Cluster Munition Monitor 2010

Ban Policy

S4 Opt
© Angela Sanabria/CCCM, 7 May 2010
Destruction of Colombia’s last stockpiled cluster munitions.

Introduction

The Convention on Cluster Munitions establishes powerful international law to end the human suffering caused by cluster munitions. It bans the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions and mandates their destruction. The convention also requires states to address the existing problems attributed to cluster munitions, notably by clearing cluster munition remnants and providing victim assistance.

On 30 May 2008, at the end of negotiations in Dublin, 107 states adopted the convention.[1] Later that year, 94 governments signed the convention in Oslo on 3–4 December. A major milestone was achieved on 16 February 2010 when the 30th ratification was deposited at the UN. This triggered the entry into force of the convention on 1 August 2010, when it became binding international law.

At the time of the convention’s entry into force, 108 countries had signed and 38 of those had taken the next step and ratified the convention, becoming States Parties legally bound by all of its provisions. As of 10 September 2010, the number of states that had ratified was 40.

The very rapid entry into force of the convention is a strong indicator of the commitment of the international community to ban cluster munitions, and of the degree to which this is seen as a vital humanitarian imperative that must be dealt with urgently. Cluster munitions are being stigmatized globally and a new international standard completely rejecting the weapon is quickly taking hold.

As detailed below, many States Parties and signatories have embraced implementation of the convention with extremely impressive speed and vigor. At least six countries have already finished destruction of their stockpiles, at least 10 have enacted national implementation legislation, and two have declared completion of their clearance programs. Numerous others are far advanced in these and other implementation activities.

Acting again with an appropriate sense of urgency, the First Meeting of States Parties to the convention will be held from 9–12 November 2010 in Lao PDR, the country most contaminated by unexploded submunitions. States Parties will agree to an ambitious Vientiane Action Plan to guide the work of the convention in coming years.

Cluster Munition Ban Policy and Activities

This section looks at which countries have signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and which have ratified it. It surveys notable developments in banning cluster munitions on a regional basis, and provides an overview of key conferences and meetings. It highlights new national implementation legislation. Finally, it summarizes the ongoing deliberations on cluster munitions in the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Signature

A total of 108 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. By signing, states take on a legal obligation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to undertake any act that would defeat the object and purpose of the convention—such as use, production, or trade of cluster munitions.

Since the convention took effect on 1 August 2010, states wishing to join can no longer sign, but must instead accede (essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step).[2]

A total of 94 states signed the convention during the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008. Fourteen states signed after that, including ten in 2009 and four in 2010.

Signatures in 2009 and 2010

State

Date of Signature

Tunisia

12 January 2009

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

18 March 2009

Jamaica

12 June 2009

Nigeria

12 June 2009

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

23 September 2009

Cyprus

23 September 2009

Haiti

28 October 2009

Dominican Republic

10 November 2009

Iraq

12 November 2009

Cameroon

15 December 2009

Seychelles

13 April 2010

Mauritania

19 April 2010

Antigua and Barbuda

16 July 2010

Djibouti

30 July 2010


Of the 108 states that signed, 40 are from Sub-Saharan Africa, 33 are from Europe, 20 are from the Americas, 12 are from Asia-Pacific, and three are from the Middle East/North Africa.

Of the 14 states that signed after the December 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference, six came from Sub-Saharan Africa, five from the Americas, two from the Middle East/North Africa, and one from Europe. There were no new signatories from Asia-Pacific.

A total of 38 countries that have used, produced, exported, or stockpiled cluster munitions signed the convention and thereby committed to never engage in those activities again.[3] This notably includes major stockpilers France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Eighteen of the countries that have been affected by cluster munitions signed, including some highly contaminated states such as Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon.[4]

A significant number of non-signatories have indicated their intention to join in the future, including many of the 19 nations that participated fully in the negotiations and formally adopted the convention in Dublin, but did not sign.[5]

Ratification

As of 10 September 2010, a total of 40 signatories had ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions. On 16 February 2010, Burkina Faso and Moldova became the 29th and 30th signatories to ratify and thus triggered entry into force on 1 August 2010.

Four signatories ratified during the signing conference on 3 December 2008: the Holy See, Ireland, Norway, and Sierra Leone. A total of 22 states ratified during 2009 and 14 more in 2010, as of 10 September 2010.

Except for Peru, all members of the “Core Group” of nations that steered the Oslo Process diplomatic initiative have ratified: Norway, Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, and New Zealand.

The ratifying states include countries that have been affected by cluster munitions (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Lao PDR, Montenegro, Sierra Leone, the UK/Falkland Islands, and Zambia); countries that have used the weapon (France and the UK); countries that have produced (Belgium, BiH, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the UK); and countries that have stockpiled (Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK).

Other ratifying states include: Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Ecuador, Fiji, Holy See, Ireland, Lesotho, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, and Uruguay.

Ratifications from 3 December 2008–7 September 2010

State

Date of Ratification

State

Date of Ratification

Norway

3 December 2008

Burundi

25 September 2009

Ireland

3 December 2008

Malawi

7 October 2009

Holy See

3 December 2008

FYR Macedonia

8 October 2009

Sierra Leone

3 December 2008

Nicaragua

2 November 2009

Lao PDR

18 March 2009

New Zealand

22 December 2009

Austria

2 April 2009

Belgium

22 December 2009

Mexico

6 May 2009

Montenegro

25 January 2010

Niger

2 June 2009

Denmark

12 February 2010

Albania

16 June 2009

Burkina Faso

16 February 2010

Spain

17 June 2009

Moldova

16 February 2010

Germany

8 July 2009

Samoa

28 April 2010

Luxembourg

10 July 2009

UK

4 May 2010

San Marino

10 July 2009

Ecuador

11 May 2010

Japan

14 July 2009

Seychelles

20 May 2010

Zambia

12 August 2009

Lesotho

28 May 2010

Croatia

17 August 2009

Fiji

28 May 2010

Slovenia

19 August 2009

Mali

30 June 2010

Uruguay

24 September 2009

Comoros

28 July 2010

Malta

24 September 2009

Antigua and Barbuda

23 August 2010

France

25 September 2009

BiH

7 September 2010


Of the 40 ratifications, 20 are from Europe, 10 are from Sub-Saharan Africa, five from Asia-Pacific, and five from the Americas. None of the three signatories from the Middle East/North Africa have ratified yet.

In order to participate as a full State Party in the First Meeting of States Parties in Lao PDR in November 2010, a country must have ratified by the end of May 2010, to account for the six month waiting period before entry into force. Thus, there will be 36 States Parties at the First Meeting of State Parties.

As detailed in the various country chapters in this report, many signatories have already initiated the ratification process and expect to conclude it soon.

Regional developments

Africa

African states were crucial to ensuring the successful adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and have continued to demonstrate a high level of interest in the convention. Forty of the 48 Sub-Saharan African states signed the convention, the highest percentage of states out of any region. Six states signed in 2009–2010: DRC (18 March 2009), Nigeria (12 June 2009), Cameroon (15 December 2009), Seychelles (13 April 2010), Mauritania (19 April 2010), and Djibouti (30 July 2010).

Ten states from Sub-Saharan Africa have ratified the convention: Sierra Leone (3 December 2008), Niger (2 June 2009), Zambia (12 August 2009), Burundi (25 September 2009), Malawi (7 October 2009), Burkina Faso (16 February 2010), Seychelles (20 May 2010), Lesotho (28 May 2010), Mali (30 June 2010), and Comoros (28 July 2010).

The eight non-signatories from Sub-Saharan Africa are: Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mauritius, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Two of these non-signatories—Sudan and Swaziland—adopted the convention in Dublin in May 2008. Sudan has stated on several occasions in 2010 that it is ready to join the convention. Mauritius, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe have participated in diplomatic conferences related to the convention since December 2008.

On 25–26 March 2010, South Africa hosted a regional meeting in Pretoria to promote universalization and implementation of the convention (see Key conferences and meeting on cluster munitions section below for more details).

