Lebanon

Mine Action

Last updated: 17 November 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (heavy contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Article 4 deadline: 1 May 2021
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty

Summary

The Republic of Lebanon is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), largely a legacy of 15 years of civil conflict, Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon (in 1978 and 1982), and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000. Cluster munition contamination is mainly the result of the conflict with Israel from July–August 2006, although some remnants are from conflicts in the 1980s.[1]

Landmines: As of the end of 2016, Lebanon had almost 27.8km2 of mine contamination, including along the Blue Line.[2] Lebanon reported 0.55km2 cleared, and 0.01km2 canceled. However, the difference in baseline mine contamination between the end of 2015 and 2016 cannot be explained by the land release results. A total of 501 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during mine clearance and rapid response explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs.

Cluster munition remnants:As of the end of 2016, Lebanon had just over 20km2 of cluster munition contamination across five provinces, an increase in the contamination reported at the end of 2015. A further 5.6km2 are suspected to contain cluster munition contamination. In 2016, 1.9km2 was released by clearance, and 0.5km2 was canceled through non-technical survey. An area of 0.26km2 was confirmed as cluster munition contaminated. A total of 4,049 submunitions were destroyed.

Recommendations for action

  • Where possible, non-technical survey and technical survey should be used to more accurately define areas of actual contamination, factoring in the required fadeout distance, especially with respect to militia minefields in northern Lebanon. This would also help more accurately establish a national baseline of mine contamination.
  • Where appropriate, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) should use demining machinery and mine detection dogs (MDDs) as primary as well as secondary clearance assets.
  • The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) should explore the possibility of resuming humanitarian demining operations.
  • LMAC should more accurately determine the baseline contamination from cluster munition remnants.
  • Newly discovered cluster strikes should not automatically be recorded in the LMAC database as covering 33,000m2. Instead, a more accurate assessment of the size of each contaminated area should be determined through non-technical and technical survey.
  • LMAC should improve its land release system to accord with international standards. Improvements should be reflected in the revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).
  • Lebanon should mobilize the necessary resources to complete cluster munition clearance as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2021.

Mine Contamination

As at the end of 2016, Lebanon had 20km2 of confirmed mined areas (excluding the Blue Line), across 1,431 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), as set out in the table below.[3] In its Annual Report for 2016, LMAC put total mine contamination, including the Blue Line, at almost 27.8km2.[4]

A further 25 “dangerous areas” totaling more than 0.78km2 are suspected to contain mines, and an additional three dangerous areas totaling more than 0.55km2 are suspected to contain mines and UXO.[5] In addition, 95 dangerous areas totaling almost 2.8km2 were suspected to contain “booby-traps,” some of which fall under the Mine Ban Treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine.[6] The designated “dangerous areas” are mainly the result of incidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community, and for which further investigation/survey is required in order to confirm the type and extent of suspected contamination.[7]

Mine contamination by province (as at end 2016)[8]

Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

Al Beqaa

38

1,104,893

Al Janoub (south Lebanon)

212

1,492,107

Al Nabatiyeh (south Lebanon)

790

6,719,065

Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)

330

10,556,483

Al Shimal (north Lebanon)

60

198,768

Beirut

1

1,000

Total

1,431

20,072,316*

Note: * Further mined area exists along the Blue Line.

The 20km2 of contamination, excluding the Blue Line, represents a decrease in overall baseline contamination over the 29km2 of contaminated area as of the end of 2015.[9] The significant difference in the baseline mine contamination cannot be explained by the clearance output in 2016.

Lebanon’s mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon (in 1978 and 1982) and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000. Mines affect the north and south of the country, though the majority are in the south. The minefields in north Lebanon and Mount Lebanon are typically “militia” minefields (i.e. were laid without a pattern and for which minefield maps do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors during the civil war. The minefields in the south are typically conventional minefields, where the location of the mines is identified on minefield maps.[10]

According to LMAC, in 2016, 98% of the Blue Line was still contaminated.[11]

