Key developments since May 2004: In September 2004, the OSCE
expressed concern about new mine-laying by both Georgian and South Ossetian
forces. Georgia is due to complete an inventory and assessment of its stockpile
of munitions in September-October 2005; the Deputy Minister of Defense told ICBL
that landmines will be among the first weapons scheduled for destruction and
that Georgia does not intend to keep any antipersonnel mines. In July 2004, the
Survey Action Center conducted an advance mission to Georgia to assess the need
for a Landmine Impact Survey. No Georgian Army clearance was reported in 2004;
limited clearance activities were ongoing in 2005. HALO Trust conducted a
survey of Georgia’s mine and UXO problem in September-October 2004. It
expanded its mine risk education to include areas near former military bases and
mined areas. HALO also carried out minefield marking. In 2004-2005, Georgia
hosted a middle manager’s training course for mine action programs in the
Caucasus.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has
expressed support for the global ban on antipersonnel mines on several
occasions. Georgia “fully shares the concern of the international
community regarding the challenge of anti-personnel landmines” and
“does its utmost to... facilitate the process of elimination and
eradication of the above-mentioned
threat.”[1 ]Georgia has voted
in favor of every annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting a ban on
antipersonnel mines since 1996, including UNGA Resolution 59/84 in December
2004.
A Deputy Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in May 2005 that
the issue of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty has been under reconsideration
since the Rose Revolution on 23 November
2003.[2 ]At the same time, another
official told ICBL that the National Security Council was preparing a decree to
establish a permanent working group on landmines. Its mandate would include
development of a landmine policy, including assessment of the Mine Ban
Treaty.[3 ]
In a May 2005 visit by the ICBL, Georgian officials said that the principal
reasons for not joining the Mine Ban Treaty are Georgia’s lack of
jurisdiction over mined areas in Abkhazia and Samachablo, and the difficulties
of clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left by the forces of the
former Soviet Union and Russia.[4 ]They also said that without financial and technological assistance,
Georgia would not be able to fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban
Treaty.[5 ]One senior Defense
official noted that the separatist Abkhazian and South Ossetian governments do
not have obligations that would prevent them from using
mines.[6]
Georgia did not attend either the First Review Conference in Nairobi in
November-December 2004, or the meetings of the intersessional Standing
Committees in Geneva in June 2005.
Georgia is party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and
its original Protocol II, but it has not ratified Amended Protocol II:
“The Defense Ministry of Georgia at this stage does not consider it
expedient to join the Amended Protocol II of 1980 CCW because of the existence
of territories uncontrollable by
Georgia.”[7 ]Georgia did not
attend the Sixth Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II in
November 2004.
The ICBL Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC) participated extensively in 2004 in
the Youth Leadership, Education and Action Program (Youth LEAP) sponsored by the
Canadian Youth Mine Action Ambassador Program and Mines Action Canada.
Youth LEAP is aimed at building the capacity of youth to work in mine action,
and to strengthen the capacity of mine action and pro-ban
organizations.[8 ]
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Georgian officials have maintained that Georgia has never produced, exported
or imported antipersonnel landmines since independence. Georgia inherited what
is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former
Soviet Union, but the exact size and composition of that stock remains
unknown.[9 ]
In September-October 2005, Georgia was due to complete an inventory and
assessment of the condition of its stockpile of munitions. The Deputy Minister
of Defense told ICBL that landmines will be among the first weapons scheduled
for destruction and that Georgia intends to destroy all of its antipersonnel
mines and not keep a
reserve.[10 ]
Use
Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines
since September 1996.[11 ]However,
it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from
2001 to 2004. Georgia has denied any use. In May 2005, the Ministry of Defense
told the ICBL that the Operational Plan of the Georgian Armed Forces does not
include mine use.[12 ]In a July
2003 letter to Landmine Monitor, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
said, “I would like to assure you that since 1996 (when President of
Georgia H.E. Eduard Shevardnadze declared unilateral moratorium on use, import
and export of antipersonnel mines) onward Georgian corresponding agencies have
been strictly abstaining from usage of antipersonnel
landmines.”[13]
Landmine Monitor has not received any allegations of mine use in 2005.
