Sri Lanka

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 02 March 2018

UPDATE: On 1 March 2018, Sri Lanks acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to become the 103rd State Party. The treaty will enter into force for Sri Lanka on 1 September.

(Information below was last updated in August 2017 and will be more fully updated later this year.)

Summary: Non-signatory Sri Lanka supports the convention’s humanitarian objectives, but has not commented on whether it will join it. Sri Lanka has participated as an observer in the convention’s meetings since 2011 and it voted in favor of a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2016.

Sri Lanka is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. Sri Lanka states that it has never stockpiled or used cluster munitions. In May 2017, Sri Lanka again denied allegations that its armed forces used cluster munitions in the 2008–2009 operation against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 

Sri Lanka has shown interest in the convention, but has not commented on its position on accession.[1] At the convention’s First Review Conference in September 2015, Sri Lanka expressed its support for the convention’s humanitarian objectives and said it has never used or stockpiled cluster munitions.[2]

In May 2017, Sri Lanka responded to a request from Cluster Munition Monitor for updated information by denying allegations it has used cluster munitions in the past.[3]

In December 2016, Sri Lanka voted in favor of a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[4] It voted in favor of the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[5]

Sri Lanka participated in one meeting of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Vienna in December 2007. It attended a regional meeting on cluster munitions in Bali, Indonesia, in November 2009.

Since 2011, Sri Lanka has participated as an observer in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention. It attended the First Review Conference in 2015. Sri Lanka did not make a statement at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016.[6]

Sri Lanka has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2016.[7]

In December 2015, Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena met with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC)’s national partner, the Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines (SLCBL), that urged him to support Sri Lanka’s accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty.[8] In May 2017, campaign representatives met with Sri Lanka’s Secretary of Defense and military officials to discuss the importance of acceding to these humanitarian disarmament instruments.[9]

Sri Lanka is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but in March 2016 announced its intent to accede to it.[10] Sri Lanka is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Sri Lankan officials have repeatedly stated that its armed forces do not possess cluster munitions and have never used the weapons.[11]

Sri Lanka has emphatically denied claims that it used cluster munitions in 2008–2009 during the final months of its military operation against the LTTE in the northern Vanni region.[12] In May 2017, Sri Lanka provided the following response to Cluster Munition Monitor’s request for updated information: “With regard to the recent allegations of using ‘Cluster Munitions’ during the operations against LTTE terrorists, Sri Lanka Army, Sri Lanka Navy and Sri Lanka Air Force re-iterated their earlier stand that they have never used Cluster Munitions”[13]

The statement does not refer to a June 2016 proposal by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) urging the government of Sri Lanka initiate an independent investigation into the alleged use of cluster munitions in past.[14] The OHCHR suggestion came after new evidence emerged in June 2016 showing that three mine clearance organizations have cleared cluster munition remnants, including unexploded submunitions, from at least six different sites in the north of the country since 2009.[15]

The Sri Lankan air force possesses aircraft capable of delivering this type of Soviet-made cluster munition, while the LTTE had light planes incapable of carrying them. The Indian air force possesses RBK-500 series cluster bombs and was involved in a military intervention against the LTTE in northern Sri Lanka in 1987–1990 and HALO told the Guardian newspaper that it could not determine who used the cluster munitions or when, asserting that it “could have been any time within the last three decades.”[16]

Previously, in April 2012, the government denied allegations that it used cluster munitions during the conflict.[17] A February 2009 media article alleged that Sri Lankan forces used cluster munitions against the LTTE, and specifically while targeting Pudukkudyirippu Hospital.[18] A UN spokesperson initially said the hospital was attacked with cluster munitions, but retracted the statement after further investigation.[19]

A March 2011 report by a UN panel of experts on Sri Lanka noted the government’s denial and said that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the credibility of the allegation of use of cluster munitions by Sri Lanka.[20]



[1] In 2010, the Ministry of Economic Development published a plan stating that it would “advocate for a ban of landmines and cluster munitions,” but it is not known to have done so. Ministry of Economic Development, “The National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka,” September 2010. In 2013, a representative of the country’s armed forces informed the CMC that the Sri Lankan military does not object to Sri Lanka joining the convention. CMC interview with Brig. H.J.S. Gunawardane, Head of the Sri Lanka delegation, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 12 September 2013.

[2] Statement of Sri Lanka, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, 9 September 2015. Notes by the Monitor.

[3] Email to Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, HRW, from Mafusa Lafir, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva, 26 May 2017.

[4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.

[5]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[6] During the high-level segment of the 2015 Review Conference, Sri Lanka made a statement expressing its support for the humanitarian objectives of the convention. Statement of Sri Lanka, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015. Notes by the Monitor.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 71/203, 19 December 2016.

[8]Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines representatives meet President,” news.lk (official government portal), 29 December 2015.

[9] Email from Vidya Abhayagunawardena, SLCBL Campaigner, 22 May 2017.

[10] In March 2016, Sri Lanka announced that it intends to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, but as of July 2017 had not done so. ICBL, “Sri Lanka decides to join Mine Ban Treaty,” 3 March 2016.

[11] Statement of Sri Lanka, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, 9 September 2015. Notes by the Monitor. See also, Monitor meeting with Amb. Dr. Palitha T.B. Kohona, and Dilup Nanyakkara, Advisor, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN in New York, New York, 19 October 2010.

[12] See, HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 242–243. In October 2009, Sri Lankan Army Commander Lt.-Gen. J. Jayasuriya stated, “Where the cluster munitions are concerned, I wish to categorically state that such inhumane weapons have never, and will never be used by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces.” Keynote address by Lt.-Gen. Jayasuriya, Sri Lankan Army, International Law on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War Seminar, Colombo, 27 October 2009. The text of the address was included in, “Flow of arms to terrorists must stop,” Daily News, 28 October 2009.

[13] Email to Mary Wareham, HRW, from Mafusa Lafir, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva, 26 May 2017.