Mines hinder socio-economic development, restricting access to land and productive resources. Most contamination is on valuable agriculture land.[12] According to LMAC, mines along the Blue Line negatively affect more than 200,000 people.[13] It has been reported that people are crossing the Blue Line to harvest olive groves and graze livestock.[14]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Lebanon reported in its latest Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report (for calendar year 2016), that cluster munition contamination at the end the year stood at just more than 20km2.[15] At the end of March 2017, Lebanon had 833 areas confirmed to contain cluster munition remnants, totaling almost 18.2km2, reported by LMAC. Five provinces still contain cluster munition contamination, as set out in the table below.[16] This is an increase on the 773 areas confirmed or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants in four provinces, totaling more than 16.3km2, at the end of 2015.[17]

A further 79 “dangerous areas” totaling 5.6km2 are suspected to contain cluster munition contamination.[18] Previously, LMAC did not disaggregate areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants from areas suspected to contain mine contamination. The designated “dangerous areas” are mainly the result of accidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community, and for which further investigation/survey is required in order to confirm the type and extent of contamination.[19]

Previously unrecorded cluster munition contamination continued to be discovered, predominantly in south Lebanon. During 2016, 17 cluster munition-contaminated areas were identified through non-technical survey, totaling 469,000m2 (of which only eight areas, totaling 264,000m2, had been entered into the International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and reported in Lebanon’s Article 7 report for 2016).[20]

Cluster munition contamination (as of end March 2017)[21]

Province

Areas

Area (m2)

Beqaa

69

2,186,501

Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)

29

957,000

South Lebanon

250

5,645,314

Nabatiyeh

483

9,347,835

North Lebanon

2

43,000

Total

833

18,179,650

 

The significant increase in total cluster munition contamination since the end of 2015 is only partly explained by the previously unrecorded contamination.[22] This is because many of the cluster munition clearance tasks conducted in 2015 proved to be greater in size than the 33,000m2 automatically recorded in the database, thereby impacting the baseline contamination area. According to LMAC, 33,000m2 is the estimated average cluster munition strike footprint, and several strikes are sometimes located within the same area.[23] However, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have calculated the size of the average cluster munition area to be larger, at around 60,000–65,000m2.[24]

According to LMAC, not all clearance undertaken in the years immediately following 2006 was in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Some Israeli bombing data has been provided—most recently through UNIFIL—but has proved to be very inaccurate. These factors have further complicated the accuracy of the baseline of cluster munition contamination.[25]

During the 2006 conflict, Israel fired an estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon.[26] In 2016, LMAC stated original contamination had been more than 60km2, with almost 44km2 having been cleared to date, leaving 16.3km2 of contamination to release at the beginning of 2016.[27] In addition, some cluster munition remnants still remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982.[28] The baseline estimate of overall contamination has continuously been revised, as previously unrecorded contamination continues to be discovered.

Additional cluster munition remnants may also exist in the Blue Line minefields in the far south of Lebanon, along the border with Israel.[29] Since late 2015, permission has been granted for clearance to be undertaken of some of the Blue Line minefields. Clearance of the Blue Line minefields commenced in November 2016,[30] and as it proceeds the extent to which these mined areas are also contaminated with cluster munition remnants will be revealed.[31]

Following clearance, around 85% of land has been used for socio-economic purposes, such as by farmers to generate a source of income.[32] Cluster munition remnants continue to affect the agricultural community, particularly in Beqaa and south Lebanon. MAG’s survey in 2014 found that in four-fifths of the contaminated areas surveyed, contamination had made access to resources unsafe or had blocked access altogether. Nonetheless, it found that many landowners and workers still enter cluster munition-contaminated areas, declaring that they have no choice.[33]

Program Management

The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA) has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine action program. It is part of the Ministry of Defense and is chaired by the minister himself. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the program, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the program on behalf of the LMAA.[34] LMAC also manages risk education and victim assistance.[35]

LMAC, part of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),[36] is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC), based in Nabatiyeh, which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa, under LMAC supervision.[37] The director of LMAC is typically rotated every couple of years, and in recent years there has been a high turnover of the colonels who have run RMAC. A new LMAC director started in early 2017, while a new director of RMAC started in May.[38]

In south Lebanon, coordination meetings between RMAC and operators take place at least once a month.[39] Clearance operators discuss with LMAC/RMAC specific land release considerations for assigned clearance tasks that arise during the pre-clearance assessment stage of operations. This may result in the refining of the task size or approved land release specifications.[40]

