Ukraine

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 17 May 2022

[UPDATE May 2022: A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report documents Russian forces' use of cluster munitions in attacks across Ukraine. At least six types of cluster munition has been used by Russia since the beginning of its invasion in February 2022. Evidence indicates that Ukraine has used them at least once.]

Summary

Non-signatory Ukraine has acknowledged the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions but has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Ukraine has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention, but not since 2014, and abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2020.

Ukraine possesses a stockpile of cluster munitions that it inherited from the former Soviet Union. The armed forces of the government of Ukraine, and Russian-backed armed opposition groups, used cluster munitions in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in 2014–2015. The government of Ukraine has repeatedly denied using cluster munitions.

Policy

Ukraine has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Ukraine has acknowledged the deadly long-term consequences of cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention.[1] In correspondence with the Monitor in 2010 and 2012, Ukraine said that it considered cluster munitions to be “legal weapons” and “an important component of Ukraine’s defense capabilities.”[2] However, the government has vehemently denied using cluster munitions in the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 and 2015 (see Use section below).

Ukraine has also expressed concern at its capacity to comply with the convention’s obligations, particularly the eight-year deadline to destroy stockpiled cluster munitions.[3]

Ukraine attended several meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and participated as an observer in the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[4]

Ukraine last participated as an observer in a meeting of the convention in 2014.[5] It was invited, but did not attend, the first part of the convention’s Second Review Conference held virtually in November 2020.

In December 2020, Ukraine abstained from voting on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[6] Ukraine has never explained why it has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Ukraine has voted in favor of UNGA and Human Rights Council resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in June 2020.[7]

Ukraine is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production and transfer

In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine has not produced cluster munitions and has not imported them.[8]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine inherited a large stockpile of cluster munitions after the break-up of the Soviet Union and shared information on the types stockpiled in 2011, as detailed in the following table.

Cluster munitions of the armed forces of Ukraine[9]

 

Cluster munition type

Surface-to-surface rocket

220mm Uragan 9M27K

300mm Smerch 9M55K

Tochka-U (SS-21)

Aircraft dispenser

KMGU containing BFK-AO2.5, BFK-ODC, BFK-PTAB, BFK-AP cartridges of submunitions

Air-dropped bomb

RBK-500-375

RBK-500-AO

RBK-500-255

RBK-500-SP-B7

RBK-500-ZAB

RBK-250-275

RBK-250-ZAB

At that time, Ukraine reported that cluster munitions constituted 35% of its stocks of conventional weapons, which totaled two million tons of ammunition. Of these cluster munitions, 34% were produced before 1980, while another 36% were produced between 1981 and 1992 and were “planned to be stockpiled and might be used.” The remaining 30% contained antivehicle landmines.[10]

Ukraine reported in 2011 that it destroyed approximately 10,000–20,000 tons of cluster munitions annually and said it could take 60 years for it to destroy stocks that are slated for destruction.[11]

Use

There has been no evidence or allegations of new use of cluster munitions in Ukraine since a February 2015 ceasefire.

Previous use

Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine between July 2014 and February 2015, according to independent investigations conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission, and others.[12] Both parties used two types of ground-fired cluster munitions:[13]

  • The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a minimum range of 20km and a maximum range of 70km and delivers 72 9N235 submunitions.
  • The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N235 submunitions or 30 9N210 submunitions.

Neither party to the conflict accepted responsibility for using cluster munitions. Ukraine repeatedly denied use and attributed the attacks to pro-Russian separatist groups and members of the Russian armed forces.[14] Russia repeatedly drew attention to Ukraine’s use of cluster munitions but never acknowledged its role in the cluster munition attacks.[15]

The 2014–2015 cluster munition attacks in Ukraine attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from at least 32 states and the European Union.[16]

Previously, in 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said Ukraine did not intend to use cluster munitions except to defend itself from “outside aggression.”[17]



[1] Statement of Ukraine, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions, 8 April 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[2] Letter No. 4132/36-196-771 from Amb. Yuriy A. Sergeyev, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva, 23 April 2012; and Letter No. 181/017 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN in Geneva, 29 April 2010.

[3] In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine’s “negative experience” with the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty was influencing how it views the Convention on Cluster Munitions. CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Deputy Director-General, Directorate General for Armaments Control and Military Technical Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[4] For details on Ukraine’s cluster munition policy and practice up to early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 249–250.

[5] Ukraine participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010–2011, and 2014.

[6]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 74/169, 18 December 2019. Ukraine voted in favor of similar UNGA resolutions in 2013–2018. See also, “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 43/28, 22 June 2020.

[8] CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[9] “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” Geneva, 1 April 2011, slides 3–4. Presentation of Ukraine to the CCW-GGE on cluster munitions. The ZAB-series submunitions referenced by the Government of Ukraine above are incendiary submunitions, not explosive submunitions.

[10] “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” Geneva, 1 April 2011, Slide 2. Presentation of Ukraine to the CCW-GGE on cluster munitions.

[11] Ibid.

[13] Because types of submunitions are identical in size, shape, and color, the only way to distinguish them is by their external markings and by measuring the size of the pre-formed fragments they contain. The Smerch and Uragan cluster munition rockets are fired from dedicated multi-barrel launchers mounted on an eight-wheeled vehicle. The 9N210 and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions are designed to self-destruct a minute or two after being ejected from the rocket. Yet a significant number of cluster munition rockets malfunctioned after launch and fell to the ground with their full payload intact, while submunitions often failed to self-destruct as designed.

[14] Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavlo Klimkin acknowledged the “serious accusations…deserve the deepest investigation.” Letter from Pavlo Klimkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, to the editor of The New York Times, 30 October 2014. See also, statement of Ukraine, OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, Vienna, 29 October 2014; and statement of Ukraine, CCW Protocol IV Meeting, Geneva, 12 November 2014. Notes by the CMC. At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2015, Ukraine continued to allege that “Russia-guided illegal armed groups” and members of the Russian armed forces carried out Uragan and Smerch rocket attacks in eastern Ukraine. See, statement of Ukraine, UNGA First Committee, New York, 13 October 2015.

[15] See, statement of Russia, OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, Vienna, 10 December 2014.

[16] The following states condemned the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, Somalia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the First Review Conference in September 2015, States Parties adopted the Dubrovnik Declaration, which affirms: “We are deeply concerned by any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, including in…Ukraine. We condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor.” See, “The Dubrovnik declaration 2015: Spectemur agendo (judged by our actions),” Annex I to the Final Report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, CCM/CONF/2015/7, Dubrovnik, 13 October 2015.

[17] CMC meeting with Ruslan Nimchynskyi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Vientiane, 11 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.


Impact

Last updated: 22 February 2021

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Treaty Status Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country summary

Ukraine is affected by contamination by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remaining from World Wars I and II, and as a result of the ongoing conflict in the east of the country since 2014. Ukraine also reported that unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[1] The extent of contamination is unknown.

