Lebanon

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 04 August 2016

Summary: State Party Lebanon ratified the convention on 5 November 2010, becoming the first State Party from the Middle East. Lebanon has expressed its desire to amend existing legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions. It has participated in every meeting of the convention and hosted the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut in September 2011. Lebanon was a lead sponsor on a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. It has condemned new use of cluster munitions and elaborated its views on a number of important issues relating to the interpretation and implementation of the convention. Lebanon reports that it has never used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions. Cluster munitions were used in the past in Lebanon, most recently by Israel in 2006.

Policy

The Republic of Lebanon signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 5 November 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 May 2011.

Following a legislative review, Lebanon in September 2012 announced its desire to amend existing legislation to ensure implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[1] In April 2013, it stated that a final report with recommendations on national measures had been drafted for circulation to stakeholders.[2]

Lebanon submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 27 October 2011 and provided annual updated reports since then, most recently in March 2016.[3]

Lebanon participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and advocated forcefully for humanitarian protection to be accorded first priority in the development of the convention’s provisions.[4] It hosted a regional conference on cluster munitions in Beirut from 11–12 November 2008 to draw attention to the convention and its Oslo Signing Conference.

Lebanon hosted the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut on 12–16 September 2011.[5] Lebanon’s President General Michel Sleiman addressed the meeting’s opening ceremony with a statement that condemned the use of cluster munitions. Lebanon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Adnan Mansour, served as president of the Second Meeting of States Parties with the assistance of Lebanon’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Najla Riachi Assaker.

Lebanon continues to play an active role in the work of the convention. From September 2014 until September 2015, it served as co-coordinator of the convention’s work on the general status and operation of the convention together with the Netherlands. In this role, Lebanon played a central role in helping to establish an implementation support unit (ISU) for the convention, including securing agreement on the financial procedures for its operation.

Lebanon participated in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015, where it made several statements. In an address to the high-level segment of the meeting, Lebanon urged States Parties to pay greater attention to their international cooperation and assistance to ensure full implementation of the convention.[6]

Lebanon was a lead sponsor on and voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the convention adopted on 7 December 2015, which urges all states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[7] A total of 139 states voted in favor of the non-binding resolution including many non-signatories.

Lebanon has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention and the First Review Conference, as well as intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011–2015. It has convened and participated in regional workshops on cluster munitions.

Lebanon has stated it is disturbed and deeply concerned at “cluster munition use anywhere by anyone.”[8] At the First Review Conference, Lebanon said, “we believe any use of cluster munitions must be condemned, regardless of who used.”[9] At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2015, Lebanon’s representative stated that “based on its continuous painful experience as a victim of these weapons since 2006, Lebanon condemns any use of cluster munitions and calls for the universalization of the Convention.”[10]

Lebanon is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Lebanon has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation. It has stated that the prohibition on the transfer of cluster munitions includes a prohibition on “transit,” that foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions is prohibited, that financing and investment in cluster munition production or transfer is prohibited, and that Article 1 of the convention takes precedence over Article 21 so that “States Parties must never undertake any act that could constitute deliberate assistance with a prohibited act.”[11]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Lebanon has stated several times that it has never used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions.[12] It has confirmed no production of cluster munitions in its Article 7 reports.[13]

Lebanon has not retained any cluster munitions for training or research purposes because it says it sees no reason to do so as the “detection of submunition remnants does not require a more sophisticated technology than what currently exists.”[14]

Israel used cluster munitions in Lebanon in 1978, 1982, and 2006.[15] The United States (US) dropped cluster bombs against Syrian air defense units near Beirut during an intervention in December 1983.[16] In 2006, Hezbollah fired cluster munitions from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[17]



[1] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012.

[2] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 15 April 2013. Lebanon did not report any new information under national implementation measures in its most recent Article 7 report. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 22 March 2016.

[3] The time periods covered by the reports are as follows: Article 7 Report submitted October 2011 (from 13 October 1990 to 27 October 2011), April 2012 (27 October 2011 to 9 April 2012), April 2013 (calendar year 2012), 15 April 2014 (calendar year 2013), 30 April 2015 (calendar year 2014), and 22 March 2016 (calendar year 2015).

[4] For details on Lebanon’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 105–107.

[5] A total of 131 governments participated in the meeting (52 States Parties, 38 signatories, and 40 observer states), as well representatives from UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC. UN, “Final Document, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties,” CCM/MSP/2011/5, Beirut, 16 September 2011.

[6] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

[7]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[8] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2015. Notes by the CMC.

[9] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

[10] Statement of Lebanon, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 15 October 2015.

[11] Letter from the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN in Geneva, 10 February 2009. It states: “It is the understanding of the Government of Lebanon that the transit of cluster munitions across, or foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on the national territory of States Parties is prohibited by the Convention. Article /1/ paragraph (b) of the Convention explicitly prohibits all stockpiling and all transfers...It is the understanding of the Government of Lebanon that all assistance with prohibited acts is prohibited under Article /1/ paragraph (c) of the Convention. While Article 21 allows for military cooperation with states non party to the Convention it does not allow any assistance with prohibited acts. In the view of Lebanon Article /1/ paragraph (c) takes precedence over Article 21 and States Parties must never undertake any act that could constitute deliberate assistance with a prohibited act. It is the understanding of the Government of Lebanon that Article /1/ paragraph (c) of the Convention prohibits the investment in entities engaged in the production or transfer of cluster munitions or investment in any company that provides financing to such entities. In the view of Lebanon ‘assistance’ as stipulated in Article /1/ paragraph (c) includes investment in entities engaged in the production or transfer of cluster munitions and is thus prohibited under the Convention.”

[12] Letter from the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN in Geneva, 10 February 2009; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 October 2011; “Cluster Munition Monitor 2012,” document provided in letter from the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN in Geneva to HRW, Ref 8/27/1 & 131/2012, 7 June 2012; and statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011.

[14] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011.

[15] HRW, “Meeting the Challenge: Protecting Civilians through the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” November 2010, pp. 33–38. For details on Israel’s use of cluster munitions in Lebanon and its impact, see HRW, Flooding South Lebanon: Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006 (Vol. 20, No. 2(E), February 2008); and Landmine Action, “Foreseeable harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006,” October 2006.

[16] US Department of the Navy, Attack Squadron 15, Memorandum from Commanding Officer, Attack Squadron 15, to Chief of Naval Operations, “Command History: Enclosure 5, Ordnance Expenditure for 1983,” 18 February 1984, declassified 28 April 2000.

[17] HRW, “Civilians Under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War,” August 2007, pp. 44–48. Hezbollah fired about 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets, each of which contains 39 Type-90 submunitions, also known as MZD-2. In June 2012, Lebanon provided the Monitor with the following statement: “In the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli aggression, the Lebanese army found several kinds of unexploded cluster munitions on the Lebanese territory. Among these found were used and failed Chinese made MZD2. All (MZD2) were found in an area that is 10 kilometers away from the Lebanese – Occupied Palestine borders. Lebanon does not stockpile any kind of cluster munitions, it has not used any in the past, and the Lebanese Government considers all failed or unexploded cluster munitions or submunitions on the Lebanese soil as a legacy of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon; it should be noted though that these MZD2 munitions were only found after the 2006 aggression.” “Cluster Munition Monitor 2012,” document provided in letter from the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN in Geneva to HRW, Ref 8/27/1 & 131/2012, 7 June 2012.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 19 October 2017

Policy

The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, but indicated in December 2009 that it intends to do so, saying that it “hopes to sign…in the future” and it “looks forward to joining the Mine Ban Treaty.”[1]

Previously, in 2004, Lebanon had said that it was unable to join the Mine Ban Treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel.[2] The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah further heightened concerns about the security of its southern border. In August 2013, Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adnan Mansour, reportedly stated that landmines “are protecting the border” with Israel.[3]

Lebanon attended, as an observer, the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago, Chile, in November–December 2016 and intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2017. It did not make any statements at these meetings.