[14] Paragraph 33 states: “In light of recent reports on new evidence that has emerged on the use of cluster munitions towards the end of the conflict, following similar allegations in the OHCHR investigation report, the High Commissioner calls for an independent and impartial investigation to be carried out.” OHCHR, “Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka,” A/HRC/32/CRP.4, 28 June 2016, p. 8.

[15] The Guardian published photographs that show clearance operators preparing to destroy the remnants of an RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb. It reported that HALO Trust cleared 42 cluster munitions—likely submunitions—from sites near Pachchilapalli, which saw fighting between government and LTTE forces at the end of the war. HALO said it reported the clearance at the time by submitting the records to the government-run mine action center. Emmanuel Stoakes, “Sri Lanka denies cluster bombs found in war zones were government weapons,” The Guardian, 26 June 2016. See also, Emmanuel Stoakes, “Cluster bombs used in Sri Lanka's civil war, leaked photos suggest,” The Guardian, 20 June 2016.

[16] Emmanuel Stoakes, “Sri Lanka denies cluster bombs found in war zones were government weapons,” The Guardian, 26 June 2016.

[17] In April 2012, the Associated Press quoted a UNDP mine action advisor as reportedly stating in an internal document that deminers had encountered submunitions in the Puthukkudiyiruppu area of northeastern Sri Lanka. See, Ravi Nessman, “UN Finds Cluster Bombs in Sri Lanka,” Associated Press (New Delhi), 26 April 2012; and Ravi Nessman, “Witness: Man hit by cluster bomb in Sri Lanka war,” Associated Press (New Delhi), 27 April 2012. The government’s Media Center for National Security responded, “The rehashed allegation in international media that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces used cluster munitions during the Humanitarian Operations is baseless. It is a repetition of similar allegations that were made earlier on several occasions and is not based on any facts.” Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, “Ministry of Defence denies use of cluster munitions by security forces,” 28 April 2012.

[18] “U.N. cites Sri Lanka cluster bomb use: The U.S., EU, Norway and Japan join in a plea to the Tamil Tiger rebels to end their failing separatist struggle and avoid more deaths,” Los Angeles Times, 4 February 2009.

[19] “UN accepts Sri Lanka has not used cluster bombs – website,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, 5 February 2009; and Walter Jayawardhana, “UN Spokesman Accepts Sri Lanka Never Had Cluster Bombs,” Ministry of Defence, 5 February 2009.

[20] Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011, p. 47 (Section G, paras. 168–169).


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 23 October 2017

UPDATE: On 13 December 2017, Sri Lanka acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, which will enter into force for it on 1 June 2018. Sri Lanka is the 163rd State Party to the Treaty. This profile will be more fully updated in the future.

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Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]

In December 2015, at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, the Ambassador of Sri Lanka stated, “Following the change of government since January 2015 elections there is a paradigm shift in the policy of the government. Presently my government is considering seriously to accede to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty as a matter of priority. There are positive signals that my government may decide to be a state party within the course of the next year. The government wants to see Sri Lanka again a committed member of the International Community to promote disarmament and humanitarian mine action.”[2]

On 2 March 2016, at the pledging conference for Mine Ban Treaty organized by the Chilean Presidency, the Ambassador of Sri Lanka announced that Sri Lanka would accede to the convention. He stated that the decision had been taken earlier that day by the Cabinet in Colombo.[3]

In June 2017, Sri Lanka stated that, “The Cabinet of Ministers of Sri Lanka, in March 2016, had approved Sri Lanka’s accession to the Ottawa Convention and we are presently working on domestic technical and other related processes required for Sri Lanka’s accession.”[4]

The Sri Lankan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SLCBL) sent delegations to meet with key stakeholders in government during 2017 to urge near-term accession to the MBT. On 10 September 2017 the SLCBL urged, by letter, that President Maitripala Sirisena deliver Sri Lanka's accession to the Mine Ban Treaty while in New York to attend the UN's 72nd General Assembly meeting. 

SLCBL members also had meetings with the heads of other non-stakeholder Ministries and with members of parliament throughout the year to request their support for Sri Lanka's accession. Previously, in August 2016, the SLCBL mobilized a national petition requesting the government accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. The petition was signed by many key former civil servants, academic professors, business owners, and civil society activists. The petition was presented to Sirisena, on 25 August 2016. Also in August 2016, the SLCBL lobbied the Secretariat of the Reconciliation Task Force to request the government accede.

Sri Lanka participated, as an observer, in the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago, Chile in November – December 2016, as well as the convention’s intersessional meetings in June 2017 in Geneva. Previously, Sri Lanka submitted a voluntary Article 7 report in 2005. It has not subsequently updated it to include information on its stockpile.

Sri Lanka voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 71/34 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 December 2016, as it has for every annual pro-ban UNGA resolution since 1996.

Sri Lanka is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but has not submitted its annual Article 13 report during the past four years.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Since the end of armed conflict in May 2009, the Monitor has not received any reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by any entity in Sri Lanka.

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has a stockpile, but its current size and composition are not known.

In April 2009, Brigadier Lasantha Wickramasuriya of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) acknowledged that the army had used antipersonnel mines in the past. He said the army had used non-detectable Belgian, Chinese, and Italian mines, as well as bounding and fragmentation mines of Pakistani, Portuguese, and United States (US) manufacture.[5] The Monitor had previously reported that Sri Lanka acquired antipersonnel mines from China, Italy (or Singapore), Pakistan, Portugal, and perhaps Belgium, the US, and others.[6]

In October 2009, Army Commander Lieutenant General Jagath Jayasuriya said that “the use of mines by the Sri Lankan military is strictly limited and restricted to defensive purposes only…to demarcate and defend military installations” and are “marked accordingly…and relevant records systematically maintained.”[7]

Prior to the end of armed conflict, in particular in 2008 and 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) laid large numbers of mines throughout the north.[8]



[1] In the past, the government stated that Sri Lanka’s accession was dependent on progress in the peace process and on an agreement to ban landmines by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The conflict in Sri Lanka ended on 20 May 2009.

[2] Statement by Amb. Ravinatha Aryasinha, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Session on Universalization, Geneva, 1 December 2015.

