well as the social, political and economic
development of the country, adding that 88 percent of the casualties are young
adults in the productive stage of
life.[74] The SAC survey found that
the most commonly blocked socioeconomic resource was farmland, affecting 62
percent of the 330 surveyed municipalities. In addition, 45 percent of surveyed
municipalities indicated that landmines are one of the main reasons internally
displaced people are unable to return home. Other major problems caused by
landmines included loss of income as a result of cattle being killed and the
hindrance of reconstruction efforts.[75]
Mine Action Program
National Mine Action Authority: The National Interministerial
Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Nacional Intersectorial
para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMA) was established on
8 October 2001.[76] CINAMA is
responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including the development
of a national plan, policy decisions and coordination of international
cooperation. The commission has two technical committees, one on victim
assistance and one on prevention, marking, mapping and mine
clearance.[77] CINAMA meets twice a
year to discuss progress and plans. The next meeting was expected to take place
on 18 July 2006.[78]
Mine Action Center: The Antipersonnel Mine Observatory Observatory
(Observatorio de Minas Antipersonal), established by Law 759 of July 2002,
functions as the technical secretariat of CINAMA . The Observatory continues to
collect mine-related information and issue statistical reports, but its
activities have greatly expanded in recent years; in early 2006, the
National Council of Social and Economic Policy (Consejo
Nacional de Política Económica y Social, CONPES) considered a
proposal to transform the Observatory into a national mine action
center.[79] A national mine action
plan for the period 2004-2009, guides the government’s mine action policy,
especially in the areas of institutional strengthening, integrated assistance to
landmine victims, compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty and communication strategy
on the issue.[80]
The Observatory supports mine action committees that function as focal points
for mine action around the country.[81] However, the committees vary in their level of activity. In Magdalena,
for example, the committee stopped meeting because the departmental government
prioritized other topics instead of the mine problem, while in Meta, the mine
action committee met just twice over the course of one year. Antioquia remains
the most active department in terms of mine action, mainly because of strong
support by local government
authorities.[82] With support from
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Observatory worked to strengthen
capacities at the departmental and local level in Antioquia and Meta, as well as
in the Montes de María region, located in the departments of
Bolívar and Sucre.[83] In
2005 and 2006, UNICEF also supported departmental authorities in Cauca,
Antioquia, Bolivar and Sucre to develop the capacity of public officials and
social workers to create advocacy initiatives, and victim assistance and mine
risk education projects in conjunction with
NGOs.[84]
Colombia and the OAS signed an agreement in 2003 to support the
country’s humanitarian activities against
landmines.[85] Through its Program
for the Integrated Action against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral
Contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), the OAS initially provided limited
assistance in the fields of mine awareness, victim rehabilitation and
development of a mine action database. Since 2005, the OAS, with the
Inter-American Defense Board, has assisted Colombian Army personnel to
strengthen the national capacity for humanitarian
demining.[86]
Colombia uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA),
which was installed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) in 2002.[87] Colombia
planned to decentralize the IMSMA database to the departmental level, starting
with those that are most affected. Colombia runs a mixed system, using the
latest form of version 3 and some components of version 4, allowing for
decentralization of the system.[88] The project is supported by the GICHD and the International Organization
of Migration (IOM).[89] As of June
2006, 15 computers had been acquired and were being installed in departmental
committees for integrated mine action, with training of some of the
committees.[90]
The database includes information on demining activities, mine risk education
and victim assistance. Colombia reports that it “constantly”
undertakes a process of verification and updating with data provided by other
institutions.[91] In addition, 32
departmental baselines, which include information on the number of hospitals and
schools, the level of literacy and the displacement of people were prepared and
integrated into IMSMA in order to better prioritize mine
action.[92]
In May 2006, the Observatory reported that information on the localization of
all 34 military minefields had been registered in IMSMA and that results of the
ongoing local impact studies were updated as they were
completed.[93] IMSMA terminals were
also planned to be installed during 2006 at the navy, the army, the police and
the Ministry of Defense in order to facilitate responses to
emergencies.[94]
Between May and July 2005, a protocol for demining was drafted by the
Observatory with the participation of the Army and National
Police.[95] The protocol is based
on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). It was elaborated based on the
characteristics of the minefields under the jurisdiction and control of the
armed forces, and is to be applied on those specific minefields although it can
be used “as a basis” to work on minefields emplaced by armed groups.
Issues covered in the protocol include: safety measures, procedures for impact
and technical surveys, marking, destruction of UXO and internal quality
assurance.[96]
Strategic Planning and Progress
Colombia’s National Strategic Plan for 2004-2009 was approved by the
government on 10 August 2004, following a participatory planning process which
involved civil society, international organizations, members of departmental
governments, CINAMA technical committees and the
UN.[97] The strategy included four
goals: capacity-building and implementing state policy against landmines;
reducing casualties and providing assistance; meeting treaty obligations by
demining military bases, destroying stockpiles and “universalizing the
fulfillment of the Treaty” through, for example, mobilizing
citizen’s participation against landmines; and promote the changes in
perception and in practice of the population towards landmines. The strategy
does not set fixed timelines for these
goals.[98]
As of May 2006, the Observatory, with the technical support of the National
Department of Planning, was in the process of drafting a Social and Economic
Policy Document in order to consolidate and coordinate Colombia’s policy
against landmines and ERW at the state level. Colombia’s 2006 Article 7
report states that “some problems have been detected such as lack of
coordination, the ‘dispersal’ of actions, the inadequate
distribution of resources and the lack of institutional evaluation, amongst
others, which has affected the achievement of the set
goals.”[99] All ministries
are expected to integrate mine action in their action plans and include a budget
line for it.[100]
According to UNDP, one of the key challenges facing mine action in Colombia
is “ensuring its sustainability at the regional and local level. Regional
and local authorities responsible for mine action, as well as regional mine
action committees, still depend to a large degree on UNDP and UNICEF
support.”[101]
Most mine clearance in Colombia has been military, undertaken for operational
purposes, and has not followed
IMAS.[102] In 2005, Colombia made
efforts to develop humanitarian demining by establishing two teams, coordinated
by a Decision Committee composed of representatives of the Observatory, the
Ministry of Defense, the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board. A first
group of 40 military and police deminers was trained in humanitarian demining
between September and November 2005 to clear the military bases. A second team
of 40 deminers was in training in July 2006 to respond to emergencies. The
Decision Committee is responsible for setting priorities for demining, based on
the threat posed to the
population.[103]
CCCM criticized the OAS and the Observatory for starting with clearance of
the Mamonal military base, arguing that the reason was not humanitarian but was
commercial, as the land was being sold by the army to private
investors.[104] According to the
OAS, Mamonal was chosen by the government as a safe area where deminers could
get experience in clearance of military
bases.[105]
Colombia’s 2006 Article 7 report states that one of the challenges in
demining military bases is the lack of financial and human
resources.[106] Operations lacked
appropriate protective equipment, ambulances, radios and transportation
vehicles.[107]
Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia must destroy all
antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but no later than 1 March 2011. Colombia’s Law 759 of 2002
acknowledges that the deadline must be complied with, but permits the Ministry
of Defense to maintain until the deadline mines laid before 1 March 2001 for
protection of military bases, energy and communication infrastructure, provided
that there is appropriate marking for the safety of the civilian
population.[108]
The Observatory states that the government plans to meet the Article 5
deadline in terms of clearance of the minefields under the jurisdiction of the
armed forces, but adds, “there is no guarantee that Colombia will be able
to declare itself mine-free in 2011, especially if non-State actors do not
embrace the principles in the Convention. However, the Government will not ask
for any extension until evaluating the possibility to completely fulfill what is
established in the
Treaty.”[109]
Demining
Identification of Mined/ERW-affected Areas: Surveys and Assessments
SAC carried out a preliminary opinion collection survey with CCCM assistance
during a two-week period in July and August 2005, to assess the available data
on landmines and the need for a Landmine Impact Survey
(LIS).[110]
Local impact surveys were conducted around the military bases; as of July
2006, 17 impact surveys had been
completed.[111]
Colombia planned to initiate an LIS in 2006, with the assistance of the
European Commission (EC). By July, the agreement with the EC had been signed
and a tendering process was expected to begin in August. The Observatory noted
that the standard LIS gives a picture of the mine situation at one point in
time, so is not appropriate to the Colombian context, given the ongoing
conflict. The Colombian LIS is intended to “measure tendencies” in
terms of the impact of landmines on particular communities in order to guide
mine risk education, victim assistance and, to a limited extent, demining
activities. The survey will not be
nationwide.[112]
The SAC report stated, “Colombia presents several particular challenges
to conducting any survey that requires traveling to, and visiting, the 1,121
districts (municipios) throughout the country. Restricted access to
communities resulting from local conflict and a poor transportation network are
the primary issues that may inhibit gathering data on landmines. Taking locator
readings with a global positioning system (GPS) of landmine fields, as well as
collecting detailed information from community members concerning landmine
locations, would also be problematic. ...they are essential tasks for an
internationally recognized Landmine Impact Survey.”