Lebanon abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 71/34 on antipersonnel mines on 5 December 2016.

Lebanon is party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and hosted its Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut in September 2011. Lebanon is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.[4]

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

In December 2009, Lebanon confirmed that it “has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.”[5] There have been no allegations of new use by Lebanese forces of antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like devices in Lebanon since 2006.[6] In late 2011 and in 2012, the Syrian Army laid antipersonnel and antivehicle mines along its borders, including the border with Lebanon in al-Buni, Heet (PMN-2 and TMN-46 mines), and Masharih al-Qaa.[7]

In August 2011, Lebanon informed the Monitor that “The Lebanese Government doesn’t use or stockpile or produce or transport any anti-personnel mines, though the Lebanese army retains very few numbers for training purposes.”[8] Earlier, in March 2008, the director of the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) said that the stockpile consists of a small quantity of mines, which he described as being lower than the maximum number permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty for training purposes.[9]

In August 2017, the Lebanese Army launched a military operation to expel Islamic State (IS) militants from an area they occupied in the western Qalamoun Mountains, near Arsala, on Lebanon’s border with Syria. The area occupied by IS was found to have extensive contamination from IS-laid improvised mines.[10]



[1] Statement by Gen. Mohamed Femhi, Director, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), Second Review Conference, Mine Ban Treaty, Cartagena, 4 December 2009. More fully, Lebanon said, “Regardless of the fact that Israel refuses to accede to the Ottawa or Oslo Conventions…Lebanon will not follow that same path. Lebanon understands the tragic consequences that cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines have on civilian populations. Lebanon has signed the Oslo treaty and hopes to sign the Ottawa Convention in the future…Lebanon, here again, confirms his beliefs in the principle of the Ottawa Convention and its noble objectives, and looks forward to joining the Mine Ban Treaty.”

[2] Statement by Amb. Michel Haddad, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 3 December 2004. The ambassador cited the “failure of the Government of Israel to submit all the maps showing the deployment of landmines” and the “continued occupation by Israel of parts of Southern Lebanon.”

[4] Lebanon acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and its optional Protocols I, II, and III on 5 April 2017.

[5] Statement by Gen. Femhi, LMAC, Second Review Conference, Mine Ban Treaty, Cartagena, 4 December 2009.

[6] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 893–895, for allegations regarding Hezbollah, Fatah al-Islam, and Israel; and response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN in Geneva, 26 August 2011. Lebanon confirmed in the August 2011 letter that “Antipersonnel mines were never used in Lebanon in 2010 or 2011.”

[7] The Lebanese president confirmed in November 2011 that Syria had planted landmines along its border with Lebanon, on the Syrian side. See, “Sleiman: Syria regrets incursions into Lebanon,” The Daily Star, 10 November 2011; “2 Syrian Nationals Wounded by Landmine at Northern Border-Crossing,” Naharnet, 9 February 2012; and “Syria plants mines along Lebanon border,” The Daily Star, 13 June 2012. For information about an injury at an unidentified location on the Syria-Lebanese border, see, “Lebanon-Syria border blast wounds 3,” Agence France-Presse, 29 July 2012. On March 9, The Washington Post published on its website a photo of dirt-covered PMN-2 antipersonnel mines and TMN-46 antivehicle mines that it reported were planted by the Syrian army on the outskirts of the Syrian village of Heet.

[8] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN in Geneva, 26 August 2011.

[9] Interview with Gen. Fehmi, LMAC, Beirut, 3 March 2008. While the text of the Mine Ban Treaty does not specify a maximum number that may be retained for demining training purposes, most States Parties have agreed that the number should be in the hundreds or thousands, or less, and not in the tens of thousands.

[10] Landmine Monitor interview with Brig. Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, in Geneva, 4 September 2017.


Mine Action

Last updated: 17 November 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (heavy contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Article 4 deadline: 1 May 2021
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty

Summary

The Republic of Lebanon is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), largely a legacy of 15 years of civil conflict, Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon (in 1978 and 1982), and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000. Cluster munition contamination is mainly the result of the conflict with Israel from July–August 2006, although some remnants are from conflicts in the 1980s.[1]

Landmines: As of the end of 2016, Lebanon had almost 27.8km2 of mine contamination, including along the Blue Line.[2] Lebanon reported 0.55km2 cleared, and 0.01km2 canceled. However, the difference in baseline mine contamination between the end of 2015 and 2016 cannot be explained by the land release results. A total of 501 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during mine clearance and rapid response explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs.

Cluster munition remnants:As of the end of 2016, Lebanon had just over 20km2 of cluster munition contamination across five provinces, an increase in the contamination reported at the end of 2015. A further 5.6km2 are suspected to contain cluster munition contamination. In 2016, 1.9km2 was released by clearance, and 0.5km2 was canceled through non-technical survey. An area of 0.26km2 was confirmed as cluster munition contaminated. A total of 4,049 submunitions were destroyed.

Recommendations for action

  • Where possible, non-technical survey and technical survey should be used to more accurately define areas of actual contamination, factoring in the required fadeout distance, especially with respect to militia minefields in northern Lebanon. This would also help more accurately establish a national baseline of mine contamination.
  • Where appropriate, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) should use demining machinery and mine detection dogs (MDDs) as primary as well as secondary clearance assets.
  • The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) should explore the possibility of resuming humanitarian demining operations.
  • LMAC should more accurately determine the baseline contamination from cluster munition remnants.
  • Newly discovered cluster strikes should not automatically be recorded in the LMAC database as covering 33,000m2. Instead, a more accurate assessment of the size of each contaminated area should be determined through non-technical and technical survey.
  • LMAC should improve its land release system to accord with international standards. Improvements should be reflected in the revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).
  • Lebanon should mobilize the necessary resources to complete cluster munition clearance as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2021.

Mine Contamination

As at the end of 2016, Lebanon had 20km2 of confirmed mined areas (excluding the Blue Line), across 1,431 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), as set out in the table below.[3] In its Annual Report for 2016, LMAC put total mine contamination, including the Blue Line, at almost 27.8km2.[4]

A further 25 “dangerous areas” totaling more than 0.78km2 are suspected to contain mines, and an additional three dangerous areas totaling more than 0.55km2 are suspected to contain mines and UXO.[5] In addition, 95 dangerous areas totaling almost 2.8km2 were suspected to contain “booby-traps,” some of which fall under the Mine Ban Treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine.[6] The designated “dangerous areas” are mainly the result of incidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community, and for which further investigation/survey is required in order to confirm the type and extent of suspected contamination.[7]

Mine contamination by province (as at end 2016)[8]

Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

Al Beqaa

38

1,104,893

Al Janoub (south Lebanon)

212

1,492,107

Al Nabatiyeh (south Lebanon)

790

6,719,065

Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)

330

10,556,483

Al Shimal (north Lebanon)

60

198,768

Beirut

1

1,000

Total

1,431

20,072,316*

Note: * Further mined area exists along the Blue Line.

The 20km2 of contamination, excluding the Blue Line, represents a decrease in overall baseline contamination over the 29km2 of contaminated area as of the end of 2015.[9] The significant difference in the baseline mine contamination cannot be explained by the clearance output in 2016.