Americas

Twenty of the 35 states in the Americas signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Five states from the region signed the convention in 2009–2010, all from the Caribbean: Jamaica (12 June 2009), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (23 September 2009), Haiti (28 October 2009), Dominican Republic (10 November 2009), and Antigua and Barbuda (16 July 2010).

Five states from the Americas have ratified the convention: Mexico (6 May 2009), Uruguay (24 September 2009), Nicaragua (2 November 2009), Ecuador (11 May 2010), and Antigua and Barbuda (23 August 2010).

The 15 non-signatories from the Americas are: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, and Venezuela. Three of these engaged in the Oslo Process and adopted the convention in Dublin in May 2008: Argentina, Belize, and Venezuela.

On 14–15 September 2009, Chile hosted the Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean on Cluster Munitions in Santiago to promote universalization and implementation of the convention. Chile also hosted the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 7–9 June 2010 (see Key conferences and meetings on cluster munitions section below for more details).

Asia-Pacific

Twelve of the 40 states from Asia-Pacific signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. No states from the region have joined since the convention was opened for signature in December 2008.

Five states from Asia-Pacific have ratified the convention: Lao PDR (18 March 2009), Japan (14 July 2009), New Zealand (22 December 2009), Samoa (28 April 2010), and Fiji (28 May 2010).

The 28 non-signatories from the region include six states that engaged in the Oslo Process and adopted the convention in Dublin in May 2008: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu. In addition, the Marshall Islands, Nepal, and Niue subscribed to the 2008 Wellington Declaration affirming their intent to conclude the negotiation of an instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

On 16–17 November 2009, Indonesia hosted the Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Bali to promote universalization and implementation of the convention (see Key conferences and meetings on cluster munitions section below for more details).

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

Thirty-three of the 54 countries in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Cyprus was the 100th state to sign the convention on 23 September 2009, the only state from the region to join the convention since the signing conference in December 2008.

Twenty European states have ratified, accounting for about half of all ratifications: Norway (3 December 2008), Ireland (3 December 2008), the Holy See (3 December 2008), Austria (2 April 2009), Albania (16 June 2009), Spain (17 June 2009), Germany (8 July 2009), Luxembourg (10 July 2009), San Marino (10 July 2009), Croatia (17 August 2009), Slovenia (17 August 2009), Malta (24 September 2009), France (25 September 2009), FYR Macedonia (8 October 2009), Belgium (22 December 2009), Montenegro (25 January 2010), Denmark (12 February 2010), Moldova (16 February 2010), the UK (4 May 2010), and BiH (7 September 2010).

The 13 non-signatories from Europe are: Andorra, Belarus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. None of the eight states from the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) signed the convention.

Four of these non-signatories (Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and Slovakia) joined in the consensus adoption of the convention on 30 May 2008. In addition, Tajikistan subscribed to the 2008 Wellington Declaration affirming its intent to conclude the negotiation of an instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

On 25–26 June 2009, Germany hosted the Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions, which was attended by 87 countries (see Key conferences and meetings on cluster munitions section below for more details).

On 8 July 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by a vote of 558 to 30 with 24 abstentions, which urges European Union member states that have not yet signed or ratified the convention to do so as a “matter of urgency before the end of 2010.”[6]

Middle East-North Africa

Three countries from the Middle East/North Africa signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Lebanon played a prominent role in the Oslo Process and signed in Oslo on 3 December 2008. On 12 January 2009, Tunisia became the first state globally to sign after the signing conference. Iraq signed on 12 November 2009.

None of the three had ratified the convention as of 10 September 2010. However, Lebanon’s Parliament approved ratification on 17 August 2010, and it was reported that Tunisia’s Chamber of Deputies adopted a ratification bill on 10 February 2010.

Bahrain, Morocco, and Qatar were among the 107 states that adopted the convention text by consensus at the conclusion of the negotiations in May 2008. Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and Saudi Arabia also attended the negotiations, but only as observers.

Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar have made positive statements about joining the convention in the near future.

Key conferences and meetings on cluster munitions

The first international meeting to be held on cluster munitions since the December 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo took place in Berlin, Germany on 25–26 June 2009. The Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions focused on the convention’s requirements for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, but also provided the opportunity for many states to speak on their progress toward ratification, and to address other implementation issues. Representatives from 87 states that have joined the convention attended the Berlin conference, as well as non-signatory Azerbaijan.

On 14–15 September 2009, Chile hosted the Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean on Cluster Munitions, which was attended by all states from the region that have signed the convention except Honduras, and by six non-signatories (Argentina, Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela). The Dominican Republic signed the convention shortly after the conference.

Albania co-hosted an event with the CMC to promote the convention on the margins of the Tirana Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South Eastern Europe on 9 October 2009.

Indonesia hosted the Regional Conference on the Promotion and Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, held in Bali, on 16–17 November 2009. A total of 21 governments attended, including nine non-signatories: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Thailand, and Vietnam..

During the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty held in Cartagena, Colombia from 29 November–4 December 2009, several governments provided updates on their signature or ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions during the high-level segment. A special side event on the convention was held. CMC staff met with 74 campaigners to discuss their campaign priorities and actions planned for promotion of the convention in 2010.

South Africa hosted the Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Pretoria on 25–26 March 2010. A total of 33 countries attended, including nine non-signatories: Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Seychelles signed the convention shortly after participating in the conference.

Chile hosted the International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Santiago on 7–9 June 2010, which was attended by representatives from 99 countries, including 13 non-signatory states, as well as by a delegation of more than 120 CMC campaigners. The Santiago conference aimed to encourage universalization of the convention, move forward preparations for the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties, and promote implementation. Directly following the Santiago conference, the CMC held a campaigners forum to share skills and experiences.

Special events to encourage universalization of the convention were held at UN headquarters in New York on 18 March 2009 and 21 October 2009. During the March 2009 event, Lao PDR ratified the convention and DRC signed.

In September 2009, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was highlighted during the UN annual treaty event held parallel to the annual opening of the UN General Assembly. Cyprus and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines signed the convention, while Burundi, France, Malta, and Uruguay deposited their instruments of ratification.

On 1 May 2009, the CMC received the Tipperary International Peace Award at a ceremony in Ireland.

On 29 May–4 June 2009, the CMC held a Global Week of Action Against Cluster Bombs, during which campaigners in 58 countries took action to call on governments to sign and ratify the convention. A CMC email campaign targeted five non-signatories, including Nigeria, which subsequently signed the convention on 12 June 2009. On 23 April 2010, the CMC launched a 100-day countdown to entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. During the countdown, the CMC targeted a different non-signatory country each week with a range of actions aimed at encouraging these governments to join the convention without delay.

National implementation legislation

The full potential of the Convention on Cluster Munitions will be best realized by the passage of national implementation legislation by each State Party. Article 9 of the convention requires States Parties to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions….”[7] Adopting comprehensive national legislation is the strongest means of fulfilling this obligation. National legislation enshrines the convention’s provisions at the domestic level, and can tailor the key provisions to the circumstances of individual States Parties. Some states may choose to rely on national policies instead of laws, but implementation legislation is important because it provides binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules that leave less room for interpretation.

Belgium became the first country to enact national legislation banning cluster munitions in June 2006. Austria then passed ban legislation which took effect in January 2008. Legislation implementing the Convention on Cluster Munitions has since been enacted by eight states: France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and the UK.

A number of other countries, including Australia, Canada, Malawi, and Slovenia have said they are in the process of drafting, considering, or adopting national legislation. Others have indicated they intend to prepare national legislation, including Burundi, Lao PDR, Samoa, and Seychelles. Mexico is considering the need for legislation.

At least two states, Denmark and Montenegro, have indicated existing laws are sufficient to implement the convention.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Discussions on cluster munitions have been ongoing in the forum of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) for more than six years. In 2006, at the Third Review Conference of the CCW, the issue of a mandate for negotiations on cluster munitions was the central subject, but States Parties could not reach agreement on a substantive mandate for future work. With the failure of the CCW to act, Norway announced that it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions.