A donor support group meeting is convened annually, which brings together donors, operators, and the national authorities.[41] UNDP personnel, funded by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to LMAC and RMAC, providing support towards capacity-building, including transparency reporting, strategic reviews, and IMSMA database entry, community liaison officers, and quality assurance (QA). The UNDP does not provide technical assistance on operational decisions.[42]

In 2015, the Ministry of Defense, represented by LMAC, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to manage and coordinate the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme (formerly known as the Arabic-Language Outreach Programme) for Mine Action.[43] The planning, management, and coordination of the program were due to be handed over to LMAC at the beginning of 2017,[44] and LMAC, through the Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL), will serve as a regional center for the program’s activities.[45] As of April 2017, the buildings of the RSHDL in Hammana were being renovated, with completion due by the end of July 2017. Lebanon plans to offer EOD courses, among others, at the RSHDL.[46]

In November 2016, a workshop on implementation of Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 was held in Lebanon, convened by Norway and the Netherlands in their capacity as the convention’s co-coordinators on clearance. The workshop, which was facilitated by the GICHD, brought together LMAC and RMAC, with national and international clearance operators, donors, and the UNDP. The main topics of discussion were cluster munition land release methodology and whether operational efficiencies can be increased through better use of non-technical and technical survey; and how a more accurate cluster munition baseline can be determined.[47]

Strategic planning

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–2020.[48] The plan called for clearance of all cluster munition remnants by 2016, and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by 2020. Both goals are dependent on capacity, but progress has fallen well short of planning targets.

A first mid-term review of the strategy was conducted in January–March 2014 to assess progress towards the 2013 milestone, and to adjust the 2016 and 2020 milestones accordingly. The review revealed that in 2011–2013 mine clearance was slow, suffering from underfunding (with consequently few operating teams), while previously unrecorded contaminated areas were identified.[49] A second mid-term assessment was being undertaken in 2016, which was due to be completed in early 2017.[50] The assessment had not yet been completed as of June 2017, but LMAC expected it to be finished “very soon.”[51]

Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel was said to depend on “political developments,”[52] but the Lebanese government subsequently took the decision to initiate larger-scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line,[53] and clearance by humanitarian demining operators began in November 2016.[54]

Lebanon has set three levels of priority for mine action operations, based on socio-economic impact. The first is to address areas close to villages, which impact housing and agricultural land, or land blocking access to agricultural land; the second is to release agricultural land that is difficult to access; and the third is to release rocky/bushy areas. Areas in which mine-related incidents occur are immediately designated high priority.[55] LMAC aims to better monitor post-clearance activities and assess how clearance supports livelihood and socio-economic development.[56] Systematic pre- and post-impact surveys by operators, using an agreed format, could support this.[57]

In 2017, LMAC planned to focus landmine and cluster munition survey on “dangerous areas” where the presence of mines or cluster munition remnants is highly expected, and to conduct clearance across Lebanon, including the Blue Line, according to its plan.[58]

In its 2016 Annual Report, LMAC reported that it will “work on optimization of non-technical (pre-clearance) surveys, so they will be completed and their general results will be accurately and periodically updated on IMSMA. The international demining best practices have shown that the effectiveness of non-technical and technical surveys will increase the efficiency of clearance operation, therefore, LMAC will pursue its duty to ensure that these surveys will be conducted for the entire countries, including the Blue Line, and that their results will be updated on IMSMA.”[59]

Standards

LMAC has been working with the UNDP and other partners to revise the NMAS.[60]

Humanitarian demining operators who were consulted submitted recommendations for the NMAS revision.[61] In March 2017, LMAC distributed a revised draft NMAS to all partners, including clearance operators, for comment.[62] According to LMAC, the revised NMAS include separate sections for cluster munition remnants and landmine survey; and will permit and facilitate the reporting of land release in accordance with IMAS.[63] Once finalized, the revised NMAS will then need to be officially approved by the Ministry of Defense.[64]

In September 2017, LMAC shared the most recent draft of the revised NMAS with the GICHD, for consultation and feedback.[65]

Quality management

During mine clearance and BAC in 2016, 1,095 monitoring visits took place, of which 1,047 resulted in acceptable results, 19 led to required improvements, and 29 found unacceptable practices.[66]