Lebanon’s mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon (in 1978 and 1982) and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000. Mines affect the north and south of the country, though the majority are in the south. The minefields in north Lebanon and Mount Lebanon are typically “militia” minefields (i.e. were laid without a pattern and for which minefield maps do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors during the civil war. The minefields in the south are typically conventional minefields, where the location of the mines is identified on minefield maps.[10]

According to LMAC, in 2016, 98% of the Blue Line was still contaminated.[11]

Mines hinder socio-economic development, restricting access to land and productive resources. Most contamination is on valuable agriculture land.[12] According to LMAC, mines along the Blue Line negatively affect more than 200,000 people.[13] It has been reported that people are crossing the Blue Line to harvest olive groves and graze livestock.[14]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Lebanon reported in its latest Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report (for calendar year 2016), that cluster munition contamination at the end the year stood at just more than 20km2.[15] At the end of March 2017, Lebanon had 833 areas confirmed to contain cluster munition remnants, totaling almost 18.2km2, reported by LMAC. Five provinces still contain cluster munition contamination, as set out in the table below.[16] This is an increase on the 773 areas confirmed or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants in four provinces, totaling more than 16.3km2, at the end of 2015.[17]

A further 79 “dangerous areas” totaling 5.6km2 are suspected to contain cluster munition contamination.[18] Previously, LMAC did not disaggregate areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants from areas suspected to contain mine contamination. The designated “dangerous areas” are mainly the result of accidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community, and for which further investigation/survey is required in order to confirm the type and extent of contamination.[19]

Previously unrecorded cluster munition contamination continued to be discovered, predominantly in south Lebanon. During 2016, 17 cluster munition-contaminated areas were identified through non-technical survey, totaling 469,000m2 (of which only eight areas, totaling 264,000m2, had been entered into the International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and reported in Lebanon’s Article 7 report for 2016).[20]

Cluster munition contamination (as of end March 2017)[21]

Province

Areas

Area (m2)

Beqaa

69

2,186,501

Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)

29

957,000

South Lebanon

250

5,645,314

Nabatiyeh

483

9,347,835

North Lebanon

2

43,000

Total

833

18,179,650

 

The significant increase in total cluster munition contamination since the end of 2015 is only partly explained by the previously unrecorded contamination.[22] This is because many of the cluster munition clearance tasks conducted in 2015 proved to be greater in size than the 33,000m2 automatically recorded in the database, thereby impacting the baseline contamination area. According to LMAC, 33,000m2 is the estimated average cluster munition strike footprint, and several strikes are sometimes located within the same area.[23] However, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have calculated the size of the average cluster munition area to be larger, at around 60,000–65,000m2.[24]

According to LMAC, not all clearance undertaken in the years immediately following 2006 was in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Some Israeli bombing data has been provided—most recently through UNIFIL—but has proved to be very inaccurate. These factors have further complicated the accuracy of the baseline of cluster munition contamination.[25]

During the 2006 conflict, Israel fired an estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon.[26] In 2016, LMAC stated original contamination had been more than 60km2, with almost 44km2 having been cleared to date, leaving 16.3km2 of contamination to release at the beginning of 2016.[27] In addition, some cluster munition remnants still remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982.[28] The baseline estimate of overall contamination has continuously been revised, as previously unrecorded contamination continues to be discovered.

Additional cluster munition remnants may also exist in the Blue Line minefields in the far south of Lebanon, along the border with Israel.[29] Since late 2015, permission has been granted for clearance to be undertaken of some of the Blue Line minefields. Clearance of the Blue Line minefields commenced in November 2016,[30] and as it proceeds the extent to which these mined areas are also contaminated with cluster munition remnants will be revealed.[31]

Following clearance, around 85% of land has been used for socio-economic purposes, such as by farmers to generate a source of income.[32] Cluster munition remnants continue to affect the agricultural community, particularly in Beqaa and south Lebanon. MAG’s survey in 2014 found that in four-fifths of the contaminated areas surveyed, contamination had made access to resources unsafe or had blocked access altogether. Nonetheless, it found that many landowners and workers still enter cluster munition-contaminated areas, declaring that they have no choice.[33]

Program Management

The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA) has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine action program. It is part of the Ministry of Defense and is chaired by the minister himself. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the program, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the program on behalf of the LMAA.[34] LMAC also manages risk education and victim assistance.[35]

LMAC, part of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),[36] is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC), based in Nabatiyeh, which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa, under LMAC supervision.[37] The director of LMAC is typically rotated every couple of years, and in recent years there has been a high turnover of the colonels who have run RMAC. A new LMAC director started in early 2017, while a new director of RMAC started in May.[38]

In south Lebanon, coordination meetings between RMAC and operators take place at least once a month.[39] Clearance operators discuss with LMAC/RMAC specific land release considerations for assigned clearance tasks that arise during the pre-clearance assessment stage of operations. This may result in the refining of the task size or approved land release specifications.[40]

A donor support group meeting is convened annually, which brings together donors, operators, and the national authorities.[41] UNDP personnel, funded by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to LMAC and RMAC, providing support towards capacity-building, including transparency reporting, strategic reviews, and IMSMA database entry, community liaison officers, and quality assurance (QA). The UNDP does not provide technical assistance on operational decisions.[42]

In 2015, the Ministry of Defense, represented by LMAC, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to manage and coordinate the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme (formerly known as the Arabic-Language Outreach Programme) for Mine Action.[43] The planning, management, and coordination of the program were due to be handed over to LMAC at the beginning of 2017,[44] and LMAC, through the Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL), will serve as a regional center for the program’s activities.[45] As of April 2017, the buildings of the RSHDL in Hammana were being renovated, with completion due by the end of July 2017. Lebanon plans to offer EOD courses, among others, at the RSHDL.[46]

In November 2016, a workshop on implementation of Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 was held in Lebanon, convened by Norway and the Netherlands in their capacity as the convention’s co-coordinators on clearance. The workshop, which was facilitated by the GICHD, brought together LMAC and RMAC, with national and international clearance operators, donors, and the UNDP. The main topics of discussion were cluster munition land release methodology and whether operational efficiencies can be increased through better use of non-technical and technical survey; and how a more accurate cluster munition baseline can be determined.[47]

Strategic planning

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–2020.[48] The plan called for clearance of all cluster munition remnants by 2016, and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by 2020. Both goals are dependent on capacity, but progress has fallen well short of planning targets.

A first mid-term review of the strategy was conducted in January–March 2014 to assess progress towards the 2013 milestone, and to adjust the 2016 and 2020 milestones accordingly. The review revealed that in 2011–2013 mine clearance was slow, suffering from underfunding (with consequently few operating teams), while previously unrecorded contaminated areas were identified.[49] A second mid-term assessment was being undertaken in 2016, which was due to be completed in early 2017.[50] The assessment had not yet been completed as of June 2017, but LMAC expected it to be finished “very soon.”[51]

Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel was said to depend on “political developments,”[52] but the Lebanese government subsequently took the decision to initiate larger-scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line,[53] and clearance by humanitarian demining operators began in November 2016.[54]

Lebanon has set three levels of priority for mine action operations, based on socio-economic impact. The first is to address areas close to villages, which impact housing and agricultural land, or land blocking access to agricultural land; the second is to release agricultural land that is difficult to access; and the third is to release rocky/bushy areas. Areas in which mine-related incidents occur are immediately designated high priority.[55] LMAC aims to better monitor post-clearance activities and assess how clearance supports livelihood and socio-economic development.[56] Systematic pre- and post-impact surveys by operators, using an agreed format, could support this.[57]

In 2017, LMAC planned to focus landmine and cluster munition survey on “dangerous areas” where the presence of mines or cluster munition remnants is highly expected, and to conduct clearance across Lebanon, including the Blue Line, according to its plan.[58]

In its 2016 Annual Report, LMAC reported that it will “work on optimization of non-technical (pre-clearance) surveys, so they will be completed and their general results will be accurately and periodically updated on IMSMA. The international demining best practices have shown that the effectiveness of non-technical and technical surveys will increase the efficiency of clearance operation, therefore, LMAC will pursue its duty to ensure that these surveys will be conducted for the entire countries, including the Blue Line, and that their results will be updated on IMSMA.”[59]

Standards

LMAC has been working with the UNDP and other partners to revise the NMAS.[60]

