With last September’s successful First Review Conference now behind them, the 100 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are entering a new period characterized by further implementation of the convention’s obligations and by responding to threats against the norm that the treaty seeks to establish.
When the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010, becoming binding international law, 108 states had signed, of which 38 were States Parties legally bound by all of its provisions. Over the past six years another 51 signatories have ratified, while 11 countries have acceded, including Cuba and Mauritius in the past year.
Five signatories have ratified since Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 was published, but 19 signatories still must ratify to become fully bound by the convention’s provisions.
The first United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the convention to ever be voted on was adopted on 7 December 2015 by an impressive margin: 139 countries voted in favor, including 33 non-signatories to the convention, while two voted against it and 40 countries abstained. Cyprus and Uganda were the only signatories to abstain.
Non-signatory Russia bolstered the case for it being the country most opposed to eradicating cluster munitions after it voted against the UNGA resolution together with Zimbabwe. Russia is largely responsible for the significant increase in cluster munition attacks on opposition-held areas of Syria since October 2015.
Non-signatory Saudi Arabia abstained from voting on the UNGA resolution and has said little in response to more than 15 months of documented cluster munition attacks in Yemen by the coalition of states it leads.
The use of banned cluster munitions in Syria and Yemen, and the resulting civilian casualties, has been met with swift public outcry and global media coverage. It has been widely condemned by States Parties and non-signatories alike as well as through resolutions by the European Parliament, Human Rights Council, UNGA, and UN Security Council. Such responses contribute to the stigma the convention is establishing against any use of cluster munitions. They also show how many non-signatories are disturbed by the use of cluster munitions even if they themselves have not yet relinquished the weapons.
There have been no reports or allegations of any States Parties engaging in activities prohibited by the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008, when the convention was adopted in Dublin on 30 May and opened for signature on 3 December.
To date, 29 States Parties have destroyed their stocks of cluster munitions, all well in advance of the convention’s eight-year deadline. Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 1.3 million stockpiled cluster munitions containing 172 million submunitions, representing the destruction of 93% of all cluster munitions and 97% of all submunitions declared stockpiled under the convention.
In 2015 alone, nine States Parties destroyed 79,184 cluster munitions and 8.7 million submunitions. States Parties France, Germany, Italy, Mozambique, and Sweden have completed destruction of their stocks since the publication of Cluster Munition Monitor 2015.
Most of the 11 States Parties with stockpiles still to destroy have begun the destruction process. All are expected to finish in advance of their respective deadlines, however some have indicated they require assistance.
A total of 27 States Parties have enacted specific legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions, while two dozen are in the process of adopting new legislation. Another 30 States Parties have indicated that existing laws will suffice to ensure their adherence. More than 80% of States Parties have provided initial transparency reports detailing the actions they are taking to implement and promote the convention.
The community of governments, UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) that brought about the Convention on Cluster Munitions remains strongly engaged and united. This partnership champions a common humanitarian disarmament objective that places the protection of civilians, victims, and affected communities at the center. In these challenging times, it should be celebrated and replicated as an inspirational example of peace in the making.
This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2015 and the first half of 2016, and sometimes later when data was available. All findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available on the Monitor website.
“Universalization” refers to the process of non-signatory countries joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, usually through accession. It also encompasses ratifications by countries that signed the convention prior to its entry into force on 1 August 2010. Both accession and ratification usually involve some form of parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.
Since the Convention on Cluster Munitions became binding international law on 1 August 2010, states can no longer sign, but instead join through a process known as accession, which is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.
Since August 2010, the number of countries that are part of the convention has risen from 108 to 119, following accessions by 11 countries. Two accessions have occurred since the publication of Cluster Munition Monitor 2015: Mauritius on 1 October 2015 and Cuba on 6 April 2016.
A total of 51 signatories have ratified the convention since August 2010 to become States Parties, including five since Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 was published: Colombia, Iceland, Palau, Rwanda, and Somalia.
Almost all of the convention’s 19 remaining signatories have committed to ratify. Many have conducted stakeholder consultations on the convention, but only a few appear to have parliamentary approval processes underway, as the following regional summaries show. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Jamaica, and Madagascar appear to be the closest to completing their ratification of the convention.
Meetings on cluster munitions
Croatia hosted the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dubrovnik on 7–11 September 2015. A total of 95 countries attended the meeting (61 States Parties, nine signatories, and 25 non-signatories) in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC. Croatia’s Prime Minister Zoran Milanović was elected by acclamation as President of the First Review Conference and in his opening address called on all countries to reject the use of cluster munitions and join the convention. Colombia ratified the convention during the meeting, while Cuba made a surprise announcement committing to accede. States Parties adopted a progress report reviewing implementation since entry into force and an action plan.
States Parties also adopted the “Dubrovnik Declaration” committing “to end the harm caused by cluster munitions” and “ensure that cluster munitions remain a stigmatized weapon” by working for “a world free of the suffering, casualties and socio-economic impacts” caused by the weapons. In the weeks and months leading up to the Review Conference, States Parties led by Croatia, in cooperation with partners such as the CMC, worked to ensure the draft declaration was not weakened or watered down. The Declaration’s firm statement that “We condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor” was adopted without amendment. Four States Parties—United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Lithuania—expressed reservations with the text.
At the annual meeting of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in November 2015, several countries expressed their views on cluster munitions, including South Korea, which expressed regret that a “complex security environment” prevents it from acceding to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Some non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, such as India and Israel, as well as EU member states Estonia, Finland, Greece, and Poland, expressed regret that states failed in 2011 to regulate the use of cluster munitions through the framework provided by the CCW. Yet none of these states have proposed CCW work on cluster munitions since then or reassessed their approach to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The 2011 failure effectively ended CCW deliberations on the matter, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument to specifically address the suffering caused by cluster munitions.
The Monitor is not aware of any regional workshops aimed at encouraging universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in the second half of 2015 or first half of 2016.
After States Parties decided in 2015 to no longer hold intersessional meetings for the convention, the Netherlands in cooperation with the CMC organized an informal meeting for States Parties in Geneva on 17 May 2016. The half-day discussion focused on universalization, responses to instances and allegations of use of cluster munitions, and strengthening the norm against the weapon.
Since 1 January 2016, the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, has served as President of the convention’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties. The meeting will be held at the UN in Geneva on 5–7 September 2016, marking the first time States Parties have held their annual meeting at the UN.
UN General Assembly Resolution 70/54
Croatia and 36 co-sponsors introduced UNGA Resolution 70/54 on “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” The non-binding resolution calls for full implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.” It was the first UNGA resolution on the convention to be adopted by a vote.
On 7 December 2015, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 139 states in favor and only two states—Russia and Zimbabwe—opposed. Forty states abstained, all non-signatories to the convention except for signatories Cyprus and Uganda.
Thirty-two non-signatories voted in favor of Resolution 70/54, proving its usefulness as a barometer of support for the convention. It also saw Russia and 13 other states that abstained on the resolution make statements explaining their vote and stance on the convention.
Regional universalization developments
Of the 49 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 are States Parties to the convention. Mauritius and Swaziland have acceded to the convention, while the rest signed and ratified. There are 14 signatory states in the region, and seven non-signatories.
Rwanda ratified on 25 August 2015, just prior to the convention’s First Review Conference. Somalia, which has suffered from the use of cluster munitions, ratified on 30 September 2015 and Mauritius acceded the next day, after enacting national implementation legislation.
In December 2015, five of the seven non-signatories to the convention from Sub-Saharan Africa voted in favor of the UNGA resolution calling on states that have not done so to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions as soon as possible: Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Sudan.South Sudan was absent from the vote.
At the First Review Conference in September 2015, Gabon informed States Parties that it hopes to join the convention, but did not provide a timeframe for completing accession. The six other African non-signatories appear to take few, if any, steps toward acceding to the convention, but Eritrea, South Sudan, and Sudan also participated as observers in the First Review Conference.
Zimbabwe surprised many by voting against the UNGA resolution in December 2015 together with Russia. It has not responded to requests to elaborate why it voted no. Signatory Uganda also has not explained why it abstained from both rounds of voting on Resolution 70/54, while signatories Angola and São Tomé e Príncipe were absent during the final vote on the resolution.
Of the 14 African signatories to the convention, three have completed or are undertaking parliamentary approval processes to ratify the convention. Madagascar’s parliament approved ratification of the convention in May 2015 while DRC’s parliament did so in 2013. For both, the last remaining step is to deposit the ratification instrument with the UN. In October 2015, Madagascar informed states that it was awaiting promulgation of the ratification, which it described as “imminent.” Liberia’s government introduced draft legislation to ratify the convention in parliament in July 2015.
The 11 other signatories from Sub-Saharan Africa have expressed their desire to ratify and several have undertaken stakeholder consultations on the matter, but none have introduced ratification measures for parliamentary consideration and approval.
Of the 35 states from the Americas, 24 are States Parties to the convention, while signatories Haiti and Jamaica still need to ratify. There are nine non-signatories in the region.
Colombia ratified the convention on 10 September 2015, during the First Review Conference. Dubrovnik is also where Cuba announced that it would accede to the convention. It followed through six months later, becoming the sixth country from the region to accede to the convention.
In December 2015, six non-signatories from the Americas voted in favor of the UNGA resolution: Suriname; Venezuela; and Caribbean states Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, and Saint Lucia. These countries have limited capacity to undertake the accession process, but their positive votes for the resolution indicate the likelihood they will join the convention in the future.
Before its accession, Cuba also voted in favor of Resolution 70/54 and affirmed its “strong support” for the convention at the UNGA First Committee in October 2015.
Argentina, Brazil, and the United States (US) abstained from the vote on the UNGA resolution and provided explanations to elaborate their long-held objections to the convention.
At the UNGA in October 2015, Jamaica said “we are currently working towards ensuring our ratification [of the convention] at the earliest opportunity.” The status of Haiti’s ratification process is not known.
Only 10 of the 40 states in the Asia-Pacific region are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, while Indonesia and the Philippines have signed, but still not ratified.
The last ratification of the convention was the Pacific island state of Palau on 19 April 2016, which became the 100th State Party to the convention.
From the Asia-Pacific region, 17 non-signatories voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015, including nine that have not made a public statement articulating their position on the convention: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. They were joined by eight other non-signatories: Kiribati, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Vanuatu.
Only seven non-signatories from the Asia-Pacific region abstained on Resolution 70/54: China, India, South Korea, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Cambodia, North Korea, and Tonga were absent during the vote. Non-signatory Niue is not eligible to vote on UNGA resolutions, but can accede to the convention.
Pakistan and Vietnam explained why they abstained from the vote, while Singapore expressed its support for the convention after voting in favor of the UNGA resolution.
Non-signatories China, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam participated as observers in the convention’s First Review Conference in September 2015.
Asia-Pacific signatories Indonesia and the Philippines still do not appear to have concluded their years-long stakeholder consultations on the convention or introduced ratification legislation into their respective parliaments for consideration and approval.
Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia
Of the 54 countries in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, 34 are States Parties to the convention: 32 have signed and ratified, while Andorra and Slovakia have acceded.
