Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline: 1 February 2018
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Cluster Munition Convention Article 4 deadline: 1 November 2023
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Recommendations for action

• Iraq should strengthen the authority, management, personnel, and resources of the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA).
• The DMA should recruit international technical assistance to enable it to discharge its sector management responsibilities effectively and transparently.
• The DMA and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) should develop information management systems to enable them to collect and share timely data on the progress of mine action and the hitherto largely unrecorded activities of commercial operators, as well as other national and international operators.
• The DMA and IKMAA should formulate multi-year plans setting out policy, priorities, and objectives.
• Iraq should develop institutional links between IKMAA, the DMA, and the Regional Mine Action Centre in the south.
• Iraq should develop the capacity and improve operating standards of national demining/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators.

Contamination

The Republic of Iraq Iraq is heavily contaminated by landmines and cluster munition remnants, as well as other unexploded ordnance.

Mine contamination

Iraq is believed to be one of the world’s most heavily mined countries but is still working to produce a comprehensive estimate of the extent of the problem based on consistent survey standards, a task complicated by the escalation of conflict in the past two years.

A landmine impact survey (Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, ILIS) was conducted in Iraq’s 18 governorates in two stages. The first, covering 13 governorates in 2004–2006, identified 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 1,730km² of land and affecting 1,622 communities and 1.6 million people. Survey of the remaining five governorates was completed in 2010 but the findings have not been released (nor any reason advanced for not doing so). However, a non-technical survey of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk completed in 2011 confirmed hazardous areas totaling 70km², 84% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (450km²) identified in these areas by the ILIS.[1]

Latest estimates reported by the DMA put total confirmed and suspected mine contamination in Iraq at 1,604km², of which three-quarters was attributed to one governorate, Basrah. The northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulimaniya under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) accounted for 258km² (16%) of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing mines and SHAs.[2]

Contamination by province as of end 2014[3]

However, IKMAA estimated total contamination in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region at the end of 2014 at 297km² (see table below).[4]

KRG contamination by province as of end 2014[5]

Additional antipersonnel mine contamination may have been added in some areas affected by recent conflict, particularly with Islamic State (IS). After operations to recapture Mosul dam, Iraqi forces reported encountering mines laid by IS, and four IKMAA deminers were reportedly killed and two injured by victim-activated devices left in properties in the vicinity of the dam in Nineveh governorate.[6] The UN said in October 2014 that an estimated 3,000 explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines remained after IS and affiliated forces withdrew from Jurf al-Sakhr, a town south of Baghdad in Babylon governorate.[7] 

Cluster munition contamination

Cluster munition remnants contaminate significant areas of central and southern Iraq, a legacy of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 2004, Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority identified 2,200 sites of cluster munition contamination along the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys.[8] However, latest estimates identify 168 cluster munition-contaminated areas in nine central and southern governorates, including Baghdad, totaling 236km² with more than half in Muthanna governorate (see table below).[9] The DMA has also identified more than 1,000km² of battle area that may also include some cluster munition contamination.[10]

Cluster munition contamination in central and southern Iraq[11]

The highway between Kuwait and Basra was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War[12] and cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad. In 2011, cluster munition remnants were said to be a feature of many of the clearance tasks being undertaken to open up access to oilfields and develop infrastructure, as well as for humanitarian clearance.[13]

In the north, coalition air strikes around Dohuk in 1991 left contamination that posed a serious hazard to residents seeking to return to the area.[14] In 2010, a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) survey of Dibis, an area northwest of Kirkuk, identified 20 previously unknown cluster strikes, with contamination from unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-63 submunitions.[15] Kurdish authorities report a total of 796,593m² of cluster munition contamination, 95% of it in Erbil governorate.[16]

Program Management

The mine action program in Iraq is managed along regional lines as follows:

• Iraqi Kurdistan region

Mine action in Iraq’s northern governorates under the KRG is managed by the IKMAA. It coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Slemani. 

