Cluster Munition Monitor 2018

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention | Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues | Annex: Timeline of Use

Introduction

This report documents the positive impact that the Convention on Cluster Munitions is making as States Parties conclude their first decade of implementation. Adopted in Dublin, Ireland, on 30 May 2008, the convention opened for signature in Oslo, Norway, six months later and entered into force on 1 August 2010.[1] Today it is widely acknowledged as the principal framework for the worldwide effort to eradicate cluster munitions and thereby prevent further human suffering from the weapons.

There were 103 States Parties to the convention as of 1 August 2018. Another 17 states have signed but not yet ratified to become States Parties themselves. The pace of universalizing the convention has continued to slow. Since publication of Cluster Munition Monitor 2017, in September 2017, the only state to ratify or accede was Sri Lanka, which acceded on 1 March 2018.

A decade on, many reasons provided by states for their lack of ratification or accession to the convention increasingly sound like excuses for inaction rather than challenges to be overcome. Israel, Russia, the United States (US), and other major non-signatories to the convention hardened their defense of cluster munitions during the reporting period. This shows how now, more than ever, is the time to defend existing norms prohibiting inhumane weapons, such as cluster munitions.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that the stigma against cluster munitions continues to grow. More than two-dozen non-signatories have voted since 2015 for an annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Most states that stockpile cluster munitions have never themselves used the weapons. Several states outside the convention have destroyed their stocks and companies have stopped producing them. As a recent workshop of Pacific island states concluded, there is a “clear moral and humanitarian rationale for joining” the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2]

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continues its work to promote implementation and universalization of the convention. In his May 2018 “Agenda for Disarmament,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres praised NGOs and campaigners of the CMC for convincing states to stem the unacceptable harm caused by cluster munitions by negotiating the 2008 convention.[3]

The CMC views compliance with core obligations as essential to ensuring the convention makes a positive impact. According to the Monitor’s review of available evidence there have never been any instances, or even allegations, of any State Party using cluster munitions.

In the reporting period, there was new use of cluster munitions in Syria and Yemen, as well as allegations of use in Egypt and Libya. None of these states are party to the convention.

None of the 17 States Parties that produced cluster munitions in the past have violated this core obligation. The Monitor seeks clarification or confirmation on South Africa’s report that cluster munitions were apparently produced until 2012—after it signed, but before it ratified the convention.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions also prohibits the acquisition and stockpiling of cluster munitions and adherence with the requirement that States Parties destroy their stocks within eight years so far remains untarnished. All States Parties facing the first stockpile destruction deadline—1 August 2018—successfully destroyed their stocks in time, including Croatia, Slovenia, and Spain in the past year. New State Party Cuba also completed its stockpile destruction, while Switzerland is expected to announce completion shortly after this report goes to print.

Of the 93 countries that stockpiled cluster munitions when this provision was negotiated, 32 have since completed destruction of their stocks, almost all due to the convention. States Parties have destroyed a collective total of 1.4 million cluster munitions and more than 177 million submunitions, which means that 99% of the total reported global stocks held by States Parties have now been destroyed. During 2017, seven States Parties destroyed a total of 33,551 cluster munitions and 1.7 million submunitions.

A total of 30 States Parties have enacted specific legislative measures to enforce their implementation of the convention’s provisions, most recently Cameroon in December 2016. Another 20 States Parties are in the process of adopting specific implementation legislation for the convention, while 43 view existing legislation as sufficient to ensure their adherence.

Some 87% of States Parties have provided initial transparency reports detailing the actions they are taking to implement and promote the convention, while compliance with the annual reporting obligation is less impressive.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2017 and the first half of 2018, with some updates through to 1 August. All findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available from the Monitor website.[4]

 

Universalization

Under Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties must encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the convention, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[5]

Accessions

Since the Convention on Cluster Munitions became binding international law on 1 August 2010, states can no longer sign, but instead must join through a process known as accession, which is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.[6]

A dozen countries have acceded to the convention, most recently Sri Lanka on 1 March 2018.[7] Sri Lanka joined after years of outreach by local campaigners. According to the government, a 2015 “paradigm shift in…policy” was driven by a desire “to see Sri Lanka again a committed member of the international community to promote disarmament and humanitarian mine action.”[8]

Yet there were few other positive developments regarding possible accessions to the convention in the reporting period. Notably, in August 2017, South Sudan’s executive Council of Ministers unanimously approved the country’s accession to the convention.[9] As of July 2018, its parliament is considering a legislative measure approving the government’s decision to accede to the convention.[10]

During the reporting period, certain non-signatories hardened their defense of cluster munitions:

  • Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided a local journalist with a list of the government’s long-standing criticisms of the convention in early 2018, but also acknowledged “the serious humanitarian problems caused by the use of cluster munitions.”[11]
  • China told States Parties in September 2017 that it “cannot join the convention at the moment…due to our national defence needs,” but expressed appreciation for its “humanitarian spirit.”[12]
  • Israel’s Haaretz reported in August 2017 on the government’s decision to purchase an artillery system made in Israel rather than Germany, apparently to allow Israeli forces to use cluster munitions in the future.[13]
  • Russia repeated its many criticisms of the convention during an October 2017 UN meeting and said its assessment of convention “has not changed.”[14]
  • The US issued a 30 November 2017 Department of Defense policy directive, abandoning a long-standing requirement that, after 2018, the US would not use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate.[15]

Ratifications

A total of 53 signatories have ratified the convention since August 2010 and are now States Parties. Benin was the last signatory to ratify the convention, on 10 July 2017.

At the convention’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2017:

  • Gambia announced its intent to complete ratification shortly, noting “there is strong political will” to do so following a recent change in government.[16]
  • Haiti said that a “draft decree of ratification of the convention has been submitted for assessment by the legislature.”[17]
  • The Philippines said that after “certificates of concurrence” are collected from four ministries, the ratification proposal will be forwarded to the president for signature and then introduced for Senate approval.[18]

There was otherwise little progress toward ratification by the 14 other signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions during the reporting period.[19]

Namibia again signaled its intent to ratify the convention in September 2016, but still has not completed the process. Liberia’s parliament has not adopted ratification legislation introduced in mid-2015. Uganda’s Cabinet received a ratification package for the convention in May 2016 that has not yet been submitted to parliament for consideration and approval.[20] Angolan officials say they are making a strong case for ratification, but the government still has not referred the convention to parliament for consideration and approval.[21] There were few moves to ratify in the reporting period by the other signatories from Sub-Saharan Africa: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Kenya, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, and Tanzania.

Indonesia has conducted extensive stakeholder consultations over the past decade, but still has not started the parliamentary approval process required to ratify. The status of Jamaica’s ratification is unknown.

The position of the last European Union (EU) signatory Cyprus is perhaps the most disappointing for those seeking to universalize the convention. In June 2018, the foreign minister of Cyprus said the government’s ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions is “still pending…due to the fact that Turkey, which has not joined the convention, is still illegally occupying the northern part of Cyprus.”[22]

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Michael Biontino, served as president of the convention’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 4–6 September 2017. A total of 82 countries attended the meeting—59 States Parties, eight signatories, and 15 non-signatories—as well as UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the convention and condemned “any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[23]

This was the only international meeting of the convention during the reporting period, but States Parties convened regional and other meetings. New Zealand and Zambia hosted a workshop on national implementing legislation and transparency measures for the convention during the annual session of UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in New York on 17 October 2017.[24]

Representatives from seven non-signatories to the convention from the Pacific region attended a regional workshop on the convention and other humanitarian disarmament treaties convened by New Zealand in Auckland on 12–14 February 2018.[25]

No state proposed to add cluster munitions back on to the program of work of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) during its last annual meeting in Geneva in November 2017.[26] The failure of the CCW’s 2011 Review Conference to adopt a draft protocol on cluster munitions has affirmed the central position of the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.

The CMC continues its advocacy in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation, including small grants to support national campaign members.[27]

The Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the UN in Geneva has agreed to serve as president of the convention’s Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 3–5 September 2018.[28] The UN has received sufficient funds to enable the meeting to be held, but states owed the convention $19,415 as of 31 May 2018.[29]

UN General Assembly Resolution 72/54

On 4 December 2017, 142 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 72/54, which urges all states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[30] Non-signatories Russia and Zimbabwe were the only states to vote against the resolution, for the third consecutive year. All of the 36 states that abstained from voting on the resolution were non-signatories to the convention with the exception of signatories Cyprus and Uganda.

A total of 32 non-signatories to the convention voted in favor of Resolution 72/54, including Nepal and Yemen for the first time.[31] Several states and groups of states made detailed statements explaining their vote on the resolution and position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[32] Poland delivered what has become an annual statement on behalf of itself and EU non-signatories Estonia, Finland, Greece, and Romania.[33]

Since its introduction in 2015, the annual UNGA resolution promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions has become a key barometer for gauging support of non-signatories for the convention’s goals. In 2016, 141 states voted in favor of the resolution, with two against and 39 abstentions.[34] In 2015, 139 states voted in favor the first resolution, with two against and 39 abstentions.[35]

 

Use of Cluster Munitions

Global overview

At least 21 governments in 40 countries and four disputed territories have used cluster munitions since the end of World War II, as detailed in the following table and longer timeline of cluster munition use included at the end of this chapter. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

Summary of states that have used cluster munitions and locations used[36]

User state

Locations used

Colombia

Colombia

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Eritrea

France

Chad, Iraq, Kuwait

Georgia

Georgia, possibly Abkhazia

Iraq

Iran, Iraq

Israel

Egypt, Lebanon, Syria

Libya

Chad, Libya

Morocco

Western Sahara, Mauritania

Netherlands

Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

Nigeria

Sierra Leone

Russia

Chechnya, Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia, Syria

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, Yemen

South Africa

Admitted past use, but did not specify where

Sudan

Sudan

Syria

Syria

Thailand

Cambodia

Ukraine

Ukraine

United Kingdom (UK)

Falklands/Malvinas, Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

United States (US)

Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

Yugoslavia (former Socialist Republic of)

Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics.

Most states that have not joined the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[37]

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems from cluster munitions, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions. Several past users of cluster munitions are now States Parties to the convention and have relinquished any use of these weapons under any circumstances such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party to the convention.

