Key developments since May 2005: In May 2006, Angola again indicated
it may require an extension of its 1 January 2007 deadline for completion of
antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction, but the Mine Ban Treaty does not allow
extensions. National implementation legislation has
been sent to the parliament. In 2005, 14.2 square kilometers of land and 668
kilometers of roads were demined, according to Angola; demining operators
reported less clearance. In December 2005, the Executive Commission for
Demining was created, to increase the efficiency and capacity of Angola’s
national demining institutions. The Landmine Impact Survey continued and by May
2006 had been completed in 15 of 18 provinces. In 2006, Angola drafted its
first mine action strategic plan, for 2006-2011. It aims to change mine action
in Angola to a dual focus on humanitarian requirements and national
reconstruction and development requirements. Mine risk education extended to 17
provinces reaching 440,334 people in 2005; the focus changed from an emergency
approach to a more development-oriented approach. In 2005, there were at least
96 new casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance, a significant decrease
from 2004; most incidents involved antipersonnel mines.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997,
ratified on 5 July 2002 and became a State Party on 1 January 2003.
In May 2006, the coordinator of the National Institute for Demining told
Landmine Monitor that draft legislation to implement the treaty domestically had
been sent to the national parliament and may be passed in
2006.[1] Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine
Ban Treaty.[2]
As of 1 June 2006, Angola’s third Article 7 transparency report had not
been recorded by the UN website; it was due by 30 April
2006.[3]
Angola participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia
in November-December 2005, where it made a statement on mine clearance. Angola
also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June
2005 and May 2006, where it made presentations on stockpile destruction and mine
clearance.
Angola was absent from the vote on 8 December 2005 on UN General Assembly
Resolution 60/80, calling for universalization and full implementation of the
Mine Ban Treaty. It was present and voted in support of the draft resolution in
the UNGA First Committee in October.
After chairing the inaugural meeting of the Forum of Mine-Affected Countries
(FOMAC) in November 2004, Angola has continued to participate in this initiative
that brings together high-level representatives from 30 mine-affected countries.
FOMAC co-chair and Angolan Ambassador to the UN in New York, Ismael
Abraão Gaspar Martins, spoke about the Forum during a debate on
assistance in mine action in the UNGA Fourth Committee (Special Political and
Decolonization) on 27 October 2005.[4] He also represented FOMAC in a media event held to launch the UN’s
first International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance for Mine Action on 4
April 2006.[5] To celebrate Mine
Awareness Day, the First Lady of Angola, Ana Paula dos Santos, and the
Secretary-General’s wife, Nane Annan, planted Angola’s national
flower (a porcelain rose) at the Isaiah Wall across from the UN in New
York.[6]
Angola has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have
had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and
3. Thus, Angola has not made known its views on issues related to joint
military operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of
antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling
devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training. It is
particularly notable that Angola has not spoken on these issues, given its
history of mine use and participation in joint operations.
Angola is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Production, Transfer, and Use
Angola states that it has never manufactured antipersonnel
mines.[7] It is not believed to have
exported in the past.
Landmine Monitor did not find any instances of use of antipersonnel or
antivehicle mines in the country in 2005 or the first half of 2006. Since the
end of the war in April 2002, there have been only sporadic and unconfirmed
reports of new use of mines, with allegations aimed primarily at criminal
groups.
In February 2006, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
(FLEC) began peace talks with the Angolan government. The small-scale FLEC
insurgency that started when Portugal annexed Cabinda to Angola in 1975
increased after the April 2002 cease-fire between the Angolan government and
UNITA, but no antipersonnel mine-laying is known to have taken place.
Stockpiling and Destruction
From Angola’s two Article 7 reports, it would appear that Angola
initially had a stockpile of 59,191 antipersonnel mines (including 257
“flares”). This included 14 different types of antipersonnel mines
from at least five countries (former Czechoslovakia, former East Germany,
Hungary, Romania and the former Soviet
Union).[8]
At the beginning of 2005, Angola had 52,119 antipersonnel mines (including 30
“flares”). It reported that it intends to destroy 50,659
antipersonnel mines of three types: 42,350 M90, 6,932 PMN-1 and 1,377
OZM-4.[9]
The treaty-mandated deadline for destruction of all of Angola’s
stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 January 2007. Angola did not destroy any
stockpiled mines in 2004, 2005, or 2006 up to
May.[10] In 2003, apparently
between September and December, Angola destroyed 7,072 stockpiled antipersonnel
mines of 12 types, plus 227
“flares.”[11]
In May 2006, Angola presented an update of its stockpile destruction plan to
the Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction.[12] According to the
plan, Angola’s objective is to destroy its stockpile by the
treaty-mandated deadline of 1 January 2007, using a budget of €1.765
million (approximately $2.2 million) provided by the European Commission (EC),
government of Angola, and UN Development Programme
(UNDP).[13]
The plan consists of five phases.[14] The first began in May 2005, after Angola received €950,000 from the
EC. Activities in 2005 included: installation of ATLAS software; training in
demilitarization of explosive ordnance and technical survey and assessment;
analysis of available information about locations and types of stockpiled
antipersonnel mines; preparation of a demolition course and of logistic
equipment; and, a “change to new facilities” which required
“logistic re-adjustment concerning maintenance, stabilization,
sustainability and physical security.” Activities in 2006 included a
visit by an evaluation team from the EC from 30 January to 3 February 2006, and
an analysis of information and data collected about stocks held by both the
government armed forces and UNITA, in order to produce an operational plan for
all provinces, with a focus on Moxico and Kuando Kubango. The physical
destruction of the mines was expected to take place from October to December
2006.[15]
In its May 2006 presentation, Angola cited a number of
“constraints” with the stockpile destruction program: a five-month
delay in starting the project (May 2005 not January 2005) due to “donor
and UN systems;” a delay in receiving imported equipment; the location of
stockpiled mines in areas that are densely mined; and, the issue of credentials
for the operational teams.[16] UNDP
has blamed the “unexpected” and “severe” delay in the
destruction program on the national mine action authority CNIDAH’s
“protracted process of obtaining from the pertinent Angolan authority an
authorization to deploy its Operations Teams to undertake nationwide Stockpile
Survey &
Analysis.”[17]
At the May 2006 in Standing Committee meeting, Angola asked States Parties to
consider “the hypothesis of a short extension period” for its
stockpile destruction deadline, in view of these constraints, the size of the
country, and the long period of civil war with many actors not involved in the
stockpiled destruction process.[18] Similarly, at the June 2005 Standing Committee meeting, the Angolan
representative stated that it may need a “short” extension if it
encountered difficulties.[19] However, the Mine Ban Treaty has no provision for extending a stockpile
destruction deadline.
In response to the presentation and extension request, the Stockpile
Destruction Standing Committee co-chair from Japan stated that a “short
extension might be necessary.”[20] The government of Canada and the ICBL then intervened to stress again that
the Mine Ban Treaty does not provide for extensions for stockpile destruction.
Landmine Monitor later reiterated this to the Angolan
delegation.[21]
Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines Reported by
Angola[22]
Type (country of origin added by LM)
To be destroyed
Retained for training
PPM-2 (East Germany)
0
200
POMZ (USSR)
0
200
M-75 (Romania)
0
200
PMN (USSR)
0
100
PMN-1 (USSR)
6,932
200
MON-100 (USSR)
0
50
PMD-6 (USSR)
0
50
PPMSR-1 (Czechoslovakia)
0
30
Flares
0
30
OTK (unknown origin)
0
190
OZM-4 (USSR)
1,377
50
MON-50 (USSR)
0
30
GYATA (Hungary)
0
30
M-90 (USSR)
42,350
100
Total
50,659
1,460
Civilians periodically and voluntarily surrender weapons to the police as
part of a broader disarmament process. In 2005, civilians in Huambo province
handed over 67 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines to
police.[23]
Angola has indicated it will retain 1,460 antipersonnel mines under Article 3
of the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes 13 types of mines, plus the 30
“flares.” In both of its Article 7 reports, Angola has a chart of
mines retained that, when added totals 1,460, but Angola has listed 1,390 as the
total.[24] Angola has not reported
in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained
mines―a step agreed by States Parties in the Nairobi Action Plan that
emerged from the First Review Conference.
Landmine and ERW Problem
Angola’s landmine and explosive remnant of war (ERW) problem, is a
result of four decades of almost continuous warfare, making it the most
mine-affected country in sub-Saharan Africa, and one of the most mined countries
in the world.[25] Landmines were
first laid in the 1960s, during the struggle for independence from Portuguese
colonial rule. After independence in 1975, the conflict continued between the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de
Libertaçao de Angola, MPLA) and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total
de Angola, UNITA). Both sides, with the support of rival foreign powers, laid
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines to defend strategically valuable towns,
infrastructure and roads.[26] Although Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 during a temporary
cessation of hostilities, both groups resumed the laying of mines between 1998
and the signing of the peace agreement in
2002.[27]
A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) started in 2004 and was ongoing in May 2006.
From preliminary survey results, it is estimated that there are approximately
2,900 suspected hazardous areas in Angola covering a total area of some 1,300 to
1,400 square kilometers. However, according to UNDP, it has to be acknowledged
that “this is still level one [general] survey data and can be
significantly reduced by technical survey and area reduction
techniques.”[28]
LIS preliminary results indicate that 1,900 communities (8.6 percent of
communities in Angola) were affected by mines and/or ERW. Two percent of the
communities were scored as high-impact, 24 percent as medium-impact and 74
percent as low-impact.[29] Estimates based on the survey, as conducted so far, claim that more than
2.2 million Angolans (16 to 20 percent of the population) are affected on a
daily basis by the presence of landmines and ERW. The LIS also found that, in
the last two years, there have been between 420 and 460 mine casualties.