[113]
Fencing and Marking
According to the OAS, “in most cases, mined areas [under military
jurisdiction and control] are fenced and do not pose a serious threat to nearby
civilians.”[114] Very few
marking and fencing operations have been conducted around minefields laid by
NSAGs. The Observatory expected to conduct a large fencing and marking
operation based on the results of the
LIS.[115]
Mine and ERW Clearance
To carry out military demining, the armed forces had approximately 600
explosives and demolition (EXDE) groups throughout the country as of February
2006, composed of five military personnel and one dog; in 2005, there were 254
EXDE groups. An additional unit, Grupo Marte, which includes seven groups of
nine army personnel, is specialized in the handling of
explosives.[116]
In 2005, the Observatory registered 607 instances of military clearance, a
decrease compared to the 862 events registered for 2004. Between January and
April 2006, an additional 155 military clearances were
registered.[117] The number of
mines destroyed and the area where operations were conducted is not reported.
According to the 2005 and 2006 Article 7 reports, only in 65 percent of cases
does the military provide the Observatory with geographic coordinates related to
its activities.[118]
Clearance operations according to IMAS were undertaken between 9 November and
1 December 2005 at the Mamonal military base, Bolívar department, by 40
military deminers. Two military officers from Honduras supervised operations;
the OAS provided logistical support and life insurance to the
personnel.[119] A total of 400
antipersonnel mines were destroyed in an area of 4,831 square
meters.[120] The demined area was
handed over to the community in a celebration on 16 December 2005. Quality
assurance was undertaken by six international OAS
observers.[121]
Clearance has been conducted only by manual methods.
Between January and November 2005, the Observatory received 36 requests for
emergency clearance from affected communities; these are transferred to the
Ministry of Defense, which decides on the appropriate action. Eight emergencies
were attended to during this period, given security concerns and the
availability of EXDE
teams.[122]
The demining team under the supervision of the OAS is reported not to have
suffered any accidents during demining. An official of the Air Force reports,
however, that there have been accidents within the EXDE and Grupo Marte
teams.[123]
Landmine Monitor was unable to confirm if any informal
(“village”) demining had taken place in Colombia since May 2005,
when local guards cleared mines and UXO in Cauca
department.[124]
Clearance by Non-State Armed Groups: Some clearance has been
undertaken in previous years by NSAGs. In July 2006, the Observatory reported
that it had not carried out verification of the area cleared in Micohaumado,
Morales municipality, by ELN in early 2005, given that the “verification
should have been done during the demining operations and a verification now
would require demining the area
again.”[125] The CCCM local
branch indicated that the road had been used since clearance by ELN and that no
accidents had been registered as of February
2006.[126]
In June 2006, the mayor of Samaniego municipality (Nariño department)
announced that ELN would carry out humanitarian demining in 14 hamlets of
Samaniego in coming months.[127] The Observatory said that it celebrated the news and wanted to ensure that
the operations by ELN would comply with international humanitarian standards;
one possibility was the creation of mixed groups of army and ELN
deminers.[128]
Mine Risk Education
In 2005, mine risk education (MRE) in Colombia
remained at a very limited level in relation to the large number of affected
municipalities and civilian casualties. There has been no regular coordination
of MRE activities through the Observatory. National Law 759 calls for the
creation of a subcommision on MRE, but as of July 2006 this had not been
created.[129]
In 2005, the Observatory for the first time brought together organizations to
share experiences, lessons learned and best practices. As a result, the
National Strategic Plan on MRE for 2005-2009 was
developed.[130] The objectives
include: to reduce the number of landmine/UXO casualties through the promotion
of safe behaviors tailored to the specific community; to provide information on
the types of landmines and UXO present and their risks; to teach what to do if a
person enters a mined area; and to find ways of reducing high-risk
behaviors.[131] Colombia also
reported that it translated IMAS for
MRE.[132] A desk needs assessment
prioritized 100 municipalities in 12 departments (Antioquia, Arauca,
Bolívar, Caquetá, Cauca, Cesar, Córdoba, Cundinamarca,
Meta, Norte de Santander, Santander and Vaupés); 64 of the municipalities
were to be targeted immediately.[133]
However, during this Landmine Monitor reporting period, the geographical
coverage of MRE in Colombia appeared to be insufficient. MRE took place in only
a small number of municipalities. As of July 2006, most municipalities selected
as a priority by the needs assessment had not received any MRE.
MRE in Colombia is limited by difficulties in linking with humanitarian mine
clearance or emergency clearance operations due to the ongoing conflict in many
parts of the country. According to CCCM, in areas where there is no
humanitarian clearance or where there has been recent use of landmines, a rapid
reduction in incidents and casualties cannot be expected as a result of MRE.
Where the armed conflict is intense, the population may be afraid to disclose
information. Meaningful MRE under these circumstances is difficult and can be
carried out only if use of explosive devices, policy and other considerations
are mentioned.[134]
Most of the MRE activities have been basic information sessions and advocacy,
conducted on a community basis. The SAC preliminary survey in 2005 found that
101 municipalities, about one-third of the 330 municipalities, reported some
kind of prevention and risk education
activity.[135] Most MRE projects
use data-gathering templates that are specific to each organization; there is no
systematic registry of these templates or of MRE strategies, nor any overall
quality control.[136]
In 2005, MRE was undertaken by the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory and some
departmental governments with the support of UNICEF and UNDP, and five national
NGOs, CCCM, Corporación Paz y Democracia, Fundación Antonio
Restrepo Barco, CIREC and the Colombian Red Cross Society, supported by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Among regional NGOs, Fundemos
was no longer active in 2005; former Fundemos staff started a new NGO, Tierra de
Paz (Land of Peace), in 2005 with support from the German NGO Diakonie Emergency
Aid, and started MRE activities in several municipalities of Cauca.
Adopt-a-Minefield supported another local NGO providing MRE in Cauca
department.[137]
NGOs and the ICRC met in June 2006 to discuss a common MRE
strategy.[138]
The 2005-2009 MRE strategy focuses on children in the education system. It
included three phases: short term intervention, including an MRE notebook and
basic MRE sessions for teachers and students; medium term intervention,
integration of MRE into the Ministry of Education’s citizen’s skills
program; and long term intervention, involving new alliances made by the
Observatory with organizations managing projects in living together, peace, and
shared community work.[139]
Colombia’s 2006 Article 7 report stated that the Observatory reported
that two pilot MRE projects were being implemented; one in the Magadalena Medio
region, which includes the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Santander
and Cesar, and the second in the Montes de María region, which includes
the departments of Bolívar and
Sucre.[140] The projects involve
institutional strengthening with mayors, local human rights officers and local
prevention committees; no other details are
reported.[141]
The Observatory’s “+Arte-Minas” (More Art Less Mines)
project developed MRE materials including a notebook, posters, other teaching
materials, and a series of seven songs by Colombian artists. During 2005, the
project included the advocacy and fundraising event Peter and the Wolf with the
Philharmonic Orchestra of Bogotá and the Spanish artist Miguel
Bosé, and a partnership with actors from the television series, Factor X,
in order to raise funds for survivor
assistance.[142]
During 2005, UNICEF continued to support 18 departmental committees for mine
action which include MRE and victim assistance among their responsibilities.
Outputs from the activities of the 18 mine action plans with regards to MRE were
not reported. In 2006, UNICEF developed a pilot project for teacher training in
Antioquia department to test MRE materials for use in schools. In June 2006,
UNICEF provided MRE training to mobile teams of the National Institute of Family
Well Being prior to their deployment to the region of Alto Atrato in
Chocó, a conflict-area contaminated by explosive devices and in which
there has been population
displacement.[143]
Corporación Paz y Democracia, supported by UNICEF, UNDP and the
Observatory, implemented MRE projects in 15 municipalities of Antioquia, in 15
municipalities of Montes de María (in Bolívar and Sucre
departments), and in six municipalities of Magdalena Medio region (in
Bolívar and Santander departments). The one-year project began in
Antioquia in the second half of 2005; activities in Meta were launched in
January 2006 and were followed by those in Magdalena Medio. At first, baseline
data is gathered to start with the process of community-based MRE. According to
UNICEF, as of March 2006, 211 MRE campaigns had been carried out with the
participation of 2,500 people.[144] MRE projects by Corporación Paz y Democracia have had evaluatory
and quality control visits from international UNICEF staff, all of which have
shown positive results, according to its project
coordinator.[145]
CCCM in collaboration with Corporación Paz y Democracia initiated a
project, Reinsertion of [Survivors] in Mine Risk Education Programs, in 2006
aiming to train 26 mine survivors as MRE trainers in 14
departments.[146] CCCM organized a series of workshops, sessions and public events
throughout 22 departments of Colombia. Most sessions include advocacy messages,
such as information on the Mine Ban Treaty, the obligations that States Parties
have assumed, and the rights of landmine
survivors.[147]
CIREC carried out a mine action (including MRE) training of trainers for 21
community leaders from Norte de Santander department and 22 community leaders
from Cundinamarca, from 17 to 23 October 2005. Following this,
“prevention messages” were delivered by the participants to 840
direct beneficiaries.[148] In June
2006, CIREC, supported by UNICEF, trained 166 community association members,
including many people with disabilities, in
MRE.[149]
The Colombian Red Cross, with support from ICRC, carried out MRE in two
municipalities of Cauca department and five municipalities in Antioquia.