Iceland ratified the convention on 31 August 2015 and the following week participated as a State Party in the convention’s First Review Conference.
Only two non-signatories from Europe voted in favor of Resolution 70/54 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Support for the convention is strongest in the European Union, where 21 of 28 EU member states are State Parties to the convention. The UNGA resolution demonstrated a clear split between EU members on the convention, as all EU non-signatories to the convention—Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, and Romania—abstained rather than vote in favor.
Poland provided an explanation on behalf of itself, Greece, Estonia, and Finland that expressed “support [for] the humanitarian goal of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” but said “at the same time, we believe that humanitarian concerns must be balanced with States’ legitimate security concerns and military and defence needs.”
Russia explained why it voted against the UNGA resolution, expressing “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions” but disagreeing vehemently with the approach taken by the ban convention. Nine other European non-signatories abstained on Resolution 70/54: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan was absent from both rounds of voting on the resolution.
Other states from the Caucasus and Central Asia have made no progress toward joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Finland, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Turkey, and Turkmenistan participated as observers in the convention’s First Review Conference in September 2015.
Cyprus is the last signatory left to ratify the convention from Europe. Its parliament has been considering draft ratification legislation for the convention since 2011, but there are concerns over Turkey’s absence from the convention. Cyprus abstained from both rounds of voting on the UNGA resolution and explained that the “abnormal security situation on the island” may have prevented ratification, but pledged “these issues can and will be resolved.”
Middle East and North Africa
Of the 19 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, only four are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Tunisia.
Algeria participated in a meeting of the convention for the first time in September 2015, when it attended the First Review Conference. It expressed firm opposition to cluster munitions and said the convention “provides a useful international norm to the global regime on disarmament.” Yemen said in May 2016 that it is considering acceding to the convention.
Jordan and Libya voted in favor of the UNGA resolution in December 2015, calling for the universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The other non-signatories abstained. Iran was the only country from the region to explain why it abstained from the resolution.
Algeria, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia participated as observers in the convention’s First Review Conference in September 2015.
Cluster munitions have been used by at least 21 governments in 40 countries and four disputed territories since the end of World War II (as detailed in the following table and the Timeline of cluster munition use found in the appendices of this chapter). Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems from cluster munitions, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions. Many countries that used cluster munitions in the past are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and have relinquished any use of these weapons under any circumstances.
Article 4 of the convention addresses the clearance of cluster munition remnants. While not retroactive, it finds that a State Party that previously used cluster munitions that became remnants on the territory of another State Party before the convention’s entry into force for both states is “strongly encouraged” to provide assistance to the affected State Party.
There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party to the convention.
However, cluster munitions have been used in seven non-signatories to the convention since its August 2010 entry into force, including Cambodia (2011), Libya (2011 and 2015), South Sudan (2014), Sudan (2012 and 2015), Syria (2012–present), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Yemen (2015–present).
Summary of states using cluster munitions and locations used
Note: Other areas are indicated in italics.
In this reporting period—since 1 July 2015—cluster munitions have been used in Syria and Yemen, as summarized below (for a more detailed accounting, please see the relevant country profile). There is also strong, but unconfirmed evidence that cluster munitions were used in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016, while signatory Kenya has denied an allegation that it used cluster munitions in Somalia in January 2016.
At the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2015, States Parties adopted the Dubrovnik Declaration, which affirms: “We are deeply concerned by any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, including in Cambodia, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen. We condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”
Use in Syria
Since 2012, Syrian government forces have used at least 13 types of cluster munitions made by two countries, as the following table shows.
From July 2012 until July 2016 at least 360 cluster munition attacks have been recorded in Syria. The actual number is likely far higher. Since mid-2012, Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions in multiple locations across 10 of the country’s 14 governorates.
Cluster Munition Monitor 2014 reported at least 249 cluster munition attacks from July 2012 until July 2014. The frequency of reported use of cluster munitions decreased significantly in the second half of 2014 and first three-quarters of 2015. It increased again when Russia began its joint operation with Syrian government forces and at least 76 attacks were recorded between 30 September 2015 and 20 July 2016.
Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Syria since beginning its joint military operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but its response is unconvincing. There is growing evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia City in Syria.
Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012
There is compelling evidence that Russia is using cluster munitions in Syria and/or directly participating with Syrian government forces in attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates such as Aleppo, Homs, and Idlib, and on armed opposition groups.
The first use in the conflict of two more types of cluster munitions has been documented since the start of Russia’s joint military operation with Syria. Advanced air-dropped RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs containing SPBE sensor fuzed submunitions have been used since October 2015 and ground-launched 3-O-8 cluster munition projectiles containing O-10 submunitions have been used since December 2015.
A remarkable number of RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM bombs appear to have been used and failed, given the high numbers of unexploded submunitions recorded after attacks.
Several air-dropped RBK-series cluster munitions used since 30 September 2015 bear markings showing they were produced from 1989 into the early 1990s, particularly the RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs, which appear to have been manufactured in 1990 and 1991. This appears to be a noticeable shift from before the Russian intervention, when production markings on the cluster bombs used in Syria showed they were produced in the 1970s and 1980s.
The UK and US have said that Russia is using cluster munitions in Syria, including in a 16 June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq. Photographs released by the forces attacked show RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munition remnants. The US Department of Defense claimed that Russian forces conducted the attack. In a statement, the Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for the attack, but did not address the reported use of cluster munitions.
It is challenging to determine conclusively if Russian or Syrian government forces are responsible for individual attacks, as they use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out offensives together. However, only Russia has forces in Syria that operate the Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack aircraft that have been used to deliver some of the RBK-series cluster bombs used in Syria. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including video and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attack sites when cluster munitions were used.
There has been no evidence to indicate that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the coalition’s Inherent Resolve operation against the non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014. A spokesperson for the US Air Force Central Command informed The Washington Post on 26 July 2016 that: “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”
Earlier use of cluster munitions
Initial reports of the use of RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets emerged in mid-2012, when the Syrian government began its air campaign on opposition-held areas. Its use of air-dropped cluster bombs has continued since then, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions and AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions for which the delivery system still is not clear.
Ground-launched cluster munitions have been used since the end of 2012, when government forces first used multi-barrel rocket launchers to deliver 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM submunitions with distinctive white nylon stabilizing ribbons. In early 2014, Syrian government forces began to use 9M55K and 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N210/9N235 submunitions equipped with self-destruct mechanisms. In July 2014, the first IS cluster munition use was documented during its advance on Ayn al-`Arab/Kobani, involving a DPICM-like submunition with a distinctive red ribbon, called “ZP-39” by experts.
Multiple 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missiles with submunition warheads have been used in Syria, including in an attack on Al-Najeya village on 4 December 2015.
As the Syria conflict continues to spiral, it is not possible to determine with confidence if opposition groups other than IS have used cluster munitions. There is evidence that opposition forces have repurposed unexploded submunitions as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). However, no opposition group operates aircraft and none have been seen in possession of the systems necessary to deliver ground-launched cluster munitions.
Responses to the use of cluster munitions
The Syrian military has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but usually does not respond to or comment on new use of cluster munitions. In December 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.” IS has not responded to its reported use of cluster munitions.
The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 140 states. Of these countries, more than 40 have made national statements condemning the use in Syria, including by the foreign ministers of Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. In February 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which he said is “killing innocent women and children.”
During the First Review Conference, 29 states condemned or expressed concern at ongoing use of cluster munitions, a dozen of which specifically mentioned cluster munition use in Syria.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has described “the carnage caused by cluster munitions in Syria” as “a direct violation” of international humanitarian law. However, the UN Secretary-General’s statement to the First Review Conference in September 2015 failed to condemn or even object to new use of cluster munitions.
States have adopted four UNGA resolutions since May 2013 condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 70/234 adopted on 23 December 2015 by a vote of 104 states in favor, which deplored and condemned “in the strongest terms” the continued use of cluster munitions.
Since April 2014, states have adopted seven Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including five since April 2015.
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which reports to the Human Rights Council, has reported on cluster munition use several times.
Use in Yemen
On 26 March 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition began a military operation in Yemen against Ansar Allah (Houthi forces) that was continuing as of July 2016 despite a 10 April 2016 ceasefire agreement.
HRW and Amnesty International have documented evidence of at least 19 cluster munition attacks in the conflict involving the use of seven types of air-delivered and ground-launched cluster munitions produced in three countries, as the following table shows.
HRW could not determine who used ground-launched cluster munitions containing “ZP-39” submunitions in Saada in April 2015, but Saudi Arabia and Houthi forces both possess rocket launchers and tube artillery capable of delivering them.
Cluster munitions used in Yemen since April 2015
None of the states participating in the Saudi Arabia-led coalition—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, UAE—are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
The first recorded cluster munition attack occurred at al-Shaaf in the western part of Saada governorate according to a video uploaded on 17 April 2015. A subsequent visit by HRW researchers to al-Amar village, 30 kilometers south of Saada City, confirmed a cluster munition attack on 27 April, including the presence of unexploded submunitions. The most recently documented cluster munition attack was on 15 February 2016 at a cement factory in Amran governornate. All three of these attacks involved the use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, the only cluster munition that the US has exported since 2008 and only on the condition that they are not used in civilian areas. Both Saudi Arabia and UAE have received CBU-105s from the US.
In Yemen, HRW has found at least three instances in which CBU-105s malfunctioned as their “skeet” or submunitions did not disperse from the BLU-108 canister and did not explode. Under existing US policy, the CBU-105 is required to have a failure rate of less than 1%. HRW documented evidence showing the CBU-105 was used in or near civilian areas, also in apparent violation of US export law.
In August 2015, HRW published the results of a research mission to Hajja governorate, which borders Saudi Arabia, documenting at least seven cluster munition rocket attacks by coalition forces from late April to mid-July 2015 that caused dozens of civilian casualties.
On 6 January 2016, coalition forces dropped a US-made CBU-58 cluster bomb containing BLU-63 submunitions on Yemen’s capital Sanaa in an attack documented by HRW, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and others. Markings on the bomb remnants indicate that it was manufactured in 1978. In Saada, HRW and VICE News also documented coalition use of notoriously harmful BLU-97 submunitions delivered by CBU-87 cluster bombs.
Amnesty International researchers documented the use of two types of cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015, apparently by coalition forces. It found the remnants of a Brazil-made ASTROS II cluster munition rocket in Saada from a 27 October 2015 attack, and in May 2016 confirmed the presence of UK-made BL-755 cluster munitions remnants in al-Khadra village in Hajja governorate.
Responses to the cluster munition use
In May 2016, Yemen informed a Mine Ban Treaty meeting that its mine clearance program has been set back by the conflict that began in March 2015 and has generated new contamination, including from cluster munition remnants.
The government of Saudi Arabia still has not issued a formal statement to confirm or deny the reports that the Saudi-led coalition used cluster munitions multiple times in Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s principle military spokesperson Brig. Gen. Ahmed Asiri has admitted in media interviews to one instance of use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in April 2015 in Hajja governorate, but argued it was not in a populated area and that they are not prohibited weapons. In February 2016, The New York Times reported that Saudi officials continue to deny ordering the use of cluster munitions in Yemen.
