Five-Year Review: State Party the United Kingdom (UK) enacted implementation legislation for the convention before it ratified on 4 May 2010. It has participated in all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties and intersessional meetings. The UK promotes universalization of the convention and hosted an event toward this objective in London in March 2015. The UK has condemned the use of cluster munitions, including in Syria. It has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation.

The UK produced, exported, imported, and used cluster munitions prior to joining the convention. In December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of a stockpile of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38.7 million submunitions. The UK initially retained cluster munitions for research and training purposes, but has not done so since 2013.

Policy

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 4 May 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 November 2010.

The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 serves as the UK’s implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, providing penal and financial sanctions for violations of its provisions.[1] The UK has classified cluster munitions in the highest category of prohibited exports under its Export Control Order of 2008.[2]

In March 2015, the UK government published a “Command Paper” prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that provides “post-legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010”  to assess how the legislation has worked in practice. The Command Paper was presented to parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the Committees on Arms Export Controls.[3] It concluded that there are “no outstanding legal issues” regarding the UK’s implementation of the Act.[4]

The UK submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 28 April 2011 and has provided annual updated reports ever since, most recently on 29 April 2015.[5]

The UK participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Just before the conclusion of the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, the UK changed its position to support a ban on all cluster munitions, a decision that had significant impact in influencing support in other countries for the convention text.[6]

The UK engages in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San José, Costa Rica in September 2014, where it confirmed the completion of the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions in December 2013. The UK has also attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, most recently in June 2015.

Promotion of the convention

The UK promotes universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 2014 report on human rights and democracy states that in 2015, the UK “will continue to work diplomatically to pursue the goal of a world free of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, by encouraging all states to refrain from the use of such weapons.”[7]

In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office informed the Monitor that “the UK has raised the issue of accession to the Convention with a number of States not Party at various points throughout [2014].” It reported that the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister for Defence and International Security, Tobias Ellwood MP, hosted a reception in London on 25 March 2015 to encourage states to join the convention. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a number of non-signatory states attended the reception, during which Ellwood encouraged their accession and “spoke about the UK’s decision to come down on the side of a prohibition, having weighed up the humanitarian and security factors.”[8] The UK has responded to the new use of cluster munitions in 2014 and the first half of 2015.

On 10 February 2015, government spokesperson, Baroness Anelay of St Johns, expressed the UK’s concern at “recent reports of the use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine” and affirmed the need to “bring to book those responsible for human rights abuses.”[9] In response to a parliamentary question later that month on the cluster munition rocket attacks in eastern Ukraine, Anelay noted the government of Ukraine’s denial that its armed forces used cluster munitions and affirmed that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used intentionally to target civilians.” Anelay called on the parties to the conflict in Ukraine to abide by international humanitarian law and called on Ukraine and Russia to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[10] In April 2015, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office official also cited the Ukraine government’s denial of cluster munition use and repeated in a letter to CMC UK member Article 36 that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used to target civilians.”[11]

The UK has vigorously and repeatedly condemned cluster munition use by the Syrian government since 2012.[12] It has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 69/189 on 18 December 2014, which expressed “outrage” at the continued use.[13] The UK has voted in favor of four Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently a UK-led resolution on 2 July 2015.[14]

The UK also led a resolution adopted unanimously by the that UN Security Council on 29 June 2015, which expresses concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and calls on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions.”[15] On 27 May 2014, the UK voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei, South Sudan in February 2014 and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[16]

On 15 March 2015, the UK’s representative to Libya, Ambassador Michael Aron, described evidence of new use of cluster bombs in Libya as “deeply disturbing.”[17]

The UK has not commented on the use of cluster munitions in Yemen in April and May 2015 by the Saudi-led coalition.

At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014, the UK expressed “concern” at “several reports” of the use of cluster munitions and urged “those states involved to cease the use of the weapons.”[18] Unlike the majority of states that made statements, the UK did not express concern at new use of cluster munitions in any specific country.

Despite these statements and actions, the CMC is concerned at a lack of consistency in the UK’s approach to how states that are part of the Convention on Cluster Munitions collectively respond to new use of cluster munitions. At a preparatory meeting for the convention’s First Review Conference in Geneva on 24 June 2015, the UK proposed watering down language condemning the use of cluster munitions in draft documents prepared for the First Review Conference.[19]

The UK is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

The UK elaborated its views on the interpretation and implementation of a number of key provisions in the convention during the process of preparing its national legislation and in the period since with respect to the prohibitions on foreign stockpiling, transit, investment in cluster munition producers, and assistance with prohibited acts in joint military operations. A number of ministerial statements are on record clarifying the meaning of the UK’s national legislation on these issues and recognizing the positive obligations under the convention.[20] Additionally,in late 2010, several parliamentary questions were raised in response to reports in the British media based on United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks.