• Central and Southern Iraq

In central and southern Iraq, responsibility for mine action was transferred in 2008 to the Ministry of Environment, which set up the DMA to coordinate and manage the sector.[17] The DMA, however, implements policy set by a Higher Council for Mine Action (HCMA) created by and reporting to the prime minister, in which the ministries of defense, interior, and oil are major actors. The HCMA is supported by a Technical Committee, functioning as its secretariat.[18]

The DMA oversees four regional mine action centers (RMACs) for the north (covering the governorates of Anbar, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Saladin), the center (Baghdad, Diyala, and Wassit), an area identified as “ME” (Babylon, Karbala, Najaf, and Qadsiya), and the south (Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar),[19] but the extent to which the RMACs were active in 2014 is unclear.

However, the DMA’s role has been weakened in recent years by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate, and mine action stakeholders continued to report obstacles to management and regulation of the sector arising from the division of responsibilities between different government institutions, poor communication and coordination between ministries, lack of transparency, convoluted bureaucracy, and corruption. Operators cite a litany of obstacles to working in Iraq from accreditation to importing and registering vehicles and equipment, access to reliable or consolidated data, demolitions, and obtaining official sign-offs for land release.[20]

iMMAP, a United States (US) non-profit NGO, provided information management technical support to IKMAA and the DMA in Baghdad and Basrah.[21]

Operators

Clearance of mines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, was conducted in 2014 by a small number of international humanitarian operators and a larger group of national and international commercial operators as follows:

• Iraqi Kurdistan region

MAG was the only active humanitarian demining operator in this region. Commercial operators included Ararat, ASA, Chamy Razan, EODT, General Safety, Khabat, RONCO, Sardal Company for Demining, Shanica, and Valmara.

• Central and Southern Iraq

In central and southern Iraq, the humanitarian agencies operating in 2014 included Danish Demining Group (DDG), Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Commercial operators, many contracted by oil companies, included Arabian Gulf, al-Safsafa, al-WAHA, G4S Ordnance Management, and Green Land. The army and civil defense were also active conducting EOD and battle area clearance (BAC). 

DDG closed its Basrah-based program at the end of 2014 citing lack of donor interest in funding operations in the south and relocated to the KRG, where in early 2015 it started registration and accreditation procedures with IKMAA.[22]

IMCO was set up in 2003 with support from the US, which in 2014 amounted to close to US$10 million. However, IMCO was unable to resolve long-running issues over registration and accreditation with the DMA. In May 2015, it received a grant termination order from the US and was due to cease operating at the end of June 2015.[23] 

Land Release 

Escalating conflict between Iraq and Islamic State in the second half of 2014 severely affected mine action, forcing temporary suspension of operations in some areas, drawing army demining and EOD capacity away from operations in the south and diverting attention to the immediate needs of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people (particularly in the northern Kurdish governorates) and the humanitarian agencies seeking to assist them. Operators in central and southern Iraq say land release has become increasingly hampered by the unavailability of military teams, who alone are authorized to conduct demolitions resulting in accumulation of cleared items on task sites posing a growing security hazard.

Land release of mined areas

The extent of mine clearance in 2014 could not be reliably determined on the basis of available data, often including major discrepancies between mine action centers and operators.

In the northern Kurdish governorates, IKMAA reported release of 3.98km² of mined area through clearance in 2014, about one-quarter less than the previous year.[24] MAG, the only international humanitarian operator working in the north in 2014, increased capacity from 245 to around 450 staff in the second half of the year with the help of short-term funding to undertake emergency tasks related to the humanitarian crisis. It reported release of a total of 7.04km², close to double the area it released in 2013. MAG did not disaggregate mine clearance from BAC and much of the released area appeared to be BAC of proposed camp sites for internally displaced persons (IDPs). At the same time, MAG reported a fall in funding for clearance of mined areas.[25] IKMAA reported MAG cleared 1.05km² of mined area in 2014.[26]

Mine clearance in the northern Kurdish governorates in 2014[27]

Operators in central and southern Iraq say land release is focused mainly on battle area rather than mined areas.