Baseline community studies were conducted in two municipalities in Norte de
Santander and in two municipalities in Meta. MRE materials were revised in
2005. In June 2005, the Colombian Red Cross carried out three MRE workshops in
San Juan de Arama municipality, Meta, targeting local rural inhabitants and
teachers for the first time in this
department.[150]
Funding and Assistance
Unlike other heavily mine-affected countries, international donors have
contributed little funding directly to mine action in Colombia. Where support
has been provided, it has been through international organizations. In 2005,
$2,332,300 was contributed by seven countries and the EC, a decrease of some 34
percent from 2004 ($3.53 million provided by three countries and the
EC).[151] Donors in 2005
were:
Canada: C$411,000 ($339,249), consisting of C$161,000 ($132,893) to OAS
AICMA for technical and impact surveys, and C$250,000 ($206,356) to UNICEF for
victim assistance and
MRE;[152]
Germany: €139,796 ($174,032) to UNICEF for MRE and victim
assistance;[153]
EC: €100,580 ($125,212), consisting of €80,053 ($99,658) to
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco for MRE, and €20,527 ($25,554) to
Diakonie for MRE; [154]
Japan: ¥70,986,190 ($644,684) for the renovation of a rehabilitation
center at the Hospital Universitario del Valle Evaristo García in
Cali;[155]
Norway: NOK2,211,283 ($343,303), consisting of NOK1,050,000 ($163,013) to
CCCM for MRE, NOK1,097,000 ($170,310) to CCCM for economic reintegration of
landmine survivors, and NOK64,283 ($9,980) to Fundación Antonio Restrepo
Barco for mine action;[156]
Spain: €215,000 ($267,653) consisting of €57,000 ($70,959) for
mine survivor and war wounded assistance, €70,000 ($87,143) for victim
assistance, and €88,000 ($109,551) for victim
assistance;[157]
Switzerland: CHF325,000 ($260,856), consisting of CHF150,000 ($120,395) for
MRE, and CHF175,000 ($140,461) to UNICEF for victim
assistance;[158]
US: $177,311 to Landmine Survivors Network
(LSN).[159]
In addition, Adopt-A-Minefield reported contributing $84,215 for MRE in
Colombia in 2005.[160]
The Colombian government approved COP571 million (about $213,400) for the
national mine action program for July 2005-June 2006, substantially less than
before (COP2.5 billion, about $934,100, for July 2004-June
2005).[161]
UNICEF reported receiving contributions totalling $1,016,568 for multi-year
periods including 2005-2006; from Canada $685,868 (2004-2008) for MRE and
survivor assistance; Sweden $170,000 (2003-2006); Switzerland $125,000
(2005-2007) for survivor assistance; and UK $35,700
(2003-2005).[162]
The Observatory is reported to have received a total of $6 million to carry
out its activities to date.[163] Funding has been provided by Canada, Japan, Sweden, the US, the EC, UNDP,
IOM and UNICEF.[164]
The OAS did not provide specific reporting on funding for its mine action
program in Colombia in 2005. It told Landmine Monitor in September 2005 that
funding shortages had impeded full implementation of its planned
activities.[165] The OAS had
previously estimated that it would require a budget of $800,000 for mine action
in Colombia in 2005.[166]
In April 2006, the EC was reported to have made a contribution of €2.5
million ($3.1 million) for a victim assistance project in
Colombia.[167] The funding will
be directed to the Observatory. The total budget for the project is €3.15
million ($3.9 million), with the remainder to be provided by the Colombian
government.[168]
Colombia was accepted into the US Department of State’s humanitarian
mine action program in September 2005, to commence in 2006. Funding will be
provided through the OAS for training and equipping a military 40-person
humanitarian demining emergency response capability for the
Observatory.[169]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
Colombia reported in April 2006 that, “whereas [mine] casualties are
diminishing in the world, in Colombia they increased in an alarming
way.”[170] In 2005, the
Antipersonnel Mine Observatory recorded 1,110 new landmine/UXO casualties,
approximately three casualties per day; 288 people were killed and 822 people
injured.[171] This represents a
significant increase from the 882 new landmine/UXO casualties in 2004, 734 in
2003, and 627 in 2002.[172] The
majority of casualties (767) were military personnel, 338 were civilians, four
were armed non-state actors, and the status of one person was unknown.
Casualties included at least 28 women, and 28 girls and 65 boys under 18 years;
the gender of three children is not known. The most common activity at the time
of the incident was military activity, other activities were “passing
by” (148), and farming (26); the activity at the time of 164 incidents was
unknown.
Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. As of 1 June, the Observatory
had registered 526 new casualties (106 people killed and 420 injured); 357 were
military personnel, 167 were civilians, one non-state actor, and the status of
one casualty was not known. There were at least 10 women, six girls and 33 boys
under 18 years, among the casualties; the gender of six children was not
known.
Landmine Monitor and knowledgeable sources in Colombia assume there is
significant under-reporting of
casualties.[173] Civilians
injured by landmines in rural areas are often a long distance from available
healthcare services, and if they do reach those services their injuries may not
be recorded as mine-related because of security concerns. Between October 2005
and 25 June 2006, Handicap International (HI) identified 60 mine survivors in
Antioquia and Bolivar departments, of whom 75 percent were not included in
Observatory statistics. HI sends its statistics to the Antioquia departmental
government on a monthly basis.[174] CCCM also has records of casualties that had not previously been included
in Observatory statistics.[175]
There is also under-reporting of military casualties, and practically no
reporting on NSAGs in Colombia. Based on information provided to CCCM-Santander
by the Army’s Second Division in June 2005, military personnel were
considered injured only if they lost a leg or if the injury was
severe.[176] The Observatory
reports only 41 non-state actors killed or injured by mines since 1990. It is
reported that ELN records its own casualties, but this information is not
shared.[177]
The rapidly increasing number of casualties is linked in part to the
government’s policy of eradicating coca fields and reclaiming land under
the “Plan Patriota,” thus increasing NSAG mine-use to protect their
camps and coca fields. Most of the new casualties are military, but also
include unemployed civilians hired by the military to clear coca fields, for
example in Vistahermosa in La Macarena national park in Meta department, or
NSAGs stepping on their own
devices.[178] In January 2006,
two peasants stepped on a mine reportedly laid by NSAGs in Vistahermosa;
one was killed. The two peasants were not part of the Macarena coca eradication
operation, which the government launched after the 28 December 2005 incident
that killed 29 military personnel.[179] A 26-year-old man was killed and two others injured after setting off an
antipersonnel mine in Macarena national park while eradicating coca in March
2006.[180] An Observatory study
confirmed that there is a “direct relation between the placement of mines,
mine accidents and illicit crops. FARC -mainly- has been using mines to
protect their narco-traffic business.” This was particularly the case in
Meta, Vichada, Antioquia, Putumayo, Caquetá, Bolívar and Norte de
Santander.[181]
The Observatory’s registry of mine casualties in Colombia uses IMSMA;
information is obtained from departmental and municipal authorities, regional
ombudsmen, DAS, bulletins, civilians and six Colombian newspapers. Data
collection is an ongoing process with statistics continually updated as new
casualties, and those from previous periods, are
identified.[182] The Observatory
supported the pilot epidemiological control system SIVIGILA in Antioquia, which
will in future include information on mine/UXO
incidents.[183]
From 1990 to 1 June 2006, the Observatory recorded a total of 5,152 mine/UXO
casualties (1,236 people killed and 3,916 injured) from 8,439 incidents; 3,264
were military, 1,845 civilians, 41 NSAG members; and two cases were unknown. At
least 187 casualties were women, 117 were girls and 418 were boys under 18
years; the gender of 33 children was not known. According to the Observatory,
the most common activities at the time of the incident were: military activities
(3,152 casualties), “passing by” (582), farming (144), tampering
(83), playing (62), police activity (32), collecting water, wood or food (24),
working at home (20), traveling (14), herding animals (13), fishing (10), other
activities (65), and unknown (951). According to the government, 92 percent of
casualties occur in rural areas and 88 percent of casualties are people of
working age.[184]
The 10 Colombian departments with the most reported casualties from 1990 to 1
May 2006 were: Antioquia with 1,288 casualties (25 percent); Meta 492 casualties
(9.5 percent); Bolívar 419 casualties (eight percent); Caquetá 387
casualties (7.5 percent); Norte de Santander 336 casualties (6.5 percent); Cauca
274 casualties (5.3 percent); Santander 257 casualties (five percent); Arauca
224 casualties (4.3 percent); Tolima 195 (3.7 percent) and Cundinamarca 142
casualties (2.8 percent). The number of reported casualties in Antioquia
increased from 678 (September 2004) to 1,288 in May
2006.[185]
Landmine Monitor estimates that the actual number of casualties could be at
least 20 percent higher than recorded by the Observatory due to delays in
reports from remote locations. The Observatory does not have the capacity to
proactively locate casualties, and the departmental authorities, who are
responsible for data collection within the Observatory framework of
decentralization, do not have up-to-date lists of casualties and incidents.