Largely in reaction to the Oslo Process, discussions on cluster munitions continued in the CCW during 2007–2008. While the Oslo Process talks progressed at a rapid pace to secure agreement on a treaty, CCW discussions produced little agreement on the scope or provisions of a possible future instrument. At the end of CCW deliberations in November 2008—after 107 states had adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin in May 2008 with a comprehensive and immediate ban on cluster munitions—CCW States Parties could still not even agree if they were aiming for a legally-binding instrument, much less the content of any agreement. They settled on a mandate to “negotiate a proposal” on cluster munitions in 2009.

After the signature of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, the tone of the debate shifted markedly in the CCW, with roughly two-thirds of CCW States Parties having adopted a far higher standard in the Convention on Cluster Munitions than anything under consideration in the CCW. However, a number of mainly non-signatory states showed resolve to continue the deliberations in the CCW.

States such as Brazil, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US were some of the most vocal supporters of continuing work in the CCW. However, these states showed little agreement among themselves on central provisions including the scope of a future agreement, the definition of cluster munitions which would be covered by it, or the timeframe in which any provision would take effect.

States which had signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions increasingly emphasized that at a minimum a future CCW instrument must be compatible with the Convention on Cluster Munitions and have a direct impact in addressing the humanitarian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions.

The draft text under discussion in 2009 had not changed much from 2008. The general prohibitions and restrictions would still allow the indefinite use of cluster munitions which have been proven to cause humanitarian suffering in numerous conflicts. The draft text contained many vaguely defined and optional provisions, and ambiguously worded restrictions. It contained a definition of cluster munitions which would be inconsistent with the Convention on Cluster Munitions, potentially posing a legal quandary for states intending to be bound by both instruments. The draft also contained provisions for an undefined transition period during which all existing cluster munitions could continue to be used.

At the end of discussions in 2009, CCW States Parties again engaged in a lengthy debate over the mandate for its work the following year. After considerable effort, a compromise was reached to include a mention of a “protocol” in the mandate, but only as a footnote to the mandate’s text.

At the conclusion of the CCW session in April 2010, a number of signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including Austria, Germany, Mexico, Norway, and South Africa increasingly questioned the merits of continuing the apparently futile discussions. Those nations and others such as Canada, France, Ireland, and Switzerland were strongly critical of the text for legitimizing the use of cluster munitions that have been proven to cause unacceptable humanitarian harm and for its lack of compatibility with the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Further consultations in Geneva at the end of June 2010 provided no evidence of agreement on main elements to be included in a future protocol.

Two new draft texts—strongly influenced and supported by the US—were circulated during one week of deliberations from 30 August–3 September 2010. However, the texts came under criticism from numerous supporters of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, who saw them as far too weak, and from states such as India, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and Russia who saw them as too far-reaching.

CCW States Parties will meet in November 2010 to continue their efforts to reach an agreement on cluster munitions, and, if still unsuccessful, to decide whether to extend the work into 2011.

Use of Cluster Munitions

Cluster munitions have been used during armed conflict in 39 countries and disputed territories since the end of World War II, including Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Russia (Chechnya), Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia, as well as the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.[8]

Since the convention was opened for signature in December 2008, there has been only one serious allegation regarding the use of cluster munitions. In June 2010, Amnesty International reported that the US appeared to have used at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” in Yemen on 17 December 2009. While Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is not able to independently confirm the allegation, Amnesty International offered substantial photographic evidence.[9] Neither government has confirmed or denied the claim.

At least 18 government armed forces have used cluster munitions since the end of World War II.

Summary of states using cluster munitions and locations used

User state

Locations used

Colombia

Colombia

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Eritrea

France

Chad, Iraq, Kuwait

Georgia

Georgia, possibly Abkhazia

Iraq

Iran, Iraq

Israel

Lebanon, Syria

Libya

Chad

Morocco

Western Sahara, Mauritania

Netherlands

former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

Nigeria

Sierra Leone

Russia

Chechnya, Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia

South Africa

Has admitted past use, location unknown

Sudan

Sudan

UK

Falkland Islands, Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

US

Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia), possibly Yemen

Yugoslavia (former Socialist Republic of)

Albania, BiH, Croatia


This accounting is incomplete, however, given that in several cases it is unclear which party used cluster munitions, including in Angola, Azerbaijan, DRC, Mozambique, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia.

In addition to the armed forces of states, non-state armed groups (NSAG) have used cluster munitions in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), BiH (by a Serb militia), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), and possibly in some of the locations noted above where it is unclear which party used the weapon.

Unconfirmed reports cite the use of cluster munitions in Pakistan, Slovenia, and Turkey, as well as in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.

Two signatory states have admitted using cluster munitions in the past, but have not disclosed relevant details. In January 2005, the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the South African Defence Force has manufactured and used submunitions in the past. In May 2009, during an event to destroy the last of Colombia’s stockpile of CB-250K cluster munitions, the Minister of Defense said the weapon had been used in the past to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by “illegal armed groups.” In March 2010, Colombia confirmed that its armed forces had used cluster munitions in the past, but it declined to specify the quantity or time period when they were used.

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a State Party that used cluster munitions on the territory of another State Party prior to entry into force of the convention “is strongly encouraged” to provide assistance to the other State Party including, “where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.”

Unilateral restrictions on use

A few states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed restrictions on the possible future use of cluster munitions. The US’ June 2008 cluster munition policy dictates that until 2018, the use of cluster munitions that exceed a 1% UXO rate—which includes all but a tiny fraction of the US arsenal—must be approved by a “Combatant Commander,” a very high-ranking military official. After 2018, the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% UXO.

Romania has said it restricts the use of cluster munitions to exclusively on its own territory. Poland has said it would use cluster munitions for defensive purposes only, and does not intend to use them outside its own territory. Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia have made similar declarations.

Timeline of cluster munition use

Date

Location

Known Details

1939–1945

Italy, Libya, Malta, USSR, United Kingdom, possibly other locations

Munitions similar in function to modern cluster munitions were used by Germany and the Soviet Union, and possibly other belligerent parties, during World War II.

1965–1975

Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam

According to an analysis of US bombing data by Handicap International, approximately 80,000 cluster munitions, containing 26 million submunitions, were dropped on Cambodia between 1969 and 1973; over 414,000 cluster bombs, containing at least 260 million submunitions, were dropped on Lao PDR between 1965 and 1973; and over 296,000 cluster munitions, containing nearly 97 million submunitions, were dropped in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975.

1970s

Zambia

Remnants of cluster munitions, including unexploded submunitions from air-dropped bombs, have been found at Chikumbi and Shang’ombo.

1973

Syria

Israel used air-dropped cluster munitions against NSAG training camps near Damascus.

1975–1991

Western Sahara, Mauritania

Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against an NSAG in Western Sahara. The same types of cluster munition remnants have been found in Mauritania.

1978

Lebanon

Israel used cluster munitions in south Lebanon.

1979–1989

Afghanistan

Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. NSAGs also used rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.

1982

Lebanon

Israel used cluster munitions against Syrian forces and NSAGs in Lebanon.

1982

Falkland Islands/Malvinas

UK forces dropped 107 BL-755 cluster bombs containing a total of 15,729 submunitions.

1983

Grenada

US Navy aircraft dropped 21 Rockeye bombs during close air support operations.

1983

Lebanon

US Navy aircraft dropped 12 CBU-59 and 28 Rockeye bombs against Syrian air defense units near Beirut in Lebanon.

1984–1988

Iran, Iraq

It has been reported that Iraq first used air-dropped cluster bombs in 1984.

1986

Libya

US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs in the Gulf of Sidra on March 25. On 14–15 April, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina Airfield.

1986–1987

Chad

French aircraft dropped cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions at various locations.

1988

Iran

US Navy aircraft attacked Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship using Mk.-20 Rockeye bombs during Operation Praying Mantis.