Operators

In 2016, mine clearance was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), and MAG, and by the Engineering Regiment of the LAF. Capacity was of a total of 11 mine clearance teams (nine working for international NGOs and two working for the LAF Engineering Regiment); five mechanical teams (four operated by the Engineering Regiment and one by MAG); and seven MDD teams operated by the Engineering Regiment.[67] This represents a decrease of one MDD team over 2015. In addition, LMAC had two non-technical survey teams in 2016.[68]

In 2016, cluster munition clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, MAG, and NPA; national operator POD; and the Engineering Regiment of the LAF.[69] Capacity fluctuated throughout 2016, but the total collective cluster munition survey and clearance capacity in Lebanon as of December 2016 comprised 22 BAC teams and two non-technical survey teams.[70]

At the beginning of 2017, a fourth international operator, NPA, which was already operational in Lebanon for cluster munition clearance, started mine clearance operations in southern Lebanon along the Blue Line.[71]

MDDs and machines are mostly used as secondary assets, and in some cases for technical survey, based on needs and the terrain of the area. Machines are used for ground preparation, including rubble removal and vegetation cutting.[72] However, often the terrain is not suitable for MDDs or machines. LMAC
has consistently raised concerns over lack of survey
and clearance capacity to address mine and cluster munition remnant contamination, which it ascribes to a lack of funding.[73]

In 2016, DCA deployed three manual mine clearance teams.[74] HI deployed four teams. This represents the same capacity as the previous year.[75] HI’s mine clearance operations in north Lebanon and the Mount Lebanon area are determined
by seasonal factors: clearance of minefields below 1,000 meters occurs during winter (October to April), and then clearance tasks above 1,000 meters begin in April and continue through the summer, depending on snow.[76]

In 2016, MAG deployed three manual clearance teams and one mechanical team.[77] MAG’s staffing increased from 40 to 50, thanks to increased funding and conversion of teams from BAC to multi-task teams. As of April 2017, MAG was the only humanitarian clearance operator in Lebanon with mechanical assets to support manual clearance operations.[78]

MAG deployed seven BAC teams in 2016,[79] up from the five deployed in 2015.[80]

NPA operated five BAC teams from February 2016 but decreased to four from June 2016, a reduced capacity compared to 2015, due to reduced funding.[81] DCA deployed three BAC teams in 2016, and one additional team in partnership with the Lebanese Association for Mine and Natural Disaster Action (LAMINDA), a national NGO founded in 2014.[82] DCA’s partnership with LAMINDA is also aimed at strengthening LAMINDA’s capacity in humanitarian mine action.[83] POD deployed five BAC teams in 2016.[84]

The 2016 capacity of the Engineering Regiment (for combined mine and cluster munition operations) was said to comprise two mine clearance teams, four mechanical demining teams, and seven MDD teams.[85]

UNIFIL was established in 1978[86] to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred in 2000); restore international peace and security; and assist the government of Lebanon to re-establish its authority in the area.[87] The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams has been to clear access lanes through minefields in order to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does not generally conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only
to facilitate placement of markers by clearing three-meter-wide lanes into mined areas.[88] UNMAS continues to engage with UNIFIL regarding the possibility of UNIFIL re-engaging in humanitarian mine action, but as of September 2017, this had not yet occurred.[89] In 2016, operational assets were provided by two UNIFIL troop contributing countries (TCCs): Cambodia and China. These assets comprised four manual clearance teams (one Cambodian team and three Chinese teams), one Cambodian mechanical clearance team, and one Chinese EOD team.[90] This represents a decrease in capacity of one manual clearance team compared to the previous year.[91]

UNMAS Lebanon, a project of UNMAS, trains UNIFIL demining units and monitors and validates UNIFIL mine clearance along the Blue Line to ensure compliance with IMAS. UNMAS Lebanon operating funds come from UNIFIL’s assessed peacekeeping budget.[92]

Land Release (mines)

Total mined area released by clearance in 2016 was almost 0.55km2. A total of 0.01km2 was reported to have been canceled by non-technical survey.