This would mean there could be between 6,500 and 15,000 mine/UXO casualties in
Colombia, including civilians, military and NSAGs (a smaller proportion than the
other two groups).[186]
Casualty data collection is further hampered by the large number of
internally displaced people in Colombia, estimated at three million. It is
unknown how many mine casualties there are among this group, and where they are
registered, especially if they do not have supporting documents or an incident
occurs when they are displaced from their homes. Displaced survivors are among
the poorest in Colombia, not having a social safety net, documents necessary to
receive services and very limited financial means. The majority of the
displaced population in Colombia are women and
children.[187]
The SAC preliminary opinion collection from 13 July to 15 August 2005 covered
330 municipalities (29 percent of the country) but in the most mine-affected
department of Antioquia covered only 14 percent of municipalities, leading to an
incomplete picture of the number of casualties. Local informants were aware of
621 casualties throughout Colombia between 1 June 2003 and August 2005,
including 138 killed; there is no information on 53 casualties. At least 18
percent of casualties (112) were under 18 years and 16 percent were females.
The survey found that 78 percent of casualties (485; 101 killed and 384 injured)
were caused by landmines and 22 percent by UXO (136; 37 killed and 99 injured).
It indicated that 193 casualties occurred in Antioquia, 65 in Caldas, 62 in
Cesar, 44 in Boyacá, 43 in Cauca, 39 in Meta, 27 in Cundinamarca, 26 in
Chocó, 24 in Norte de Santander, 22 in Arauca, and 76 in other parts of
the country. The most common activity at the time of the incident was farming
(210). Tampering was the cause of five percent of casualties, but contrary to
other LIS, the rate of casualties was higher among adults (21 casualties) than
children (13 casualties).[188]
Survivor Assistance
At the First Review Conference, Colombia was identified as one of 24 States
Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest
responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for
assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation
and reintegration of survivors.[189] Colombia prepared its 2005-2009 objectives for the Sixth Meeting of States
Parties in November-December 2005. The objectives included: consolidate and
decentralize information management at different levels; reduce the number of
landmine casualties and provide effective healthcare; and create a national
strategy for integrated care of landmine survivors. There were no specific
objectives for physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support and social
reintegration, economic reintegration and laws and public
policies.[190]
At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Colombia presented its
progress in achieving its 2005-2009 objectives, and included a victim assistance
expert in its delegation. Colombia highlighted as main achievements in 2005:
developing a National Council of Public Policy document on disability; analyzing
the process of providing medical care, rehabilitation, legal and administrative
assistance and their costs; a decree providing rehabilitation retroactively;
organizing interdepartmental meetings with survivors; developing shared
responsibility through awareness-raising; and improved and broadened information
management. The main challenges included: extending national geographical
coverage and the package of services; building capacity and improving medical
care, referral systems and community-based rehabilitation programs; including
mine survivors in policy-and strategy-making; and supporting disabled
people’s organizations and implementation of disability
rights.[191]
Colombia’s Article 7 report of April 2006 included voluntary Form J
providing an update on victim assistance
activities.[192]
Survivors are increasingly engaged by the government in awareness campaigns
and activities aiming to inform the public of the magnitude of the landmine
problem, the suffering it causes, and to highlight that mine use is a breach of
international humanitarian law. However, there is little information on the
positive impact these government actions have on the actual life of survivors
and their families. Private foundations, international organizations and NGOs
working on survivor assistance are achieving results due to their presence and
knowledge of the situation at the municipal and community level, and due to
their cooperation and networking. They play a key role in providing assistance
to all segments of society, as they are not identified with the
government.[193]
The Antipersonnel Mine Observatory’s technical subcommittee on mine
victim assistance coordinates and monitors the program for Mine Accident
Prevention and Victim Assistance in cooperation with the Ministry of Social
Protection, international organizations, state agencies and NGOs. The Ministry
of Interior coordinates the Committee of Prevention and Assistance of
Disasters.[194] In 2005, the
Observatory developed new policies for the integrated care of landmine
casualties, with special focus on child survivors, as many casualties are
children. A plan for godparents (padrinos) for survivors, and for promoting
social responsibility, was also
prepared.[195]
Health facilities in mine-affected areas reportedly have the infrastructure,
equipment, supplies and staff to deal with landmine casualties. Hospitals are
obliged to provide free and immediate assistance to mine casualties and a
referral system is in place to ensure adequate rehabilitation. The state
assumes the cost of services and the National Supervision of Health monitors the
quality of services.[196]
First-aid is available through the Colombian Red Cross, Civil Defense, and
Firefighters (Bomberos). In some areas, emergency transport is available;
Antioquia department has an air
ambulance.[197] However, from
Landmine Monitor field visits in May and November 2005, it appears that
emergency care for civilians at the scene of a mine incident continues to be
poor, existing medical treatment is slow, and transportation to health
facilities is inadequate. The rural health posts will often vary in terms of
medical supplies available, number of personnel, and the training of personnel.
Roadblocks, interruptions of public transportation, and “vehicle-free
days” prohibitions imposed by combatants to prevent movement on the roads
sometimes prevent survivors from reaching adequate medical care. It can take
hours or even days to reach the nearest
hospital.[198] Health
professionals may be threatened if they are perceived as taking sides;
occasionally health professionals are kidnapped and forced to provide services,
and health centers are abandoned for security reasons or are raided for
supplies.[199] However, the
government is in the process of building capacity in rural areas by training
health personnel, and providing medical equipment and ambulance
services.[200] A draft decree
discussing accident insurance and emergency transport was discussed; under the
decree mine/UXO casualties would receive emergency transport and stabilization
in the first health
center.[201]
Specialized medical and rehabilitation services are for the most part located
in the main urban centers, far from the mine-affected areas. Level III and
level IV hospitals have the capacity to provide surgical assistance and
corrective surgery.[202] However,
transport costs are often beyond the means of civilian mine casualties; new
facilities are opened without taking this into
account.[203] When people do not
possess the necessary supporting documents they cannot receive treatment, which
is a problem for indigenous and displaced people. Reportedly, referrals to
specialized health centers for post-hospitalization are not automatically made
for survivors, and many healthcare facilities charge survivors for medical
services, such as medical exams, X-rays and basic medication, all of which are
too expensive for poor families. Other medication and certain types of
services, such as plastic surgery, are not covered by the obligatory health
plan. As a result, many survivors and their families end up in debt, postpone
or forego treatment.[204]
An additional pressure on the system is the demobilization of most
paramilitary groups, who, now considered to be civilians, compete with others
for the resources available.[205] According to CCCM and local hospital authorities, one of the biggest
challenges is the delay in reimbursement to medical and rehabilitation
providers. This limits the financial means of service providers, who therefore
prefer to treat patients with private health plans and not landmine survivors
who are covered by the
state.[206]
Military mine casualties are transported to an emergency center and to the
Central Military Hospital in Bogotá, fully equipped to handle trauma
cases. Military survivors have access to programs for physical rehabilitation
and psychological
support.[207]
The paramilitary had a rehabilitation center on the northern coast; NSAGs
have their own surgeons and health services. However, many members of NSAGs are
likely to lack adequate medical and rehabilitation
treatment.[208]
In 2005, the Observatory participated in the US Army Southern Command
project, with support from the US Department of State, training six departmental
teams and 12 municipal teams in dealing with physical and psychological
emergencies to minimize the impact of landmine incidents. The teams were from
Santander, Norte de Santander, Bolívar, Arauca, Caquetá and
Putumayo.[209] The ICRC conducted
joint missions with the Ministry of Social Protection mobile medical teams to
remote rural areas affected by conflict, and helped with the reopening of nine
health posts in cooperation with local health
authorities.[210]
Physical rehabilitation services are available in several major cities;
services, but not accommodation and transport, are free of charge for a maximum
of one year. The Ministry of Social Protection covers the cost of the first
prosthetic or orthotic; sometimes local authorities cover the cost of
replacements. Access to services is limited due to the location of the centers,
a lack of awareness of the available services, and complicated procedures.