Cluster munitions have been used in seven non-signatories since the convention entered into force in August 2010: Cambodia (2011), Libya (2011 and 2015), South Sudan (2014), Sudan (2012 and 2015), Syria (2012–present), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Yemen (2015–present).[38]

New use

In this reporting period (July 2017–July 2018), cluster munitions were used in Syria and Yemen, while allegations of new use in Egypt and Libya could not be conclusively confirmed by the Monitor. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Civilian harm caused by new use of cluster munitions has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations. In September 2017, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.”[39] Approximately 20 countries and the EU publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions during the meeting, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[40]

New use in Syria

Research continues to show that Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in the country. The Monitor has documented at least 36 cluster munition attacks between July 2017 and June 2018, but could not verify additional evidence of at least two-dozen more possible cluster munition attacks. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2017 reported at least 600 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2012 and July 2017, including 238 attacks between August 2016 and July 2017.

This indicates a significant drop in new use in the reporting period, but the number of cluster munition attacks was certainly higher, as many attacks likely went unrecorded. Local residents, journalists, activists, and first responders continue to record and share evidence of cluster munition use in Syria, but such first-hand information has become increasingly scarce. Additionally, videos and photographs showing cluster munition remnants often do not provide information on the date or circumstances of use.

During the reporting period, most cluster munition attacks were recorded in the governorates or provinces of Damascus and Idlib, while there was also new use of cluster munitions in Aleppo, As-Suwayda, Deir ez-Zor, and Rif Dimashq governorates. All of the country’s 14 governorates except Tartus have experienced the use of cluster munitions since 2012; As-Suwayda governorate was added to this list after a 22 May 2018 attack using OTR-21 Tochka ballistic missile and 9N24 submunitions.[41]

Various groups have reported new use of cluster munitions in Syria over the past year:

  • Siege Watch issued a report on Eastern Ghouta that lists eight cluster munition attacks by Syrian government forces supported by Russia between 2 February and 11 March 2018.[42]
  • Human Rights Watch investigated a 21 September 2017 cluster munition attack using ShOAB-0.5 submunitions on Qalaat Al-Madiq in Idlib that killed at least two civilians and injured at least one.[43] It identified at least 12 cluster bomb attacks in Jisr Al-Shughur, Al-Tamaneh, and other parts of Idlib governorate between 19 September and 30 September.

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and that it is using cluster munitions in Syria or, at a minimum, directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.[44] There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia initiated a joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but the overall number of reported attacks has decreased in the year to July 2018.[45]

Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012[46]

Type

Cluster munition name

Number of submunitions

Country produced

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

USSR

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

USSR

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM

108

Russia/USSR

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

USSR

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

USSR

RBK-500 SPBE

15

Russia

Rocket

Uragan (9M27K-series)

30

Russia

Smerch (9M55K)

72

Russia

SAKR

56 or 72

Egypt

Missiles

9M79 Tochka ballistic missile with 9N123K warhead containing

9N24submunitions

50

Russia/USSR

Projectile

3-O-8

14

Russia/USSR

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

USSR

BKF PTAB-2.5KO

12

USSR

 

In a December 2016 statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov did not explicitly deny Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but stated that Russia views cluster munitions as “a legal means of warfare” and claimed the “Russian military unflinchingly adhere[s] to the norms of international humanitarian law.”[47]

There has been no evidence that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition operation against the non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014.[48] In July 2016, a spokesperson for the US Air Force’s Central Command said, “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[49]

Israel has undertaken air strikes and artillery and missile attacks in Syria, particularly over the past year, but there is no evidence to indicate this has involved the use of cluster munitions.

IS used cluster munition rockets in Syria in 2014 and may have continued to use them since then.[50] As the Syria conflict continues, it is not possible to determine with confidence if other armed groups have used cluster munitions. There is evidence that opposition forces have repurposed unexploded submunitions for use in air-delivered and ground-emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). When activated by their victim, such devices are considered antipersonnel landmines prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[51]

At least 13 types of air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions have been used in Syria as well as an unknown type of rocket-delivered submunition. When and how the Syrian government obtained these cluster munitions, and in what quantities, remains unknown, but they were all manufactured in the Soviet Union or Russia, with one exception.[52]

New use in Yemen

On 26 March 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition began a military operation in Yemen against Ansar Allah, whose military wing is also known as the Houthi armed group (Houthi), that was continuing as of 1 July 2018.[53] None of the states participating in Saudi Arabia’s coalition—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, UAE, and Yemen—are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The coalition however receives support from States Parties such as France and the UK.

The Saudi-led coalition has used cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015. Most of the recorded cluster munition attacks were documented in 2015, 2016, and up to February 2017, as shown in the following table.[54]

Cluster munitions used in Yemen since April 2015[55]

Type of cluster munition

Country of origin

Stocks possessed by

Air-delivered

CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon, each deploying 10 BLU-108 canisters that disperse four submunitions called “skeet”

US

Saudi Arabia, UAE

CBU-87 bomb, each containing 202 BLU-97 submunitions

US

Saudi Arabia

CBU-58 bomb, each containing 650 BLU-63 submunitions

US

Saudi Arabia,

Morocco

BL755 cluster bomb, each containing 147 No 2 Mk 1 submunitions

UK

Saudi Arabia

Ground-launched

ASTROS II rocket, each containing up to 65 submunitions

Brazil

Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia

M26 rocket, each containing 644 M77 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) submunitions

US

Bahrain, Egypt, UAE

“ZP-39” DPICM submunitions (delivery system unknown)

Unknown

Unknown

 

One review of official Houthi news reports by a group of independent researchers found evidence of four possible cluster munition attacks in Saada and Taizz governorates in 2017—after February—that the media articles attributed to the Saudi-led coalition.[56] International organizations and media have been unable to access the north of Yemen, where these cluster munition attacks were reported.

Cluster Munition Monitor did not find evidence of new cluster munition use in Yemen in the first half of 2018. A representative from a commercial company assisting the Saudi-led coalition to clear landmines and explosive remnants of war in Yemen told the Monitor in June 2018 that the company is not aware of any new cluster munition use in the first half of 2018.[57]

Cluster munition attacks are likely going unrecorded in Yemen in the reporting period as first-hand evidence has become increasingly challenging to collect. Since 2015, seven types of air- and ground-delivered cluster munitions supplied by three countries have been used in Yemen.

Alleged use in Egypt

In February 2018, Amnesty International condemned new use of cluster munitions in the Sinai by the Egyptian Air Force, citing evidence contained in two videos posted by Egyptian military social media accounts, including one released on 9 February that showed US-made CBU-87 Combined Effects Munitions, each containing 202 BLU-97 bomblets, being loaded on to Egyptian aircraft.[58] A 20 February 2018 video posted on Twitter by the Egyptian Army’s official spokesperson shows a US made Mk-118 submunition used in Rockeye cluster bombs lying on the ground that Egyptian armed forces alleged they found and destroyed in northern Sinai.[59]

As of 1 July 2018, Egyptian officials have not responded to requests from The New York Times, the CMC, Amnesty International, and others to confirm or deny that the country’s armed forces has used cluster munitions in northern Sinai. Cluster Munition Monitor has not been able to conclusively confirm new use by Egyptian forces on the basis of available evidence. It will continue to monitor and evaluate the situation in the Sinai regarding possible cluster munition use.

Alleged use in Libya

Cluster Munition Monitor has not been able to independently verify and confirm recent evidence of possible cluster munition use in Libya due in large part to a lack of independent media and local reporting from inside the country.

Evidence collected by an aviation-focused blogger indicates that Libyan National Army (LNA) forces are continuing to mount cluster munitions on their aircraft that they use to conduct air attacks on opposition forces. A photograph published by the blogger in June 2018 shows a Soviet/Russian RBK-250–270 PTAB-2.5M cluster bomb mounted on a MiG-23 aircraft that reportedly flew sorties to southern Sebha.[60] This was the only evidence of possible use in the first half of 2018.

During 2017, there were three sightings of cluster munitions affixed to Libyan aircraft, all in the first half of the year:

  • A photograph reportedly taken on 4 February 2017 at Benina airbase shows at least seven RBK-series PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh cluster bombs lying on the tarmac. The “bombing location” is listed as “Benghazi-al-Sabri.”[61]
  • Video and photographs reportedly taken on 3 March 2017 show an RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M being mounted on a MiG-23 aircraft of the LNA/Air Force.[62] Reportedly this aircraft then flew sorties to south of Nofaliya and in the Jufrah area.[63]
  • Two videos reportedly taken at Benina airbase on 3 March 2017 show LNA technicians mounting two RBK-250 cluster bombs on two LNA aircraft that then allegedly flew sorties to Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Sidra.[64]

The forces of Khalifa Hiftar receive air support from Egypt and the UAE, which both possess cluster munitions and have not acceded to the ban convention. In November 2017, the Egyptian Army released a video of a possible cluster munition attack by the Egyptian Air Force on a convoy of trucks in Libya.[65]

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but it has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single strike in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a decade-old Department of Defense directive requiring it no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% UXO after 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside of their own territory. Thailand claims to have removed its cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Non-state armed groups

Due to the relative complexity of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used them. In the past, NSAG use of cluster munitions has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), BiH (by Croat and Serb militias), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), Syria (by IS), and Ukraine (by opposition forces).[66]

 

Production of Cluster Munitions

A total of 34 states have developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions, of which 18 ceased manufacturing cluster munitions prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[67]

Producers

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so, as listed in the following table. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and most are located in Asia and Europe.

Cluster munition producers

Brazil

Korea, South

China

Pakistan

Egypt

Poland

Greece

Romania

India

Russia

Iran

Singapore

Israel

Turkey

Korea, North

United States

 

It is unclear if all of these countries produced cluster munitions in 2017 and/or the first half of 2018 because of a lack of transparency and available data. Greece, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, and the US have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[68]

During the reporting period, Russia began testing the “Drel” PBK-500U gliding cluster bomb, a new cluster munition developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise according to the company.[69]

Israel reportedly rejected an upgrade of artillery systems for the Israel Defense Forces that would have included a system made in Germany because of the German government’s insistence that Israel not use it to deliver cluster munitions. Haaretz published a piece entitled the “Cluster Bomb Nation” that criticized the decision to instead purchase an artillery system made by local company Elbit.[70]

Brazilian company Avibrás Aeroespacial SA in March 2017 did not deny it still produces ASTROS surface-to-surface rockets with submunition warheads, but claimed that since 2001 the rockets are equipped with a “reliable self-destruct device” that it incorrectly said “complies with humanitarian principles and legislation” of the ban convention.[71]

US company Textron Systems Corporation announced in August 2016 it will no longer produce cluster munitions (CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons), which it manufactured for each sales order.[72] Textron was the last US manufacturer of cluster munitions.[73] The US Army awarded a $71 million contract in April 2018 to acquire 1,250 155mm BONUS artillery projectiles from a company in Sweden.[74] These projectiles deliver two sensor-fuzed submunitions and are not prohibited by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Singapore Technologies Engineering announced in November 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating: “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[75]

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. There have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any of the convention’s States Parties since the convention took effect in August 2010.