The contamination in Ukraine is yet to be surveyed although estimates have suggested that about 8% of the lands, covering about 7,000 km², contain or are suspected to contain antipersonnel mines and other ERW. With the support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Ukraine was in the process of establishing a national humanitarian mine action program (not established as of April 2020).

The Law on Mine Action, adopted in January 2019, was not implemented and neither the national mine action authority nor the national mine action center had been established. An amendment to the law was submitted to parliament in February 2020.[2]

Despite efforts to inform populations living along the line of contact, children have continued to be particularly vulnerable to ERW and more widespread risk education campaigns were needed.

There is no centralized victim surveillance system. Despite a decrease in new reported mine/ERW casualties since 2017, the number of new casualties has remained high in eastern Ukraine and available data is likely an underestimation.

As a result of the ongoing conflict, the healthcare system in eastern Ukraine has been suffering from damage to health care infrastructure, a shortage of health care workers, and insufficient medical supplies and equipment. Survivors had free access to emergency medical care, however they often did not have full access to continuing medical care, rehabilitation and functional prosthetics. Psychosocial support remained largely unavailable.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party

Article 5 clearance deadline: 1 December 2023

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Non-signatory

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

State Party

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline

Ukraine’s initial Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 June 2016. In November 2018, Ukraine submitted late its first extension request. In granting the five-year extension, until 1 June 2021, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Ukraine had not acted in accordance with the agreed process for the submission of extension requests.[3]

In its first extension request, Ukraine stated that its ability to comply with its Article 5 obligations was impeded by the lack of access to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[4]

Ukraine submitted a second extension request in June 2020, which was approved at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2020, setting a new deadline of 1 December 2023. In its second extension request, Ukraine noted that the ongoing conflict in the country’s eastern regions resulted in further contamination of areas along the contact line. Ukraine also reported that the irregularity and non-selectivity of the use of antipersonnel mines by the armed groups hampered efforts to estimate the scale of contamination.[5]

The OSCE Project-Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) estimated that Ukraine was unlikely to meet its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline due to the ongoing conflict.[6] In June 2020, Ukraine stated that it did not have control over territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, impeding its ability to clear contaminated areas in these territories, and that the hostilities were causing further contamination along the contact line.[7]

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[8]

Mine action commenced

In the process of being established

National mine action management actors

  • Ministry of Defence coordinates demining activities
  • United Nations (UN) Mine Action Sub-Cluster coordinates mine action overall
  • National mine action program was not established as of April 2020

United Nations Agencies

  • UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster
  • UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
  • Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
  • UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Other actors

  • OSCE PCU
  • OSCE Special Monitoring Mission
  • International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
  • HALO Trust
  • Danish Demining Group (DDG)
  • Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de déminage, FSD)

Mine action legislation

Law 9080-1 on Mine Action entered into force on 22 January 2019; an amendment of the law was submitted to Parliament in February 2020 for adoption

Mine action strategic and operational plans

  • State Program for Mine Action in Ukraine 2017–2021 was on hold pending adoption of the amendment of the mine action law
  • State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern Regions of Ukraine for 2017–2021 includes a section on mine action
  • Annual operational plans are developed by the Ministry of Defence

Mine action standards

Published on 1 April 2019 as advisory document (pending formal approval by the Cabinet of Ministers once the national mine action authority is established)

In 2013, the Ministry of Defence’s Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action was tasked with coordinating demining at the national level and serving as the secretariat to the national mine action authority in Ukraine.[9] Several other institutions are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Services, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Defence, the National Police, and the State Border Service.[10]

The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) is responsible for clearance and it established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Center” in 2015 in Kiev. The center coordinates the pyrotechnical teams—similar to rapid-response Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams—involved in technical and non-technical survey (NTS), demining, internal quality control of SESU units, information management, handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, and risk education.[11]

The demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces in Kamyanets-Podilsky, focuses on building the military’s capacity for EOD.[12]

Strategies and policies

There is no strategic plan for mine action. The Ministry of Defence develops annual operational plans.[13]

Announced by the Ministry of Defence in February 2016,[14] the State Program for Mine Action in Ukraine for 2017–2021 was on hold due to the pending process with the mine action law.[15]

Resolution 1071 of 13 December 2017, issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, approved the State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern Regions of Ukraine for 2017–2021. One section of the program foresees the implementation of humanitarian demining of territories and water areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, comprising of survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines and ERW.[16]

Legislation and standards

Ukraine’s mine action legislation entered into force on 22January 2019, but it has not been implemented and the mine action authority and center have not been established. The law was amended and submitted to Parliament for adoption in February 2020. Until the adoption of the amended law, the Ministry of Defence coordinates demining activities, while the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster coordinates the overall mine action program.[17]

National Mine Action Standards were published in April 2019. They will become binding after the adoption of the amended Law on Mine Action and the establishment of a national mine action authority.[18]

Information management

There are two functioning Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases, one managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defence. The databases collect and analyze contamination and land release data from national operators and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[19] Consolidation of both databases to create a central national IMSMA database is planned once Ukraine adopts its mine action legislation.[20] Data on mine/ERW accidents and casualties, and victim assistance were not being collected.[21] Data on risk education was collected by the Protection Cluster.

Gender and diversity

The OSCE PCU integrated gender and diversity considerations into their activities, in cooperation with the GICHD’s Gender and Mine Action Program (GMAP).[22]

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination overview[23]

Coordination mechanisms

UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster, chaired by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Risk education thematic meetings to coordinate risk education and to exchange experiences and best practices

Coordination outcomes

Risk education activities are reported quarterly to the Protection Cluster and related data is publicly available

Risk education standards

National standards for risk education were being developed

 

Coordination

Risk education is coordinated through the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster, chaired by UNDP.[24]

National Standards and guidelines

There is no national risk education strategy. As of April 2020, Ukraine was in the process of developing national standards for risk education. There was no accreditation process for risk education operators.[25]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[26]

Government focal points

  • The Ministry of Social Policy is responsible for disability issues, including: physical rehabilitation, the provision of prosthetics and assistive devices to survivors, and employment and other economic inclusion activities
  • The Ministry of Health is responsible for emergency and long-term medical care; its rehabilitation department, responsible for injured civilians, was under reformation

Coordination mechanisms

None

Plans/strategies

None

Survivor inclusion and participation

Not reported

 

Laws and policies

Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, and the provision of other state services. These provisions were not effectively applied. Legislation requires that public buildings are accessible to persons with disabilities. Despite the legal requirements, most public buildings remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities. Access to employment, education, healthcare, transportation, and financial services remained difficult.[27]

By law, employers must set aside a quota of 4% of employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. It was reported that many people employed to fill the quota requirement received minimal salaries but did not work at the companies of employment. Legislation also requires employers to take into account the individual needs of employees with disabilities. However, generally these laws were not enforced.[28]

The Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced People came into effect on 19 November 2014. The law provides UAH880 (approximately US$30) per month for persons with disabilities.[29] In September 2016, the Parliament adopted legislation to harmonize the law with international standards with respect to the rights of persons with disabilities.[30] Under the 2005 Law “On Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities in Ukraine,” every person with a disability is entitled to receive physical rehabilitation services.[31]

Persons with disabilities in eastern Ukraine did not receive appropriate care.[32]

Impact

Contamination

Contamination overview[33]

Landmines/ERW

Preliminary estimate of 7,000km2, comprising of mines, ERW, and IEDs*

Extent of contamination: Unknown

Cluster munition remnants

Extent of contamination: Unknown

* A further 14,000km2 suspected to be contaminated in non-government-controlled territory. The exact size of contaminated areas could not be determined due to the ongoing conflict.