According to the LIS preliminary report of November 2005, the province of
Bié has the highest number of
victims.[30] Data gathering by
Mines Advisory Group shows that Moxico is the most heavily impacted province,
with 522 suspected areas in 291 communities identified as
mine-affected.[31]
LIS preliminary results identified the most significant socioeconomic effects
to be restricted access to agricultural land (50 percent of affected
communities), limited access to areas used for firewood, building material and
herbs (21 percent), and limited access to roads and paths (10
percent).[32]
The threat of mines on primary and secondary roads restricts access and
remains a major hindrance to development. Large tracts of the country’s
rail infrastructure are off-limits and the rehabilitation of water and
electricity distribution for much of the country is also affected, due to the
widespread practice of mining high voltage electricity pylons and water
reservoirs/dams during the many years of
conflict.[33] Refugee repatriation
and reintegration efforts, in the north and northeastern provinces particularly,
are impeded as mines constrain access for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian
agencies.[34]
Mine Action Program
Two main mine action bodies exist in Angola. The Inter-sectoral Commission
on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão nacional intersectorial
de desminagem e assistência humanitária, CNIDAH), created in 2001,
provides strategic coordination and planning at the national level, and the
Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem,
CED), established in December 2005, coordinates and manages the three national
mine action operators. Although CNIDAH is considered the national mine action
authority in Angola, the mine action institutional make-up of the country does
not follow the usual national authority/mine action center dual structure found
in other mine-affected countries. This can be explained partly by the number of
state institutions conducting operations (three) in the country, which called
for a single management structure for efficient use of
resources.[35]
CNIDAH became fully operational in early 2004 and since then has sought to
consolidate its role as Angola’s national mine action authority. It
replaced the National Institute for the Destruction of Mines and UXO (Instituto
Nacional de Remoção de Objectos e Engenhos Explosivos, INAROEE),
which was dissolved because it proved unable to discharge its role to a standard
that maintained the confidence of its implementing partners and donors. Its
planning and operational functions were split between CNIDAH and the National
Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD). INAD’s
director is also the coordinator of the CNIDAH subcommittee on mine clearance,
chairs technical meetings, assists CNIDAH’s president on technical issues,
and coordinates responses on issues relating to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[36]
CNIDAH is responsible for the planning, coordination and supervision of
demining, mine risk education and victim
assistance.[37] It includes the
ministries of defense, agriculture, health, labor, transport, social
reintegration and planning, and the Angolan Armed
Forces.[38] It has two
subcommissions, on mine clearance and on victim
assistance.[39] Support from UNDP
to CNIDAH began in April 2003. UNDP provided five technical advisors in Luanda
and six field advisors to support CNIDAH on a regional basis, through a European
Commission-funded project due to end in December
2006.[40]
The Executive Commission for Demining (Commissão Executiva de
Desminagem, CED) was created in December 2005 in order to coordinate the
demining operations of the three national institutions involved in clearance;
namely the Angolan Armed Forces, INAD and the National Reconstruction Office
(Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GNR), as well as to enhance
their clearance
capacity.[41] The creation of the CED also serves to better support the upcoming
electoral process scheduled for late 2006 or 2007, by ensuring that people can
travel in security to the polling
stations.[42] Composed of
representatives from each of the three institutions, the CED reports to the
President of Angola and is coordinated by the Minister of Assistance and Social
Reinsertion.[43]
Through the creation of the CED, the government is in the process of
substantially investing in its national clearance capacity, as it expects the
three national demining institutions “to form the nucleus of the long-term
national humanitarian demining capability of
Angola.”[44] The CED drafted
an ambitious operational plan for 2006-2007, which is expected to result in
equipping 43 manual clearance brigades (18 brigades from the army, 15 from INAD
and 10 from GNR), a total of 2,947
staff.[45] As of May 2006, the
budget for the CED (over US$110 million) was approved by the Council of
Ministers partially (as this is being done incrementally), and some equipment
procurement was underway. [46]
CNIDAH retains its core functions―planning and coordination of mine
clearance, accreditation and quality assurance, and information
management―while CED functions exclusively at the operational
level.[47] The CED participates in
the planning process in the same way as other operators; for example,
CED’s tasks must be approved by the provincial government and its work
must be reported in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
format to the database managed by
CNIDAH.[48] UNDP has claimed that
the creation of the CED would be beneficial for coordination between CNIDAH and
the country’s other national institutions as it establishes a single focal
point for all mine-related activities conducted by national
operators.[49] According to the
strategic plan, legislation will be created which clearly defines the roles and
responsibilities of the various mine action organs of the Angolan government; no
such legislation had been drafted as of June
2006.[50]
CNIDAH installed IMSMA in 2004 to receive LIS data, with the intention of
consolidating all LIS information in IMSMA format. Although in 2005 IMSMA was
mainly used for LIS data, CNIDAH is increasingly using the other IMSMA modules
for entering data on all elements of mine
action.[51] According to the
timeline laid down in Angola’s strategic plan (see below), during
2006 and 2007, IMSMA reporting will be established for MRE and accident data
will be used to guide planning.[52] UNDP claimed in April 2006 that all mine action IMSMA reports were already
in use and all data was updated
regularly.[53]
In early 2006, CNIDAH database staff were in the process of installing
terminals for IMSMA in each province; as of April, half of Angola’s 18
provinces were equipped with IMSMA. UNDP explained that the IMSMA installation
process was lengthy due to Angola’s vast size, travel limitations and the
many provinces requiring support; the process was planned to finish in
mid-2006.[54]
Version 3 of IMSMA has been in use in Angola. In August 2005, the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an assessment
mission to update IMSMA to version 4. As of May 2006, it was awaiting a formal
request from CNIDAH for training of staff in the new
version.[55] UNDP reported that it
was waiting for GICHD to make all version 4 modules operational, which was
expected to happen by the end of
2006.[56]
CNIDAH’s database staff also focused efforts at the operator level to
ensure accurate reporting in IMSMA format. Training workshops and presentations
have been conducted at the national and provincial levels in conjunction with
the installation of IMSMA. According to UNDP, this process has been aided by
the simplification of the IMSMA reporting format to better suit the Angolan
context.[57]
Six data staff recruited in 2004 by the Survey Action Center (SAC) to enter
LIS data into IMSMA were laid off when the survey was suspended in May 2005 due
to lack of funding. SAC’s chief database officer was transferred to
CNIDAH, under contract to UNDP, to ensure continued entry of LIS data and to
train CNIDAH staff.[58] UNDP
extended the contract until the end of 2006 to ensure completion of data
entry.[59]
Strategic Planning and Progress
Angola’s Mine Action Strategic Plan was drafted in early 2006 and
covers the period 2006-2011; Angola has not had a strategic plan for mine action
previously. A review to assess progress is planned for
2009.[60] As of May 2006, the
strategic plan was undergoing final amendments following review by
CNIDAH’s president and was expected to be sent to the President of Angola
for approval.[61]
To assist in drafting the plan, UNDP and CNIDAH hired an international
consultant on two occasions. In October-November 2005, a first draft was
prepared as a basis for debate. In March 2006, the strategy was refined
following consultations with donors, operators and government
agencies.[62] The draft strategic
plan has five goals:
To significantly reduce the risk to impacted communities and at-risk groups
by 2011;
To provide medical care and assistance to mine survivors within the national
health systems and provide assistance to reintegrate into community life;
To support national infrastructure investment and reconstruction;
To fully establish a mine action capability that is sustainable by national
resources; and,
To establish a “world class mine action program” in Angola; this
includes making significant progress towards meeting Angola’s Mine Ban
Treaty responsibilities and conducting clearance in accordance with humanitarian
standards. [63]
The strategic plan envisions that, by 2011, the number of high-impact
communities will have been reduced to zero, the number of medium-impact
communities will be reduced by 50 percent and all remaining suspected hazardous
areas will be marked.[64]
The strategic plan also aims to continue decentralizing the mine action
program, a process which began in 2005 with the delegation of responsibility for
planning, coordination and operational management to provincial governments.
“Operations rooms” were established in each of the 18 provinces as
focal points for demining; these are under the authority of the vice governors,
with an assistant and two working groups of mine action partners operating in
the province (one working group will focus on provincial humanitarian mine
action requirements and the other on national reconstruction and development
requirements within the
province).[65]
Each province is expected to undertake detailed planning based on LIS data
entered into the IMSMA databases, in order to coordinate with mine action
operators and partners to make and implement annual
plans.[66] By the end of 2005, all
of Angola’s 18 provinces had drafted annual mine action
workplans.[67]
Overall, the strategy aims to shift mine action in Angola from a
predominantly humanitarian focus to a dual focus on humanitarian requirements
and national reconstruction and development requirements. CNIDAH is thus
expected “to take the lead in implementing a stakeholder relationship
program with key government ministries and donors to ensure that projects are
assessed for mine implications and that demining requirements are included in
the project proposal.”[68]
Pending adoption of the strategic plan, CNIDAH’s goals for 2005 were to
“promote and improve the general level of results, more efficient use of
capabilities, the safety and quality of operational activities and to enable
CNIDAH’s response to the landmine problem to be covering the whole of the
national territory, in an integrated coordinated manner and in the shortest time
frame possible.” Three strategic objectives were set, in relation to the
overall goals:
To consolidate CNIDAH as the national mine action authority, efficiently
regulating and coordinating the sector; this involves extending CNIDAH’s
coordination to the provinces and implementing the LIS;
To develop national institutions, particularly INAD’s operational
capacity and its demining school; and,
To support a careful and sustainable expansion of operational
capacity.[69]
Angola has integrated mine action into its development plan. Mine action is
identified as a specific goal in the national Strategy to Combat Poverty
(Estrategia de Combate à Pobreza, ECP) which covers the period 2004-2006.
One of the ECP’s goals is to “guarantee basic physical security
through demining, disarmament and the upholding of law and order throughout the
country.” The ECP calls for the involvement and cooperation of all key
stakeholders in clearing mines, for enhanced national clearance capacity and for
the implementation of mine risk education. It also plans for the destruction of
mines and UXO on land with agricultural potential and close to populated areas
by 2006.[70] As of May 2006, it was
reported that the current ECP would be extended to cover 2007, with the aim of
producing a new document within the next
year.[71]
The mine action legislative framework includes various government decrees
that have reformed the mine action sector since
2001.[72] INAD’s internal
regulations were promulgated in a decree issued by the Minister of Assistance
and Social Reinsertion on 18 June
2005,[73] and the creation of the
CED was approved by Presidential Decree on 28 November 2005 and published on 5
December 2005.[74] The newly
drafted strategic plan envisions the adoption of new legislation to make clear
the roles and responsibilities of the various mine action bodies (CNIDAH, CED,
INAD, the Armed Forces and the GNR) and to provide the framework for regulatory
policies such as accreditation, external quality assurance and
funding.[75]
Since 2004, a comprehensive set of national mine action standards has been in
preparation, based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). As of May
2006, 22 standards had been produced and/or distributed, and two outstanding
standards relating to the accreditation and use of mine detection dogs were
under final review.[76]
Evaluations of Mine Action
UNDP conducted a review in 2004 of the extent of the mine problem in Angola
and the response of the government and the international community. It
concluded that institutional structures supporting mine action were in place and
that the government, supported by UNDP, was committed to ensuring that mine
action was effectively coordinated through CNIDAH. The review recommended that
there be a strengthening of the role of CNIDAH and INAD and other local demining
organizations, further inclusion of NGOs in CNIDAH’s coordination
framework, and increased assistance and engagement from donors in planning and
monitoring mine action projects.[77] Most of the review’s recommendations were included in UNDP’s
subsequent projects with
CNIDAH.[78]
Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola must destroy all antipersonnel
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but
no later than 1 January 2013. According to Angola’s new strategic plan,
current demining capacity delivers an annual clearance rate of 10 square
kilometers of land and approximately 600 kilometers of road. Given LIS
estimates of the total mine-contaminated area (1,300 to 1,400 square kilometers)
the plan states that, “a rudimentary analysis indicates that based on
current clearance rates, it will take some 130 years to clear Angola of
landmines/ERW.”[79]
However, a number of measures are being undertaken by different operators to
speed up the process, such as area reduction and increased manual and mechanical
capacity which could generate a much higher annual clearance rate. Thus,
Angola’s strategic plan claims that, by 2011, Angola will have made
“significant progress in meeting its Ottawa Treaty responsibilities
(recognizing the size of the problem in Angola, the funding available and the
level of international
support).”[80]
Demining
At least 10 operators were involved in mine clearance in Angola in 2005.
These were INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces (AAF), TeleServise (an Angolan
commercial company), and seven international NGOs: HALO Trust, Norwegian
People’s Aid, DanChurchAid, INTERSOS, Mines Advisory Group, Menschen gegen
Minen, and Santa Barbara
Foundation.[81]
The HALO Trust is the largest mine clearance operator in Angola, with more
than 1,000 staff conducting operations in four provinces (Kuando Kubango,
Benguela, Bié and Huambo). Operations in 2005 focused on the continued
deployment of large numbers of demining teams, the opening of emergency road
access and completion of the
LIS.[82]
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) worked in 2005-2006 in four provinces
(Malange, Zaire, Moxico and Kwanza Sul). It has three regional bases which
function as fully integrated mine action units with manual, mechanical and
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. Operations in 2005 focused on the LIS,
as well as the clearance of roads, agricultural land and social infrastructures.
In early 2006, NPA extended its operations in Uige and Zaire to conduct the LIS,
and therefore trained new
staff.[83]
DanChurchAid works in the eastern provinces of Moxico and Lunda Sul. Its
operations focused on tasks assigned by its partner, Lutheran World Foundation
(LWF), as part of LWF’s rehabilitation program. It also worked on road
survey and clearance. In April 2005, operations suffered a major setback as a
road accident killed eight staff and injured 20 others; the previous manual
capacity was not restored until the end of
2005.[84]
INTERSOS has operated in the southern provinces of Namibe, Huila and Kuando
Kubango and, since April 2005, in Kunene. In August 2005, it ended operations
in Namibe, where it completed LIS implementation. Operations in 2005 focused on
reopening roads for the safe return of refugees and transit of people and goods,
particularly in support of the electoral process. In 2006, it participated in a
capacity-building project of a local mine risk education NGO with funds from
UNDP.[85]
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) worked in Moxico province in 2005 and extended
operations in two new provinces, Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte. It closed
operations in Kunene province in March 2005. At the start of 2006, MAG closed
two of its operations bases in Moxico following the completion of road clearance
which allowed repatriation of Angolan refugees from the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Operations in 2005 focused on implementing the LIS in Moxico and Lunda
Sul, on road assessments, road threat risk reduction and mine risk
education.[86]
People against Landmines (Menschen gegen Minen, MgM) worked in the northern
provinces of Bengo, Kwanza Norte and Kwanza Sul, and in the southern provinces
of Kunene and Kuando Kubango. In 2005, MgM focused mainly on the mechanical
clearance of secondary routes and continued to expand its manual component to
clear large minefields to allow for the resettlement of displaced
people.[87]
Santa Barbara Foundation (SBF) has operated in the western coastal province
of Benguela. Activities in 2005 included clearance, EOD, mine risk education
and marking of affected areas. It also trained the local police in how to
handle UXO and ammunition, and destroyed the explosive items delivered to SBF.
