Cluster Munition Monitor 2022

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Jump to a specific section of the chapter:

Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention

Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues

 

Introduction

 

The Convention on Cluster Munitions seeks to prevent human suffering from cluster munitions, which are indiscriminate explosive weapons that impact a wide area and disperse multiple submunitions, many of which fail to detonate and pose a threat long after conflict ends.

The convention entered into force on 1 August 2010 and is in good standing, with a total of 110 States Parties and 13 signatories.[1] There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use, production or transfers of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in Dublin, Ireland on 30 May 2008.

Upon adopting the convention, one government found that the strict new standard set by the agreement’s prohibitions would have “an immediate impact on the international cluster munitions market” and directly impact its own acquisition plans.[2] There is increasing evidence that this has happened as cluster munitions are being phased out of service in many of the 47 countries with stocks that have not joined the convention.[3]

The notable exception is Russia, which has used both old stocks of cluster munitions and newly developed ones extensively in Ukraine since its invasion of the country began on 24 February 2022. In a short period this new use has caused hundreds of civilian casualties and is destroying and damaging civilian infrastructure including homes, hospitals, and schools.

There have been some recorded instances of cluster munition use by the government of Ukraine during the 2022 war. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that cluster munitions, as defined by the convention, have been transferred among the artillery, rocket systems, and other weapons that the Ukrainian government has received from third parties in 2022.

The lack of cluster munition transfers to Ukraine reflects how three-quarters of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have banned these weapons.[4] It also shows how other states that have not banned cluster munitions are nonetheless quietly taking significant steps to align their policies and adapt their military practices to adhere with the convention’s prohibitions, including on assisting with any banned activities.

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine was roundly condemned at the May 2022 intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Held for the first time since 2015, the intersessional meetings provided an important opportunity to hear from Bulgaria, Peru, and Slovakia on their ongoing destruction of cluster munition stocks, which has resulted in the destruction of at least 1,658 cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions in 2021 and the first half of 2022. South Africa was notably absent from the updates, which is worrisome given that its November 2023 stockpile destruction deadline is fast approaching.

The intersessional meetings held in 2022 helped keep the spotlight on universalization challenges between formal annual meetings of the convention. This is essential, as the convention risks significant loss of momentum as the COVID-19 pandemic continues into its third year. No country has ratified or acceded to the convention since 2020.

The pace of national implementation legislation, required by some states to accede, has also been slow; although during the reporting period, Niue adopted the first such law reported in any state in two years. Compliance with the annual transparency reporting requirement has been sporadic.

The hybrid intersessional meetings showed how the convention’s community of states, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), United Nations (UN) agencies, institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) are adapting and continuing their collaborative work to promote implementation and universalization.

The same principles of inclusiveness and partnership have characterized the development of a political declaration, agreed at the UN in Geneva on 17 June 2022, that seeks to prevent civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in towns, cities, and other populated areas.[5] The declaration will help strengthen the emerging norm against cluster munitions and positively shape behavior, if its signatories interpret it as requiring them to refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2021 and the first half of 2022. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles, which are available on the Monitor website.[6]

Universalization

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to it, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[7]

Pace of universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Paceuniv CMM2022

Accessions

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it, but must join through a process known as accession.[8]

Saint Lucia was the last country to accede to the convention, in September 2020.

In states that remain outside the convention, there was little evidence of movement to acceede to the convention during 2021 or in the first half of 2022. One positive highlight was seen in the participation of South Sudan and Zimbabwe at a regional universalization workshop on the convention held in March 2022 in Abuja, Nigeria, as it signaled an interest from both states in acceding to the convention.

In Argentina, a cross-party group of 13 parliamentary representatives from the Chamber of Deputies recommended in May 2022 that the government accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions without delay. In Brazil, a parliamentary committee rejected a legislative proposal recommending accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in January 2022.[9]

Support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions by regional body

Regional body

Support (%)

Support (number of states)

Non-signatories to the convention

African Union (AU)

87%

48 of 55

Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, South Sudan, Sudan, Zimbabwe

Organization of American States (OAS)

77%

27 of 35

Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Dominica, Suriname, US, Venezuela

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

30%

3 of 10

Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

9%

1 of 11

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

European Union (EU)

78%

21 of 27

Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)

56%

10 of 18

Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

 

Ratifications

During the reporting period, no signatory has ratified the convention. São Tomé and Príncipe was the last country to ratify it, in January 2020.

Of the 13 signatories still to ratify the convention, nine are in Sub-Saharan Africa, two are in the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from the Asia-Pacific.[10]

Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Angola

Central African Republic

Cyprus

DRC

Djibouti

Haiti

Indonesia

Jamaica

Kenya

Liberia

Nigeria

Tanzania

Uganda

 

Nigeria’s Federal Executive Council reportedly approved a memo recommending ratification of the convention in June 2021.[11] All African signatories to the convention, except Djibouti, attended the regional workshop on universalization co-hosted by Nigeria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK), in Abuja, on 23–24 March 2022.[12]

The vast majority of signatories have ultimately followed through on their pledge to ratify, though it is clear that the pace of ratifications has slowed significantly.[13] Most signatories do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval. Cyprus remains the last European Union (EU) member state to have signed but not ratified the convention, after its parliament put the ratification “on hold” in 2013.[14]

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The final part of the convention’s Second Review Conference took place in a hybrid format in Geneva on 20–21 September 2021, under the presidency of Ambassador Félix Baumann, the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN in Geneva. A total of 87 countries attended either the first part of the conference on 25–27 November 2020 and/or the second part in September 2021.[15]

At the conclusion of the Second Review Conference, States Parties adopted the 50-point Lausanne Action Plan, which lays out actions for them to undertake over the period 2021–2026.[16] They also adopted the Lausanne Declaration, which states:

“We underscore our obligation never under any circumstances to use cluster munitions and, in accordance with the object and provisions of the Convention, we condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor, remaining steadfast in our determination to achieve a world entirely free of any use of these weapons.”[17]

The Permanent Representative of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Ambassador Aidan Liddle, is serving as president of the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties, which will be held in Geneva from 30 August to 2 September 2022.