[3] Press Release, “Sri Lanka soon to be the 163rd State Party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,” Implementation Support Unit, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpile, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

[4] Statement by Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on Universalization, Geneva, 8-9 June 2017.

[5] Presentation on Humanitarian Demining by Brig. Lasantha Wickramasuriya, SLA, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, 2 April 2009. The presentation included a section titled “Types of Mines Used by the Sri Lankan Army” followed by photographs and titles: P4MK1 (Pakistan antipersonnel mine); M72 (China antipersonnel mine); VS-50 (Italy antipersonnel mine); M16A1 (US bounding antipersonnel mine, however the photograph shows what appears to be a P7 MK 1 Pakistan or PRBM966 Portugal bounding mine); PRB 415 (photograph shows what appears to be a NR 409 Belgian antipersonnel mine); PRB 413 (photograph shows what appears to be a Portugal M421 antipersonnel mine); M15 and ND MK 1 antivehicle mines; and M18A1 Claymore mines.

[6] In its voluntary Article 7 report submitted in 2005, Sri Lanka noted the presence of these antipersonnel mines in minefields: P4MK1, P4MK2, P4MK3, P5MK1, Type 69 (Pakistan); PRB 413 (Portugal/Pakistan); PRB 409, M696 (Portugal); Type 66, Type 72 (China); and VS-50 (Italy/Singapore). Voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Forms C and H, 13 June 2005. The Monitor previously identified the following antipersonnel mines as having been used by government troops in the past: P4 and P3 MK (manufactured by Pakistan); Type 72, Type 72A, and Type 69 (China); VS-50 (Italy or Singapore); NR409/PRB (Belgium); M409 and M696 (Portugal); and M18A1 Claymore (US). See ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1,118; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 881.

[7]Flow of arms to terrorists must stop,” The Sri Lanka Guardian, 28 October 2009.

[8] Prior to its demise, the LTTE was considered an expert in making explosive weapons. It was known to produce several types of antipersonnel mines: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4MK1 Pakistani mine), SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine), fragmentation antipersonnel mines from mortars, and variants of some of these antipersonnel mines, including some with antihandling features (including Rangan 99 antipersonnel mines with a motion sensor), as well as Amman 2000, MK1, and MK2 antivehicle mines. See ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2010.


Mine Action

Last updated: 21 November 2017

Summary

In 2016, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka adopted a new national mine action strategy, which sets the target for completion of clearance by 2020. The size of remaining antipersonnel mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination as of February 2017 was just over 26.3km2, a large decrease from the nearly 68.4km2 in mid 2015. In 2016, a total of 32km2 was canceled by non-technical survey, 4.2km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 2.3km2 of mined areas was cleared, with the destruction of 59,304 antipersonnel mines. A total of 22km2 was confirmed.

Recommendations for action

  • Continued efforts should be made to implement efficient land release methodology and to more accurately define the size of remaining contamination.
  • Sri Lanka should implement its resource mobilization plan and seek increased funding to ensure mine action activities can meet the 2020 clearance target.

Contamination

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and ERW. Most contamination is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. The estimate of mine/ERW contamination as of February 2017 was just over 26.3km2, a decrease from the nearly 68.4km2 in June 2015. Contamination estimates across the 10 affected districts across three provinces are set out in the table below.[1]

Mine/ERW contamination (as of February 2017)[2]

Province

District

Area (m2)

Northern

Jaffna

821,555

Kilinochchi

10,787,756

Mullaitivu

7,391,741

Vavuniya

2,098,660

Mannar

4,160,512

Subtotal

 

25,260,224

Eastern

Trincomalee

403,823

Batticaloa

323,133

Ampara

9,839

Subtotal

736,795

North Central

Anuradhapura

344,437

Subtotal

344,437

Total

26,341,456

 

Most remaining contamination is located in Sri Lanka’s five northern districts. Both sides made extensive use of mines, including belts of P4 MKI and II blast antipersonnel mines laid by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), and long defensive lines with a mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid by the LTTE.[3] Indian Peacekeeping Forces also used mines during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990.[4]

The SLA used both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, with all use said to have been recorded. Minefield records were handed over to the national mine action program and entered into the national database after the conflict, which greatly facilitated clearance.[5] Operators have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including antipersonnel mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift mechanisms, most of which the group constructed itself, and often containing a larger explosive charge than the P4 MKI and II mines (up to 140g compared to 30g). Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and, to a lesser extent, antivehicle mines, were also used by the LTTE, along with a number of forms of IED to act as fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and magnetically initiated explosive devices, and mines connected to detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells.[6]

Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs, artillery shells and missiles, mortar bombs, handheld antitank projectiles, and rifle and hand grenades. Large caches of abandoned explosive ordnance also exist, particularly in the north.[7]

In 2016, HALO Trust reported that the impact of mines in its areas of operations is primarily socio-economic, with large areas of paddy field and agricultural land blocked for use. Highest priority for clearance is land designated for the resettlement and return of internally displaced persons, mainly concentrated in areas around Muhamalai, Nagarkovil, and the Jaffna High Security Zone, it said. In December 2016, two sectors of the Muhamalai minefield cleared by HALO were officially released, which allowed for the resettlement of a portion of the Intherapuram village and the return of 13 displaced families.[8]

In 2016, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported that in one of its areas of operations, in Mannar district, thousands of internally displaced persons have returned since 2010, though a further 1,300 families are still awaiting resettlement. According to MAG, more than 70% of the population in Mannar district rely on agriculture to get by, and land free of mines and ERW is therefore vital to support conflict-affected communities. Of note in 2016, MAG reported that it performed emergency clearance within the grounds of Mannar Technical College due to discovery of an antipersonnel mine during site preparation for the building of new classrooms. In addition, MAG also cleared three mined areas that were obstructing the installation of electricity pylons, enabling infrastructure to be built to supply communities in Mannar that were previously without electricity.[9]

Program Management

The Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu Religious Affairs became the lead agency for mine action in 2015 as chair of the interministerial National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), which sets policy and is mandated to “manage linkages within the government, mine action community and donors.”[10] Its policies and decisions are implemented by the National Mine Action Center (NMAC), set up in 2010[11] to liaise with government ministries and development partners to determine mine action priorities; prepare a strategic plan; and set annual workplans to put it into effect. NMAC is also responsible for accrediting mine action operators, setting national standards, and acting as the secretariat of NSCMA.[12]

Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality managed by a Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) in Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering Committees for Mine Action. The committees are chaired by government agents heading district authorities.[13]

Under its national mine action strategy for 2016–2020 (see below), the government of Sri Lanka intends to convene steering committee meetings for mine action up to twice per year at national level and at three regional levels, one for the east (Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee) and two for the north (Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu; and Anuradhapura, Mannar, Polonnaruwa, and Vavuniya, respectively).[14]

A decision by the previous government had set a deadline of the end of 2014 for the withdrawal of international operators from the country, which was then extended until the end of 2016. This decision led to NMAC’s activities being severely curtailed due to a suspension in funding while it awaited reassignment to a new government ministry following January 2015 elections, and a loss of some international funding for mine action operations as donors withdrew support in expectation of international operators being asked to leave the country. Previous political issues appeared to be resolved during 2016, however, with renewed political commitment to mine action in Sri Lanka. NMAC reported it fully expected international operators to continue operations until the completion of clearance in 2020 under the new mine action strategy.[15]

Strategic planning

In May 2016, a new national mine action strategy for 2016–2020 was adopted, developed with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and in consultation with operators and the SLA. The strategy, which sets the goal of clearing all mines and ERW by 2020, contains the following strategic objectives:

  • The scope of the mine/ERW problem is identified, confirmed, and addressed using appropriate methodologies and resources.
  • Mine/ERW safe behavior among women, girls, boys, and men is promoted.
  • The needs of mine/ERW victims are determined and met and victims are integrated into society.
  • Sri Lanka accedes to the Mine Ban Treaty and complies with relevant obligations.
  • Long-term residual contamination is effectively managed by appropriate and sustainable national capacities.
  • The Sri Lanka mine action sector can access quality information for its strategic and operational decision-making.[16]

An external mid-term review of the strategy will be requested by NMAC in mid-2018 to evaluate progress and ensure its continued relevance.[17]

Since early 2009, resettlement of internally displaced persons has been the focus of survey and clearance activities, including in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya districts in the north, and Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee districts in the east.[18] Clearance is focused on high-priority areas for resettlement, agricultural land, irrigation tank areas, and other infrastructure and development initiatives, as well as of heavily mined areas such as around Kilinochchi and the Muhamalai Forward Defence Line.[19] In addition, in 2016, the government of Sri Lanka granted increased access to areas of the Jaffna High Security Zone allowing HALO Trust to conduct clearance and MAG to clear previously restricted areas in Eastern province, further expanding the reach of mine action in the country.[20]

Standards

There were no changes to Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards, which continued to be in effect in 2016, though operators reported a full review of the standards was planned to take place in the course of 2017.[21]

Quality management

In September 2016, NMAC expressed concern about reductions in quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) staff capacity and identified a need for assistance in training new recruits.[22]

According to HALO, NMAC’s overall response time for QA improved during the year as it was able to hire additional QA officers. It noted a number of improvements in QA, including final checks of post-clearance inspections occurring within one month of submission of a completion report, quarterly QA of data submitted to IMSMA, and frequently same-day approval of minefield execution plans upon submission.[23]

Information management

In 2015, an updated version of the software for the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was installed and a process of data entry and ground verification was initiated.[24] In 2016, operators reported that significant efforts were exerted by stakeholders to correct erroneous data entered into IMSMA, leading to a more accurate representation of remaining contamination. MAG reported that, following its re-survey of six districts, and data verification in two additional districts carried out by HALO, the IMSMA database was completely overhauled in 2016.[25]

Operators

In 2016, demining was conducted by the SLA; one national NGO, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH); and the two international NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG. A national organization, SHARP, became operational from January 2016 after securing funding and inheriting equipment and staff from international NGO Danish Demining Group, which closed operations in Sri Lanka in 2014.[26]

After a steep reduction in demining personnel in 2015 due to a cut in funding following the previous government’s announcement that all international demining organizations would have to leave the country by the end of the year (a decision subsequently reversed), in 2016, HALO Trust’s operational staff increased from 330 staff at the start of the year to 442, as a result of the re-engagement of a former donor. In December 2016, 39 manual teams were deployed as well as two survey teams and seven mechanical teams with the assistance of six machines, including four CASE front-end loaders, one tracked Caterpillar, one JCB excavator, and one stone crusher.[27] MAG’s capacity increased in 2016 to a total of 15 manual clearance teams, eight mechanical teams, and four community liaison teams.[28]

NMAC reported in October 2016 that the SLA employed a total of 555 persons in demining operations, of whom 515 were deminers, along with 11 mechanical flails. DASH, and its subcontractor, SHARP, employed 274 deminers, and a total of 355 staff during the year and one mechanical asset.[29]

Land Release

A total of nearly 38.5km2 was reported released in 2016, an increase from almost 36.2km2 in 2015. However, the amount of land released through clearance and technical survey decreased to 6.5km2 in 2016, from close to 9.8km2 in 2015.[30] Non-technical survey which began in June 2015 was completed in February 2017, with the cancellation of 42.4km2 of suspected hazardous area (SHA), reducing the total contamination from just over 68.4km2 to close to 26km2.[31]

Survey in 2016

A total of 32km2 was reported canceled by non-technical survey by MAG and HALO in 2016, while confirming nearly 22km2 as mined.[32] Just under 4.2km2 was reportedly reduced through technical survey during the year.[33] This compares to release by survey in 2015, when according to NMAC’s official data, a total of 26.4km2 was canceled by non-technical survey and a further 6.3km2 reduced through technical survey.[34]

In 2016, in close cooperation with NMAC, MAG re-surveyed six of eight contaminated districts to reclassify and confirm that SHAs registered in the IMSMA database were in fact confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). It reported canceling a total of just over 27.6km2 in 2016 through non-technical survey and reducing nearly 756,000m2, while confirming over 6.5km2 as mined.[35]