1991

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabian and US forces used artillery-delivered and air-dropped cluster munitions against Iraqi forces during the battle of Khafji.

1991

Iraq, Kuwait

The US, France, and the UK dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-
launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions were used in the conflict.

1992–1994

Angola

Deminers have found dud Soviet-made PTAB submunitions in various locations.

1992–1994

Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan

Submunition contamination has been identified in at least 162 locations in Nagorno-Karabakh. There are also reports of contamination in other parts of occupied Azerbaijan, adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh.

1992–1995

BiH

Yugoslav forces and NSAGs used cluster munitions during civil war. NATO aircraft dropped two CBU-87 bombs.

1992–1997

Tajikistan

ShOAB and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley, used by unknown forces in civil war.

1994–1996

Chechnya

Russian forces used cluster munitions against NSAGs.

1995

Croatia

On 2–3 May 1995, an NSAG used Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers to conduct attacks in the city of Zagreb. The Croatian government claims that Serb forces used BL-755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa river.

1996–1999

Sudan

Sudanese government forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions.

1997

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone has said that Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers used BLG-66 Belouga bombs on the eastern town of Kenema. ECOMOG denied these reports.

1998

Afghanistan/Sudan

In August, US ships and submarines fired 66 TLAM-D Block 3 cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, at a factory target in Khartoum, Sudan, and at NSAG training camps in Afghanistan.

1998

Ethiopia, Eritrea

Ethiopia and Eritrea exchanged aerial cluster munition strikes. Ethiopia attacked Asmara airport, and Eritrea attacked Mekele airport. Ethiopia also dropped BL-755 bombs in Gash-Barka province in Eritrea.

1998–1999

Albania

Yugoslav forces used rocket-delivered cluster munitions in disputed border areas, and NATO forces carried out six aerial cluster munition strikes.

1998–2003

DRC

Deminers have found BL-755 bombs and dud submunitions in the villages of Kasu, Katelwa, and Est Agrico in Kabalo territory.

1999

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The US, the UK, and the Netherlands dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing 295,000 submunitions in now-Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.

2001–2002

Afghanistan

The US dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions.

Unknown

Uganda

RBK-250/275 bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions have been found in the northern district of Gulu.

2003

Iraq

The US and the UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions, containing an estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions, in the three weeks of major combat.

2006

Lebanon

Israeli forces used surface-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.

2006

Israel

Hezbollah fired more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets into northern Israel.

2008

Georgia

Russian and Georgian forces both used cluster munitions during the August 2008 conflict. Submunitions found by deminers include the air-dropped AO-2.5 RTM and the rocket-delivered 9N210 and M85.

2009

Yemen

Amnesty International reported that the US apparently used at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with 166 BLU-97 submunitions to attack an alleged terrorist training camp in al-Ma’jalah on 17 December 2009.


Production of Cluster Munitions

A total of 34 states have developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions.[10] Fifteen of these states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, foreswearing any future production. Of the 19 non-signatories that have produced, it is likely that 17 continue to produce today, or expect to produce in the future. Argentina and Serbia have indicated that they do not intend to produce in the future.

The countries that have developed or produced cluster munitions are listed in the following table:

Countries that have developed or produced cluster munitions[11]

States Parties and Signatories

Australia

Japan

Belgium

Netherlands

BiH

South Africa

Chile

Spain

France

Sweden

Germany

Switzerland

Iraq

UK

Italy

 
 

Non-Signatories

Argentina

Pakistan

Brazil

Poland

China

Romania

Egypt

Russia

Greece

Serbia

India

Singapore

Iran

Slovakia

Israel

Turkey

North Korea

US

South Korea

 

Note: Italics indicate non-signatories that say they no longer produce.

In June 2010, a Turkish official informed Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor that Turkey does not produce cluster munitions. It is unclear if this simply means there is no current production, or if this is the result of a shift in policy whereby Turkey is foreswearing future production.

Several countries confirmed production in 2010 in public statements or in communications with Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor including Poland, Singapore, and South Korea.

At least three of the countries still producing cluster munitions have established standards for reliability of submunitions. In 2001, the US instituted a policy that all submunitions reaching a production decision in fiscal year 2005 and beyond must have a failure rate of less than 1%. In 2005, the Polish Ministry of Defense said that it requires a failure rate of less than 2.5% for the submunitions it purchases. South Korea issued a directive in 2008 requiring that in the future it only acquire cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms and a 1% or lower failure rate.

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is not aware of any new transfers of cluster munitions in 2009 or the first half of 2010. However, Amnesty International obtained documents indicating an April 2009 shipment of inert components for 155mm K-130 cluster munition artillery projectiles from South Korea’s Poongsan Corporation to Pakistan Ordnance Factories’ Sanjwal plant. Another set of documents revealed a shipment in February 2010 of inert components for K-310 artillery shells from Poongsan Corporation to Pakistan. According to Amnesty, both shipments were transported by UK-flagged vessels.[12]

While the true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to lack of official information, at least 15 countries have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[13]

The US has probably been the world leader in exports, having transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of unreliable and inaccurate submunitions to at least 29 countries.[14] Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 33 states. Many of them inherited cluster munition stockpiles after the dissolution of the USSR.[15]

While the full extent of Chinese exports of cluster munitions is not known, unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan. Hezbollah fired over 100 Chinese Type-81 122mm rockets with dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions into northern Israel in 2006.

Brazil, Germany, Israel, South Korea, Slovakia, and Turkey have exported cluster munitions in the past five years. Among the recipients of cluster munitions exports since 2005 are Georgia, India, Pakistan, Slovakia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

At least two states that have not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US and Singapore, have enacted export moratoriums. In December 2007, the US Congress placed a one-year moratorium on the transfer of cluster munitions unless they have a 99% or higher tested reliability rate. The legislation also required that any state receiving cluster munitions from the US must agree that those cluster munitions will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used in areas where civilians are known to be present. This export ban was extended in 2008 and 2009.

On 26 November 2008, Singapore announced that it would impose an indefinite moratorium on the export of cluster munitions with immediate effect.

In June 2010, a Turkish official told Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor that Turkey does not transfer or import cluster munitions. It is unclear if this is a new policy adopted by Turkey. According to official reports to the UN, Turkey both imported and exported cluster munitions as recently as 2007.

Global Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor estimates that a total of 86 countries possessed stockpiles of cluster munitions at some point in time. This figure has varied over recent years as new information has become available and governments have clarified whether or not they do or did possess stockpiles of cluster munitions.[16] Of the 86, a total of 38 have signed and/or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor estimates that 74 countries currently possess cluster munition stockpiles. In a highly commendable commitment to early compliance with the convention’s obligations, four States Parties (Norway, Moldova, Spain, and Belgium) and two signatories (Colombia and Portugal) have reported completion of stockpile destruction in 2009 or 2010.

In addition, in 2010 signatories Afghanistan and Angola reported they no longer had stockpiles as all had been destroyed during years of broader post-conflict disarmament programs. Signatory Uganda declared in 2009 that it had no stocks. In earlier years, signatories Australia and Honduras, and non-signatory Argentina, reported that they once had stockpiles, but destroyed them long before the start of the Oslo Process in 2007.

Of the 74 countries that currently possess cluster munition stockpiles, a total of 27 have signed and/or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

A total of 17 countries that are either States Parties or signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have disclosed that, prior to any destruction activities, they stockpiled a total of at least 1.1 million cluster munitions containing more than 146 million submunitions. The known number of cluster munitions and submunitions currently or once held by States Parties will undoubtedly grow considerably as the detailed information required by the convention’s transparency reports become available from other States Parties.