The UAE has denied using CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in Yemen. None of the other members of the coalition have commented on the use of cluster munitions in Yemen or responded to a CMC letter calling for an end to the attacks.
US officials have indicated that the US is aware of Saudi Arabia’s use of cluster munitions in Yemen, including CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, which are banned by the Convention on Cluster Munitions as they fall under the convention’s definition of a cluster munition. In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended transfers of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen.
The use of BL-755 cluster munitions in Yemen marks the first documented use of UK-made cluster munitions since the Convention on Cluster Munitions, to which the UK is party, entered into force in 2010. The UK has denied Saudi use of cluster munitions in Yemen. The UK’s last transfer of BL-755 cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia was in 1989.
Brazil has not commented on the evidence that its ASTROS cluster munition rockets have been used by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. In May 2016, HRW shared research findings with Brazilian government officials, including photographs from Hajja governorate showing unexploded submunitions from the rocket attacks.
Since the convention’s intersessional meetings in June 2015, states have continued to express concern at or condemn new use of cluster munitions in Yemen.
On 12 January 2016, the Netherlands in its capacity as president of the convention expressed deep concern at the reported cluster munition use in Yemen. At the Conference on Disarmament on 29 February 2016, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders said he was “deeply concerned about reports of the use of cluster munitions in the Yemen conflict” and called on all countries to “refrain from using cluster munitions.”
Previously, Costa Rica as president of the convention’s Fifth Meeting of States Parties and Croatia as president of the First Review Conference both condemned the use of cluster munitions in Yemen.
The UN, the ICRC, and the CMC have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Yemen. On 25 February 2016, the European Parliament adopted another resolution condemning the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen, including the use of cluster bombs. It adopted a similar resolution on 9 July 2015.
Use in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan
There is credible evidence that two types of ground-launched cluster munition rockets were used in Nagorno-Karabakh during the first week of April 2016 during fighting across the line of contact separating local Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces. Ground fighting was confined to areas close to the line of contact, but Azerbaijan launched artillery and rockets more than 10 kilometers into Nagorno-Karabakh from 1 April until 5 April 2016 when a ceasefire went into effect.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have both denied using cluster munitions in the brief conflict and accused the other side of using cluster munitions against civilians. Cluster Munition Monitor has not been able to conduct an independent investigation to make a conclusive determination about responsibility.
Within 10 days of commencing an emergency clearance operation in cooperation with Nagorno-Karabakh’s Emergency Situations Service on 8 April 2016, the HALO Trust reported the clearance and destruction of close to 200 unexploded M095 DPICM-type submunitions from near the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert in northeast Nagorno-Karabakh. HALO found remnants of Israeli-produced LAR-140 surfaced-fired rockets, which deliver the M095 DPICM submunitions. The cluster munitions were reportedly fired from Azerbaijan.
Media documented the remnants of the cargo section of 9M55K 300mm Smerch rockets in the southeast of Hardut district near the borders with Azerbaijan and Iran. Correspondents from Russian media outlet Sputnik photographed remnants of the cargo section of 9M55K Smerch rockets in a cemetery outside the village of Shukyurbeyli in Hadrut region. Azerbaijan was reported to have fired the Smerch rockets on the night of 4 April.
Allegation of use by Kenya in Somalia
On 24 January 2016, a Somali media outlet published a report on an alleged cluster munition attack in the Gedo region of Somalia. It published photographs reportedly taken at the site of the attack that show dead livestock and the remnants of UK-made BL-755 cluster bombs and their submunitions. According to the article, the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) carried out the attack, reportedly against al-Shabaab, after Kenyan troops were forced to retreat from their base near the Somali border town of El Adde.
The Governor of Gedo region, Mohamed Abdi Kalil, accused the KDF of attacking the area around Bardere City “using illegal cluster bombs.” At the UN Security Council in February 2016, the US said it was “deeply disturbed by allegations” that Kenya attacked civilian areas in Somalia in January 2016, including “claims that cluster munitions were deployed in violation of international law.” It called for an investigation.
The UN investigated and reported to the Security Council on 9 May 2016, finding that:
In addition to civilian casualties, air strikes by the Kenyan military from 15 to 23 January in the Gedo region reportedly resulted in the killing of livestock and the destruction of water wells and houses. In this regard, allegations of cluster munitions were reported by the media and local communities. However, the Government of Kenya has officially denied them. Unexploded sub-munitions are reported to have been used by Al-Shabaab as improvised explosive devices during attacks. On 31 January, the Federal Government announced a committee to investigate the impact of the air strikes, but the committee has yet to begin its work.
It is not possible on the basis of the above evidence for the Monitor to confirm the use of cluster munitions in January 2016, or to identify the responsible party.
Unilateral restrictions on use
Several states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed restrictions on the possible future use of cluster munitions.
The US confirmed in November 2011 that its policy on cluster munitions is still guided by a June 2008 US Department of Defense directive requiring that any US use of cluster munitions before 2018 that results in a 1% or higher unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate must be approved by a “Combatant Commander,” a high-ranking US military official. After 2018, the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% UXO.
Romania has stated it restricts the use of cluster munitions to exclusively on its own territory. Poland has stated it would use cluster munitions for defensive purposes only, and does not intend to use them outside its own territory. Estonia and Finland have made similar declarations.
During the failed CCW negotiations on cluster munitions, several states that have not signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions publicly stated that they were prepared to accept a ban on the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980 as part of the proposed CCW protocol, including China, India, and Russia. The CMC has called on these states to institute the commitments they made at the CCW as national policy as an interim measure toward joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Non-state armed groups
Due to the relative sophistication of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used them.
In the past, NSAG use of cluster munitions has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), BiH (by a Serb militia), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), Syria (by IS), and Ukraine (by opposition forces).
Government forces used cluster munitions against NSAGs in Syria, and Yemen in the second half of 2015 and into 2016, while in the past, cluster munitions were used against NSAGs in several countries, including Lebanon, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.
A total of 34 states have developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. Half of these states ceased manufacturing cluster munitions prior to or as a result of joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Sixteen countries are believed to produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so. None of these states have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Asia and Europe account for the majority of producer states, with six and five producers respectively. The Middle East and North Africa has three producer states while the Americas has two.
Cluster munition producers
It is not known if cluster munitions were produced in all these countries in 2015 or the first half of 2016 due to lack of transparency and available data. Greece, Romania, Singapore, and Turkey have indicated no active production, but the Monitor continues to list them as producers as it is unclear if they have adopted a new policy forswearing any future production of cluster munitions.
In November 2015, the private company Singapore Technologies Engineering (STE) announced that it has ceased production of cluster munitions. In a statement posted to its website, STE wrote, “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.” The Monitor will continue to list Singapore as a producer until the government formally commits not to acquire cluster munitions from its domestic industry. Singapore already observes an indefinite export moratorium.
In June 2011, Greece told the Monitor that its last production of cluster munitions was in 2001. In April 2011, Romania’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, “Romania is not a producer of cluster munition[s].” In August 2011, Turkey stated it has not produced cluster munitions since 2005.
Some cluster munition producers have established specific standards aimed at addressing the weapon’s failure rate and resulting UXO:
- South Korea in 2008 issued a directive requiring that in the future it would only acquire cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms and a 1% or lower failure rate.
- In 2001, the US instituted a policy that all submunitions produced after 2005 must have a UXO rate of less than 1%.
Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. There have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any of the convention’s States Parties or signatories since the convention took effect in August 2010.
Eighteen states have ceased the production of cluster munitions, as shown by the following table. All are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except non-signatory Argentina, which has indicated that it does not intend to produce cluster munitions in the future.
Former producers of cluster munitions
Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including France, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.
Exporters and recent transfers
Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or for research and training purposes. States Parties Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Ecuador’s Santa Barbara company, which is part of the Ministry of Defense, listed a type of cluster munition in its 2016 arms catalogue as available for sale. In June 2016, following an inquiry from the CMC, Ecuador confirmed that it is not selling cluster munitions and the item was removed from the catalogue.
While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in publicly available information, the US has probably been the world leader in exports, having transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas. Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the USSR. The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.
Use of cluster munitions in 2015 and 2016 and further research point to previously unknown transfers of cluster munitions. For example:
- Saudi Arabia acquired ASTROS cluster munition rockets from Brazil at some point and received its last shipment of BL-755 cluster bombs from the UK in 1989.
- Syria possesses SAKR cluster munition rockets bearing the production markings of Egyptian companies. Based on evidence of cluster munition use by government forces since 2012, Syria has imported at least 12 types of cluster munitions made by either the USSR or Russia.
- In October 2015, Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters issued an alert warning the public of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) fabricated by Boko Haram from cluster munitions. It issued photographs showing submunitions from French-made BLG-66 cluster munitions that it said had been recovered from arms caches found in areas contested by Boko Haram.
- The US provided small numbers of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons to Oman (32 in 2012), Singapore (3 in 2014), and South Korea (2 in 2015).
Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. The use of US-manufactured and supplied CBU-105 cluster munitions by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen in 2015 and 2016 is raising questions about whether statutory US transfer requirements are being met. In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended transfers of US cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas of Yemen.
Non-signatories Georgia, India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the UAE are among the recipients of cluster munitions exports since 2005.
At least two states that have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions have enacted a partial or complete export moratorium: Singapore and the US.
The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 91 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table. At least 31 of these countries have destroyed their stockpiled cluster munitions, while 11 States Parties to the convention still have stocks to destroy.
Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions
Note: Countries in italics still possess stockpiles.
Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories
It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions currently stockpiled by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as too few have disclosed information on the types and quantities possessed.
In 2011, the US said its stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.” However, the US appears to have made significant progress since 2008 in removing the cluster munitions from its active inventory and placing them in the demilitarization inventory for destruction. There is a lack of detailed information on the process, including the number and types destroyed, but according to a December 2015 US Army presentation there are currently 136,000 tons of cluster munitions in the demilitarization account.
Georgia completed the destruction of 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions in 2013; it used Israeli-made cluster munition rockets during the 2008 conflict with Russia. Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their respective stockpiles of cluster munitions.
Stockpiles possessed by States Parties
A total of 40 States Parties have stockpiled cluster munitions at some point in time, of which 29 have completely destroyed their stockpiles.
According to available information, at one point 32 States Parties stockpiled nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing more than 178 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.
Cluster munitions declared by States Parties
Note: Italics indicate states that still possess stockpiles to destroy.
Eight more States Parties that have or are believed to stockpile cluster munitions are not listed in the table above. Six have not formally declared the stocks in their initial Article 7 transparency reports:
- The Republic of the Congo informed States Parties in 2011 that it had no stocks of cluster munitions, but has not provided its transparency report, originally due in August 2015.
- Cuba has never confirmed or denied stockpiling cluster munitions, but is believed to possess cluster munitions of Soviet-era origin. Its initial transparency report is due by March 2017.