HALO Trust reported canceling just over 41,600m2 of CHA during non-technical survey and clearance, and reducing over 123,600m2 by technical survey, along with confirming close to 10,200m2 as mined by survey activities in 2016. Additionally, HALO was tasked by NMAC to re-survey SHAs originally reported by other clearance operators, and in the process canceled 49 SHAs with a size of over 4.4km2 and confirmed a further 103 areas with a size of nearly 14.7km2 as mined.[36]

MAG emphasized the impact of the collaborative re-survey effort in fundamentally changing how Sri Lanka plans towards completion at both the strategic and operational levels.[37]

Mined area survey in 2016[38]

Operator

SHAs canceled

Area canceled (m²)

SHAs confirmed as mined

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

DASH

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

286,348

MAG

277

27,607,927

97

6,517,936

755,769

HALO

 

41,601[39]

4

10,157

123,626

HALO

49

4,423,138

103

14,667,094

0

SHARP

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

0

SLA

N/R

N/R

N/R

N/R

3,014,006

Total

326

32,072,666

204

21,195,997

4,179,749

Note: TS = technical survey; N/R = not reported.

Clearance in 2016

Nearly 2.3km2 of mined area was reportedly cleared in 2016, with a total of 59,304 antipersonnel mines, 117 antivehicle mines, and 2,907 items of unexploded ordinance (UXO) destroyed.[40] This compares to 2015, when NMAC reported 3.52km2 of mined area cleared.[41]

Mine clearance in 2016[42]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

DASH

N/R

770,110

12,630

65

875

MAG

29

453,575

10,280

2

430

HALO

29

802,168

16,192

44

1,214

SHARP

N/R

27,264

69

0

5

SLA

N/R

296,304

20,133

6

383

Total

58

2,349,421

59,304

117

2,907

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle; N/R = not reported.

In 2016, MAG released in total over 1.12km2 through clearance and technical survey, destroying over 10,280 mines in the process. It stated that this significant increase in output was a result of an increase in funding.[43] As a result of increasingly positive collaborative interaction with NMAC, MAG was able to conduct clearance in Eastern province for the first time since 2009. Subsequently, MAG was able to project that all remaining confirmed hazardous areas in Eastern province could be completed by the end of 2017.[44]

HALO Trust cleared 802,168m2 and reduced 123,626m2 in 2016, which shows a decrease in the amount of area cleared in 2016, compared with 2015 due to a decrease in the use of flails and beach-tech teams in Nagarkovil, as areas appropriate for the deployment of these mechanical assets were largely cleared in 2015 and in previous years. The SLA released additional sections of the Jaffna High Security Zone (HSZ) in 2016, which allowed for HALO to increase its pace of survey and clearance of former HSZ areas, from clearance of just under 40,500m2 in 2016, compared with nearly 21,700m2 in 2015.[45]

Deminer safety

HALO Trust reported that five deminers were injured in separate accidents during 2016. Three deminers involved in antipersonnel mine clearance accidents in March, May, and September sustained minor injuries and were able to return to work. As a result of the accidents, HALO reported that a revised risk assessment lead to a change in deployment and the increased use of mechanical support for demining. Two other accidents in August and November involving an antipersonnel mine and an unknown device resulted in more serious injuries to deminers.[46]

Progress towards completion

In line with Sri Lanka’s national mine action strategic plan’s completion deadline, both MAG and HALO Trust asserted in 2017 that clearance of all known contamination is possible by 2020, with increased support from donors and an expansion in clearance capacity.[47]

NMAC has reported that, cumulatively, a total of 133.4km2 of mine contamination was reduced or cleared between 2002 and March 2017, and a total of 705,565 mines destroyed during that timeframe.[48]

Since 2012, Sri Lanka has reported clearing close to 32km2 of mined area, though clearance dropped significantly in 2013 following a decline in capacity due to closure of the operations of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) in 2013, and two Indian demining NGOs, Horizon and Sarvatra, in 2012 (see table below).

Mine clearance in 2012–2016

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

2.35

2015

3.52

2014

3.75

2013

6.44

2012

15.58

Total

31.64

 

According to Sri Lanka’s national mine action strategy, 6.5km2 is expected to be reduced or cleared annually with sustained resources. As noted above, NMAC is expected to request an external mid-term review of the strategy in 2018 to evaluate progress and to adapt the strategy if necessary.[49] In 2016, a resource mobilization action plan to accompany the strategy was developed by the government of Sri Lanka, in collaboration with the GICHD, specifying, among other things, activities, tasks, responsibilities, and time-lines.[50]

The government created a national budget line for mine action in 2015.[51] NMAC reported that during the year, funding for its operational costs and the SLA’s demining unit had been provided by the government.[52]

HALO Trust reported that increased donor funding in 2017 had enabled it to hire 60% more national staff and it was expecting a corresponding increase in clearance output. It stated clearance priorities would remain unchanged and that a large portion of HALO’s demining capacity would remain in Muhamalai and Nagarkovil for the purpose of clearing land for resettlement.[53] It would focus on completing clearance of all mined areas in Jaffna, which it said will hopefully be completed in early 2018.[54]

On 21 June 2017, the first of Sri Lanka’s mine-affected districts was declared safe from landmines, after clearance of Batticaloa district was declared completed by MAG, with the support of the SLA and government of Sri Lanka.[55]

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu Religious Affairs, “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016; email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, Assistant Director of Operations, Quality Management, and Planning, and Chairman of Accreditation Committee, National Mine Action Center (NMAC), 14 October 2016; NMAC, “Annual Progress Report on Mine Action Year 2014,” undated but 2015; Mines Advisory Group (MAG), “SL District Re-survey Results Before & After Re-survey,” August 2017; and email from Alistair Moir, Country Director, MAG, 28 September 2017. The figure of 26.3km2 includes contamination figures for Anuradhapura district as of 30 June 2016. MAG reported that Anuradhapura was not part of the 2015–2017 re-survey and that the total amount of contamination remaining in the areas re-surveyed (Mannar, Vavuniya, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara) amounted to 25,997,019m2 as of August 2017.