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions

States Parties

Signatories

Non-signatories

Austria

Belgium

BiH

Croatia

Denmark

France

Germany

Japan

Moldova

Montenegro

Norway

Slovenia

Spain

UK

Afghanistan

Angola

Australia

Bulgaria

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Rep. of the Congo

Czech Republic

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Honduras

Hungary

Indonesia

Iraq

Italy

Netherlands

Nigeria

Peru

Portugal

South Africa

Sweden

Switzerland

Uganda

Algeria

Argentina

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Belarus

Brazil

Cambodia

China

Cuba

Egypt

Eritrea

Estonia

Ethiopia

Finland

Georgia

Greece

India

Iran

Israel

Jordan

Kazakhstan

North Korea

South Korea

Kuwait

Libya

Mongolia

Morocco

Oman

Pakistan

Poland

Qatar

Romania

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Serbia

Singapore

Slovakia

Sudan

Syria

Thailand

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

UAE

US

Uzbekistan

Yemen

Zimbabwe

14 (10 current)

24 (17 current)

48 (47 current)

Note: Bold italics indicates no longer possesses stocks.

The vast majority of states outside of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that stockpile the weapon have not disclosed detailed information on the quantities, types, or other information.  Thus it is not possible, given what is known, to make a valid global estimate of quantities in stockpiles.

Only one other country, the US, has disclosed the size of its stockpile. As reported to its legislature in 2004, the US stockpile consisted of nearly 5.5 million cluster munitions containing nearly 730 million submunitions.

Known stockpiles of cluster munitions of States Parties and signatories prior to destruction activities

<table "=""> 

Cluster Munitions

Submunitions

States Parties

Austria

12,699

620,781–798,147

Belgium

115,975

Approximately 10.25 million

Denmark

Approximately 42,320

Approximately 2.63 million

France

Approximately 35,000

Approximately 15 million

Germany

Approximately 550,000

Approximately 50 million

Moldova

1,385

27,330

Montenegro

353

51,891

Norway

53,745

Approximately 3.3 million

Slovenia

1,080

52,920

Spain

5,560

251,876

UK

190,549

Approximately 38.76 million

Signatories

Afghanistan*

*

*

Angola

Unknown

7,215

Colombia

72

10,832

Czech Republic

67

5,377

Netherlands

Approximately 191,500

Approximately 26 million

Portugal

22

3,234

Total

At least 1.1 million

At least 146 million

* The Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan said that “about 113,196 items containing 29,559 kilograms” of old Soviet stocks of cluster munitions had been destroyed.

Destruction of stockpiles

The destruction of stockpiles of cluster munitions has accelerated since the adoption and signature of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. States Parties Spain (March 2009), Norway (July 2010), Moldova (July 2010), and Belgium (August 2010), and signatories Colombia (November 2009) and Portugal (“early” 2010) have already completed stockpile destruction.

Spain destroyed 4,724 cluster munitions with 223,261 submunitions. Norway destroyed 53,745 cluster munitions with about 3.3 million submunitions. Moldova destroyed 1,385 cluster munitions with 27,330 submunitions. Belgium destroyed 115,975 cluster munitions with 10,250,935 submunitions. Colombia destroyed 72 cluster munitions with 10,832 submunitions. Portugal destroyed 22 cluster munitions with 3,234 submunitions.

Additionally, an Angolan official said that all Angolan stocks were destroyed from 2003–2010 as part of a broader weapons disposal effort. HALO Trust reported destroying 7,215 submunitions from Angolan stocks. Similarly, Afghanistan told Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor in 2010 that in recent years it had finished destruction of old Soviet stocks of cluster munitions, along with other weapons. Uganda stated in 2009 that it did not have any stocks, but there is uncertainty about whether it stockpiled in the past and subsequently destroyed stocks. Argentina, Australia, and Honduras report that stockpiles were eliminated many years ago.

Two countries anticipate completing their stockpile destruction programs this year: Austria (November 2010) and Montenegro (“end of” 2010).

Others have projected that their destruction programs, which are already underway, will be completed well in advance of their eight-year deadline, including the UK (anticipated completion in 2013), Germany (anticipated completion in 2015), France (anticipated completion in 2016), and the Netherlands.

As of March 2010, 14 million submunitions of the UK’s original total of nearly 39 million stockpiled submunitions had been destroyed and contracts had been placed for the destruction of all remaining submunitions. As of February 2009, Germany had already destroyed approximately 30% of its stockpile.

Canada and Switzerland previously destroyed some stocks considered obsolete, and are in the process of planning further destruction. Furthermore, several other states have begun to take steps to initiate their national destruction programs, including developing inventories, budgets, and schedules. These include Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, and Slovenia.

States have not yet provided many details about the costs of stockpile destruction. Spain said it paid €4.9 million (US$6.8 million) to destroy its stocks.[17] Moldova said two donors provided a total of €111,000 ($154,679) for its stock destruction. Norway estimated it would cost about €40 ($56) per shell; it destroyed 53,000 shells, which would equate to about €2.1 million ($3 million). Other estimates for the total cost of their stockpile destruction programs include: Austria, €1 million ($1.4 million); Belgium, €3 million ($4.2 million); France, €30 million–35 million ($41.8 million–$48.8 million); and Germany, €40 million ($55.7 million).

Destruction of obsolete and beyond-shelf-life cluster munitions is a routine part of ammunition operations. For example, the US has destroyed on average 7,200 tons (7.2 million kg) of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) per year at an average annual cost of $7.1 million since 2000.

Retention of cluster munitions for training and development

The Convention on Cluster Munitions allows for the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for development of and training in detection, clearance and destruction techniques, and development of counter-measures, such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons. The number of retained cluster munitions is limited to “the minimum number absolutely necessary” for these purposes.

During the negotiations, the CMC opposed the provision allowing for retention because states did not demonstrate that any of the purposes for retaining cluster munitions and submunitions were essential enough to justify an exception to the prohibition on stockpiling. For example, to the CMC’s knowledge, no clearance organization accredited to the UN is believed to use live submunitions for training.

Given that the convention just entered into force and the first transparency reports by States Parties are not due until early 2011, it is not possible to characterize fully common state practice regarding the retention of cluster munitions.

Some States Parties and signatories that have or had stockpiles have indicated—either through statements or by destroying their entire stock—that that they will not retain any cluster munitions or submunitions, including Afghanistan, Angola, Austria, Colombia, Honduras, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, and Slovenia. Japan said it does not have a plan to retain any cluster munitions. Australia has said that it retains only representative samples of inert cluster munitions and submunitions.

Spain intends to retain 836 cluster munitions (containing 28,615 submunitions) for training and countermeasures testing purposes. France’s national implementation law permits it to retain up to 500 cluster munitions, together with their submunitions, and an additional 400 submunitions acquired outside the container. Belgium has stated that it intends to retain 300 155mm artillery shells, each with 88 DPICM submunitions, or a total of 26,400 submunitions.

Additionally, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have indicated that they will retain some amount of cluster munitions.

Some other states have expressed their views. According to Malawi, the retention of cluster munitions for training and development “should be the exception and not the rule,” and those that do retain should only keep a “very limited number.”[18] Ecuador has stated that the number of units retained for training should not be bigger than 1,000 and should decrease over time. Ghana expressed the view that states should retain only the minimum number of cluster munitions required for training purposes, which could be in the hundreds or thousands but not the tens of thousands.

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process diplomatic conferences to develop the Convention on Cluster Munitions and during the Dublin negotiations, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on some matters relating to one of the convention’s most basic and important provisions: the prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts. State Parties have an obligation under Article 1 “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”

Interoperability (Article 21)

During the negotiations, some states expressed concern about the possible impact of the Article 1 prohibition on assistance on joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention and still stockpile and reserve the right to use cluster munitions.[19] In response to these “interoperability” concerns, states agreed to the insertion of a new Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention.” This article was strongly criticized by the CMC for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 says that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. An article, which should have a unified and coherent purpose, cannot logically require discouragement of use in one paragraph and then by implication allow encouragement of that use in another.

The CMC has said that, in order to adhere to the object and purpose of the convention, “States must make it clear that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under this treaty—including use, transfer or stockpiling of cluster munitions—when engaging in joint operations with non-States Parties.”[20]

As reported in 2009,[21] some states had already articulated this view, or a similar view, including Ecuador,[22] Ghana,[23] Guatemala,[24] Iceland,[25] Lebanon,[26] and Mexico.[27] A large number of states have subsequently shared their views.