It conducted the LIS in Kunene province until May 2005, and planned to start the
LIS in Bengo province in June
2006.[88]
In 2005, INAD operated seven demining brigades in seven provinces, partly
funded by the government. It was planned that eight more brigades would to be
equipped and trained through the CED initiative and deployed in April
2006.[89] As of May, these brigades
were still being equipped and were to be deployed shortly
thereafter.[90] INAD operates a
demining school, which provides training on all aspects of mine action,
including mine risk education, clearance, EOD and data
collection.[91]
In 2006, INAD assumed responsibility for training the Angolan Armed Forces in
demining.[92] In April 2006, 138
soldiers participated in a demining course led by INAD instructors in Coxa-Londe
base, north of Uige city.[93]
UNDP drafted a project document aimed at enhancing INAD’s capacity. In
April 2006, the recruitment process started for a chief technical advisor, to be
funded by UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and a training
advisor, to be funded by the UNDP country
office.[94] The positions were
expected to be filled in June-July
2006.[95]
Both the armed forces and troops under the National Reconstruction Office
were expected to take a bigger role in mine clearance in
2006.[96]
Prioritization of land for demining is based on requests from the government,
LIS results and discussions with CNIDAH provincial authorities. Specific
requests from NGOs and the UN are also taken into
account.[97] NPA has conducted task
impact assessment since 2001. Provincial vice governors are involved or at
least informed about the task selection. When government priorities differ from
NPA’s priorities, such as when the government targets economic
development, those tasks are conducted by state or commercial
operators.[98] MAG has developed a
task assessment since October 2005, using LIS data to conduct more detailed
surveys combining community interviews with technical assessments to identify
priority areas for clearance. This enables MAG to ensure that limited clearance
resources are targeted effectively to maximize impact. In 2006, MAG also
planned to develop a post-clearance assessment methodology appropriate to
Angola, determining indicators for measuring the outcome and impact of
clearance activities and thereby improving the prioritization
process.[99]
Identification of Mined Areas: Surveys and Assessments
The Landmine Impact Survey, which started in 2003, was ongoing in 2006 after
being temporarily suspended in May 2005. Initiated by the Survey Action Center
(SAC), it aimed to provide the first comprehensive national database of
mine/UXO-affected areas, as a basis for planning and prioritization of mine
action. Six operators have been involved in data-gathering: NPA, MAG, INTERSOS,
SBF, HALO and INAD. The original completion date for the LIS fieldwork was
February 2005. In November 2004, an operational review extended the deadline to
August 2005. On 31 May 2005, the survey was suspended as a result of a funding
shortfall. SAC’s office ceased operations and its last staff member left
on 15 June 2005.[100]
In May 2005, at the time of LIS fieldwork suspension, surveys had been
completed in 10 of the 18 provinces due to be surveyed. NPA completed surveying
Malanje, Kwanza Norte and Kwanza Sul, INTERSOS completed Huíla, SBF
completed Kunene, HALO completed Huambo, Benguela and Bié, and INAD
completed Lunda Norte and
Luanda.[101]
Between May and December 2005, two more provinces were completed with new
funding. In August 2005, INTERSOS completed the survey of Namibe with
additional Italian funding, and MAG finished Moxico province, with US Department
of State funding.[102]
Three more provinces were completed between January and May 2006: HALO
completed the survey of Kuando Kubango in February 2006, MAG finished data
gathering in Lunda Sul in April 2006, and NPA finished surveying in Zaire
province with funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in
May 2006.[103] Of the three
provinces remaining to be surveyed (Uige, Cabinda and Bengo), NPA began
operations in Uige province in May 2006, SBF planned to start survey in Bengo in
June, and a proposal from INAD was pending to work in Cabinda province; survey
activities in Bengo and Cabinda provinces were funded by the UNDP Emergency
Response Fund.[104]
The LIS fieldwork was expected to end by September 2006, with a final report
distributed by 28 February 2007.[105]
SAC agreed with CNIDAH in June 2005 to send a technical advisor to coordinate
the completion of the survey.[106] Funding for this was obtained from Germany in April 2006; starting in
July, the advisor was expected to conduct three missions overseeing completion
of the LIS.[107] During the
suspension of SAC’s involvement, the UNDP advisory team assisted CNIDAH in
coordinating survey
activities.[108]
In November 2005, SAC published an interim report for the 10 provinces
completed by May 2005.[109] This
was distributed to the provincial operations rooms and operators to use in
tasking and priority setting. For the other provinces completed since May 2005,
data was distributed as soon as processed and quality-assured by CNIDAH. The UN
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) also conducted an inspection of some of the work
completed between May 2005 and March 2006, and reported general satisfaction
with its quality.[110]
According to UNDP, by April 2006, LIS data was being used by provinces and
operators in task selection and planning. The interim results were also used as
the basis for drafting Angola’s strategic mine action
plan.[111]
SAC reported in May 2006 that the LIS scoring system used for the economic
impacts had not been approved by
CNIDAH.[112] The Survey Working
Group decided in July 2005 that the LIS impact scoring system needed
updating.[113]
Previous surveys in Angola included the general survey conducted between 1994
and 1998 by NPA with support from HALO, MAG and Greenfield Consultants
(subcontracted by CARE). Complete survey reports were issued on 14 provinces and
partial reports on two more, but resumption of hostilities brought an end to the
fieldwork. The survey data was entered into a database held by the former
demining institute INAROEE.[114] A study by the GICHD, published in 2006, concluded that the general
survey, although incomplete, proved a valuable resource to international
agencies as it included detailed reports of road conditions and surveyors’
assessments of the high, medium or low priority of
hazards.[115]
Marking and Fencing
One of the objectives of the strategic plan is for all remaining suspected
hazardous areas to be marked by
2011.[116] The majority of
operators report conducting marking operations.
MAG marks some areas following clearance to indicate residual risk. MAG
explained that, given the size of many suspected areas, full clearance is
impossible and therefore it clears those areas that will reduce or remove the
impact for communities and marks the remaining suspected
areas.[117]
HALO reports that as part of the EC project for “emergency return and
resettlement in 2004, it was involved in the marking of minefields adjacent to
the roads used regularly by people to avoid internally displaced people (IDPs)
or returnees straying off the road.” HALO used concrete posts at either
end with painted stones running between the end posts. Since then, it has
maintained the marking at least annually, or as necessary. In 2005, HALO teams
maintained 155 previously marked minefield sites. Only minefields along the
roads that are a humanitarian priority fall within HALO’s clearance task
list.[118]
SBF marked areas with mine signs in Benguela province on approximately 2,000
square meters of land in 2005.[119] NPA conducted marking in areas that will not be cleared, focusing on the
provinces of Uige and Zaire given both the organized repatriation and
spontaneous movement of refugees in these two provinces. DanChurchAid also
reported marking mined and mine-suspected areas, particularly schools and
clinics, using sticks and tape to indicate which areas are safe to
use.[120] INTERSOS reported
marking suspected and mined areas with danger signs, stones and pickets,
depending on the area.[121]
No fencing activities were reported by operators in 2005.
Mine and ERW Clearance
In 2005, according to CNIDAH, 14.2 square kilometers of land and 668
kilometers of roads were cleared; 4,770 antipersonnel mines, 358 antivehicle
mines, 738,357 UXO and other explosive devices as well as 1,334 pieces of small
arms ammunition were found and
destroyed.[122] This exceeds
reported clearance of 10.7 square kilometers in
2004.[123] But UNDP explains the
difference in terms of “...inconsistency in reporting... INAD reports
enormous clearance figures when in reality the tasks were huge stretches of
railway and high tension line that largely are not
mined.”[124]
Operators informed Landmine Monitor of clearance results in 2005, which total
12.2 square kilometers―less than CNIDAH reports―but almost double
the number of mines destroyed. According to UNDP, “...a surprising number
of operators are still unable or unwilling to submit IMSMA format reports, a
process that we [UNDP/CNIDAH] continue to
develop.”[125]
Area Cleared and Mines Destroyed in Angola in 2005
Although the Angolan Armed Forces conducted clearance in 2005, CNIDAH did not
have clearance data as of April
2006.[136]
Mainly manual techniques are used in Angola. Deploying and supporting
mechanical mine clearance assets is difficult due to the size of the country and
destruction/disrepair of roads and bridges. However, as infrastructure is
reconstituted, it is expected that more mechanical mine clearance assets will be
deployed to speed up
clearance.[137]
INAD and the Angolan Armed Forces use mainly manual techniques; however the
CED initiative planned the purchase of a substantial national mechanical mine
clearance capacity (10 Mine Wolf tillers and 4 Bozena remote-controlled
mini-flails).[138] INTERSOS
reported that in 2005 it mainly used manual techniques, but acquired mechanical
equipment at the end of the year to clear antivehicle
mines.[139]
Six organizations reported using both mechanical and manual techniques during
2005. In addition to its manual clearance capacity, MAG used mechanical units
for ground preparation. NPA used flail machines (Aardvarks and Hydremas) and
Casspirs with steel wheels. MgM used armored graders and rotary mechanical
sifting machines. HALO used mechanical units for vegetation cutting, excavation
and inspection of soil that presents difficulty for manual
deminers.[140] SBF also reported
using either technique, depending on the
task.[141] Although
DanChurchAid’s clearance capacity is mainly manual, it used an armored
vegetation cutter and a back-hoe to improve access when conducting road
surveys.[142]
Two organizations reported using mine detection dog techniques, SBF and
MgM.[143] In December 2005, NPA
closed its Remote Explosive Scent Tracing project, which used dogs for mine
detection on roads, having found limitations in the efficiency and operability
of dogs.[144] HALO had stopped
using dogs in 2004 because of variations in reliability and effectiveness in
Angola, and concurrent high
costs.[145]
Demands by provincial government authorities, UN and other aid agencies for
the opening of roads have increased since 2002, and gained greater importance in
light of the 2006 election.[146] Three organizations reported introducing advanced technology for the
survey of roads: MAG, HALO and DanChurchAid. In 2005, MAG introduced a road
operations team to conduct route assessments and respond to reports of
antivehicle mines on roads, and to conduct Road Threat Risk Reduction―a
combination of techniques, including targeted manual clearance of high risk
areas, creation of passing points and road widening, and threat reduction by
large-loop detection and roller-based pressure systems on armored
vehicles.[147]
HALO designed specifically for Angola a cost-effective solution for roads
suspected of containing antivehicle mines. Road Threat Reduction involves
“a systematic search at a practical speed in situations where the mine
density is very low and the humanitarian need for access is very
high.”[148] The system is
controlled by a driver from an armor-protected tractor, with low ground pressure
wheels. Mounted on the front of the vehicle is a deep-penetrating metal
detector to find antivehicle
mines.[149] Four systems were
deployed in 2006.[150]
In October 2005, DanChurchAid introduced the Wide Area Detecting System,
which uses large loop detectors based on GPS technology. It can survey a road
of eight meters width to a depth of 1.2 meters at a speed of up to 30 kilometers
per day.[151] The system was
accredited by CNIDAH on 10 April
2006.[152]
Angola’s strategic plan stated that CNIDAH “fully supports”
area reduction methodologies as they are more cost-efficient, faster, and
maintain safety and quality. In particular, HALO’s approach was
encouraged; in addition to the normal LIS questionnaire, HALO conducted a
detailed general survey of suspected hazardous areas through polygon mapping of
the minefield perimeters, resulting in suspected areas recorded by HALO being
many times less than LIS estimates. The strategic plan stated that “this
is a more accurate process than the community mapping and visual verification
method outlined in the LIS protocols, which uses visual estimates.”
[153]
CNIDAH is mandated to conduct quality assurance on clearance operations. In
2005, it had one quality assurance team that struggled to keep up with its
workload.[154] Some operators,
including HALO, MgM and DanChurchAid, reported that delays in quality assurance
by CNIDAH delayed the formal handover of land to the civilian population.
DanChurchAid reported that it had not handed over any land as of April 2006,
because it was waiting for it to be
quality-assured.[155] HALO also
reported that only one quality assurance visit was conducted in 2005 by a joint
UNDP/CNIDAH team and that by December 2005, 41 completed tasks were not
officially signed for by CNIDAH. However, HALO continued to conduct informal
handover to recipients who have in general begun to use the
land.[156] Land cleared by MAG
was also handed over and used without any form of external quality assurance
“since CNIDAH does not have a large enough capacity to conduct
post-clearance.”[157] INAD
reported that it was conducting internal quality assurance as CNIDAH was too
slow.[158]
The creation of three regionally-based quality assurance teams was under
consultation with the US Department of State in early 2006, for a twelve-month
period costed at $350,000. In addition to the existing team based in Luanda
(covering Luanda, Uige, Zaire, Bengo, Malanje, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul
provinces), one new team would be based in Huambo (covering Huambo, Benguela and
Bié provinces), the second in Luena (covering Luena, Moxico, Lunda Sul
and Lunda Norte provinces), and the third team would be based in Menongue
(covering Menongue, Kunene, Huila and Kuando Kubango provinces). The government
is expected to allocate additional resources to increase the number of teams to
reach an optimal quality assurance
capacity.[159] CNIDAH reports
that to further speed up the handover process, post-clearance sampling is
planned to move to a system where only a percentage of tasks will be
inspected in accordance with the national mine action standards and IMAS. For
operators with a proven track record, one out of every three tasks can be
sampled to ensure compliance.[160]
According to UNDP, no informal (“village”) demining has been
reported in Angola.[161] SAC,
however, referred to there having been some reports of informal demining, adding
that “every LIS has identified village
demining.”[162]
Deminer safety: In 2005, 10 accidents involving deminers were
reported to Landmine Monitor, none resulting in death. MAG had three demining
accidents in 2005, all of which resulted in minor injuries; two of the accidents
were a result of simple breaches of standing operating
procedures.[163] HALO had six
demining accidents; two involved injuries; there were no fatalities; all were
unintentional detonations of antipersonnel mines because of breaches of standing
operating procedures.[164]
In addition, UNDP reported that one INAD deminer was injured while working on
the railway near Luena, as a result of poor procedures and
supervision.[165]
All international operators reported providing insurance to deminers. Five
organizations (HALO , MAG, NPA, MgM and DanChuchAid) insured their deminers
through international companies while INTERSOS and SBF used local companies.