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war; and IED=improvised explosive device.

Landmine contamination

Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other explosive ordnance, mostly as a result of World Wars I and II. Ministry of Defence engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, but 32 former firing ranges covering 1,500km2 remain contaminated with ERW.[34]

Ukraine is also contaminated by antipersonnel mines as a result of the ongoing conflict which broke out in 2014 in the Crimean Peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts.[35] Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and antipersonnel mines were reported to be planted in populated areas and near civilian infrastructure.[36] IEDs used included booby-traps and devices, especially hand grenades, with tripwires.[37]

Preliminary estimates showed that about 8% of the lands, totaling up to 7,000km², in government-controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, contain or are suspected to contain antipersonnel mines and other ERW, including IEDs.[38] In addition, 14,000km2 in non-government-controlled areas were also suspected to be mine-contaminated.[39] It is further indicated that 15–20% of the contamination was from mines, while the rest was from ERW.[40] The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the belligerent parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations has been severely limited.[41]

The explosive hazard contamination in eastern Ukraine was estimated to impact around two million people.[42] Civilians living along the contact line were unable to engage in agricultural activities and access to some villages was restricted. The contamination, or suspicion of contamination also poses a threat to people crossing the contact line. Maintenance and repair of vital civilian infrastructure facilities has been impeded by the presence of mines and ERW.[43] The collection of firewood was reported to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.[44] Access to farmlands, hospitals, and schools was also impeded.[45] Explosive ordnance poses a humanitarian risk to internally displaced people (IDPs) and returning refugees.[46]

Cluster munitions remnant contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Cluster munitions used in the conflict have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which contain 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions.[47] (See Ukraine’s Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for details.)

Ukraine has reported that many unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[48] The most intensive use of cluster munitions was in and around the city of Debalcevo, in Donetsk region.[49]

Casualties

Casualties overview[50]

Casualties

All known casualties (between 1945 and 2019)

4,714 (2,719 killed and 1,995 injured)

 

Casualties in 2019

Annual total

324 (similar to the 325 casualties in 2018)

 

Survival outcome

105 killed, 219 injured

Device type causing casualties

127 ERW, 111 unspecified mine, 59 undifferentiated mine/ERW, 15 antivehicle mine, 11 improvised mine, 1 antipersonnel mine

Civilian status

174 civilians, 144 military, 3 deminers, 3 unknown

Age and gender

284 adults (247 men, 22 women, 15 unknown)

37 children (25 boys, 5 girls, 7 unknown)

3 age and gender unknown

Note: ERW=explosive remnant of war.

Casualties in 2019: details

The 324 casualties identified in 2019 was similar to the 325 casualties identified in 2018, which was a significant decrease from previous years.[51] Casualty data peaked in 2015 and 2016 with 706 and 785 new casualties respectively. The Monitor recorded 2,727 mine casualties (941 killed and 1,786 injured) from 2014 through 2019.

There is no centralized database for the collection of casualty data.[52] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) collects only conflict-related civilian casualty data. Through its pilot project on data collection, the Ministry of Defence also collects data on civilian casualties in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including mine/ERW casualties. The database was however poorly populated. In 2019, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories was developing a mine accident and casualty database and collecting data on civilians killed or injured by mines/ERW.[53]

The Monitor has recorded at least 4,714 mine/ERW casualties (2,719 killed and 1,995 injured)in Ukraine to the end of 2019. The UN reported that more than 1,500 civilians were killed in Ukraine between 1945 and 1995 in mine/ERW incidents. Another 130 people were killed during clearance operations in the same period.[54]

The then named Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES, since December 2012 operating as the State Emergency Service of Ukraine) reported that between 1996 and 2008 there were 229 ERW casualties (100 killed and 129 injured), including 59 children, due to “handling of devices.”[55]

The OHCHR has recorded over 1,000 civilian mine/ERW casualties between April 2014 and December 2019.[56] The Danish Demining Group (DDG) recorded 1,582 mine/ERW casualties from open sources between June 2014 and October 2018,[57] and the HALO Trust recorded 2,103 casualties between 2014 and 2019, based on open sources and security reports. The HALO Trust however noted that “due to a lack of reliable information from the non-government-controlled areas, the available data is likely an underestimation of the scale of the problem.”[58]

Cluster munition casualties[59]

The Monitor has recorded 76 cluster munition casualties in Ukraine; 72 casualties during attacks and four due to the detonation of unexploded submunitions.[60]

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators

National

  • Ukrainian Armed Forces
  • SESU (under the Ministry of Internal Affairs)
  • State Special Transport Service (clearance of transport infrastructure)
  • Ukrainian Deminers Association (NGO)
  • Demining Solutions (commercial)
  • Security Service (counter-IED operations)
  • State Border Service
  • National Police (counter-IED operations)
  • Demining Team of Ukraine
  • National Guard of Ukraine

International

Since 2014:

  • DDG: survey and clearance

Since 2015:

  • FSD: survey and clearance
  • The HALO Trust: survey and clearance

Note: IED=improvised explosive device.

Clearance

Land release overview (as of December 2019)[61]

Clearance in 2019

1.65km2

Battle area clearance (BAC): 70km2 reportedly reduced by technical survey

Ordnance destroyed in 2019

Over 70,000 mine/ERW

Progress

Ukraine has yet to conduct full survey to determine the extent and location of contamination and does not have access to all the mined areas

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

Land release: landmines

Humanitarian demining operations in the safely accessible areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are conducted according to the annual plan developed by the Ministry of Defence and interested authorities, which details clearance and survey priorities for each operator.[62] In addition to NTS and technical survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), the main goals of the plan remained the demining of populated areas, security during rehabilitation of infrastructure, clearance of agricultural areas and of critical infrastructures (power lines, water and gas pipe infrastructure, thermal power plants, roads and railways).[63]

The overall extent of mine contamination in Ukraine cannot be reliably estimated until surveys will be completed. In its 2019 Article 7 report, Ukraine noted that NTS conducted by NGOs have identified mined areas in Bakhmut, Lyman, Sloviansk, and Volnovakha districts in Donestsk region, and in Popasna and Stanichno-Luhansk districts in Luhansk region.[64]

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups,[65] and international clearance operators have subsequently begun clearance in government-controlled areas.