Survey in 2016 (mines)

In 2016, 14,171m2 in four suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) was canceled by LMAC/RMAC non-technical survey teams. In addition, 195,139m2 was confirmed as mined in 32 SHAs.[93]

Clearance in 2016 (mines)

LMAC reported clearance of almost 0.55km2 in 2016, across 31 mined areas, with the destruction of 417 antipersonnel mines, 53 antivehicle mines, 21 submunitions, and 62 other items of UXO (see table below). This is a significant decrease compared to the 0.92km2 of mined area cleared in 2015.

Mine clearance in 2016[94]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

UXO destroyed

Comments

DCA

8

29,021

63

0

5

7

4 UXO destroyed by LAF

HI

13

109,127

296

3

0

27

19 UXO destroyed by LAF

MAG

5

10,184

57

49

0

19

 

LAF Emergency Response

5

401,474

1

1

16

9

 

Total

31

549,806

417

53

21

62

 

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

An additional 108,420m2 was cleared by the LAF during rapid response call-outs in 2016, during which 59 antipersonnel mines, 28 antivehicle mines, 133 submunitions, and 794 other items of UXO were destroyed.[95]

Furthermore, UNIFIL reported destruction of 25 antipersonnel mines during its 2016 operations on the Blue Line.[96]

According to LMAC, mine clearance focuses on CHAs, and most of the tasks assigned for clearance were found to have mines.[97] However, HI reported that in eight of the 13 areas it cleared, representing 28% of the overall mined area cleared, it did not find mines.[98] This was said to be largely due to the unconventional nature of the militia minefields being cleared by HI in north Lebanon and the fact that the CHAs of these minefield tasks are not always accurately defined. Some clearance tasks were created due to mine incidents having occurred, but subsequently no further contamination was discovered. There have also been incidences of clearance tasks created due to a fear of mines, rather than actual evidence of contamination.[99]

HI’s clearance output increased by 12% in 2016, compared to the previous year, and the daily productivity of the deminers increased by 17%.[100]

While some clearance task areas do not contain any contamination, others require clearance of a much larger area than recorded in the IMSMA database. HI reported that since its first mine clearance operation in Lebanon in 2011, it has cleared 71% more area than the CHA initially tasked and outlined in the task dossiers received from LMAC.[101] Again, this is largely due to the lack of clearly defined CHAs for militia minefields. There have also been reports of mines being found completely outside the task area, and which were destroyed during clearance of access lanes. In addition, the CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not include obligatory fadeout distances, which can considerably increase the overall size of the task.[102] Deployment of MDDs or demining machinery to help facilitate survey and clearance in north Lebanon is limited in scope, due to the climate and terrain of many of the tasks in the region.[103]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Total cluster munition-contaminated area released by clearance in 2016 was just over 1.9km2,[104] an increase compared to the 1.69km2 of area cleared in 2015.[105]

No area was reported as reduced by technical survey in 2016, but 0.5km2 was reported as having been canceled through non-technical survey.[106]

An area of 0.64km2 was confirmed as cluster munition contaminated in 2016. A further 0.21km2 was also discovered, but as of June 2017 had not been recorded in IMSMA.[107]

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Lebanon recorded five areas totaling 514,866m2 as canceled by LMAC/RMAC in 2016.[108] This represents an increase in release on the 17 areas totaling 92,614m2 canceled in 2015.[109]

In addition, LMAC confirmed eight areas in 2016, totaling 264,000m2, as cluster munition contaminated, which were recorded in the IMSMA database.[110] A further nine cluster munition-contaminated areas totaling 205,000m2 were also discovered in 2016, but were not recorded in IMSMA as their inclusion had not yet been “approved” by LMAC’s director.[111] New cluster munition-contaminated areas are typically the result of call-outs from the public, alerting LMAC to previously undiscovered ERW.[112]

LMAC does not formally permit operators to conduct additional survey other than pre-clearance assessments, as clearance tasks are already considered to reflect survey results. As of April 2017, clearance operators had not been permitted to conduct technical survey on BAC tasks.[113] In 2016, MAG and NPA were permitted to conduct pre-clearance non-technical survey on some cluster munition tasks.[114]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Lebanon reported clearing just over 1.9km2 of cluster munition-contaminated land in 2016, across 76 areas, destroying in the process 3,916 submunitions, 256 other items of UXO, and four antipersonnel mines (see table below).[115] In addition, a further 99,641m2 was cleared and classified by LMAC as “re-clearance” to avoid double counting,[116] as initial surface clearance had already been undertaken prior to 2009.

