Russian Federation

Mine Action

Last updated: 29 November 2015

Recommendations for action

  • Russia should take the necessary measures to identify the extent and impact of mine contamination (in particular in Chechnya and the North Caucasus) and clear mined areas in a timely manner.
  • Russia should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.

Contamination

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. 

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mine contamination affected 14km2 of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km2 of land was mined, including 165km2 of farmland and 73km2 of woodland.[3] 

Alleged use of mines in Crimea in 2014

Reports of minefields emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea, appear to have concerned either “phoney minefields” or areas containing trip-flares. These devices are not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty.[4]

At a meeting of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 2014, Ukraine alleged Russian use of TM-62 antivehicle mines and unidentified antipersonnel mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea.[5] At the same CCW meeting, Russia denied use of antipersonnel mines, asserting “the Self Defense forces of Crimea, before the referendum, placed the minefields with relevant markings, around Chongar.” Russia said “they placed only signal mines and put proper signage around the fields”[6] (see Mine Ban Policy section for Ukraine for more details).

Program Management

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).[7]

Russia reported the establishment of an International Demining Action Center by the armed forces in 2014. The center serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action center as the term is generally understood in mine action.[8] 

While the overall operational demining capacity in Russia is not known, 23 specialists, 26 demining teams, 138 land and facilities deminers, 42 conventional improvised explosive devices (CIED) specialists, and 56 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators were said to have been trained in 2014.[9]

Land Release

Russia has continued to clear ordnance left over from World War II as well as mines and ERW from Chechnya and other affected areas in the North Caucasus.

In May 2010, a representative of the Chechen branch of Russia’s MES claimed that 2.47km2 of land had been cleared during the past five years, and that 5,143 explosive devices and 21 air-dropped bombs had been “neutralised.”[10] In 2012, the head of the armed forces’ engineers, Lieutenant-General Yuri Stavitsky, reportedly announced that the Federal Ministry of Defense had sent military engineers to Chechnya to clear about 0.5km2 of farmland. He said a special battalion of deminers employing contract servicemen was undergoing training for deployment in Russia’s southern military district, including Chechnya.[11] 

Russia’s CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report for 2013 stated that more than 400,000 mines and explosive items were found and destroyed, claiming that clearance had been conducted over an area of more than 84,000 hectares. This huge area of demining (840km2) is not plausible, at least as far as mine clearance is concerned.[12]

In March 2014, the engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense was reported in an online article as having started a new phase of clearance in Chechnya. The engineering unit planned to clear 8,000 hectares (80km2) of contaminated land in Achkhoy-Martan and Grozny districts, and in the highlands of Shatoy and Vedeno districts. In 2013, the same unit reportedly demined more than 2,000 hectares (20km2) of agricultural lands, destroying over 1,700 explosive items.[13] 

Further online media reports in November 2014 reported that the demining battalion of the 11th Engineer Brigade of the Russian armed forces had been conducting mine clearance in Chechnya and Ingushetia. During clearance, mechanical assets were used first, followed by mine detectors, and in some instances mine detection dogs. According to the article, demining has been conducted since spring 2012, and planned results for three years were achieved in two. In 2014, 3,200 hectares (32km2) of land was verified with more than 3,500 explosive devices found and destroyed.[14]

In its CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V transparency reports for 2014, Russia stated that the main operational focus of its engineering troops was on demining in Chechnya and Ingushetia. The engineering unit of the Russian armed forces inspected and checked for explosives on 12,270 hectares (122.7km2) of land, along with 332.4km of road, 69km of railway, and various premises and transportation infrastructure. In total, more than 200,000 explosive objects were destroyed.[15] Of this total, Russia reported that much of the clearance concerned former arsenals, armory bases, military areas, and demolition polygons (which were active in 2010–2011). Russia has also, though, reported under CCW Protocol V that in 2012–2014, approximately 55km2 of agricultural and forest land, economic infrastructure, and private houses were checked. During this period deminers reportedly destroyed 8,000 explosive items.

In 2015, the engineering unit of the Russian armed forces planned to clear 61km2 of land.[16]



[1] UNMAS, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2009,” New York, 2008, p. 284.

[3]MoE sappers to demine arable land in Chechnya,” Caucasian Knot, 3 April 2009; “In Chechnya MES deminers destroyed 25 explosive devices,” Caucasian Knot, 5 October 2009; and “Human rights activists: 25,000 hectares of Chechen territory are still mined,” Caucasian Knot, 7 May 2008.

[4] Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II defines it a phoney minefield as “an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.” Art. 2(8), CCW Amended Protocol II.

[5] Presentation by Dr. Kateryna Bila, Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Implementation of the Protocol II by Ukraine,” CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 1 April 2014.

[6] Statement of Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 1 April 2014.

[7] See, for example, “It is planned to establish special groups for demining of lands within MES,” Caucasian Knot, 23 July 2009; and “Autumn demining is completed in Chechnya,” Vesti Kavkaza, 28 October 2009.

[8] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form B, 31 March 2015; and meeting with Andrey Grebenshchikov, First Secretary, Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.

[9] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form B, 31 March 2015.

[10] V. Dzutsev, “Chechen Officials Press Moscow to Assist with Demining as Blasts Still Claim Lives,” Georgian Daily, 11 May 2010.

[11] “Russia begins mine clearing in Chechnya,” Novosti, 4 April 2012.

[12] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 15 March 2014.

[14]How to search for mines in Chechnya,” 18 November 2014.

[15] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2014), Form B; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A.

[16] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2014), Form A.