- Guinea’s stockpile status and plans for its destruction are not known. It has not yet submitted its initial transparency report, which was due by September 2015.
- Guinea-Bissau acknowledges that it stockpiles cluster munitions, but is nearly four years late in delivering its initial transparency report for the convention.
- Honduras stated in 2007 that it no longer possessed a stockpile ofcluster munitions, but has yet to deliver its initial transparency report, originally due in February 2013.
- South Africa has stated that its relatively small stockpile of cluster munitions has been earmarked for destruction.
States Parties Afghanistan and Iraq have reported the completion of stockpile destruction, but did not provide a specific completion date or the total quantity destroyed. Both continue to report the discovery and destruction of stocks of cluster munitions believed to have been abandoned in arms caches.
A total of 43 States Parties have confirmed never stockpiling cluster munitions, most through a direct statement in their transparency report for the convention. Since September 2015, Mali, Panama, Paraguay, and Saint Kitts and Nevis have submitted initial transparency reports confirming they do not possess any stocks.
Stockpiles possessed by signatories
The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory. Angola stated in 2010 that its entire stockpile had been destroyed and its armed forces no longer possessed cluster munitions, but it has yet to make an official declaration that all stocks of cluster munitions were destroyed.
Two other signatories acknowledge stockpiling cluster munitions, but have yet to disclose information on the quantities and types or destruction plan. Indonesia has acknowledged stockpiling cluster munitions, but has not disclosed information on the types and quantities possessed. A Nigerian official confirmed in April 2012 that its armed forces stockpile BL-755 cluster bombs. In October 2015, Nigeria alleged that Boko Haram has been using BLG-66 cluster munitions recovered from arms caches.
Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.
States Parties have collectively destroyed nearly 1.4 million cluster munitions containing more than 172 million submunitions, as shown in the following table. This represents the destruction of 93% of the total stockpile of cluster munitions and 97% of the total number of submunitions declared by States Parties.
Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties
Note: Italics indicate States Parties that have not yet completed stockpile destruction.
Annual destruction progress since entry into force
Since the convention took effect in August 2010, States Parties have destroyed 611,787 cluster munitions and 93.6 million submunitions:
- In 2011, 10 States Parties destroyed 107,000 cluster munitions and 17.6 million submunitions.
- In 2012, nine States Parties destroyed 173,973 cluster munitions and 27 million submunitions.
- In 2013, 10 States Parties destroyed 130,380 cluster munitions and 24 million submunitions.
- In 2014, eight States Parties destroyed 121,585 cluster munitions and 16.4 million submunitions.
- In 2015, nine States Parties destroyed 79,184 cluster munitions and 8.7 million submunitions.
Of the 29 States Parties that have completed destruction of their stockpiled cluster munitions, four destroyed their stocks before the convention’s entry into force: Ecuador in 2004, Colombia in 2009, and Moldova and Norway in July 2010.
In the period since then, 21 States Parties have completed their stockpile destruction obligation under the convention:
- Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, and Montenegro in the last four months of 2010.
- BiH, Hungary, Portugal, and Slovenia in 2011.
- The Netherlands in 2012.
- Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Macedonia FYR, and the UK in 2013.
- Canada and Denmark in 2014.
- Germany, Italy, Japan, Mozambique, and Sweden in 2015.
- France in the first half of 2016.
States Parties Afghanistan, Republic of the Congo, Honduras, and Iraq report or state that they have completed stockpile destruction, but have not specified the date of completion or the total quantity destroyed.
Destruction in 2015 and 2016
All States Parties have destroyed their stocks of cluster munitions well in advance of the convention’s eight-year deadline, which was hotly debated during the 2008 negotiations. With more than half a million cluster munitions, Germany reported the highest number of stocks of any State Party, but destroyed them all two years and nine months in advance of its 1 August 2018 deadline. Germany’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs announced on 25 November 2015 the completion of the destruction of “50,000 tonnes” of cluster munitions.
France and Japan were also among the first 30 ratifications to trigger the convention’s entry into force on 1 August 2010, resulting in the same August 2018 stockpile destruction deadline: France completed destruction on 30 June 2016, which is two years and a month in advance, while Japan completed three years in advance, on 9 February 2015. Croatia and Spain are the last States Parties with the August 2018 deadline still to complete stockpile destruction.
Other States Parties that concluded stockpile destruction in 2015 took even less time. Italy announced completion on 14 December 2015, four years and 2 months in advance of its deadline. Mozambique destroyed all its stocks between October 2014 and September 2015, completing destruction five years in advance of its deadline. Sweden completed its stockpile destruction on 13 April 2015, five and a half years in advance of its deadline.
During 2015, nine States Parties destroyed 79,184 cluster munitions and 8.7 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.
Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2015
Note: Italics indicate States Parties that have not completed stockpile destruction.
Three States Parties are in the process of stockpile destruction:
- Croatia has made rapid progress since beginning the destruction of its cluster munition stocks, destroying 80% of them by the end of 2015.
- Slovakia began stockpile destruction in the second half of 2015 and destroyed another 50 cluster munitions and 3,026 submunitions in the first half of 2016. It is on track to complete destruction well in advance of its January 2024 deadline.
- Switzerland destroyed 60% of its cluster munition stockpile by the end of 2015. It is on track to complete destruction in 2018, in advance of its January 2021 deadline.
Six States Parties with stockpiles indicate that they plan to begin destruction, but are not known to have started yet:
- Botswana previously reported its plan to destroy its stocks by the end of 2015 in advance of its December 2019 deadline. The current status of stockpile destruction is unclear as Botswana last provided an Article 7 transparency report in April 2014.
- Bulgaria last provided an Article 7 report in April 2015, but has committed to destroy its stocks by the October 2019 deadline.
- Guinea-Bissau still has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, originally due in October 2011, but it has requested financial and technical assistance to destroy the stockpile by the May 2019 deadline.
- Peru reported a slightly larger stockpile in July 2016 that it is preparing to destroy by its March 2021 deadline.
- South Africa has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, originally due by 29 April 2016, or detailed the number and types of cluster munitions it stockpiles or the plan for their destruction.
- Spain still has not destroyed additional stocks reported in 2012, but its implementing legislation for the convention specifically requires their destruction by the convention’s deadline of 1 August 2018.
Two States Parties are believed to stockpile cluster munitions, but must confirm:
- Cuba’s initial transparency report is due by 30 March 2017.
- Guinea is believed to stockpile cluster munitions, but has not provided its Article 7 transparency report for the convention, originally due in September 2015.
Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.
The CMC questioned the need for this provision when the convention was negotiated, as it saw no compelling reason to retain live cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for research and training purposes. In their transparency reports, statements and letters, and implementation legislation, most States Parties have expressed the view that there is no need to retain any live cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, or for the development of counter-measures. This includes 19 States Parties that stockpiled cluster munitions in the past.
Some States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions—Chile, Croatia, and Moldova—have declared the retention of inert items that have been rendered free from explosives and no longer qualify as cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.
Despite this, 11 States Parties—all from Europe—are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes, as shown in the following table. The initial quantity of cluster munitions (and submunitions) retained, the quantity retained at the end of calendar year 2015, and the quantity and types used or “consumed” for permitted purposes are listed.
Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2015)
Note: The quantity totals may include individual submunitions retained, which are not contained in a delivery container.
In September 2015, Slovakia stated that with respect to the convention’s provision concerning the retention of cluster munitions, “Slovakia does not intend to keep any submunitions and we plan to destroy all our stockpiles.” Slovakia subsequently reported that it intends to use its retained cluster munitions for the development of destruction techniques in “the second half of 2016.”
Germany has reduced the number of cluster munitions retained by almost a quarter since 2011 by consuming them in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training, but remains the State Party with the highest number of retained cluster munitions.
Switzerland reduced the number of cluster munitions it has retained for training as Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, and Spain have also done. In most cases, states have significantly reduced the number of cluster munitions retained for training since their initial declarations were made. This would indicate that the initial amounts retained were likely too high, but it is still not clear if current holdings constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes.
States Parties Australia and the UK initially retained cluster munitions, but have since destroyed and not replaced them.
Italy and Sweden have yet to consume any of their retained cluster munitions. During 2015, the Netherlands reduced the number retained slightly from the previous total, stating that the “quantity for 2015 is slightly lower than reported for 2014, without use during reporting period.”
Czech Republic, Denmark, and Sweden are retaining individual submunitions only.
Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. An updated report is due by 30 April each year thereafter, covering activities in the previous year. The CMC encourages states to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.
According to the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs website as of 21 July 2016, a total of 76 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report for the convention, representing 82% of States Parties for which the obligation applied at that time. This compliance rate represents a slight increase from previous years.
A total of 18 States Parties have missed the deadline to submit their initial transparency reports, of which six are more than five years late.
State Parties with overdue initial Article 7 reports (as of 21 July 2016)
Six new States Parties have deadlines pending: Iceland and Rwanda (31 July 2016), Colombia (28 August 2016), Somalia (31 August 2016), Mauritius (29 September 2016), and Cuba (30 March 2017).
Canada, Chad, Mali, Panama, Paraguay, Slovakia, and St. Kitts and Nevis have provided their initial transparency reports since the convention’s First Review Conference in September 2015.
Annual reports for 2015
As of 21 July 2016, a total of 43 States Parties have submitted their annual updated transparency report covering activities in 2015. Two dozen States Parties have yet to submit their annual updated reports, which were due by 30 April 2016.
Prior to ratifying, Canada provided voluntary transparency reports for the convention in 2011–2014, while Palau provided one in 2011. DRC submitted voluntary reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014.
Only a small number of states have used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and discourage use of cluster munitions, list cooperation and assistance support, or report on other important matters such as their position on interpretive issues.
According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.
A total of 27 States Parties have enacted specific legislative measures to implement the convention’s provisions, as listed in the table below. Some enacted legislation prior to ratifying or acceding to the convention, often by combining the legislative approval process for both implementation and ratification/accession.
States with implementation laws for the Convention on Cluster Munitions
A total of 11 states enacted implementing legislation prior to the convention’s August 2010 entry into force. Since then, 16 states have enacted implementing legislation, including four in 2015 and one in the first half of 2016.
Since mid-2015, three States Parties to the convention have adopted implementing legislation:
- Bulgaria’s parliament adopted implementing legislation for both the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 November 2015 and the law took effect on 8 December 2015. The legislation “prohibits any activities with cluster munitions and antipersonnel mines on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, except those permitted by the Convention...[and] regulates the conditions and procedures for transfer, transportation, and destruction.” It also amended Articles 337–339 of the Penal Code in June 2016 to establish penal sanctions for violating the prohibitions in the new implementation law on the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
- In Mauritius, the National Assembly adopted a law on 21 June 2016 that serves as the country’s implementing legislation for both the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty. The Anti-Personnel Mines and Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act 2016 prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, or transfer of cluster munitions and provides for penal sanctions of up to 15-years’ imprisonment for violations.
- Togo amended its Penal Code in November 2015 to criminalize use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions, as well as explosive bomblets, in accordance with the convention. Article 577 provides for penal sanctions of 10–20 years' imprisonment and a fine of CFA5–100 million.