[2] MAG, “SL District Re-survey Results Before & After Re-survey,” August 2017; and emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 28 September and 6 October 2017. Figures for Anuradhapura are as of 30 June 2016. MAG reported that Anuradhapura district was not part of the 2015–2017 re-survey. It is also not clear based on previous reporting if a small amount of contamination remains in Colombo district.

[3] Interviews with demining operators, Colombo, 29 March–2 April 2010; and with Maj. Pradeep Gamage, Officer-in-Charge, North Jaffna Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), Jaffna, 3 April 2007.

[4] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 6.

[5] Ibid.; and interview with Rob Syfret, Operations Manager, HALO Trust, in Kilinochchi, 12 September 2016.

[6] Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO Trust, 11 April 2014; and “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 6.

[7] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 6.

[8] Emails from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April and 28 September 2017.

[9] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August and 27 September 2017.

[10] “The National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka,” Ministry of Economic Development, September 2010, p. 9; and email from Sri Mallikarachchi, Senior IMSMA Officer, NMAC, 13 October 2015. After Sri Lanka’s January 2015 presidential elections and change of government, the Ministry of Economic Development, which formerly housed NMAC, was dismantled. A March 2015 Cabinet memorandum then assigned development activity, implemented by the former Ministry of Economic Development, to other relevant ministries. This resulted in responsibility for the national mine action program being assigned to the Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, and Hindu Religious Affairs. “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 10.

[11] The Cabinet formally approved the creation of NMAC on 10 July 2010. 


[12] Email from Amanthi Wickramasinghe, Programme Officer − Peace and Recovery, UNDP, Colombo, 11 March 2011. 


[13] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 9. It states that: “Steering committees used to play an important role in providing guidance to the mine action programme and in promoting transparency and accountability. At the national level the Steering Committee fulfilled the role of a National Mine Action Authority. It used to convene key national stakeholders including the SLA and relevant Ministries, mine action NGOs and main development partners. At regional and district levels, steering committees were tasked to ensure priority-setting of survey, clearance and MRE activities.”

[14] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 10.

[15] Interview with Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, Colombo, 15 September 2016.

[16] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 11.

[17] Ibid., p. 27.

[18] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 7.

[19] Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.

[20] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and Helaine Boyd, Programme Support Officer, HALO Trust, 25 April and 28 September 2017.

[21] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[22] Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016; and interview, Colombo, 15 September 2016.

[23] Email from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[24] Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.

[25] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[26] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 12.

[27] Emails from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April and 28 September 2017.

[28] Email from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017.

[29] Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016.

[30] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017; presentation by Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, “1st Quarter Meeting 2017,” undated; and “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 13.

[31] Email from Alistair Moir, MAG, 27 September 2017.

[32] Ibid., 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[33] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017; and presentation by Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, “1st Quarter Meeting 2017,” undated.

[34] Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 14 October 2016.

[35] Email from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017.

[36] Emails from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April and 28 September 2017.

[37] Email from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017.

[38] ibid.; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017; and presentation by Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, “1st Quarter Meeting 2017,” undated.

[39] HALO Trust reported that this was cancelation of confirmed hazardous areas, not suspected hazardous areas. Email from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[40] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017; and presentation by Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, “1st Quarter Meeting 2017,” undated.

[41] Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016. Demining organizations are not permitted to destroy mines found using explosives. The SLA collects mines recovered on a daily basis which it transports to an army facility for destruction. Interviews with Ivica Stilin, MAG, in Vavuniya, 13 September 2016; and with Rob Syfret, HALO Trust, in Kilinochchi, 12 September 2016.

[42] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017; and presentation by Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, “1st Quarter Meeting 2017,” undated.

[43] Email from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Email from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[46] Ibid., and 28 September 2017. HALO Trust reported that the accident in August involved an unknown device suspected to be a grenade and resulted in injuries to the deminer’s hand, leg, and eyes. In the second accident in November, a deminer was injured by an antipersonnel mine, resulting in the amputation of both hands.

[47] Emails from Alistair Moir, MAG, 21 August 2017; and from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[48] Presentation by Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, “1st Quarter Meeting 2017,” undated.

[49] “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, pp. 13 and 27.

[50] Ibid., p. 26.

[51] Ibid., p. 22.

[52] Email from Mahinda Bandara Wickramasingha, NMAC, 7 October 2016. NMAC reported the government also allowed all demining related equipment to be imported tax-free during the year.

[53] Email from Helaine Boyd, HALO Trust, 25 April 2017.

[54] Ibid., 28 September 2017.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 11 December 2017

In 2016, international contributions from four states supporting clearance and risk education activities in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka totaled US$4.6 million, which represents a decrease of more than $1 million (18%) compared to 2015.[1]

The largest contributions came from the United States (US) ($2.5 million) and Japan ($1.4 million) for clearance and risk education activities, and represented more than 90% of total international support in 2016.

Sri Lanka has never reported its financial contribution to its mine action program. However, in a speech on the 2012 budget, President Mahinda Rajapaksa indicated that it was substantial, stating that since 2009 the army has been engaged in demining, rebuilding, and urban development at a cost of LKR5.4 billion (approximately US$42 million).[2]

International contributions: 2016[3]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount (US$)

US

Clearance and risk education

$2,500,000

2,500,000

Japan

Clearance

¥154,161,266

1,418,749

Canada

Clearance

C$569,386

429,952

United Kingdom

Clearance and risk education

£173,036

234,550

Total

 

 

4,583,251

 

Since 2012, international contributions to mine action in Sri Lanka totaled about $41.5 million, and averaged some $8 million per year. In comparison, international support for mine action in Sri Lanka totaled $91.5 million in 2007–2011 (and averaged $18 million per year).

International assistance to mine action has considerably declined in recent years, dropping from $12.5 million in 2012 to just $4.6 million in 2016 (a 63% decrease).

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[4]

Year

Amount (US$)

% change from previous year

2016

4,583,251

-18

2015

5,614,583

-34

2014

8,449,142

-19

2013

10,372,587

-17

2012

12,490,824

-49

Total

41,510,387

 

 



[1] Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 21 July 2017; Japan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017; United Kingdom, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017; and email from Steve Costner, Deputy Office Director, Weapons Removal and Abatement, United States (US) Department of State, 30 October 2017.