Ambassador Liddle chaired the convention’s first intersessional meetings since 2015, which were held in a hybrid format in Geneva on 16–17 May 2022. A total of 74 countries attended: 59 States Parties, eight signatories, and seven non-signatories.

Ambassador Abdul-Karim Hashim Mostafa, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the UN in Geneva, has been designated as president of the convention’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, scheduled for 11–14 September 2023.

The CMC continues its advocacy work in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation, cooperating closely with the convention’s presidency, States Parties, the ICRC, and the ISU. During the reporting period, the CMC’s Investing in Action capacity development program supported advocacy outreach initiatives by national campaigns in Azerbaijan, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Nepal, and Serbia. On 8 April 2022, the CMC organized a meeting hosted by the Permanent Mission of the UK to the UN in New York, to promote universalization of the convention among Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument to eliminate these weapons and the unacceptable harm they cause. During the reporting period there were no formal proposals for the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to consider cluster munitions again, after its failure in 2011 to adopt a new protocol that aimed to legitimize them.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 76/47

The annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is a useful tracker to gauge interest in and support for the convention, particularly from states that have not joined. Since its introduction in 2015, support for the annual UNGA resolution on the convention has grown steadily.

A total of 146 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 76/47, on the implementation of the convention, on 6 December 2021, including 36 non-signatories.[18] This was the second-highest number of votes in favor of the annual UNGA resolution on the convention to date.

After abstaining from the vote in 2020, Russia returned to its original practice of voting against the resolution, making it the only country to do so in 2021.[19] In stark contrast, China voted for the resolution for the first time, as did Lao PDR and Lebanon.

All except three of the 37 states to abstain from voting on the 2021 UNGA resolution are non-signatories to the convention.[20] Zambia was the only State Party to abstain from the resolution, along with signatories Cyprus and Uganda.

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions[21]

Year

Resolution

In Favor

Against

Abstained

2015

70/54

139

2

39

2016

71/45

141

2

39

2017

72/54

142

2

36

2018

73/54

144

1

38

2019

74/62

144

1

38

2020

75/62

147

0

38

2021

76/47

146

1

37

 

Several states not party explained their vote on the 2021 UNGA resolution.[22] Russia repeated its argument that cluster munitions are “legitimate weapons” that are “only harmful when misused.” Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia, as well as other non-signatories, reiterated their long-held objections over how the convention was negotiated and adopted outside of UN auspices, due to their firm opposition to creating new international law.

Use of Cluster Munitions

Global overview

Since the end of World War II in 1945, at least 23 governments have used cluster munitions in 41 countries and five other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Past use of cluster munitions[23]

User state

Locations used

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan

Nagorno-Karabakh

Colombia

Colombia

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Eritrea

France

Chad, Iraq, Kuwait

Georgia

Georgia, possibly Abkhazia

Iraq

Iran, Iraq

Israel

Egypt, Lebanon, Syria

Libya

Chad, Libya

Morocco

Mauritania,Western Sahara

Netherlands

Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

Nigeria

Sierra Leone

Russia

Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, Chechnya

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, Yemen

South Africa

Admitted past use, but did not specify where

Sudan

Sudan

Syria

Syria

Thailand

Cambodia

Ukraine

Ukraine

UK

Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia), Falklands/Malvinas

US

Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

Yugoslavia (former Socialist Republic of)

Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

 

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new cluster munition use by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.[24] Several past users and producers of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK, are now States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Most states outside the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[25]

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, cluster munitions have been used in eight non-signatories: Azerbaijan in 2020; Cambodia in 2011; Libya in 2011, 2015, and 2019; South Sudan in 2014; Sudan in 2012–2015; Syria in 2012–2021; Ukraine in 2014–2015 and 2022; and Yemen in 2015–2017.

New use

Cluster munitions were used in Ukraine during the reporting period (August 2021–July 2022). Ukraine is the only country in the world where cluster munitions are being used as of August 2022.

Use in Ukraine

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions extensively since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, causing civilian casualties and damaging civilian infrastructure including homes, hospitals, and schools. Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions at least three times during the conflict.

Russia has used at least six types of cluster munitions in Ukraine during 2022:

  • 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rockets, which have a range of 10–35km and deliver 30 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
  • 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rockets, which have a range of 20–70km and deliver 72 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
  • 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missiles, which deliver 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions (9M544 model) or 72 antipersonnel submunitions (9M549 model);
  • 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missiles, which are equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions;
  • A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile;
  • RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bombs, which contain 268 PTAB-1M high explosive antitank submunitions.

As of 1 July 2022, hundreds of cluster munition attacks by Russian forces have been documented, reported, or are alleged to have occurred in at least ten of Ukraine’s 24 provinces (or oblasts): Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia. Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in the conflict and has sought to draw attention elsewhere, alleging that Ukrainian forces were responsible for several possible cluster munition attacks.

Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions, including Uragan cluster munition rockets, in at least three locations that were under the control of Russia’s armed forces or affiliated armed groups at the time. Such use was reported in Husarivka, in Kharkiv oblast, on either 6 or 7 March; in Yenakiieve, in Donetsk oblast, on 22 March; and in Kherson on 14 June.[26] Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces previously used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine from July 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire. Ukraine has not denied using cluster munitions in the 2022 conflict, but says that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law.”[27]

Russia has stated that it regards cluster munitions as “a lawful form of munitions” that “are only harmful when misused.”[28] Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in Ukraine and has accused Ukraine of using the weapons, for example in the city of Donetsk on 14 March in an attack that has not been independently confirmed.[29]

Ukrainian officials have expressed grave concern over Russia’s use of cluster munitions during the 2022 conflict. Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova told a UN Security Council debate on 27 April that Russia’s use of cluster munitions in populated areas is proof that it “blatantly disregards international humanitarian law.”[30] In March 2022, she had described cluster munitions as “one of the most treacherous weapons, operating indiscriminately and causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering among civilians.”[31]

The new use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 40 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council, the Security Council, and the General Assembly.[32] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the EU, the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the CMC.

Allegations of use

Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions since 2012, but the Monitor is not aware of any credible evidence of cluster munition attacks in Syria during the reporting period. The last recorded cluster munition attacks were by government forces near Aleppo on 14 March 2021.[33] Subsequent use may have gone unreported, and the Monitor has not been able to independently verify allegations, such as one alleging that a Turkish-backed armed group used cluster munitions when shelling the village of Um Kef, near Tal Tamir in al-Hasakah governorate, on 4 June 2022.[34]

Previously, Armenia (or forces backed by Armenia) and Azerbaijan used cluster munitions during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, in September–October 2020. There have been no reports or allegations of new cluster munition use in the region since then.

Use by non-state armed groups

Few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used cluster munitions—due in part to the relative complexity of these weapons and their delivery systems. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance; in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by ethnic Croat and Serb militias; in Croatia by an ethnic Serb militia; in Israel by Hezbollah; in Libya by the Libyan National Army (LNA); in Syria by the Islamic State; and in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatist rebels.

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The United States (US) maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a Department of Defense directive, which had required the US to no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside their own territories. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Production of Cluster Munitions

Since World War II, at least 34 states have collectively developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. This includes 18 countries that ceased manufacturing these weapons prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[35]

Producers

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Cluster munition producers

Brazil

Korea, South

China

Pakistan

Egypt

Poland

Greece

Romania

India

Russia

Iran

Singapore

Israel

Türkiye

Korea, North

US

 

In 2022, Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions, while Russian forces used at least two newly developed cluster munitions during the conflict in Ukraine. Russian forces have used the 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions. The same company is producing guided 9M54-series cluster munition missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.[36] Russia has also used a cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile.

Iranian state-owned media reported in August 2021 that the domestically produced Qadr S ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,000km, carries a cluster munition warhead.[37] The exact type of submunition has not been publicly disclosed.

Few of the remaining producer countries are known to have manufactured cluster munitions either during 2021 or in the first half of 2022. This is largely due to a lack of transparency and available data as well as disinvestment measures aimed at financial institutions. For example:

  • After acquiring Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer—Israel Military Industries (IMI)—in late 2018, Elbit Systems Ltd. announced that it would discontinue the production of cluster munitions.[38] In October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. confirmed that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[39]
  • Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating, “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[40]
  • In South Korea, Hanwha Corporation shareholders approved a proposal in September 2020 to end the company’s production of cluster munitions by shifting this activity to the Korea Defense Industry Corporation, a new company affiliated with Hanwha.[41]
  • The last US manufacturer of cluster munitions, Textron Systems Corporation, announced in 2016 that it was ending production.[42] In January 2021, US defense contractor Northrop Grumman announced that it was ending participation in a US government stockpile management contract to test the shelf-life of cluster munitions.[43]

Greece, Poland, Romania, and Türkiye have also indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[44] States that say their policy is aligned with the convention’s prohibitions should elaborate how specific policies, practices, and doctrine have changed in this regard, and detail any measures in place to deter and prevent such activities in future.

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party.

Eighteen states have ceased production of cluster munitions. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, except non-signatory Argentina.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina

Italy

Australia

Japan

Belgium

Netherlands

BiH

Slovakia

Chile

South Africa

Croatia

Spain

France

Sweden

Germany

Switzerland

Iraq

UK

 

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including BiH, Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[45]

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.[46]

There were no recorded exports or imports of cluster munitions by any state during the reporting period.

A handful of mainly state-owned companies still promote their cluster munitions at various defense industry arms fairs. In June 2022, Munitions India Ltd. displayed the cluster munition variant of the Pinaka missile system at the Eurosatory arms fair, in violation of Eurosatory rules.[47]

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[48]

While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was probably the world’s leading exporter as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries and other areas.[49]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[50] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 95 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions, containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[51]

Countries that stockpiled cluster munitions[52]

States Parties

Signatories

Non-signatories

Afghanistan

Austria

Belgium

BiH

Botswana

Bulgaria

Cameroon

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Congo, Rep. of

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Czech Republic

Denmark

Ecuador

France

Germany

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Honduras

Hungary

Iraq

Italy

Japan

Moldova

Montenegro

Mozambique

Netherlands

North Macedonia

Norway

Peru

Philippines

Portugal

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

UK

Angola

Cent. African Rep.