Eighteen states have ceased the production of cluster munitions, as shown in the following table. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except non-signatory Argentina, which has committed not to produce cluster munitions in future.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina

Italy

Australia

Japan

Belgium

Netherlands

BiH

Slovakia

Chile

South Africa

Croatia

Spain

France

Sweden

Germany

Switzerland

Iraq

United Kingdom

 

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[76]

During the reporting period, South Africa submitted its initial transparency report for the convention.[77] Under the section on the decommissioning of cluster munition production facilities, it stated: “None. Production ceased in 2012 at Rheinmetall, denel.” Cluster Munition Monitor has asked Rheinmetall Denel Munition to clarify if the company produced cluster munitions in 2008–2012, when South Africa was a signatory to the convention, as well as asked South Africa for clarification on the report.[78] Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signatories to any treaty are required not to engage in acts that would defeat the treaty’s “object and purpose.”

 

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[79]

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training purposes.[80] At least two states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have enacted a partial or complete export moratorium: Singapore and the US.

While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in publicly available information, the US was probably the world’s leading exporter because it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas.[81]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the USSR.[82] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Turkey, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. Non-signatories Georgia, India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the UAE have imported cluster munitions since 2005.

An Indian defense company displayed components for cluster munitions at its booth at the Eurosatory defense trade event in Paris in June 2018.[83] Cluster munition projectiles made by Egyptian company Heliopolis were displayed by Egypt’s Ministry of Military Production for sale at the international arms fair IDEX in Abu Dhabi in February 2017.[84]

 

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 93 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[85] At least 36 of those countries have now destroyed their stockpiled cluster munitions, while eight States Parties to the convention still have stocks to destroy.

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions[86]

States Parties

Signatories

Non-signatories

Afghanistan

Austria

Belgium

BiH

Botswana

Bulgaria

Cameroon

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Congo, Rep. of

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Czech Republic

Denmark

Ecuador

France

Germany

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Honduras

Hungary

Iraq

Italy

Japan

Macedonia FYR

Moldova

Montenegro

Mozambique

Netherlands

Norway

Peru

Portugal

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

Angola

Cent. African Rep.

Cyprus

Indonesia

Nigeria

Algeria

Argentina

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Belarus

Brazil

Cambodia

China

Egypt

Eritrea

Estonia

Ethiopia

Finland

Georgia

Greece

India

Iran

Israel

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Korea, North

Korea, South

Kuwait

Libya

Mongolia

Morocco

Oman

Pakistan

Poland

Qatar

Romania

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Serbia

Singapore

Sudan

Syria

Thailand

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

UAE

United States

Uzbekistan

Venezuela

Yemen

Zimbabwe

41 (8 current)

5 (3 current)

47 (46 current)

Note: Countries in bold no longer possess stockpiles.

 

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

A total of 41 States Parties have stockpiled cluster munitions at some point in time, of which 33 have now completed destruction of those stocks.

According to available information, at one point 35 States Parties stockpiled nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing more than 179 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Six States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the table below due to insufficient information. Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau still have not provided initial Article 7 transparency reports to formally report the status of stockpiled cluster munitions, but Republic of the Congo states that it has completed stockpile destruction. Honduras submitted its transparency report in March 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions because the stocks were destroyed long before the convention’s entry into force.[87] Afghanistan and Iraq have reported the completion of stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions that the Monitor understands were found in abandoned arms caches.

State Party Cameroon is no longer listed as stockpiling after reporting in 2017 that all six of its cluster munitions have been retained for research and training purposes.

States Parties that never stockpiled

More than 53 States Parties have formally confirmed never stockpiling cluster munitions, most through a direct statement in their transparency report for the convention.[88] Since September 2017, Belize, Cook Islands, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Nauru, and Palestine have submitted initial transparency reports confirming they have never possessed cluster munitions.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

  • Cyprus transferred 3,760 GRM-20 mortar projectiles and 2,559 M20G submunitions to Bulgaria in 2014 for the purposes of stockpile destruction and, in July 2018, Bulgaria reported the stocks will be destroyed once “the necessary procedure for obtaining license for destruction” is completed.[89]

Cluster munitions declared by States Parties[90]

State Party (year of completion or deadline)

Quantity of cluster munitions

Quantity of submunitions

Austria (2010)

12,672

798,336

Belgium (2010)

115,210

10,138,480

BiH (2011)

445

148,059

Botswana (Dec. 2019 deadline)

510

14,400

Bulgaria (Oct. 2019 deadline)

6,901

190,566

Cameroon (2017)

6

906

Canada (2014)

13,623

1,361,958

Chile (2013)

249

25,896

Colombia (2009)

72

10,832

Côte d’Ivoire (2013)

68

10,200

Croatia (2018)

7,235

178,318

Cuba (2017)

1,856

0

Czech Republic (2010)

480

16,400

Denmark (2014)

42,176

2,440,940

Ecuador (2004)

117

17,199

France (2016)

34,856

14,916,881

Germany (2015)

573,700

62,923,935

Hungary (2011)

287

3,954

Italy (2015)

4,963

2,849,979

Japan (2015)

14,011

2,027,907

Macedonia FYR (2013)

2,426

39,980

Moldova (2010)

1,385

27,050

Montenegro (2010)

353

51,891

Mozambique (2015)

293

12,804

Netherlands (2012)

193,643

25,867,510

Norway (2010)

52,190

3,087,910

Peru (Mar. 2021 deadline)

2,005

152,982

Portugal (2011)

11

1,617

Slovakia (Jan. 2024 deadline)

1,235

299,187

Slovenia (2017)

1,080

52,920

South Africa (Nov. 2023 deadline)

1,495

99,465

Spain (2018)

6,837

293,652

Sweden (2015)

370

20,595

Switzerland (Jan. 2021 deadline)

205,894

12,203,135

United Kingdom (2013)

190,828

38,758,898

Total

1,489,482

179,044,742

Note: Bold indicate states that still possess stockpiles to destroy.

 

  • Indonesia has acknowledged that it possesses cluster munitions, but has not disclosed information on the types and quantities stockpiled or its plan to destroy them.
  • Nigeria has not disclosed the quantity of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but said in 2012 that its armed forces possess UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[91] Nigeria has made several appeals for “cooperation and assistance” to destroy the stockpile.[92]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

  • Angola stated in September 2017 that the process of compiling its draft transparency report allowed it to confirm that stockpiled cluster munitions were all destroyed in or by 2012.
  • The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[93]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as few of these states have publicly shared information on the types and quantities possessed.

The US said in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[94] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since 2008 in removing cluster munitions from its active inventory and placing them in the demilitarization inventory for destruction. According to US budget materials released in February 2018, “there are approximately 122,083 tons of cluster munitions in the demil stockpile,” plus 188,787 tons in the continental US and another 127,972 tons outside the continental US.[95]

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions in 2013.[96] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to the air force in August 2011, including Israeli-made AS TAL-1 cluster bombs.[97] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[98]

Some non-signatories admit to not stockpiling cluster munitions. In July 2017, Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs told the CMC that Latvia “neither produces nor possesses cluster munitions, nor does it store or use them” and claimed the government “currently has no plans to acquire or use them.”[99]

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

The convention’s States Parties have collectively destroyed 1.4 million cluster munitions containing more than 177 million submunitions, as shown in the following table. This represents the destruction of 99% of the total reported global stocks of cluster munitions and 99% of the total number of submunitions declared by States Parties.

Destruction completed

All States Parties that have completed destruction of their cluster munitions stocks did so in advance of the convention’s eight-year deadline. All States Parties facing the first stockpile destruction deadline—1 August 2018—successfully destroyed their stocks in time, including Croatia, Slovenia, and Spain in the past year.

Four States Parties completed destroying their cluster munition stocks during the reporting period:

  • Cuba reported in April 2018 that it no longer possesses cluster munitions after destroying its stockpile in 2017 by open detonation, but it has not provided information on the quantity destroyed or detailed the process involved.[100]
  • Croatia informed the Monitor on 31 July 2018 that it has completed destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions.[101] The convention’s president welcomed this development in a statement.[102]
  • Slovenia reported in June 2018 that 41,825 PAT-794 submunitions transferred years ago for the purpose of destruction were destroyed during 2017.[103]

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties (as of 31 December 2017)[104]

State Party

Cluster munitions

Submunitions

Austria

12,672

798,336

Belgium

115,210

10,138,480

BiH

441

147,967

Canada

13,623

1,361,958

Chile

249

25,896

Colombia

72

10,832

Côte d’Ivoire

68

10,200

Croatia

7,235

38,030

Cuba

1,856

unknown

Czech Republic

480

16,400

Denmark

42,176

2,440,940

Ecuador

117

17,199

France

34,876

14,916,881

Germany

573,700

62,923,935

Hungary

287

3,954

Italy

4,963

2,849,979

Japan

14,011

2,027,907

Macedonia FYR

2,426

39,980

Moldova

1,385

27,050

Montenegro

353

51,891

Mozambique

293

12,804

Netherlands

193,643

25,867,510

Norway

52,190

3,087,910

Peru

40

1,838

Portugal

11

1,617

Slovakia

417

20,710

Slovenia

1,080

52,920

South Africa

139

78,994

Spain

6,837

293,652

Sweden

370

20,595

Switzerland

201,839

11,611,490

UK

190,828

38,758,898

Total

1,473,887

177,656,753

Note: Bold indicates states that still possess stockpiles to destroy.

 

  • Spain informed Cluster Munition Monitor on 9 July 2018 that the destruction has been completed.[105] It reportedly completed “months ahead” of the deadline.[106]

Stockpile destruction by year since entry into force

Year

Number of States Parties

Cluster munitions destroyed

Submunitions (millions) destroyed

2011

10

107,000

17.6

2012

9

174,112

27

2013

10

130,380

24

2014

8

121,585

16.4

2015

9

79,184

8.7

2016

3

56,171

2.8

2017

7

33,551

1.8

 

Destruction underway

During 2017, seven States Parties destroyed 33,551 cluster munitions and nearly 1.8 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2017

State Party

Cluster munitions destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

Croatia

6,596

0

Cuba

1,856

0

Peru

9

888

Slovakia

162

4,494

Slovenia

0

41,825

Spain

241

5,070

Switzerland

24,687

1,732,143

Total

33,551

1,784,420

During the reporting period, six other States Parties with stockpiled cluster munitions made progress to destroy them:

  • Botswana is working to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions by the end of 2018 with technical assistance from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).[107]
  • Bulgaria has yet to start physical destruction of the stockpile, but reported in June 2018 that “a national plan” to destroy the cluster munitions is in the “final stage of preparation” and said Bulgarian authorities are “negotiating options” with the NATO Support Agency to ensure destruction of the cluster munitions.[108]
  • Peru destroyed a small quantity of cluster munitions during 2017 during research on how to safely destroy its stockpile.[109] It is receiving technical support for its stockpile destruction, including on potential disassembly and destruction techniques, from NPA, which conducted trainings in May and June 2018.[110]
  • Slovakia had destroyed one-third of its total declared stocks of cluster munitions and 6% of the submunitions by the end of 2017. The stocks are being destroyed by open detonation.
  • South Africa provided an initial transparency report in September 2017 stating that 139 cluster munitions and 78,994 submunitions or components were destroyed in or by September 2012.[111]
  • Switzerland had just 60 cluster munitions and 3,920 submunitions left to destroy by the beginning of 2018. It is expected to announce completion of the stockpile destruction during the convention’s Eighth Meeting of States Parties in September 2018.