The DMA reported release of a total of almost 13.1km² of mined area through clearance in 2014, attributing most of it to DDG and small amounts to civil defense or commercial companies.[29] DDG, however, reported it did not conduct mine clearance, releasing instead 9.18km² of battle area.[30]

IMCO, among the biggest of the operators working with total staff of 162, said it released 0.09km² of mined area in 2014 and reduced 0.33km² through technical survey, clearing a total of 80 antipersonnel mines and 32 antivehicle mines, however, the DMA did not record it as releasing any mined land.[31]

NPA deployed a post-clearance sampling and survey team supporting and tasked by RMAC-South in Basrah governorate, where it reported releasing more than 9km² in 2014. NPA started clearance operations operating in Missan governorate in mid-2014 but focused on BAC.[32] 

Mine clearance in 2014[33]

Land release of cluster munition-contaminated areas

IKMAA reported that MAG released 119,983m² (0.1km²) of cluster munition-affected land in 2014 destroying 920 submunitions and that IKMAA had destroyed another 267 submunitions. MAG reported releasing a total of 7.04km² but did not report tackling any cluster munition contamination; data presented to a sector planning workshop in May 2015 did not record any clearance of cluster munition remnants.[34]

The DMA reported clearance of 21 areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants covering 12.89km² in 2014, resulting in destruction of 906 submunitions. This included 10.9km² attributed to DDG, 0.4km² by IMCO, and the remaining 1.59km² by civil defense teams in Basra, Missan, Najaf, and Thi-Qar.[35] The Article 7 report provided similar figures, and reported that DDG cleared 262 submunitions, and IMCO cleared 160 submunitions. The remaining contamination was cleared by the civil defense.[36]

DMA data also varied sharply from results reported by operators. DDG reported clearing 9.18km² of battle area but said it did not tackle any cluster munition hazards or destroy any cluster munition remnants.

IMCO, among the largest of the operators working with a total staff of 162, said it released 20.8km² of cluster munition-contaminated area in Basra and Wassit governorates in 2014, destroying only 254 submunitions. IMCO was set up in 2003 with US support that in 2014 amounted to close to US$10 million. 

NPA deployed a post-clearance sampling and survey team, supporting and tasked by RMAC-South in Basrah governorate, where it reported releasing more than 9km². In mid-2014, NPA started operating in Missan governorate with two battle area clearance and two impact assessment (non-technical survey) teams as well as a risk education team. As of mid-2015, NPA teams had identified six suspected hazardous areas and 46 confirmed hazardous areas in Missan, including substantial amounts of cluster munition contamination in Maimar, Majar Kabeer, and Qalet Sali districts.[37]

Treaty Compliance 

Prospects for Iraq fulfilling either of its treaty obligations are overshadowed by conflict and insecurity. However, mine/UXO sector planning and implementation are also severely constrained by political instability, institutional weakness, dysfunctional bureaucracy, and corruption, in addition to a shortage of trained personnel.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018. Incomplete and inconsistent reporting on mine clearance makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress towards fulfilling its treaty obligations, but there is no prospect of Iraq fulfilling its treaty obligations by 2018. 

In 2012, Deputy Environment Minister Kamal Latif stated that Iraq would not meet its 2018 clearance deadline. Developments in Iraq since then, including the escalation of conflict with IS and affiliated forces in the second half of 2014, only reinforce that conclusion.[38] Moreover although Iraq lacks a current strategic plan, operators are clear that the humanitarian priority in central and southern Iraq is not clearing mines but other ERW, including cluster munition remnants.

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Iraq is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2023. 

It is hard to assess the progress of Iraq against its Article 4 obligations in the absence of comprehensive survey and clearance data.