Cyprus

Indonesia

Nigeria

Algeria

Argentina

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Belarus

Brazil

Cambodia

China

Egypt

Eritrea

Estonia

Ethiopia

Finland

Georgia

Greece

India

Iran

Israel

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Korea, North

Korea, South

Kuwait

Libya

Mongolia

Morocco

Oman

Pakistan

Poland

Qatar

Romania

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Serbia

Singapore

Sudan

Syria

Thailand

Türkiye

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

UAE

US

Uzbekistan

Venezuela

Yemen

Zimbabwe

 

42 (5 current)

5 (3 current)

48 (47 current)

Note: Countries in bold still possess stockpiles.

 

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

In the past, the convention’s States Parties stockpiled a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions, containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 40 countries—37 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munition stocks have now destroyed them.

Four States Parties have cluster munition stocks still to destroy, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions held by States Parties still to complete stockpile destruction[53]

State Party

Cluster munitions

Submunitions

Deadline

Bulgaria

6,905

190,919

1 October 2022

Peru

2,012

162,417

1 April 2024

Slovakia

1,235

299,187

1 January 2024

South Africa

1,485

99,465

1 November 2023

Total

11,637

751,988

 

 

Questions remain over whether Guinea knowingly possesses cluster munitions, as it apparently imported them in the past and may still possess them. Guinea must report any stocks in its Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was due in April 2015 but still has not been submitted.[54]

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

  • Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles, containing 2,559 M20G submunitions, to Bulgaria in 2014. By August 2019, they had been destroyed by private company EXPAL Bulgaria.[55] Cyprus has never made a public statement or provided a voluntary transparency report to confirm if it has now destroyed all its stockpiled cluster munitions.
  • Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions, but has not shared information on its plan to destroy them under the convention. In June 2022, an Indonesian official told the Monitor that the stockpile consists of approximately 150 “very old” cluster bombs.[56]
  • Nigeria has appealed for cooperation and assistance to destroy its stockpile of cluster munitions, which includes UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[57]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

  • Angola stated in 2017 that all of its stockpiled cluster munitions had been destroyed in or by 2012.[58]
  • The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[59]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

The US reported in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than six million cluster munitions.”[60] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since then to remove cluster munitions from its active inventory and place them in its demilitarization inventory for destruction. In April 2022, Expal USA was awarded a contract for the demilitarization and disposal of US cluster munition stocks.[61]

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs, containing 320,375 submunitions, in 2013.[62] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.[63] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[64]

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction

Of the 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, at least 37 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Switzerland was the last State Party to complete stockpile destruction under the convention, in March 2019.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction[65]

State Party (year of completion)

Cluster munitions

Submunitions

Austria (2010)

12,672

798,336

Belgium (2010)

115,210

10,138,480

BiH (2011)

445

148,059

Botswana(2018)

510

14,400

Cameroon (2017)*

6

906

Canada (2014)

13,623

1,361,958

Chile (2013)

249

25,896

Colombia (2009)

72

10,832

Côte d’Ivoire (2013)

68

10,200

Croatia (2018)

7,235

178,318

Cuba (2017)**

1,856

N/R

Czech Republic (2010)

480

16,400

Denmark (2014)

42,176

2,440,940

Ecuador (2004)

117

17,199

France (2016)

34,876

14,916,881

Germany (2015)

573,700

62,923,935

Hungary (2011)

287

3,954

Italy (2015)

4,963

2,849,979

Japan (2015)

14,011

2,027,907

Moldova (2010)

1,385

27,050

Montenegro (2010)

353

51,891

Mozambique (2015)

293

12,804

Netherlands (2012)

193,643

25,867,510

North Macedonia (2013)

2,426

39,980

Norway (2010)

52,190

3,087,910

Philippines (2011)

114

0

Portugal (2011)

11

1,617

Slovenia (2017)

1,080

52,920

Spain (2018)

6,837

293,652

Sweden (2015)

370

20,595

Switzerland (2019)

206,061

12,211,950

UK (2013)

190,832

38,759,034

Total

1,478,151

178,311,493

Note: N/R=not reported.

*Cameroon did not destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but instead retained them all for research and training.

**Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

Five States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the overview table, due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

  • Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions found in abandoned arms caches.
  • The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.[66]
  • Guinea-Bissau initially reported possessing cluster munitions in 2011, but did not provide information on the types or quantities.[67] It subsequently clarified in May 2022 and reported in July 2022 that it does not possess any stocks.[68]
  • Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions as it had destroyed its stockpile long before the convention’s entry into force.[69]

Destruction underway

During 2021 and the first half of 2022, three States Parties destroyed a total of at least 1,658 cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions from their stocks, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2021–mid-2022

State Party

Cluster munitions destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

Bulgaria

1,303

41,495

Peru

296

3,000

Slovakia

59

2,238

Total

1,658

46,733

 

Peru and Slovakia destroyed a total of 355 cluster munitions and 5,238 submunitions during 2021. Bulgaria did not destroy any cluster munitions in 2021, but has destroyed 1,303 cluster munitions and 41,495 submunitions in February–May 2022. Previously, in 2020, four States Parties destroyed a total of 2,277 cluster munitions and more than 52,000 submunitions.