Training in rehabilitation medicine, physical therapy and occupational therapy
is available.[211]
Legally, survivors are entitled to psychosocial support for one year after
the incident.[212] The
psychological effects of armed conflict are the main health and physical problem
faced by victims of conflict in Colombia, but mental health services receive
little attention by health authorities and are
under-funded.[213]
The Ministry of Education deals with inclusive education and teacher training
for people with disabilities, but accessibility is limited. The National
Learning Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA) provides vocational
training in urban centers; these courses are free of charge for people with
disabilities. In 2005, the Observatory and SENA started training of trainers
for the integrated care of survivors, including emergency assistance,
psychosocial support, socioeconomic reintegration and job placement. It was
expected to deploy 200 SENA instructors in 64 municipalities of Colombia in
2006.[214] Economic reintegration
programs are also available, including micro-credit schemes, job placement
schemes and unemployment subsidies for vulnerable groups. State compensation is
paid to survivors or the families of those killed in mine/UXO
incidents.[215]
Reportedly, only seven percent of people with disabilities in Bogotá
have access to education and only 15 percent have access to rehabilitation
services.[216]
CIREC provides integrated rehabilitation services, as well as medical
services, psychosocial support, educational opportunities and direct financial
assistance.[217] In 2005, CIREC
assisted 8,944 patients, providing 2,489 medical consultations, 3,199 physical
and occupational therapy sessions, 446 psychology sessions and 2,810 social
services. The center produced 481 prostheses and 4,330 orthoses. CIREC treated
83 mine/UXO survivors, of whom 11 were military and 72 civilian; 13 other mine
survivors were referred by the OAS. CIREC provides mobile medical and
rehabilitation services to assist people with disabilities in remote rural
areas; in 2005, they assisted 407 people, providing 46 prostheses, 28 orthoses,
67 wheelchairs and 95 other technical
supports.[218]
CIREC’s Semillas de Esperanza (Seeds of Hope) community leadership
program includes a variety of psychosocial and socioeconomic reintegration
programs and technical support to associations of people with disabilities in
regions affected by violence and receives UNICEF support. In October 2005,
CIREC and Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) signed an agreement to implement
phase II of the program in 23 municipalities in Santander, Norte de Santander,
Cundinamarca, and Cauca. In 2005, income generation projects benefited 59
people in Santander, Bolívar, Cauca, and Cundinamarca departments. The
program trained 45 team leaders and provided leadership training to 840 people
in communities in Norte de Santander and Cundinamarca. All groups of
“Seeds of Hope” collect mine/UXO survivor information with the
purpose of identifying future
beneficiaries.[219]
The University Hospital of the Valley in Cali received funding from Japan and
the Valle del Cauca departmental government to develop a rehabilitation center
covering Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Chocó, Risaralda,
Quindío, Caldas, Huila, Putumayo and Caquetá, which was
inaugurated in June 2006. The center will have the capacity to provide surgery,
physiotherapy, occupational and language therapy to landmine/UXO survivors, but
will not produce prostheses. Timely provision of prostheses to the hospital is
problematic as there is a delay in reimbursement of costs. Other challenges
include the lack of transportation and accommodation, and psychological support
and socioeconomic reintegration services are not
available.[220]
In Cúcuta, Norte de Santander, the Center for Orthoses and Prostheses
opened on 18 November 2005. It benefits both civilian and military people with
disabilities, including mine
survivors.[221]
The University Hospital San Vicente de Paúl in Medellín,
Antioquia, provides integrated rehabilitation for mine survivors; in 2005, the
center assisted 69 survivors with support from La Caixa Foundation of Barcelona,
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, and the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims
Aid.[222] The Hogar Jesús
de Nazareth (Jesus of Nazareth Shelter) in Bucaramanga, Santander, assisted 38
landmine survivors receiving physical rehabilitation in the city with
accommodation and food.[223] Other organizations providing rehabilitation services are the University
Hospital of Santander, Bucaramanga, which is aiming to open a regional
rehabilitation center, and the NGO Corporación
Dike.[224]
ICRC continued its program to assist victims of violence in 2005, providing
second hand prostheses, transport, and assistance during the rehabilitation
process. Survivors also received legal advice regarding their rights, as well
as financial support. In 2005, ICRC assisted 102 mine survivors, including 57
new cases and 45 cases from 2004. In addition, 28 UXO survivors received
support, including 19 new cases and nine from
2004.[225] In May 2006, ICRC
organized a seminar on war surgery. The ICRC made an evaluation visit in 2005
to several rehabilitation centers and, as a result decided to donate
polypropylene for the fabrication of 50 prostheses in each center, to provide
special tools and prosthetic components, and to train a technician of each
institute in Nicaragua.[226]
CCCM, with the support of the government of Catalonia and the La Caixa
Foundation of Barcelona and in partnership with the Catalan NGO Movimento per la
Pau (Movement for Peace), locates mine survivors and provides transport and
support while they are undergoing rehabilitation in Bogotá and other
urban centers. CCCM started a 12-month project on 1 October 2004 in Antioquia,
Cauca, Meta and the south of Bolívar and Santander, benefiting 80
survivors and their families. Evaluation of the support stated that there was
an increased understanding of bureaucratic procedures, administrative obstacles
and political will or lack thereof. Increased interaction with other assistance
organizations, departmental authorities, and more survivor input, as well as
improved data collection was
advised.[227] Following a new
contribution from Barcelona, the project has been extended to September 2006, 50
survivors have been identified as beneficiaries, and 41 have received support as
of June 2006.[228] CCCM and
Movimento per la Pau started a similar 12-month project on 1 April 2005, in
Caldas, Caquetá, Cesar, Norte de Santander and Nariño departments
which had not benefited from assistance projects before. In the first nine
months, only 26 people were assisted, as the identification of survivors was
hampered due to security issues and lack of organizational support for the
project coordinators. In the last three months, 52 more people were assisted;
the project was not extended.[229]
CCCM, with the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid, supported 10
additional landmine survivors in Aquitania and San Francisco municipalities,
Antioquia.[230] With UNDP
support, CCCM provided assistance and advice to 20 mine survivors claiming their
rights to care and rehabilitation from Meta, Antioquia, and the Montes de
María region; CCCM monitored the quality of care and rehabilitation they
received.[231]
In September 2004, Handicap International, in partnership with Foundation for
Integrated Rehabilitation (REI), started a program to improve the situation of
displaced people and people with disabilities in the departments of Antioquia,
Bolívar, and Cesar through a community-based rehabilitation
approach.[232] Through this
program, HI identified civilian mine/UXO survivors and started the Assistance to
Landmine/UXO Victims in Antioquia and Bolívar project in October 2005,
aiming to provide orthopedic, rehabilitation, and psychological support. HI
identified survivors outside the General System of Social Security of Colombia
in collaboration with ICRC, REI Foundation in Cartagena, Orthopraxis Orthopedic
Workshop in Medellín and local hospitals. By June 2006, 60 survivors
were identified (five from Bolívar and 55 from Antioquia) and 52 of them
received assistance. HI has an agreement with Orthopraxis and REI Foundation to
adapt prostheses of survivors who are not covered by the state because they lack
necessary documents. The project will also provide small grants for productive
projects to at least 10 of the identified survivors. In 2006, UNICEF, in
cooperation with CIREC and HI, aimed to provide physical and psychological
rehabilitation for, and to support the socioeconomic reintegration of 65
landmine survivors (40 in Antioquia and 25 in Bolívar). On 6 and 7
April 2006, HI organized a training seminar for local authorities, health and
humanitarian aid actors, and community members of Bajo Cauca-Causasia region,
Antioquia, to improve healthcare services for civilian mine/UXO survivors in the
region; 17 survivors
participated.[233]
The Antioquia departmental government offers legal advice to survivors and
their families to assist with procedures to access state humanitarian
aid.[234] In Antioquia and Cauca,
Corporación Paz y Democracia, with the support of UNICEF, provided legal
and educational assistance to survivors and their
families.[235]
The Antipersonnel Mine Survivors Foundation, founded by a mine survivor,
provides psychosocial support to landmine survivors in Cauca, Santander,
Medellín, and
Bogotá.[236]
The Der-hechos Group of the Javeriana University provides legal counseling
services assisting people with disabilities in claiming their benefits and
services. The group is supported by the Institute of Social and Cultural
Studies and CCCM.[237]
United for Colombia (UFC), established in 2003 by Colombians living in the
US, supports military and civilians disabled by the conflict in Colombia. In
July 2005, four Colombian military mine survivors were assisted at Baylor
University Medical Center in Dallas. In March 2006, UFC sent a team of US
doctors for a training session in surgical interventions at the Military
Hospital and the Kennedy Hospital in
Colombia.[238]
Disability Policy and Practice
Colombia has legislation that protects disabled people’s rights,
including mine survivors. However, implementation of the legislation is limited
and many mine survivors do not know about benefits and services
available.[239]
The Ministry of Social Protection, the Presidency, Acción Social and
the Ministry of Education, provide financial support and capacity-building for
associations and networks of people with
disabilities.[240]
[1] See Article 7 Report, Form A, 6
May 2005, and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 255, for details on penal
sanctions and other aspects of the law. [2] Colombia has previously
submitted five Article 7 reports on 6 May 2005, 11 May 2004, 27 May 2003, 6
August 2002 and 15 March 2002. [3] Remarks to the Standing
Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 25 June
2004 (Landmine Monitor/HRW notes). [4] Interventions at the Sixth
Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 30 November 2005. Notes taken by Landmine
Monitor Colombia. [5] See for example,
“Intervención de Colombia en los temas del cumplimiento del
Articulo 5, universalización, destrucción del arsenal
almacenado,” Maria Victoria de Santos, National Government Delegate, Sixth
Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, Croatia, 28 November 2005; Intervention by
María Angela Holguin, Ambassador to the UN, and María Angela
Holguin, First Committee Debates, UN General Assembly, New York, 3 October 2005.