Humanitarian demining operators who were consulted submitted recommendations for the NMAS revision.[61] In March 2017, LMAC distributed a revised draft NMAS to all partners, including clearance operators, for comment.[62] According to LMAC, the revised NMAS include separate sections for cluster munition remnants and landmine survey; and will permit and facilitate the reporting of land release in accordance with IMAS.[63] Once finalized, the revised NMAS will then need to be officially approved by the Ministry of Defense.[64]

In September 2017, LMAC shared the most recent draft of the revised NMAS with the GICHD, for consultation and feedback.[65]

Quality management

During mine clearance and BAC in 2016, 1,095 monitoring visits took place, of which 1,047 resulted in acceptable results, 19 led to required improvements, and 29 found unacceptable practices.[66]

Operators

In 2016, mine clearance was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), and MAG, and by the Engineering Regiment of the LAF. Capacity was of a total of 11 mine clearance teams (nine working for international NGOs and two working for the LAF Engineering Regiment); five mechanical teams (four operated by the Engineering Regiment and one by MAG); and seven MDD teams operated by the Engineering Regiment.[67] This represents a decrease of one MDD team over 2015. In addition, LMAC had two non-technical survey teams in 2016.[68]

In 2016, cluster munition clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, MAG, and NPA; national operator POD; and the Engineering Regiment of the LAF.[69] Capacity fluctuated throughout 2016, but the total collective cluster munition survey and clearance capacity in Lebanon as of December 2016 comprised 22 BAC teams and two non-technical survey teams.[70]

At the beginning of 2017, a fourth international operator, NPA, which was already operational in Lebanon for cluster munition clearance, started mine clearance operations in southern Lebanon along the Blue Line.[71]

MDDs and machines are mostly used as secondary assets, and in some cases for technical survey, based on needs and the terrain of the area. Machines are used for ground preparation, including rubble removal and vegetation cutting.[72] However, often the terrain is not suitable for MDDs or machines. LMAC
has consistently raised concerns over lack of survey
and clearance capacity to address mine and cluster munition remnant contamination, which it ascribes to a lack of funding.[73]

In 2016, DCA deployed three manual mine clearance teams.[74] HI deployed four teams. This represents the same capacity as the previous year.[75] HI’s mine clearance operations in north Lebanon and the Mount Lebanon area are determined
by seasonal factors: clearance of minefields below 1,000 meters occurs during winter (October to April), and then clearance tasks above 1,000 meters begin in April and continue through the summer, depending on snow.[76]

In 2016, MAG deployed three manual clearance teams and one mechanical team.[77] MAG’s staffing increased from 40 to 50, thanks to increased funding and conversion of teams from BAC to multi-task teams. As of April 2017, MAG was the only humanitarian clearance operator in Lebanon with mechanical assets to support manual clearance operations.[78]

MAG deployed seven BAC teams in 2016,[79] up from the five deployed in 2015.[80]

NPA operated five BAC teams from February 2016 but decreased to four from June 2016, a reduced capacity compared to 2015, due to reduced funding.[81] DCA deployed three BAC teams in 2016, and one additional team in partnership with the Lebanese Association for Mine and Natural Disaster Action (LAMINDA), a national NGO founded in 2014.[82] DCA’s partnership with LAMINDA is also aimed at strengthening LAMINDA’s capacity in humanitarian mine action.[83] POD deployed five BAC teams in 2016.[84]

The 2016 capacity of the Engineering Regiment (for combined mine and cluster munition operations) was said to comprise two mine clearance teams, four mechanical demining teams, and seven MDD teams.[85]

UNIFIL was established in 1978[86] to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred in 2000); restore international peace and security; and assist the government of Lebanon to re-establish its authority in the area.[87] The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams has been to clear access lanes through minefields in order to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does not generally conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only
to facilitate placement of markers by clearing three-meter-wide lanes into mined areas.[88] UNMAS continues to engage with UNIFIL regarding the possibility of UNIFIL re-engaging in humanitarian mine action, but as of September 2017, this had not yet occurred.[89] In 2016, operational assets were provided by two UNIFIL troop contributing countries (TCCs): Cambodia and China. These assets comprised four manual clearance teams (one Cambodian team and three Chinese teams), one Cambodian mechanical clearance team, and one Chinese EOD team.[90] This represents a decrease in capacity of one manual clearance team compared to the previous year.[91]

UNMAS Lebanon, a project of UNMAS, trains UNIFIL demining units and monitors and validates UNIFIL mine clearance along the Blue Line to ensure compliance with IMAS. UNMAS Lebanon operating funds come from UNIFIL’s assessed peacekeeping budget.[92]

Land Release (mines)

Total mined area released by clearance in 2016 was almost 0.55km2. A total of 0.01km2 was reported to have been canceled by non-technical survey.

Survey in 2016 (mines)

In 2016, 14,171m2 in four suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) was canceled by LMAC/RMAC non-technical survey teams. In addition, 195,139m2 was confirmed as mined in 32 SHAs.[93]

Clearance in 2016 (mines)

LMAC reported clearance of almost 0.55km2 in 2016, across 31 mined areas, with the destruction of 417 antipersonnel mines, 53 antivehicle mines, 21 submunitions, and 62 other items of UXO (see table below). This is a significant decrease compared to the 0.92km2 of mined area cleared in 2015.

Mine clearance in 2016[94]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

UXO destroyed

Comments

DCA

8

29,021

63

0

5

7

4 UXO destroyed by LAF

HI

13

109,127

296

3

0

27

19 UXO destroyed by LAF

MAG

5

10,184

57

49

0

19

 

LAF Emergency Response

5

401,474

1

1

16

9

 

Total

31

549,806

417

53

21

62

 

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

An additional 108,420m2 was cleared by the LAF during rapid response call-outs in 2016, during which 59 antipersonnel mines, 28 antivehicle mines, 133 submunitions, and 794 other items of UXO were destroyed.[95]

Furthermore, UNIFIL reported destruction of 25 antipersonnel mines during its 2016 operations on the Blue Line.[96]

According to LMAC, mine clearance focuses on CHAs, and most of the tasks assigned for clearance were found to have mines.[97] However, HI reported that in eight of the 13 areas it cleared, representing 28% of the overall mined area cleared, it did not find mines.[98] This was said to be largely due to the unconventional nature of the militia minefields being cleared by HI in north Lebanon and the fact that the CHAs of these minefield tasks are not always accurately defined. Some clearance tasks were created due to mine incidents having occurred, but subsequently no further contamination was discovered. There have also been incidences of clearance tasks created due to a fear of mines, rather than actual evidence of contamination.[99]

HI’s clearance output increased by 12% in 2016, compared to the previous year, and the daily productivity of the deminers increased by 17%.[100]

While some clearance task areas do not contain any contamination, others require clearance of a much larger area than recorded in the IMSMA database. HI reported that since its first mine clearance operation in Lebanon in 2011, it has cleared 71% more area than the CHA initially tasked and outlined in the task dossiers received from LMAC.[101] Again, this is largely due to the lack of clearly defined CHAs for militia minefields. There have also been reports of mines being found completely outside the task area, and which were destroyed during clearance of access lanes. In addition, the CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not include obligatory fadeout distances, which can considerably increase the overall size of the task.[102] Deployment of MDDs or demining machinery to help facilitate survey and clearance in north Lebanon is limited in scope, due to the climate and terrain of many of the tasks in the region.[103]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Total cluster munition-contaminated area released by clearance in 2016 was just over 1.9km2,[104] an increase compared to the 1.69km2 of area cleared in 2015.[105]

No area was reported as reduced by technical survey in 2016, but 0.5km2 was reported as having been canceled through non-technical survey.[106]

An area of 0.64km2 was confirmed as cluster munition contaminated in 2016. A further 0.21km2 was also discovered, but as of June 2017 had not been recorded in IMSMA.[107]

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Lebanon recorded five areas totaling 514,866m2 as canceled by LMAC/RMAC in 2016.[108] This represents an increase in release on the 17 areas totaling 92,614m2 canceled in 2015.[109]

In addition, LMAC confirmed eight areas in 2016, totaling 264,000m2, as cluster munition contaminated, which were recorded in the IMSMA database.[110] A further nine cluster munition-contaminated areas totaling 205,000m2 were also discovered in 2016, but were not recorded in IMSMA as their inclusion had not yet been “approved” by LMAC’s director.[111] New cluster munition-contaminated areas are typically the result of call-outs from the public, alerting LMAC to previously undiscovered ERW.[112]

LMAC does not formally permit operators to conduct additional survey other than pre-clearance assessments, as clearance tasks are already considered to reflect survey results. As of April 2017, clearance operators had not been permitted to conduct technical survey on BAC tasks.[113] In 2016, MAG and NPA were permitted to conduct pre-clearance non-technical survey on some cluster munition tasks.[114]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Lebanon reported clearing just over 1.9km2 of cluster munition-contaminated land in 2016, across 76 areas, destroying in the process 3,916 submunitions, 256 other items of UXO, and four antipersonnel mines (see table below).[115] In addition, a further 99,641m2 was cleared and classified by LMAC as “re-clearance” to avoid double counting,[116] as initial surface clearance had already been undertaken prior to 2009.