[2] Ministry of Economic Development, “2012 Budget 100 Proposals for Development His Excellency the President Mahinda Rajapaksa presented the 2012 budget proposals to the parliament,” undated. Average exchange rate for 2012: LKR127.231=US$1, Oanda.com, Historical Exchange Rates.

[3] Average exchange rate for 2016: C$1.3243=US$1; ¥108.66=US$1; £1=US$1.3555. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017.

[4] See previous Monitor reports. Totals for international support in 2015 and 2014 have been rectified as a result of revised US funding data. 


Casualties

Last updated: 23 January 2018

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

22,193 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties

Casualties occurring in 2016

8 (2015: 8)

2016 casualties by survival outcome

8 (1 killed; 7 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

2 antivehicle mines; 1 antipersonnel mine; 5 ERW

 

In 2016, eight adult male mine/ERW casualties were recorded in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in six incidents.[1] Eight adult male casualties were also recorded  in 2015, in five mine/ERW incidents.[2] This marked a significant decrease in annual casualties compared to the 21 and 22 mine/ERW casualties, in 2014 and 2013 respectively.[3] Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020 reports different annual total casualty figures for the two years prior to 2015: with 16 casualties in 2014 and 21 in 2013 recorded.[4]

In 2014, UNICEF reported that since the 1980s some 22,177 mine/ERW casualties had been recorded, including 1,603 civilian casualties. However, from 2006 to 2009 accurate casualty information was difficult to access due to ongoing conflict, likely resulting in under-reporting.[5] In April 2010, it was reported that since the 1980s there were a total of 21,993 mine casualties, including 1,419 civilian returnees; 3,770 recorded amputees among the armed forces, police, and civil defense forces; and 16,804 mine casualties among the non-state armed group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).[6] From 1999 to the end of 2016, the Monitor identified 1,185 casualties in Sri Lanka (144 killed; 577 injured; 464 unknown).



[1] Email from Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 11 July 2017.

[2] Ibid., 11 May 2016; and “Sri Lanka National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020,” May 2016, p. 19.

[3] Emails from Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 11 May 2015; and from Vidya Abhayagunawardena, Monitor Researcher 19 May 2015.

[5] Email from Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 11 May 2015.

[6] Statement by Brig. Udaya Nanayakkara, Chief Field Engineer, Sri Lanka Army, in “On landmines and explosive remnants of war: raising awareness and taking Action,” Asian Tribune (Colombo), 30 April 2010. Although not stated, presumably all these casualties were included in the 30-year total.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 16 March 2018

Victim assistance commitments

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Sri Lanka has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Sri Lanka ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 8 February 2016.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Sri Lanka, both civilian and military, was estimated to be in the thousands.[1] The National Mine Action Center (NMAC) reported 1,474 registered civilian mine survivors injured in Sri Lanka between 1985 and the end of 2011.[2]

Victim assistance since 2015

The support provided to the physical rehabilitation sector in Sri Lanka significantly decreased with the phasing out of ICRC and Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International), which resulted in a decrease in geographical coverage. A general reduction in funding for victim assistance activities resulted in a decrease in the availability of services for mine/ERW victims.[3] However, a mapping of the physical rehabilitation sector in Sri Lanka led by HI in collaboration with various stakeholders in 2013 showed that there remained gaps in geographical coverage, a lack of capacity among existing providers, a shortage of trained workers, and unclear referral mechanisms between health facilities and physical rehabilitation services. Other important challenges were the lack of awareness among persons with disabilities about the existence and importance of physical rehabilitation, as well as the lack of long-term follow-up at home and community level, which may result in people abandoning their rehabilitation or stopping their use of assistive devices.

Victim assistance in 2016

There was a decrease in the number of service providers; especially among international NGOs.

There was also a decrease in financial support as most of the donors withdrew direct support as the post-conflict recovery programs were completed. The national mine action strategy was revised in 2016 and included a section on victim assistance.[4] Survivors and their representative organizations were not involved in the provision of victim assistance services.[5]

Assessing victim assistance needs

There was no combined or comprehensive data on the number or the needs of mine/ERW survivors, victims of war, or other persons with disabilities. Ongoing needs assessments were conducted by mine risk education agencies in the field using specific questionnaires. These agencies also informed new victims of their rights and available services. District-level referral mechanisms were established.[6]

In June 2016, Sri Lanka was to update its injury surveillance system.[7] The NMAC was yet to start coordinating with state and non-state victim assistance partners to improve access to existing services for mine/ERW survivors and to address the gaps in service availability.[8] 

Details of mine/ERW incidents were recorded in the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and casualty data collection was carried out by the NMAC. The data was used by the relevant government institutions, such as the Ministry of Resettlement, Department of Social Services and Social Welfare (MoSS), for their programs. NGOs also access the NMAC data for use in their programs.[9]

Victim assistance coordination[10]

Government coordinating body/focal point

None; the Ministry of Social Empowerment, Welfare and Kandyan Heritage (formerly the Ministry of Social Services, MoSS) is responsible for coordinating the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities

Coordinating mechanism

UNICEF acted as the coordination point for victim assistance activities

Plan

None; victim assistance is included in the National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka

 

No victim assistance planning and coordination meetings as such were reported in 2016. NMAC had a victim assistance officer in place but the appointee had not been trained. No victim assistance focal points in the relevant ministries had been identified as of October 2017.[11] UNICEF supported victim assistance service providers, though at a much lower scale than for risk education.[12] Due to budget constraints and a decrease in the number of new casualties in 2016, UNICEF reduced its efforts towards victim assistance. UNICEF noted that it became challenging to provide continued support to victims.[13]

Ministries dealing with victim assistance include the Ministry of Social Empowerment, Welfare and Kandyan Heritage (formerly, MoSS), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Defense, which acts as the Directorate of Rehabilitation.[14]