The HALO Trust cited the lack of an explosives license as the main limiting factor for its program in Ukraine, it had to rely on states institutions to destroy all mine/ERW found.[66]

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de déminage, FSD) stopped its survey and clearance activities in Ukraine in 2019 due to a lack of funding.[67] In 2020, FSD started a new two-year clearance and survey project which will end on 30 June 2022.[68]

It was reported that national operators lacked up-to-date technical equipment for mine clearance.[69]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided training courses to demining and EOD specialists on surveying and clearing contaminated areas.[70]

In 2019, about 1.7km2 was released through clearance.[71] Additional land was cleared and awaiting quality control before it could be released.[72] In addition, 70km2 of battle area were reportedly reduced through technical survey. Data on land cancelled through NTS in 2019 could not be provided as there was no firm data on the size of confirmed and SHAs.[73]

Land release: cluster munition remnants

During clearance and EOD spot tasks operations in 2019, the HALO Trust removed five cluster munitions (9N210).[74]

Deminer safety

There were reports of shooting at deminers of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine who were operating near the line of contact in the east of Ukraine.[75]

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[76]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Governmental

Special Transport Service of the Ministry of Defence

Risk education integrated with clearance activities

State Emergency Service of Ukraine

Risk education integrated with clearance activities

National

Demining Solutions

Risk education integrated with clearance activities

International

The HALO Trust

Conducted risk education sessions in schools, community centers and during door-to-door household visits across government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions

DDG

Provided risk education to populations living near the line of contact, through the use of mass media (social media, TV, print, and radio), group sessions, training of schoolteachers in affected areas. It encouraged peer-to-peer risk education

FSD

Provided risk education sessions in schools and nursery schools along the line of contact

UNICEF

Provided risk education to children and families and partnered with FSD for risk education activities

UNHCR

Co-lead of the Protection Cluster Ukraine and conducted risk education in Luhansk region in May 2019

ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross

Risk education activities included: information sessions and plays in schools or community centers; while the ICRC provided material support for marking contaminated areas

Save the Children

Conducted risk education in schools and nurseries along the line of contact

In addition to these risk education operators, a number of Ukrainian NGOs also conducted risk education.[77] As the entity coordinating risk education in Ukraine, the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster organized risk education activities around the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action in April 2019.[78] In 2020, the UNDP launched a mine awareness project aiming at enhancing mine risk prevention.[79]

There was no evaluation of risk education efforts in Ukraine.[80] Risk education operators reported quarterly on their activities to the Protection Cluster.[81] The HALO Trust conducted knowledge, attitudes and practices survey before and after its risk education sessions.[82]

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiaries of risk education in 2019[83]

Risk education operator

Men

Boys

Women

Girls

DDG

11,131

4,006

15,296

4,186

FSD

416

10,631

845

10,169

HALO

14,867

24,672

18,343

23,617

Mine Safe Ukraine

100

0

10

0

Save the Children

311

2,904

580

2,704

Ukrainian Deminers Association

61

395

90

408

UNICEF

83

4,931

356

4,902

UNHCR

1

0

26

0

 

The ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross reported a total of 30,940 beneficiaries in both government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas, 60% of whom were children.[84]

The number of risk education beneficiaries totaled 167,698 in 2019.[85] Almost 60% of beneficiaries were children.[86]

Despite current efforts by mine action actors to provide risk education, a study by DDG suggested that “there is a need for more widespread risk education campaigns.” According to this study, there is a higher proportion of incidents caused by the handling of ERW than by encounters with mines, especially among children casualties.[87]

Implementation

Target groups

Risk education target groups are school children and internally displaced persons. Individuals who cross the contact line at official crossing points are also informed about the risk posed by explosive ordnance.[88]

In 2020, FSD was planning to target specifically persons traveling from non-government-controlled areas to government-controlled areas.[89] The HALO Trust primarily targeted working age men as they constituted the majority of mine/ERW casualties, as well as women who represented a high proportion of victims of mine/ERW incidents while crossing the contact line. Other groups targeted by the HALO Trust’s risk education activities included: children, due to their natural curiosity; motorists, due to the high level of contamination with antivehicle mines in Ukraine; and elderly and persons with disabilities.[90] The ICRC reported targeting populations in areas most impacted by mine/ERW contamination, in particular adult men. Children, as the second most affected group, were also targeted by the ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross risk education activities.[91]

In eastern Ukraine, the 15km buffer zone from the contact line disproportionately affected elderly people. Insufficient pensions forced them to continue to cultivate plots of land, pick mushrooms, and collect firewood in areas contaminated with mines and ERW.[92]

In Ukraine, risk education targets mostly populations living within 5km of the line of contact in government-controlled areas, leaving other affected communities without such critical information.[93] In particular, risk education operators do not have access to persons leaving on the eastern side of the line of contact, many of whom have to regularly cross it to collect pensions or access other public goods.[94]

Delivery methods

Most risk education was delivered using small printed media. The HALO Trust used pamphlets, booklets, and other materials and placed posters in visible places in schools and villages. Games, puzzles and coloring materials were used during school sessions with younger children.[95] The HALO Trust also transferred risk education materials including leaflets, posters, and stickers to police departments in Donetsk and Luhansk for further dissemination.[96]

DDG had a pilot project to use web and mobile phone platforms to collect information about hazards caused by unexploded ordnance.[97]

FSD implemented a small project in specialized education institutions for children with disabilities. This included risk education using a sign language trainer.[98]

Marking

In April 2019, the government of Ukraine approved regulations that standardized the marking of hazardous areas.[99]

Victim Assistance

Providers and activities

Victim assistance operators[100]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Governmental

Ministry of Health

Responsible for emergency and long-term medical care

Ministry of Social Policy

Responsible for physical rehabilitation; provision of prosthetics and assistive devices to survivors; employment and other economic inclusion activities

Ukrainian Research Institute of Prosthetics and Rehabilitation

Physical rehabilitation, prosthetics, and training of specialists

National

Proliska

Financial assistance; psychological support

International

UCP Wheels for Humanity

Training for physical rehabilitation personnel; economic empowerment; delivery of assistive technology; medical and physical rehabilitation

ICRC

Support to: livelihood activities; emergency medical care and health facilities and physical rehabilitation. Social inclusion through sports

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) Trust Fund

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics, economic inclusion, and psychological support

International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine VictimsEnhancing Human Security (ITF)

Support psychosocial rehabilitation for children and physical rehabilitation in Slovenia; provision of equipment to the Ukrainian Research Institute of Prosthetics and Rehabilitation

Doctors without borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF)

Mobile clinics along the frontline; increased psychological and medical support to people living in government-controlled areas, including IDPs

UNICEF

Psychosocial support; supported a needs assessment on victim assistance (conducted by DDG)

DDG

Advocacy through the publication of a needs assessment on victim assistance

Note: IDPs=Internally displaced people.