Manual clearance is the primary method of clearing cluster munition remnants in Lebanon, but machines are sometimes deployed to make access lanes and prepare the ground.

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2016[117]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

Comment

DCA

6

237,636

1,023

31

MAG

23

595,380

485

211

MAG cleared an additional 32,241m2, classified by LMAC as “re-clearance.” Eleven UXO items were destroyed by the LAF

NPA

15

430,145

1,162

9

NPA cleared an additional 66,800m2, classified by LMAC as “re-clearance.” An additional 245 submunitions located by NPA, were destroyed by the LAF, but were not reported to LMAC during 2016

POD

29

549,295

1,181

0

POD also cleared an additional 600m2, classified by LMAC as “re-clearance”

LAMINDA

3

89,311

65

5

 

Total

76

1,901,767

3,916

256

 

 

In addition, during rapid response call-outs the Engineering Regiment and the LAF collectively cleared 108,420m2, across 748 tasks, during which 133 submunitions, 794 other items of UXO, 59 antipersonnel mines, and 28 antivehicle mines were destroyed.[118]

Of the cluster munition clearance tasks undertaken in 2016, MAG reported one where no contamination was discovered.[119] NPA reported working for 17 days on one BAC task, and three days on another, without discovering evidence of cluster munition contamination. After discussions between NPA and RMAC, it was decided to suspend these tasks.[120]

Deminer safety

One deminer from MAG was injured by an antipersonnel mine in southern Lebanon in November 2016.[121]

Progress Toward Antipersonnel Mine Clearance Completion

Lebanon has cleared 4.28km2 of mined area in the last five years, as detailed in the table below.

Mine clearance in 2012–2016[122]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

0.55

2015

0.92

2014

1.28

2013

0.54

2012

0.99

Total

4.28

 

Lack of international funding continues to pose a challenge to demining operations.[123] The EU has indicated that its funding for mine and cluster munition clearance, currently provided to DCA, HI, MAG, and NPA, will likely not be extended after the end of the current grant periods in 2018.[124]

According to LMAC, in order for Lebanon to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020, and in line with 2011–2020 strategy, it would need the 138 clearance team capacity as specified in the strategy.[125] Current capacity is far below this level, and as such, Lebanon is well behind its targets for mine clearance. The impact of working in difficult terrain and weather conditions has also been identified as an obstacle to meeting this deadline.[126] Based on the reported 20km2 of total mined area as at the end of 2016 (excluding the Blue Line), and average clearance rates of less than 1km2 per year, it could take many years for Lebanon to become mine-free.

While operators agree that lack of capacity is certainly holding back clearance, they also believe that swifter progress could come from improved land release methodology.[127]

LMAC has asserted that the results of the second mid-term review of the strategic mine action plan for 2011–2020, conducted in 2016 and due to be completed in 2017, will help to reflect more accurately Lebanon’s expected landmine clearance completion date.[128]

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lebanon is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2021. Lebanon is not on track to meet this deadline.

LMAC has asserted that the results of the second mid-term review of the strategic mine action plan for 2011–2020, conducted in 2016 and due to be completed in 2017, will help reflect more accurately Lebanon’s expected cluster munition clearance completion date.[129] However, fewer BAC teams, discovery of previously unrecorded cluster munition-contaminated areas, and the impact of working in difficult terrain, have all been identified as obstacles to meeting this deadline.[130]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated land had been expected to be completed by the end of 2016, in accordance with the 2011–2020 national strategy.[131] However, meeting this target was contingent on maintaining the number of BAC teams required.[132] In May 2012, stakeholders believed the 2016 target date was reasonable if both funding and the number of teams stabilized or increased, and if contamination estimates proved accurate. The first review of the 2011–2020 strategy in early 2014 confirmed that with existing capacity it would not be possible to finish cluster munition clearance before 2020 at the earliest.[133]

Lebanon’s most recent Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2016) estimates that an additional 24 teams would be needed to complete cluster munition clearance by 2020.[134] A more accurate estimate of the required capacity will be made during the second mid-term assessment of the strategic plan that is under way in 2017.[135]

Annual clearance of cluster munition-contaminated land had decreased successively since 2012, but 2016 recorded an increase in clearance, as illustrated in the table below.

Five-year summary of clearance[136]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

1.90*

2015

1.69

2014

2.10

2013

2.47

2012

2.98

Total

11.14

Note: * In addition, a further 99,641m2 of re-clearance was conducted.

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.


[1] Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011.

[2] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 32.

[3] Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[4] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 32.

[5] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, then Director, and Brig.-Gen. Hassan Fakih, then Head of Operations, LMAC, Beirut, 18 April 2016.

[8] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[9] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[10] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[11] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016.”

[12] Emails from Brig.-Gen Nassif, LMAC, 12 May 2015; from Jacqui Brownhill, Desk Office, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 1 May 2015; and Catherine Smith, Deputy Desk Officer, Handicap International (HI), 20 March 2015.

[13] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[14] Interview with Henri Francois Morand, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Naquaora, 14 April 2016; and Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), UN doc. S/2016/189, 26 February 2016, p. 4.

[15] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F. The total area of the table detailing the size and location of cluster munition-contaminated area correctly sums to 20,031,672m2, and not 21,702,781m2 in the table in Lebanon’s Article 7 report. This is reportedly due to a computation error, and LMAC confirmed that the correct total is 20,031,672m2. Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 22 June 2017.

[16] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[17] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016; presentation by LMAC at the 19th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisers, Geneva, 18 February 2016; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F.

[18] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017.

[19] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 18 April 2016.

[20] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar 2016), Form F; and emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017.

[21] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[22] Presentation by Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 16 November 2016.

[23] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 22 June 2017.

[24] Interview with Bekim Shala, Programme Manager, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and email from Eva Veble, Lebanon Programme Manager, NPA, 8 July 2016.

[25] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; and presentation by Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, 16 November 2016.

[26] Landmine Action, “Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006,” 2006.

[27] Presentation by LMAC at the 19th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisers, Geneva, 18 February 2016.

[28] Landmine Action, “Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006,” 2006; and interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[29] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[30] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[31] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[32] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7–11 September 2015.

[33] MAG, “Cluster Munition Contamination in Lebanon using survey data,” September 2014, p. 4.

[34] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014, pp. 4–5.

[35] UNDP, “Mine Action in Lebanon: A Review of the Lebanon Mine Action Programme and UNDP Support to mine action in Lebanon,” Final Report, September 2011, p. 9.

[36] LMAC, “2012 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre,” March 2013.

[37] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011, p. 4.

[38] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 22 June 2017.

[39] Interview with Col. Pierre Bou Maroun, Director, RMAC, Nabatiyeh, 16 November 2016.

[40] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[41] Interview with Lt.-Col. Henry Edde, then Director, RMAC, Nabatiyeh, 12 April 2016; and interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 18 May 2016.