In addition, Saint Kitts and Nevis reported in December 2015 that it enacted domestic legislation entitled the Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act on 27 August 2014. The Monitor is seeking a copy of the law, which does not appear to be available online.
Legislation under consideration
At least 23 States Parties have stated that they are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Grenada, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia.
Existing law deemed sufficient
At least 31 States Parties have indicated that their existing laws will suffice to enforce their adherence to the convention: Albania, Andorra, BiH, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iraq, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tunisia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.
Developments in the reporting period included:
- Croatia enacted mine action legislation on 21 October 2015 that it reports is “intended to be comprehensive” and “as such, the Act states that each failure in treatment of cluster munitions is subject to misdemeanor sanction.” The law does not impose sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the convention on territory under its jurisdiction or control, however Croatia’s Penal Code does apply.
- Palau has reported existing legislation under legal, administrative, and other measures to implement the convention, including its Constitution, which it states “prohibits use, production, and transhipment of cluster munitions.”
- Paraguay provided its initial transparency report in May 2016, listing its ratification law under national implementation measures.
- Slovakia cited existing arms trafficking legislation and its Penal Code to enforce its adherence to the convention’s provisions.
The status of national implementation measures is unknown or unclear in the remaining States Parties, most of which have not provided an initial Article 7 transparency report.
During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on some important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on the following issues of concern so that common understandings can be reached:
- The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
- The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and
- The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.
A number of States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, as of 21 July 2016, more than three dozen States Parties had not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues.
More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, especially with respect to interoperability. The cables also show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in a number of States Parties.
Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance
Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.
Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both require States Parties to discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.
The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.
At least 37 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.
During the reporting period:
- Costa Rica stated that Article 21 must not be interpreted in a manner that contradicts Article 1.
- Mauritius enacted implementing legislation in June 2016 that states: “no person shall in any manner assist, encourage or induce any other person to engage in any [of the prohibited acts].”
- Togo’s amended its Penal Code to prohibit assisting, encouraging, or inciting others to violate the convention’s prohibition on cluster munitions.
States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21:
- Australia’s Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 has been heavily criticized for allowing Australian military personnel to assist with cluster munition use by states not party. Section 72.41 of Australia’s implementing legislation “provides a defence to the offence provisions where prohibited conduct takes place in the course of military cooperation or operations with a foreign country that is not a party to the Convention.” During joint or coalition military operations, Australian Defence Force personnel could help plan operations or provide intelligence for, and/or contribute logistical support to coalition members during which a state not party uses cluster munitions.
- Canada’s Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act 2014 has elicited similar criticism for its provisions allowing Canadian Armed Forces and public officials to “direct or authorize” an act that “may involve” a state not party performing activities prohibited under the convention during joint military operations. In March 2015, the Chief of Defence Staff issued a directive to “provide direction on prohibited and permitted activities to [Canadian Armed Forces] personnel who might become involved in cluster munition related activities.”
- Japan has been reluctant to publicly discuss its interpretation of Article 21. However, in a June 2008 State Department cable, a senior Japanese official apparently told the US that Japan interprets the convention as enabling the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions.
- The UK’s 2010 implementation law permits assistance with a number of acts prohibited under the convention if the assistance occurs during joint military operations. In addition, the UK stated in 2011 that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”
States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 allows for military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed. Spain’s 2015 implementation law establishes that military cooperation and participation in military operations by Spain, its military personnel, or its nationals with states that are not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and that use cluster munitions is not prohibited. After Spain’s opposition parties called for the draft legislation to prohibit Spain’s involvement at all times in military operations with other states that use cluster munitions, the draft legislation was adjusted to incorporate the positive obligations of Article 21(2) of the convention, requiring Spain to work for universalization and to discourage the use of cluster munitions.
The US and its coalition partners have not used cluster munitions in the “Operation Inherent Resolve” military action against IS forces that started in 2014 in Syria and Iraq. The Monitor requested information from the UK on how it is engaging in the Iraq portion of the joint operation with the US and other states that have not banned cluster munitions. In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) responded:
The prohibition on the UK’s use of cluster munitions is reflected in our operational targeting policy documents which outline how UK armed forces will operate, including with coalition partners. Restrictions on the use of weapons and national caveats imposed during coalition operations are a normal part of coalition operations. These directives include the national, operationally-specific, rules of engagement profiles and national caveats which will ensure that any action is within the parameters of UK law.
Transit and foreign stockpiling
The CMC has stated that the injunction to not provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.
States Parties that have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention—include Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.
US stockpiling and transit
States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US has removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories. The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.” According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.
The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:
- A US cable dated December 2008 states, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”
- Germany has not expressed clear views on the convention’s prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, but according to a December 2008 cable, it has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany.
- Italy, Spain, and Qatar were identified by the US in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.” Spain reported in 2011 that it is in the process of informing the states not party with which it cooperates in joint military operations of its international obligations with respect to the prohibition of storage of prohibited weapons on territory under its jurisdiction or control.
- Japan maintains that US military bases in Japan are under US jurisdiction and control, so the possession of cluster munitions by US forces does not violate the national law or the convention. A December 2008 cable states that Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them.”
- According to a cable detailing the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the “U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG),” until US cluster munitions are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime, “they are considered to be under U.S. title, and U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”
- According to a May 2007 cable, the US may store cluster munitions in Kuwait.
A number of States Parties as well as the CMC view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.
A total of 10 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the table below.
Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions
Four States Parties enacted legislation on cluster munitions containing provisions on disinvestment prior to the convention’s 1 August 2010 entry into force, while six have adopted disinvestment laws in the period since. There was no new legislation relating to disinvestment in the second half of 2015 or first half of 2016.
At least 28 States Parties and signatories to the convention have elaborated their view that investment in cluster munition production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention: Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, France, Ghana, Guatemala, the Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, the UK, and Zambia.
At the First Review Conference in September 2015, Costa Rica made its first interpretive statement regarding investments in cluster munitions, declaring that it views “investment in the production of cluster munitions…as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.”
A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.
Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, and other states have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.
At the First Review Conference, States Parties also adopted the Dubrovnik Action Plan, which encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investments in producers of cluster munitions.
Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
CMC co-founder and member PAX continues to lead advocacy and research to encourage governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors. In June 2016, PAX issued another update of its report detailing the status of global investment in cluster munition producers.
Timeline of cluster munition use
 Since entry into force on 1 August 2010, states can no longer sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions, in accordance with Article 15. Accession and ratification are now the most common ways to become a State Party. Non-signatories to the convention, also known as “states not party,” are those that have not signed the convention or bound themselves as States Parties through accession or other mechanisms such as acceptance or approval.
 The convention text was adopted by consensus by the 107 governments that were full participants in the negotiations. However, adoption does not have any legal obligation attached. Sixteen countries adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin on 30 May 2008, but never signed or acceded: Argentina, Bahrain, Brunei, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
 Sweden destroyed its last stocks on 13 April 2015, but did not announce completion until September 2015.
 There are 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory (Marshall Islands). All States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have joined the Mine Ban Treaty except Cuba, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Palestine, while 47 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have yet to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Greece, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Malaysia, Maldives, Niue, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saint Lucia, Serbia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
 The convention enters into force for each individual state on the first day of the sixth month after their deposit of the instrument of accession or ratification with the UN in New York. The Monitor lists a country as a State Party as soon as the deposit has occurred.
 Ninety-four states signed the convention in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008, while 10 signed in 2009 and four signed in the first seven months of 2010 before the convention entered into force.
 Grenada, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago acceded in 2011; Andorra and Saint Kitts and Nevis in 2013; Belize and Guyana in 2014; Palestine, Mauritius, and Slovakia in 2015; and Cuba in 2016.
 Prior to entry into force, four signatories ratified upon signing the convention in 2008, 22 in 2009, and 12 in 2010 before 1 August. Eleven ratified in the last five months of 2010, 15 in 2011, 10 in 2012, five in 2013, two in 2014, seven in 2015, and one in 2016, as of 21 July.
 Of the 19 signatories left to ratify the convention, 14 are from Sub-Saharan Africa, two are from the Americas, two from Asia-Pacific, and one from Europe. Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that “would defeat the object and purpose” of any treaty they have signed. Thus, signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have committed to never use, produce, or transfer cluster munitions, even if they have not yet ratified. The Vienna Convention is considered customary international law binding on all countries.
 The 25 non-signatories that attended were: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Finland, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam. Armenia and Suriname are not on the List of Participants, but delivered statements to the meeting. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference List of Participants, 1 October 2015, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2014/11/List-of-participants_CCM_1RC.pdf.
 The president was assisted by Josko Klisovic, Deputy Assistant Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia and Dijana Pleština, Director of the Office for Mine Action of the Government of Croatia.
 Of the 121 high contracting parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons all but 39 have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, India, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, South Korea, Latvia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, UAE, United States (US), Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. See the full list of CCW states at bit.ly/CCWstatus.
 The African regional workshop held in Addis Abada in August 2016 falls outside the reporting period of Cluster Munition Monitor 2016.
 The fifth and final round of intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions took place in Geneva on 22–23 June 2015, with participation by 56 countries including from non-signatories Cambodia, Cuba, Finland, India, Libya, Pakistan, Qatar, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. UN agencies, the ICRC, the CMC and other international organizations also attended.
 The first five annual meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its First Review Conference took place in States Parties that are contaminated by cluster munition remnants and/or leaders of the convention: Lao PDR in 2010, Lebanon in 2011, Norway in 2012, Zambia in 2013, Costa Rica in 2014, and Croatia in 2015.
 Croatia sponsored UNGA Resolution 70/54 on Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with these co-sponsors: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia FYR, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, and Zambia.
 “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/54.
 Previous UNGA resolutions on the convention in 2008 and 2009 were adopted without a vote. See, UNGA Resolution 63/71 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted without a vote on 2 December 2008, bit.ly/UNGA63-71; and UNGA Resolution 64/36 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted without a vote on 2 December 2009, bit.ly/UNGA64-36.
 The 40 abstentions were: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, the US, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen.
 The non-signatories that voted in favor of the UNGA resolution were: Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei, Central African Republic, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
 The following abstainers elaborated their views on the draft resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Argentina, Brazil, Cyprus, Iran, Latvia, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, the US, and Vietnam. Four states voting in favor made statements (Austria, Cuba, Mexico, and Singapore), in addition to the Russian Federation with its no vote. See, UN, “Record of First Committee 24th meeting,” A/C.1/70/PV.24, 4 November 2015.
 Statement of Gabon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7–11 September 2015. Unofficial translation, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2015/09/Gabon_Statement1.pdf.
 In January 2016, the convention’s coordinators for universalization reported that only “administrative procedures” remain for Madagascar and the DRC to complete ratification. Minutes of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Coordination Meeting, Geneva, 21 January 2016, www.clusterconvention.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Minutes-21-January-2016.pdf.
 Email from Teresa Dybeck, Programme Manager, Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 27 July 2015.
 Angola, Benin, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Gambia, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé e Príncipe, Tanzania, and Uganda.