Major Developments in 2019

Needs assessment

DRC-DDG, with the support of UNICEF, conducted a needs assessment of child mine/ERW survivors in 2019, in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Due to the limited timeframe of the project, it was not an in-depth needs assessment and it recommended the conduct of a more thorough needs analysis.[101]

Medical care and rehabilitation

As a result of the ongoing conflict, the healthcare system in eastern Ukraine is suffering from damage to health care infrastructure, a shortage of health care workers, and insufficient medical supplies and equipment.[102]

Survivors had free access to emergency medical care, however they often did not have full access to continuing medical care, rehabilitation, and functional prosthetics. Access to medical care was particularly difficult for survivors living in rural areas, where most mine/ERW incidents occurred, and they often could not afford to travel to urban centers.[103]

The ICRC provided first-aid training, ambulances repair, surgical supplies, medical equipment to hospitals on both sides of the line of contact. It also gave cash assistance to cover hospital expenses as well as repairs or upgrades of 30 health facilities along the line of contact.[104]

As public health facilities in Ukraine’s conflict-affected regions gradually resumed services, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) began transferring patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. By the end of 2019, all were provided with care through the public health system.[105]

A cohesive and coordinated rehabilitation system was lacking. Physical rehabilitation facilities were located in districts and cities, and access for mine/ERW survivors living in conflict-affected rural areas was limited. No assistance was provided for transportation.[106] Child mine/ERW survivors often received cosmetic rather than functional prostheses.[107] UNICEF reported that “families often lack the means or ability to provide children with the assistive devices they need.”[108] The Donetsk and Luhansk regions suffered from a lack of qualified specialists and equipment to assist mine/ERW survivors.[109]

The ICRC provided mobility aids, physical rehabilitation equipment, and supplies, and supported the training of four orthopedic technicians.[110]

The USAID’s Leahy War Victims Fund continued to support the UCP Wheels for Humanity, which provided training for rehabilitation personnel, assistive technologies, and medical and physical rehabilitation for persons with disabilities—many of whom were injured in the ongoing conflict.[111] The UPC Wheels for Humanity project launched in 2019, Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems (SRSHS), aimed to improve rehabilitation services and increase access to those services in Ukraine. The SRSHS project aligned with the World Health Organization Rehabilitation 2030 Agenda.[112]

The ITF supported psychosocial rehabilitation for severely traumatized children from eastern Ukraine (Donbass region) on the Slovenian coast with the support of the Youth Health and Summer Resort of the Slovenian Red Cross. ITF also continued to support physical rehabilitation for one conflict casualty.[113] The ITF provided equipment to the Ukrainian Research Institute for Prosthetics and Rehabilitation.[114]

The NATO Trust Fund provided for physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and vocational rehabilitation for injured soldiers; support to the rehabilitation sector through the provision of equipment, training of physical rehabilitation and psychological professionals, support to the development of academic curricula for prosthetists, and provision of psychological support to former military personnel, it also continued to support physical rehabilitation for one conflict casualty at the University Rehabilitation Institute of the Republic of Slovenia in Ljubljana.[115]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

Psychosocial support remained largely unavailable.[116] Local and international NGOs provided psychological and psychosocial support on request to survivors.

Efforts have been made in Ukraine to make education more inclusive of persons with disabilities. The Concept of Inclusive Schools was adopted in 2010. Social and financial assistance to survivors was lacking.[117] ICRC supported social inclusion through sporting events.[118] The ITF supported psychosocial rehabilitation for severely traumatized children from eastern Ukraine (Donbass region) on the Slovenian coast with the support of the Youth Health and Summer Resort of the Slovenian Red Cross.[119]



[1] National Security and Defense Council and State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), “Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges,” Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, side-event, Geneva, 2 December 2015.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE Project-Coordinator in Ukraine (OSCE PCU), 10 April 2020.

[6] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[8] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[9] Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; and email from Anton Shevchenko, Project Officer, Politico-Military and Environmental Projects, OSCE, 23 June 2015.

[10] Email from Anton Shevchenko, Project Officer, Politico-Military and Environmental Projects, OSCE, 23 June 2015; and emails from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 14 June 2016; and from Gianluca Maspoli, Country Focal Point for Ukraine, GICHD, 20 June 2017, and 5 July 2018.

[11] National Security and Defense Council and SESU, “Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges,” Ukraine side-event, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Operations UNIFIER,” undated; and “Humanitarian mine and UXO clearing of the territory of Ukraine conducted by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine,” Side-event presentation by Col. Oleh Bondar, SESU, Geneva, 17 February 2016.

[12] Emails from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 14 June 2016; and from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defense, 17 June 2016.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Emails from Lt.-Col. Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defense, 21 October 2016 and 27 June 2017; from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 20 June 2017; and from Inna Cruz, Information Management Advisor, GICHD, 5 July 2018.

[20] Email from Miljenko Vahtavic, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 30 April 2018.

[21] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019.

[22] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[23] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020; and by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[25] Ibid.

[26] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 37; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2015.

[27] United States (US) Department of State, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2020.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Exchange rate for Feburary 2020: UAH27.655=US$1, Oanda, Currency Converter.

[30] US Department of State, “2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine,” Washington, DC, 3 March 2017.

[31] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 48.

[32] US Department of State, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2020.

[33] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 8 June 2020.

[34] Ibid., 10 April 2020.

[35] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Landmines in Ukraine: Technical Briefing Note,” 6 April 2015; Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities,” undated; Oksana Grytsenko, “Minefields Kill 261, Wound 479,” Kyiv Post, 21 January 2016; and “Ukraine’s desperate attempt to defuse landmines – as more are planted,” The Guardian, 4 April 2016.

[36] OHCHR, “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2017,” December 2017, p. 5.

[37] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020.

[38] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020; Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 8 June 2020; Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 1; and “Measures to ensure compliance,” presentation by Col. Viktor Kuzmin, Deputy Chief, Engineer Troops, Armed Forces of Ukraine, provided to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 9 June 2017.

[39] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[40] Interview with Maksym Komisarov, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[41] Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 5 July 2018; Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 8 June 2020; and Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[43] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019, p. 1.

[44] Ibid.; and Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities,” undated.

[46] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 10; and Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities,” undated.

[48] National Security and Defense Council and SESU, “Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges,” Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Ukraine Side-event, Geneva, 2 December 2015.

[49] Interview with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 20 May 2016.