INAD and AAF deminers are not insured but are part of the national social
security system.
Most operators report no evidence or record of HIV/AIDS among
deminers.[166] Some specifically
stated that they do not require HIV/AIDS
testing.[167] Only one operator
(MgM) reported that HIV/AIDS was a major problem in its southern
operations.[168] Six
organizations (MAG, NPA, MgM, HALO, INTERSOS and SBF) reported having put in
place specific HIV/AIDS policies and/or awareness campaigns. DanChurchAid
reported that no HIV/AIDS policy was in place as of April
2006.[169]
Mine Risk Education
In 2005, 15 national NGOs and six international organizations undertook mine
risk education (MRE) in 17 of 18
provinces.[170] As in the
previous year, greater access allowed for better information gathering on mine
contamination. International organizations engaged in MRE included DanChurchAid
(Moxico, Lunda Sul), Handicap International (Benguela, Huambo), INTERSOS
(Kunene, Huíla, Kuando Kubango), MAG (Moxico, Lunda Sul), NPA, and the
Association for Aid and Relief Japan (Lunda Sul). UNICEF Angola continued to
provide support to a network of national NGOs. The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) supported MRE through the Angolan Red Cross.
INAD started providing MRE for the first time in 2005, after 147 MRE
educators from five provinces were trained, with UNICEF
support.[171]
In most provinces, MRE was provided by national NGOs in support of provincial
mine action programs led by the vice governors for social
affairs.[172] The Angolan Armed
Forces and the National Police, as well as the Angolan National Road Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Estradas de Angola, INEA), have played an increasingly
significant role in MRE in Angola, following their successful involvement in the
2004 Stay on the Safe Path campaign for drivers. In 2005, direct support was
extended to include Bengo, Kuando Kubango, Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte and Zaire
provinces (the only province not reached in 2005 was
Cabinda).[173]
CNIDAH reported that 440,334 people were reached in 9,389 MRE sessions
(approximately 22 percent men, 27 percent women, 50 percent children) during
2005. This compares to nearly 360,000 in 2004 and about 800,000 in
2003.[174] In Moxico province
alone four MRE operators reached 108,000 citizens during
2005.[175]
UNICEF Angola continued to provide technical and financial support to
field-based MRE activities of eight local NGOs and INTERSOS, in nine of the most
mine- contaminated provinces (Bié, Huambo, Huíla, Malanje, Moxico,
Kuando Kubango, Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte and Uíge). In 2005, 205,357
people in 4,093 sessions received MRE messages as a result of UNICEF support to
NGO partners.[176]
A subcommission of CNIDAH coordinates all MRE activities in Angola; it
includes representatives of UNICEF, Handicap International, ICRC, MAG and at
least 10 national NGOs. Accrediting of MRE organizations started in 2005,
undertaken by CNIDAH. UNICEF continued to serve as focal point for MRE among UN
agencies.[177] Angola has
national MRE standards based on IMAS.
As part of the decentralization of mine action planning, 17 provincial MRE
plans were created in 2005.[178] In May 2006, ICRC and UNICEF supported CNIDAH in outlining a
development-orientated MRE approach and training
needs.[179]
The Stay on the Safe Path campaign continued in 2005, under CNIDAH
coordination, reaching 16
provinces.[180] CNIDAH also
focused on setting up community mine action committees under the overall
leadership of provincial vice governors to engage with traditional leaders and
municipal authorities as part of a strategy to promote sustainable MRE. These
local mine committees, of typically 12 community leaders and volunteers, are
intended to share information about the location of mined and dangerous areas
and incidents; to inform and to link with local governmental and NGO bodies; to
support mine victims; to provide MRE to newcomers and returning internally
displaced people (IDPs); to take responsibility for maintaining knowledge on
mine safety and to respect mine warning signs; to maintain a link between the
community and mine action service
providers.[181]
CNIDAH reported that 192 mine committees were created in
2005.[182] However, maintaining
the mine committees proved to be a challenge, especially as members seemed to
expect incentives. In May 2006, UNICEF said that, “at this moment forming
Mine Committees is not a priority of CNIDAH any
more.”[183] Handicap
International (HI) had already started setting up mine action committees in
2004. At times, duplication of efforts was an
issue.[184] DanChurchAid formed
70 mine committees in 2005.[185] MRE was undertaken both as community liaison component of clearance
operations and as a stand-alone activity. DanChurchAid reached 39,848
beneficiaries in 2005 (18,444 adults, 21,404 children).
The Angolan Red Cross continued to be active in Benguela and Bié
during 2005-2006.[186] It started
to cooperate with Angola’s National Police on awareness campaigns about
landmines and other explosives.[187] In Benguela, Red Cross volunteers working with police reported the
discovery of 142 ERW to demining organizations for follow-up. In Bié,
ICRC helped develop an information sheet and guidelines on reporting information
on mines. In 2006, the Angolan Red Cross extended MRE to the provinces of Kuando
Kubango, Kwanza Norte, Moxico and
Zaire.[188]
HI supported MRE in highly-affected municipalities in three provinces of the
central highlands: Huambo, Benguela and Bié. HI continued strengthening
community networks and building capacities of local associations and local NGOs.
In Huambo, 22 networks with 306 volunteers were created and maintained, one
training and three refresher workshops were held; 123,457 people participated in
1,042 MRE sessions. In Benguela, 34 networks with 179 volunteers were created;
eight training sessions were held and the volunteers started providing MRE
sessions in the last quarter of 2005, reaching 34,176
people.[189] Reporting of
incidents and of suspected mines/ERW is part of the expected activities of the
networks. In Huambo, 10 reports were provided on casualties and 30 reports on
explosive devices in 2005.[190]
HI undertook an external evaluation of its Huambo MRE project in 2005. Some
of the main findings were that HI had managed to create a large number of agents
to undertake MRE, that volunteers need close monitoring, supervision and
refresher training to stay motivated, and that unless MRE is seen as a long-term
requirement, other approaches may be more suitable and less time consuming than
a community-based approach. Training for agents in participatory methods was
recommended.[191]
HALO entered into a two-year partnership with the local NGO Child Support
Group (Grupo de Apoio a Criança, GAC) to conduct community MRE in
Bié, Benguela and Huambo in 2005, in addition to MRE conducted by its
combined teams.[192] The combined
teams provided MRE to 4,151 people in 2005, and through GAC, a further 34,202
were reached. Reporting of suspected devices and dangerous areas led to
localizing eight previously unknown dangerous
areas.[193]
INTERSOS had at least three MRE specialists in each of its EOD/survey teams
in Huíla, Kunene and Kuando Kubango. MRE activities were held in 198
localities reaching more than 20,000 people. Methodologies used included
interviews, conversations, lectures, courses, theater, songs, stories and
simulations. INTERSOS also partnered with Clube de Jovens in Kuando Kubango to
create an MRE capacity for the local NGO ACADIR in a “participatory
theatre” project, financed by UNICEF, which started in October 2005.
Initial workshops were held for 45 community volunteers (3 from each of the 15
communities). By March 2006, about 30,000 people in the 15 communities had been
involved. Community liaison was also developed through other
partnerships.[194]
MAG continued delivering MRE as a stand-alone activity in Moxico throughout
2005, focusing on the repatriation process and visiting communities identified
in the LIS process as having a landmine problem. MAG’s five community
liaison teams in Moxico delivered MRE, as well as their main function of
ensuring that the land cleared by the technical teams is a priority for the
local community.[195]
MgM partnered with Trindade Ninho de Infancia in Bengo and Kwanza Sul, and
with Associação Angolana Salvadora dos Povos (ASASP) in Kwanza
Norte. In 2005, difficulties arose over Trindade’s lack of institutional
support for its field staff and with regard to reporting. ASASP, however,
provided MRE in support of MgM’s clearance work to MgM’s full
satisfaction.[196]
From 26 September to 1 October 2005, CNIDAH held a national MRE methodology
meeting, attended by all national MRE partners “to develop strategies for
MRE implementation, to promote knowledge exchange between participants, and to
achieve a national perspective on achievements made in
Angola.”[197]
In early 2006, CNIDAH undertook an MRE training-needs assessment supported by
ICRC and UNICEF, which pointed to radio and the police as particularly effective
channels of dissemination. ICRC designed a training manual and field-tested
manuals for the police.[198] In
May, CNIDAH organized a national MRE meeting with technical and financial
support from UNICEF to discuss planning MRE based on LIS data, a transition from
emergency to development approach and revising the IMSMA reporting
format.[199]
Several other capacity-building events took place in the reporting period.
In December 2005 and May 2006, ICRC and the Angolan Red Cross organized
workshops for journalists on how to transmit MRE
messages.[200] In February 2006,
ICRC facilitated a week-long training course jointly with the Angolan Red Cross
for new provincial coordinators.[201] Also in February, with UNICEF support, MRE NGOs exchanged visits to share
experiences in implementing MRE activities in the field and, in particular, the
training of local mine committees.[202] MAG worked with local NGOs in Moxico (Kalofulofu) and in Lunda Sul and
Lunda Norte (Zango la mwaya and Angolan Red Cross) to develop their capacity to
deliver MRE to at-risk
populations.[203]
Funding and Assistance
In 2005, 17 countries and the EC reported contributing $35,771,510 to mine
action in Angola. This represents an increase of some 28 percent from the $28
million contributed in 2004 by 15 countries, the EC and
UNDP.[204] International donors
in 2005 identified by Landmine Monitor included:
Canada: C$264,812 ($218,582) to UNICEF for
MRE;[205]
Belgium: €184,116 ($229,206) to HI for victim
assistance;[206]
Denmark: DKK7,500,000 ($1,250,980) to DanChurchAid for mine clearance and
MRE;[207]
EC: €7,268,400 ($9,048,431), consisting of €2,850,000
($3,547,965) to NPA for demining; €2 million ($2,489,800 ) to UNDP for
demining, €2 million ($2,489,800 ) to UNDP for institutional support, and
€418,400 ($520,866) to UNDP for technical
assistance;[208]
Finland: €966,000 ($1,202,573) consisting of €150,000 ($186,735)
to HALO for mine clearance, €416,000 ($517,878) to FinnChurchAid for mine
clearance, and €400,000 ($497,960) to Finnish Red Cross/ICRC for victim
assistance;[209]
France: €1,800,000 ($2,240,820), consisting of €1 million
($1,244,900) to Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire (FSP) for mine clearance,
and €800,000 ($995,920) for victim
assistance;[210]
Germany: €2,774,244 ($3,453,656), consisting of €690,000
($858,981) to a rehabilitation center for victim assistance, €606,570
($755,119) to Medico International/MAG for mine clearance, €695,794
($866,194) to MgM for mine clearance, and €781,880 ($973,362) to SBF for
mine clearance;[211]
Ireland: €700,000 ($871,430) consisting of €500,000 ($622,450)
to HALO for mine clearance, and €200,000 ($248,980) to HI for victim
assistance;[212]
Japan: ¥68,799,074 ($624,822) consisting of ¥26,023,256 ($236,339)
to Association for Aid and Relief, Japan, for MRE, and ¥42,775,818
($388,483) to HALO for mine
clearance;[214]
Netherlands: €2,055,935 ($2,559,433), consisting of €900,000
($1,120,410) to NPA for mine clearance and MRE, €155,935 ($194,123) to HI
for victim assistance, and €1 million ($1,244,900) to MAG for mine
clearance and MRE;[215]
Norway: NOK19,500,000 ($3,027,386), consisting of NOK18 million ($2,794,510)
to NPA for mine clearance, and NOK1,500,000 ($232,876) for the
LIS;[216]
South Africa: Rand 780,000 ($105,222) to
ICRC;[217]
Spain: €160,000 ($199,184) to NPA for mine
clearance;[218]
Sweden: SEK8 million ($1,070,807) to NPA for mine
clearance;[219]
Switzerland: CHF830,000 ($666,185), consisting of CHF800,000 ($642,106) to
HALO for mine clearance and CHF30,000 ($24,079) to HI for
MRE;[220]
UK: £782,768 ($1,424,637) consisting of £465,814 ($847,781) to
HALO for road verification and £316,954 ($576,856) to MAG for integrated
demining;[221]
US: $6,823,000, consisting of $6,172,000 from the Department of State and
$651,000 from the Leahy War Victims
Fund.[222]
Private funding was reported by the Humpty Dumpty Institute ($770,000 to HALO
for mine clearance)[223] and by
Terre des Hommes (€55,569, or $69,178, in multi-year funding for schooling
of people with disabilities including landmine
survivors).[224] Including these
amounts, total reported international funding contributed in 2005 came to
$36,610,688.