[42] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[43] Email from Anna-Lena Schluchter, containing data from Rana Elias, Focal point for Lebanon, GICHD, 21 June 2017.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2–5 September 2015.

[46] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[47] Expert level workshop under the framework of supporting Lebanon in meeting its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 obligations, attended by Lucy Pinches, Mine Action Review Project Manager and Senior Researcher, NPA, Beirut, 17 November 2016.

[48] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011.

[49] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014.

[50] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[51] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 9 June 2017.

[52] Presentation by Maj. Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiye, 4 May 2012; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST), 7 May 2014.

[53] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[54] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016.

[57] Email from Craig McDiarmid, Programme Manager, NPA, 8 June 2016.

[58] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[59] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 35.

[60] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 7 July 2015; and from Rory Logan, Programme Manager, NPA, 20 April 2015; and statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7–11 September 2015.

[61] Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and with Craig McDiarmid, NPA, Tyre, 12 April 2016.

[62] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[65] Interview with Rana Elias, GICHD, Geneva, 6 September 2017.

[66] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 35.

[67] Ibid., p. 30; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[68] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[72] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016; from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017; and from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[73] Statements of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, September 2010; Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, September 2013; Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Costa Rica, September 2014; Mine Action Support Group Meeting, 18 October 2013; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, 9 April 2014; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013), Form F.

[74] Email from Charlotte Billoir, Programme Coordinator, DCA, 13 November 2017.

[75] Emails from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April and 13 July 2017; and from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[76] Email from Chris Chenavier, HI, 7 April 2016.

[77] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[78] Email from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.; and from Bekim Shala, MAG, 3 April 2016.

[81] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[82] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and LAMINDA website.

[83] See LAMINDA website for more information.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[86] UN Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

[87] UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Mandate,” undated.

[88] Presentation by Maj. Pierre Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiye, 4 May 2012; and emails from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 2 October 2015, and 18 September 2017.

[89] Email from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 18 September 2017.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., 13 October 2016; and from Sarah Holland, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 30 September 2016.

[92] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 30 September 2016.

[93] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and LMAC, “Annual report 2016,” p. 28. DCA also reported reducing 45,931m2. Email from Charlotte Billoir, DCA, 13 November 2017.

[94] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017; from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017; and from Charlotte Billoir, DCA, 13 November 2017. DCA reported the clearance of 26,792m2. MAG recorded clearing 25,167m2. Furthermore, there were some discrepancies with LMAC’s Annual Report for 2016, which stated that MAG cleared 24,384m2 of mined area in 2016, destroying 56 antipersonnel mines, 50 antivehicle mines, and 18 other items of UXO; that HI cleared 299 antipersonnel mines; and that the Engineering Regiment cleared 494,009m2, and destroyed 60 antipersonnel mines, 29 antivehicle mines, and 2,382 other items of UXO.

[95] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[96] Email from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 18 September 2017.

[97] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[98] Email from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017.

[99] Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and with Chris Chenavier, HI, Toula, 18 April 2016; and email from Samuel Davaux, HI, 13 July 2017.

[100] Email from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017.

[101] Ibid., 29 September 2017.

[102] Interview with Chris Chenavier, HI, Toula, 18 April 2016.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 5 July 2016.

[107] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 9 June 2017.

[108] Ibid., and 24 April 2017.

[109] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 5 July 2016.

[110] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F. In addition, NPA reported confirming 496,945m2 as cluster munition remnant-contaminated during pre-impact assessments on its tasks, before clearance teams were deployed, but this is not classified as formal non-technical survey and is therefore not included in the survey data reported by LMAC.

[111] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 9 June 2017.

[112] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016.

[113] Email from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[114] Emails from Bekim Shala, MAG, 21 June 2016; and from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[115] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F. The clearance table in Lebanon’s Article 7 report, totaling just over 2km2, is the sum of 1.9km2 of clearance and 1km2 of re-clearance.

[116] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F.

[117] In addition, MAG destroyed four antipersonnel mines during BAC. Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 22 June 2017; from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017; and from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017. There was a small discrepancy between the clearance data provided by MAG (630,809m2, destroying 486 submunitions, 213 other items of UXO, and four antipersonnel mines) and NPA (496,945m2, locating 1,407 submunitions, of which 1,162 were destroyed by NPA) and 245 (one cluster bomb unit, in which 245 submunitions were still encased) by RMAC; in addition to locating 11 items of UXO, of which nine were destroyed by NPA and two by the LAF) and that of LMAC, explained by the fact that MAG and NPA included “re-clearance” figures in their clearance totals, whereas LMAC reports re-clearance separately, to prevent double counting. “Re-clearance” refers to tasks where surface clearance was executed initially, prior to 2009. DCA, LAMINDA, and POD did not provide data.

[118] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[119] Email from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[120] Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[121] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[122] See Landmine Monitor reports on clearance in Lebanon covering 2012–2016.

[123] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[124] Feedback from clearance operators during research field visit to Lebanon, May 2016.

[125] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[126] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[127] Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016, and with Craig McDiarmid, NPA, Tyre, 12 April 2016.

[128] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[129] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[130] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F.

[131] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014.

[132] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011.

[133] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014.

[134] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F.

[135] Ibid.

[136] See Cluster Munition Monitor reports on clearance in Lebanon covering 2012–2016.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 12 November 2017

In 2016, contributions from six international donors for mine action activities in the Republic of Lebanon totaled US$16.9 million, about twice as much as the $8.7 million reported in 2015.[1]

The United States (US) provided the largest contribution with $29.6 million, which represents more than half of the total international mine action assistance in Lebanon for 2016.

International contributions: 2016[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount (US$)

European Union

Various

€8,072,488

8,937,859

US

Clearance

$3,000,000

3,000,000

Norway

Clearance and risk education

NOK16,500,000

1,965,783

Japan

Clearance

¥170,270,111

1,566,999

Netherlands

Clearance and risk education

€1,219,832

1,350,598

Slovenia

Various

N/R

88,411

Total

   

16,909,650

Note: N/R = not reported.

In 2016, the Ministry of Defense of Lebanon supported the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) with personnel, facilities, and 19 Armed Forces Engineering Regiment teams, as well as three rapid response companies. Lebanon has reported contributing an average of $9 million per year.[3]

Since 2012, the government of Lebanon contributed $44.9 million to its mine action program, or 40% of its total mine action budget, while international contributions totaled some $69 million, an average of about $14 million per year.

Lebanon’s Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020 had estimated the need for more than $43 million a year for 2014–2016.[4] As in 2014 and 2015, this target had not, by a large margin, been met in 2016.

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[5]

Year

National contributions (US$)

International contributions (US$)

Total budget (US$)

2016

9,000,000

16,909,650

25,909,650

2015

9,000,000

8,676,129

17,676,129

2014

9,000,000

6,865,794

15,865,794

2013

9,000,000

19,572,312

28,572,312

2012

8,900,000

17,957,931

26,857,931

Total

44,900,000

69,981,816

114,881,816

 



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Frank Meeussen, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, European External Action Service, 30 September 2017; Japan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017; response to Monitor questionnaire by Olivia Douwes, Policy Officer, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 June 2017; email from Ingrid Schoyen, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2017; ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2016,” April 2017, p.25; and email from Steve Costner, Deputy Office Director, Weapons Removal and Abatement, United States (US) Department of State, 30 October 2017.

[2] Average exchange rate for 2016: €1=US$1.1072; ¥108.66=US$1; NOK8.3936=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017.

[3] Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2017.

[4] LMAC, “Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011, p. 21.

[5] See previous Monitor reports. Totals for international support in 2014 and 2013 have been rectified as a result of revised US funding data. Total for 2012 has also been rectified as a result of database clean-up.