[50] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2019 is based on: email from Vera Kholodniak, Information Management Officer, Danish Demining Group, 21 September 2020; Monitor analysis of OHCHR, “Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine,” 16 January 2020; monthly factsheets of the Protection Cluster Ukraine; reports of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine; Monitor media monitoring 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2019. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.

[51] See previous Monitor reports.

[52] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020; and Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019.

[53] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 31.

[54] ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1999).

[55] Landmine Monitor analysis of MES, “Daily Reports,” previously available at http://old.mns.gov.ua.

[56] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019; and UNDP in Ukraine, “Canada and UN launch new mine awareness project,” 15 April 2020.

[57] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 10.

[58] Email from Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 10 July 2020.

[59] Casualties occurring during cluster munition attacks and strikes are recorded separately from the Monitor mine/ERW casualty total.

[60] See HRW, “Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 October 2014; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Cluster Munition Ban Policy Profile: Ukraine,” November 2015; and casualty data provided by emails from Rune Bech Persson, DDG, 15 August 2017; and from Nick Smart, HALO, 26 June 2017.

[61] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 8 June 2020, p. 3. Data on land cancelled through NTS in 2019 could not be provided as there was no firm data on the size of confirmed and suspected hazardous areas. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[62] Ibid.

[64] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form C.

[65] Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015; and interview, 18 February 2015.

[66] HALO Trust, Annual Report, 31 March 2019, p. 13.

[67] FSD, “Ukraine,” undated.

[68] FSD, “[Ukraine],” Facebook page, 1 July 2020.

[69] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019.

[70] ICRC, “Annual Report 2019 volume II,” 29 June 2020, p. 430.

[71] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020; and email from Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 10 July 2020.

[72] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Email from Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 10 July 2020.

[75] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[76] Ibid.; Protection Cluster Ukraine, “August 2019 factsheet,” August 2019, p. 2; DDG, “Where we work: Ukraine,” undated; FSD, “New project in Ukraine,” October 2019; UNICEF, “Ukraine,” 24 December 2019; Protection Cluster Ukraine, “MRE 2017-2020,” March 2020; ICRC, “Annual Report 2019 volume II,” 29 June 2020, p. 430; and Save the Children, “Protecting children from mine-related accidents in schools along the contact line,” 9 June 2020.

[77] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[78] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “April 2019 factsheet,” April 2019, p. 2.

[79] UNDP in Ukraine, “Canada and UN launch new mine awareness project,” 15 April 2020.

[80] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[81] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020.

[82] Ibid.

[83] For Save the Children beneficiary data: figures for a risk education project which started in September 2019 and ended in February 2020. For FSD beneficiary data: this includes a risk education project which started in September 2019 and ended in September 2020, and a joint UNICEF/FSD project. For UNICEF beneficiary data: 4,537 additional beneficiaries of a UNICEF risk education project were not disaggregated by age group and gender. For UNHCR beneficiary data: figures are for a risk education project primarily targeting elderly women. See, Protection Cluster Ukraine, “MRE 2017-2020,” March 2020.

[84] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Srdjan Jovanovic, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, 30 April 2020.

[85] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Activities conducted from 1 January to 31 December 2019,” undated.

[86] Protection Cluster Ukraine “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Sessions,” 27 April 2020.

[87] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 20.

[88] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, OSCE PCU, 10 April 2020.

[89] FSD, “Ukraine,” undated.

[90] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020.

[91] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Srdjan Jovanovic, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, 30 April 2020.

[92] Ibid.; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Project Officer, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020; and by Olena Kryvova, FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020.

[93] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019.

[94] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, Programme Officer, HALO Ukraine, 11 May 2020.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “August 2019 factsheet,” August 2019, p. 2.

[97] DRC, “Ukraine,” undated.

[98] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Olena Kryvova, FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020.

[99] Ministry for Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, “Danger! Mines! Cabinet of ministers of Ukraine approved regulations of marking mine and ERW hazards, developed by MTOT,” 4 May 2019.

[100] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2015; The Ukrainian Research Institute of Prosthetics, Prosthetic Construction and Rehabilitation, “Department of Comprehensive Rehabilitation,” undated; UNHCR, “A woman wounded by a grenade explosion heals and begins to support vulnerable populations as a social worker,” 1 April 2020; and Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Activities conducted from 1 January to 30 June 2020,” undated; US Department of State, “To walk the earth in safety,” 2 April 2020, p. 36; ICRC, “Annual Report 2019 volume II,” 29 June 2020, pp. 430–432; NATO, “Summary of ongoing trust funds,” February 2019, pp. 16–17; ITF, “Annual Report 2019,” 13 March 2020, pp. 52–54; MSF, “MSF in Ukraine in 2019,” undated, p. 86; and MSF, “Ukraine,” undated; UNICEF, “430,000 children continue to bear the brunt of eastern Ukraine conflict,” 2 December 2019; UNICEF, “Ukraine Appeal,” 24 December 2019; DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019.

[101] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019.

[103] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019; and DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, pp. 35–36 and 45.

[104] ICRC, “Annual Report 2019 volume II,” 29 June 2020, p. 432.

[105] MSF, “International Activity Report 2019,” August 2020, p. 86.

[106] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 37.

[107] Ibid., p. 38.

[109] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 34.

[110] ICRC, “Annual Report 2019 volume II,” 29 June 2020, p. 431.

[111] US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” 19th edition, 2020, p. 36.

[112] UPC Wheels for Humanity, “Our Projects,” undated.

[113] ITF, “Annual Report 2019,” 13 March 2020, pp. 52–54.

[114] Ibid.

[115] NATO, “Summary of ongoing trust funds,” February 2019, pp. 16–17.

[116] Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Mine Action in Ukraine,” 15 March 2019.

[117] DRC-DDG and UNICEF, “Mine victim assistance needs,” October 2019, p. 43.

[118] ICRC, “Annual Report 2019 volume II,” 29 June 2020, p. 432.

[119] ITF, “Annual Report 2019,” 13 March 2020, pp. 52-54.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 17 November 2021

Policy

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999 and ratified it on 27 December 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2006.

At the intersessional meetings in June 2019, Ukraine reported that the law “On Mine Action in Ukraine” was adopted by its parliament on 6 December 2018 and entered into force on 25 January 2019. Ukraine reported that the legislation “defines the legal and organization foundations for the implementation of anti-mine activities in Ukraine.” Ukraine has also adopted two resolutions, on regulations for marking mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), and on funding procedures.[1]

Similar legislation had been introduced in 2016, but failed to pass.[2] Ukraine has reported existing regulations under national implementation measures, as well as a 2012 law to ratify an agreement with an agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to destroy stockpiles.[3]

Ukraine regularly submits updated annual Article 7 transparency reports. Its most recent Article 7 report was submitted on 1 April 2021, covering calendar year 2020.[4]

Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference in 2009, Ukraine has attended almost all treaty meetings, including the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019, the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually in November 2020, and the intersessional meetings, held virtually in June 2021.