Foreign stockpiling

In June 2008, immediately after the adoption of the convention, the UK stated it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention.[21] In December 2009, the government stated that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.”[22] In 2010, the UK announced that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[23]

The March 2015 Command Paper finds that the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act “allows for the extension of its provisions to any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and any British overseas territory” but states that its application has only been extended to include the Isle of Man to date.[24] Therefore the UK has not applied its national legislation to the full extent possible, maintaining the possibility of acts being permitted in certain British overseas territories that would be prohibited on the mainland UK. This could represent a loophole by which foreign stocks of cluster munitions could return to the UK’s overseas territories in the future.

Transit

In March 2010, UK parliamentarians asked if “transit” of cluster munitions through UK territory is prohibited under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. The government stated that transit “would not in itself be prohibited, but a direct application would have to be made to the Secretary of State who would have to grant permission before it could happen. We would be reluctant to grant such permission.”[25]

In December 2010, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence said that under Section 8 of the UK’s legislation, the Foreign Secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.”[26] In 2011, a Minister of State clarified that this provision had been used only once, and that was to grant the US a temporary extension to keep cluster munitions on UK territory as it underwent the process of removing all remaining stockpiles.[27]

A US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and made public by Wikileaks in 2010 stated that the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Security Policy Group had “reconfirmed” to US officials that “off-shore storage” of cluster munitions “on US ships would still be permitted” until 2013, and by temporary exception.[28] In response to a parliamentary question on the cable, the previous Labour government minister responsible for the legislation said that “it was our complete intention that there would be no American cluster munitions on British territories anywhere in the world.”[29]

According to the Command Paper, the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act has been extended to the overseas territory of the Isle of Man but not other overseas territories. Therefore it is technically possible that authorization by the Foreign Secretary would not be necessary for the transit or transfer of cluster munitions by visiting forces through other UK overseas territories, such as Diego Garcia.[30]

Interoperability

The convention’s Article 21 provisions on interoperability, the issue of joint military operations with states not party that use cluster munitions, are addressed in Clause 9 of the UK’s national legislation.[31] In 2011, the UK stated that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”[32]

During the development of the UK’s implementation legislation, parliamentarians expressed concern that this clause would provide a loophole that would undermine the purpose of the convention and of the UK’s legislation, which is the elimination of cluster munitions.[33] When pushed by members of parliament to clarify just exactly what activities this clause would permit UK troops engaged in joint military operations to do, the government responded that UK troops “would not be allowed to request use of [cluster] munitions where the choice of munitions was within their exclusive control” but that “they could facilitate operations where [cluster munitions] might be used by a partner.”[34]

Parliamentarians argued that there would likely be situations that, while not illegal under the bill, would clearly be against the spirit and intention of the legislation and pressed the government on the need to develop proper guidelines and briefings for the UK military.[35] The government responded that “States Parties have to make sure that any other state with which they are working understands the basis on which their personnel will be engaged,” and added, “We have to make sure there is clear guidance for personnel, so they know exactly what they can and cannot do. That is already in hand.”[36] A significant result of the parliamentary debates on interoperability and Clause 9 was the recognition by the government of the need to promote universal adherence to the convention.

While there has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in the “Operation Inherent Resolve” military action against forces of Islamic State (IS) (or Islamic State of Iraq the Levant, ISIL) that began last year in Syria and Iraq, the CMC has warned the US against using cluster munitions. The Monitor requested information from the UK on how it is engaging in the Iraq portion of the joint operation with the US and other states that have not banned cluster munitions. In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded:

The prohibition on the UK’s use of cluster munitions is reflected in our operational targeting policy documents which outline how UK armed forces will operate, including with coalition partners. Restrictions on the use of weapons and national caveats imposed during coalition operations are a normal part of coalition operations. These directives include the national, operationally-specific, rules of engagement profiles and national caveats which will ensure that any action is within the parameters of UK law. Furthermore, a Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive is issued to all UK personnel embedded with coalition forces explaining the UK legal position and how this affects their individual responsibilities in all matters including targeting.[37]

During the 2011 NATO military operation in Libya, Foreign Secretary William Hague informed the UK parliament that “we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies do not use cluster munitions.”[38] NATO confirmed that its forces did not use cluster munitions during the Libya operation in its formal response to a UN Commission of Inquiry.[39]

Advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs

The 2010 Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act makes it an offense for a person to “make arrangements under which another person acquires a prohibited munition,” “to make arrangements under which another person transfers a prohibited munition,” or to “assist, encourage or induce” any other person to engage in prohibited acts.

Concerns have been raised in the past about the promotion of cluster munitions by exhibitors at the annual Defence Systems and Equipment International Exhibitions (DSEi) in London. In 2009 and 2011, the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the DSEi in London displayed promotional materials advertising their cluster munitions.[40] Exhibitor information regarding “compliance” for the exhibition in September 2013 emphasized that it is prohibited to exhibit “non-unitary munitions” except those excluded from prohibition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[41] No advertisement of cluster munitions was reported at the 2013 exhibition.

The 2015 Command Paper does not include any reference to the advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs in 2009 and 2011.[42]

Investment

While direct investment in cluster munitions is considered prohibited by Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act under the prohibition on assistance, the issue of indirect investments is not addressed. In 2011, the UK government recognized the need for further work to address “the problem of remote financing” and said that it had set up a working group to look into the matter.[43] The working group is not believed to have met as of July 2015.

In 2011, Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Alistair Burt stated that “indirect financing, including investments in companies that may produce cluster munitions alongside a range of other items and services, is an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.”[44] There have been no parliamentary statements since that would suggest further action by the government to address investment in cluster munition manufacturers.

The 2015 Command Paper specifically highlights that the 2010 implementing legislation “did not prohibit indirect financing of cluster munitions production.”[45]

In March 2015, an opposition member asked the government a series of parliamentary questions about investment in cluster munition producers, including the adequacy of existing legislation, the possibility of enacting specific legislation to ban such investment, the ability of pension schemes to invest indirectly in cluster munition manufacture, and whether guidance could be issued to help pension schemes avoid such investment.[46] The government responded that there were no plans to review this specific area of pensions investments.[47]

Financial institutions have responded to public pressure and campaigning actions by NGOs calling for disinvestment from cluster munition manufacturers. A 2014 report on worldwide investment in cluster munitions published by CMC member PAX, identified US$1.4 billion invested by UK financial institutions in companies that manufacture cluster munitions between June 2011 and September 2014.[48] It listed seven UK financial institutions as implicated in investing in companies that produce cluster munitions.[49]

Use

As a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK has foresworn any use of cluster munitions, but in the past the UK used cluster munitions extensively, including in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas in 1982, in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) in 1999, and in Iraq in 2003.[50]

Production and transfer

The UK produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions in the past and has declared that it now has no facilities to produce cluster munitions.[51]

The UK produced several variants of the BL-755 bomb with 147 submunitions and also produced the L20A1 artillery projectile with 49 M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions under license from Israel Military Industries.[52]

BL-755 cluster bombs were exported to, or were otherwise finally possessed by, the following countries: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[53]

The UK also imported cluster munitions from the US: M483 155mm artillery projectiles, M26 rockets for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition (MPSM) rocket warheads used with CRV-7 air-to-surface launchers, and CBU-87 cluster bombs.[54]

Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reported in detail on the ambiguous status of the “Starstreak” high-velocity missile, produced by Thales Air Defence Limited, with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act.[55]

Stockpile destruction

The UK once stockpiled a total of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38,758,898 submunitions, as listed in the following table.[56]

Cluster munitions formerly stockpiled by the UK[57]

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK was required to declare and destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 November 2018.

On 17 December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of the stockpile, five years in advance of the treaty-mandated deadline.[58] The UK announced the completion at the convention’s intersessional meetings in April 2014 and the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014. It also declared the completion of the stockpile destruction in its April 2014 Article 7 report.

The stockpile was transferred and then destroyed at facilities in Germany, Italy, and Norway.[59] In April 2014, the UK reported that the total cost of the stockpile destruction was “around £40 million,” or US$66 million.[60]

Retention

Since 2013, the UK has reported that it does not have any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or research purposes and “has no immediate plans to acquire and retain sub-munitions for permitted purposes, but reserves the right to do so.”[61]

Previously, in 2011 and 2012, the UK reported that it was retaining 956 explosive submunitions of four types.[62] In 2013, it reported that the retained submunitions had been destroyed by demolition “because of concerns over condition, packaging and storage.”[63]

Policy

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999, and national legislation implementing the treaty entered into force the same day.

The UK served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from 1999–2000, and as coordinator of the Sponsorship Programme for many years. More recently, the UK served on the Committee on Cooperative Compliance from 2016–2018 and the Committee on Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance since 2018. The UK was also Vice President of the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.

The UK has attended most meetings of the treaty, including the Third Review Conference in Maputo in December 2014. More recently, the UK attended the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, where it reported on its clearance efforts in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas and requested a clearance deadline extension request until 2024, which was granted. It also highlighted its support for mine action in nine countries from 2014–2018.[1] The UK also attended the treaty’s intersessional meetings in May 2019, where it again provided an update on clearance activities.[2]

The UK is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. The UK is not party to Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

The UK completed destruction of its stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines on 19 October 1999.

Initially, the UK retained close to 5,000 mines for training purposes, but decided in 2003 that the number was excessive and reduced it to less than 2,000. In 2018, the UK announced that its previously reported 724 antipersonnel mines retained for training were inert munitions not subject to the convention, and thus has zero mines retained for training or research.[3]

Production of antipersonnel mines in the UK was not prohibited until entry into force of the treaty on 1 March 1999, although some manufacturers had ceased production earlier. The UK’s first Article 7 report stated that production facilities had been converted or decommissioned.[4] The partial export moratoria of 1994 and 1995 were made comprehensive in 1996. Imports were banned in May 1997.

The UK was previously a major producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, with at least four major manufacturers producing five types of antipersonnel mines.[5] The UK was described in 1993 as one of the “top 10” exporters of antipersonnel mines and a primary source of advanced mine technology. British antipersonnel mines have been found in many mine-affected countries, including Afghanistan, Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique, and Somalia, and were also exported to other countries. Mines were also imported from Canada, France, and the United States.

20-Year Summary of Mine Action

Note: ERW = explosive remnants of war.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999 and national legislation implementing the treaty entered into force on the same day. The UK completed destruction of its stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines on 19 October 1999. Initially, the UK retained close to 5,000 mines for training purposes, but in 2003, reduced it to less than 2000. At the end of 2018, the UK declared retaining no antipersonnel mines as defined under the convention.[8] After entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, there were allegations of attempted transfers of antipersonnel mines in the UK by Pakistani, Romanian, and UK companies.

Despite becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999, the UK did not commence clearance on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas until 2009. In November 2008, the UK requested, and was granted, a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to clear mines areas from the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. A further five-year extension was requested in March 2018 and granted through to 1 March 2024.

The UK is making significant progress in the release of mines areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas and predicts that only eight mined areas, covering an estimated 0.16km² will remain by the end of March 2020, all located in the Yorke Bay area of the islands.

Contamination and Impact

The mined areas are the result of armed conflict with Argentina in 1982.[9]

The UK has reported that no civilian has ever been killed or injured by mines on the islands.[10] There have been several cases where civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield. The Ministry of Defence reported “infringement” of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008.[11] It is a criminal offence on the Falklands/Malvinas to enter a minefield.[12]

The socio-economic impact of contamination on the islands is said to be minimal. All mined areas and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) have been “perimeter-marked and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.”[13] According to the UK, mined areas represent “only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land.”[14] A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animals’ deaths.[15]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

The UK became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999 and has since submitted two Article 5 deadline extension requests, one for 10 years from 2009–2019, and a further five-year extension through to 1 March 2024. It is expected that this will be the final deadline extension the UK will request.

The UK began the first formal clearance operations on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas at the end of 2009 and has carried out clearance operations in phases. The first four phases of clearance took place from October 2009 to March 2016, during which 35 mined areas were released, totaling just over 2.4km².[16] Phase 5 (a) was completed at the end of March 2018 with just over 4.8km² of land cleared. Phase 5(b) commenced in April 2018 and is expected to conclude by 31 March 2020.[17] Eight remaining mined areas, covering 0.16km² are expected to remain on completion of Phase 5(b). Technical survey will be conducted to inform the planning and costing for the release of these remaining mined areas.[18]

The UK requested a five-year extension until 1 March 2024 to ensure adequate time for this clearance.[19] Two further areas, Don Carlos Bay and Beatrice Cove, have been out of bounds to all persons on the islands since 1982 and have not been surveyed. They are not thought to be mined, but if found to be, the UK expects that they could be cleared within the five-year extension period.[20]

The UK has increased its funding commitment for Phase 5, up to £27 million compared to the £11 million for the first four stages due to the minefields being more technically challenging and environmentally sensitive.[21] Other challenges include the remote locations, adverse weather conditions, incomplete Argentine minefield records, and the limits on the capacity of the islands to provide certain facilities for demining.[22]

Program Management

Management

A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action on the islands. The NMAA is chaired by the UK FCO and comprises representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falklands Islands’ government, and a strategic advisor.

A Suspect Hazardous Area Land Release Committee (SHALARC), provides a forum for contractors to discuss issues of concern or interest, such as the land release process, including when land has been released for public use. The body is based on the islands and is composed of local officials and a representative of the UK military.[23]

Legislation

The UK implemented a Landmines Act in 1998 that came into force in 1999.[24] The Falkland Islands government has had a Crimes Ordinance in place since 1989, which makes it a criminal offence for any person to willfully enter a minefield; to cause or attempt to cause a mine to explode; to cut or remove minefield fencing; to remove damage or obscure minefield signs or notices; or to drive an animal into a minefield.[25]

Environmental protection

The Falkland Islands/Malvinas contain sensitive flora, fauna, and fragile terrain that creates an additional challenge to the conduct of demining operations. Environmental standards are agreed on in coordination with the islands’ government Environmental Planning Department to minimize damage to the fragile environment and to aid remediation.[26] The UK also conducted an environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 2017 as the most environmentally sensitive minefields will be cleared from 2018 onwards. The report identified two particular issues: a) the penguins on the islands that often breed in burrows in mined areas,[27] and b) the sensitive beach and sand dune area at Yorke Bay,[28] where the remaining eight contaminated areas are located.[29] The report set down conditions to ensure that impact to the environment is limited to the minimum practicable.[30]

Gender

Gender policies and procedures are in place to cover mine action on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, including at the level of the UK FCO, the National Mine Action Authority, the land release contractor (currently SafeLane Global), and the Demining Project Office (currently Fenix Insight). While one third of management positions in SafeLane Global on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas are held by women, none of the survey or clearance personnel is female. This is despite equal employment opportunities.[31] The contractors were also contacted in 2018 by the UK government setting out safeguarding policies and procedures.[32]

Land Release

Feasibility study

In 2001, the UK and Argentina agreed to carry out a joint feasibility study on the clearance of landmines on the islands. Cranfield University was selected by the two governments to carry out the Feasibility Study, including a field survey of the islands. The report, published on 9 July 2007, highlighted the environmental and remediation challenges, the climatic constraints, and the limitations of the existing local infrastructure.[33]

Survey

While non-technical and technical survey have formed a key part of the UK’s operations on the islands for many years, the UK has not historically collated data on area cancelled and on area reduced.[34] During Phase 5(a) (November 2016 to March 2018), technical survey was reported to have been completed in minefields in Port Howard, Fox Bay, and Stanley Area 3, but no data was reported on the amount of mined area reduced through survey.[35] Survey will be conducted during Phase 5(b) for the remaining eight areas in Yorke Bay to support planning and costing of the clearance operations.

Planning and priority setting

At the beginning of operations, the UK prioritized clearance of areas closest to settlements and civilian infrastructure, resulting in release of areas closest to Port Stanley and the roads leading in and out of the islands’ capital. A 2016 study, carried out by the UK’s Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory applied Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis to rank all remaining minefields according to a range of factors including: size/density of minefield; terrestrial factors (remoteness of location, topography, and difficulty of mine removal); human factors (proximity to life, benefits to local population of clearance, and political priorities of the UK/islands governments); and environmental factors (conservation of wildlife and adherence to local legislation). This priority list has informed the Phase 5 demining.[36]

Clearance

Some clearance was undertaken in the early 1980s immediately following the conflict, during which 1,855 mines were removed and destroyed from mined area.[37] However, between the date the UK became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty (1 March 1999) and the submission of its first Article 5 deadline extension request in 2008, no clearance took place.[38]

From 2009 until March 2018, 11.84km² of contaminated land has been released; 85 areas out of a total of 122 mined areas identified in 2009.

In 2018, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) contributed £43.5million (US$58.1 million)[1] in mine action funding to 19 countries. Compared to 2017, the UK’s funding increased by 117% ($31.4 million more) in US dollar terms, and rose by 109% (£22.7 million more) in national currency terms.

The largest contributions went to Afghanistan and Iraq, receiving the equivalent of more than $31 million, and representing more than half of UK’s total funding.

Contributions by recipient: 2018[2]

In 2014–2018, the UK’s contribution to mine action totaled more than £100 million ($138 million). In comparison, in the previous five-year period from 2009–2013, the UK’s support to mine action amounted to £61.7 million ($97.1 million).

Summary of contributions: 2014–2018[3]

In September 2018, the UK announced the provision of an additional £46 million (some $58 million) towards projects for demining, risk education, and capacity development in Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Vietnam.[4]

In April 2017, the UK announced a £100 million aid package (some US$126 million) to support landmine clearance and risk education projects over the next three years, which represents a tripling in its contribution to mine action[5] in comparison to its 2014–2016 contributions of £36.4 million (US$53.4 million). This new funding will focus on countries “where the greatest numbers of people continue to suffer from landmine contamination…and where continued insecurity and instability pose an ongoing threat to UK interests.” The countries that will benefit from this support are: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.[6]