Manual clearance is the primary method of clearing cluster munition remnants in Lebanon, but machines are sometimes deployed to make access lanes and prepare the ground.

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2016[117]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

Comment

DCA

6

237,636

1,023

31

MAG

23

595,380

485

211

MAG cleared an additional 32,241m2, classified by LMAC as “re-clearance.” Eleven UXO items were destroyed by the LAF

NPA

15

430,145

1,162

9

NPA cleared an additional 66,800m2, classified by LMAC as “re-clearance.” An additional 245 submunitions located by NPA, were destroyed by the LAF, but were not reported to LMAC during 2016

POD

29

549,295

1,181

0

POD also cleared an additional 600m2, classified by LMAC as “re-clearance”

LAMINDA

3

89,311

65

5

 

Total

76

1,901,767

3,916

256

 

 

In addition, during rapid response call-outs the Engineering Regiment and the LAF collectively cleared 108,420m2, across 748 tasks, during which 133 submunitions, 794 other items of UXO, 59 antipersonnel mines, and 28 antivehicle mines were destroyed.[118]

Of the cluster munition clearance tasks undertaken in 2016, MAG reported one where no contamination was discovered.[119] NPA reported working for 17 days on one BAC task, and three days on another, without discovering evidence of cluster munition contamination. After discussions between NPA and RMAC, it was decided to suspend these tasks.[120]

Deminer safety

One deminer from MAG was injured by an antipersonnel mine in southern Lebanon in November 2016.[121]

Progress Toward Antipersonnel Mine Clearance Completion

Lebanon has cleared 4.28km2 of mined area in the last five years, as detailed in the table below.

Mine clearance in 2012–2016[122]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

0.55

2015

0.92

2014

1.28

2013

0.54

2012

0.99

Total

4.28

 

Lack of international funding continues to pose a challenge to demining operations.[123] The EU has indicated that its funding for mine and cluster munition clearance, currently provided to DCA, HI, MAG, and NPA, will likely not be extended after the end of the current grant periods in 2018.[124]

According to LMAC, in order for Lebanon to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020, and in line with 2011–2020 strategy, it would need the 138 clearance team capacity as specified in the strategy.[125] Current capacity is far below this level, and as such, Lebanon is well behind its targets for mine clearance. The impact of working in difficult terrain and weather conditions has also been identified as an obstacle to meeting this deadline.[126] Based on the reported 20km2 of total mined area as at the end of 2016 (excluding the Blue Line), and average clearance rates of less than 1km2 per year, it could take many years for Lebanon to become mine-free.

While operators agree that lack of capacity is certainly holding back clearance, they also believe that swifter progress could come from improved land release methodology.[127]

LMAC has asserted that the results of the second mid-term review of the strategic mine action plan for 2011–2020, conducted in 2016 and due to be completed in 2017, will help to reflect more accurately Lebanon’s expected landmine clearance completion date.[128]

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lebanon is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2021. Lebanon is not on track to meet this deadline.

LMAC has asserted that the results of the second mid-term review of the strategic mine action plan for 2011–2020, conducted in 2016 and due to be completed in 2017, will help reflect more accurately Lebanon’s expected cluster munition clearance completion date.[129] However, fewer BAC teams, discovery of previously unrecorded cluster munition-contaminated areas, and the impact of working in difficult terrain, have all been identified as obstacles to meeting this deadline.[130]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated land had been expected to be completed by the end of 2016, in accordance with the 2011–2020 national strategy.[131] However, meeting this target was contingent on maintaining the number of BAC teams required.[132] In May 2012, stakeholders believed the 2016 target date was reasonable if both funding and the number of teams stabilized or increased, and if contamination estimates proved accurate. The first review of the 2011–2020 strategy in early 2014 confirmed that with existing capacity it would not be possible to finish cluster munition clearance before 2020 at the earliest.[133]

Lebanon’s most recent Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2016) estimates that an additional 24 teams would be needed to complete cluster munition clearance by 2020.[134] A more accurate estimate of the required capacity will be made during the second mid-term assessment of the strategic plan that is under way in 2017.[135]

Annual clearance of cluster munition-contaminated land had decreased successively since 2012, but 2016 recorded an increase in clearance, as illustrated in the table below.