Ukraine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, and Protocol V on ERW. Ukraine submitted its latest annual report for CCW Amended Protocol II in November 2016, and submitted an annual report for Protocol V in October 2016. Ukraine is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production and transfer

Ukraine has declared that it “has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines.”[5] Ukraine has not produced antipersonnel mines since its independence, and is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines.[6] Its 1999 moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, formally in place through 2003, stayed in effect until the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Ukraine in 2006.

Use

Landmines were used in the conflict between government forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in early 2014—initially in Crimea, and later in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of eastern Ukraine. The government of Ukraine has stated that it has not used antipersonnel mines in the conflict, and has accused Russian-supported insurgent forces of laying landmines in Ukraine.[7]

Landmine Monitor has received no credible information that Ukrainian government forces have used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2014 and into 2020.[8]

Information continues to be received documenting that Russian-supported separatists in eastern Ukraine are using an improvised type of antipersonnel mine, which combines a POM-2 bounding fragmentation mine with the rocket motor of a rocket-propelled grenade, to create a short range remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system.[9]

Through survey, the HALO Trust identified a total of 1,653 military and civilian casualties on both sides of the current contact line, caused by mines and ERW. Using remote accident mapping technology, the HALO Trust was able to conduct this preliminary technical survey to identify contamination in inaccessible areas. They identified at least 135 villages, out of the 873 assessed, which were contaminated by landmines.[10]

There is significant evidence, at different locations, that antipersonnel mines of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s, and antipersonnel mines with production markings from the 2000s—indicating Russian origin—are stockpiled and used by Russian-supported separatists in eastern Ukraine.[11] The Armed Forces of Ukraine and the security services continue to confiscate caches of antipersonnel mines along the front line, including MON-50 directional mines,[12] MON-90 directional mines,[13] PMN-1 and PMN-2 blast mines,[14] OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines,[15] and POM-2 scatterable mines.[16]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and has therefore been in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty ever since.[17] It has not provided a timeline for when it will complete the destruction of its stockpile and comply with its obligation.[18] For years, Ukraine repeated at nearly every formal and informal Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it would depend on international support for the destruction of its stockpiles.[19] Most recently, Ukraine stated at the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019 that it “is determined to destroy the existing antipersonnel landmines inherited from pre-independence time,” citing that it “still manages to direct funds from the State budget to the purpose of the antipersonnel landmine destruction.”[20]

The types and quantities of antipersonnel mines that Ukraine has reported in its stockpile have varied over the years. The highest reported total—6,664,342 mines of nine different types—was detailed in Landmine Monitor 2006.[21]

In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2020, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines (3,363,828 PFM-type, and 605 OZM-4 hand-emplaced bounding fragmentation mines).[22] Ukraine destroyed a small number of PFM-type mines in 2020 that were considered to be unstable and unsafe for further storage.

Stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by Ukraine, 2011–2020[23]

Year

APMs destroyed

2020

456

2019

216,252

2018

892,320

2017

438,328

2016

652,840

2015

19,944

2014

576

2013

332,352

2012

22,604

2011

9,890

Total

2,585,562

Note: APM=antipersonnel mine.

The remainder of Ukraine’s POM-2 remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 2018, by the company Ukroboronprom. A small number were destroyed at the storage facility as their condition made them too hazardous to move. The OZM-4 mines were located in storage facilities in Crimea when that territory was seized in 2014, and are currently under the control of Russia.[24]

From 1999 until 2010, Ukraine destroyed significant quantities of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, using both its own resources and international assistance.[25]

Ukraine remains unable to articulate a timeframe for the completion of stockpile destruction. A previous agreement reached between the Ministry of Defense, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines was terminated in 2020. The three parties are currently in the process of tendering a new agreement.[26] As the President of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties noted, “Ukraine further indicated that it is doing its best to intensify the interaction with relevant stakeholders on the matter” and added that “as soon as the tender procedure will be completed, Ukraine will inform on the activities carried out under Article 4.”[27]



[1] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019.

[2] Ukrainian Parliament, “Draft Law on Mine Action in Ukraine,” 9 September 2018; and Ukrainian Parliament, “Draft Law on Mine Action in Ukraine,” 12 October 2016.

[3] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 1 April 2014, Form A. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database.

[4] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 1 April 2021. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database.

[5] Ibid., Form E.

[6] For example, in May 2009, Ukraine said it “did not produce APL [antipersonnel landmines] in the past, doesn’t produce at present, and will not produce them in the future.” Presentation of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

[7] Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 18 June 2014; Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015; and Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019. In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions. The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines are not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

[8] Russia stated in October 2017, “We note with great regret that the information on alleged violations of Ottawa Convention is not verified at all. As we can see with regard to events in Ukraine the UN Secretary General investigation mechanism envisaged by Ottawa Convention remains inactive. Moreover, at the 2015–2016 State Parties meetings no one even tried to question Kiev’s compliance with Ottawa Convention during the civil war that it unleashed in the South-East of the country.” Statement by Vladimir Yermakov, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, Debate on Conventional Weapons, New York, 20 October 2017. In February 2016, Ukraine informed the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance that “its Armed Forces are authorized to use mines in command-detonate mode, which is not prohibited under the Convention. All mines planted in command-detonate mode are recorded, secured and access is restricted.” Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), “Report and Preliminary Observations: Committee On Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Chile, Peru and Sweden): 2016 Intersessional Meetings,” May 2016, p. 4.

[9] See, for example, Schroeder, Matt (MSchroeder77), “Another RPG-delivered POM-2 anti-personnel mine documented in Ukraine. facebook.com/pressjfo.news.” 30 August 2021, 00:00 UTC. Tweet; Spa, Abraxas (AbraxasSpa), “More and more POM-2 anti-personnel mines delivered via RPG. According to JFO/EODs, drones used to drop these too.” 20 April 2021, 09:28 UTC. Tweet; Schroeder, Matt (MSchroeder77), “More RPG-delivered POM-2 mines in Donetsk.” 13 April 2021, 02:20 UTC. Tweet; and Weapons, Lost (LostWeapons), “Improvised Mine or improvised RPG. Can’t believe I missed these but really I think the best trench warfare weapon. RPGs modified to deploy POM-2 mines when then auto deploy 4 tripwires. Especially cold fronts you could just spam these at an enemy trench line.” 1 December 2020, 12:39 UTC. Tweet. See also, DFRLab, “Long-Range Mining in the Donbas,” 30 October 2020.

[10] Nick Torbet and Patrick Thompson, “21st Century Survey in Eastern Ukraine and the Use of Technology in Insecure Environments,” Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 21, Issue 2, July 2017.

[11] For evidence of markings from 2003, see, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), “SBU reveals three hidings with ammunition and Russian mine in ATO area,” 15 November 2016; and for evidence of markings from 2010, see, Ukrainian Military TV, “Prove the presence of Russian mines in Donbas,” YouTube.com, 1 March 2017.