Two States Parties appear to be struggling to destroy their stocks. Guinea is believed to stockpile cluster munitions, but has not provided its Article 7 transparency report for the convention, originally due in September 2015. Guinea-Bissau has requested financial and technical assistance to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but has not submitted a transparency report for the convention.

 

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

The CMC questioned the need to allow for the retention of cluster munitions during the convention’s negotiations as it sees no compelling reason to retain live cluster munitions. Most States Parties agree there is no need to use live cluster munitions for training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, or for the development of counter-measures. This includes at least 21 States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions.[112]

Nonetheless, 13 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2017)[113]

State Party

Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)

Date first reported

Retained in 2017

Consumed in 2017

Initially retained

Germany

372 (29,184)

37 (2,912)

685 (62,580)

2011

Netherlands

274 (23,752)

0

272 (23,545)

2011

Belgium

216 (19,008)

10 (880)

276 (24,288)

2011

Switzerland

53 (2,867)

0

138 (7,346)

2013

Bulgaria

8 (400)

0

8 (400)

2017

Cameroon

6 (906)

0

6 (906)

2014

Slovakia

5 (3,220)

0

5 (3,220)

2015

Spain

5 (578)

110 (2,310)

711 (16,652)

2011

France

3 (190)

0

55 (10,284)

2011

Denmark

0 (3,346)

0

170 (-)

2011

Sweden

0 (125)

0

0 (125)

2013

BiH

0 (30)

0

0 (30)

2013

Czech Rep.

0 (15)

0 (10)

0 (796)

2011

 

Germany still retains the largest number of cluster munitions, but it again reduced the total number after consuming retained cluster munitions during explosive ordnance disposal training in 2017. Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, and Spain each reduced the number of cluster munitions and/or submunitions retained for training in 2017.

Switzerland reported a slight increase in the number of retained cluster munitions in April 2018.[114]

Italy destroyed all three cluster munitions and 641 submunitions that it initially retained for research and training during 2017.[115] Slovakia said in 2015 that it had decided not to retain cluster munitions, but in September 2017 said that “technical difficulties” meant it has not yet destroyed cluster munition rockets initially retaining for research and training.[116]

BiH, Cameroon, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden have yet to consume any of their retained cluster munitions.[117] France consumed retained cluster munitions in previous years, but not in 2017.

Cameroon is the first and, to date, only State Party from Africa retaining cluster munitions after reporting its decision to retain all six of its stockpiled cluster munitions for research and training purposes.[118]

After previously indicating it would not retain any stocks for research and training, Bulgaria reported in June 2018 that is retaining eight 9N123K cluster munitions containing 400 9N24 submunitions that were previously listed as stockpiled.[119]

BiH, Czech Republic, Denmark, and Sweden are retaining individual submunitions only.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have significantly reduced the number retained since making their initial declarations, which would indicate that the initial amounts retained were likely too high. It is still unclear if current holdings by States Parties constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes.

States Parties Australia, Italy, and the UK initially retained cluster munitions that they subsequently decided to destroy and not replace. States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, and Moldova declared retaining inert items rendered free from explosives that no longer qualify as cluster munitions under the convention.

 

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. An updated report is due by 30 April each year thereafter, covering activities in the previous calendar year. The CMC encourages states to submit their transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[120]

According to the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs website, a total of 89 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report for the convention as of 4 July 2018.[121] This represents 87%, which is a slight increase in compliance rate of States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, which is a similar compliance rate compared to previous years.[122] Belize, Cook Islands, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Nauru, Palestine, and South Africa have submitted initial transparency reports since September 2017.

However, 13 States Parties are late in providing their initial transparency reports, as listed in the following table. New State Party Sri Lanka’s initial transparency report is due by 28 February 2019.

Overdue initial Article 7 reports (as of 4 July 2018)

Benin

30 June 2018

Cape Verde

28 September 2011

Comoros

30 June 2011

Republic of Congo

28 August 2015

Guinea

19 April 2015

Guinea-Bissau

28 October 2011

Guyana

27 September 2015

Iceland

31 July 2016

Madagascar

30 April 2018

Rwanda

31 July 2016

Somalia

31 August 2016

Togo

29 May 2013

Tunisia

28 August 2011

 

After submitting the initial transparency report, the convention requires that States Parties provide an annual upated report by 30 April. A total of 56 States Parties have submitted their annual updated transparency report that was due by 30 April 2018, covering activities in 2017.[123]

Canada and Palau provided voluntary transparency reports prior to ratifying the convention. The DRC shared voluntary reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014, but still has not ratified.

Only a few states have used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and discourage use of cluster munitions, list cooperation and assistance support, or report on other important matters such as their position on interpretive issues.[124]

 

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.”[125] The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 30 States Parties have enacted specific legislative measures to implement the convention’s provisions, as listed in the table below.[126] Since Cluster Munition Monitor 2017, States Parties Cameroon, Colombia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis have been added to this list.

States with implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State (year enacted)

Australia, 2012

Austria, 2008

Belgium, 2006

Bulgaria, 2015

Cameroon, 2016

Canada, 2014

Colombia, 2012

Cook Islands, 2011Czech Republic, 2011

Ecuador, 2010

France, 2010

Germany, 2009

Guatemala, 2012

Hungary, 2012

Iceland, 2015

Ireland, 2008

Italy, 2011

Japan, 2009

Liechtenstein, 2013

Luxembourg, 2009

Mauritius, 2016

New Zealand, 2009

Norway, 2008

Saint Kitts and Nevis, 2014

Samoa, 2012

Spain, 2015

Sweden, 2012

Switzerland, 2012

Togo, 2015

UK, 2010

 

The last country to enact implementing legislation for the convention was Cameroon in December 2016. No States Parties are known to have adopted implementing legislation for the convention in 2017 or first half of 2018.

At total of 43 States Parties have indicated their existing laws and regulations will suffice to enforce their adherence to the convention.[127] Another 20 States Parties indicate they are planning or in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[128] The status of national implementation measures is unknown or unclear in another dozen States Parties, including several that have yet to provide an initial transparency report.[129]

Developments during the reporting period included:

  • Afghanistan reported in April 2018 that implementation legislation “has recently been processed by the Ministry of Justice and has been sent to the Legislation Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers for their review and approval.”[130]
  • Belize reported in November 2017 that national implementation measures for the convention are “pending.”[131]
  • Botswana reported in May 2018 that it “is in the process of making a draft law in order to start the domestication process of the convention.”[132]
  • Cameroon announced in September 2017 that its National Assembly adopted legislation on 14 December 2016 that prohibits the use, development, manufacturing, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions.[133]
  • Côte d’Ivoire listed three laws under national implementation measures in its transparency report, indicating it may view existing legislation as sufficient.[134]
  • Lao PDR reported in April 2018 that initial draft implementation legislation for the convention has been prepared.[135]
  • Malawi reported in June 2018 that it has established an inter-ministerial taskforce to finalize draft legislation, which will then be submitted to Cabinet for consideration.[136]
  • Palestine listed a 1998 law on arms and explosives under national implementation measures in March 2018 and said a consultative committee is considering if specific implementing legislation is needed for the convention.[137]
  • Saint Kitts and Nevis shared information in September 2017 on its implementing legislation—the Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act—that was enacted on 27 August 2014.[138]
  • South Africa reported in September 2017 that it does not plan to enact specific implementing legislation for the convention, as it regards the Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act as sufficient to enforce both treaties.[139]
  • Swaziland reported in March 2018 that its implementing legislation is “in process.”[140]
  • Zambia is working to incorporate the convention into domestic law, but in January 2018 reported a backlog of bills to be drafted by the Ministry of Justice.[141]

 

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

  1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
  2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
  3. The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, as of 1 July 2018, more than three-dozen States Parties had not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were few new statements during the reporting period.[142]

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, and US stocks and foreign stockpiling.[143]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both require States Parties to discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[144]

Implementing legislation adopted by the Saint Kitts and Nevis does not permit assistance in prohibited conduct, but allows members of the Defence Force of Saint Kitts and Nevis to participate in military activities with armed forces of states that are not party to the convention.[145]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21:

  • Australia’s Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 has been heavily criticized for allowing Australian military personnel to assist with cluster munition use by states not party. Section 72.41 of Australia’s implementing legislation provides a defence to the offence provisions where prohibited conduct takes place in the course of military cooperation or operations with a foreign country that is not a party to the Convention.”[146] During joint or coalition military operations, Australian Defence Force personnel could help plan operations or provide intelligence for, and/or contribute logistical support to coalition members during which a state not party uses cluster munitions.[147]
  • Canada’s Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act 2014 has elicited similar criticism for its provisions allowing Canadian Armed Forces and public officials to “direct or authorize” an act that “may involve” a state not party performing activities prohibited under the convention during joint military operations.[148] In March 2015, the Chief of Defence Staff issued a directive to “provide direction on prohibited and permitted activities to [Canadian Armed Forces] personnel who might become involved in cluster munition related activities.”[149]
  • Japan has been reluctant to publicly discuss its interpretation of Article 21.[150] However, in a June 2008 State Department cable, a senior Japanese official apparently told the US that Japan interprets the convention as enabling the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions.[151]
  • The UK’s 2010 implementation law permits assistance with a number of acts prohibited under the convention if the assistance occurs during joint military operations.[152] In addition, the UK stated in 2011 that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”[153]

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 allows for military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed. Spain’s 2015 implementation law establishes that military cooperation and participation in military operations by Spain, its military personnel, or its nationals with states that are not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and that use cluster munitions is not prohibited.[154] After Spain’s opposition parties called for the draft legislation to prohibit Spain’s involvement at all times in military operations with other states that use cluster munitions, the draft legislation was adjusted to incorporate the positive obligations of Article 21(2) of the convention, requiring Spain to work for universalization and to discourage the use of cluster munitions.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction to not provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[155]