However, in September 2004 it was reported that representatives of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) expressed concern
“about the fact that Georgia and South Ossetia are mining the conflict
area” in order to reinforce their defense facilities; Roy Reeve, head of
the OSCE mission to Georgia, said the mine-laying was absolutely
unacceptable.[14 ]During renewed
fighting in South Ossetia in November 2004, several civilian landmine casualties
were reported.[15]
Vakhtang Kapanadze, military advisor to the President of Georgia, told the
ICBL that Georgian military forces in South Ossetia laid only remote-controlled
Claymore mines, and removed them when leaving the
territory.[16 ]The Deputy Minister
of Defense noted that both armed forces in South Ossetia were supported by
militias, and he could not guarantee that militias did not use antipersonnel
mines.[17 ]
On 19 August 2004, Russian peacekeeping forces, moving in to occupy an area
vacated by Georgian troops in the contested Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia,
alleged that Georgian forces had mined the territory. Russian General
Svyatoslav Nabzdorov was quoted by media stating that “[Georgian] troops
left behind some surprises for the peacekeepers that arrived here....We removed
two of these surprises—tripwire
mines.”[18 ]The General later
said that Georgian forces had placed at least 215 tripwired antipersonnel mines
and 20 other mines.[19 ]
During a field visit to Adjara in August 2004, the ICBL Georgian Committee
saw both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines stored in a facility of the
Ministry of Security office in Helvachauri; the mines had been seized from the
population of Helvachauri district.[20 ]On 25 August 2004 in the port of Batumi, 28 OZM-72 antipersonnel mines and
10 TM-62M antivehicle mines were found among scrap
metal.[21 ]
Landmine and UXO Problem, Survey and Assessment
The majority of landmines in Georgia are located near the Inguri River that
separates Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia. The other main mine-threat to
civilians comes from mines laid around existing and former Russian military
bases. The Ministry of Defense states that Russia did not provide information
or maps on mines, explosives or other dangerous materials when they handed over
some of their military bases to
Georgia.[22 ]
In May 2005, OSCE officials told the ICBL that the Joint Peacekeeping Forces
(Russian, Georgian and Ossetian) had drawn up maps of mined
territories.[23 ]The officials
believed that all major mined areas in South Ossetia had been identified, but
noted that OSCE patrols continue to gather information on possible mined areas
and any mine incidents.[24 ]
Several surveys and assessments of contamination by mines and UXO in Georgia
have been carried out, which describe the mine/UXO problem as limited or
minimal.[25 ]In July 2004, the
Survey Action Center (SAC) conducted an advance mission to assess the need for a
Landmine Impact Survey. SAC identified the mine problem as primarily affecting
the border with Abkhazia and a limited number of military bases and strategic
locales, but with mines also existing in the border areas with Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Chechnya, Turkey and Ingushetia. As of July 2005, no
decision had been reached on whether a Landmine Impact Survey will be conducted
in Georgia.[26 ]
From 27 September to 9 October 2004, HALO Trust conducted a targeted survey;
the survey results showed there was not a huge humanitarian mine problem in the
country, and many of the areas that were once mined are now
safe.[27 ]HALO reports that it
visited or identified 24 areas suspected of having a landmine problem; five of
the areas could not be visited due to the security situation. Regarding the 19
sites visited, HALO concluded, “Seven sites are tasks suitable for
military mine clearance and do not have a direct impact on the local population.
