Qatar
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Ten-Year Review: Non-signatory Qatar has never commented on humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions or elaborated its position on joining the convention. Qatar has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention, most recently in September 2019. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2019.
Qatar is not known to have used, produced, or exported cluster munitions, but it has imported them and possesses a stockpile. Qatar has not shared information on the types and quantities of its stockpiled cluster munitions.
Policy
The State of Qatar has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Non-signatory Qatar has never commented on humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions, or elaborated its position on joining the convention.[1]
Qatar participated in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and joined in its consensus adoption in Dublin in May 2008. Yet Qatar attended the Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 only as an observer and did not sign the convention.[2]
Qatar has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention, most recently the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2019.[3] Qatar has never made a statement or intervention in these meetings, but its representatives have met with the Cluster Munition Coalition.
In December 2019, Qatar abstained from voting on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that called on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[4] Qatar has never explained why it has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution since it was first introduced in 2015.
Qatar has voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in June 2020. It co-sponsored the 2019 resolutions on Syria.[5] Qatar has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2019.[6] In 2012, Qatar said it was “appalled” by the Syrian government’s use of “cluster munitions against its own people.”[7]
Qatar is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling
Qatar is not known to have produced cluster munitions.
A Qatari official told the Monitor in 2011 that Qatar has never used or exported cluster munitions.[8]
Qatar has imported cluster munitions and possesses a stockpile.[9] It has acquired ASTROS II multi-barrel launchers and cluster munition rockets from Brazil.[10]
Foreign stockpiling
The United States (US) military may stockpile cluster munitions on Qatar’s territory, according to a 2008 US diplomatic cable that stated, “The U.S. stores cluster munitions in Qatar. Post reports that it is unknown whether Qatar is aware that U.S. cluster munitions are stored there.”[11]
[1] Government officials have often told the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) that Qatar is studying the convention and the implications of joining it. CMC interview with Lt. Abdulaziz Hamdan Al-Ahmad, Secretary of the National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons, in Geneva, 5 September 2017; CMC interview with Brig. Gen. Ahmad Abdulrahim Al-Abdellah, Ministry of Defense, in Lusaka, 11 September 2013; Monitor interview with Brig. Gen. Nasser al-Ali, Chair of National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons (NCPW), Qatar Armed Forces, in Beirut, 13 September 2011; and letter from Amb. Nassir Adbulaziz al-Nasser, Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the UN in New York, to Human Rights Watch (HRW), 9 March 2009.
[2] For more details on Qatar’s cluster munition policy and practice up to early 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 228–229.
[3] Qatar has missed only one meeting, which was the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2018.
[4] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019.
[5] See, “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council (HRC) Resolution 43/28, 22 June 2020; “The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” HRC Resolution 41/L.25, 8 July 2019; “The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” HRCResolution 42/L.22, 24 September 2019; and “The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” HRC Resolution 40/L.7, 22 March 2019. Qatar voted in favor of similar HRC resolutions in 2013–2019.
[6] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 74/169, 18 December 2019. Qatar voted in favor of similar UNGA resolutions in 2013–2018.
[7] Email from Anna Fritzsche, Campaign and Research Assistant, Crisis Action, 16 October 2012.
[8] Monitor interview with Brig. Gen. al-Ali, NCPW, Qatar Armed Forces, Beirut, Lebanon, 13 September 2011.
[9] In 2013, a Ministry of Defense representative confirmed that Qatar possesses cluster munitions, but has only used them in training. CMC interview with Brig. Gen. Al-Abdellah, Qatar Ministry of Defense, Lusaka, Zambia, 11 September 2013.
[10] Terry J. Gander and Charles Q. Cutshaw, eds. Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2001–2002 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2001), pp. 630–631.
[11] The cable also states that “Post suspects that if Qatar does sign the treaty, the Qataris would want to ensure no cluster munitions are stored there, though to Post’s knowledge this is not something the U.S. has ever discussed with Doha. The U.S. would need to make a direct inquiry to determine if Qatar is going to sign and to discover Qatari intentions. Post anticipates Qatar would request removal of cluster munitions if Qatar signed and were aware of U.S. stocks.” The cable also stated that “Unlike other potential signatory states (Germany, Japan, UK) where U.S. military forces store cluster munitions, Italy, Spain, and Qatar have not yet approached the Department or DoD on this issue.” “Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
Mine Ban Policy
Policy
The State of Qatar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 October 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 April 1999. It believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically.
Qatar regularly attends meetings of the treaty, most recently the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018 and the intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2019. Qatar did not provide a statement at either meeting. Qatar also attended the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014.
Qatar is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. Qatar is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Use, production, transfer, and stockpile
Qatar has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes.
Support for Mine Action
In 2010 Qatar contributed US$139,700 for victim assistance activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories via the International Trust Fund for Mine Victims Assistance (ITF).[1]
Qatar made its first recorded mine action contribution in 2009, when it contributed $2 million to Sudan for the purchase of mine clearance equipment.[2]