  • The Australian government stated that the prohibition on assistance “is subject to the exception contained in Article 21,” noting this provision “does not prohibit inadvertent participation in the use, or assistance in the use, of cluster munitions.”[28]
  • Belgium stated, “In the case where a State Party engages in cooperation or military operations with States non-parties, a series of guaranties are provided: the cooperation or the military operation must be in conformity with international law; each State Party must notify non-states parties of its obligations under the Convention; it must promote the norms established by the Convention and discourage non-states parties from using cluster munitions. Similarly, paragraph 4 [of Article 21] affirms the primacy of the fundamental obligations of the Convention, which cannot be derogated from, even in the framework of cooperative activities or military operations with States-non-party.”[29]
  • Colombia “absolutely rejects and prohibits…military operations with states not party to the convention in which they carry out exercises or actions prohibited by the Convention.”[30]
  • France’s national implementation law allows for participation in military operations with states not party that might engage in activities prohibited by the convention, but states that it is prohibited for any person acting in a joint military operation to use, develop, manufacture, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or transfer cluster munitions, or to use or request the use of cluster munitions, where the choice of ammunition is under their exclusive control.[31]
  • Ireland has stated, “It is Ireland’s view that any deliberate assistance in the commission of an act prohibited by the Convention in the context of military co-operation with a state not party will be inconsistent with this obligation to make its best efforts to discourage the use of cluster munitions by the latter and that Article 21(3) must be interpreted accordingly.” It also noted that the purpose of a relevant provision in its national implementation law “is not to enable assistance with prohibited acts…. Rather, this provision is intended to ensure that no person may be prosecuted for an act or omission that might otherwise constitute assistance but is unintended or inadvertent, or has only a remote or indirect relationship to the commission of a prohibited act by a state not party to the Convention.”[32]
  • Madagascar said “assistance to prohibited acts during joint military operations with non State Parties is not permitted by the Convention.”[33]
  • Malawi stated that “States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce or encourage any prohibited activity” under the convention during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions.”[34]
  • Montenegro elaborated that “participation in planning or implementation of operations, exercises or other military activities by the armed forces of Montenegro, performed in joint actions with armed forces of states not parties to the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions], undertaking in activities prohibited by the CCM, are by itself not assistance, encouragement or initiative [sic] in accordance with Article 1, par (c) of the Convention.”[35]
  • New Zealand’s national implementation legislation clarifies that mere participation in joint operations is allowed, but a member of the armed forces may not expressly request the use of cluster munitions.[36]
  • In an explanatory annex to its implementing legislation, Norway stated that “the exemption for military cooperation does not authorize states parties to engage in activities prohibited by the convention.”[37]
  • Portugal has stated that it will not use cluster munitions, “regardless of what country might be commanding military forces.”[38]
  • Slovenia will “not to participate in any military operation using cluster munitions during joint military operations with non-States Parties to the Convention.”[39]
  • The UK’s national implementation legislation contains a clause on interoperability.[40] In response to concerns that the clause could provide a loophole which would undermine the purpose of the convention and the UK’s legislation, the government responded that UK troops “would not be allowed to request use of [cluster] munitions where the choice of munitions was within their exclusive control,” but that “they could facilitate operations where [cluster munitions] might be used by a partner.”[41]

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the ban on transfer and the ban on assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as a ban on the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. It has also said that the ban on stockpiling and the ban on assistance should be seen as prohibiting the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.[42]

As reported in 2009, a number of states had already expressed the view that transit and foreign stockpiling are banned. Those making explicit statements regarding transit included Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Ghana, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, South Africa, and Zambia. The Netherlands took the view that transit is allowed so long as the cluster munitions “remain the property of the third party in question.”[43]

Those making explicit statements regarding the ban on foreign stockpiling included Bulgaria, Madagascar, Malta, and Mexico.[44]

Additional states have expressed their positions in 2009 and 2010.

  • Austria has stated that the “transit of cluster munitions across or foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on the national territory of States Parties is prohibited by the Convention…. Should a State Party to the Convention allow a foreign state to stockpile cluster munitions on its territory, this action would be in violation with the provision entailed in Article 1 paragraph c that prohibits assistance “to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.”[45] Austria’s national law banning cluster munitions specifically prohibits transit.
  • Colombia has said the government “absolutely rejects and prohibits any manner of transfer or storage of foreign cluster bombs in Colombian territory.”[46]
  • France’s national legislation does not explicitly prohibit transit. Inclusion of such a provision was rejected on the basis that “transit” is not explicitly prohibited in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and that a prohibition would be difficult to implement, especially in relation to air transit.[47] In July 2010, the Secretary of State for Defense stated that the government considers commercial transit to be included in the prohibition.[48] He said that while transit by other governments would be difficult to control, France will endeavor to prevent any state transit of cluster munitions on its territory.[49]
  • Guatemala said it “considers that the stockpiling of cluster munitions of other countries in the territory of a State Party to the Convention…is prohibited according to Article 1 of the Convention.”[50] Earlier, it said, “Even though the Convention is not explicit…Guatemala agrees that the transit of cluster munitions in the territory of the States Parties should not be permitted.”[51]
  • Macedonia told Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor in February 2010 that, having ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Macedonia now prohibits the transit of cluster munitions across its national territory.[52]
  • Malawi stated, “As well as transfer, the transit of CM [cluster munitions] is prohibited” under the convention. It also stated, “There should be no stockpiling of CM of non-State Parties on the territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party and State Parties must ensure the destruction or removal of CM of foreign states on the territory.”[53]
  • The Netherlands reiterated its view that the convention prohibits the transfer of cluster munitions, but not the “transit” of cluster munitions across the territory of States Parties, due to the necessity of balancing States Parties’ treaty obligations with alliance obligations during military operations with states not party.[54] It said that “the new treaty determines specifically that transfer refers to both physical movement as well as transfer of ownership. Transit is only physical movement, not transfer of ownership. Transit of cluster munitions over Dutch territory that remains property of allies are not subject to the provisions of the convention.”[55] The Netherlands also said it does not consider the storage of cluster munitions by states not party on the territory of States Parties to be prohibited under the convention, provided that the cluster munitions remain under the ownership of the state not party.[56]
  • Portugal stated, “It is the Portuguese view that the Convention does not unequivocally exclude the possibility of foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on, or the transit of this type of armament across, the national territory of a State Party. In the latter case, the transit could be authorized once it does not represent a transfer under the definition established in Article 2 of the Convention; in other words, only in the circumstance when the cluster munitions in transit are to remain under the control of the same non State Party that requested the passage.”[57]
  • Slovenia has said, “[I]n our view, the Convention also contains the prohibition of transit and stockpiling of cluster munitions by third countries on the territory of each State Party. Therefore, such activities are illegal and not allowed on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia.”[58]

Disinvestment

There has been a great deal of activity on the part of NGOs and financial institutions aimed at disinvestment from producers of cluster munitions. The CMC has taken the position that the convention’s prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts constitutes a prohibition on investment, direct and indirect, in production of cluster munitions.

The CMC’s Stop Explosive Investments campaign, which promotes disinvestment from cluster munition producers, was launched in London on 29 October 2009. The launch coincided with the release of the report “Worldwide investments in cluster munitions: a shared responsibility” by CMC members IKV Pax Christi and Netwerk Vlaanderen. An update of this report in April 2010 found that 146 financial institutions were investing $43 billion in producers of cluster munitions.[59] There are approximately 20 national level disinvestment campaigns, targeting both financial institutions and governments to ban investments in cluster munitions.

Financial institutions and investors have taken action to stop investment in cluster munition production in Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and elsewhere.