Bulgaria had destroyed 48% of its overall cluster munition stocks and 44% of its submunitions by May 2022. An accidental explosion at a contractor’s stockpile destruction facility in December 2020 put the project on hold until February 2022, but since then the destruction of cluster munitions has scaled up considerably.[70] Due to the delay, Bulgaria has requested a third extension of its stockpile destruction deadline, which will be considered at the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties in August–September 2022.[71]

Slovakia reiterated at the convention’s intersessional meetings in May 2022 that it has “an ongoing plan and is doing its best to fulfil its Article 3 obligation” by the end-of-year deadline.[72] Peru also reported that it was on track to meet its April 2024 deadline despite the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw a lower number of cluster munitions destroyed than planned in 2021.[73]

South Africa did not provide an update at the May 2022 intersessional meetings, which the CMC said was “highly disturbing” since its stockpile destruction deadline is in 2023 and the convention has received no updates from South Africa for the past five years.[74]

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

A total of 11 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2021)[75]

States Party

Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)

Year first reported

Currently retained

Consumed in 2021

Initially retained

Belgium

175 (16,368)

0 (0)

276 (24,288)

2011

Germany

151 (13,587)

36 (2,909)

685 (62,580)

2011

Switzerland

42 (2,097)

0 (0)

138 (7,346)

2013

Spain

7 (522)

0 (0)

711 (16,652)

2011

Bulgaria

6 (300)

1 (50)

8 (400)

2017

Cameroon

6 (906)

0 (0)

6 (906)

2014

France

3 (189)

00 (0) 0 (0)

55 (10,284)

2011

Denmark

0 (2,816)

0 (0)

170 (0)

2011

Netherlands

0 (1,854)

0 (0)

272 (23,545)

2011

Sweden

0 (113)

0 (0)

0 (125)

2013

BiH

0 (30)

0 (0)

0 (30)

2013

 

Belgium retains the highest number of cluster munitions of any State Party and reported consuming 14 cluster munitions in 2020.[76] Germany comes second and consumed 36 cluster munitions and 2,909 submunitions in 2021.[77] Bulgaria also consumed cluster munitions while training explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel in 2021.

Spain increased its stockpile of retained cluster munitions, from three in 2020 to seven in 2021.[78]

BiH, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland did not consume any retained cluster munitions in 2021. Cameroon has not provided a transparency report detailing the status of its retained cluster munitions since 2017.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have reduced their stocks significantly since making their first declarations, indicating that the initial amounts retained were not the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for the permitted purposes under the convention.

Some States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, Moldova, and the Netherlands have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which are no longer considered to be cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

A majority of States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for training purposes, including 28 States Parties that once possessed stocks.[79] Guinea-Bissau reported in July 2022 that it has no stockpiled cluster munitions, including for research and training purposes.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.[80]

As of 1 August 2022, 102 States Parties had submitted an initial transparency report.[81] Of the eight States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 reports, Cabo Verde and Comoros are more than a decade overdue.

States Parties with initial Article 7 deadlines

State Party

Date due

Cabo Verde

28 September 2011

Comoros

30 June 2011

Congo, Rep. of

28 August 2015

Guinea

19 April 2015

Madagascar

30 April 2018

Rwanda

31 July 2016

São Tomé and Príncipe

28 December 2020

Togo

29 May 2013

 

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year.

Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been sporadic, as more than half of States Parties do not provide Article 7 reports annually. A total of 12 States Parties have not provided an annual update since submitting their initial Article 7 report.[82] South Africa’s lack of annual reports is concerning given its stockpile destruction obligations.

During 2022, signatory the DRC submitted its fourth voluntary transparency report since 2011, while non-signatory South Sudan provided its third such report since 2020. Canada and Palau provided voluntary reports prior to ratifying the convention.

The CMC continues to encourage states to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[83]

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 22 states have done so since.

National implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party (year enacted)

Afghanistan (2018)

Australia (2012)

Austria (2008)

Belgium (2006)

Bulgaria (2015)

Cameroon (2016)

Canada (2014)

Colombia (2012)

Cook Islands (2011)

Czech Republic (2011)

Ecuador (2010)

France (2010)

Germany (2009)

Guatemala (2012)

Hungary (2012)

Iceland (2015)

Ireland (2008)

Italy (2011)

Japan (2009)

Liechtenstein (2013)

Luxembourg (2009)

Mauritius (2016)

Namibia (2019)

New Zealand (2009)

Niue (2021)

Norway (2008)

Saint Kitts and Nevis (2014)

Samoa (2012)

Spain (2015)

Sweden (2012)

Switzerland (2012)

Togo (2015)

UK (2010)

 

The pace of the adoption of new legislation has slowed. However, on 17 March 2021, Niue enacted specific legislation to govern its implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty.[84] Niue’s Anti-Personnel Mines and Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act enforces the two conventions with penal sanctions and fines.[85]

Another 20 States Parties have indicated that they are either planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[86]

A total of 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[87]

Other States Parties are still considering whether specific implementing legislation for the convention is needed.

Several guides are available to encourage the preparation of robust legislation. The CMC prepared model legislation in 2020.[88] Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation.[89] The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states.[90] New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.[91]

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

  1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
  2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
  3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties have not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.[92] Please refer to previous Cluster Munition Monitor reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks, and foreign stockpiling.[93]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate States Parties’ obligation under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party, and to encourage them to join the convention.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[94]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties and Lithuania used Article 21 as a justification to argue forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[95]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.

Disinvestment

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Lausanne Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention’s Second Review Conference in September 2021, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investment in producers of cluster munitions.[96]

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions.

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party

Year enacted

Belgium

2007

Ireland

2008

Italy

2021

Liechtenstein

2013

Luxembourg

2009

Netherlands

2013

New Zealand

2009

Saint Kitts and Nevis

2014

Samoa

2012

Spain

2015

Switzerland

2013

 

Italy enacted legislation in December 2021 to prohibit companies from funding manufacturers of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.[97] Law No. 220 applies to all companies, regardless of whether they are registered in Italy or abroad.[98]

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.[99]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

Several private companies in non-signatory states have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments for prohibited weapons. These companies include Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.