 Of the 24 States Parties from the Americas, 18 signed and ratified the convention: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Uruguay.
 Statement of Cuba, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 11 September 2015, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2015/09/Cuba_High-Level-Segment1.pdf.
 Belize, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago have acceded to the convention from the Americas.
 Explanation of Vote by Argentina, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015. See, UN, “Record of First Committee 24th meeting,” A/C.1/70/PV.24, 4 November 2015; Explanation of Vote by Brazil, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015, bit.ly/UNGA1stCommBrazil2015; and Explanation of Vote by the US, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015, http://usun.state.gov/remarks/6955.
 There are 19 non-signatories from Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam) and nine non-signatories from the Pacific (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu).
 The 10 States Parties from the Asia-Pacific region are Afghanistan, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Japan, Lao PDR, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, and Samoa.
 From Europe, 32 countries have signed and ratified the convention: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
 Explanation of Vote by Greece, Estonia, Finland, and Poland, delivered by Poland, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015. UN, “Record of First Committee 24th meeting,” A/C.1/70/PV.24, 4 November 2015.
 Outside of the EU, the 13 other European and Central Asian non-signatories are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
 Letter from Elena Rafti, Security Policy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 27 May 2015.
 The 15 non-signatories from the Middle East and North Africa are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. Bahrain, Morocco, and Qatar joined in the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the negotiations in May 2008.
 Statement of Algeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2015/09/Algeria_Hardcopy_statement.pdf.
 Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016. Notes by HRW.
 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen.
 In February 2015, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen sent observers to the First Preparatory meeting of the Review Conference, and in June 2015, Libya, Morocco, and Yemen sent observers to the Second Preparatory meeting of the Review Conference, both held in Geneva.
 Non-signatory stockpilers Estonia, Finland, Turkey, and the UAE state that they have never used cluster munitions, while a dozen non-signatories with cluster munition stocks are not known to have ever used them: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mongolia, Oman, Qatar, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
 Nine non-signatories known to produce cluster munitions stated that they have never used cluster munitions: Brazil, China, Egypt,Greece, South Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. The Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producers: India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore. That leaves Israel, Russia, and the US as the only countries to both produce and use cluster munitions.
 Colombia, France, Iraq, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK.
 There was also an allegation that a weapon that appears to meet the criteria of a cluster munition was used in non-signatory Myanmar in early 2013. Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Myanmar’s northern Kachin state claimed that the Myanmar army used cluster munitions against KIA forces in an attack near the town of Laiza on 26 January 2013. Photographs showed the remnants of an M1A1 cluster adapter and 20-pound fragmentation bombs.
 This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes in Angola, Azerbaijan, DRC, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh.
 “The Dubrovnik declaration 2015: Spectemur agendo (judged by our actions),” annexed to the Final Report of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/CONF/2015/7, 13 October 2015, bit.ly/CCMRevConFinalReport.
 In 2004, Jane’s Information Group listed Syria as possessing RBK-series air-dropped bombs as well as the KMGU dispensers, indicating that the stocks used after 2012 were not newly-acquired. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 846.
 The information contained in this Monitor summarizes and updates information published in HRW reports, which in turn draws on reporting by locals—including photographs and videos—and witness accounts. HRW generally only records the use of cluster munitions if the attack and/or remnants were filmed to ensure visual confirmation and if at least one other source has confirmed the use of cluster munitions. The actual number of attacks is probably much higher, as local activists and media have reported many more incidents of what appear to be cluster munition use.
 As of July 2016, the Monitor still has not seen any evidence of cluster munition use in the governorates of Tartus, Quneitra, As-Suwayda, or Al-Hasakah.
 Video database searches have revealed evidence of a few dozen cluster munition attacks in the period. HRW documented IS use in July–August and an air-delivered cluster munition attack by Syrian government forces on Manbij on 21 August. HRW, “Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use,” 1 September 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/01/syria-evidence-islamic-state-cluster-munition-use.
 There were at least 34 cluster munition attacks by the Russian-Syrian joint operation on opposition-controlled territory between 30 September 2015 and 8 February 2016. While it is possible that new use went unrecorded, just two cluster munition attacks were reported in March, April, and the first three weeks of May. Another 40 cluster munition attacks were recorded from 27 May–20 July 2016.
 In addition, it is not clear how the Islamic State (IS, also called ISIL) obtained cluster munitions rockets of unknown origin containing “ZP-39” submunitions that it first used in Syria in 2014.
 HRW stated, “The four types of ground-fired cluster munitions used recently were launched from large vehicles that are complicated to operate and have never been seen in the possession of armed opposition groups.” HRW, “Russia/Syria: Extensive Recent Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 December 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/20/russia/syria-extensive-recent-use-cluster-munitions.
 Markings on the RBK-series air-dropped bombs and their submunitions, as well as a comparison with the Soviet manuals for the weapons, show the cluster munitions used in Syria until September 2015 were manufactured at Soviet state munitions factories in the 1970s and early 1980s.
 The New Syrian Army (@NSyA_Official), “Russians are lying with E-conference & more updates on our FB page,” 1:18pm, 19 June 2016, Tweet, https://twitter.com/NSyA_Official/status/744625482973519872.
 Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “On June 18 Russia and US held teleconference on implementing the Memorandum on preventing aerial incidents in Syria,” 19 June 2016, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12087713@egNews.
 Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015, bit.ly/Amnesty23Dec2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/08/russia/syria-daily-cluster-munition-attacks.
 In September 2015, the US Department of Defense listed eight Operation Inherent Resolve coalition members conducting US-led airstrikes in Iraq: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatorys Jordan and the US, and States Parties Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and the UK. It listed nine coalition nations participating in US-led airstrikes in Syria: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatories Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, and the US, as well as States Parties Australia, Canada, and France. Department of Defense, “Airstrikes Hit ISIL Terrorists in Syria, Iraq,” 30 September 2015, www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/621107/airstrikes-hit-isil-terrorists-in-syria-iraq.
 Email from Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Writer, The Washington Post, 27 July 2016. See also: Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Despite denial, ‘growing evidence’ Russia is using cluster bombs in Syria, report says,” The Washington Post, 28 July 2016, bit.ly/WashPost28Jul2016.
 The 250-kilogram class RBK-series cluster bombs can be delivered by fighter ground-attack aircraft as well as rotary wing aircraft, such as Mi-24 and Mi-8 series helicopters. Brown Moses Blog, “Evidence of cluster bombs being deployed in Syria,” 10 July 2012, bit.ly/BrownMoses10Jul2012; and HRW Press Release, “Syria: Evidence of Cluster Munitions Use by Syrian Forces,” 12 July 2012, www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/12/syria-evidence-cluster-munitions-use-syrian-forces.
 AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions can be loaded into BKF cartridges and dispersed by KMG-U dispensers, while AO-2.5RT submunition can also be delivered by RBK-500 cluster bomb.
 It is not known if the 122mm rockets are SAKR-18 or SAKR-36 variants, which contain 72 and 98 submunitions respectively. The design of the fuze system in this type of submunition makes it very sensitive and submunitions that fail to explode on initial impact are liable to detonate if disturbed. HRW Press Release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” 14 January 2013, www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/14/syria-army-using-new-type-cluster-munition.
 Armament Research Services, “9M27K Series Cargo Rockets in Syria,” 22 February 2014, www.armamentresearch.com/9m27k-series-cargo-rockets-in-syria/. HRW attributed responsibility for the use to Syrian government forces, stating, “It is highly unlikely that rebel forces could acquire the eight-wheeled, 43,700-kilogram launch vehicle or operate its sophisticated fire control system without significant training or time to conduct practice drills. There is no video evidence or written claims that any rebel group controls any BM-30 launchers, its similarly sized re-supply vehicle, or any 300mm surface-to-surface rockets like the 9M55K rocket.” HRW Press Release, “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 February 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/18/syria-new-deadly-cluster-munition-attacks.
 HRW, “Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use,” 1 September 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/01/syria-evidence-islamic-state-cluster-munition-use. Markings on some of the submunitions indicate they were manufactured in 1993. Brown Moses Blog, “The markings on what’s assumed to be a Sakr submunition suggests the designation is ZP39, made in 1993,” 4 April 2014, https://twitter.com/Brown_Moses/status/452120358271725568.
 HRW, “Russia/Syria: Extensive Recent Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 December 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/20/russia/syria-extensive-recent-use-cluster-munitions.
 According to the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), “the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stressed on [15 October 2012] that the misleading media outlets have recently published untrue news claiming the Syrian Arab Army has been using cluster bombs against terrorists.” According to SANA, “the General [in] Command said the Syrian Army does not possess such bombs.” “Syria denies using cluster bombs,” CNN, 16 October 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/15/world/meast/syria-civil-war/. In March 2013, Syrian diplomatic representatives denied the evidence of Syrian cluster bomb use. Letter from Firas al Rashidi, Charge d’affair ad interim, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic to Japan, to the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, 7 March 2013.
 Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “Russian Defence Ministry commented on briefing of Amnesty International,” 23 December 2015, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12072315@egNews.
 A total of 143 countries have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements, including 93 States Parties and signatories. The 50 non-signatories that have condemned the use of cluster munition in Syria are: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, South Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, UAE, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen.
 The following states have made national statements condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria: Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo, Turkey, UK, and US.
 BiH, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, and Zambia.
 Statement by the UN Secretary-General, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of State Parties, San José, 3 September 2014, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2014/09/UNSG.pdf; and statement of the UN Secretary-General, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.
 “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 70/234, 23 December 2015, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/70/234.
 “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Report 28/69, 5 February 2015.
 The “ZP-39” is a dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) type submunition but its manufacturer and delivery system are not publicly known or reported by standard international reference materials. HRW, “Yemen: Cluster Munitions Harm Civilians,” 31 May 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/31/yemen-cluster-munitions-harm-civilians.
 HRW conducted four research missions to Yemen since May 2015, documenting 16 cluster munition attacks that killed 19 civilians and wounded 66. Email from Belkis Wille, Senior Researcher, HRW, 22 May 2016. Between July 2015 and April 2016, Amnesty International documented 10 cases in which 16 civilians were injured or killed by cluster munition attacks and from their remnants. Nine were children, two of whom were killed. Amnesty International, “Children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb minefields in Yemen,” 22 May 2016, bit.ly/Amnesty22May2016.
 “اليمن : إسقاط طيران العدوان السعودي الامريكي قنابل مظلية محرمة دوليا,” YouTube.com, 17 April 2015. HRW found these cluster munitions were used within 600 meters of villages, in possible violation of US law. HRW, “Yemen: Saudi-led Airstrikes Used Cluster Munitions,” 3 May 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/03/yemen-saudi-led-airstrikes-used-cluster-munitions.
 Fatik Al-Rodaini (@Fatikr), “Types of bombs being parchuted by Saudi warplanes in Saada N #Yemen,” 27 April 2015, 12:50pm, Tweet, https://twitter.com/Fatikr/status/592777902736965632.
 The US states that CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons are the only cluster munitions “that meet that our stringent requirements for unexploded ordnance rates, which may not exceed 1 percent.” Jeff Rathke, Acting Deputy Spokesperson, US State Department Press Conference, 4 May 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/05/241844.htm#SAUDIARABIA2.