In addition, the Czech Republic reported contributing CZK2 million ($83,366)
for MRE and mine clearance in Angola and Zambia in 2005; it was not reported how
these funds were to be
distributed.[225] The EC reported
allocating €799,684 ($995,527) to HI for victim assistance in 2005; this
amount is to be dispersed from April 2006 to April
2009.[226]
During 2005, UNDP Angola concluded an agreement with the EC for funding of
€2 million ($2,489,800) to the UNDP-administered Rapid Response Fund,
which was launched in June 2005. In 2005, one project was selected for Rapid
Response Fund financing.[227] As
of May 2006, four more projects were selected which require urgent intervention;
the projects included demining, MRE and the LIS. UNDP committed $50,000 to the
fund in 2006.[228]
UNDP did not report any mine action funding for Angola through the Thematic
Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in 2005 (in 2004, it reported
contributions from four donors totaling
$1,733,956).[229]
Seven operators (DanChurchAid, INTERSOS, HALO, MAG, MgM, NPA, SBF) reported
budgets totaling at least $29.6 million for mine action in Angola in 2005.
The Angolan government allocated $3 million for mine action in 2005, to be
managed by INAD.[230]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
In 2005, there were at least 96 new mine/UXO casualties in Angola. CNIDAH
recorded 36 landmine/UXO incidents in 2005, which killed 26 people and injured
70 others. Of the recorded incidents, 21 were caused by antipersonnel mines,
five by antivehicle mines and 10 by UXO. Incidents were recorded in Bié
(seven), Moxico (nine), Huambo (four), Kwanza Sul (three), Malanje (three),
Huila (two), Kwanza Norte (two), Luanda (two), Kunene (one), Kuando Kubango
(one), Namibe (one) and Uige (one). Most casualties were aged between 15 and 35
years.[231] This represents a
significant decrease compared with at least 191 new casualties in 86 incidents
recorded by CNIDAH in 2004.[232] The true number of casualties is presumed to be higher than what has been
reported, as many incidents are not recorded due to inaccessibility and the lack
of a comprehensive data collection
system.[233] CNIDAH recognizes
that there is inadequate identification, registration and analysis of casualties
and survivor information.[234]
Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. Landmine Monitor recorded one
mine incident: on 9 February, in Andulo municipality, Bié province, a
passenger-laden truck hit an antivehicle mine killing two people and injuring 28
others.[235]
Due to data collection and database entry issues, CNIDAH was not able to
provide complete data for 2005 and no casualty data for
2006.[236] Reportedly, data has
not been entered into IMSMA since 2002 when responsibility was moved from
INAROEE to CNIDAH. Under INAROEE, data collection was comprehensive and
unified. When CNIDAH took control of the data collection, INAROEE provincial
offices stopped providing data and CNIDAH had to rely on other sources. In
2006, CNIDAH started to set up IMSMA databases at provincial level, with the
required staff training. It was planned to have a complete dataset by the end
of 2006.[237]
Preliminary data from the LIS indicates that 330 mine/UXO casualties in the
24 months preceding survey were identified in 13 provinces. Most incidents were
recorded in Moxico province (111), followed by Bié (58), Kwanza Sul (30),
Malanje (26), Lunda Norte (25), Benguela (20), Kwanza Norte (18), Huambo (15),
Huíla (13), Kunene (seven) and Lunda Sul (seven); no casualties were
recorded in Luanda and Namibe.[238] Women made up about 23 percent of the casualties and men 76 percent; 49
percent were aged 30 to 44 years, 28 percent were aged 15 to 29 years, 11
percent were aged five to 14 years, and seven percent were over 45 years old;
the age of five percent was not known. Activities at the time of the mine/UXO
incident included traveling (31 percent), collecting wood and water (18
percent), and farming (11 percent). Only four percent of recorded incidents
were due to tampering.[239]
The total number of landmine casualties in Angola is not known, as there is
no nationwide injury surveillance mechanism. Because of the war, access to
healthcare and social assistance has been reduced, impeding data collection. In
September 2004, the government reportedly stated that 700 people had been killed
and 2,300 injured in landmine incidents “over the last six
years.”[240] The government
estimates that there are 70,000 to 80,000 mine survivors in Angola, representing
78 percent of all people with disabilities. Approximately two-thirds of
survivors are concentrated in Luanda, with others in the mine-affected provinces
of Bié, Huambo, Malanje and Moxico. According to government estimates 85
percent of mine survivors are young people and 70 percent are
illiterate.[241] The majority of
mine survivors are male, ex-military and of working
age.[242]
Survivor Assistance
At the First Review Conference in November-December 2004, Angola was
identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine
survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest
needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for
the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of
survivors.[243] Angola presented
its 2005-2009 objectives for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in
November-December 2005. The objectives included: a nationwide mine casualty
survey; improved communication among organizations collecting data by using
IMSMA sheets; incident surveillance; improved medical care including first-aid
teams in medium and high-impact areas; increased rehabilitation; community-level
psychosocial support; more socioeconomic reintegration projects at province
level; implementation of disability legislation and inclusion in development
strategies.[244] Angola also
participated in the Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa
in Nairobi from 31 May to 2 June
2005.[245]
In May 2006, at the Standing Committee meetings, Angola presented its
progress in achieving its 2005-2009 objectives, and included a victim assistance
expert on its delegation. Angola highlighted the weak and strong points of its
victim assistance program and stated it would work towards complete inclusion of
people with disabilities by creating mechanisms for equal opportunities,
awareness-raising, improved knowledge of the law and an integrated assistance
approach involving all stakeholders, including
survivors.[246]
The Support and Social Reintegration Sub-Commission of CNIDAH coordinates and
monitors victim assistance activities. It is made up of representatives of the
ministries of health, labor, social affairs and education, UN agencies, ICRC,
and NGOs. The ICRC and physical rehabilitation NGOs also work with the
Orthopedic Coordination Group.[247] The subcommission meets once a month or whenever necessary. Various
actors reported that CNIDAH had become more actively involved in survivor
assistance in 2005 as compared with previous
years.[248] In 2005, CNIDAH
announced that survivor assistance would become a stronger pillar of mine
action, and the government pledged increased financial support for victim
assistance.[249] Nevertheless, the government recognized coordination remained
weak.[250] CNIDAH accepted that
the role of each actor involved in survivor assistance needs better definition
to overcome competing interests.[251]
Assistance to mine survivors is a part of the Ministry of Health’s
National Program for the Rehabilitation of People with Physical and Sensorial
Disability (Programa Nacional de Reabilitação da Pessoa Portadora
de Deficiência Sensorial Motora, PNR)
2001-2005.[252] The PNR was
amended and extended for the second time to 2007 to grant more time for
implementation.[253]
In 2006, a preliminary internal evaluation concluded that the PNR has made
possible the transition from service provision for amputees to a program of
public health for all people with
disabilities.[254] Revised
objectives were drafted for the PNR 2006-2010, including: improved
prosthetic/orthotic services; stronger physiotherapy sector; better PNR
structures, procedures and staffing; integration of disabled people’s
organizations into the national rehabilitation sector; small-scale pilot
projects in audio-related rehabilitation and
ophthalmology.[255] These revised
objectives focus less on macro-management and capacity-building than was the
case in the PNR for 2001-2005. An external evaluation was scheduled to be
completed in July 2006, leading to a budget revision and a final decision on
strategy.[256]
Few Angolans have access to healthcare; the public health situation in the
country remains critical. Details of emergency and continuing medical care in
Angola were reported in last year’s Landmine
Monitor.[257] Most orthopedic
centers are located far away from the mine-affected communities and financial
resources limit accessibility for rural
survivors.[258] It is estimated
that only 25 percent of the needs are being met by existing
facilities.[259] According to
preliminary findings of the LIS, of 275 recent survivors, only four reported
receiving any form of physical rehabilitation after the
incident.[260] A shortage of
trained rehabilitation specialists is partly responsible for the unmet
demand.[261]
The Ministry of Health runs 11 physical rehabilitation centers, which provide
physical rehabilitation, prosthetics and orthotics, psychosocial support and
vocational training for all people with disabilities. In 2005, the 11 centers
provided physical rehabilitation services to total of 2,691 people, produced
2,505 prostheses, 328 orthoses, and 6,640 assistive devices were distributed,
1,477 repairs were made and 1,562 survivors received psychosocial
support.[262]
Angola is in the process of the nationalizing physical rehabilitation
centers, as outlined in the PNR. HI provided institutional support to the
nationalization process until 31 March
2006.[263] According to an
evaluation of the nationalization of five rehabilitation centers, “with
the gradual withdrawal of international assistance, [PNR] needs to play a key
role in this sector that is far more prominent than it is today. Providing
technical and managerial assistance to all rehabilitation centres in Angola is a
huge task. At the time of evaluating the five centres, however, their
collaboration with [PNR] was generally very weak and only very limited technical
guidance had been received from national
level.”[264]
The ICRC supports three Ministry of Health physical rehabilitation centers in
Luanda, Huambo and Kuito, providing imported material, technical assistance,
on-the job training and managerial assistance. In 2005, the centers produced
1,262 prostheses (83 percent for mine survivors), 136 orthoses (10 percent for
mine survivors), 2,492 pairs of crutches and distributed 56
wheelchairs.[265] The three
ICRC-assisted centers offered 50 percent of the total services provided by the
11 centers in Angola in 2005. The ICRC continued to play a key role in forums
organized by the PNR to promote development and strengthening management
capacity of physical rehabilitation in the country. In 2005, two ICRC-sponsored
technicians successfully completed a one-year training course in lower limb
orthotics at the Tanzania Training Centre for Orthopaedic Technicians. The ICRC
changed its approach from direct involvement in the centers to facilitating
access and improving quality of services, providing travel reimbursements to
patients, advocating for long-term accessibility solutions, and promoting
sustainability by supporting PNR activities and strengthening managerial
autonomy of the centers.[266]
Handicap International provided technical assistance to the Ministry of
Health on implementation of the PNR until 31 March 2006. In early 2005, HI
started a community-based rehabilitation project in the provinces of Benguela,
Huíla and Namibe, focusing on an effective referral system, social
reintegration, awareness raising, lobbying and prevention of disability.
Upgrading of centers in the three provinces was completed in December and
activities started in early 2006. HI objectives in 2006 included assessment of
the needs of people with disabilities to better adapt responses, strengthening
the capacity of disabled people’s organizations, decreasing stigmatization
of disabled people via awareness raising and socioeconomic reintegration through
a pilot project in Benguela province and a market analysis
study.[267]
INTERSOS handed over management of the Landmine Victims Orthopedic Center in
Menongue, Kuando Kubango province to the Ministry of Health in March 2005, but
continued to provide technical support, training for technicians, training for
psychosocial support, equipment, repairs and maintenance, and transport to the
center. In 2005, the center assisted 135 people, of which 105 were landmine
survivors.[268] INTERSOS surveyed
amputees in Menongue and Luandato in 2005 to collect information about their
satisfaction with prosthetic services, and quality of life. The study indicated
that 15 percent of amputees had stopped wearing their prostheses, but that among
civilians, this was 31 percent (more than 68 percent of the civilian group were
female). Reasons for not wearing prostheses were pain, poor fit, need for
repair and loss. The majority of amputees said that maintenance was not
available. People surveyed sometimes talked about intimidating treatment and
refusals by prosthetic technicians to assist. Unemployment levels for amputees
‘in-uniform’ had remained virtually unchanged (the military and
police continue to employ disabled personnel) but among civilians male
unemployment had increased from 31 to 45 percent and female unemployment from 32
to almost 72 percent. INTERSOS concluded that outreach services, information on
available services, and training contact points for patients within the center,
especially targeted at female amputees, would be
beneficial.[269]
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) supported the Moxico Regional
Physical Rehabilitation Center, providing physical rehabilitation,
physiotherapy, psychosocial support, and socioeconomic reintegration to
war-affected Angolans; 27 percent of staff at the center have a disability,
including five mine survivors. Beneficiaries are brought to Luena from the
neighboring provinces of Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte by road and air as virtually
no services are available in these provinces for mine survivors. In 2005, the
center provided rehabilitation to 826 people, including 328 landmine survivors.