As reported last year, national legislation in Belgium and Ireland prohibited investment in production, and government pension funds in Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, and Sweden had withdrawn and/or banned investments in cluster munition producers. Several countries had made statements confirming that in their view, such investment is banned under the convention, including Lebanon, Mexico, and Rwanda.[60]

More recently, Luxembourg enacted national legislation with a prohibition on investment in June 2009,[61] and New Zealand did so in December 2009.[62] There have been legislative initiatives in Germany,[63] the Netherlands,[64] and Switzerland.[65]

The following countries have made statements regarding investment in cluster munition production in 2009 and 2010:

  • Colombia, in response to a question from Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, said, “Colombia prohibits investment in the production of cluster munitions.”[66]
  • France has said that its national implementation law’s prohibition on assistance bans both direct and indirect financing of cluster munition production.[67]
  • Guatemala stated that “investment in [cluster munition] production is prohibited according to Article 1 of the Convention.”[68]
  • Madagascar stated, “Since the beginning of the Oslo process, Madagascar concurs with the view that investment, of any form, in the production of cluster munitions is prohibited by the Convention.”[69]
  • Malawi has said that Article 1(c) on the prohibition of assistance “should read to prohibit investments in CM [cluster munition] producers.”[70]
  • Malta stated, “With regard to investment in the production of cluster munitions, Malta interprets Article 1(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions as prohibiting this activity. Malta believes that the assistance prohibition under Article 1(c) of the Convention precludes financing and investment in corporations linked with the production of cluster munitions.”[71]
  • Montenegro stated that it “has no plans to invest in cluster munitions.”[72]
  • The UK government has confirmed to Parliament that under the provisions of the national implementation legislation “which have been modelled upon the definitions and requirements of the convention, the direct financing of cluster munitions would be prohibited. The provision of funds directly contributing to the manufacture of these weapons would therefore become illegal.”[73]
  • Zambia has said it believes that the prohibition on assistance prohibits investment in the production of cluster munitions.[74]


    [1] The convention text was adopted by consensus by the 107 governments that were full participants in the negotiations. However, adoption does not have any legal obligation attached. Nineteen of the governments that adopted had not signed or acceded as of 1 September 2010.

    [2] A state must deposit an instrument of accession with the UN. The convention will enter into force for each individual state on the first day of the sixth month after depositing their instrument of accession.

    [3] This includes seven users (Colombia, France, Iraq, Netherlands, Nigeria, South Africa, and the UK); five exporters (Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, and the UK); 15 producers (Australia, Belgium, BiH, Chile, France, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK); and 38 stockpilers (see table in Global Stockpiles section).

    [4] Signatory states where cluster munitions have been used include: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, UK/Falkland Islands, and Zambia. Some of these states are no longer affected.

    [5] The 19 nations that adopted the convention but did not sign include: Argentina, Bahrain, Belize, Brunei, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Slovakia, Sudan, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.

    [6]The resolution calls for European Union members to sign and ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions, promote the convention to states not party, implement and provide assistance for the implementation of the convention, participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Lao PDR, and not to support a protocol within the CCW that would be incompatible with the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. European Parliament, “European Parliament resolution on the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the role of the EU,” 6 July 2010, www.europarl.europa.eu.

    [7] For recommendations of best practice in this field, see: Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Fulfilling the Ban: Guidelines for Effective National Legislation to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2010; and ICRC, “Model Law, Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,” www.icrc.org.

    [8] Some of these states are no longer thought to be contaminated, including: Albania, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia. Others are believed to have at most a small residual contamination including: Colombia, Eritrea, Grenada, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Two other states are contaminated from explosions in ammunition storage areas (Republic of the Congo and Guinea-Bissau), and still others may have contamination from firing ranges (Chile and Jordan).

    [9] See, Amnesty International, “Images of Missile and Cluster Munitions Point to US Role in Fatal Attack in Yemen,” 7 June 2010, www.amnesty.org.

    [10]As new information has become available, the list of producers has changed over time. A total of 33 states were identified in 2002 by Human Rights Watch as having developed or produced cluster munitions. Human Rights Watch, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org. Canada and Bulgaria were removed from the list, and Australia, BiH, and Japan were added; Serbia was listed instead of Yugoslavia.

    [11] In these listings, the loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

    [12] Amnesty International, “Deadly Movements: Transportation Controls in the Arms Trade Treaty,” July 2010, pp. 10–11.

    [13]At least five signatories exported cluster munitions in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, and the UK), as well as at least 10 non-signatories (Brazil, China, Egypt, Israel, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Turkey, US, and former Yugoslavia). Information about transfers of cluster munitions has increased over the years. In 2002, Human Rights Watch estimated that at least nine countries had transferred 30 different types of cluster munitions to at least 45 other countries. Human Rights Watch, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002.

    [14]The US has exported cluster munitions to: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK.

    [15] Russian/Soviet cluster munitions have been reported in the stocks of: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Moldova, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

    [16]Since 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has added Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Republic of the Congo as past or current stockpilers, and removed Mali and Sri Lanka. Human Rights Watch has been documenting the global stockpiling of cluster munitions for many years. In 2002, it identified 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions.

    [17] Average exchange rate for 2009: €1=US$1.3935. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2010.

    [18] Statement by Maj. Dan Kuwali, Director of Legal Services, Malawi Defence Force, “Promoting a Common Understanding of the Provisions of the Convention in Africa,” Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Pretoria, 25 March 2010.

    [19] This has been a much discussed topic in the context of the Mine Ban Treaty, which has a near identical provision. Most States Parties to that treaty have agreed that while joint military operations with states not party are permissible, States Parties should not: participate in planning for use of mines; train others to use mines; derive direct military benefit from others’ use of mines; agree to rules of engagement permitting use of mines; request others to use mines; or provide security or transportation for mines.

    [20] CMC, “CMC Briefing Paper on the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” www.stopclustermunitions.org. For a fuller discussion on interoperability, see Human Rights Watch, “Staying True to the Ban on Cluster Munitions: Understanding the Prohibition on Assistance in the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2009, www.hrw.org.

    [21] See Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

    [22] Ecuador stated that Article 21 should never be used to justify any derogation from the convention’s core prohibitions and the article should not be interpreted as suspending other obligations under the convention. It said the spirit of Article 21 is to promote universalization of the convention. Presentation by Ecuador, “Interpretive Statement,” Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions, Quito, 6 November 2008.

    [23] Ghana has said that States Parties must not intentionally assist other states in using cluster munitions and in other acts prohibited by the convention. CMC, “Report on the Kampala Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 29–30 September 2008, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

    [24] “Guatemala would not participate in any military operation with States that use cluster munitions.” Letter No. 136/ONU/09 from the Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the UN in Geneva, 19 March 2009.

    [25] At the adoption of the convention, Iceland stated that the convention’s provision on interoperability “should not be read as entitling states parties to avoid their specific obligations under the convention for this limited purpose.” Statement of Iceland, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008.

    [26] Lebanon wrote that the convention’s prohibition on assistance took precedence over joint operations, and that Article 21 did not “allow any assistance with prohibited acts.” Letter from Permanent Mission of Lebanon to UN in Geneva, 10 February 2009.

    [27] Mexico has stated that “deliberately providing assistance for the execution of prohibition activities” is not allowed under the convention. Letter from Amb. Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, Secretariat of Foreign Relations of Mexico, to Human Rights Watch, 4 March 2009.

    [28] Australia, “Government Response to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Report No 103 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” undated but released on 13 May 2010.

    [29] This is contained in an explanatory memorandum to the decree approving the convention adopted by the Parliament of Brussels and to the draft law in the Senate. See Parliament of Brussels, “Ontwerp van ordonnantie houdende instemming met: het Verdrag inzake clustermunitie, gedaan te Dublin op 30 mei 2008 en ondertekend te Oslo op 3 december 2008” (“Draft decree approving the Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted in Dublin on 30 May 2008 and signed in Oslo on 3 December 2008”), 13 October 2009, Legislative document A–14/1–G.Z. 2009, www.weblex.irisnet.be.

    [30] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombia, 26 March 2010.