Casualties

Last updated: 13 July 2017

 Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end of 2016

At least 3,747 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (907 killed; 2,840 injured)

Casualties occurring in 2016

7 (2015: 17)

2016 casualties by survival outcome

7 injured (2015: 2 killed; 15 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

2 antipersonnel mines, 3 ERW, 1 unexploded submunition, 1 undifferentiated mine/ERW

 

In 2016, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) identified seven mine/ERW casualties. Six casualties were men and one was a boy. No female casualties were recorded in 2016 (or since 2014). Four of the casualties were Lebanese and three were foreign nationals, two of whom were Syrian refugees.[1]

The seven casualties identified in 2016 marked a significant decrease from the 17 casualties identified in 2015, the 16 casualties identified in 2014, and the 24 casualties identified in 2013. Annual mine/ERW casualty rates have declined significantly from the 98 casualties in the year 2000, except for a spike in casualties between August and December 2006 immediately following the July 2006 bombing, shelling, and cluster munition attacks on southern Lebanon by Israel.[2]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Lebanon recorded from 1975 to December 2016 was 3,747.[3]. Between 2006 and 2016 LMAC reported that there were 481 casualties (58 killed and 423 injured). Of these, 332 were adults and 149 were children. Ninety-three percent (447) were male and 7% (34) were female. Thirty-eight were caused by mines, 46 by ERW, 333 by unexploded submunitions, and 64 by unknown devices.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

LMAC reported one unexploded submunition casualty for 2016, which is a significant decrease from the 13 reported in 2015. Through December 2016, the Monitor had identified 734 cluster munition casualties, including those recorded by LMAC. Little data is available on casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes; only 16 (three killed; 13 injured) were identified.[5] LMAC data for the same time period indicated 685 casualties (157 killed; 528 injured) from unexploded submunitions, of which 19% (132) were children at the time of the incident.[6] From 2006 to end 2016, LMAC recorded 333 cluster munition casualties (40 killed; 293 injured), of which 30% (101) were children at the time of the incident.[7]



[1] Emails from Brig. Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, 2 June 2017, and 24 June 2017.

[2] Between August and December of 2006, 209 casualties were recorded. Presentation of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Side Event, Geneva, 28 June 2011.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 7 July 2016; and statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.

[4] Email from Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[5] Prior to July 2006, 338 casualties occurred, and 369 casualties occurred between August 2006 and December 2011. It was not clear if the casualties during use were included in this total. Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 121; Patrick Galey, “Living without a leg,” Bikya Masr (Nabatieh), 14 November 2009; and email from Col. Rolly Fares, LMAC, 30 March 2012.

[6] Emails from Col. Fares, LMAC, 30 March 2012; from Brig. Gen. Imad Odeimi, LMAC, 9 July 2013; and from Brig. Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 13 May 2015; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, 22 June 2016.

[7] Email from Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 June 2017.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 27 July 2017

Summary points based on findings

  • Create a sustainable funding strategy for the physical rehabilitation sector that relies on international funding and national donations.
  • Ensure that all survivors in the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) database have received a healthcare card to facilitate their access to care.
  • Introduce standards for prosthetic devices.

Victim assistance commitments

The Lebanese Republic is responsible for significant numbers of cluster munition victims and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as landmine survivors, who are in need. Lebanon has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Lebanon signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 14 June 2007.

There were at least 3,747 mine/ERW survivors in Lebanon as of December 2016.[1]

Victim assistance since 2015

Lebanon has a national strategy for the period 2011–2020 that requires a regular needs assessment of the situation of, and services available to, cluster munition victims.[2] The victim assistance strategy established targets for comprehensive victim assistance by 2020. 

Due to the crisis in Syria, diversion of healthcare resources and other services to assist incoming refugees from that country increased.

Victim assistance in 2016

The funding situation improved since 2013, however, the existing level of support was still insufficient to serve the victims.[3] The recent influx of large numbers of refugees from Syria continued to exacerbate the situation.[4]

Assessing victim assistance needs

The victim assistance survey, launched in 2013 by LMAC, was finalized in 2014.[5] LMAC conducted a national needs assessment survey that reached out to a randomly selected sample of 690 victims (survivors and deceased) and their families. It assessed medical, economic, social, psychological, and educational/training needs, as well as opportunities and challenges.[6] Survey data provided the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance (Steering Committee) with information, focusing mostly on medical and rehabilitation needs.[7] Upon analysis of the survey data, the Steering Committee determined that there was a need for a new national needs assessment survey, yet the necessary funds had not yet been allocated as of June 2017. In 2016, LMAC continued to update the mine victims’ database.[8]

In response to the influx of Syrian refugees, the ICRC conducted a physical rehabilitation needs assessment mission in 2014. After the assessment, the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Project Manager began working to further assess the situation and build relationships with physical rehabilitation services in Lebanon.[9]

Victim assistance coordination[10]

Government coordinating body/focal point

LMAC

Coordinating mechanism(s)

National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance (Steering Committee), coordinated by LMAC and involving national victim assistance NGO service providers and relevant government ministries

Plan

Victim Assistance Strategy as part of Lebanon Mine Action National Strategy 2011–2020

 

LMAC manages and coordinates the implementation of victim assistance in Lebanon through the Steering Committee, which includes representatives of the following organizations:

  • The Injured and Victims of War Association;
  • The Islamic Al Rissala Scouts Association;
  • The Islamic Health Council;
  • The Landmines Resource Center;
  • The Lebanese Association for Health and Social Care;
  • The Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped;
  • The Ministry of Social Affairs;
  • The National Rehabilitation and Development Center;
  • Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA);
  • The Philanthropic Association for the Handicapped in Nabatiyeh;
  • The Vision Association for Development, Rehabilitation and Care; and
  • The World Rehabilitation Fund.

The Steering Committee is responsible for implementing the victim assistance strategy in addition to ensuring coordination between the different stakeholders.[11] In 2015, it held eight meetings to discuss on-going and future projects as well as updates on the national situation. Additionally, two workshops on national standards for victim assistance were held in 2015.[12]

The Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020includes a commitment to the “full realisation of the rights of mine victims guaranteed,” where “all victims are provided with medical, social, psychological, and economic support as part of the fulfillment of their full legal rights as stated in the law 220/2000.” The strategy contains a specific reference to victim assistance in the context of the Article 5 obligation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the “spirit of compliance” with the Mine Ban Treaty, and implementation of the CRPD.[13]

The midterm review of the Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020 was completed in 2014 and published in 2016.

Lebanon did not provide an update on its progress and challenges in implementing victim assistance at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Meeting of States Parties in September 2016. It did make a statement on victim assistance at the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Dubrovnik in September 2015.[14] Lebanon submitted its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for calendar year 2016, which includes information on victim assistance.

In 2015, an external evaluator from the European Union (EU) visited Lebanon to evaluate the implementation of EU-funded projects regarding victim assistance.[15]

Disability issues were coordinated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the National Council of Disabled.[16] Local and international humanitarian agencies helped persons with disabilities among refugees from Syria, and Lebanese host communities were coordinating their efforts through the Disability and Older Age Working Group, formed in June 2013.[17]

Survivor inclusion and participation

A survivor was reported to have been included in the Steering Committee as a representative of NGO service providers. Disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) were also included in the Steering Committee.[18]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Ministry of Health

Government

Medical attention and prosthetics

Ministry of Social Affairs

Government

Disability benefits; socio-economic inclusion and prosthetics

Landmines Resource Center (LMRC)

National NGO

Advocacy, training/capacity-building for survivors

Al-Jarha Association for the War Wounded and Disabled in Lebanon

National NGO

Medical, physiotherapy, prosthetics production, sports activities, loans, peer support, psychological support, vocational training

Islamic Risala Scouts Association

National NGO

Ambulances and transportation, vocational training

Islamic Health Commission (IHC)

National NGO

Psychosocial support, mobility devices, loans

Lebanese Association for Health and Social Care

National NGO

Basic medical care, vocational training, etc.

Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped (LWAH)

National NGO

All types of rehabilitation activities for persons with disabilities

National Rehabilitation and Development Center (NRDC)

National NGO

Rehabilitation, psychological care, prosthetic limbs

Vision Association for Development, Rehabilitation and Care

National NGO

Prosthetic limbs workshop, loans, vocational training, psychological care, advocacy

Jezzine Landmine Survivor Development Cooperative

National NGO

Survivor-managed cooperative producing and selling eggs, chickens, and honey

Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI)

International NGO

Medical assistance, computer training, and prosthetics

World Rehabilitation Funds

International NGO

Support to medical care and health services

Lebanese Red Cross

National society

Emergency medical attention; training in first aid and upgrading of emergency medical service stations with equipment and supplies

ICRC

International organization

Support to medical care and health services

Handicap International

International NGO

Psychological support services in refugee camps and gatherings

 

In 2016, the ICRC continued to support Lebanon’s health system, which is overloaded due to internal violence and the arrival of war-wounded Syrians seeking medical assistance. In its ongoing response to this situation, the ICRC provided support to 15 medical facilities and paid for the treatment of 799 patients, a significant increase from 219 patients in 2015.[19] The ICRC maintained its support for its main operational partner, the Lebanese Red Cross, which carries out medical evacuations of Syrian war casualties crossing into Lebanon in 2016.[20]

In response to the strain on the Lebanese medical system, the ICRC established a weapon traumatology center in two Tripoli hospitals for all patients. The center, split between Dar al-Chifae hospital and Dar al-Zahra hospital, was opened to all patients in October. In 2016, the center performed more than 600 operations on 306 patients, while the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH) in Beirut performed over 240 surgical operations. More than 800 persons with disablities received physical rehabilitation services at the Dar al-Zahra hospital.[21] The ICRC held seminars on weapon-wound surgery, amputee care, first aid, and emergency room trauma care (for further information on ICRC services to Syrians in Lebanon, see the Syria country profile). It also helped the Lebanese Red Cross blood bank keep pace with the increased demand caused by the influx of Syrian war casualties.[22]

Rehabilitation, including prosthetics, economic inclusion, and psychosocial assistance

Approximately 100 relatively active but poorly funded private organizations provided most of the assistance received by persons with disabilities.[23] Physical rehabilitation was largely dependent on funding from external donors and national charities.[24] In 2016, the EU, the Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI), and ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) were among the major donors for victim assistance in Lebanon, providing rehabilitation services to 135 mine/ERW survivors.[25]

The Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped (LWAH) reported fitting prostheses and assistive devices to almost 400 persons with disabilities and providing physiotherapy services to almost 600 persons with disabilities in 2016.[26]

In 2016, the ICRC fitted 108 new patients with prostheses. This represented a decrease of 36% from 170 prostheses provided in 2015. The ICRC provided physiotherapy services to 72 patients in 2016.[27]

LMAC, in coordination with the Steering Committee, the EU, and the MLI, implemented two economic inclusion projects that targeted 183 mine/ERW survivors. The survivors received training for income-generating projects, namely poultry production, beekeeping, and tree planting. After the trainings, 42 survivors won grants to start businesses.[28] LMAC, in coordination with the Steering Committee members, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Health, provides social and medical assistance to widows and children of deceased mine/ERW victims, as well as income-generation trainings.[29] In 2016, the Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand continued to provide income-generation trainings to survivors and to the family members of those killed or injured.[30]

Psychological support was the least developed area of assistance in Lebanon. In 2015, it was reported that persons with psychosocial impairments had been recently granted the use of disability identification cards.[31] In 2016, the ICRC’s weapon traumatology center and the RHUH provided psychosocial care for over 160 patients.[32]

Handicap International provided psychosocial support services to 400 children living in refugee camps in 2016.[33]

National laws and policies

Law 220/2000 on the “Access and Rights of People with Disability” addresses the rights of persons with disabilities to have access to adequate education, rehabilitation services, employment, medical services sports, public transport, and other facilities. However, Lebanon also reported that the law had yet to be comprehensively put into practice, due in part to a lack of implementation mechanisms.[34] Lebanon reported that it is looking to integrate the implementation of Convention on Cluster Munitions victim assistance provisions into existing coordination mechanisms, such as the ones created for the CRPD and Law 220/2000.[35] However, little progress has been made since parliament passed the law on disabilities in 2000.[36] Inadequate assistance for persons with disabilities resulted in severe consequences, including challenges in gaining access to services, isolation, and stigma. It was reported that Lebanon lacked a national disability policy and coordination between relevant ministries, which wasted the opportunities for implementation of existing legislation, as well as an absence of a budget for its implementation.[37]

Discrimination against persons with disabilities is prohibited by law, but continued to exist. The National Disability Law stipulates a 3% quota for hiring persons with disabilities for all employers. However, there was no evidence the law was enforced and there was little or no impact. The law required that buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities, but the building code still required amendments.[38] The National Council of Persons with Disability has held consultations, including persons with disabilities, on social protection programs. The Council, however, does not have any executive responsibility despite its responsibility for disability social policy.[39] Civil society organizations represented on the Steering Committee are also members of the National Council of Persons with Disability. This was reported to ensure the participation of persons with disabilities in consultations.[40]

Most public schools as well as transportation to and from schools were not yet accessible.[41]

There were a number of submissions to Lebanon’s 2015 Universal Period Review in the Human Rights Council that raised concerns about access to education for children with disabilities. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education developed a strategic plan for educational integration for the period 2017–2021.[42]

Persons with disabilities in Lebanon continue to face barriers to exercising their civil and political rights, particularly in regards to access to information.[43] Article 92 of Lebanon’s electoral law requires that the Ministry of the Interior eliminate barriers to voting for persons with disabilities; however, measures have not been implemented.[44]

The Steering Committee coordinated consultation sessions between the municipalities and its members to raise awareness of the rights of victims and other persons with disabilities.[45] In 2016, efforts to update national standards and pricing of prosthetic services were ongoing.[46]



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[2] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 16 April 2012.

[3] Emails from Brig. Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 13 May and 9 June 2015; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[4] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017; and interview with Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, in Geneva, 8 February 2017.

[5] Email from Brig. Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 13 May 2015.

[6] LMAC, “National Victim Needs Assessment Survey,” 1 June 2013; and email from Brig. Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 22 July 2015.

[7] Email from Brig. Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 13 May 2015.

[8] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[9] ICRC, “Annual Report 2014,” 12 May 2015, pp. 498–503.

[10] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for the period 27 October 2011 to 9 April 2012), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[11] Email from Brig. Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 13 May 2015.

[12] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, 22 June 2016.

[13] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy,” September 2011.

[14] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015; and statement of Lebanon, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, 22 June 2016.

[16] United States (US) Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, March 2017; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[17] World Rehabilitation Fund, “Lebanon -Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis,” undated.

[18] Email from Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, 14 July 2017.

[19] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, pp. 487 & 592.

[20] Ibid., p. 490.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., pp. 487–492.

[23] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, March 2017.

[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Rolly Fares, LMAC, 30 March 2012; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[26] LWAH, “Facts and Figures,” undated.

[27] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 492.

[28] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[29] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[30] Email by Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, 20 June 2017.

[31] Lebanese Coalition of Organizations of Disabled Persons, “Questionnaire response to Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities to social protection,” May 2015.

[32] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 490.

[33] Handicap International (HI), “Lebanon Country Card,” August 2016, p. 2.

[34] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[35] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.

[36] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, March 2017.

[38] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, March 2017.

[39] Lebanese Coalition of Organizations of Disabled Persons, “Questionnaire response to Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities to social protection,” May 2015.

[40] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig. Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 2 June 2017.

[41] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, March 2017.

[42] Ministry of Education and Higher Education, “Reaching All Children with Education: RACE II (2017-2021),” August 2016.

[43] Article 19, Lebanon: Disability and Access to Information (London, UK; May 2015).

[45] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, 22 June 2016; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.