The center produced 178 prostheses, 253 pairs of crutches, five wheelchairs, and
21 other assistive devices. There was a decrease in services in 2005 because
the staff salaries were not paid adequately and there was a lack of
transportation for patients. The center was handed over to Moxico health
authorities in January 2005, but VVAF planned to continue to support the center
until 2008. However, it was unclear whether the Moxico health authorities would
be able to continue providing services for patients in Lunda Norte and Lunda
Sul.[270]
In early 2005, 12 Angolan technicians were sent to El Salvador to undertake a
three-year prosthetic and orthotic training program at Don Bosco University. In
March 2006, another 12 Angolan technicians were sent, sponsored by the PNR. In
February 2006, 39 technicians started a three-year long distance training
program with Don Bosco University, with PNR sponsorship. The PNR also sponsored
the training of nine people in physiotherapy and five in psychology at the
Angolan Private Institute of Higher
Learning.[271]
Most people with disabilities face physical and social barriers that hinder
their full participation in society. Individual or group psychosocial support
programs have been developed at the community
level.[272]
Economic reintegration of mine survivors is the responsibility of the
ministries of labor and social affairs, but there is no national strategy. Few
mine survivors are able to earn a sustainable living; the situation is
aggravated by the high number of people of working age with disabilities, the
concentration of mine survivors in urban areas, high levels of national
unemployment, high illiteracy, limited availability of vocational training and
social exclusion of mine survivors and other people with
disabilities.[273]
The Ministry of Labor’s National Institute for Education and
Professional Training and the Ministry of Social Affairs’ National
Institute for Support of Disabled People work with local and international NGOs
to support mine survivors with vocational training and microcredit programs;
however, most services are concentrated in Luanda or in provincial
capitals.[274] In Benguela, there
are four government and 10 private vocational training centers, in Lubango there
are two government and 10 private centers, and Namibe has one government and
eight private centers; however, it is not clear if all centers are open to
people with disabilities.[275]
In 2005, the government reported that within the framework of socioeconomic
reintegration, 6,434 landmine survivors benefited from projects implemented by
national NGOs and others including the International Paralympic Committee, Lwini
Social Solidarity Fund, HI, VVAF and
ICRC.[276]
The Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities (Centro de Apoio
a Promoção e Desenvolvimento de Comunidades, CAPDC), a local NGO
created with the support of Medico International, worked in partnership with
VVAF to identify, assess, refer and transport beneficiaries to Moxico Regional
Physical Rehabilitation Center, to provide psychosocial support and emergency
material support to the most vulnerable and referrals to vocational training and
microcredit programs, and to provide follow-up to those rehabilitated. In 2005,
the program provided psychosocial support for 822 people and socioeconomic
reintegration support for housing nine families of disabled people. VVAF also
supports the Sports for Life program to promote the physical and psychosocial
rehabilitation of mine survivors and other people with disabilities. In 2005,
487 athletes with disabilities from three provinces in eastern Angola
participated in wheelchair basketball and organized amputee soccer training.
Sports for Life will be registered as an Angolan association by the end of
2006.[277]
Disability and Development Partners (DDP) supports the local NGO League for
the Reintegration of Disabled People (LARDEF) in Luanda, Benguela and Moxico to
implement several projects to promote the socioeconomic reintegration,
empowerment and employment opportunities of people with disabilities and to
raise awareness on their rights and
needs.[278]
In September 2005, HI started a two-year (2005-2007) socioeconomic
reintegration project in Huambo, which includes vocational training and
employment assistance.[279] From
September to December 2005, HI identified 50 beneficiaries (80 ex-military), of
whom 58 percent are landmine
survivors.[280] HI initiated a
pilot project for 33 beneficiaries in February 2006. HI works in partnership
with two national organizations, the National Association of Disabled of Angola
(Associação dos Defícientes de Angola, ANDA) and
Association of Solidarity of Persons with Disabilities (Associação
de Solidariedade de Pessoas Portadoras de Deficiência,
ASADEF).[281]
ANDA also worked in partnership with the Lwini Social Solidarity Fund on
socioeconomic reintegration programs to enable people with disabilities to
return to their areas of origin.[282] The Lwini Social Solidarity Fund also planned to carry out an agricultural
project in previously mined land to stimulate food self-sufficiency, in
collaboration with Roots of Peace and World
Vision.[283]
The Young Men’s Christian Association provided vocational training
scholarships to mine survivors in Huambo at the Rural Center for Development,
sponsored by the Church World
Services.[284]
The International Paralympic Committee implemented the Rehabilitation through
Sport Program in Huambo province, providing training to physiotherapists and
sports trainers on the use of sport activities as a tool for rehabilitation. In
2005, the program trained eight professionals and 21 people with disabilities,
including 10 landmine survivors, in sports rehabilitation
techniques.[285]
Disability Policy and Practice
Angola has three legislative acts on protecting the rights of disabled
people; in 2006, as in 2005, a draft law on the rights of disabled people was
before parliament.[286] In
addition, Law 21-B/92 of MINSAU identifies people with disabilities as a
vulnerable group to whom priority for assistance should be
given.[287] The government
recognizes there is lack of implementation of the legislation and lack of
financial resources.[288]
The Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for issues relating to people
with disabilities such as food aid, housing, wheelchairs, and socioeconomic
reintegration.[289] Landmine
Monitor was informed that 70 percent of the 89,170 registered disabled were
landmine/UXO survivors.[290] In
2005, the Ministry of Social Affairs changed its focus from vocational training
to the creation of cooperatives or associations. In 2006, the Ministry of
Health’s National Direction for the Integration of People with Disability
received eight times its 2005 budget, which was said to reflect the importance
given by the government to assisting people with disabilities, including
landmine survivors.[291]
Angola has a system of social security, which covers people with
disabilities; however, to benefit, a person must have contributed to the
scheme.[292] For disabled
ex-combatants, benefits are available according to the level of disability;
however, this system is reportedly not functioning
properly.[293]
Angola’s interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper includes provisions
for people with disability in terms of education and vocational
training.[294]
[1] Interview with Balbina
Malheiros Dias da Silva, Coordinator, National Institute for Demining (INAD),
Geneva, 9 May 2006. In June 2005, he said that draft legislation was nearly
complete and would be submitted to the Council of Ministers for consideration,
and then to parliament. Interview with Balbina Malheiros Dias da Silva, INAD,
Geneva, 14 June 2005. [2] Article 7 Report, Form A, 3 May
2005. [3] Landmine Monitor obtained a
copy of Angola’s third Article 7 report, covering January 2005 to March
2006. Angola submitted Article 7 reports on 3 May 2005 (for calendar year 2004)
and 14 September 2004 (for September 2003-April 2004). The initial report was
due 30 June 2003. [4] UN Department of Public
Information, “Special Political Committee Completes Debate on Removal
Action; Delegates Stress Continuing Problems after Long-Ago Conflicts,”
Sixtieth General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 27 October 2005, www.un.org. [5] UN Department of Public
Information, “Press Conference on Mine Awareness Day,” New York, 3
April 2006. [6] Roots of Peace,
“International United Nations Day for Landmine Awareness,” 4 April
2006; remarks by Nane Annan, “UN World Landmine Awareness Day 2006,”
New York, 4 April 2006, www.rootsofpeace.org. [7] Article 7 Report, Form E, 3 May
2005. [8] Article 7 Reports, Forms B, D
and G, 14 September 2004 and 3 May 2005. [9] Article 7 Report, Forms B and
D, 3 May 2005. [10] Article 7 Reports, Form D,
14 September 2004 and 3 May 2005; statement by Angola, Standing Committee on
Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006. [11] Article 7 Report, Form G, 14
September 2004. Previously, in June 2004, Angola reported a different number,
stating it had destroyed 8,432 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Presentation by
CNIDAH, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine
Action Technologies, Geneva, 24 June 2004. [12] Presentation “SPD
Project” and statement by Angola, Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006 (notes by Landmine Monitor/HRW). [13] Ibid; “Implementation
of the Ottawa Convention through the disposal of anti-personnel
landmines,” statement by Angola and UNDP, Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction, Geneva, 15 June 2005. The European Commission funded 85 percent
(€1.5 million), the Angolan government 10 percent (€170,000) and
UNDP five percent (€95,000). In June 2004, Angola cited a budget of $1.47
million. Presentation by CNIDAH, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine
Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 24 June 2004. [14] Phase 1 is Preparation;
Phase 2 Coordination and Training; Phase 3 Survey and Analysis of Stocks
(completed by end August 2006); Phase 4 Review, Tests, and Training (completed
by end September 2006); Phase 5 Execution (Destruction), Assessment and
Monitoring (completed by end December 2006). Presentation “SPD
Project” and statement by Angola, Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006 (notes by Landmine Monitor/HRW). [15] Presentation “SPD
Project” and statement by Angola, Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006 (notes by Landmine Monitor/HRW). [16] Ibid. [17] UNDP, “Angola: Crisis
Prevention and Recovery,” mirror.undp.org/angola/crisis.htm,
accessed 18 May 2006. [18] Presentation “SPD
Project” and statement by Angola, Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006 (notes by Landmine Monitor/HRW). [19] Statement by Angola,
Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 15 June 2005 (notes by
Landmine Monitor/HRW). [20] Oral remarks by Amb. Yoshiki
Mine, Geneva, 11 May 2006 (notes by Landmine Monitor/HRW). [21] Landmine Monitor (HRW)
meeting with Adriano Goncalves, Director, Stockpile Destruction Programme,
CNIDAH, 11 May 2006. [22] Article 7 Report, Forms B
and D, 3 May 2005. POMZ is misspelled as PNZ, and PMN-1 is misspelled as PMM-1,
in the Article 7 report. [23] “Civilians Surrender
Over 2,000 Firearms in Huambo,” Angola Press Agency, 20 December
2005. [24] Article 7 Reports, Form D,
14 September 2004 and 3 May 2005. [25] UN, “Country Profile:
Angola,” www.mineaction.org, accessed 19 April 2006. Under Protocol V to
the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as
unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly
excluded from the definition. [26] A UNDP review indicated that
45 types of antipersonnel mines from 18 countries and 39 types of antivehicle
mines from 14 countries were found in Angola. In addition, unexploded ordnance
“are ever-present and their types and origins are varied,” and some
armed depots have been registered in Angola’s mine action database. UNDP,
“Angola: Mine Action Sector Review,” New York, May 2004, p. 7. The
same data on mines found in Angola was included in Article 7 Report, Form H, 3
May 2005. [27] For more details on landmine
use in Angola, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 136. [28] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
Technical Advisor, Programming and Planning for Mine Action, UNDP, Luanda, 6
April 2006. [29] This information is based on
LIS data as of April 2006, and projected estimates of the remaining areas
(approximately 20 percent of the territory) which, as of March 2006, had not
been surveyed; telephone interview with Andrew Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 13 April
2006. Figures also provided by email by Mike Kendellen, Director for Survey,
Survey Action Center (SAC), 24 April 2006. [30] SAC, “Angola Atlas
Interim Report, Provinces of: Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Kunene,
Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Luanda, Lunda Norte and Malanje,” 30 November
2005, www.sac-na.org, accessed on 11 April
2006. [31] Email from Greg Crowther,
Program Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Luanda, 6 April 2006. [32] Email from Mike Kendellen,
SAC, 24 April 2006; email from Andrew Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [33] UN, “Country Profile:
Angola;” email from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 24 April 2006. [34] CNIDAH, “Response to
the questionnaire on the status of implementation of Article 5 of the
Implementation Support Unit of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian
Demining,” submitted at Standing Committee meetings in May 2006. [35] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 30 May 2006. [36] UNDP, “Angola: Mine
Action Sector Review,” New York, May 2004, p. 5; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 137-138. [37] CNIDAH, www.cnidah.gv.ao, accessed 11 April 2006; see
Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 137. [38] Interview with Adriano
Goncalves, CNIDAH, Geneva, 12 May 2006. [39] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 137. [40] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [41] Ibid, and telephone
interview, 13 April 2006. [42] Ibid; “Angola:
Country’s Demining Process Records Progress,” Angola Press
Agency, Luanda, 6 January 2006. [43] Government Gazette, Office
of the President of the Republic, Dispatch number 28/05 of 5 December 2005. [44] CNIDAH, “Response to
ISU questionnaire,” May 2006. [45] CED, “Demining
Operation–2006/2007,” pp. 6-7. [46] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 15 May 2006. [47] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006; interview with Adriano Goncalves, CNIDAH, Geneva, 12
May 2006. [48] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 30 May 2006. [49] Telephone interview with
Andrew Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 13 April 2006. [50] CNIDAH, “Mine Action
Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 24. [51] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 139. [52] CNIDAH, “Mine Action
Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 50. [53] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [54] Ibid. [55] Interview with Jean-Paul
Rychener, IMSMA Regional Coordinator for Africa, GICHD, Geneva, 11 May 2006. [56] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 26 May 2006. [57] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006, and telephone interview, 13 April 2006. [58] Interview with Mike
Kendellen, SAC, 26 July 2005; email from Andrew Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 6 April
2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 140. [59] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [60] CNIDAH, “Mine Action
Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 7. [61] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 15 May 2006. [62] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [63] CNIDAH, “Mine Action
Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, pp. 19-23. [64] Ibid, p. 19. [65] Ibid, p. 13. [66] Ibid, p. 28. [67] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006, and telephone interview, 13 April 2006. [68] CNIDAH, “Mine Action
Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, pp. 7, 40. [69] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [70] República de Angola,
Ministerio de Planeamento, “Estrategia de Combate à Pobreza,”
Luanda, 24 September 2003, pp. 15, 17, 18, 21. [71] Emails from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 26 and 30 May 2006. [72] UNDP, “Angola: Mine
Action Sector Review,” New York, May 2004, p. 11. [73] “Angola: Government
promulgates internal regulation of Landmine Institute,” Angola Press
Agency, Luanda, 18 June 2005. [74] Government Gazette, Office
of the President of the Republic, Dispatch number 28/05 of 5 December 2005. [75] CNIDAH, “Mine Action
Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 24. [76] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 26 May 2006. [77] UNDP, “Angola: Mine
Action Sector Review,” New York, May 2004, p. 5. [78] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 15 May 2006. [79] CNIDAH, “Mine Action
Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 15. [80] Ibid, p. 23. [81] CNIDAH, “Operational
Results, Demining per operator, January-December 2005,” (translation),
undated but 2006. [82] Email from Christian
Richmond, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, Program
Manager, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [83] Email from Mario Nunes,
Deputy Program Manager, NPA, Luanda, 13 March 2006. [84] Email from Harald Arn Wie,
Representative/Program Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), Luanda, 3 March 2006. [85] Email from Marco Ravelli,
Project Manager, Mine Action Unit Angola, INTERSOS, Luanda, 20 March 2006. [86] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [87] Email from Ken
O’Connell, Country Program Director, MgM, Angola, 26 February 2006. [88] Email from Nobert Rossa,
Chief Executive Officer, SBF, Luanda, 22 March 2006; email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 26 May 2006. [89] Interview with Leonardo
Sapalo, Director, INAD, 16 March 2006; CED, “Demining
Operation–2006/2007,” undated, p. 7. [90] Telephone interview with
Leopoldo Sapalo, INAD, 30 May 2006. [91] Interview with Leonardo
Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 16 March 2006. [92] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 15 May 2006. [93] “Angolan Army Soldiers
Receive Demining Training,” Angola Press Agency, Uige, 17 April
2006. [94] Email from Andrew Frizzell,
UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [95] Telephone interview with
Andrew Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 13 April 2006. [96] CED, “Demining
Operation–2006/2007,” undated, pp. 7-9. The GNR had not been
operational as of May 2006; GNR deminers will mainly be demobilized soldiers.
Interview with Adrianao Goncalves, CNIDAH, Geneva, 12 May 2006. [97] Emails from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006; email from
Mario Nunes, NPA, Luanda, 24 April 2006; email from Marco Ravelli, INTERSOS, 20
March 2006. [98] Emails from Mario Nunes,
NPA, Luanda, 13 March and 21 April 2006. [99] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [100] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 138-139. [101] SAC, “Angola Atlas
Interim Report, Provinces of: Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Kunene,
Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Luanda, Lunda Norte and Malanje,” 30 November
2005. [102] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006; email from Marco Ravelli, INTERSOS, 20 March 2006.
[103] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006; email from Christian Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard
Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006; email from Mario Nunes, NPA, Luanda, 24 April
2006; SAC, Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 2006. [104] Email from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 26 May 2006. [105] Email from Mike
Kendellen, SAC, 23 February 2006. [106] Ibid. [107] SAC, Newsletter, Vol. 5,
No 3, March 2006; email from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 26 May 2006. [108] Email from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006; email from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 30 May
2006. [109] SAC, “Angola Atlas
Interim Report, Provinces of: Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Kunene,
Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Luanda, Lunda Norte and Malanje,” 30 November
2005. [110] Emails from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 6 April and 26 May 2006. [111] Email from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 6 April 2006; email from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 23
February 2006. [112] SAC also notes that the
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not approve the weighting system until
after the LIS was conducted, as did the authorities in Puntland. Email from
Mike Kendellen, SAC, 26 May 2006. [113] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [114] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 138. [115] GICHD, “The Role of
Survey in Mine Action,” March 2006, Geneva, p. 45. [116] CNIDAH, “Mine
Action Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 19. [117] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 11 April 2006. [118] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006; email from
Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 30 May 2006. [119] Email from Nobert Rossa,
SBF, Luanda, 22 March 2006. [120] Email from Harald Arn
Wie, DCA, Luanda, 3 March 2006. [121] Emails from Marco
Ravelli, INTERSOS, Luanda, 20 March and 26 April 2006. [122] CNIDAH,
“Operational Results, Demining per operator, January-December 2005,”
(unofficial translation), undated but 2006. [123] Article 7 Report, Form G,
3 May 2005. This figure refers to the total land cleared by “several
demining operators.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p.
140. [124] Email from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 26 May 2006. [125] Ibid.
[126] The term
“verification” applied to roads has not been defined and is used
differently by operators. Comparison with actual clearance is not advisable.
Since some operators do not report separately for verification and clearance,
all operations on roads are included in the same column.
[127] Email from Harald Arn
Wie, DCA, Luanda, 3 March 2006; 13,400 square meters of mine clearance includes
EOD operations.
[128] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. HALO
describes its “road threat reduction technique” as not being
“full clearance,” but rather “a serious attempt” to
locate as many antivehicle mines in situations where mine density is very low
and humanitarian need for access very high.” HALO does not report
technical survey data.
[129] Emails from Marco
Ravelli, INTERSOS, 20 March and 26 April 2006. The antipersonnel mines were
found during survey and EOD activities.
[130] Emails from Greg
Crowther, MAG, Angola, 11 and 21 April 2006. The 456,054 square meters of mine
clearance includes manual demining and risk reduction clearance around bridges
by road operation teams. The 886 kilometers of roads were declared
“trafficable” through assessment and risk reduction; these roads
were previously categorized as “red roads,” which are closed for use
to UN agencies according to their own security classification. In the UXO
column, 1,900 refers to UXO and AXO combined, therefore there were probably more
than the total of 15,826 AXO shown in the table.
[131] Email from Ken
O’Connell, MgM, Angola, 26 February 2006.
[132] Emails from Mario
Nunes, NPA, Luanda, 13 March and 24 April 2006. NPA reports that in total, it
has cleared 3,729,683 square meters: 741,190 square meters manually cleared,
2,982,240 square meters cleared mechanically, 7,208 square meters cleared by
NPA’s Rapid Response Team which carries out EOD; 258 kilometers of road
clearance (2,079,565 square meters) is included). NPA Angola does not report on
area reduction separately.
[133] CNIDAH,
“Operational Results, demining per operator, January-December 2005,”
(unofficial translation), undated but 2006. These figures are inflated as the
majority of INAD’s clearance was conducted on railways and on high tension
power lines; INAD data refers to extended sections of infrastructure, when in
reality, only spot tasks were conducted in known hazardous areas. Email from
Andrew Frizzell, UNDP Luanda, 6 April 2006.
[134] Emails from Nobert
Rossa, SBF, Luanda, 22 March 2006 and 25 April 2006; most mines and UXO were
destroyed in EOD activities.
[135] CNIDAH,
“Operational Results, Demining per operator, January-December 2005,”
(unofficial translation), undated but 2006. [136] Email from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 4 May 2006. CNIDAH planned to formalize a reporting
regime. [137] CNIDAH, “Mine
Action Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 15. [138] Ibid. [139] Email from Marco Ravelli,
INTERSOS, Luanda, 20 March 2006. [140] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006; email from
Greg Crowther, MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006; email from Mario Nunes, NPA, Luanda,
13 March 2006; email from Ken O’Connell, MgM, Angola, 26 February
2006. [141] Email from Nobert Rossa,
SBF, Luanda, 22 March 2006. [142] Email from Hans Rune
Kampenhøy, Operation Manager, DCA, 24 April 2006. [143] Emails from Ken
O’Connell, MgM, Angola, 26 February 2006; email from Nobert Rossa, SBF,
Luanda, 22 March 2006. [144] Email from Mario Nunes,
NPA, Luanda, 13 March 2006, and telephone interview, 28 March 2006. [145] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [146] Statement by Angola,
Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 30 November 2005. [147] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [148] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [149] “The HALO Trust
Operational Update”, www.thehdi.org,
accessed 25 May 2006. [150] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [151] Email from Harald Arn
Wie, DCA, Luanda, 3 March 2006; email from Hans Rune Kampenhøy, DCA,
Luanda, 24 April 2006. [152] Email from Hans Rune
Kampenhøy, DCA, 24 April 2006. [153] CNIDAH, “Mine
Action Strategy 2006-2011,” draft, 30 March 2006, p. 37 [154] Ibid, p.24. [155] Telephone interview with
Ken O’Connell, MgM, Angola, 28 March 2006; email from Harald Arn Wie, DCA,
Luanda, 3 March 2006; email from Hans Rune Kampenhøy, DCA, Luanda, 24
April 2006. [156] Email from Christian
Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [157] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [158] Interview with Leonardo
Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 16 March 2006. [159] Emails from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 6 April and 3 May 2006, and telephone interview, 13
April 2006. UNDP notes that the location of quality assurance teams might be
refined during the course of the project. [160] Email from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 3 May 2006. [161] Email from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 4 May 2006. [162] Email from Mike
Kendellen, SAC, 30 May 2006. [163] Emails from Greg
Crowther, MAG, Luanda, 6 April and 21 2006. [164] Emails from Gerhard Zank,
HALO, Luanda, 10 and 30 May 2006. [165] Emails from Andrew
Frizzell, UNDP, Luanda, 26 and 30 May 2006. [166] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006; email from Nobert Rossa, SBF, Luanda, 22 March 2006;
email from Marco Ravelli, INTERSOS, Luanda, 20 March 2006; email from Mario
Nunes, NPA, Luanda, 13 March 2006; email from Christian Richmond, HALO, UK, and
Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21 April 2006. [167] Email from Greg Crowther,
MAG, Luanda, 6 April 2006; email from Harald Arn Wie, DCA, Luanda, 3 March 2006;
email from Christian Richmond, HALO, UK, and Gerhard Zank, HALO, Luanda, 21
April 2006. [168] Email from Ken
O’Connell, MgM, Angola, 21 April 2006. [169] Email from Hans Rune
Kampenhøy, DCA, Luanda, 24 April 2006. [170] Statement by Angola,
Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socioeconomic Reintegration, Geneva,
9 May 2006; CNIDAH, “Response to the GICHD questionnaire...,” May
2006. [171] UNICEF Angola,
“Educação sobre o Risco das Minas,” 28 December 2005,
Luanda, p. 3, received by email from Miki Fukuhara, MRE Officer, UNICEF, 24 May
2006. [172] Telephone interview with
and email from Miki Fukuhara, UNICEF, 24 May 2006. National NGOs include
Angolan Red Cross (Benguela, Bié), ASASP until June 2005 (Kwanza Norte),
Centro de Apoio à Promoção e Desenvolvimento
Comunitário (Lunda Sul), Clube de Jovenes (Huíla) Cuidados da
Infancia until June 2005 (Kwanza Sul), Enxame de Abelhas (Moxico), Grupo Apoio a
Criança (Bié, Huambo), Palanca Negra (Malanje), Secut Bagos
(Uíge), Trindade Ninho de Infancia (Bengo, Kwanza Sul). [173] Statement by Angola,
Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socioeconomic Reintegration, Geneva,
9 May 2006; CNIDAH, “Response to the GICHD questionnaire...,” May
2006. [174] Article 7 Report, Form I,
draft obtained by Landmine Monitor at Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 11
May 2006. [175] “Over 1,000
Landmines Deactivated In 2005,” Angola Press Agency, 17 April
2006. [176] Email from Miki Fukuhara,
UNICEF, 24 May 2006. [177] Ibid, and telephone
interview, 24 May 2006. [178] Article 7 Report, Form I,
draft obtained 11 May 2006; UNDP Angola website; mirror.undp.org/angola/crisis.htm,
updated 20 April 2006, accessed 28 May 2006. [179] Telephone interview with
Miki Fukuhara, UNICEF, 24 May 2006. [180] Email from Miki Fukuhara,
UNICEF, 24 May 2006. [181] UNICEF Angola,
“Educação sobre o Risco das Minas,” 28 December 2005,
Luanda, p. 8. [182] The initial plan had 165
committees and included Benguela province as well. See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 144. [183] Email from Miki Fukuhara,
UNICEF, 24 May 2006. [184] Ruth Bottomley,
“Evaluation Report for Handicap International France, Strengthening and
Promoting Associations and Community Networks for Sustainable Mine Risk
Education,” HI, Lyon, May 2005, p. 6. [185] Response from DCA to
Landmine Monitor MA/MRE questionnaire, 3 March 2006. DCA employs nine national
MRE and community liaison staff. [186] “Red Cross
Increases Awareness Activities On Landmines Risks,” Angola Press
Agency, Luanda, 21 February 2006. [187] “Angola: Police,
Red Cross cooperate in landmine awareness,” Angola Press Agency, 17
April 2006. [188] ICRC, “Special
Report, Mine Action 2005,” Geneva, May 2006, p. 14; ICRC, “Annual
Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 59. [189] HI, “PEPAM
(Programme d’Education pour la Prévention des Accidents par Mines)
Provinces de Huambo, Benguela et Bié),” in HI, “Programme
Angola, Rapport d’activités, Année 2005,” Lyon,
undated, pp. 10-12. It lists 145 volunteers and 34 network leaders. [190] 10 antipersonnel mines,
two antivehicle mines, 22 UXO. HI, “Final report January 2004-December
2005,” Luanda, Annexes 1 and 2, pp. 35-37. [191] Ruth Bottomley,
“Evaluation Report for Handicap International France, Strengthening and
Promoting Associations and Community Networks for Sustainable Mine Risk
Education,” HI, Lyon, May 2005, p. 6. [192] Response by HALO to
Landmine Monitor MA/MRE questionnaire, 21 April 2006. [193] “Bié: Eight
Mine Fields Localised,” Angola Press Agency, Kuito, 26 May
2006. [194] Response by INTERSOS to
Landmine Monitor MA/MRE questionnaire, 20 March 2006. [195] MAG, “MAG,
Angola,” [leaflet, 2006], Luanda/Manchester, www.magclearsmines.org, accessed 5 June
2006. [196] MgM, “Overview of
MgM Demining Operations Lot 2, Bengo, Kwanza Norte and Kwanza Sul,”
Luanda, 2006, p. 7, received by email from Ken O'Connell, MgM, Angola, 26
February 2006. [197] UNICEF Angola,
“Educação sobre o Risco das Minas,” 28 December 2005,
Luanda, p. 3; email from Miki Fukuhara, UNICEF, 24 May 2006. [198] Mine Action Support
Group, “MASG Newsletter First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May
2006, p. 19. [199] Email from Miki Fukuhara,
UNICEF, 24 May 2006. [200] Ibid. [201] “Red Cross
Increases Awareness Activities On Landmines Risks,” Angola Press
Agency, Luanda, 21 February 2006. [202] Email from Miki Fukuhara,
UNICEF, 24 May 2006. [203] Response by MAG to
Landmine Monitor MA/MRE questionnaire, email from Greg Crowther, MAG, Luanda, 6
April 2006. [204] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 145-146. [205] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [206] Email from Stan Brabant,
Head, Policy Unit, HI, 26 May 2006; email from Dominique Jones, Conseiller,
Ministry of Defense, 17 May 2006. [207] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March
2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = DKK5.9953. US Federal Reserve,
“List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [208] Email from Laura Liguori,
Security Policy Unit, Conventional Disarmament, EC, 20 June 2006. Average
exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449, used throughout this report. US
Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January
2006. [209] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Paula Sirkiä, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 March
2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449, used throughout
this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),”
3 January 2006. [210] France Article 7 Report,
Form J, 26 April 2006; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 6
October 2005. [211] Germany Article 7 Report,
Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database. [212] Ireland Article 7 Report,
Form J, 21 April 2006; emails from Therese Healy, Department of Foreign Affairs,
May 2006. [213] Emails from Manfredo
Capozza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2006. [214] Emails from Kitagawa
Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated
information received by JCBL from Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11 May
2005 and Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006. Average
exchange rate for 2005: US$1= ¥110.11, used throughout this report. US
Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January
2006. [215] Email from Ellen
Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje
Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006. [216] Email from Annette A.
Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = NOK6.4412. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [217] Statement by South
Africa, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 1 December 2005. Average
exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = ZAR0.13490, Landmine Monitor estimate based on
www.oanda.com. Although the recipient was
not specified, it is assumed to have been Angola, consistent with South
Africa’s past funding allocations. [218] Spain Article 7 Report,
Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Luis Gómez Nogueira, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 25 April 2006. [219] Sweden Article 7 Report,
Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, March-May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = SEK7.4710. US
Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January
2006. [220] Email from Rémy
Friedmann, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [221] Email from Andrew
Willson, Department for International Development, 20 March 2006. Average
exchange rate for 2005: £1 = US$1.820. US Federal Reserve, “List of
Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [222] USG Historical Chart
containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial
Management Specialist, US Department of State, 20 July 2005. [223] The Humpty Dumpty
Institute, “Opening Roads to Angola’s Future: Milk Sale Clears
Mines,” Final Report, www.thehdi.org, accessed 3 June 2006. [224] Information collected
from Actiongroup Landmine.de members, in email from Markus Haake,
Actiongroup Landmine.de, 8 June 2006. [225] Email from Jan Kara,
Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 April 2006. Average exchange rate for
2005: US$1 = CZK23.99048. Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com. [226] Email from Laura Liguori,
EC, 20 June 2006. This amount has not been included in the 2005 total for
Angola. [227] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p.147; email from Keita Sugimoto, UNDP, 22 May 2006. [228] Email from Keita
Sugimoto, UNDP, 22 May 2006. [229] UNDP, “Mine Action
Contributions to UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and
Recovery,” 20 April 2006; UNDP, “Funding Update by Donors,”
2005. [230] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 146. [231] Email from Adolfo
Ferreira, UNDP Assistant for Training and Quality Control for Mine Action,
CNIDAH, Luanda, 25 May 2006. [232] Email from Joaquim Merca,
Technical Advisor, UNDP, 14 July 2005. [233] ICRC, “Special
Report, Mine Action 2004,” Geneva, June 2005, p.17; see Landmine
Monitor Report 2004, pp. 132-133. [234] Statement by Angola,
Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socioeconomic Reintegration, Geneva,
9 May 2006; Article 7 Report, Form J, draft obtained 11 May 2006. [235] “Two people killed
in a mine explosion in Bié,” Angola Press Agency / All Africa
Global Media via COMTEX, Kuito, 9 February 2006; “Landmines kills two,
injures 28 in Angola, Xinhua News Agency, Luanda, 10 February 2006. [236] Emails from Pedro
Ribeiro, IMSMA Officer, CNIDAH, Luanda, 31 May and 2 June 2006. [237] Email from Pedro Ribeiro,
CNIDAH, Luanda, 2 June 2006. [238] Presentation by Mohammad
Qasim, UNDP Advisor, CNIDAH Plenary Session, 24 March 2006, faxed to Landmine
Monitor by Adolfo Ferreira, CNIDAH, Luanda, 26 May 2006. [239] Email from Mike
Kendellen, SAC, 21 May 2006. [240] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 147. [241] “Final Report of
the Meeting of State Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
“Victim Assistance objectives of the State Parties that have the
responsibility for significant number of landmine survivors,” Zagreb, 28
November-2 December 2005, p. 110. [242] Email from Elsa Neto,
Victim Assistance Quality Control Officer, CNIDAH, Luanda, 10 April 2006. [243] UN, “Final Report,
First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004,
APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33. [244] “Final Report of
the Meeting of State Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 109-114. [245] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 148. [246] Statement by Angola,
Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration,
Geneva, 9 May 2006. [247] See also Landmine
Monitor Report 2004, p. 134. [248] Interviews with NGOs and
governmental officials during field visit to Angola, 9-17 March 2006. Actors
stated that the increased activity was due in part to the appointment of
Madalena Nazareth Neto, well known for her disability advocacy work, as
Coordinator of the Assistance and Social Reintegration Sub-Commission. [249] “Angola: Landmines
Affect about 1,300 Square Km of National Ground,” Angola Press
Agency, Luanda, 6 April 2006. [250] Statement by Angola,
Assistance and Social Reintegration Sub-Commission Coordinator, CNIDAH, Standing
Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 9 May
2006. [251] Interview with Elsa Neto,
CNIDAH, Luanda, 9 March 2006. [252] For details of the
PNR’s six objectives, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 148. [253] Interview with Piet de
Mey, Technical Advisor on Public Health, PNR, Luanda, 16 March 2006. [254] “Esboco duma
proposta do Plano 2006-2010,” (Draft Proposal of the 2006-2010 Plan), 24
February 2006, provided to Landmine Monitor by Piet de Mey, PNR, Luanda, 16
March 2006. [255] “Draft Proposal of
the 2006-2010 Plan,” 24 February 2006. [256] Interview with Piet de
Mey, PNR, Luanda, 16 March 2006. [257] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 149. [258] “Final Report of
the Meeting of State Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 111-112. [259] Presentation by Dr.
Adriano Gonçalves, CNIDAH, Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim
Assistance in Africa, Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 134-135. [260] Email from Mike
Kendellen, SAC, 13 July 2005. [261] Anders Eklund,
“Evaluation of Five Physical Rehabilitation Centers in Angola,”
Luanda, September 2005, p. 8. Menongue, Lubango, Benguela were evaluated in
November/December 2004, Viana and Luena in April 2005. [262] Email from Elsa Neto,
CNIDAH, Luanda, 10 April 2006; for details of the centers, see Landmine
Monitor Report 2005, p. 149. [263] Email from Emmanuelle
Rioufol, Head of Mission, HI, Luanda, 26 May 2006. [264] Anders Eklund,
“Evaluation of Five Physical Rehabilitation Centers in Angola,”
Luanda, September 2005, p. 2. [265] Email from Rebecca
Thomson, Head of Delegation, ICRC, Luanda, 5 April 2006; ICRC, “Physical
Rehabilitation Program in 2005,” draft received 19 May 2006, p. 11. [266] ICRC, “Physical
Rehabilitation Program in 2005,” draft received 19 May 2006, p. 11. [267] HI, “Angola
Program: Activity Report 2005,” Luanda, 2006, p. 22; interview with
Emmanuelle Rioufol, HI, Luanda, 14 March 2006. [268] Response by INTERSOS to
Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire, 16 March 2006. [269] INTERSOS, “Method
for Assessing the Reintegration of Users of Rehab Services,” Luanda,
February 2006, pp. 3-69. [270] Interview with John
Grabowski, VVAF, Luanda, 16 March 2006; response by VVAF to Landmine Monitor VA
Questionnaire, 16 March 2006; email from Anita Keller, Program Manager, VVAF, 27
September 2005; email from Tracy Brown, VVAF, 17 July 2005. [271] Interview with Emmanuelle
Diavita, Program Director, PNR, Ministry of Health, Luanda, 10 March 2006. [272] “Final Report of
the Meeting of State Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 112-113. [273] Ibid, pp. 113-114. [274] HI, “Country
Situation Analysis: Angola,” Brussels, June 2005, p. 26. [275] Teresa Boers,
“Diagnostico Final da Situação das PPDs nas Provincias da
Benguela, Huila, e Namibe,” for MINARS contracted by HI, April-May 2005,
pp. 7-23. [276] Article 7 Report, Form J,
draft obtained 11 May 2006. [277] Email from Anna
Kudareskwa, Rehabilitation Manager, VVAF, Luena, 29 May 2006; response by VVAF
to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire, 16 March 2006; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 151. [278] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 152. Until August 2005, DDP was known as the Jaipur Limb
Campaign UK. [279] Email from Stanislas
Bonnet, Desk Officer for Angola, HI, 25 August 2005; HI, “Angola Program:
Activity Report 2005,” Luanda, 2006, p.14. [280] Interview with Gabby
Palancia, Project Assistant Socio-Economic Project, HI, Huambo, 14 March 2006;
interview with Emmanuelle Rioufol, HI, Luanda 14 March 2006. [281] Presentation,
“Lessons learned from the pilot group of 33 beneficiaries,” provided
to Landmine Monitor by Gabby Palancia, HI, Huambo, 14 March 2006. [282] Presentation by CNIDAH,
Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, 23
June 2004; “Lwini Fund Gala Yields USD 500,000,” Angola News
Agency, 18 June 2005. [283] “Angolan first lady
considers destroying of landmines decisive for reconstruction,” Government
of Angola, New York, 5 April 2006. [284] Church World Services,
“Vocational Training of Landmine Survivors Angola,” 5 October
2005. [285] Response by International
Paralympic Committee to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire, 10 May 2006. [286] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 137. [287] Presentation by Dr.
Adriano Goncalves, CNIDAH, Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in
Africa, Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005. [288] Article 7 Report, Form J,
draft obtained, 11 May 2006. [289] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 153. [290] Interview with Andre
Dzinga Nkula, National Director for the Integration of People with Disability,
Ministry of Social Affairs, Luanda, 10 March 2006. [291] Interview with Andre
Dzinga Nkula, Ministry of Social Affairs, Luanda, 10 March 2006. Landmine
Monitor was not provided with the exact amount allocated. [292] HI, “Country
Situation Analysis: Angola,” Brussels, June 2005, p. 24. [293] Interview with Julie
Nuttens, HI, 29 June 2005. [294] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 154.
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