[12] Ukrainian Military TV, “Prove the presence of Russian mines in Donbas,” YouTube.com, 1 March 2017. SBU, “SBU reveals 2 Russian mines in ATO area,” 2 May 2017; SBU, “SBU seizes landmines produced in Russia in the ATO area,” 25 April 2017; and SBU, “SBU reveals cache with explosives in ATO area,” 16 January 2017.

[15] SBU, “SBU removes the military munitions,” 21 September 2018; SBU, “SBU blocks illegal sale of arms,” 19 September 2018; and SBU, “SBU uncovers ammunition of Russian production in ATO area,” 16 December 2017.

[16] Swampy, “Clearance around forward positions,” Beyond the Borders, 27 October 2017 (no longer available online); SBU, “SBU prevents terrorist attacks prepared by Russian secret services in Mariupol,” 17 August 2017; SBU, “SBU deactivates mine of Russian production in ATO area,” 26 April 2017; and SBU, “SBU reveals three hidings with ammunition and Russian mine in ATO area,” 15 November 2016.

[17] On 18 May 2010, Ukraine officially informed States Parties in a note verbale that “it will be unable to comply with its Article 4 obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines by 1 June 2010 deadline.” At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2010, after Ukraine missed its deadline, Ukraine’s representative noted that this is not “unexpected information to States Parties” and that “Ukraine remains open for the fruitful cooperation with States Parties and potential donors and hopes for the practical assistance to make Ukraine territory free from [antipersonnel mine] stockpiles of PFM-type as soon as possible.” See, Statement of Amb. Oleksandr Nykonenko, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 21 June 2010.

[18] The requirement to destroy almost six million PFM-type antipersonnel mines was a key obstacle that prevented Ukraine from rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty. PFM mines contain a liquid explosive filling (VS6-D) that makes them dangerous and difficult to destroy, and requires sophisticated pollution control measures. In mid-2003, a European Commission (EC) technical study determined that the condition of Ukraine’s PFM stockpiles was good. The mines were consolidated into two sites, from a previous total of 13 storage locations. See, ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, July 2006), p. 765.

[19] In 2002, the EC launched a project to finance the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM mines, but a contract awarded in December 2005 was cancelled in April 2007. In 2008, Ukraine said that it had decided to make a national financial contribution toward destruction of about 1.6 million of the PFM mines, and also requested a renewal of European Union (EU) assistance. In 2009 and 2010, Ukraine said on multiple occasions that it was unlikely to meet its stockpile destruction deadline. It appealed to States Parties in May 2009 to find a “joint solution” to the problem and to come up with an option that would “prevent Ukraine from violating the Article 4 deadline” including international financial assistance, to modernize destruction facilities and acquire additional equipment. In a statement at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference, in Cartagena on 2 December 2009, Amb. Nykonenko of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Ukraine could destroy one million mines per year if the destruction facility was upgraded, and that with additional assistance the timeframe might be reduced to three years.

[20] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019.

[21] For a chart showing reported changes in the quantities and types of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Ukraine from 2006–2009, see, ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009), p. 774.

[22] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 1 April 2019, Forms B and G. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database.

[23] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, 2012–2015 and 2017–2020, Form G. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database.

[24] Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 1 April 2019, Form B. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database.

[25] In a November 2008 presentation, Ukraine indicated it had destroyed its entire stock of 238,010 POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M mines, as well as all 8,060 PMD-6 mines. Ukraine also destroyed more than 400,000 PMN mines in 2002 and 2003, and 101,088 PFM-1 mines in 1999. In June 2008, Ukraine reported that between 2005 and 2007, an experimental program to partially dismantle and destroy 8,000 POM-2 mines was carried out at the Donetsk Chemical Plant, and a further 48 POM-2 mines were destroyed at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports submitted in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Ukraine also noted that while its MON-type and OZM-type antipersonnel mines could be used in command-detonated mode in compliance with the treaty, these stockpiled mines were excessive and unsuitable for use, and that it had plans to destroy them.

[26] Statement of Ukraine, Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 22 June 2021.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 16 November 2020

In 2019, 11 donors contributed US$22.3 million toward mine action in Ukraine; this represents a $10.4 million increase from the amount contributed in 2018.[1]

The largest contribution was from the United States (US), which provided $8.5 million to support capacity-building and clearance activities. Two additional donors—the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK)—provided a combined total of $9.2 million.

Of the total contribution in 2019, nearly half ($10 million, or 45%) went toward clearance and risk education activities, while 10% ($2.3 million) was for victim assistance and the remaining 45% ($10 million) went toward capacity-building or other mine action activities that were not disaggregated by the donors.

International contributions: 2019[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount

(national currency)

Amount (US$)

US

Capacity-building and clearance

US$8,500,000

8,500,000

EU

Clearance, risk education, and victim assistance

€5,165,068

5,781,777

UK

Clearance

£2,635,682

3,365,239

Germany

Capacity-building, clearance, and risk education

€1,431,670

1,602,611

France

Clearance

€500,000

559,700

Italy

Risk education and victim assistance

€500,000

559,700

Sweden

Clearance

SEK5,000,000

528,519

Japan

Various

¥50,188,992

460,365

Norway

Clearance and risk education

NOK3,000,000

340,905

Finland

Clearance, risk education, and victim assistance

€290,000

324,626

Canada

Clearance and risk education

C$250,000

188,409

Slovenia

Victim assistance

€59,678

66,803

Total

 

N/A

22,278,654

Note: N/A=not applicable.

International contributions to mine action in Ukraine have totaled some $62 million since 2015, representing an average of $12.4 million per year.

Summary of contributions: 2015–2019[3]

Year

Amount (US$)

2019

22,278,654

2018

11,867,014

2017

8,581,898

2016

10,560,861

2015

8,795,914

Total

62,084,341

 


[1] Canada Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 11 June 2020; response to Monitor questionnaire by Frank Meeussen, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, European External Action Service (EEAS), 30 August 2020; response to Monitor questionnaire by Anni Mäkeläinen, Desk Officer, Unit for Arms Control, Finland Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 13 July 2020; emails from Yves Marek, Ambassador, Secretary General, National commission for the elimination of antipersonnel mines (CNEMA), 27 July and 10 August 2020; Germany Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 16 March 2020; Italy Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 25 June 2020; Japan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 March 2020; email from Ingrid Schøyen, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs, Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 June 2020; ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2019,” March 2020, pp. 17–18; email from Kajsa Aulin, Assistant Health Affairs and Disarmament, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations in Geneva, 24 September 2020; UK Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2020; and US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2019,” 2 April 2020.

[2] Average exchange rates for 2019: €1=US$1.1194; C$1.3269=US$1; £1.2768=US$1; NOK8.8001=US$1; SEK9.4604=US$1; ¥109.02=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2020.

[3] See previous Monitor reports.