 During a visit in May 2015, residents showed HRW two BLU-108 canisters and an unexploded submunition from the attack near the main road between Sanaa and Saada, about 100 meters south of al-Amar. At that location, HRW found a third empty canister in bushes nearby. HRW field researchers also identified BLU-108 with their “skeet” still attached following the 21 May 2015 attack in Sanaa and the 15 February 2016 attack in Amran. HRW, “Yemen: Cluster Munitions Harm Civilians,” 31 May 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/31/yemen-cluster-munitions-harm-civilians; and HRW, “Yemen: Saudis Using US Cluster Munitions,” 6 May 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/06/yemen-saudis-using-us-cluster-munitions.
 A woman and two children were injured in their homes by CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons used on 12 December 2015, on the port town of Hodaida, while at least two civilians were wounded in an attack near al-Amar village in Saada governorate on 27 April 2015.
 HRW, “Yemen: Cluster Munition Rockets Kill, Injure Dozens,” 26 August 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/26/yemen-cluster-munition-rockets-kill-injure-dozens.
 Ben Anderson, Samuel Oakford, and Peter Salisbury, “Dead Civilians, Uneasy Alliances, and the Fog of Yemen’s War,” VICE News, 11 March 2016, https://news.vice.com/article/dead-civilians-uneasy-alliances-and-the-fog-of-yemens-war.
 Amnesty International, “Children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb minefields in Yemen,” 22 May 2016, bit.ly/Amnesty22May2016; and Amnesty International, “Yemen: Evidence counters UK claims about the use of British-made cluster munitions in Yemen,” 6 June 2016, bit.ly/Amnesty6Jun2016.
 Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016. Notes by HRW.
 It also has not responded to a 27 March 2015 letter sent by the CMC to Saudi Arabia and other coalition members urging that they refrain from using cluster munitions in the military operation in Yemen. CMC, “Saudi Arabia and others must not use cluster munitions in Yemen,” 27 March 2015, bit.ly/CMC27Mar2015.
 Asiri informed CNN on 4 May 2015 that Saudi Arabia had used CBU-105s in Yemen against armored vehicles only, describing it as an “anti-vehicle weapon” and stating, “We do not use it against persons. We don’t have any operation in the cities.” Ben Brumfield and Slma Shelbayah, “Report: Saudi Arabia used U.S.-supplied cluster bombs in Yemen,” CNN, 4 May 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/03/middleeast/yemen-hrw-cluster-munitions-saudi-arabia/index.html. Asiri acknowledged to The Financial Times that Saudi forces have used a US weapon that engages targets such as armored vehicles and is “equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features” but did not call it a cluster munition and argued it was used to target vehicles not people. “Saudi Arabia accused of using cluster bombs in Yemen airstrikes,” The Financial Times, 3 May 2015, https://next.ft.com/content/57ee6c92-f1a1-11e4-98c5-00144feab7de. Asiri told Bloomberg News that the categorization of the cluster munitions as banned “isn’t correct.” Alaa Shahine, “Saudis deny sending troops to Yemen, reject cluster-bomb report,” Bloomberg News, 3 May 2015, bit.ly/SaudiDenial3May2015. Asiri informed CNN on 11 January 2016 that it has used cluster munitions against concentrated rebel camps and armored vehicles, but never against civilian populations. “Rights group: Saudi Arabia used US cluster bombs on civilians,” CNN, 29 February 2016, www.cnn.com/2016/02/29/politics/saudi-arabia-us-cluster-bombs-on-civilians/.
 A diplomatic representative of the UAE told the CMC that the UAE is not using CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons because they are banned by the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Interview with UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, Geneva, 12 April 2016.
 For example, a US Defense Department official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told media in August 2015 that “the U.S. is aware that Saudi Arabia has used cluster munitions in Yemen.” See, Paul D. Shinkman, “U.S. Official: Saudis Have Used Cluster Bombs in Yemen," US News and World Report, 19 August 2015, bit.ly/SaudiUse-US-19Aug2015.
 According to Foreign Policy, a senior US official said the administration acknowledged reports that the weapons had been used “in areas in which civilians are alleged to have been present or in the vicinity” and added: “We take such concerns seriously and are seeking additional information.” John Hudson, “White House blocks transfer of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia,” Foreign Policy, 27 May 2016, bit.ly/UStransferblock27May2016. See also, HRW, “US: Stop Providing Cluster Munitions,” 2 June 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/02/us-stop-providing-cluster-munitions.
 For example, on 24 May 2016, the UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond told parliament that “there is no evidence yet that Saudi Arabia has used cluster munitions” in Yemen. See, Jeremy Binnie, “UK rejects claim BL 755 cluster munition used in Yemen,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 May 2016, www.janes.com/article/60748/uk-rejects-claim-bl-755-cluster-munition-used-in-yemen.
 Countries that have expressed concern at or condemned the use of cluster munitions in Yemen in national statements include: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Burundi, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Portugal.
 Costa Rica, “Costa Rica condena el uso de municiones en racimo en Yemen,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 May 2015, bit.ly/CostaRicaCondemns5May2015;and statement of Croatia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings. Geneva, 23 June 2015. Notes by HRW.
 European Parliament, “Resolution on the humanitarian situation in Yemen,” 25 February 2016, bit.ly/EPYemen25Feb2016; and “Joint Motion for a Resolution on the situation in Yemen,” 8 July 2015, bit.ly/EpYemen8Jul2015. The earlier resolution was adopted without a vote.
 HALO Trust, “HALO Begins Emergency Clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016, www.halotrust.org/media-centre/news/halo-begins-emergency-clearance-in-karabakh/; HALO NargoroKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “NK’s Emergency Situations Service & HALO have destroyed 200+ #clustermunitions since clearance resumed in #Karabakh,” 20 April 2016, 9:14am, Tweet, https://twitter.com/HALO_NK/status/722820830254641152.
 On 28 April 2016, a spokesperson from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that “cluster munitions used by the Armenian troops against the civilian Azerbaijani population living densely along the line of contact aimed at intentional destruction of manpower, do not bear any military goal and serve solely to perpetrate mass killings among the civilians.” See, “Azerbaijani MFA: Armenian use of cluster munition serves only committing mass destruction among civilians,” Report.az, 28 April 2016, bit.ly/Az28Apr2016. On 6 April 2016, a spokesperson from Armenia’s Ministry of Defense issued photographs showing the remnants of Smerch rockets that he claimed Azerbaijan fired into Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the article, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “do not possess weaponry of this kind.” “Armenian MOD provides factual proof of prohibited cluster missile use by Azerbaijani army,” ArmenPress, 6 April 2016.
 HALO NargoroKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO’s assessment of new #clustermunition contamination is underway near Mokhratagh village, Martakert, #Karabakh,” 14 April 2016, 6:39am, Tweet, https://twitter.com/halo_nk/status/720607303779676164; and HALO NargoroKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Rapid assessment of new #clustermunition strikes in #Karabakh has allowed HALO to establish the footprint (extent),” 6 May 2016, 8:19am,Tweet, https://twitter.com/HALO_NK/status/728605106434904064.
 HALO NargoroKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO starts emergency clearance of #clustermunition(s) in Nerkin Horatagh village, Martakert, #Karabakh,” 12 April 2016, 6:19am, Tweet, https://twitter.com/halo_nk/status/719877588248829952.
 RT (Russia Today) correspondent Murad Gazdiev (@MuradoRT), “@MarkHiznay South-East of Hardut. Right where NKR, Azerbaijan and Iran borders cross. Exact coordinates in pic,” 5 April 2016, 1:37pm, Tweet, https://twitter.com/muradort/status/717451053315330048; and Alexandru Cociorvel (@AlexandruC4), “Azerbaijani “cluster bomb” that fell on NKR last night. Patches of burned ground all around,” 5 April 2016, 11:22am, Tweet, https://twitter.com/alexandruc4/status/717417219970478081.
 “Traces of war in Karabakh,” Sputnik, 4 April 2016, http://sputnikarmenia.ru/photo/20160406/2804318.html.
 “Losses shelling forces arrested Gedo and Juba,” Calanka Media, 24 January 2016, http://calankamedia.com/?nid=33006. See also, “Sawirro: Kenya Oo Qaaday Weerar Culus Oo Aar goosi Ah!!," Somalia Memo, 24 January 2016, http://somalimemo.net/articles/4278/Sawirro-Kenya-Oo-Qaaday-Weerar-Culus-Oo-Aar-goosi-Ah.
 Mohamed Abdi Klil (@GovernorKalil), “#KDF jets pounded #Bardere city area southern #Gedo region, killing Civilians, destroying livestock Using illegal cluster bombs #Somalia @UN,” 5 March 2016, 8:02am, https://twitter.com/GovernorKalil/status/706147790703955969.
 “Somalia - Security Council, 7626th meeting,” UN Web TV, 18 February 2016, http://webtv.un.org/search/somalia-security-council-7626th-meeting/4762620696001?term=Eritrea.
 UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2016/430),” 9 May 2016, p. 10, para. 51.
 In 2006, Hezbollah fired more than 100 cluster munition rockets from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. See, ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada: October 2010), p. 159.
 Use of cluster munitions against Syrian opposition forces has been ongoing since 2012. Libyan forces of the Gaddafi regime used cluster munitions against rebel forces in 2011. The government of the separatist territory of Abkhazia asserted that Georgian forces fired cluster munitions into the Kodor Valley in August 2008. Moroccan forces used cluster munitions against the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario) in Western Sahara from 1975 to 1988.
 The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.
 “Sustainability Governance,” Singapore Technologies Engineering website, undated, http://www.stengg.com/corporate-governance/sustainability/sustainability-governance; and Stop Explosive Investments, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 18 November 2015, bit.ly/STE18Nov2015. Investors received similar letters. See also, Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, bit.ly/STEQuits18Nov2015.
 Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, 14 June 2011.
 Statement of the Republic of Korea, CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 13 November 2008.
 Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001.
 Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited the production capacity of former Yugoslavia, has declared, “There are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011, bit.ly/BihCCMArt7-20Aug2011.
 There is no comprehensive accounting available of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK), in addition to exports by non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the US, and Yugoslavia.
 81mm Cargo Mortar Bomb Type W87. Initial research findings by Neil Corney, Omega Research Foundation (UK).
 Letter from Dr. Oswaldo Salgado Espinoza, Gerente General, Santa Barbara, to Megan Burke, Director, CMC, 9 June 2016.
 US recipients include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.
 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, Soviet cluster munition remnants have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.
 “Boko Haram has cluster bombs: Nigeria’s DHQ,” The News Nigeria, 8 October 2015, http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2015/10/boko-haram-has-cluster-bombs-nigerias-dhq/.
 The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW listed 56 states that stockpiled. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890.