[6] Presidencia de la
República (SNE), “Vicepresidente Santos pide a grupos ilegales
dejar de sembrar minas antipersona,” Bogotá, 4 April 2006. [7] “Plan Patriota after 14
months of its implementation,” statement issued by the Secretariat of the
Central Chiefs of Staff of FARC-EP, 26 January 2005, www.rebelion.org. [8] Three rounds of talks were
held, in Havana, Cuba in December 2005 and February 2006, and in Medellín
in April 2006. [9] “El Oriente quiere ser
un ejemplo para el Eln,” El Colombiano (Medellín), 19 April
2006. [10] See Human Rights Watch,
The “Sixth” Division: Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy
in Colombia, New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2001. [11] “Editorial: La
desmovilización de las Auc,” El Colombiano
(Medellín), 23 April 2006. [12] “Con la
desmovilización de 30.431 paramilitares se llega al fin de un desarme
histórico,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), 19 April 2006. [13] CCCM Cesar, “Informe
Regional, Febrero 2006,” Valledupar, 1 March 2006. [14] Colombian Army (ANE),
“Hallado campamento de las autodefensas en el Meta,” 17 February
2006; “Colombian army seizes huge rightist arsenal,” EFE
(Bogotá), 17 February 2006. [15] “Surgen nuevos grupos
de paramilitares que entrarían a operar cuando termine el actual desarme
con las autodefensas,” Caracol (Bogotá), 25 April 2006;
“Rearme de paras en zonas de coca,” El Colombiano
(Medellín), 28 April 2006. [16] These programs are supported
financially and technically by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the
Norwegian government, the Generalitat of Catalunya, and the Townhall of
Barcelona and Caixa Foundation. The departments are Antioquia, Arauca,
Bolívar, Caldas, Caquetá, Cauca, Cesar, Chocó,
Cundinamarca, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Santander,
Guaviare, Huila, Tolima, Sucre, Valle del Cauca, Casanare, Putumayo and
Vaupés. [17] On 9 November 2005, for
example, the CCCM issued a communiqué in which it stated that the
humanitarian demining project started by the government in the Mamonal former
Naval Base, in Bolívar department, was not humanitarian in nature since
clearance was being carried out for financial interests related to sale of the
land for commercial purposes, not because it was a priority for civilian
populations. CCCM, Press Release No. 22, Bogotá, 9 November 2005, www.colombiasinminas.org. [18] See ICBL Website Report,
“Victim Assistance report launch in Medellín, Colombia Draws
International Attention,” www.icbl.org/lm/updates/va_release_summary. [19] Geneva Call Press Release,
“ELN will talk about antipersonnel landmines with Geneva Call in
Cuba,” 7 December 2005; Glemis Mogollón Vergara, “Antonio
García está en Cuba; solo falta Luis C. Restrepo,” El
Colombiano (Medellín), 14 December 2005; “Grupo suizo espera
reducir minas terrestres en Colombia,” Associated Press (Havana),
21 December 2005, and email correspondence from Anki Sjöberg, Geneva Call,
21 July 2006. [20] Email from Anki
Sjöberg, Geneva Call, 21 July 2006. [21] CCCM, “Carta dirigida
al Comando Central del Ejército de Liberación Nacional,”
Medellín, 8 February 2006. [22] For details on destruction
of stockpiles, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 315. [23] Interviews with Engineer
Sergio Rodríguez, Second Technical Manager, INDUMIL, 5 July 2000 and 24
July 2001. [24] Letter from General
Commander of the Armed Forces, 21 January 2000. [25] Armed Forces presentation,
“Desarrollo Compromisos Convención de Ottawa,” National Army,
Bogotá, 26 January 2004. [26] Armed Forces presentation,
“Desarrollo Compromiso con la Convención de Ottawa,”
Bogotá, 6 March 2006. [27] “Destruyeron 4
toneladas de anfo e incautaron material de guerra,” Diario del Sur
(Pasto), 4 May 2006. [28] Presidencia de la
República (SNE), “Colombia cumple con la Convención de
Ottawa,” “En Ponedera se destruyó la última mina
antipersonal almacenada por el Estado,” 24 October 2004. [29] Article 7 Report, Form D,
April 2006. [30] “Antipersonnel
Mines,” document provided by Emersson José Forigua Rojas, Advisor,
Directorate of International Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, to Landmine
Monitor (MAC), 27 September 2005. These are also listed in Article 7 Report,
Form D, April 2006. The date of destruction is not reported. [31] “Antipersonnel
Mines,” document provided by Emersson José Forigua Rojas, Ministry
of National Defense, to Landmine Monitor (MAC), 27 September 2005. The date of
destruction is not reported. These mines are not listed in the April 2006
Article 7 report. [32] Ibid. The Ministry
explained inconsistencies in considerable detail, noting such things as mines
retained for training being listed as mines to be destroyed, counting antitank
mines as antipersonnel mines, mines being reported as held by the wrong service,
and failures of accounting due to inexperience of personnel. [33] Article 7 Reports, Form B,
April 2006, 6 May 2005 and 11 May 2004. In the 2004 report, the Army held 786
mines, the Air Force 100 mines, and the Navy 100 mines. This would apparently
indicate that the Army transferred 86 antipersonnel mines to the Navy and
destroyed 100 mines no longer needed for training activities, although the
government did not specifically report any destruction. [34] “Antipersonnel
Mines,” document provided by Emersson José Forigua Rojas, Ministry
of National Defense, to Landmine Monitor (MAC), 27 September 2005. [35] Article 7 Report, Form B,
April 2006. [36] CCCM Caldas Regional Report,
“Desactivación de 100 MAP elaboradas en botellas de plástico
– Unidad antiexplosivos DAS regional Caldas, en el Municipio de
Samaná, en julio 26 de 2005,” Manizales, August 2005. [37] National Army of Colombia
Press Release, “Localizado depósito clandestino de minas
antipersona de las FARC,” 2 October 2005. [38] “Descubierto arsenal
de la Jacobo Arenas en Páez–Belalcázar,” El Liberal
(Popayán), 18 October 2005. [39] Colombian Army,
“Hallado campamento de las autodefensas en el Meta,” 17 February
2006; “Colombian army seizes huge rightist arsenal,” EFE
(Bogotá), 17 February 2006. [40] See, Maria Clara
Ucrós, CCCM Communications Coordinator, “CCCM Mission Report to
Caruru, Vaupes,” Bogotá, 23 September 2005; UN OCHA, “Informe
de Misión Caruru,” September 2005, www.colombiassh.org/temp/misiones.html.
[41] “Infantes caen en
mina,” El Meridiano de Sucre (Sincelejo), 5 August 2005. [42] “Ataque de FARC deja
15 policías muertos y 14 heridos en el norte de Colombia,”
Agence France-Presse (Bogotá), 2 August 2005. [43] “Explosión deja
un militar muerto y dos heridos en noroeste de Colombia,” Agence
France-Presse (Bogotá), 12 July 2005. [44] CCCM Press Release No. 20,
“Las minas acechan a los civiles, Crítica situación en
Cocorná,” Bogotá, 31 August 2005. [45] “Asesina FARC a cuatro
personas al noreste de Colombia,” Notimex (Bogotá), 15
August 2005. [46] ANE, “Desactivadas
diez minas antipersona de las Farc,” Bogotá, 21 September 2005. [47] “Campo minado explota
al paso de camión con insumos agrícolas,” La
Opinión (Cucutá), 21 September 2005. [48] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Colombia,”
Washington DC, 8 March 2006. [49] “Desactivan Campo
Minado en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta,” El Heraldo
(Barranquilla), 13 October 2005. [50] “Tres militares
muertos y cuatro heridos por minas en Antioquia,” EFE
(Bogotá), 18 November 2005. [51] “Desactivan 34 minas
antipersonales en alrededores de escuela,” EFE (Bogotá), 2
December 2005. [52] “Ejército
destruyó minas en Abejorral,” El Colombiano
(Medellín), 27 January 2006. [53] “Mueren 11
guerrilleros en combates en Colombia,” Associated Press
(Bogotá), 29 January 2006. [54] “Colombia says child,
3 others killed by FARC mines,” Reuters (Bogotá), 20 January
2006. [55] “Mina sembrada en
carretera de Antioquia causa la muerte de un soldado y deja a dos más
heridos,” Caracol Radio (Bogotá), 22 February 2006. [56] “Destruyen 20 minas
antipersona en operaciones en Antioquia, Meta y Putumayo,” El Tiempo
(Bogotá), 22 February 2006. [57] “Landmines kill 4,
wound 8 in Colombia,” EFE News Service (Bogotá), 21 May
2006. [58] “Ejército toma
el control,” El Meridiano de Córdoba (Córdoba), 5
August 2005. [59] ANE, “Desactivadas 18
minas sembradas por el Eln y las Farc,” 2 August 2005. [60] “Minas llenan de
terror caminos de Sotomayor,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), 27
December 2005. [61] “Minas hieren a tres
infantes de marina,” El Universal (Cartagena), 25 January 2006. [62] National Police (ANNP),
“Policia Nacional, deja al descubierto nuevo tipo de camuflaje de mina,
desactivado campo minado,” 7 March 2006. [63] ANE, “El
Ejército Colombiano destruyó 69 minas antipersona,” 10 April
2006. [64] “Colombia army seizes
huge rightist arsenal,” EFE (Bogotá), 17 February 2006. [65] Laura De Young,
“Colombia,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.1, September
2005. Under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive
remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive
ordnance (AXO). Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition. Colombia
uses the term “municiones abandonadas sin explotar” (unexploded
abandoned ordnance) which refers to both UXO and AXO such as caches and
stockpiles of ammunitions. Telephone interview with Luz Piedad Herrera,
Coordinator, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [66] Data by the Antipersonnel
Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006; according to the Department of National
Statistics, there are 1,092 municipalities as of July 2006; see www.dane.gov.co,
accessed 6 July 2006. [67] OAS Action Against
Antipersonnel Mine Program (AICMA), “Portfolio 2005-2006,” p.