[1] Only 16 of the 107 governments that participated in the Dublin negotiations and adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 May 2008 have not joined the convention: Argentina, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Adoption does not carry any legal obligations.

[2] Finland stated that the convention “will have an immediate impact on the international cluster munitions market and, consequently, it will also affect Finland’s acquisition plans.” Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, “Agreement reached in cluster munitions negotiations,” 29 May 2008, bit.ly/FinlandPressRelease29May2008.

[3] In 2013, there was reportedly “intense debate” in the General Staff of the Greek armed forces over procurement efforts to modernize the country’s ammunition for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) due to the apparent requirement that Greece “select and implement a solution…required by international treaty to ban cluster munitions.” See, “US-German ‘battle’ for Greek MLRS,” Defence Point, 19 December 2013, bit.ly/DefencePoint19Dec2013.

[4] All of the 30 NATO member states have signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions except Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Türkiye, and the United States (US).

[5] “Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” 17 June 2022, bit.ly/PoliticalDeclaration17June2022.

[6] See, ICBL-CMC country profiles, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

[7] Accession, ratification, and other methods of joining the convention usually require parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.

[8] Accession is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.

[9] Most recently, in 2019, Rubens Bueno reintroduced legislation to ban cluster munitions, which he first proposed in February 2012. The bill was again rejected by Brazil’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense on 14 January 2022. See, Agência Câmara de Notícias, “Comissão rejeita projeto que proíbe produção e exportação de bombas de fragmentação” (“Commission rejects bill banning production and export of cluster bombs”), 14 January 2022, bit.ly/BrazilCommittee14Jan2022; and Stefano Salles and Lucas Janone, “Exportador, Brasil se recusa a aderir convenção contra uso de bombas de fragmentação” (“Exporter, Brazil refuses to adhere to convention against the use of cluster bombs”), CNN Brazil, 5 March 2022, bit.ly/CNNBrazil5March2022.

[10] Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that “would defeat the object and purpose” of any treaty they have signed. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is considered customary international law and binding on all countries.

[11] Email from Mimidoo Achakpa, Coordinator, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Women’s Network Nigeria, 23 June 2021.

[12] Convention on Cluster Munitions ISU, Report on the African Regional Convention on Cluster Munitions Universalization Workshop in Abuja, Nigeria, 23–24 March 2022; and statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022, bit.ly/StatementNigeria16May2022.

[13] A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, while 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference in September 2015. Another 10 states ratified the convention in the five years leading to the Second Review Conference, held in November 2020. No further states have ratified since 2020.

[14] Letter from Basil Polemitis, Security Policy Director, Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 24 April 2013.

[15] A total of 76 countries attended the first part of the Second Review Conference: 60 States Parties, three signatories, and 13 non-signatories, in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC. A total of 87 States Parties attended the second part of the Second Review Conference: 66 States Parties, five signatories, and 16 non-signatories, in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.

[16] “Annex II: Lausanne Action Plan,” Final Report of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/CONF/2021/6, 6 October 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlanAnnexII.

[17] “Annex I: Lausanne Declaration: Protecting Lives, Empowering Victims, Enabling Development,” Final Report of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/CONF/2021/6, 6 October 2021, bit.ly/LausanneDeclarationAnnexI.

[18] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/47. The non-signatories that voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 76/47 were Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen.

[19] Previously, Russia abstained from the vote in 2020 and 2018, and voted against it in 2015–2017 and 2019. Zimbabwe voted against the UNGA resolution in 2015–2018, but has abstained from the vote since 2019.

[20] The 37 states that abstained from the vote are: Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates (UAE), US, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[21] See, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/47; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/62; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/62; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/54; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/72/54; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/71/45; and “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/54.

[22] See, UNGA First Committee, video record, 2 November 2021, bit.ly/UNGAFirstCttee2Nov2021. Notably, there was again no group statement from Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Romania explaining their vote and lack of accession to the convention, after these states had previously made a joint statement every year from 2015–2018.

[23] This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete, as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes use in Angola, Armenia, DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia.

[24] However, State Party Lebanon reports that it has experienced the use of cluster munitions from the conflict in Syria. According to its clearance deadline extension request, northeast Lebanon became contaminated by cluster munitions used when fighting in Syria spilled over the border into Lebanon in 2014–2017. See, Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, December 2019, bit.ly/LebanonArt4ExtRequestCCMDec2019.

[25] Nine non-signatories that produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt,Greece, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Korea, and Türkiye), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producers (India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore). This leaves Israel, Russia, and the US as the only countries to both produce and use cluster munitions.

[26] Thomas Gibbons-Neff and John Ismay, “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions,” New York Times, 18 April 2022, nyti.ms/3uYskbv; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation: 24 February–15 May 2022,” 29 June 2022, bit.ly/OHCHR29June2022; and Special Kherson Cat (bayraktar_1love), “The use of cluster munitions against a group of Russian snipers somewhere on Kherson direction, Today. Successful, according to information I have.” 14 June 2022, 11:44 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/KhersonCatTweet14June2022.

[27] Thomas Gibbons-Neff and John Ismay, “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions,” New York Times, 18 April 2022, nyti.ms/3uYskbv.