    [31]It explicitly prohibits assistance, which was not the case under France’s implementation law for the Mine Ban Treaty. National Assembly, France, “Projet de loi tendant à l’élimination des armes à sous-munitions, Texte Adopté no. 508” (“Bill on the elimination of cluster munitions, Adopted text no. 508”), XIII Legislature, Extraordinary session of 2009–2010, 6 July 2010, Art. L. 2344-2, www.assemblee-nationale.fr.

    [32] Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland, “Note on the Measures Taken by Ireland to Implement Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 11 March 2009.

    [33] Letter from Amb. Rajemison Rakotomaharo, Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the UN in Geneva, 2 April 2010.

    [34] Statement by Maj. Dan Kuwali, Malawi Defence Force, “Promoting a Common Understanding of the Provisions of the Convention in Africa,” Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Pretoria, 25 March 2010.

    [35] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maja Boskovic, Third Secretary, Directorate for UN and Other International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Montenegro,16 April 2010.

    [36] New Zealand, Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act 2009, Public Act 2009 No. 68, 17 December 2009, sec. 10(3) and 11(6), www.legislation.govt.nz.

    [37]Excerpt from Proposition No. 4 (2008–2009) to the Storting of Norway on consent to ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, p. 23.

    [38] Email from Luis Filipe Cunha, Directorate for Security and Defense Affairs, Unit of Disarmament and Non Proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portugal, 5 July 2010.

    [39] Letter from Samuel Žbogar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Slovenia, 20 April 2010.

    [40] The clause states: “It is a defence for a person charged with an offence specified in any of paragraphs 1 to 6 of Schedule 2 [the prohibitions of the convention] to show that the person’s conduct took place in the course of, or for the purposes of, an international military operation or an international military co-operation activity.” Members in the UK House of Commons went to great lengths to seek clarification on the scope of this clause.

    [41] Statements by John Redwood and Chris Bryant, UK House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 162, www.publications.parliament.uk.

    [42] These issues have also been the subject of a decade-long discussion in the Mine Ban Treaty. All but a handful of States Parties expressing views have said that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited. See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

    [43] For sources and more details on the positions of these countries, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 24–25.

    [44] Ibid.

    [45] Letter from Amb. Alexander Marschik, Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria, 9 March 2009.

    [46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombia, 26 March 2010.

    [47]Statement by Hervé Morin, Minister of Defense, France, during the examination of the implementation bill before the Senate, 6 May 2010. Senate, France, “Séance du 6 mai 2010 (compte rendu intégral des débats)” (“Session of 6 May 2010 (verbatim report of proceedings)”), 6 May 2010, www.senat.fr.

    [48] Statement by Hubert Falco, Secretary of State for Defense, France, “Élimination des armes à sous-munitions: Discussion d’un projet de loi adopté par le Sénat” (“Elimination of weapons munitions: Discussion of a bill passed by the Senate”), XIII Legislature, Extraordinary session of 2009–2010, 6 July 2010, www.assemblee-nationale.fr.

    [49] Statements by Hubert Falco, Committee on National Defense and the Armed Forces, National Assembly, France, “Compte rendu no. 37” (“Record no. 37”), Five pm Session, 22 June 2010, www.assemblee-nationale.fr.

    [50] Letter No. 580/MRAC/2010 from the Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the UN in Geneva, 14 May 2010.

    [51] Letter No. 136/ONU/09 from the Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the UN in Geneva, 19 March 2009.

    [52]Telephone interview with Majkl Sibinovski, Head, Arms Control Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FYR Macedonia, 15 February 2010.

    [53] Statement by Maj. Dan Kuwali, Malawi Defence Force, “Promoting a Common Understanding of the Provisions of the Convention in Africa,” Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Pretoria, 25 March 2010.

    [54] Netherlands, Summary of the plenary debate on the “Approval of the Bill on the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted on 30 May 2008 in Dublin,” 30 June 2010.

    [55] M.J.M. Verhagen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and E. van Middelkoop, Minister of Defence, Netherlands, “Approval of the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted on May 30 2008 in Dublin, Note with regard to the report,” 5 March 2010, zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl.

    [56] Ibid.

    [57] Letter No. 42 from Paula Silva Cepeda, Charge d’Affaires, Portuguese Embassy, Washington, DC, 29 July 2010.

    [58] Letter from Samuel Žbogar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Slovenia, 20 April 2010.

    [59] IKV Pax Christi and Netwerk Vlaanderen, “Worldwide investments in cluster munitions: a shared responsibility,” updated April 2010, www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org/report.

    [60] For sources and for more details, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 18–19.

    [61]Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourg, “Projet de lois portant approbation de la Convention sur les armes à sous-munitions ouverte à la signature à Oslo, le 3 décembre 2008” (“Draft legislation approving the Convention on Cluster Munitions open for signature in Oslo, 3 December 2008”), No. 5981, Normal Session 2008–2009, 12 January 2009. Article 3 of this law contains a ban on investments: “All persons, businesses and corporate entities are prohibited from knowingly financing cluster munitions or explosive submunitions.”

    [62] Government of New Zealand, Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act 2009, Public Act 2009 No. 68, 17 December 2009, www.legislation.govt.nz.

    [63] A motion of the German Green Party called for a realignment of financial markets, including a ban on investments in cluster munitions. Motion tabled by Members of the German Bundestag Dr. Gerhard Schick and Dr. Hermann Ott, and the Alliance 90/Greens parliamentary group, “Antrag: Finanzmärkte ökologisch, ethisch und sozial neu ausrichten” (“Realigning financial markets according to environmental, ethical and social criteria”), 24 February 2010.

    [64]On 8 December 2009, the Dutch Parliament accepted a motion that prohibits investment in cluster munitions. However, on 31 March 2010, the Dutch Minister of Finance decided not to carry out the motion. See J.C. de Jager, Minister of Finance, and J.P.H. Donner, Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, “Government position on the motion regarding cluster munitions,” 31 March 2010, Reference: FM/2010/3898 M. In May 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided an explanation for the refusal to implement the motion, saying that the convention applies only to States Parties and not to individuals or private institutions.

    [65] The Swiss National Council passed a motion to prohibit financial support for the production of all banned weapons on 10 March 2010, and the Swiss Council of States approved the motion on 17 June 2010. Motion by Maury Pasquier, Member of Parliament, Switzerland, “Against the financing of prohibited weapons,” Council of States, No. 09.3618, 11 June 2009, www.parlament.ch.

    [66] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombia, 26 March 2010.

    [67] Statement by Hubert Falco, “Élimination des armes à sous-munitions: Discussion d’un projet de loi adopté par le Sénat” (“Elimination of weapons munitions: Discussion of a bill passed by the Senate”), XIII Legislature, Extraordinary session of 2009–2010, 6 July 2010, www.assemblee-nationale.fr. See also, statements by Hubert Falco, Committee on National Defense and the Armed Forces, National Assembly, French Republic, “Compte rendu no. 37” (“Record no. 37”), Five pm Session, 22 June 2010, www.assemblee-nationale.fr.

    [68] Letter No. 580/MRAC/2010 from the Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the UN in Geneva, 14 May 2010.

    [69] Letter from Amb. Rajemison Rakotomaharo, Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the UN in Geneva, 2 April 2010.

    [70] Statement by Maj. Dan Kuwali, Malawi Defence Force, “Promoting a Common Understanding of the Provisions of the Convention in Africa,” Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Pretoria, 25 March 2010.

    [71] Email from Mariella Grech, Counsellor, Global Issue Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malta, to Handicap International France, 26 April 2010.

    [72] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maja Boskovic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Montenegro, 16 April 2010.

    [73] Statement by Chris Bryant, UK House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 7 December 2009), Column 2WS, www.publications.parliament.uk.

    [74] Statement by Sheila Mweemba, Director, Zambian Anti-Personnel Mine Action Centre, National Committee on Anti-Personnel Landmines Meeting, Lusaka, 11 September 2009. Notes by Zambia Campaign to Ban Landmines.