17. [68] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [69] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Eventos por Minas Antipersonal (MAP)/Municiones Abandonadas
sin Explotar (MUSE) 1990–01 de Junio de 2006.” [70] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Frecuencia departamental de eventos por Minas Antipersonal
(MAP)/Municiones Abandonadas sin Explotar (MUSE) 1990–01 de Junio de
2006.” [71] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Eventos por MAP/MUSE 1990 al primero de junio de
2006.” [72] The survey refers to
municipios (municipalities) as “districts.” SAC,
“Preliminary Opinion Collection, Final Report,” October 2005, pp.
5-9. The report states that the 88 percent figure should be treated with
caution, a much greater variation in mine contamination between municipalities
and community levels should be expected, as was the case with the Landmine
Impact Survey in Afghanistan; also, the survey only covered 29 percent of the
territory. [73] Article 7 Reports, Form C, 6
May 2005 and April 2006. Of the 21 mined areas, four were under the
jurisdiction of the Air Force, five under the Navy, and 12 under the Army. The
13 sites requiring verification were under Army jurisdiction. Colombia
previously reported differently: in September 2004, it reported 22 minefields
with a total of 2,768 mines; in August 2002, it reported a total of 9,409
emplaced landmines; in May 2002, it reported 54 minefields containing 20,000
landmines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 266. [74] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [75] SAC, “Preliminary
Opinion Collection, Final Report,” October 2005, p. 12. [76] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006; for details of CINAMA, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p.
267. [77] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 267. [78] Telephone interview with Luz
Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [79] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006. [80] “State Policy and
Country Strategy Plan for integrated mine and UXO action 2004–2009,”
Bogotá, 2005. For details of the Program for the Prevention of
Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and Victim Assistance, see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 267. [81] CCCM has registered the
existence and functioning of departmental mine action committees in Santander,
Cauca, Meta, Antioquia, Bolívar, Caldas, Nariño and Magdalena.
There are some departments that include the mine issue in their general
development committees. [82] CCCM, “Regional
Reports,” Bogotá, October 2005. [83] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006. [84] Email from Sharon Ball, Mine
Action Project Officer, UNICEF Columbia, 21 July 2006. [85] “OAS launches
landmine-clearing course in Colombia,” OAS Press Release, 16
September 2005. [86] OAS, “Taking Action
Against Landmines,” www.oas.org, accessed
27 June 2006; OAS AICMA, “Portfolio 2005-2006,” p. 18. [87] SAC, “Preliminary
Opinion Collection, Final Report,” October 2005, p. 2. [88] Telephone interview with
Simon Berger, Regional IMSMA Coordinator for Latin America, GICHD, 31 May
2006. [89] Interviews with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006, and
Geneva, 10 May 2006. [90] Telephone interview with Luz
Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [91] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [92] Telephone interview with Luz
Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [93] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Geneva, 10 May 2006. [94] Interview with Col. Luis
Alfredo Cabrera Albomoz, Inspector Delegate of the Air Force and mine action
focal point for the Ministry of Defense, Bogotá, 28 February 2006. [95] Interview with Diego Osorio,
Advisor, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 16 February 2006. [96] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Protocolo de Desminado,” Bogotá, 2005. [97] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 267. [98] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Política de Estado y Plan Estratégico
País para la Acción Intregral contras las Minas Antipersonal y
Munición abandonas sin Explotar 2004-2009,” undated. [99] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [100] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Geneva, 10 May 2006, and telephone
interview, 6 July 2006. [101] Mine Action Support
Group, “MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May
2006, p. 15; email from Sharon Ball, UNICEF Columbia, 21 July 2006. [102] Eric Filippino,
“Colombia: Mine Action and Armed Conflict,” Journal of Mine
Action, Issue 8.2, November 2004; OAS AICMA, “Portfolio
2005-2006,” p. 17. [103] Telephone interview with
Luz Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [104] CCCM, “Comunicado
#22,” Bogotá, 9 November 2005. The Observatory also provided a
completion report of the clearance of Mamonal military base to CCCM, which
indicates that the reason for clearance is “industrial;” see
“Finalización de Estudio, Mamonal,” undated, document
provided by the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory on 23 March 2006. [105] Interview with William
McDonough and Jaime Toso, OAS, Zagreb, 30 November 2005. [106] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [107] Interview with Col. Luis
Alfredo Cabrera Albomoz, Ministry of Defense, Bogotá, 28 February
2006. [108] Article 4 of Law 759, 25
July 2002. [109] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006. [110] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 269. [111] Telephone interview with
Luz Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [112] Ibid. [113] SAC, “Preliminary
Opinion Collection, Final Report,” October 2005, p. 3. [114] OAS AICMA
“Portfolio 2005-2006,” p. 19. [115] Telephone interview with
Luz Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [116] Interview with Diego
Osorio, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 16 February 2006. [117] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [118] Article 7 Reports, Form
A, April 2006 and 6 May 2005. [119] Interview with Diego
Osorio, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 16 February 2006;
“Thirty Landmine Fields to Be Destroyed in Colombia,” Washington
File, 10 November 2005. [120] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Finalización de Estudio, Mamonal,” undated.
[121] Interview with Col. Luis
Alfredo Cabrera Albomoz, Ministry of Defense, Bogotá, 28 February 2006.
[122] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Emergencias por minas antipersonal reportadas al
Observatorio de Minas Antipersonal de enero 2005 a noviembre 2005,”
undated. [123] Interview with Col. Luis
Alfredo Cabrera Albomoz, Ministry of Defense, Bogotá, 28 February
2006. [124] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 272. [125] Telephone interview with
Luz Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [126] Interview with
José Adolfo Bernal, CCCM coordinator in the south of Bolívar
department, Medellín, 8 February 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report
2005, p. 271. [127] “En tres meses el
ELN comenzaría el desminado humanitario en 14 veredas del municipio de
Samaniego, Nariño,” El Colombiano (Medellín), 20 June
2006. [128] Telephone interview with
Luz Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 6 July 2006. [129] Email from Camilo Serna,
Operations Coordinator, CCCM, 7 July 2006. [130] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006; Article 7
Report, Form C, April 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 273. [131] “More Art, Less
Mines,” document given at the launch of the Communications Strategy of the
National Mine Action Program 2004-2009, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory,
Bogotá, 16 February 2006. [132] Article 7 Report, Form I,
April 2006. [133] Ibid. [134] Email from Camilo Serna,
CCCM, 9 July 2006. [135] SAC, “Preliminary
Opinion Collection, Final Report,” October 2005, pp. 6, 13. [136] Interview with
Álvaro Jiménez Millán, Coordinator, CCCM, Bogotá, 22
February 2006. [137] Email from Camilo Serna,
CCCM, 9 July 2006. [138] Email from Camilo Serna,
CCCM, 7 July 2006. [139] Article 7 Report, Form C,
April 2006; interview with Sharon Ball, and Olga Lucía Zuluaga,
Humanitarian Action Consultant, UNICEF Colombia, Bogotá, 23 March
2006. [140] Article 7 Report, Form I,
April 2006. [141] Ibid. [142] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Integrated and Coordinated Actions Against Mines,”
Draft, March 2006. [143] Mine Action Support
Group, “MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May
2006, p. 15. [144] Interview with Sharon
Ball and Olga Lucía Zuluaga, UNICEF Colombia, Bogotá, 23 March
2006. [145] Interview with Olga
Lucía Jiménez, Project Coordinator, Paz y Democracia,
Medellín, 9 February 2006, and email, 11 July 2006. [146] Movimento per la Pau,
“Report of the Projects Executed by CCCM in Colombia,” Barcelona,
January 2006. [147] CCCM departmental monthly
reports 2005 and 2006, Bogotá. [148] CIREC, “Centro
Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia CIREC, Programa Semillas de
Esperanza, Actividades 2005,” in email from Jorge Quesada Ortega,
Coordinator, Semillas de Esperanza, CIREC, Bogotá, 25 May 2006. [149] Email from Sharon Ball,
UNICEF Colombia, 21 July 2006. [150] Email from José
Antonio Delgado, ICRC, Bogotá, 26 January 2006; ICRC, “ICRC Special
Report–Mine Action 2006,” May 2006, p. 16. [151] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 276. [152] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [153] Germany Article 7 Report,
Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database. UNICEF reported
receiving $161,445 from Germany specifically for victim assistance activities;
interview with Sharon Ball and Olga Lucia Zuluaga, UNICEF Columbia,
Bogotá, 23 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 =
US$1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of
Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [154] Email from Laura Liguori,
Security Policy Unit, Conventional Disarmament, EC, 20 June 2006. [155] Emails from Kitagawa
Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated
information received by JCBL from the Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11
May 2005, and Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006. Average
exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = ¥110.11. US Federal Reserve, “List
of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 277. [156] Email from Annette A.
Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = NOK6.4412. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [157] Spain Article 7 Report,
Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Luis Gómez Nogueira, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 25 April 2006; emails from Camilo Serna, CCCM,
30 June and 4 July 2006. [158] Email from Rémy
Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [159] Email from Michael Moore,
LSN, 29 May 2006; email from Michael Gerber, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 7 March 2006. [160] Email from Zach Hudson,
Program Manager, Adopt-A-Minefield, 2 June 2006. [161] Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 276. [162] Interview with Sharon
Ball and Olga Lucia Zuluaga, UNICEF Columbia, Bogotá, 23 March 2006. [163] Article 7 Report, Form J,
April 2006, p. 38. [164] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006. [165] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 277. [166] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 332; OAS, “Mine Action Program: Making the Western
Hemisphere landmine-safe,” p. 6, presented at Standing Committee meetings,
May 2003. [167] “Tras la
presentación de Juanes, Parlamento Europeo le donó a Colombia 2,5
millones de euros,” El Espectador (Bogotá), 20 April 2006.
[168] Telephone interview with
María Sánchez Gil-Cepeda, Colombia Programme, EuropeAid, 14 June
2006. Funding was reportedly approved at the end of 2005, however it was not
reported by the EC for 2005. [169] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 276; email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining
Advisor, US Department of State, 28 September 2005 and 19 July 2006. [170] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [171] Unless otherwise stated,
all information in this section is taken from the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory
reports dated 1990-1 June 2006, www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/minas,
accessed 11 June 2006. [172] In Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 277-278, it was reported that 863 casualties were recorded.
As of June 2006, this number had increased to 822 casualties recorded in 2004.
Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, “Victimas segun estado de eventos MAP/MUSE
(Victims according to condition for landmine/UXO events),” www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/minas,
accessed 11 June 2006. [173] Based on Landmine Monitor
interviews with health workers, displaced persons and others in mine-affected
areas during May 2005 and November 2005. [174] Email from Dominique
Delvigne, Country Director, HI Colombia, 14 June 2006. [175] Email from Alvaro
Jiménez Millán, CCCM, 27 June 2006. [176] Information provided to
Guillermo Gil Sayer, Coordinator, CCCM Santander, by the Army Second Division,
Bucaramanga, 16 June 2005. [177] Email from Alvaro
Jiménez Millán, CCCM, 27 June 2006. [178] Ibid; email from Charlie
Avendaño, Regional Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 26 June 2006. [179] “Un campesino
murió por explosión de campo minado de la guerrilla en
Vistahermosa (One peasant died from in explosion in guerrilla minefield in
Vistahermosa),” El Tiempo (Meta), 20 January 2006. [180] “Víctima de
una mina antipersona, murió erradicador en el Parque de La Macarena
(Victim of an antipersonnel mine, an erradicator died in La Macarena
Park”),” El Tiempo (Bogotá), 29 March 2006. [181] “FARC usan minas
antipersona para proteger narcotráfico (FARC using antipersonnel mines to
protect narco traffic),” SNE (Bogotá), 21 April 2006. [182] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
“Victim Assistance objectives of the States Parties that have the
responsibility for significant number of landmine survivors,” Zagreb, 28
November-2 December 2005, pp. 128-129. For example, the Observatory reported in
May 2006 that there had been 1,097 new mine and UXO casualties in 2005. In June
2006, the figure had increased to 1,110 new casualties in 2005. [183] Interview with Zoraida
Delgado, Victim Assistance and Mine Risk Education Coordinator, Antipersonnel
Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 16 February 2006; Article 7, Form J, April
2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 278. [184] Article 7 Report, Form A,
April 2006. [185] Antipersonnel Mine
Observatory, “Frecuencia departamental de victimas 1990-01 May 2006
(Frequency of victims by departments 1990-01 May 2006),” www.derechoshumanos.gov.co,
accessed 18 May 2006. [186] Information provided by
several victim assistance actors in Colombia in May 2005, November 2005 and
April-June 2006. [187] Email from Alvaro
Jiménez Millán, CCCM, 27 June 2006; email from Charlie
Avendaño, Landmine Monitor, 26 June 2006. [188] SAC, “Preliminary
Opinion Collection, Final Report Colombia,” October 2005, pp. 10-12. [189] UN, “Final Report,
First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 28 November-2 December 2004,
APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33. [190] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 128-134. [191] Presentation by Luz
Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Standing Committee on Victim
Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 9 May 2006. [192] Article 7 Report, Form J,
April 2006. [193] Information provided by
several victim assistance actors in Colombia in May 2005, November 2005 and
April-June 2006. [194] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 129. [195] Interview with Zoraida
Delgado, Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, Bogotá, 16 February 2006. [196] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 129-131. [197] Ibid. [198] Observations made by
Landmine Monitor during visits to rural areas of Cauca, Antioquia, and Santander
departments, May and November 2005. [199] Information provided by
several victim assistance actors in Colombia in May 2005, November 2005 and
April-June 2006. [200] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 130. [201] Ministry of Social
Protection, “Decreto borrador: Por el cual se reglamenta parcialmente el
funcionamiento de la Subcuenta del seguro de Riesgos Catastróficos y
Accidentes de Tránsito del Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía,
Fosyga” (“Draft Decree: Through which the functioning of the sub
account of Catastrophic Risk and Car Accidents of the Solidarity and Guarantee
Fund, FOSYGA, is regulated”), provided by Antipersonnel Mines Observatory
to CCCM, Bogotá, 5 June 2006. [202] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 130. [203] Observations made by
Landmine Monitor during visits to rural areas of Cauca, Antioquia, and Santander
departments, May 2005. [204] Email from from Alvaro
Jiménez Millán, CCCM, 27 June 2006; email from Charlie
Avendaño, Landmine Monitor, 26 June 2006. [205] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by several victim assistance actors in Colombia in May 2005,
November 2005 and April-June 2006. [206] CCCM, “Una tarea
que no da tregua (A task without respite),” Bogotá, December 2005;
Landmine Monitor interview with Belkis Angulo Brion, Deputy Director of the
Physical and Rehabilitation Unit, University of Hospital of the Valley, Cali,
Valle del Cauca, 8 March 2006. [207] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 335. [208] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by several victim assistance actors in Colombia in May 2005,
November 2005 and April-June 2006. [209] Interview with Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006. [210] ICRC, “Annual
Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 264. [211] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 131-132. [212] Ibid, p. 132. [213] “Efectos
sicológicos del conflicto armado son los peores problemas de salud
pública que afronta Colombia (Psychological effect of armed conflict is
the worst health problem faced by Colombia),” El Tiempo
(Bogotá), 27 April 2006. [214] Interview with Sharon
Ball and Olga Lucia Zuluaga, UNICEF Columbia, Bogotá, 23 March 2006. [215] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 133. [216] “El 93 por ciento
de los discapacitados de Bogotá carecen de educación (93 percent
of persons with disabilities in Bogotá do not receive education),”
El Tiempo (Bogotá), 18 May 2006. [217] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 335. [218] Email from Jorge Quesada,
Coordinator, Semillas de Esperanza, CIREC, Bogotá, 25 May 2006. [219] Ibid. [220] Interview with Belkis
Angulo Brion, University of Hospital of the Valley, Cali, Valle del Cauca, 8
March 2006. [221] “Alternativa para
discapacitados,” La Opinión (Cúcuta), 19 November
2005. [222] Email from Paula Bernal
Blanco, Victim Assistance Coordinator, CCCM, Bogotá, 26 May 2006. [223] Email from Guillermo Gil
Sayer, CCCM Santander, Bogotá, 23 May 2006; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 281. [224] Article 7 Report, Form J,
April 2006, p. 113. [225] Interview with
José Antonio Delgado, ICRC, Bogotá, 25 January 2006; see
Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 283. [226] Article 7 Report, Form J,
April 2006. [227] Movimento per la Pau,
“Movimento Per la Pau Project Overview in Colombia,” Project AVCO 1
(01-10-04 – 30-09-05), Barcelona, January 2006. [228] Email from Camilo Serna,
CCCM, 16 June 2006. [229] Movimento per la Pau,
“Movimento Per la Pau Project Overview in Colombia,” Project AVCO 2
(01-04 -05 – 31-03-06), Barcelona, January 2006. [230] Email from Paula Bernal,
CCCM, 17 February 2006. [231] CCCM, “Informe de
actividades del proyecto e fortalecimiento de las acciones de la sociedad civil
agrupada en la Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (Report of the project to
strengthen civil society actions done by the Colombian Campaign Against
Landmines),” Bogotá, 1 February 2006. [232] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 283. [233] Emails from Dominique
Delvigne, HI Colombia, 21 and 28 June 2006. [234] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 283. [235] Mine Action Support
Group, “MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May
2006, p. 15. [236] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 283. [237] Email from Luz Piedad
Herrera, Antipersonnel Mine Observatory, 16 May 2006. [238] UFC, “Nuestros
Proyectos (Our Projects),” www.unitedforcolombia.org, accessed 8 June
2006. [239] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 337. [240] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 134; see also Landmine Monitor Report
2005, p. 284.