During the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2017:

  • The Philippines told States Parties that as a signatory, it “continues to defend its position to prohibit the use, local and foreign stockpiling, investment, production and transit of cluster munitions in the country.”[156]
  • Saint Kitts and Nevis stated its commitment to ensuring its territory is never used as a transit or shipment point for cluster munitions.[157]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories after 2008. The UK announced in 2010 that there were “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[158] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[159]

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:

  • A US cable dated December 2008 states, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[160]
  • Germany has not expressed clear views on the convention’s prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, but according to a December 2008 cable, it has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany.[161]
  • Italy, Spain, and Qatar were identified by the US in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[162] In its initial report for the convention Spain reported that it was informing non-signatories which it cooperates with in joint military operations of its international obligations prohibiting stockpiling of prohibited weapons on territory under its jurisdiction or control.[163]
  • Japan apparently does not view cluster munitions on US military bases in Japan as falling under Japan’s jurisdiction and control or violate the national law or the convention. A December 2008 cable found that Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them.”[164]
  • According to a cable detailing the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the “U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG),” until US cluster munitions are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime, “they are considered to be under U.S. title.”[165]
  • According to a May 2007 cable, the US may store cluster munitions in Kuwait.[166]

Disinvestment

Several States Parties as well as the CMC view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted by States Parties at the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015 encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investments in producers of cluster munitions.[167]

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the table below.[168]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party

Year enacted

Belgium

2007

Ireland

2008

Italy

2011

Liechtenstein

2013

Luxembourg

2009

Netherlands

2013

New Zealand

2009

Saint Kitts and Nevis

2014

Samoa

2012

Spain

2015

Switzerland

2013

 

Four States Parties enacted legislation on cluster munitions containing provisions on disinvestment prior to the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force, while seven have adopted disinvestment laws in the period since.

No country enacted legislation relating to cluster munitions disinvestment in 2017 or the first half of 2018. The Monitor has added Saint Kitts and Nevis to the list of states with disinvestment laws after reviewing its 2014 implementing law for the convention, which prohibits investments of funds in the development and production of cluster munitions.[169]

At least 31 States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their view that investment in cluster munition production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention: Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, France, Ghana, Guatemala, the Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad & Tobago, the UK, and Zambia.[170]

In September 2017, Peru stated that it interprets Article 1 as prohibiting investments in the production of cluster munitions, that is to say, it bans the provision of financial assistance to producers of cluster munitions.[171]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

At least three companies in non-signatories have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from numerous investors: US company Textron Systems announced in 2016 it is stopping cluster munition production, while US company Orbital ATK issued a similar statement in August 2017. Singapore Technologies Engineering announced in 2015 that it no longer manufactures cluster munitions.

Former US cluster munition producer Orbital ATK commissioned a March 2018 report that criticized the US policy adopted November 2017 for backing away from long-standing plans to end the use of nearly all cluster munitions after 2018. According to the report, “continuing to rely on cluster weapons exposes the US military to international backlash and hampers America’s ability to remain on the cutting edge of defense technology.”[172]

CMC co-founder and member PAX continues to lead advocacy and research to encourage governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors.[173]

Timeline of cluster munition use[174]

Date

Location

Known details of use

2012–present

Syria

Syrian government forces have used 13 types of cluster munitions, including air-dropped bombs, dispensers fixed to aircraft, and ground-launched rockets, while Islamic State (IS) forces have used at least one type of cluster munition. Cluster munition attacks increased after Russia began its joint military operation with Syrian government forces in September 2015.

2015–present

Yemen

A Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that began a military operation against Ansar Allah forces (the Houthi) in Yemen on 25 March 2015 has used CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, CBU-58, CBU-87, and BL755 cluster bombs, and M26 and ASTROS II rockets. Cluster munitions containing “ZP-39” submunitions have also been used, but the user is not known.

2016

Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan

There is credible evidence that two types of cluster munition rockets were used in April 2016, but the Monitor could not conduct an independent investigation to make a conclusive determination about responsibility. Armenia and Azerbaijan have denied using cluster munitions and accused each other of using them.

2016

Somalia

Kenya has denied an allegation that it used BL755 cluster munitions in Somalia in a January 2016 attack against al-Shabaab. The Monitor could not confirm this use of cluster munitions or identify the responsible party.

2015

Sudan

The Sudanese Air Force was responsible for cluster munition attacks in Southern Kordofan in February, March, and May 2015 using RBK-500 AO-2.5 RT cluster bombs.

2015

Libya

In February and March 2015, remnants of air-dropped cluster bombs were recorded at Bin Jawad and Sirte respectively. The Libyan Air Force bombed both locations in early 2015, but it was not possible to conclusively determine responsibility.

2014–2015

Ukraine

From July 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire, both Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed insurgent groups used two types of cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine: 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch rockets delivering 72 9N235 submunitions and 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan rockets containing 30 9N235 submunitions or 30 9N210 submunitions.

2014

South Sudan

In Jonglei State, the UN found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions by the road 16 kilometers south of Bor in the week of 7 February, in an area not known to be contaminated by remnants before that time.

2012

Sudan

There were two compelling allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan in Southern Kordofan state, involving a Chinese Type-81 DPICM in Troji on 29 February and a RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb in Ongolo on 15 April.

2011

Libya

Libyan government forces used MAT-120 mortar-fired cluster munitions, RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs, and 122mm cargo rockets containing an unidentified type of DPICM.

2011

Cambodia

Thai forces fired artillery-delivered cluster munitions with M42/M46 and M85 type DPICM submunitions into Cambodia during border clashes near Preah Vihear temple.

2009

Yemen

The US used at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, to attack a “training camp” in Abyan governorate on 17 December. Northern Saada governorate is contaminated by cluster munitions used in late 2009 during fighting by the government of Yemen, Houthi rebels, and Saudi Arabia. The user responsible is not clear, but remnants include US-made CBU-52 cluster bombs and BLU-97, BLU-61, and M42/M46 submunitions as well as Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs.

2008

Georgia

Russian and Georgian forces used cluster munitions during the August 2008 conflict. Submunitions cleared by deminers include air-dropped AO-2.5RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210 and M095.

2006

Lebanon

Israeli forces used ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.

2006

Israel

Hezbollah fired more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets into northern Israel.

2003

Iraq

The US and the UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions, containing an estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions in the three weeks of major combat.

Unknown

Uganda

RBK-250-275 bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions have been found in the northern district of Gulu.

2001–2002

Afghanistan

The US dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions.

1999

Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)

The US, the UK, and the Netherlands dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing 295,000 submunitions in what is now Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, and in Albania. FRY also used cluster munitions.

1999

Chechnya

Russian forces used cluster munitions against NSAGs.

1998–2003

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Deminers have found BL755 bombs, BLU-63 cluster munitions, and PM-1 submunitions.

1998–1999

Albania

Yugoslav forces used rocket-delivered cluster munitions in disputed border areas, and NATO forces conducted six aerial cluster munition strikes.

1998

Colombia

The Colombian air force used a World War II-era cluster munition in an attack on Santo Domingo in the municipality of Tame on 13 December.

1998

Ethiopia, Eritrea

Ethiopia attacked Asmara airport and dropped BL755 bombs in Gash-Barka province in Eritrea. Eritrea used cluster munitions in two separate strikes in Mekele, including at a school.

1998

Afghanistan/Sudan

In August, US ships and submarines fired 66 TLAM-D Block 3 cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, at a factory in Khartoum, Sudan, and at reported NSAG training camps in Afghanistan.

1997

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone has said that Nigerian peacekeepers in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) used BLG-66 Beluga bombs on the eastern town of Kenema. ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu denied these reports.

1996–1999

Sudan

Sudanese government forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions.

1995

Croatia

An NSAG used Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers in an attack on the city of Zagreb on 2–3 May. Additionally, the Croatian government claimed that Serb forces used BL755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa River.

1994–1996

Chechnya

Russian forces used cluster munitions against NSAGs.

1992–1997

Tajikistan

ShOAB-0.5 and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley, used by unknown forces in civil war.

1992–1995

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

Yugoslav forces and NSAGs used cluster munitions during the war. NATO aircraft dropped two CBU-87 bombs.

1992–1994

Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan

Submunition contamination has been identified in at least 162 locations in Nagorno-Karabakh. Submunition types cleared by deminers include PTAB-1, ShOAB-0.5, and AO-2.5 RT. There are also reports of contamination in other parts of occupied Azerbaijan, adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh.

1992–1994

Angola

Deminers have found dud Soviet-made PTAB and AO-2.5 RT submunitions in various locations.

1991

Iraq, Kuwait

The US, France, and the UK dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the conflict.

1991

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabian and US forces used artillery-delivered and air-dropped cluster munitions against Iraqi forces during the Battle of Khafji.

1988

Iran

US Navy aircraft attacked Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship using Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during Operation Praying Mantis.

1986–1987

Chad

French aircraft dropped cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions at various locations.

1986

Libya

US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs in the Gulf of Sidra on 25 March. On 14–15 April, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina Airfield.

1984–1988

Iran, Iraq

It has been reported that Iraq first used air-dropped bombs in 1984. Iraq reportedly used Ababil-50 surface-to-surface cluster munition rockets during the later stages of the war.

1983

Lebanon

US Navy aircraft dropped 12 CBU-59 and 28 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs against Syrian air defense units near Beirut.

1983

Grenada

US Navy aircraft dropped 21 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during close air support operations.

1982

Falkland Islands/Malvinas

UK forces dropped 107 BL755 cluster bombs containing a total of 15,729 submunitions.

1982

Lebanon

Israel used cluster munitions against Syrian forces and NSAGs in Lebanon.

1979–1989

Afghanistan

Soviet forces extensively used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. NSAGs also used rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.

1978

Lebanon

Israel used cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.

1977–1978

Somalia

Contamination discovered in 2013 in Somali border region. Submunitions found include PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh, but the party that used the weapons is unknown.

1975–1988

Western Sahara, Mauritania

Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against an NSAG in Western Sahara. Cluster munition remnants of the same types used by Morocco in Western Sahara have been found in Mauritania.

1973

Egypt, Syria

Israel used air-dropped cluster munitions against Egyptian air defense installations in the Suez Canal zone and on reported NSAG training camps near Damascus.

1970s

Zambia

Remnants of cluster munitions, including unexploded submunitions from air-dropped bombs, have been found at Chikumbi and Shang’ombo.