Five-year summary of clearance[136]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

1.90*

2015

1.69

2014

2.10

2013

2.47

2012

2.98

Total

11.14

Note: * In addition, a further 99,641m2 of re-clearance was conducted.

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.


[1] Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011.

[2] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 32.

[3] Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[4] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 32.

[5] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, then Director, and Brig.-Gen. Hassan Fakih, then Head of Operations, LMAC, Beirut, 18 April 2016.

[8] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[9] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[10] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[11] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016.”

[12] Emails from Brig.-Gen Nassif, LMAC, 12 May 2015; from Jacqui Brownhill, Desk Office, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 1 May 2015; and Catherine Smith, Deputy Desk Officer, Handicap International (HI), 20 March 2015.

[13] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[14] Interview with Henri Francois Morand, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Naquaora, 14 April 2016; and Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), UN doc. S/2016/189, 26 February 2016, p. 4.

[15] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F. The total area of the table detailing the size and location of cluster munition-contaminated area correctly sums to 20,031,672m2, and not 21,702,781m2 in the table in Lebanon’s Article 7 report. This is reportedly due to a computation error, and LMAC confirmed that the correct total is 20,031,672m2. Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 22 June 2017.

[16] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[17] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016; presentation by LMAC at the 19th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisers, Geneva, 18 February 2016; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F.

[18] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017.

[19] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 18 April 2016.

[20] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar 2016), Form F; and emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017.

[21] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[22] Presentation by Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 16 November 2016.

[23] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 22 June 2017.

[24] Interview with Bekim Shala, Programme Manager, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and email from Eva Veble, Lebanon Programme Manager, NPA, 8 July 2016.

[25] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; and presentation by Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, 16 November 2016.

[26] Landmine Action, “Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006,” 2006.

[27] Presentation by LMAC at the 19th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisers, Geneva, 18 February 2016.

[28] Landmine Action, “Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006,” 2006; and interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[29] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[30] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[31] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[32] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7–11 September 2015.

[33] MAG, “Cluster Munition Contamination in Lebanon using survey data,” September 2014, p. 4.

[34] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014, pp. 4–5.

[35] UNDP, “Mine Action in Lebanon: A Review of the Lebanon Mine Action Programme and UNDP Support to mine action in Lebanon,” Final Report, September 2011, p. 9.

[36] LMAC, “2012 Annual Report Lebanon Mine Action Centre,” March 2013.

[37] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011, p. 4.

[38] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 22 June 2017.

[39] Interview with Col. Pierre Bou Maroun, Director, RMAC, Nabatiyeh, 16 November 2016.

[40] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[41] Interview with Lt.-Col. Henry Edde, then Director, RMAC, Nabatiyeh, 12 April 2016; and interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 18 May 2016.

[42] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[43] Email from Anna-Lena Schluchter, containing data from Rana Elias, Focal point for Lebanon, GICHD, 21 June 2017.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2–5 September 2015.

[46] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[47] Expert level workshop under the framework of supporting Lebanon in meeting its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 obligations, attended by Lucy Pinches, Mine Action Review Project Manager and Senior Researcher, NPA, Beirut, 17 November 2016.

[48] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011.

[49] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014.

[50] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[51] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 9 June 2017.

[52] Presentation by Maj. Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiye, 4 May 2012; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST), 7 May 2014.

[53] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[54] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016.

[57] Email from Craig McDiarmid, Programme Manager, NPA, 8 June 2016.

[58] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[59] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 35.

[60] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 7 July 2015; and from Rory Logan, Programme Manager, NPA, 20 April 2015; and statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7–11 September 2015.

[61] Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and with Craig McDiarmid, NPA, Tyre, 12 April 2016.

[62] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Interview with Brig.-Gen. Nassif, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016.

[65] Interview with Rana Elias, GICHD, Geneva, 6 September 2017.

[66] LMAC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 35.

[67] Ibid., p. 30; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[68] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[72] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016; from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017; and from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[73] Statements of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, September 2010; Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, September 2013; Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Costa Rica, September 2014; Mine Action Support Group Meeting, 18 October 2013; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, 9 April 2014; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013), Form F.

[74] Email from Charlotte Billoir, Programme Coordinator, DCA, 13 November 2017.

[75] Emails from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April and 13 July 2017; and from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[76] Email from Chris Chenavier, HI, 7 April 2016.

[77] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[78] Email from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.; and from Bekim Shala, MAG, 3 April 2016.

[81] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[82] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and LAMINDA website.

[83] See LAMINDA website for more information.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[86] UN Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

[87] UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Mandate,” undated.

[88] Presentation by Maj. Pierre Bou Maroun, RMAC, Nabatiye, 4 May 2012; and emails from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 2 October 2015, and 18 September 2017.

[89] Email from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 18 September 2017.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., 13 October 2016; and from Sarah Holland, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 30 September 2016.

[92] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 30 September 2016.

[93] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and LMAC, “Annual report 2016,” p. 28. DCA also reported reducing 45,931m2. Email from Charlotte Billoir, DCA, 13 November 2017.

[94] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017; from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017; and from Charlotte Billoir, DCA, 13 November 2017. DCA reported the clearance of 26,792m2. MAG recorded clearing 25,167m2. Furthermore, there were some discrepancies with LMAC’s Annual Report for 2016, which stated that MAG cleared 24,384m2 of mined area in 2016, destroying 56 antipersonnel mines, 50 antivehicle mines, and 18 other items of UXO; that HI cleared 299 antipersonnel mines; and that the Engineering Regiment cleared 494,009m2, and destroyed 60 antipersonnel mines, 29 antivehicle mines, and 2,382 other items of UXO.

[95] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[96] Email from Henri Francois Morand, UNMAS, 18 September 2017.

[97] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[98] Email from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017.

[99] Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016; and with Chris Chenavier, HI, Toula, 18 April 2016; and email from Samuel Davaux, HI, 13 July 2017.

[100] Email from Samuel Davaux, HI, 4 April 2017.

[101] Ibid., 29 September 2017.

[102] Interview with Chris Chenavier, HI, Toula, 18 April 2016.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 5 July 2016.

[107] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 9 June 2017.

[108] Ibid., and 24 April 2017.

[109] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 5 July 2016.

[110] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F. In addition, NPA reported confirming 496,945m2 as cluster munition remnant-contaminated during pre-impact assessments on its tasks, before clearance teams were deployed, but this is not classified as formal non-technical survey and is therefore not included in the survey data reported by LMAC.

[111] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 9 June 2017.

[112] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F; and email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016.

[113] Email from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[114] Emails from Bekim Shala, MAG, 21 June 2016; and from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[115] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F. The clearance table in Lebanon’s Article 7 report, totaling just over 2km2, is the sum of 1.9km2 of clearance and 1km2 of re-clearance.

[116] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F.

[117] In addition, MAG destroyed four antipersonnel mines during BAC. Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 22 June 2017; from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017; and from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017. There was a small discrepancy between the clearance data provided by MAG (630,809m2, destroying 486 submunitions, 213 other items of UXO, and four antipersonnel mines) and NPA (496,945m2, locating 1,407 submunitions, of which 1,162 were destroyed by NPA) and 245 (one cluster bomb unit, in which 245 submunitions were still encased) by RMAC; in addition to locating 11 items of UXO, of which nine were destroyed by NPA and two by the LAF) and that of LMAC, explained by the fact that MAG and NPA included “re-clearance” figures in their clearance totals, whereas LMAC reports re-clearance separately, to prevent double counting. “Re-clearance” refers to tasks where surface clearance was executed initially, prior to 2009. DCA, LAMINDA, and POD did not provide data.

[118] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[119] Email from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[120] Email from Craig McDiarmid, NPA, 30 March 2017.

[121] Emails from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017; and from Dave Willey, MAG, 25 April 2017.

[122] See Landmine Monitor reports on clearance in Lebanon covering 2012–2016.

[123] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[124] Feedback from clearance operators during research field visit to Lebanon, May 2016.

[125] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 21 May 2016.

[126] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[127] Interviews with Bekim Shala, MAG, Nabatiyeh, 14 April 2016, and with Craig McDiarmid, NPA, Tyre, 12 April 2016.

[128] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[129] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.

[130] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F.

[131] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014.

[132] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011.

[133] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014.

[134] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F.

[135] Ibid.

[136] See Cluster Munition Monitor reports on clearance in Lebanon covering 2012–2016.