[28] UN, “First Committee approves 8 drafts, continuing action phase, as delegates differ over definition of legitimate arms control treaties,” GA/DIS/3677, 2 November 2021, press.un.org/en/2021/gadis3677.doc.htm.

[29] Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council, 15 March 2022, bit.ly/LetterRussia15March2022.

[30] Statement by Iryna Venediktoya, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, to the Security Council, “Ensuring accountability for atrocities committed in Ukraine,” 27 April 2022, bit.ly/UkraineStatement27April2022.

[31] Venediktova, Iryna (VenediktovaIV), “On March 1, Russia fired cluster bombs at civilian targets in the village of Chernomorske (Kherson region). Cluster munitions are one of the most treacherous weapons, operating indiscriminately and causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering among civilians.” 7 March 2022, 15:51 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/VenediktovaTweet7March2022.

[32] Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.

[33] According to Syria Civil Defense, cluster munitions were used in attacks on Tarhin and Al-Hamran villages, east of Aleppo, on 14 March 2021. See, Syria Civil Defence (SyriaCivilDef), “The regime and Russia’s shelling on Tarhin and Al-Hamran villages east of #Aleppo yesterday has left unexploded cluster bombs that threaten the lives of civilians in the area. The #WhiteHelmets UXO teams scan the area to locate and destroy any unexploded cluster bombs.” 15 March 2021, 16:31 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/WhiteHelmetsTweet15March2021.

[34] “Tal Tamr Military Council commander: Turkish occupation bombed Umm al-Kif village with cluster bombs,” ANHA Hawar News Agency, 4 June 2022, bit.ly/HawarNewsAgency4June2022.

[35] The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

[36] According to Rostec, Russian president Vladimir Putin reportedly set an objective in 2016 for the company to use only Russian components in the modernized multi-launch rocket systems. See Rostec, “The New Rocket System Passes Official Tests,” 25 January 2017, rostec.ru/en/news/4519813/.

[37] “Qadr missile; symbol of achieving new missile capabilities,” Iran Press News Agency, 18 August 2021, bit.ly/IranPressNewsAgency18Aug2021.

[38] According to Elbit Systems Ltd. vice president David Vaknin, “As part of the Elbit Systems organization, IMI Systems will not be continuing its prior activities with respect to cluster munitions. All of Elbit Systems activities relating to munitions, including those activities to be continued by IMI Systems, will be conducted in accordance with applicable international conventions or US law.” See, Tovah Lazaroff, “Elbit rejects HSBC's BDS disclaimer stating: ‘We don’t produce cluster bombs’,” Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2019, bit.ly/JerusalemPost3Jan2019; and PAX Stop Explosive Investments, “Elbit Systems confirms cluster munitions exit,” 23 January 2019, bit.ly/PAXElbitSystems23Jan2019.

[39] Email to PAX from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., 14 October 2020.

[40] See, Singapore Technologies Engineering website, www.stengg.com/en; PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015, bit.ly/StopExplosiveSTE2015; and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015. The president of the company said the decision came about in part because “we often get asked by the investment community [about] our stand on cluster munitions.” Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, 11 November 2015.

[41] Choi Min-kyung, “Hanwha to get rid of unethical arms business,” Money Today,

15 September 2020, bit.ly/MoneyToday15Sep2020.

[42] Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) of Hopkins, Minnesota, US, manufactured a solid rocket motor for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105, but produced it only for use in that weapon. See, Majorie Censer, “Textron to discontinue production of sensor-fuzed weapon,” Inside Defense, 30 August 2016, bit.ly/TextronDiscontinue; and “Last US cluster-bomb maker to cease production,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), 1 September 2016, bit.ly/AFPUSClusterBombs1Sept2016.

[43] Marcus Weisgerber, “Northrop Grumman Says It Will Walk Away From Cluster Bomb Contract,” Defense One, 28 January 2021, bit.ly/DefenseOne28Jan2021.

[44] For example, in April and October 2021, Türkiye informed the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that “Turkey has never used, produced, imported or transferred cluster munitions since 2005 and does not intend to do so in the future.” Letter to Amb. Aidan Liddle of the UK, President of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, from Amb. Sadik Arslan, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the UN in Geneva, 5 October 2021.

[45] Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of the former Yugoslavia, has declared that “There are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

[46] States Parties Chile, France, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purposes of destruction: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

[47] Omega Research Foundation (Omega_RF), “Pinaka DPICM on display at #Eurosatory2022 Displaying mockups of #ClusterMunitions is in breach of #Eurosatory rules https://eurosatory.com/home/exhibitors/who-can-exhibit/admission-to-the-exhibition/?lang=en. Munitions India Ltd (@ofk_India) should be banned from attending again. @lemondefr.” 20 June 2022, 10:49 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/OmegaResearchTweet20June2022.

[48] There is no comprehensive accounting available of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK), in addition to exports by non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, US, and the former Yugoslavia.

[49] Recipients of US exports include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, the UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

[50] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, Mozambique, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, Soviet cluster munition remnants have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

[51] The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW provided the first list identifying 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002.

[52] This information is drawn from Monitor ban policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as statements and other sources. Armenia has been added to the list of stockpilers following evidence of its use of cluster munitions in 2020.

[53] This table lists the total number of cluster munitions declared by these States Parties, and does not reflect the cluster munitions destroyed to date.

[54] The Republic of Moldova has reported that it transferred 860 9M27K cluster munition rockets, each containing 30 fragmentation submunitions, to Guinea in 2000, for use in its 220mm Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers. Submission of the Republic of Moldova, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for calendar year 2000, 30 May 2001.

[55] Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 June 2017; Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2019; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2020. The Greek-made GRM-20 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar system uses these projectiles, each of which contain 20 submunitions.

[56] Cluster Munition Monitor meeting with Risha Jilian Chaniago, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Indonesia, Geneva, 24 June 2022.

[57] Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012, bit.ly/StatementNigeria18Apr2012. Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Nigerian Air Force possesses UK-made BL755 cluster bombs. See, Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), p. 843.

[58] Statement of Angola, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCMStatementAngola4Sep2017.

[59] Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementCAR14Sep2011.

[60] Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUSStatement14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.

[61] “Contract Award: Expal USA (Hooks, Texas) – $28,830,008,” Defense Daily, 15 April 2022, bit.ly/DefenseDaily15April2022.

[62] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated. This document was provided by the press office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

[63] “El Ministerio de la Defensa de Venezuela destruye bombas de racimo” (“The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs”), Infodefensa.com, 26 August 2011, bit.ly/VenezuelaDestroysClusterBombs.

[64] Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, 14 June 2011; and presentation of Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” slide 2, Geneva, 1 April 2011.

[65] See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Some quantities of cluster munitions and/or submunitions have changed since previous reports due to adjusted information provided in Article 7 reports. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a collective total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions.

[66] In September 2011, the Republic of the Congo stated that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory. In May 2013, it reported that it had destroyed its remaining 372 antipersonnel landmines that were held for training and research purposes, following the massive explosions at a weapons depot in Brazzaville in March 2012. It reported that it was now a country free of landmines and cluster munitions. Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementRepCongo15Sep2011; statement by Col. Nkoua, National Focal Point of the Struggle Against Mines, seminar to mark the 20th Anniversary of the ICBL hosted by the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs, Kinshasa, 19 December 2012; and statement of the Republic of the Congo, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

[67] Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 January 2020; and statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 3 September 2014, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-BissauSep2014. Guinea-Bissau told States Parties that it had asked for help to destroy its stockpile in 2013 from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which had conducted a technical assessment in 2011 that found the cluster munition stocks were held by the armed forces “in very bad conditions.” See, statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-Bissau11Sep2013. A 2011 inventory review by the National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI) found that an air force base in Bissau City held stocks of cluster munitions. Interview with César Luis Gomes Lopes de Carvalho, General Director, CAAMI, in Geneva, 27 June 2011. RBK-series air-dropped bombs and PTAB-2.5 submunitions were among munitions ejected by an explosion at an ammunition storage facility on the outskirts of Bissau City in 2000. See, Cleared Ground Demining, “Guinea Bissau,” undated, bit.ly/ClearedGroundGuinea-Bissau.

[68] Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2022, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauStatement19May2022; and Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 6 July 2022.

[69] According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munition were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007, and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

[70] Statement and presentation of Bulgaria, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022, bit.ly/BulgariaStatement16May2022.

[71] Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 3 deadline Extension Request, April 2022, bit.ly/BulgariaArt3ExtRequestCCMApr2022; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2022.

[72] Statement of Slovakia, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022, bit.ly/SlovakiaStatement16May2022.

[73] Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022; and Peru Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 5 May 2022.

[74] Statement of the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022, bit.ly/CMCStatement16May2022.

[75] For more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained by each country, see Monitor country profiles, www.the-monitor.org/cp; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM. The totals may also include individual submunitions retained which are not contained in a delivery container.

[76] Email from Vincent Bodson, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Belgium to the UN in Geneva, 4 August 2022; and Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C.1, April 2022.

[77] Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, April 2022.

[78] Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, April 2022.

[79] Afghanistan, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Slovenia, and UK.

[80] The transparency report should be emailed to the UN Secretary-General via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs at ccm@un.org. For more information, see: www.clusterconvention.org/reporting-forms.

[81] Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

[82] Benin, Burundi, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Iceland, Lesotho, Mali, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Sri Lanka.

[83] Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable.” States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J.

[84] Niue Anti-Personnel Mines and Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act, 17 March 2021, bit.ly/NieuAct17March2021; and Niue Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 2 December 2021.

[85] Under the Act, any person convicted of violating the law’s prohibition on cluster munitions can be imprisoned for up to seven years or fined up to NZ$500,000, or both. A body corporate can also be fined $500,000, and individuals holding office at the company are subject to the penalties referred to above if they consented to the offense or acted negligently.

[86] Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zambia.

[87] Albania, Andorra, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[88] CMC, “2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions: Model Legislation. Act to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 2020, bit.ly/CMCModelLegislation2020.

[89] HRW and IHRC, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” September 2014, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

[90] ICRC, “Model Law: Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,” March 2013, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationICRC.

[91] New Zealand, “Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act,” 7 September 2011, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationNZ2011.

[92] The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritania, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of Moldova, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[93] As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions, that originated from 100 locations between 2003 and 2010.

[94] Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2012), pp. 34–35, bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2012; CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27, bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2011; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2010; HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineAction2009; and HRW and IHRC, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” 3 September 2014, pp. 19–23, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

[95] Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See, CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29, bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2011; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2010; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineAction2009.

[96] Action 47, Lausanne Action Plan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, Geneva, September 2021, www.clusterconvention.org/lausanne-action-plan/.

[97] Previously, Law No. 95 was enacted in 2011 to ban financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention. This provision supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines advocated for a separate, more detailed law.

[98] PAX Stop Explosive Investments, “Italy bans investments in cluster bomb producers,” 28 February 2022, bit.ly/ItalyPAX28February2022.

[99] Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, and Zambia.