1965–1975

Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam

According to a Handicap International (HI) review of US bombing data, approximately 80,000 cluster munitions, containing 26 million submunitions, were dropped on Cambodia in 1969–1973; over 414,000 cluster bombs, containing at least 260 million submunitions, were dropped on Lao PDR in 1965–1973; and over 296,000 cluster munitions, containing nearly 97 million submunitions, were dropped in Vietnam in 1965–1975.

1939–1945

Italy, Libya, Malta, Palau, Solomon Islands, USSR, the UK, possibly other locations

Munitions similar in function to modern cluster munitions were used by belligerent parties during World War II in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific.

 

.................................................

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics.


 

[1] A total of 107 governments that were full participants in the negotiations adopted the convention text by consensus, but adoption does not carry any legal obligations. Sixteen countries adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin on 30 May 2008, but never signed or acceded: Argentina, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.

[2] “Auckland Declaration on Conventional Weapons Treaties,” Pacific Conference on Conventional Weapons Treaties, Auckland, New Zealand, 12–14 February 2018, bit.ly/AucklandDeclaration2018.

[3] UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Securing Our Common Future – An Agenda for Disarmament (New York, June 2018), bit.ly/SGDisarmamentAgenda2018.

[5] Both accession and ratification usually involve some form of parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.

[6]The convention enters into force for each individual state on the first day of the sixth month after their deposit of the instrument of accession or ratification with the UN in New York. However, the Monitor lists a country as a State Party as soon as the deposit has occurred. When the convention became binding international law on 1 August 2010, 108 states had signed, of which 38 were States Parties legally bound by its provisions. Ninety-four states signed the convention in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008, while 10 signed in 2009, and four signed in the first seven months of 2010 before the convention entered into force.

[7] Grenada, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago acceded in to the convention in 2011; Andorra, and Saint Kitts and Nevis in 2013; Belize and Guyana in 2014; Mauritius, Palestine, and Slovakia in 2015; Cuba in 2016; and Sri Lanka in the first half of 2018.

[8] Statement by Amb. Ravinatha Aryasinha, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Session on Universalization, Geneva, 1 December 2015, bit.ly/MBT4MSPSriLanka.

[9] The announcement was made by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson of National Mine Action Authority of South Sudan. See, bit.ly/CCM7MSPSouthSudan and bit.ly/SouthSudanBansCMs.

[10] Email from Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority of South Sudan, 19 July 2018.

[11] Thiago de Araújo, “Bombas de fragmentação: as mortes no exterior que militares do Brasil não permitem evitar” (“Fragmentation bombs: the deaths abroad that the Brazilian military cannot avoid”), Sputnik Brazil, 13 March 2018, bit.ly/BrazilianBombsAbroad.

[12] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPChina.

[13] Gill Cohen, “Israeli Army Buying Local Cannons to Sidestep International Ban on Cluster Bombs,” Haaretz, 8 August 2017, bit.ly/IsraelBuysLocalCannons.

[14] Statement of the Russian Federation, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 20 October 2017, bit.ly/UNGARussia20Oct2017.

[15] Deputy Secretary of Defense Shanahan, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Cluster Munitions,” 30 November 2017, bit.ly/DoDPolicyOnCM17.

[16] Statement of the Gambia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPGambia.

[17] Unofficial translation. “Aujourd’hui, ma delegation est en mesure de confirmer que le projet de décret de ratification de la Convention sur les armes à sous-munitions a été soumis à l’appréciation du pouvoir législatif.” Statement of Haiti, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPHaiti. Official audio recording, UN Digital Recordings Portal, bit.ly/CCM7MSPHaitiRecording.

[18] Statement of the Philippines, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPPhilippines.

[19] Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that “would defeat the object and purpose” of any treaty they have signed. Thus, signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have committed to never acquire, produce, transfer, or use cluster munitions, even if they have not yet ratified. The Vienna Convention is considered customary international law and binding on all countries.

[20] Statements of Uganda, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 3 September 2014; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Coordination Committee Meeting, Geneva, 28 April 2016. Notes by the CMC. In February 2014, a Ugandan diplomat told the CMC that the ratification process was underway but requires Cabinet approval before it can be referred to parliament for adoption. Interview with Matata Twaha, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Uganda to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 20 February 2014.

[21] In June 2016, representatives from Angola’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense said the ratification process was at a “very advanced stage.” See, Michael P. Moore, “It’s time for Angola to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Opinion piece, Cluster Munition Coalition website, based on meeting between Michael P. Moore, Researcher for the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, and representatives from Angola’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, Angola, June 2016, bit.ly/MooreOpEdAngola. In August 2016, Angolan officials predicted that the ratification process would be completed within two months. ICBL-CMC meeting with Fernando Pedro Marques, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Angola, Addis Ababa, 4–5 August 2016.

[22] Letter to Mines Action Canada from Nikos Christodoulides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, 12 June 2018.

[23] Cuba and Nicaragua did not support the inclusion of the phrase “in conformity with article 21.” See the final report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, September 2017, http://bit.ly/CCMFinalReport2017.

[24] New Zealand convened the workshop in its capacity as coordinator of national implementation measures together with Zambia, which serves as the convention’s coordinator for transparency measures, with support provided by the convention’s implementation support unit. See the website of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, bit.ly/CCMNationalImplementation.

[25] Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia (FS Micronesia), Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. States Parties Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, and Samoa also attended. See, Pacific Conference on Conventional Weapons Treaties, http://bit.ly/PacificConferenceConventionalWeapons.

[26] Final Report of the CCW Fifth Review Conference, Geneva, 23 December 2016, bit.ly/CCW5ReviewFinalReport.

[27] Campaigners received support for their outreach activities in countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Somalia. International Campaign to Ban Landmines–Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL–CMC), “2016 Annual Report,” March 2017, bit.ly/ICBLCMC16AnnualReport.

[28] See the final report of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, http://bit.ly/CCMFinalReport2017. The first meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions were held in States Parties that are contaminated by cluster munition remnants and/or leaders of the convention: Lao PDR in 2010, Lebanon in 2011, Norway in 2012, Zambia in 2013, Costa Rica in 2014, and Croatia in 2015.

[29] A total of 52 countries owed funds to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 31 May 2018: State Party Spain owed the most (US$5,094), followed by State Party Chile ($4,532), and non-signatory Brazil ($4,320). See, UN Finance Office, Status of Contributions of BWC, CCW, CCM, OTW as of 31 May 2018, bit.ly/FundStatusMay2018.

[30] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017, bit.ly/UNGAResolution72-54.

[31] Thirty-two non-signatories voted in favor of the resolution: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, FS Micronesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and Yemen.

[32] These non-signatories abstained from voting on the 2018 UNGA resolution and elaborated their views on the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Argentina, Brazil, Myanmar, Pakistan, Poland (on behalf of Greece, Estonia, Finland, and Romania), and South Korea. State Party Cuba and signatory Cyprus also spoke. See, UN, “Record of First Committee 26th meeting,” A/C.1/72/PV.26, 31 October 2017, undocs.org/A/C.1/72/PV.26.

[33] Poland provided an explanation on behalf of itself, Greece, Estonia, Finland, and Romania that expressed “support [for] the humanitarian goal of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” but said “at the same time, we believe that humanitarian concerns must be balanced with States’ legitimate security concerns and military and defence needs.” Explanation of Vote by Greece, Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania, delivered by Poland, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 31 October 2016, bit.ly/UNGAPoland31Oct2016.

[34] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016, bit.ly/UNGAResolution71-45.

[35] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, bit.ly/UNGAResolution70-54.

[36] This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes in Angola, Azerbaijan, DRC, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia, as well as other area Nagorno-Karabakh.

[37] Nine non-signatories that produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt,Greece, South Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, and Turkey), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producers (India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore), which leaves Israel, Russia, and the US as the only countries to both produce and use cluster munitions.

[38] There was also an allegation that a weapon that appears to meet the criteria of a cluster munition was used in non-signatory Myanmar in early 2013.

[39] See, “Final report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4–6 September 2017,” CCM/MSP/2017/12, 25 September 2017, para. 27, bit.ly/CCMFinalReport2017.

[40] Belgium, China, Cuba, Croatia, France, Germany, Ghana, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

[41] See, @QalaatAlMudiq, “NE. #Suweida: a missile (apparently a #Russia|n Tochka) fell SE. of #Khalkhalah Airbase, far from any front. http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=32.896309&lon=36.720085&z=10&m…,” 5:31pm, 22 May 2018, Tweet, twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/998949519604805634; @QalaatAlMudiq, “A closer view,” 7:24pm, 22 May 2018, Tweet, twitter.com/qalaatalmudiq/status/998977973503123457?s=21; and @MGhorab3, “An unknown missile fell between the villages of #Sheqa and #Geneina in northern #Suweida,” 10:54am, 22 May 2018, Tweet, twitter.com/MGhorab3/status/998849504521719808.

[42] “Siege Watch, Tenth Quarterly Report Part 1 – Eastern Ghouta, February–April 2018,” PAX, bit.ly/SiegeWatchFebApr18; and “Repeated Attacks with Incendiary Weapons, Cluster Munitions and Chemicals on Eastern Ghouta,” Syrians for Truth and Justice, 26 March 2018, www.stj-sy.com/en/view/476. These reports documented cluster munition attacks in Misraba, Douma, Hamouriya, Beit Sawa, Arbin, and Madyara on 2 February 2018, in Hamoriya on 7 March 2018, and in Arbin on 11 March 2018.

[43] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Russia/Syria: Deadly Airstrikes on Trapped Civilians,” 31 October 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/31/russia/syria-deadly-airstrikes-trapped-civilians.

[44] Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out attacks jointly. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets that deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used. Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015, bit.ly/AmnestySyria23Dec2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016, bit.ly/HRWSyria8Feb2016.

[45] From the outset of the by Russian-Syrian joint operation, there were at least 76 cluster munition attacks on opposition-controlled territory between 30 September 2015 and 20 July 2016.

[46] At the outset of the conflict in 2012, markings on cluster munitions remnants indicated they were produced in the 1970s and 1980s; while since September 2015, most of the cluster munitions used in Syria bear production dates from 1989 into the early 1990s. Most RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs were manufactured in 1990 and 1991.

[47] “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016, bit.ly/RussiaOnCMInSyria.

[48] In September 2015, the US Department of Defense listed eight Operation Inherent Resolve coalition members conducting US-led airstrikes in Iraq: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatory Jordan and States Parties Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and the UK. It listed nine coalition nations participating in US-led airstrikes in Syria: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatories Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, as well as States Parties Australia, Canada, and France. Department of Defense, “Airstrikes Hit ISIL Terrorists in Syria, Iraq,” 30 September 2015, bit.ly/AirstrikesHitISIL.