 Slovakia published information on its stockpile of 899 cluster munitions in January 2014, prior to acceding to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It reported 602 122mm AGAT rockets, 67 M26 rockets, 95 RBK cluster bombs and 3,303 submunitions, and 135 KMG-U dispensers. Explanatory Note, “Draft Action Plan for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Slovak Republic under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” attached in letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, 25 April 2014, bit.ly/Slovakia25Apr2014.
 Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUS14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.
 Rickey Peer, US Army, “Joint Munitions Command (JMC) Overview, Conventional Ammunition Demil Program,” Global Demil Symposium, 8 December 2015, Slide 5, www.dtic.mil/ndia/2015demil/Peer.pdf . It did not indicate the type, but described the munitions as “rounds” which indicates artillery-delivered DPICM. According to the presentation, an additional 272,000 tons “remain in service accounts which would require disposal.”
 “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated but provided by the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 May 2014.
 Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece in Geneva, 14 June 2011; and presentation of the Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” Geneva, 1 April 2011, Slide 2.
 There are some changes to the total numbers of cluster munitions and/or submunitions previously reported due to revisions based on adjusted information provided in transparency reports. See the country profiles for full information.
 Statement of Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/cl_congo.pdf. In 2011, clearance personnel destroyed cluster munitions remnants and PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh submunitions from an arms depot that was bombed during the 1997–1998 conflict. Cluster munitions were also apparently part of weapons stockpiles destroyed in 2008–2010 with the assistance of UK-based humanitarian demining organization Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
 In 2013 and 2011, Guinea-Bissau blamed the delay on a lack of information on its stockpile of cluster munitions. Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2013/09/Guinea-Bissau-SP.pdf. In June 2011, Guinea-Bissau warned the Article 7 report could be delayed due to its review of the status of stockpiled cluster munitions. Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Clearance and Risk Reduction, Geneva, 29 June 2011.
 Afghanistan reports that its national armed forces no longer stockpile cluster munitions and regularly reports on the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions recovered from abandoned weapons. Abandoned cluster munitions are not considered stockpiles under the convention but rather are covered by Article 4 on the destruction of cluster munition remnants. In June 2015, Iraq reported that it has no stockpile of cluster munitions, while the previous report provided in June 2014 listed 92,092 munitions destroyed from 2003–2013 (prior to the convention’s entry into force) and 6,489 munitions destroyed in 2013 in the reports stockpiling section, but are more likely cluster munition remnants or abandoned cluster munitions destroyed in the course of clearance. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2015, bit.ly/CCMArt7Iraq29Apr2015; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/CCMArt7Iraq27Jun2014.
 Albania, Andorra, Australia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Ireland, Holy See, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Zambia have made definitive statements, either in transparency reports or in interventions at official meetings. However, other States Parties did not indicate if they possess stockpiles, but simply indicated “not applicable” or “none” in the form or left the form blank. The CMC has urged all states to clearly indicate in their next reports that there are no cluster munitions stockpiled under their jurisdiction and control, including by stating a more unequivocal response such as “zero.”
 CMC meetings with Maria Madalena Neto, Victim Assistance Coordinator, Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 7–9 June 2010. Notes by the CMC/HRW. Neto later confirmed this statement, noting that the air force led a task force responsible for the program. Email from Maria Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, 13 August 2010.
 Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012, bit.ly/CCMNigeria18April2012. Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Nigeria Air Force possesses British-made BL-755 cluster bombs. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 843.
 “Boko Haram has cluster bombs: Nigeria’s DHQ,” The News Nigeria, 8 October 2015, http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2015/10/boko-haram-has-cluster-bombs-nigerias-dhq/.
 This includes the information submitted by States Parties on a voluntary basis for cluster munitions and submunitions destroyed before entry into force.
 Before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions. The numbers of munitions reported destroyed by these nations prior to entry into force are included in this table. See the relevant Monitor country profile for more information.
 Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Defence press release, “Germany fulfils Oslo Convention obligations ahead of time - 50,000 tonnes of cluster munitions destroyed,” 25 November 2015, bit.ly/GermanyCompletes25Nov2015.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 9 May 2016.
 Slovakia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B.2 and B.3, 28 June 2016.
 657 RBK-250 PTAB 2.5 cluster bombs and27,594 submunitions and 53 BME-330 AR and9,540 submunitions.
 Article 3, Section 1 of the Amendment to Law 33/1998.
 Afghanistan, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, Peru, Portugal, and Slovenia.
 Please see the ban policy country profiles online for more information on retention, including specific quantities for each type retained.
 Statement of Slovakia, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2015/09/Slovakia_High-level-segment1.pdf.
 Slovakia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Transparency Report, Form C, 28 June 2016.
 In 2011–2014, Germany consumed a total of 195 cluster munitions and 17,061 in EOD training.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2016, bit.ly/CCMArt7Netherlands29Apr2016. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an annual inventory check to prepare the 2016 Article 7 report identified a smaller number of cluster munitions and submunitions. It informed the Monitor that none of the retained cluster munitions were used in calendar year 2015, but in a previous calendar year, although the consumption was not reported as such at the time. Email forwarded by Maaike Beenes, Humanitarian Disarmament Program Officer, PAX, 25 July 2016.
 A small number of states are not providing definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable” in response to particular information requests. States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J.
 The compliance rate is an improvement on the 80% compliance rate reported by Cluster Munition Monitor 2015, 77% compliance rate reported by Cluster Munition Monitor 2014, and the “three-quarters” compliance rate recorded by Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013.
 Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Holy See, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Seychelles, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and Zambia.
 Andorra, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Hungary, Ireland, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.
 Austria, Belgium, DRC, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Zambia have utilized Form J in their initial Article 7 transparency reports.
 For recommendations of best practice in this field, see HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” September 2014; ICRC, “Model Law, Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 2013; and “Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act 2011,” prepared by New Zealand for small states not possessing cluster munitions and not contaminated by them, 2013, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2013/03/Model-Legislation_Cluster-Munitions-Act-2011.pdf.
 Letter Ref: 258 from Maria Pavlova, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, HRW, 18 May 2016.
 The Anti-Personnel Mines and Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act 2016, Act No. 11 of 2016, entered into force 25 June 2016, http://mauritiusassembly.govmu.org/English/acts/Documents/2016/act1116.pdf. It repealed the Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act.
 Ibid., sections 4 and 7.
 According to Articles 560–579 the manufacture and trafficking of cluster munitions is punishable under the amended Penal Code. CEJUS, “Passage en revue du nouveau code pénal togolais: qu'est-ce qui a changé?” (“Review the new penal code of Togo: what has changed?”), 24 November 2015, bit.ly/TogoCode24Nov2015.
 Croatia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 9 May 2016.
 Email from Hrvoje Debač, Deputy Director, Croatia Office for Mine Action, 29 June 2016.
 Act No. 392/2011 Coll. and Act No. 300/2005 Coll. as Amended. Slovakia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 28 June 2016.
 The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.
 As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions that originated from 100 locations in the 2003–2010 period.
 At least 37 States Parties and signatories have previously stated their agreement with this view: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, August 2012), pp. 34–35; CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26. See also, HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Staying Strong,” pp. 19–23.
 Statement of Costa Rica, First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 10 September 2015.
 See section 4(1)(b) of The Anti-Personnel Mines and Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act 2016, Act No. 11 of 2016, which entered into force on 25 June 2016 and repealed the Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act, http://mauritiusassembly.govmu.org/English/acts/Documents/2016/act1116.pdf.
 According to Articles 560–579 the manufacture and trafficking of cluster munitions is punishable under the amended Penal Code. CEJUS, “Passage en revue du nouveau code pénal togolais: qu'est-ce qui a changé?” (“Review the new penal code of Togo: what has changed?”), 24 November 2015, bit.ly/TogoCode24Nov2015.
 Bills digest 72 2010–11 on the Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill 2010, 1 March 2011, www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd1011a/11bd072.
 “Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act (S.C. 2014, c. 27),” sec. 11(1)(a-b).
 Convention on Cluster Munitions voluntary Article 7 Report, Form A, 29 April 2015.
 At the convention’s 2011 intersessional meetings, Japan stated that the use of cluster munitions in joint military operations is “totally under control” and warned the meeting that “we should not discuss Article 21 here while the appropriate military officials are absent.” Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011. Notes by the CMC and HRW.
 “Oslo convention on cluster munitions will not prevent U.S.-Japan military operations,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO1748 dated 25 June 2008, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TOKYO1748_a.html.
 Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act, ch. 11, 2010, sec. 9 and schedule 2, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/11/pdfs/ukpga_20100011_en.pdf.
 Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011.
 Article 2, Section 3 of the Amendment to Spain’s Law 33/1998.
 The CMC has urged the US against using any cluster munitions in the operation. Letter from CMC US to President Barack Obama, 30 March 2015, www.noclusterbombs.org/assets/uscbcm/pdf/Letters/CMCUSA_LtrObama_30Mar2015_final.pdf.
 “Response to Cluster Munition Monitor,” document attached to email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 May 2015.
 Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.
 Statement of Costa Rica, First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 10 September 2015.
 Section 8 of the UK’s legislation states that its foreign secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In 2011, UK officials stated that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory. Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 1 November 2011), Column 589W, bit.ly/Browne1Nov2011.
 According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, “After the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Norway discussed with the USA the issue of their stockpile of cluster munitions on Norwegian territory. Norway offered to destroy these cluster munitions together with our own stockpiles. However, the USA decided to remove their stocks, something which happened during the spring of 2010.” Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2012. According to a 2008 US cable, the US stockpile in Norway apparently consisted of “2,544 rounds” of “D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)” and “2,528 rounds” of “D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM.” See, “Norway raises question concerning U.S. cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08OSLO676 dated 17 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08OSLO676_a.html.
 “Demarche to Afghanistan on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 2 December 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE134777_a.html.
 A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, then-Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” “MFA gives reassurances on stockpiling of US cluster munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BERLIN1609_a.html. See also, “Demarche to Germany Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125631 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE125631_a.html.
 The cable states, “Rome should note that cluster munitions are stored at Aviano and Camp Darby.” “Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE125632_a.html.
 Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 27 January 2011.
 “Consultations with Japan on implementing the Oslo convention on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TOKYO3532_a.html.
 “Cluster munitions: Israeli’s operational defensive capabilities crisis,” US Department of State cable dated 18 April 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TELAVIV1012_a.html.
 The cable contains the text of a message sent from a US military advisor to UAE authorities concerning a transfer of “ammunition immediately via US Air Force aircraft from Kuwait stockpile to Lebanon.” With respect to the items to be transferred, the cable states: “The United States will not approve any cluster munitions or white phosphorus.” See, “Follow-up on UAE response to Lebanese request for emergency aid,” US Department of State cable 07ABUDHABI876 dated 24 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ABUDHABI876_a.html.
 Italy’s Law No. 95 bans financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention, a provision that supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines has advocated for a separate, more detailed law.
 Statement of Costa Rica, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015. Cited in: PAX, Worldwide Investment in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility, June 2016 update (Utrecht, June 2016), p. 210, www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org/report.
 For more detailed information, please see the relevant Cluster Munition Monitor country profile online at: www.the-monitor.org. This accounting does not capture every location of cluster munitions use. Cluster munitions have been used in some countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear.