Ukraine

Mine Action

Last updated: 29 November 2015

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline: 1 June 2016
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Recommendations for action

  • Ukraine should establish an operational national mine center under civilian control.
  • Ukraine should establish a centralized database to collate information on mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination resulting from the ongoing conflict.
  • Ukraine should undertake survey to identify the extent and impact of antipersonnel mines (in particular in Donetsk and Luhansk) at the earliest opportunity, and conduct clearance as soon as possible.
  • Ukraine should take all necessary measures to protect civilians from mines and ERW.

Contamination 

In the first half of 2014, escalating violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country.[1] Evidence exists of use of mines, cluster munitions, and other ordnance in Ukraine, but the full extent of contamination will remain unclear until the cessation of hostilities.

Prior to the current conflict, Ukraine was historically affected by mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces during World War II, but also from World War I. Ministry of Defense engineering units completed partial clearance of affected areas in the mid-1970s. The precise scope of any residual mine problem is not known.

Mine contamination 

In its previous Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Ukraine declared no known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control.[2] However, since the outbreak of hostilities in 2014, there is significant evidence from various locations that several types of mines were available to parties to the conflict, and it is clear that antipersonnel mines have been used.[3]

In February 2015, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported contamination in Ukraine with OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, MON (50, 90, 100, and 200) directional antipersonnel mines, and TM-62 antivehicle mines.[4] In an April 2015 Technical Briefing Note, Human Rights Watch reported the presence of at least two types of blast antipersonnel mines, three types of MON-series directional fragmentation mines, and OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines that can function as antipersonnel mines depending on the type of fuze used, as well as PDM-1M antilanding mines equipped with fuzes capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person.[5] In September 2015, the OSCE observed four blast PMN-type antipersonnel mines on the outskirts of Pavlopil, a government-controlled village, 26km northeast of Mariupol.[6]

At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2015, Ukraine asserted that approximately 8% of the territory in eastern Ukraine is contaminated with antipersonnel mines and IEDs.[7] It appears that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea were actually either “phoney minefields” or areas containing trip flares[8] (see Mine Ban Policy section for more details). 

In June 2015, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) met two representatives of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) “ministry for emergency services,” who said that there was a need for mine clearance on more than 51,000 hectares (510km2) in “LPR”-controlled areas.[9]

In September 2015, OSCE reported that “in government-controlled Volnovakha (53km southwest of Donetsk), the deputy head of the emergency services of Volnovakha district told the OSCE SMM that 30 per cent of the district was contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and expressed particular concern about government-controlled Novotroitske and Mykolaivka (36 and 39km south-west of Donetsk, respectively), and Starohnativka and Andriivka (51 and 61km south of Donetsk). He added that near government-controlled Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), eight or nine people had suffered injuries in booby-trap incidents over the last three months.”[10]

While Ukraine did not report the detailed location of suspected or confirmed antipersonnel contamination in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report for 2014, it did state that antipersonnel mines had been cleared and destroyed in areas of combat operations.[11] 

In addition to posing a serious risk to human life, the presence of mines and ERW also has a detrimental socioeconomic impact, with contamination preventing safe use of agricultural land for cultivating crops or raising livestock—two major sources of livelihood.[12] 

Cluster munition contamination 

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Amid the violence that erupted in Ukraine in 2014, evidence suggests that both government and anti-government forces have used cluster munitions.[13] These have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions[14] (see the Cluster Munition Ban section for more details.) 

Other explosive remnants of war 

Ukraine is contaminated by other UXO resulting from the current conflict. It is also affected by unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance from World War I, World War II,[15] and Soviet military training. As of April 2015, Ukraine reported 32 former military firing ranges and areas contaminated with explosive objects from past wars, with 150,000 hectares (1,500km2) remaining to be cleared.[16] In 2013, 34 former military sites were reported totaling over 1,530km2.[17]

In addition, a substantial part of the sea and other waters of Ukraine are contaminated with explosive items from past wars.[18]

Program Management

An interministerial working group was set up by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2006.

On 2 September 2014, Presidential Decree No. 423 on “Mine Action National Authority” was signed.[19] Following the decree, the Ministry of Defense’s “Department of Ecology and Mine Security” became responsible for coordinating demining and serves as the national mine action secretariat in Ukraine. The Ministry is working to develop legislation on a national mine action authority.[20] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been working with the OSCE Project Coordination Unit in Ukraine to help foster mine action institutions.[21] As of June 2015 however, no national mine action center had been established.[22]

According to the OSCE Project Coordination Unit, in order to address the main operational challenges Ukraine needs to institutionalize a national mine action authority and center appropriate to a conflict setting; to introduce legislation for emergency ERW response; and expand the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) system to enable centralized nationwide information management.[23]

Strategic planning

The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State Program for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–2014.[24] The program foresaw clearance of 15km2 over five years with the destruction of 500,000 items of ERW. As of June 2015, there was no new program for 2015 onwards due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.[25] 

Ukraine has developed a plan for humanitarian demining operations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, if it obtains safe access to the areas. The main goals for 2015 are demining of populated areas, security during rehabilitation of infrastructure, and clearance of UXO from agricultural areas.[26]

Operators

While the presidential decree in September 2014 made the Ministry of Defense the central coordinating body for demining in Ukraine, a number of other ministries also continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and disposal of ERW and mines.[27] 

The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), formerly known as the Ministry of Emergencies, is generally responsible for humanitarian clearance of affected territories, with the exception of those allocated to the other ministries and bodies. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for all areas where military units, educational institutions, companies, or organizations belonging to the armed forces are permanently located. The Engineering Division of the Ministry of Defense conducts UXO spot clearance tasks. The national Border Guard Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea. The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Special Transportation Service is responsible for clearance of national transport (railways, roads, terminals etc.). Lastly, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has an engineering department that conducts explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), in particular for improvised explosive devices.[28]

Ukroboronservice is a national demining organization that acts as a subcontractor for the Ukrainian government. Ukroboronservice is not currently undertaking clearance in Ukraine.[29]

As of April 2015, the SESU deployed 32 “pyrotechnic” units, totaling 500 personnel, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs deployed 27 units, totaling nearly 200 people. Forty percent of capacity is dedicated to humanitarian demining and UXO clearance in areas contaminated as a result of former conflicts.[30] According to the OSCE, the SESU planned to deploy 55-strong teams in the 2015 clearance season.[31]

As of April 2015, the Ministry of Defense was deploying 25 manual clearance teams comprising a total of 125 personnel, two explosives detection dog teams, 15 demining robots, and four BMR-2 machines.[32]

In July 2015, the OSCE and the SESU launched a project to assist in clearing territories in the eastern regions from UXO, backed by a €1 million contribution from Germany. According to the OSCE, this provision of assistance was urgently required, due to destruction of assets of the two regional emergency services teams in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions during the ongoing conflict. Under the project, SESU staff will receive training, equipment, and assistance in optimizing clearance standards for UXO clearance. Four 22-strong EOD teams will be assigned to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and detection and protective equipment and vehicles will be provided.[33] 

In September 2015, Danish Demining Group (DDG) started a €1.57m project funded by the European Union to equip four teams of the SESU in the eastern oblasts, providing demining equipment, vehicles, and training, and also to expand mine risk education (MRE) activities across the region along the contact line, in government-held areas.[34]

Standards

A special instruction for the identification, render-safe, and disposal of explosive items, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), was approved by the General Staff of the Ukrainian armed forces on 1 August 2014.[35]

Information management

The IMSMA has been piloted by the GICHD and SESU in four regions of Ukraine; there are plans to institutionalize it and expand its use across the country.[36]

Land Release 

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of ERW contamination has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and pro-Russian separatist groups.[37] In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2014, Ukraine reported that in mined areas in Donetsk and Lugansk, demining was carried out by engineering and demining units of the armed forces of Ukraine, the National Border Guard Service, and SESU, “in the course of the antiterrorist operation.”[38] Clearance of ERW in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk is typically reactive and takes place soon after attacks or when notification of contamination is received via members of the local community. Items of UXO are either destroyed in situ, or removed to storage areas or compounds.[39] 

SESU is actively clearing government-controlled areas of mines and UXO.[40] Ukraine asserts that it conducts clearance of mines and ERW in the shortest time possible, and as of June 2015 reported clearance of 15,775 explosive items, including an unspecified number of antipersonnel mines.[41] Clearance of mines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, is often undertaken by its pyrotechnic teams, and has sometimes taken place quickly within 36 hours of new contamination, especially in populated areas. Clearance operations are often as a result of emergency call-outs from the local community, which trigger deployment of a reconnaissance team, and, if required, a pyrotechnic team to neutralize the threat. Clearance has been slower in rural areas.[42] 

In the separation zone, the Ukrainian armed forces are undertaking clearance (military breaching) of ERW contamination.[43]

In areas controlled by pro-Russian rebel groups, the separatists are undertaking clearance of ERW and mines. In Donetsk, former SESU personnel, now organized under the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) are undertaking the bulk of clearance around Donetsk city. The personnel are organized into regular shifts, with clearance being provided all day and all night.[44] 

The Ukrainian authorities and the pro-Russian rebels are, to varying degrees, recording written logs of emergency call outs and clearance operations,[45] but data is not typically disaggregated into weapon type.[46] Clearance data is not available from pro-Russian separatist groups, and an accurate picture of the scale of ERW clearance being undertaken in eastern Ukraine and of remaining cluster munition contamination is not available.

Deminer safety

In September 2015, a Ukrainian serviceman was reportedly killed, and another soldier injured, during demining operations near the village of Novotoshkivske in the Popasna district of the Luhansk region.[47] In occupied territory in Obozne, 18km north of Luhansk, an LPR deminer was reportedly injured by a landmine while checking the area for contamination.[48] A further mine blast was reported to have injured another LPR deminer on 26 September 2015, also in rebel-controlled Obozne.[49] 

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance 

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. 

While Ukraine did not report on the detailed location of suspected or confirmed antipersonnel contamination in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2014, it did report that clearance and destruction of antipersonnel mines had been carried out in areas of combat operations in mined areas in Donetsk and Lugansk.[50]

In the case of the discovery of new areas containing antipersonnel mines in Ukraine, under the process agreed by States Parties at the Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012, Ukraine should inform States Parties of their discovery and location and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. In addition, if Ukraine is unable to complete the clearance of mined areas before the next meeting of States Parties it should submit a request for an extended deadline, which should be as short as possible and no more than 10 years, in accordance with the obligations set out in Article 5.[51] As of September 2015, Ukraine had not submitted an Article 5 extension request. 



[1] Violence erupted in eastern Ukraine following the 21 February 2014 ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych. By mid-March, armed groups initially calling themselves “self-defence units” seized and occupied administrative buildings in several cities, towns, and villages in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Ukrainian government’s counterinsurgency operations in these regions have intensified since the country’s 25 May 2014 presidential elections and were continuing sporadically as of October 2015 despite a ceasefire in place.

[2] See, for example, Ukraine’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Form C. Ukraine’s national reports under Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II list information on mined areas as “missing.” See CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2013), Form B.

[3] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Landmines in Ukraine: Technical Briefing Note,” 6 April 2015.

[4] OCSE, “ERW clearance in a conflict setting,” presentation by Anton Shevchenko, 18th International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and UN Advisors, Geneva, 16 February 2015.

[5] Human Rights Watch, “Landmines in Ukraine: Technical Briefing Note,” 6 April 2015.

[6] OCSE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 28 September 2015,” 29 September 2015.

[7] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Cooperative Compliance Committee), Geneva, 25–26 June 2015.

[8] CCW Amended Protocol II defines a phoney minefield as “an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.” Art. 2(8).

[9] OCSE, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 11 June 2015,” 12 June 2015.

[10] OSCE, “Latest from OSCE SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 10 September 2015,” 11 September 2015.

[11] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C, G, and F.

[12] OSCE, “Cleaning-up unexploded ordnance in eastern Ukraine,” 31 July 2015; OSCE, “Latest from OSCE SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 6 April 2015,” 7 April 2015; OSCE, “Latest from OSCE SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) 3 April 2015,” 6 April 2015; and OSCE, “Latest from OSCE SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 2 April 2015,” 3 April 2015.

[13] Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Widespread use of cluster munitions,” 20 October 2014; “Ukraine used cluster bombs, evidence,” New York Times, 20 October 2014; HRW “Ukraine: Attacks require better investigation,” 19 December 2014; HRW, “A test of the new Ukraine’s commitment to reform,” 15 January 2015; and HRW, “Ukraine: More Civilians killed in Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 March 2015.

[14] Ibid.

[15] In World War II, ammunition, particularly around the towns of Kerch and Sevastopol, was stored in “adits,” horizontal passageway tunnels in hills or mountainsides. These tunnels were used as munitions depots by the Soviet Army and were blown up in 1942 before they left the area. Clearance of the adit tunnels was expected to take a decade or more to complete. See, “During a Year in Kerch and Sevastopol neutralized 33 thousands of munitions,” forUm, 4 December 2009.

[16] Statement of Ukraine, CCW Protocol V Meeting of Experts, Geneva, April 2015; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A.

[17] Statement of Ukraine, Protocol V Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 3 April 2014 (audio only).

[18] Ibid., April 2015.

[19] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form D, 21 March 2015; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A, April 2015.

[20] Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebetiuk, Head of Engineer Ammunition Service, Central Department, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; and email from Anton Shevchenko, Project Officer, Politico-Military and Environmental Projects, OSCE, 23 June 2015.

[22] Ibid.

[23] OSCE, “ERW clearance in a conflict setting,” presentation by Anton Shevchenko, 16 February 2015.

[24] Email from Lt.-Col. Vitaliy Baranov, Ministry of Defense, 20 January 2010.

[25] Interview with Col. Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.

[26] Statement of Ukraine, CCW Protocol V Meeting of Experts, Geneva, April 2015.

[27] Interview with Col. Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; and email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 23 June 2015.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Interview with Col. Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.

[30] Ibid.

[31] OSCE, “ERW clearance in a conflict setting,” presentation by Anton Shevchenko, 18th International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and UN Advisors, Geneva, 16 February 2015.

[32] Ibid.

[34] Email from Edward Crowther, DDG Ukraine, 12 October 2015.

[35] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form D; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A.

[36] Email from Megan Latimer, Advisor, Land Release and Operational Efficiency, GICHD, 3 July 2015.

[37] Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015; and interview, 18 February 2015.

[38] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C, G, and F.

[39] Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015; and interview, 18 February 2015.

[40] UNICEF, “Children killed and injured by landmines and unexploded ordnance in eastern Ukraine,” 31 March 2015.

[41] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Cooperative Compliance Committee, Geneva, 25–26 June 2015.

[42] Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015; and interview, 18 February 2015.

[43] Email from Eva Veble, Programme Director, Albania, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 10 June 2015; and meeting with Col. Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.

[44] Email from Megan Latimer, GICHD, 3 July 2015.

[45] Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, in Geneva, February 2015; and interview, 18 February 2015.

[46] Interview with Col. Shchebetiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.

[47] Interfax Ukraine, “Ukrainian serviceman killed in demining operation in Luhansk region – authorities,” 22 September 2015.

[48] OSCE, “Latest from OSCE SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 25 September 2015,” 26 September 2015.

[49] OSCE, “Latest from OSCE SMM to Ukraine based on information received as of 27 September 2015,” 28 September 2015.

[50] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Forms C, F, and G.

[51] Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3–7 December 2012, APLC/MSP.12 /2012/10, 21 January 2013, para. 28(a)–(c), p. 10.