The Georgian military conducted mine clearance in the mid-1990s and for these
seven cases should be encouraged to continue with their good work. Another
seven sites were discredited during the survey, due to a lack of evidence of
landmines or reports of incidents since military clearance was conducted. The
remaining five sites have been identified as suspect mined areas with an effect
upon the local population. As such, humanitarian mine clearance in conjunction
with mine risk education would be
beneficial.”[28 ]
However, of the five areas requiring humanitarian mine clearance, and
despite incidents occurring in them, HALO advised, “it would only be
possible to conduct clearance at one location. The remaining mined areas are
near active military bases or around former Russian military bases which have
not been handed over to the Georgian authorities.” Although Russian
military authorities have been in negotiation about returning these bases to
Georgian control, no permission has been granted for humanitarian mine action
agencies to demine them. HALO added, “Before humanitarian mine clearance
were to be conducted at these sites the post-clearance land use would have to be
clarified.”[29 ]
One measure of the mine/UXO problem in Georgia is provided by the incidence
of casualties. In 2004, there were more new casualties caused by mines and UXO
than in 2003; a total of 319 casualties have been recorded since 2001. Reports
from NGOs indicate that many mine/UXO-affected areas are unfenced and unmarked,
with the exception of some military bases. The former Mtskheta military area
was fenced during Soviet times, but the fence is badly damaged; some warning
signs remain. In July 2004, HALO marked the Sagarejo depot, but one week later
found that none of the warning signs remained; presumably they were removed by
the local population.[30]
Mine Action Coordination and Planning
There is no single national authority responsible for mine action
coordination in Georgia. Responsibility for mine action in military zones and
bases has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. The Department of
Border Guards is responsible for border areas. The Ministry of Internal Affairs
is responsible for mine action in populated areas, including roads and
railroads. However, in May 2005 a presidential military advisor indicated that
a crisis management group would be formed under the aegis of the National
Security Council of Georgia, whereby one unit would have responsibility for
landmine policy, assessment of mine action needs and ensuring effective mine
action.[31 ]Creation of a
coordination body has been strongly advocated by donors and
partners.[32 ]
A management training course for mine action programs in the Caucasus was
held in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, from December 2004-February 2005. The
course was organized by the Georgian Technical University, Cranfield Mine
Action, the Slovenia-based International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine
Victims Assistance, and Ljubljana University’s Center for Management
Development and Training. The 19 participants included eight each from the mine
action centers in Azerbaijan and Armenia, and three from
Georgia.[33]
The Georgian Army is thought to have 54 trained deminers. US training was
conducted in 2001-2002. The US also transferred demining equipment to
Georgia.[34 ]Georgia does not use
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA); it is not known if
the Armed Forces are using another database system.
Mine/UXO Clearance
No clearance activities by the Georgian Army during 2004 were reported. As
of July 2005, demining operations in the Kodori Gorge had not begun, despite a
statement by the Georgian presidential envoy in June 2004 that each side was
ready to begin operations and that the UN Mission in Georgia would provide
assistance. Agreement by Georgia and Abkhazia to clear mines from the Kodori
Gorge was first announced in September
2003.[35 ]
During 2004, Russian military engineers carried out some clearance of mines
and UXO at a former engineering ammunition depot in Sagarejo, in western
Georgia. A Russian Army officer was reported in February as stating that most
ammunition at the site would be removed or destroyed, so that Georgia could
assume control of the facility.[36 ]When the ICBL-GC visited the area in May-July 2004, it found that a
clearance machine had been used to demine roads inside the military base, but
had not cleared other areas including some concealed by overgrown vegetation.
ICBL-GC identified several PFM-1 and PMN-2 mines. The Sagarejo site will be
passed to Georgia at the end of
2006.[37 ]
In February 2005, the Ministry of Defense started clearance of the Vaziani
military site near Tbilisi. The site is contaminated by an estimated
3,000-5,000 PMN-2 antipersonnel mines. Manual clearance with six deminers was
to be conducted on 16,700 square meters in total. Also required was technical
survey of the perimeter, which is suspected as being contaminated by OZM-72,
POMZ and PFM mines. By the end of March, some 300 antipersonnel mines and UXO
had been cleared from an area of 380 square meters, and operations were ongoing.
One deminer was injured during mine operations at Vaziani in
2005.[38 ]
Originally, Vaziani was to be cleared with NATO support, under a memorandum
of understanding signed with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in
October 2002, involving the disposal of over 300 missiles at former military
bases and UXO at military sites, under the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program.[39 ]However, NAMSA was
unable to proceed with clearing Vaziani, as Georgia intended to use the cleared
area as a military range, which is contrary to PfP policy. NAMSA is not
supporting clearance of other military
sites.[40]
In May 2005, the ministries of defense and foreign affairs stated that a
January 2001 agreement between Georgia and Turkey to clear landmines on the
joint border will be reconsidered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it was
concluded by the previous government, before sending it to parliament. The
Turkish parliament has already ratified the
agreement.[41]
Mine Risk Education
Mine risk education (MRE) has been carried out in Georgia (excluding
Abkhazia) by ICBL-GC, HALO, Ministry of Education and UNICEF.
In August 2004, ICBL-GC undertook MRE activities with children and youth in
Samtckhe-Javakheti and Adjara regions targeted toward internally displaced
children from the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. Activities included a series
of lectures, with the distribution of MRE material such as posters, calendars,
leaflets and exercise books.
HALO started providing MRE in July 2003, focusing on internally displaced
persons and people traveling between Zugdidi region and Abkhazia. HALO
identified a particular need to conduct MRE for those crossing the border
illegally, often accompanied by their
children.[42 ]Following its survey,
HALO expanded MRE activities to include areas surrounding former military bases
and other mined areas. During 2004, HALO provided MRE sessions in Sagarejo (a
former Russian military base), Gardabani (a former Russian military firing range
area) and Mtskheta (a former Russian military engineering base). Ten schools in
these areas received MRE lectures; over 4,000 MRE brochures, 400 MRE coloring
books and 3,000 textbooks were distributed. All schools in the areas were
provided with a large picture board that displays the types of mines or UXO that
may be encountered locally. MRE lectures were given using audio-visual aids,
including a HALO video that has been translated into the Georgian language.
Mine posters were used to help explain the rules of behavior in case anyone sees
a mine or suspect mine or item of UXO. HALO describes these lessons as focusing
on one idea only—that people can identify dangerous objects and know how
to avoid incidents by walking away and contacting the authorities. Puppet shows
were used for small children in kindergartens and schools. A normal lecture
group was about 60 people. After one such lecture, a mortar was discovered near
a Sagarejo school; the police were contacted and removed the
item.[43]
Information gathered by HALO indicates that mine-related incidents in
Georgia occur due to people being unaware, uninformed and at times reckless with
regard to the mine risk. Minefields have not been marked, so people are unaware
of mined areas. People have not been told that there are mines in the region
and have not, in the past, been told what to look out for that may cause an
incident or injury. In most areas where HALO has operated, people have not
previously received MRE. All demographic groups are targeted, but emphasis is
placed on children. Children, taught at school, are believed by HALO to spread
the message to other children in their homes, villages and towns, as well as to
the adult population.[44]
During 2004, HALO also carried out minefield marking to alert the local
population to the dangers of entering mined areas. In the absence of permission
to conduct extensive mine clearance in Georgia, HALO will continue to conduct
MRE throughout the country. HALO states that it will also continue to collect
mine and UXO casualty information to create an accurate database, so that the
impact of the mine/UXO problem can be accurately
quantified.[45 ]
In 2005, UNICEF planned to conduct MRE activities and develop a larger
program on disability and landmine survivors. This will focus on Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, budgeted at US$1,260,000. UNICEF also continues to support HALO
in its MRE programs and funds the printing of MRE
materials.[46 ]
Funding and Assistance
The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF)
provided $150,000 for management training for mine action centers in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, which was held in Tbilisi in December 2004 and
January-February 2005. The ITF donor was the
US.[47]
In previous years, assistance was provided to Georgia by the US, in the form
of training Army deminers and supply of equipment. Georgia’s 1999 request
for assistance to clear minefields surrounding two ex-Soviet military bases was
deferred by the US due to concerns about instability in
Georgia.[48 ]When the request was
reconsidered in 2003, a US Policy Assessment Visit concluded that: the
humanitarian impact of landmines in Georgia (excluding Abkhazia) was minimal;
the government was not sufficiently committed to alleviating the problem; the
risk that funding might be misappropriated was too high. Following the November
2003 change of government in Georgia, the US left open the possibility of future
support.[49 ]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
There is no official record of the number of people killed or injured by
landmines and UXO in Georgia.[50 ]In 2004, ICBL-GC collected data on 53 new casualties caused by landmines,
UXO or improvised explosive devices (IED); seven people were killed and 46
injured, including six children, five women and six military personnel. This
represents a small increase from the 50 casualties (eight killed and 42 injured)
recorded in 2003.
Reported casualties in 2004 included an antivehicle mine explosion on 21
August that injured six people at the Chakvi resort in Achara. According to the
Press Center of the Interior Ministry, sappers had failed to find the mine
during clearance operations in May
2004.[51 ]On 31 August, according
to a Georgian official, two peacekeepers, including one Russian from a joint
force, were killed and two others were injured in a landmine explosion in South
Ossetia. Other reports claimed that it was militants and two shepherds involved
in the incident.[52 ]On 6 November,
two members of a Rustavi-2 television crew were injured after one of them
stepped on a landmine near the village of Kekhvi in South
Ossetia.[53 ]A few days later, a
local resident in the village of Eredvi was injured by a mine on the road
linking Didi and Patara Liakhvi
gorges.[54]
The ICBL-GC database was previously the only source of information on mine
casualties in Georgia outside of the territory of Abkhazia. However, an advance
survey mission to Georgia in July 2004 questioned the accuracy of the data due
to the lack of comprehensive details on each casualty
recorded.[55 ]Following a targeted
survey in September-October 2004, HALO identified 27 mine casualties outside
Abkhazia between 2001 and August 2005, including 15 in 2004 and two in
2005. HALO has created a database and is collecting casualty data through
its MRE program.[56]
Casualties continue to be reported in 2005. Between January and May,
ICBL-GC recorded eight new mine/UXO/IED casualties. One deminer was injured
during clearance operations at the military base in Vaziani.
In May 2005, in Greece, two Georgian men were killed in a mine explosion
while illegally crossing the border from
Turkey.[57]
The total number of landmine casualties in Georgia is not known. ICBL-GC
has recorded 319 mine/UXO/IED casualties since 2001, which includes 56 children,
21 women and 51 military, security forces, deminers or Russian peacekeepers.
Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and Practice
Hospitals throughout Georgia routinely run short of basic medical supplies
due to a lack of funding. In 2004, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) assisted seven hospitals in western Georgia, including five in Abkhazia,
supplying medicines, equipment and surgical supplies, mostly for weapon-related
injuries or emergency surgery. Assistance to the hospitals was cut back or
terminated when the program ceased at the end of 2004. In 2004, 1,497 surgical
operations were performed at the ICRC-assisted hospitals; at least eight were
for mine casualties.[58 ]
ICRC, in collaboration with local authorities in Gagra and in cooperation
with a local partner in Tbilisi, supports two prosthetic/orthotic centers. The
centers are the only major facilities available for physical rehabilitation in
Georgia. In 2004, the Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic and Orthopedic
Rehabilitation assumed responsibility for the management of the center in
Tbilisi. ICRC supported the renovation of additional accommodation for patients
during rehabilitation, and donated equipment, tools and stocks. It also
supported an outreach program in the Gali area for those unable to reach the
center without assistance. In 2004, the Tbilisi center provided 357 prostheses
(36 for mine survivors) and 658 orthoses (one for a mine survivor). ICRC
reimbursed 75 percent of the costs of services. The Gagra center provided 81
prostheses (41 for mine survivors) and 47 orthoses. In 2004, more than 1,100
people received physical rehabilitation at the two centers; 1,070 crutches and
34 wheelchairs were also distributed.[59 ]Training was provided for six physiotherapists, and one orthopedic
technician was sponsored for a three-year course at the Cambodian School of
Prosthetics and Orthotics.[60 ]
The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs has a special program,
Medical and Psycho-Social Program for Invalids, for the care and rehabilitation
of persons with disabilities at rehabilitation centers in Tbilisi, Kutaisi and
Batumi.[61 ]
In early 2004, ICBL-GC conducted psychological support sessions for two
landmine survivors in Sagarejo. A psychologist and a psychiatrist from NDOBA
Trust, the first psychosocial support service in Georgia, participated in the
sessions.
The NGO Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children
promotes disability issues and the Mine Ban Treaty through meetings, training, a
newspaper and a radio broadcast. Mine survivors participate in all the
activities.[62]
Two Georgians with a disability, including a mine survivor, participated in
the Raising the Voices training in Geneva in February 2004, and at the Survivor
Summit and the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in
November-December 2004.
The June 1995 Law on the Social Protection of the Disabled outlines the
rights of persons with disabilities; however, it has not been fully implemented
because of the economic situation in
Georgia.[63]
[1 ]Letter to Landmine Monitor from
David Aptsiauri, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July
2003.
[2 ]ICBL meeting with Alexander
Maisuradze, Deputy Director, Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic
Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[3 ]ICBL meeting with Vakhtang
Kapanadze, Military Advisor to the President, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[4 ]ICBL meetings with David
Sikharulidze, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005;
Alexander Maisuradze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005;
Vakhtang Kapanadze, Military Advisor to the President, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. In
2002, a representative of the Ministry of Defense provided written answers to
questions submitted by Landmine Monitor. One written answer stated:
“There do still exist the mined territories in Abkhazia and Samachablo, on
which do not apply the jurisdiction of Georgia and naturally on these
territories Georgia cannot carry out monitoring nor demining works. Besides on
the territory of Georgia there are hundreds of military objects left by forces
of former Soviet Union and Russia, objects where are set mines, explosive
substances and the sources which cause various professional diseases, and in the
budget of the state and the Defense Ministry of Georgia there were not foreseen
the means for liquidation of sources of danger.” Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, p. 653.
[5 ]ICBL meetings with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005; Alexander Maisuradze,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005; Vakhtang Kapanadze, Military
Advisor to the President, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. See also, Note Verbale from the
Permanent Mission of Georgia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), FSC. DEL/12/01, 17 January 2001.
[6]ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[7 ]Letter (#11/316) to
ICBL-Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC) from N. Laliashvili, Head of Defense Politics
and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 23 June 2004
(unofficial translation by ICBL-GC).
[8 ]Activities included:
international youth symposia, in conjunction with the First Review Conference,
in Nairobi; in Tbilisi, regional capacity-building workshops for overseas
campaigns on how to involve youth in their mine action work; regional youth
capacity-building symposia in Moscow; small grants program for overseas
campaigns participating in regional capacity-building workshops; development of
a Working With Youth in Mine Action Resource Manual; Young Professionals
International Mine Action Program (YPIMAP)—an international internship
program for young Canadians.
[9 ]ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. This same information
was provided to ICBL-GC by the Ministry of Defense on 6 February 2002.
[10 ]ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[11 ]The moratorium was
proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the United Nations in September
1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine
Monitor Report 1999, p. 792; Note Verbale to OSCE, 17 January 2001.
[12 ]ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[13]Letter from David Aptsiauri,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July 2003.
[14 ]“OSCE voices concern
over landmines in Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone,” Interfax
(Tbilisi), 10 September 2004.
[15]Two members of a television
crew were injured when they stepped on a mine in a forest near the village of
Kekhvi. “TV crew injured in South Ossetia mine explosion,”
Kavkasia Press (Tbilisi), 6 November 2004. A few days later, a local
resident who lives in the village of Eredvi was injured by a mine on the road
linking Didi and Patara Liakhvi gorges. “Mine Explosion, Shelling
Reported in South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia (UNA-Georgia online
magazine), 9 November 2004.
[16 ]ICBL meeting with Vakhtang
Kapanadze, Military Advisor to the President, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[17 ]ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[18 ]“Russian general says
withdrawing Georgians left behind booby traps,” Channel One TV
(transcript), Moscow, 20 August 2004.
[19 ]“Situation in the
Northern Caucasus,” Strana.Ru Information Agency, 24 August
2004.
[20 ]ICBL-GC meeting with Merab
Bolkvadze, Head of the Helvachauri Security Service, and visit to Helvachauri
Security Service Office, Helvachauri, Adjara region, 26 August 2004.
[21 ]ICBL-GC meeting with Nika
Siradze, Head of the Demining Unit, Ministry of Security, Batumi, 26 August
2004; ICBL-GC visit to Batumi port, 26 August 2004.
[22 ]Interview with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. See also report on
Abkhazia in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[23 ]ICBL meeting with Roy Reeve,
head of OSCE Mission to Georgia and Lt. Col. R. M. Zbigniew Fec, Chief Military
Officer, OSCE Mission to Georgia, Tbilisi, 23 May 2005.
[24 ]Email to ICBL-GC from Lt.
Col. R. M. Zbigniew Fec, OSCE Mission to Georgia, 5 May 2005.
[25 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 689-970. In 2003, a US assessment of Georgia’s
request for mine action funding concluded that the humanitarian impact of
landmines in Georgia (excluding Abkhazia) was minimal. “Humanitarian Mine
Action Subgroup Minutes of December 11, 2003 Meeting,” Fact Sheet, US
Department of State, Washington DC, 23 December 2003, www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/27510.htm,
accessed 27 August 2005.
[26 ]Email from Mike Kendellen,
Director for Survey, SAC, 28 July 2005.
[27 ]Email from David McMahon,
Program Manager, HALO Georgia, 2 August 2005.
[28 ]Response to Landmine Monitor
Questionnaire, David McMahon, HALO Georgia, email, 4 June 2005.
[29 ]Response to Landmine Monitor
Questionnaire, David McMahon, HALO Georgia, email, 4 June 2005.
[30]ICBL-GC field visit to
Sagarejo depot, July 2004.
[31 ]ICBL meeting with Vakhtang
Kapanadze, Military Advisor to the President, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. He said the
working group would be chaired by the NSC, with representatives of the
ministries of defense, interior and foreign affairs, and would seek the views of
international organizations and NGOs.
[32 ]ICBL meeting with Alexander
Maisuradze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[33]ITF, “Contribution to
the Landmine Monitor 2005,” by email from Iztok Hočevar, Head of
International Relations Department, ITF, 22 July 2005.
[34 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 970.
[35 ]“Georgia, Abkhazia
Agree to Demine Kodori Gorge,” Interfax News Service (Tbilisi), 10
June 2004; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 970.
[36 ]“Russian Servicemen to
Clear Mines in Georgia,” Interfax News Service (Tbilisi), 27
February 2004.
[37 ]Interview with Konstantine
Gabashvili, Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations, Tbilisi, 24
May 2005.
[38 ]Interview with officers of
the Logistics Department, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 29 March 2005.
[39 ]NATO Press Release,
“NAMSA Signs Memorandum of Understanding with Georgia on Logistics Support
for Demilitarization,” no. 2002:113, 2 October 2002.
[40]Email to ICBL-GC from John
Paul Grimsley, Project Supervisor - Georgia, PfP Trust Fund Group, Special
Projects Program, NAMSA Georgia, 16 May 2005; ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, Georgia, 25 May 2005; ICBL meeting
with Alexander Maisuradze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May
2005.
[41]ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005; ICBL meeting with
Alexander Maisuradze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[42 ]Laurence Desvignes,
“Mine Action Needs Assessment Mission - Georgia,” UNICEF, July 2003,
p. 10; see also report on Abkhazia in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[43]Email from David McMahon,
Program Manager, HALO Georgia, 4 June 2005.
[44]Email from David McMahon,
Program Manager, HALO Georgia, 4 June 2005.
[45 ]Email from David McMahon,
Program Manager, HALO Georgia, 4 June 2005.
[46 ]UNICEF, “Humanitarian
Action Report 2005,” www.unicef.org; UN OCHA Georgia, “Abkhazia
briefing report,” July 2004, www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf.
[47]ITF, “Contribution to
the Landmine Monitor 2005,” email from Iztok Hočevar, Head of
International Relations Department, ITF, 22 July 2005.
[48 ]“Fact Sheet: Meeting
of the Interagency Working Group on Demining,” 2 September 1999.
[49 ]“Humanitarian Mine
Action Subgroup Minutes of December 11, 2003 Meeting,” Fact Sheet, Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 23
December 2003, www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/27510.htm,
accessed 27 August 2005.
[50 ]Unless otherwise stated, all
information in this section is based on the ICBL-GC casualty database, which
records information obtained from hospitals throughout Georgia as well as media
reports and surveys since 2001.
[51 ]“One person killed and
six injured in result of Saturday’s explosion of anti-tank mine in
Achara,” Black Sea Press, 23 August 2004.
[52 ]“Two Reported Dead
After Georgia Land Mine Explosion,” Associated Press (Tbilisi), 31
August 2004.
[53 ]“TV crew injured in
South Ossetia mine explosion,” Kavkasia Press (Tbilisi), 6 November
2004.
[54]“Mine Explosion,
Shelling Reported in South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia (UNA-Georgia
online magazine), 9 November 2004.
[55 ]Survey Action Center,
“Advance Survey Mission to Georgia: 17 July to 26 July 2004,” p.
10.
[56]Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from David McMahon, Program Manager, HALO Georgia, 1 August 2005.
[57]“Greek soldier killed
during demining operation near Turkish border,” Associated Press
(Athens), 14 June 2005.
[58 ]ICRC, “Annual Report
2004,” Geneva, June 2005, p. 207; UN OCHA Georgia, “Abkhazia
Briefing Note January 2005,” p. 8, www.undp.org.ge; UN OCHA Georgia,
“Abkhazia Briefing Note July 2004,”
www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf.
[59 ]Email from Georgian
Foundation for Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation, 21 April 2005; ICRC
Physical Rehabilitation Program, “Annual Report 2004,” Geneva, July
2005, pp. 34-35, 44.
[60 ]ICRC, “Annual Report
2004,” Geneva, June 2005, p. 207.
[61 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2003, pp. 587-588.
[62]Information provided by
Madona Kharebava, Head, Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled
Children, Tbilisi, April 2005.
[63]US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004: Georgia,”
Washington DC, 28 February 2005; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004,
p. 974.
About Us
Our Research Products