The 2016 National Mine Action Strategy for Sri Lanka contains victim assistance objectives, several of which were intended to be measurable, but has no baseline information or data; these include the number of victims benefiting annually from medical and rehabilitation services, psychosocial support, access to socio-economic inclusion/per year, and the number of service providers by sector of assistance.[15]

A National Action Plan for Disability was approved in January 2014. It focuses on persons with disabilities in general, but also includes mine/ERW victims—in particular, support and increased accessibility to the rehabilitation sector, as well as community-based rehabilitation, are integral parts of the plan.[16]

Survivor inclusion

According to information available, involvement of the survivors and/or their representative organizations in planning and the provision of services was minimal.[17] Disabled persons’ organizations are included in the various coordination mechanisms.[18]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Ministry of Social Empowerment, Welfare and Kandyan Heritage (formerly the MoSS)

Government

Community-based rehabilitation including self-help groups, medical care, assistive devices, income-generation projects, assistance with housing, and self-employment

Ranaviru Sevana Rehabilitation Centre

Government

Provided physical rehabilitation, social support, economic inclusion, and other assistance to disabled veterans

Jaffna Jaipur Center for Disability Rehabilitation (JJCDR)

National NGO

The only center providing physical rehabilitation on the Jaffna peninsula; produced prostheses for amputees, wheelchairs, and other mobility devices, and provided micro-credit for persons with disabilities and financial support for students with disabilities; operated an outreach program for those unable to travel to the center

Sarvodaya

National NGO

Psychological assistance

Social Organizations Networking for Development (SOND)

National NGO

Provided mobility devices, psychosocial support, referrals, support for medical assistance, and economic inclusion

Valvuthayam Caritas

National NGO

Providing prosthetics and mobility devices through Mannar Rehabilitation Center; outreach to areas such as Kilinochchi, Mullaithievu, and Puttalam

Leonard Cheshire Disability Resource Center

National NGO branch of international NGO

Providing access to livelihood for persons with disabilities in Gampaha District

Meththa Foundation

National NGO branch of international NGO

Providing prosthetic and mobility devices

Motivation

International NGO

Supporting provision of prosthetics and wheelchairs to mine/ERW survivors in Vavuniya, Jaffna, and Mannar

UNICEF

UN

Support to MoSS and NGO rehabilitation services; mine risk education; provided financial support to implementing NGOs and referrals through a victim assistance network

ICRC

International organization

Trained and reimbursed some patients for the cost of treatment

 

HI no longer provided rehabilitation services in 2016.[19] The HI physical rehabilitation centers in Batticaloa and Kilinochchi were handed over to the Ministry of Health to continue the delivery of services. UNICEF reported a reduction in the availability of physical rehabilitation and economic inclusion services in 2016, due to a decrease in funding.[20]

Despite the withdrawal of ICRC support, the JJCDR provided prostheses and mobility devices to 71 mine/ERW victims and conducted outreach visits 725 homes. The micro-credit program run by JJCDR however stopped in 2016.[21]

SOND provided emergency assistance to three mine/ERW victims. Thirteen mine victims were identified by SOND for livelihood support, which they received from the respective Grama Niladhari (village officer) Divisional Secretary Social Service Officer. The activities ranged from animal husbandry to TV repair and fishing. Each mine survivor beneficiary received initial financial assistance for livelihood activities.[22]

UNICEF activities in 2016 were mindful of age- and gender-specific needs.[23] UNICEF’s mine risk education program reached 250,000 community members.[24]

Laws and policies

Sri Lanka lacked adequate legislation to protect and respect the rights of persons with disabilities. The Draft Disability Rights Bill has been amended by the Department of Legal Draftsman, and the Ministry of Social Empowerment, Welfare and Kandyan Heritage is currently reviewing the proposed amendments.[25] Discrimination continued to occur in employment, education, and the provision of state services, including public transportation. Access to buildings and public transportation for persons with disabilities remained rare.[26]



[1] Based on casualty figures in statement by Brig. Udaya Nanayakkara, Chief Field Engineer, Sri Lanka Army, in “On landmines and explosive remnants of war: raising awareness and taking Action,” Asian Tribune (Colombo), 30 April 2010; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 4 November 2014.

[2] Government of Sri Lanka, UN Nations & Partners “Joint Plan for Assistance Northern Province 2012,” p. 57.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 13 October 2017.

[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 13 October 2017.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ministry of Health, “National Injury Surveillance (NIS) System,” Colombo, 17 May 2016.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jayashanka Basnayake, Deputy Programme Coordinator, HI Sri Lanka, 4 August 2016.

[10] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 11 May 2015; email from Vidya Abhayagunawardena, 19 May 2015; ICRC, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015; ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015; emails from Nancy Rollinson, HI Sri Lanka, 22 and 27 October 2014; MoSS and Ministry of Health, “Sri Lanka: National Action Plan for Disability, a multisectoral framework,” January 2014; “The National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka,” Ministry of Economic Development, September 2010; and MoSS, “Performance Report 2013,” Battaramulla, undated but 2014.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 13 October 2017.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 13 October 2017.

[15] Ibid., pp. 17–19.

[16] MoSS and Ministry of Health, “Sri Lanka: National Action Plan for Disability, a multisectoral framework,” January 2014; emails from Nancy Rollinson, HI Sri Lanka, 22 and 27 October 2014; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 4 November 2014.

[17] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 13 October 2017; and by Jayashanka Basnayake, HI Sri Lanka, 4 August 2016.

[18] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 4 November 2014.

[19] Email from Matteo Caprotti, Country Representative, HI, 17 July 2017.

[20] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 13 October 2017.

[21] Emails from Dr. J. Ganeshamoorthy, Chairperson, JJCDR, 13 and 14 July 2017.

[22] Response to Monitor questionnaire by S. Senthurajah, Executive Director, SOND, 5 November 2016; and email, 8 October 2017.

[23] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mihlar Mohamed, UNICEF, Colombo, 13 October 2017.

[24] UNICEF, “Annual Report 2016: Sri Lanka,” p. 10.

[25] Letter from the Ministry of Social Empowerment, Welfare and Kandyan Heritage, 17 October 2017.

[26] United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Sri Lanka,” Washington, DC, March 2017.