[49] Email from Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Writer, Washington Post, 27 July 2016. See also, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Despite denial, ‘growing evidence’ Russia is using cluster bombs in Syria, report says,” Washington Post, 28 July 2016, bit.ly/WPRussiaClusterBombs.

[50] In 2014, IS forces used an unknown type of rocket-fired cluster munition that dispersed DPICM-like submunition with a distinctive red nylon ribbon called “ZP-39.” HRW, “Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use,” 1 September 2014, bit.ly/HRWSyria1Sept2014. Markings on some of the submunitions indicate they were manufactured in 1993. Brown Moses Blog, “The markings on what’s assumed to be a Sakr submunition suggests the designation is ZP39, made in 1993,” 4 April 2014, twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/452120358271725568.

[51] A video uploaded to YouTube on 26 March 2014 reportedly of arms captured by government forces from rebel groups shows submunitions prepared for use as IEDs, bit.ly/IEDVideo26March2014.

[52] Syrian government forces have used Egyptian-made 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM submunitions, but it is unclear if the 122mm rockets were SAKR-18 or SAKR-36 variants, which contain 72 and 98 submunitions respectively. HRW press release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” 14 January 2013, bit.ly/HRWSyria14Jan2013.

[53] UN-brokered ceasefires went into effect on 10 April 2016, 19 October 2016, and 19 November 2016.

[54] In February 2017, the Saudi-led coalition fired Brazilian-made ASTROS II cluster munition rockets in Saada governorate on at least three locations, according to investigations by Amnesty International and HRW. HRW, “Yemen: Brazil-Made Cluster Munitions Harm Civilians,” 23 December 2016, bit.ly/HRWYemenBrazil23Dec2016; Amnesty International, “Yemen: Saudi Arabia-led coalition uses banned Brazilian cluster munitions on residential areas,” 9 March 2017, bit.ly/AmnestyYemen9March2017; and HRW, “Yemen: Cluster Munitions Wound Children,” 17 March 2017, bit.ly/HRWYemen17Dec2017.

[55] HRW could not determine who used ground-launched cluster munitions containing “ZP-39” submunitions in Saada in April 2015, but Saudi Arabia and Houthi forces both possess rocket launchers and tube artillery capable of delivering them.

[56] It listed reported cluster munition strikes in 2017 in Taizz on 25 and 26 March 2017 and in Saada on 14 April, 18 July, 20 July, and 22 July. Cluster Munition Monitor casualties and victim assistance team review of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED), “Middle East 2016–2018” (update July 10) data for calendar year 2017. Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, 47(5) 651–660, 2010.

[57] Monitor interview with Chris Clark, Global Director of Operations, Dynasafe Group, Geneva, 7 June 2018.

[58] Amnesty International, “Egypt: Cluster bomb video highlights human rights concerns in North Sinai,” 14 February 2018, bit.ly/ClusterBombsInNorthSinai.

[59] Egyptian Army spokesman, video, “Eleventh statement of the General Command of the Armed Forces,” 20 February 2018, twitter.com/EgyArmySpox/status/966189898926559234.

[60] Arnaud Delalande, “#Libya - #LNA MiG-23UB '8008' loaded with RBK-250–270 cluster bomb seen at Brak al-Shati before taking off to strike Chadian militias southern #Sebha,” 6 June 2018, Tweet, twitter.com/Arn_Del/status/1004285052459601923.

[61] Arnaud Delalande, “Libyan CBU monitoring,” AeroHistory blog, 9 July 2017, aerohisto.blogspot.com/p/libyan-cbu.html.

[62] Arnaud Delalande, “Video – LNA tech. loading bombs (including RBK-250 cluster bombs) on MiG-23UB ‘8008’ before striking #Benghazi Defense Brigade this morning,” 12:24pm, 3 March 2017, Tweet, twitter.com/Arn_Del/status/837624672221024256; and Arnaud Delalande, “Video - LNA still used cluster bombs against SDB : MiG-23BN '4136' loaded with 2 RBK-250 at Benina AB this afternoon #Libya,” 5:52pm, 3 March 2017, Tweet, twitter.com/Arn_Del/status/837707166282878977.

[63] Arnaud Delalande, “All Bets Are Off as a Surprise Offensive Roils the Libyan War,” War is Boring, 6 March 2017, bit.ly/WarIsBoring6March2017.

[64] Arnaud Delalande, “Libyan CBU monitoring,” AeroHistory blog, 3 March 2016, bit.ly/LibyanCBUMonitoring03March2016.

[65] The Egyptian Army Facebook posted the video which claims to show the destruction by the Egyptian Air Force of a 10-vehicle convoy en route from Libya to Egypt. Egyptian Army Facebook page, November 2017, www.facebook.com/EgyArmySpox/videos/1174832842647696. The post alleges that the vehicles contained arms, ammunition, contraband, and insurgents, all of which it claims were totally destroyed in the attack.

[66] In 2006, Hezbollah fired more than 100 cluster munition rockets from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. See, ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada: October 2010), p.159.

[67] The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

[68] For example, Greece has not formally committed to never produce cluster munitions, but, in 2011, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official claimed “the last production of cluster munitions in Greece was in 2001.” Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, 14 June 2011.

[69] Piotr Butowsky, “Russia set to finalise PBK-500U glide bomb evaluation,” Jane’s 360, 9 January 2018, bit.ly/RussiaGlideBombEvaluation; and Michael Peck, “Cluster Bombs Are Back—and America and Russia Can’t Get Enough,” The National Interest, 21 April 2018, bit.ly/NationalInterest21Apr2018.

[70] Gill Cohen, “Israeli Army Buying Local Cannons to Sidestep International Ban on Cluster Bombs,” Haaretz, 8 August 2017,bit.ly/IsraelLocalCannons8Aug2017; and Gideon Levy, “The Cluster Bomb Nation,” Haaretz, 10 August 2017, bit.ly/ClusterBombNation10Aug2017.

[71] Luiza Souto, “Brazilian company denies NGO denunciation on cluster bombs in Yemen,” Globo, 3 March 2017, bit.ly/BrazilOnClusterBombsinYemen.

[72] “Last US cluster-bomb maker to cease production,” AFP, 1 September 2016, bit.ly/AFPLastUSCluster. In a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Textron announced it has discontinued production of the CBU-105 because of reduced orders, stating that “the current political environment has made it difficult” to obtain sales approvals from the executive branch and Congress. Majorie Censer, “Textron to discontinue production of sensor-fuzed weapon,” Inside Defense, 30 August 2016, bit.ly/TextronDiscontinue.

[73] Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) of Hopkins, Minnesota manufactured a solid rocket motor for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105, but produced it only for use in that weapon.

[74] Department of the Army, “Justification Book of Procurement of Ammunition, Army FY19 Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” pp. 329–330, https://www.asafm.army.mil/documents/BudgetMaterial/FY2019/ammo.pdf.

[75] See the Singapore Technologies Engineering website, www.stengg.com/en. See also, PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015. Investors received similar letters; and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, bit.ly/STEngineeringQuitsCM. In a letter to PAX, which leads the explosive investments disinvestment campaign for the CMC, the company President Tan Pheng Hock explained that the decision came about in part because “we often get asked by the investment community [about] our stand on cluster munitions.” Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd, 11 November 2015.

[76] Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of former Yugoslavia, has declared, “There are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011, bit.ly/BihCCMArt7-20Aug2011.

[77] The report was originally due by 29 April 2016. It covers calendar year 2015. See, South Africa, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 8 September 2017, bit.ly/CCMArt7SouthAfrica17.

[78] Letter from Cluster Munition Monitor to Rheinmetall Denel Munition (Pty) Ltd. of South Africa, 6 July 2018.

[79] There is no comprehensive accounting available of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK), in addition to exports by non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the US, and Yugoslavia.

[80] States Parties Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purposes of destruction, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

[81] US recipients include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

[82] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, Soviet cluster munition remnants have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

[83] Event organizers requested that they alter their display, but the caption “Cargo Ammunition for 130&155mm Gun - bomblet assembly” remained visible at the event. See, Omega Research, also Hyderabad Precision Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. brochure / information, obtained from Eurosatory, June 2018, on file in Omega Research Foundation archive, twitter.com/Omega_RF/status/1007587179386851328.

[84] Brochure, Heliopolis Co. for Chemical Industries, National Organization for Military Production, Ministry of Military Production, Arab Republic of Egypt, pp. 8, 10, & 12. Shared by Omega Research via Twitter, 3 March 2017.

[85] The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW listed 56 states that stockpiled. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890.

[86] This information is drawn from Cluster Munition Monitor Ban policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in the transparency reports, statements, and other outlets.

[87] According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munitions were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007; and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

[88] Albania, Andorra, Australia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Colombia, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Ireland, Holy See, Honduras, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Zambia have made definitive statements, either in transparency reports or in interventions at official meetings. However, other States Parties do not indicate if they possess stockpiles, but simply state “not applicable” or “none” in the form or leave the form blank. The CMC urges states to clearly indicate in there are no cluster munitions stockpiled under their jurisdiction and control by providing a clearer, more unequivocal response such as “zero.”

[89] Bulgaria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 June 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Bulgaria18.

[90] There are some changes to the total numbers of cluster munitions and/or submunitions previously reported due to revisions based on adjusted information provided in transparency reports. See the country profiles for full information.

[91] Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012, bit.ly/CCMNigeria18April2012. Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Nigeria Air Force possesses British-made BL755 cluster bombs. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 843.

[92] See, for example, “Croatia Progress Report,” CCM/CONF/2015/6, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 6 October 2015, bit.ly/CroatiaProgressReport2015.

[93] Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/CCMCAR14Sep2011.

[94] Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUS14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.

[95] Department of the Army, “Justification Book of Procurement of Ammunition, Army FY19 Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” p. 614, https://www.asafm.army.mil/documents/BudgetMaterial/FY2019/ammo.pdf.

[96] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated but provided by the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

[97] “The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs” (“El Ministerio de la Defensa de Venezuela destruye bombas de racimo”), Infodefensa.com, 26 August 2011, bit.ly/VenezuelaDestroysClusterBombs.

[98] Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece in Geneva, 14 June 2011; and presentation of the Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” Geneva, 1 April 2011, slide 2.

[99] Letter to CMC from Edgars Rinkēvičs, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, 20 July 2018.

[100] The report states that “The cluster munitions and existing explosive submunitions were destroyed” (“Las municiones en racimo y submuniciones explosivas existentes fueron destruidas”). Cuba, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Cuba18.

[101] Email from Hrvoje Debač, Deputy Director, Croatia Office for Mine Action, 31 July 2018.

[102] Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit, “Croatia completes the destruction of its cluster munition stocks,” 31 July 2018. bit.ly/CCMCroatiaStockpiles31Aug2018.

[103] Slovenia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 6 June 2018; and email from Jelka Travnik, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the UN in Geneva, to Mary Wareham, HRW, 11 June 2018. See also, Bulgaria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 June 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Bulgaria18.

[104] This table includes information submitted by States Parties on a voluntary basis for cluster munitions and submunitions destroyed before entry into force. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions. The numbers of munitions reported destroyed by these countries prior to entry into force are included in this table. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for more information.

[105]Email from Ambassador Julio Herráiz, Permanent Representative of Spain to the Conference on Disarmament, 9 July 2018.

[106] Email from Sheila Mweemba, Director, Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit; and Implementation Support Unit, “Spain gets rid of all its cluster munitions,” 25 July 2018.bit.ly/CCMSpainStockpiles25July2018.

[107] Botswana, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 7 May 2018; and email from Hans Risser, Head of Operations, Department for Humanitarian Disarmament, NPA, 30 July 2018.

[108] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 June 2018.

[109] Peru stated the nine cluster bombs and 888 submunition were destroyed in 2017. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Peru18. However, information provided by NPA in July 2018 indicates that the cumulative totals presented in transparency reports contain some accounting errors and the information is being re-evaluated in conjunction with Peruvian stakeholders. Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 27 July 2018.

[110] Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 27 July 2018.

[111] Those destroyed cluster munitions have been added to the total number destroyed during 2012.

[112] Afghanistan, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ecuador, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, Macedonia FYR, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, Peru, Portugal, and Slovenia.

[113] Please see the Ban policy country profiles and/or relevant Article 7 transparency reports for more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained. The quantity totals may include individual submunitions retained, which are not contained in a delivery container.

[114] Switzerland, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2017, bit.ly/CCMArt7Switzerland17; and Switzerland, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Switzerland18.

[115] Italy, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.

[116] Statement of Slovakia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPSlovakia.

[117] The Netherlands declared an additional four cluster munitions and about 800 submunitions retained for training when they were discovered after the completion of stockpile destruction in 2012.

[118] Cameroon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, August 2014, bit.ly/CCMArt7Cameroon14. See also, statement of Cameroon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017. Official audio recording, UN Digital Recordings Portal, bit.ly/CCM7MSPCameroonRecording.

[119] Bulgaria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms B and C, 27 June 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7BulgariaJune2018.

[120] Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable” in response to particular information requests. States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J.

[121] These States Parties have submitted initial Article 7 transparency reports for the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, BiH, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. See, the UN’s Article 7 website, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.

[122]Cluster Munition Monitor 2017 and Cluster Munition Monitor 2016 reported an 82% compliance rate for the submission of initial transparency reports, while Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 reported 80% compliance with the reporting requirement. Cluster Munition Monitor 2014 reported a 77% compliance rate, while it was “three-quarters” of states in Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013.

[123] Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palestine, Peru, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, Uruguay, and Zambia.

[124] For example, Austria, Belgium, Colombia, DRC, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, and Zambia utilized Form J in their initial Article 7 transparency reports.

[125] For recommendations of best practice in this field, see HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” September 2014, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014; ICRC, “Model Law, Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 2013; and “Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act 2011,” prepared by New Zealand for small states not possessing cluster munitions and not contaminated by them, 2013, bit.ly/CCMModelLeg.

[126] A total of 11 states enacted implementing legislation prior to the convention’s August 2010 entry into force and 19 states have done so since then.

[127] Albania, Andorra, BiH, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[128] Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Grenada, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Palestine, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, and Zambia.

[129] Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Guinea, Guyana, Madagascar, Nauru, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Somalia, and Sri Lanka.

[130] Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.

[131] Belize, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 8 November 2017, bit.ly/CCMArt7Belize17.

[132] On 14 December 2016, the National Assembly adopted legislation that prohibits the use, development, manufacturing, acquisition, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions. Botswana, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 7 May 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.

[133] Statement of Cameroon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2017. Official audio recording, UN Digital Recordings Portal, bit.ly/CCM7MSPCameroonRecording. The law contains fines for violations, ranging from $1 to $170 (1,000 to 100,000 CFA) as well as penal sanction of various terms, e.g. 15–25 years for production, storage, importation, and transportation, 10–30 years for sales. “Loi portant régime général des armes et munitions au Cameroun” (“Law regulating arms and ammunitions”), Chapter IV, Law No.2016/015, Republic of Cameroon, 14 December 2016, bit.ly/CameroonLaw2016-015.

[134] Côte d’Ivoire, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 February 2016, bit.ly/CCMArt7CotedIvoire16. Côte d’Ivoire has reported the same three laws in its transparency reports from 2013 to 2016.

[135] Lao PDR, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 26 April 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Lao18.

[136] Malawi, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 28 June 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Malawi18.

[137] Law 2/1998 prohibits and punishes anyone, except for the state, from producing, stockpiling, transferring, and receiving arms or explosives in the Palestinian territories. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 March 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Palestine18. See also, statement of Palestine, Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 September 2016,bit.ly/CCM6MSPPalImpLeg.

[138] Statement of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2017. Official audio recording, UN Digital Recordings Portal, bit.ly/CCM7MSPStKittsAndNevisRecording. See also, “Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act, 2014,” Law No. 12 of 2014, Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis, 27 August 2014, bit.ly/CMProhibitionStKittsAndNevis. Saint Kitts annexed the law to its second Article 7 transparency report.

[139] South Africa, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 September 2017,bit.ly/CCMArt7SAfrica8Sep2017 .

[140] Swaziland, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 March 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Swaziland18.

[141] Zambia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 31 January 2018, bit.ly/CCMArt7Zambia18; and statement of Zambia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPZambia.

[142] The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[143] As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions that originated from 100 locations in the 2003–2010 period.

[144] At least 38 States Parties and signatories have previously stated their agreement with this view: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, August 2012), pp. 34–35; CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26. See also, HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Staying Strong,” 2014, pp. 19–23, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

[145] Section 6(3) states: “A member of the Defence Force does not commit an offence against section 4 merely by engaging, in the course of his or her duties, in operation, exercises, or other military activities with the armed forces of a State that is not a party to the Convention.” “Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act, 2014,” Section 6(3), Law No. 12 of 2014, Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis, 27 August 2014, bit.ly/CMProhibitionStKittsAndNevis.

[146] Bills digest 72 2010–11 on the Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill 2010, 1 March 2011, bit.ly/Digest72_2010–11.

[147] Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012, No. 114, 2012, www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012A00114/Download.

[148] “Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act (S.C. 2014, c. 27),” sec. 11(1)(a-b).

[149] Canada, Convention on Cluster Munitions voluntary Article 7 Report, Form A, 29 April 2015, bit.ly/CCMArt7Canada15.

[150] At the convention’s 2011 intersessional meetings, Japan stated that the use of cluster munitions in joint military operations is “totally under control” and warned the meeting that “we should not discuss Article 21 here while the appropriate military officials are absent.” Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011. Notes by the CMC/HRW.

[151] “Oslo convention on cluster munitions will not prevent U.S.-Japan military operations,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO1748 dated 25 June 2008, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TOKYO1748_a.html.

[152] Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act, ch. 11, 2010, sec. 9 and schedule 2, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/11/pdfs/ukpga_20100011_en.pdf.

[153] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011, bit.ly/UK2011OtherIssues.

[154] Article 2, Section 3 of the Amendment to Spain’s Law 33/1998.

[155] Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

[156] Statement of the Philippines, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPPhilippines.

[157] Statement of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2017. Official audio recording, UN Digital Recordings Portal, bit.ly/CCM7MSPStKittsAndNevisRecording.

[158] Section 8 of the UK’s legislation states that its foreign secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In 2011, UK officials stated that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory. Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 1 November 2011), Column 589W, bit.ly/Browne1Nov2011.

[159] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, “After the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Norway discussed with the USA the issue of their stockpile of cluster munitions on Norwegian territory. Norway offered to destroy these cluster munitions together with our own stockpiles. However, the USA decided to remove their stocks, something which happened during the spring of 2010.” Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2012. According to a 2008 US cable, the US stockpile in Norway apparently consisted of “2,544 rounds” of “D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)” and “2,528 rounds” of “D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM.” See, “Norway raises question concerning U.S. cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08OSLO676 dated 17 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OSLO676_a.html.

[160] “Demarche to Afghanistan on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 2 December 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE134777_a.html.

[161] A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, then-Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” “MFA gives reassurances on stockpiling of US cluster munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BERLIN1609_a.html. See also, “Demarche to Germany Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125631 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE125631_a.html.

[162] The cable states, “Rome should note that cluster munitions are stored at Aviano and Camp Darby.” “Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE125632_a.html.

[163] Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 27 January 2011, bit.ly/CCMArt7Spain11.

[164] “Consultations with Japan on implementing the Oslo convention on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TOKYO3532_a.html.

[165] “Cluster munitions: Israeli’s operational defensive capabilities crisis,” US Department of State cable dated 18 April 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TELAVIV1012_a.html.

[166] The cable contains the text of a message sent from a US military advisor to UAE authorities concerning a transfer of “ammunition immediately via US Air Force aircraft from Kuwait stockpile to Lebanon.” With respect to the items to be transferred, the cable states: “The United States will not approve any cluster munitions or white phosphorus.” See, “Follow-up on UAE response to Lebanese request for emergency aid,” US Department of State cable 07ABUDHABI876 dated 24 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ABUDHABI876_a.html.

[167] Dubrovnik Action Plan, First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 10 September 2015, bit.ly/DubrovnikActionPlan.

[168] Italy’s Law No. 95 bans financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention, a provision that supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines has advocated for a separate, more detailed law.

[169] “A person shall not provide or invest funds with the intention that those funds are to be used, or knowing that they are to be used, in the development or production of cluster munitions.” “Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act, 2014,” Section 6(3), Law No. 12 of 2014, Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis, 27 August 2014, bit.ly/CMProhibitionStKittsAndNevis.

[170] Statement of Trinidad and Tobago, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 20 October 2017. See the UN web recording from 1:10:42 onwards.

[171] Intervention of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munition Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2017, bit.ly/CCM7MSPPeru.

[172] Igor Geyn, “Modernizing the U.S. Munitions Arsenal,” Government Business Council, 23 March 2018, www.govexec.com/media/orbital_ib_modernizingmunitions_v5_032318.pdf.

[173] PAX, Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility (Utrecht, May 2017), www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org/report.

[174] For more detailed information, please see the relevant Cluster Munition Monitor country profile online at: www.the-monitor.org. This accounting does not capture every location of cluster munitions use. Cluster munitions have been used in some countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear.